THE PROEMIA TO LOGIC

A knowledge of its end or purpose is the beginning of understanding logic. The end of logic is to help reason order three of its own acts and thereby perfect them. These three acts can be called understanding what a thing is, understanding the true or the false, and reasoning. These are clearly acts of looking reason whose end is to know or understand, and not acts of practical reason ordered to doing (such as to command and to entreat). These three acts of looking reason can also be distinguished from the acts of reason ordered to knowing how much or how many (such as counting, measuring and calculating). Logic is the tool of the man who wonders what and why.

Thomas Aquinas has written two proemia to logic, one at the beginning of his commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias*, and the second at the beginning of his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics.* Since the second is more complete, we will name it the *major* proemium and the first, the *minor* proemium. Both divide logic by the distinction of three acts of reason begun by Aristotle in the third book *About the Soul*. In both, Thomas distinguishes the books in logic, which have come down to us from the Father of logic, as they correspond to these three acts, but only in the second does he subdivide the books pertaining to the third act

Let us start by looking at the two proemia in my English translation.

THOMAS AQUINAS: MINOR PROEMIUM TO LOGIC

As the Philosopher says in the third book *On the Soul*, the operation of the understanding is twofold: one which is called the understanding of indivisibles by which the understanding grasps the nature of each thing in itself; and the other is the operation of the understanding putting together and dividing. There is added however a third operation of reasoning by which reason proceeds from the known to an investigation of the unknown.

The first of these operations is ordered to the second because there cannot be a putting together and division except of simples grasped. The second however is ordered to the third because it is necessary that from some known truth to which the understanding assents, one proceeds to getting certitude about something unknown.

Since however Logic is called the science of reason, it is necessary that its consideration be about those things which pertain to the aforesaid three operations of reason.

Aristotle therefore determines in the book of the *Categories* about those things which pertain to the first operation of the understanding; that is, about those things which are conceived by a simple understanding. The Philosopher determines about those things which pertain to the second operation; namely, about affirmative and negative statements in the book called *Peri Hermeneias*. He determines about those things which pertain to the third operation in the book of the *Prior Analytics* and those following it, in which are taken up the syllogism simply and the diverse species of syllogism and argument.

And therefore by the foresaid order of the three operations, the book of the *Categories* is ordered to the book *Peri Hermeneias* which is ordered to the book of the *Prior Analytics* and the following ones.

THOMAS AQUINAS: MAJOR PROEMIUM TO LOGIC

As Aristotle says in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, the human race lives by art and reasonings: in which the Philosopher seems to touch upon a certain property of man by which he differs from the other animals. For other animals are led by some natural instinct to their acts; man however is directed by the judgment of reason in his acts. And hence it is that diverse arts serve to perfect human acts easily and orderly. For art seems to be nothing other that a certain ordering by reason of how human acts can arrive at a suitable end through determined means.

Reason however is not only able to direct our lesser parts, but also directs its own act. For this is a property of the understanding part, that it reflects upon itself; for the understanding understands itself, and likewise reason is able to reason about its own act. If therefore from this, that reason reasons about the act of the hand, there has been found the art of building or of metal-working through which man is able to perform acts of these kinds easily and orderly; for the same reason, some art is necessary which directs the act of reason itself, by which man can proceed in the very act of reason orderly, easily and without error.

And this art is Logic, that is rational science, which is rational not only from this that it is according to reason (which is common to all arts), but also from this that it is about the very act of reason as its own matter. And therefore it seems to be the art of arts because it directs us in the act of reason from which all the arts proceed.

It is necessary therefore to take the parts of logic according to the diversity of the acts of reason. There are however three acts of reason of which the first two are of reason according as it is a certain understanding.

One act of understanding is the understanding of the indivisible or incomplex, by which it conceives what a thing is. And this operation is called by some the forming of the understanding or imagination through the understanding. And to this operation of reason is ordered the teaching which Aristotle gives in the book of the *Categories*.

The second operation of understanding is the composition or division of the understanding, in which there is now the true or the false. And for this act of reason serves the teaching which Aristotle gives in the book the *Peri Hermeneias*.

The third act of reason is according to that which is characteristic of reason, namely to go from one thing to another, so that through what is known it might come to a knowledge of the unknown. And the rest of the books of logic serve this act.

It should be noted however that the acts of reason are like, to some extent, the acts of nature. Whence also art imitates nature as far as it can. In the acts of nature, however, there is found a three-fold diversity. For in some things nature acts out of necessity, so that it is not able to fail. In some things nature operates for the most part although sometimes it can fall short of its proper act. Whence in these there is necessarily a twofold act: one which is for the most part, as when a perfect animal is generated from a seed; and another when nature falls short of what is suitable to it, as when from seed is generated something defective because of the corruption of some principle.

And these three are also found in the acts of reason. For there is a proceeding of reason bringing in necessity, in which a defect of truth is not possible. And through such a proceeding of reason is acquired the certitude of knowledge. There is however another proceeding of reason in which the true is for the most part concluded, not however having necessity. The third proceeding of reason however is that in which reason departs from the true because of the defect of some principle that should have been observed in reasoning.

The part of logic which serves the first proceeding is called the judging part in that judgment is with the certitude of knowledge; and because there cannot be a judgment about effects except by resolving to first principles, therefore this part is called analytic, that is resolving. The certitude of judgment, however, which is obtained by resolution, is either from the very form of the syllogism only and to this is ordered the book of the *Prior Analytics*, which is about the syllogism simply; or also with this from the matter, because per se and necessary propositions are taken and to this is ordered the book of the *Posterior Analytics*, which is about the demonstrative syllogism.

Another part of logic, which is called the finding part, serves the second proceeding of reason. For finding is not always with certitude. Whence judgment is required about those things which have been found in order that certitude may be had. Moreover, just as in natural things which are done for the most part a certain gradation can be noted (because the stronger the power of nature, the more rarely it fails in its effect), so also in the proceeding of reason which is not with complete certitude, some gradation is found as it approaches more and less to perfect certitude.

For sometimes through a process of this kind, although certain knowledge does not come to be, nevertheless belief or opinion

comes to be because of the probability of the propositions from which it proceeds; for reason wholly inclines to one part of a contradiction although with fear of the other. And to this is ordered the *Topics* or Dialectic for the dialectical syllogism is from probable opinions which Aristotle considers in the book of the *Topics*.

Sometimes belief or opinion does not come to be completely but a suspicion, because reason does not wholly incline to one part of a contradiction although it is more inclined to this part than to that. And to this is ordered the *Rhetoric*.

Sometimes only estimation inclines to some part of a contradiction because of some representation, in the way in which a man comes to detest some food if it is represented to him under the likeness of something detestable. And to this is ordered the *Poetics;* for it belongs to the poet to lead into something virtuous through a suitable representation.

All of these pertain to rational philosophy; for it belongs to reason to lead from one thing of another.

The part of logic which is called Sophistic serves the third proceeding of reason, which Aristotle considers in the book of the *Refutations*.

It should be noted that Thomas uses the word *judgment* in speaking of the third act of reason. In many scholastic works on logic, this word is used in describing the second act. Thomas explains why this word is used more in the third act than in the second:

Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate,* Q. 15, Art. 1, Ad 4:

> iudicare non est proprium rationis, per quod ab intellectu distingui possit, quia etiam intellectus iudicat hoc esse verum, illud falsum.
>
> Sed pro tanto iudicium rationi attribuitur, et comprehensio intelligentiae, quia iudicium in nobis ut communiter fit per resolutionem in principia, simplex autem comprehensio per intellectum.

Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate,* Q. 15, Art. 1, Ad 4:

> To judge is not something private to reason by which it can be distinguished from the understanding because the understanding also judges this to be true and that false.
>
> But judgment is attributed to reason to some extent and grasping to the understanding because judgment in us commonly comes to be by resolution to beginnings, but simple grasping by the understanding.

Thomas casts some further light on the connection and order of these three acts of reason in the following two passages by considering that order in the light of action or motion depending upon some form and upon something immobile:

Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Responsio:

> Unumquodque autem agit secundum exigentiam suae formae quae est principium agendi et regula operis.
>
> ...Unde...intellectus formatus per quidditates rerum ex hoc dirigitur in cognitione principiorum, quae scitis terminis

cognoscuntur, et ulterius in cognitionibus conclusionum quae notae fiunt ex principiis...

Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Responsio:

Each thing acts according to the requirement of its form which is the origin of its acting and the rule of its work.

Whence the understanding formed by the what-it-is of things is directed from this to a knowledge of the beginnings [premises] which are known when their terms are known, and further to a knowledge of conclusions which become known from the beginnings [premises].

Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVII, Quaest. I, Art. III, Responsio:

In omnibus autem hoc invenitur quod motus procedit a primo immobili quieto. Quod quidem patet in naturalibus; quia primum movens in quolibet genere est non motum illo genere motus, sicut primum alterans est non alteratum.

Similiter patet in intellectualibus; quia motus rationis discurrentis procedit a principiis et quidditatibus rerum, quibus intellectus informatus terminatur.

Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVII, Quaest. I, Art. III, Responsio:

In all things it is found that motion proceeds from a first immobile at rest. This is clear in natural things because the first mover in every genus is not moved by that kind of motion, as the first altering is not altered.

> Likewise, it is clear in things of the understanding because the motion of reason discoursing proceeds from beginnings and the what-it-is of things by which the formed understanding is determined.

It is because of the connection and order of these three acts that the direction of all of them reasonably belongs to one science.

Although Thomas has said that these three acts are logic's own matter, it must not be thought that these three acts are the very subjects considered in logic. But before we can see this, we must take up another question: how does reason order its own acts or thinking?

Thomas gives us the beginning of an answer to this question in his Proemium to the *Nicomachean Ethics,* where he divides reason's knowledge by the order it considers. Starting from the connection between reason and order, he distinguishes order in comparison to reason and then divides reason's knowledge by the order it considers. We learn where logic is in this division and that logic is about the order made by reason in our thinking when we order our thoughts and the vocal sounds that signify those thoughts.

THOMAS AQUINAS, PROEMIUM TO THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, it belongs to the wise to order. The reason for this is that wisdom is

the greatest perfection of reason whose property it is to know order. For, although the sense powers know some things absolutely, to know the order of one thing to another belongs only to understanding or reason.

But a twofold order is found in things. One is of the parts of some whole or some multitude to each other, as the parts of a house are ordered to each other. The other is the order of things to their end. And this order is more the chief one than the first. For, as the Philosopher says in the XII book of the *Metaphysics*, the order of the parts of an army to each other is because of the order of the whole army to its leader.

Order however is compared to reason in four ways:

> There is an order which reason does not make, but only considers, as is the order of natural things.
>
> There is also an order which reason by considering makes in its own act, as when it orders its thoughts to each other, and the signs of thoughts which are signifying vocal sounds.
>
> There is moreover a third order which reason by considering makes in the acts of the will.
>
> And there is a fourth order which reason by considering makes in exterior things of which it is the cause, such as a box or a house.

And because the consideration of reason is perfected by the firm disposition of knowledge, there are diverse forms of knowledge according to the diverse orders which reason properly considers.

For the consideration of the order of things which human reason considers but does not make belongs to natural philosophy; thus that with natural philosophy, we also include metaphysics.

The order however which reason by considering makes in its own act belongs to rational philosophy which considers the order of the parts of a speech to each other and the order of beginnings to conclusions.

But the order of voluntary acts belongs to the consideration of moral philosophy

And the order which reason by considering makes in exterior things constructed by human reason belongs to the mechanical arts.

Thomas points out that reason orders its own thinking *by ordering its own thoughts and the vocal sounds or words which signify those thoughts.*

And in the second reference to logic in the above text, Thomas seems to emphasize that logic is immediately about the order in the speech signifying our thoughts. Indeed, there is evidence that Aristotle's books in logic are about the speeches and names used to order our thoughts and, consequently, our thinking. *Speech* in logic means vocal sound signifying by human agreement, having parts that signify by themselves. (Every speech is composed ultimately of names. A name is vocal sound signifying by human agreement, no part of which signifies by itself.)

But what are the speeches by which reason orders its thoughts and, consequently, its thinking?

In the following passage, Thomas points out the speeches formed in the first two acts of reason:

Thomas Aquinas, *In I Super Ioannem*, Lect 1, n. 25:

> Intellectus autem duo format, secundum duas eius operationes. Nam secundum operationem suam, quae dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia, format definitionem; secundum vero operationem suam, qua componit et dividit, format enunciationem, vel aliquid huiusmodi

Thomas Aquinas, *In I Super Ioannem*, Lect 1, n. 25:

> The understanding however forms two things by two of its operations. For by its operation which is called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; by its operation in which it composes and divides, it forms a statement or something of this kind.

Definition of a thing helps reason to understand what that thing is. And in statements, reason understands the true or the false.

Thomas points out, as Aristotle did before him, that truth and falsity are found in the second act and the statement, and not in the first:

Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum,* Q. V. Art I, Ad 7:

> veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione, et in signo ejus quod est enuntiatio, et non in primo, vel signo eius quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid.

Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum,* Q. V. Art I, Ad 7:

> truth and falsity are properly found in the second operation, and in its sign which is the statement, and not in the first, or its sign which is definition, except in some qualified way.

In another text, Thomas repeats the connection of definition with the first act and statement with the second act and adds the speech corresponding to the third act:

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2)

> sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secunda, enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio.

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2:

> just as in exterior acts one can consider the operation and the work, as the act of building and the built, so also in the works of reason one can consider the act itself of reason which is to understand and to reason and something constituted by an act of this kind; which, in looking reason, first is definition; second statement; and third, syllogism or argument.

But there is another text of Thomas, in which he gives the subjects of logic for the three acts as syllogism, statement and predicate or said of:

Thomas Aquinas, *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lectio XX, n. 171:

> Sciendum tamen est quod alia ratione dialectica est de communibus et logica et philosophia prima. Philosophia enim prima est de communibus, quia eius consideratio est circa ipsas res communes, scilicet circa ens et partes et passiones entis. Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica autem est de operationibus rationis; logica etiam erit de his quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de *intentionibus* rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent. Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subiectis. Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, *syllogismum, enunciationem, praedicatum*, aut aliquid huiusmodi.

Thomas Aquinas, *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lectio XX, n. 171:

> It should be known that for another reason dialectic and logic and first philosophy are about what is common. For first philosophy is about the common because its consideration is about the common things themselves, to wit, about being and the parts and passions of being. And because reason is employed about all that is in things while logic is about the acts of reason; logic also will be about what is common to all things, that is about the intentions of reason, which are related to all things. But not thus that logic is about the common things as subjects. For logic considers as subjects, *syllogism, statement, predicate*, or something of this kind.

The syllogism is of course the chief subject of the logic of the third act of reason. And the enunciation or statement is the chief subject

of the logic of the second act. But instead of saying *definition* for the first act, Thomas says *predicate or said of*.

Does Thomas think that the subject of the logic of the first act of reason is not definition (as it would seem to be for definition is to the first act as statement and syllogism are to the second and third acts of which they are the subjects)? Or is he merely thinking of the books which have come down to us from the Father of logic where the *Categories* is the only book in the logic of the first act? *Praedicatum,* or what is said of many things, fits the book called the *Categories* and also Porphyry's *Isagoge* or introduction to the *Categories.* And this is reflected in the Latin names for the matter of these two books, one of which is called the *praedicabilia* and the other the *praedicamenta*.

It is difficult to deny the relevance of definition to the first act of reason for it is definition that enables us to understand distinctly what a thing is. And since the name of the defined is a name said of many things (for we define the universal, such as man or square, and not the singular as Socrates or this individual square) and each of the names in the definition is a name said of even more things, the consideration of the predicate which is a name said of many things is ordered to a consideration of definition and the defined.

Although it is surely not wrong to consider definition in the logic of the first act, Aristotle may have thought the consideration of definition in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics* and the help given to defining by the tools of dialectic and the places for all the problems in the books *About Places* (mistranslated often as the *Topics*) was sufficient.

Further, as we said earlier, logic is the tool of the man who wonders what and why. Hence, in some ways the second book of the *Posterior Analytics* is closest to this end. For there Aristotle

considers the questions what and why, how they are both answered fully by a knowledge of causes, the many connections between definition and demonstration by which those questions are answered, and how definitions and demonstrations can be made. Definition is a beginning of syllogism and especially of demonstration.

Moreover, the emphasis on predicate (or what is said of) and therefore on predication (or being said of) is most appropriate to the way logic proceeds. In wisdom, Aristotle sometimes uses logic and natural philosophy to show something. And Thomas contrasts these two ways of proceeding by saying that the logic proceeds *per viam praedicationis* and natural philosophy, *per viam motus.*

Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Metaphysicorum,* Lectio II, nn. 1287-1289:

> Attamen diversitatem materiae ab omnibus formis non probat Philosophus per viam motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis philosophiae, sed per viam praedicationis, quae est propria Logicae, quam in quarto huius dicit affinem esse huic scientiae.
>
> But the Philosopher does not prove the diversity of matter from all forms by way of motion, which proof is by way of natural philosophy, but by the way of being said of, which is appropriate to logic, which he said (in the fourth book) was akin to this science.

This also enables us to separate proceeding in the way belonging to logic from the way of proceeding in wisdom:

Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVII, n. 1658:

> Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei. Unde quicquid respondetur ad quid est, dicit

> pertinere ad quod quid est; sive illud sit intrinsecum, ut materia et forma; sive sit extrinsecum, ut agens et finis. Sed Philosophus qui existentiam quaerit rerum, finem vel agentem, cum sint extrinseca, non comprehendit sub quod quid erat esse. Unde si dicamus, domus est aliquid prohibens a frigore et caumate, logice loquendo significatur quod quid erat esse, non autem secundum considerationem Philosophi.
>
> The logician considers the way of being said of, and not the existence of the thing. Whence whatever is answered to the question what is it, is said to pertain to the what it is; whether that is inward, as matter and form, or outward, as the agent or end. But the Philosopher, who seeks the existence of things, does not put the end or agent under what-was-to-be since they are outward. Whence, if we say a house is something to keep out the cold and the hot, speaking logically the what was to be is signified, but not according to the consideration of the Philosopher.

As one goes through logic, one sees how fundamental it is to consider what is said of something and the way it is said of something.

THE PLACE OF LOGIC IN THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy is sometimes divided into two parts and sometimes into three.

If we divide it into two, it is divided into its two chief parts, which are theoretical or looking philosophy and practical philosophy. Hence, when Lady Wisdom appears to Boethius in the *Consolation of*

Philosophy, she has on her dress the Greek letters naming these two parts. These differ by their end. The end of looking philosophy, as its name indicates, is to see or understand. And the end of practical philosophy, as its name also indicates, is to do well. This is like the use we make of our eyes, sometimes just to see something beautiful, and at other times, to do something like walking or driving.

But sometimes philosophy is divided into three parts where we add to the two chief parts, a third part which is the *tool* of philosophy. Logic is a tool for acquiring philosophy rather than a chief or principal part of philosophy.

But if we divide philosophy into only two parts (looking and practical), logic would be more reduced to looking philosophy, as Thomas explains in this text:

Thomas Aquinas, *In Boetii de Trinitate*, Lectio II, Q. I, Art. 1, Ad 2:

> ...scientiae speculativae, ut patet in principio *Metaphysicorum*, sunt de illis quorum cognitio quaeritur propter seipsa. Res autem de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propter seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias. Et ideo logica non continetur sub philosophia speculativa quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quoddam reductum ad eam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et definitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in speculativis scientiis indigemus. Unde secundum Boetium in *Comment. super Porphyrium* (L. 1, cap. 3) non tam est scientia quam scientiae instrumentum.
>
> [adminiculum: I a prop, a support, *the pole on which the vine is trained* I Transf. aid help]

Thomas Aquinas, *In Boetii de Trinitate*, Lect. II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2:

> Looking sciences, as is clear in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, are about things the knowledge of which is sought for its own sake. The things however which logic is about, are not sought to be known for themselves, but as a help to the other sciences. And therefore logic is not contained under looking philosophy as a principal part, but as something reduced to it; insofar as it provides looking with its tools, namely syllogisms and definitions and others of this kind which we need in the looking sciences. Whence according to Boethius in his *Commentary on Porphyry*, it is not so much a science as the tool of science.

Sometimes logic is placed among the liberal arts and in this consideration we can also see its connection more with looking philosophy than practical philosophy.

The distinction of the seven liberal arts into the quadrivium and the trivium goes back to Pythagoras (who divided the four mathematical sciences of the quadrivium) and Plato (who was distinguishing the trivium). The distinction of the seven and their place in education was formalized in the Middle Ages (hence, their Latin names). In the following text, Thomas explains why they are called liberal arts and their place and that of logic in particular at the beginning of philosophy.

Thomas Aquinas, *In Boetii de Trinitate*, Lect. II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3:

> Ad tertium dicendum quod septem liberales artes non sufficienter dividunt philosophiam theoricam, sed ideo, ut dicit Hugo de Sancto Victore in III sui Didascalicon, praetermissis quibusdam aliis septem connumerantur, quia his primum erudiebantur, qui philosophiam discere volebant, et ideo distinguuntur in trivium et quadrivium, eo quod his quasi

quibusdam viis vivax animus ad secreta philosophiae introeat. Et hoc etiam consonat verbis Philosophi qui dicit in II Metaphysicae quod modus scientiae debet quaeri ante scientias; et Commentator ibidem dicit quod logicam, quae docet modum omnium scientiarum, debet quis addiscere ante omnes alias scientias, ad quam pertinet trivium. Dicit etiam in VI Ethicorum quod mathematica potest sciri a pueris, non autem physica, quae experimentum requirit. Et sic datur intelligi quod post logicam consequenter debet mathematica addisci, ad quam pertinet quadrivium; et ita his quasi quibusdam viis praeparatur animus ad alias philosophicas disciplinas.

Vel ideo hae inter ceteras scientias artes dicuntur, quia non solum habent cognitionem, sed opus aliquod, quod est immediate ipsius rationis, ut constructionem syllogismi vel orationem formare, numerare, mensurare, melodias formare et cursus siderum computare. Aliae vero scientiae vel non habent opus, sed cognitionem tantum, sicut scientia divina et naturalis; unde nomen artis habere non possunt, cum ars dicatur ratio factiva, ut dicitur in VI Metaphysicae. Vel habent opus corporale, sicut medicina, alchimia et aliae huiusmodi. Unde non possunt dici artes liberales, quia sunt hominis huiusmodi actus ex parte illa, qua non est liber, scilicet ex parte corporis.

Thomas Aquinas, *In Boetii de Trinitate*, Lect. II, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3:

To the third it should be said that the seven liberal arts do not sufficiently divide looking philosophy, but rather, as Hugo of St. Victor says in the third book of his *Didascalicon*, seven are numbered (setting aside some others) because those who wish to learn philosophy are first instructed in these, and therefore they are distinguished into the trivium and the quadrivium, in that through these as by certain roads the lively soul enters into the secrets of philosophy. And this also fits with the words

of the Philosopher who says in the second book of the *Metaphysics* that the mode of science ought to be sought before the sciences; and the Commentator there says that one ought to learn logic that teaches the common mode of all the sciences and to which pertains the trivium, before all the other sciences. And he [Aristotle] says also in the sixth book of the *Ethics* that mathematics is able to known by boys. But not natural science which requires experience. And thus is given to be understood that after logic one ought to learn mathematics to which pertains the quadrivium; and thus by these as by certain roads the soul is prepared for the other philosophic disciplines.

Or rather, these among the other sciences, are called arts, because they not only have knowledge, but some work that is immediately of reason itself, as the construction of a syllogism or to form a speech, to number, to measure, to form melodies, and to compute the course of the stars. But other sciences either do not have a work but knowledge only, as divine and natural science (whence they cannot have the name of art since art is called making reason, as is said in the *N. Ethics*, VI.) or they have a bodily work, as medicine, chemistry and others of this kind. Whence they cannot be called *liberal* arts, because acts of this kind belong to man by that part in which he is not free, namely the bodily part.

FOREWORD TO THE *CATEGORIES*

A complete foreword to a book should consider its matter, end, form and author.

THE MATTER OF THE *CATEGORIES*

The title of Aristotle's book, the *Categories,* comes from the Greek word used in the courtroom in accusing someone of some crime. The accuser tries to show that something bad can truly be said of the accused: he is a murderer, or a thief, or something else. When the word was carried over to logic, it kept the general sense of something *said of*, what is called a *predicate* in Latin. But something is always said of something. The *Categories* is about something said of something. But what is being said of what?

The *Categories* is about *names said of things.* A name, however, is a vocal sound that signifies by human agreement. What do the names said of things in the *Categories* signify? And are they names said of one thing or of many things?

The *Categories* is about names said of *many* things, signifying the same *what it is* in each of them.

A name said of many things, signifying one and the same nature or *what it is* in them is either a genus or a species, as we learn in the *Isagoge* of Porphyry. Hence, the *Categories* is about genera and species.

But the *Categories* is about such names when said without the intertwining of them in a statement or any other speech and without the intertwining of more than one thing in their meaning. If the meaning of *chair* intertwines some kind of matter (such as wood) and a shape, the *Categories* is not about such names. For matter and shape are not the same kind of thing in particular or, even in general.

THE END OF THE *CATEGORIES*

The aim of the *Categories* is to begin the distinction and order of these names under the ten highest genera.

The logician can *begin* the distinction and order of these names under the ten highest genera. For the ten genera can be distinguished by diverse ways in which something can be *said of* individual substances and logic is about the ways of being said of. And to distinguish and order are acts of reason. (Hence, Shakespeare defined reason by *looking before and after)*. But the completion of the distinction and order of species under genera is a work of the other forms of reasoned out understanding.

The immediate end of the *Categories* is useful for a further end which is definition. The *Categories* is useful for definition in two ways. In giving the highest genera, it begins our knowledge of the first part of the definitions of things which is their genus. And in distinguishing between substance and accident, it gives us a beginning for distinguishing between two kinds of definitions of things. For some things are defined by themselves like substances and there we have the first sense of definition. And other things must be defined like accidents are defined. Since they are something of another thing, they must be so defined. And this is definition in another and lesser sense.

THE FORM OF THE *CATEGORIES*

The form of the *Categories*, as that of any book, is twofold. One is the division and order of the book. The other is how it considers its matter in order to achieve its end.

The *Categories* is divided into three parts. These, using the Latin word for *categories*, are usually called the ante-predicaments (chapters one through four), the predicaments (chapters five through nine) and the post-predicaments (chapters ten through fifteen).

In the ante-predicaments, we learn what is to be divided according to the ten genera (chapter one and the division *of those said* in chapter two), how they can be divided according to the ten genera and how the latter can be distinguished (the division *of beings* in chapter two and the rules of praedicamental order in chapter three), and the distinction of the ten genera (chapter four).

In the predicaments, we learn about substance (chapter five), the three genera of accidents denominating substance intrinsically (chapters six through eight) and very briefly about the six genera of accidents denominating substance extrinsically.

In the post-predicaments, we learn how species and genera can be distinguished by opposites and placed before, or together with, other species and genera where they belong under the ten genera (chapters ten through thirteen). Then, we learn how motion and change can be led back to the genera (chapter fourteen), and how accidents are led back to substance which has them. (Chapter fifteen).

As regards how the matter is considered to achieve the end, it should be known that logic has a remote foundation in things and a proximate foundation in reason. Thus the natures of things are the formal beginning of all that is placed under the ten genera of things and form is the only kind of cause central to this work. (Hence, the logician does not define the continuous in the way that the natural philosopher does.) But as the logician considers things insofar as they are in reason and (as Boethius says) a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood, and from universality come predicability, the logician especially considers how names are said of something. As the natural philosopher proceeds *per viam motus*, so the logician proceeds *per viam praedicationis*. Hence, the name of this work also touches upon how it proceeds.

THE AUTHOR OF THE *CATEGORIES*

The author of this book is The Philosopher and the Father of Logic, Aristotle, the student of Plato and the teacher of Thomas Aquinas.

DUANE H. BERQUIST

A PROEMIUM TO THE *CATEGORIES*

Reason knows things in a confused way before distinctly and, therefore, in general before in particular. We must follow this road in coming to know what the *Categories* is about.

The *Categories* in general is about *the distinction and order of names signifying things through thoughts*.

But we must say more precisely and in particular what it is about, determining more each part of what has been said in general.

It is about names signifying things, but we can say more precisely that it is about names signifying *what things are*. Hence, it is about the distinction and order of genera and species for these names signify what things are. A genus signifies what one general kind of thing is and a species signifies what one particular kind of thing is under that general kind of thing. *Animal*, for example, signifies what one general kind of thing is and *dog* signifies what is one particular kind of thing under animal. Hence, the *Categories* is about the distinction and order of genera and species

Names signifying *what it is* in things sensed or imagined are names said of many things. Both genera and species are names said of many things. But taken strictly, they are names said of many things with the *same* thought in mind of what they are.

Thus, the *Categories* is about *names said of many things with the same thought in mind of what they are.*

It is about the distinction and order of such names. We can distinguish such names from other names and from each other. And we can discover their order to other names and to each other.

We distinguish names placed upon things (such as *man, seven*, *courage*) from names placed upon names (such as *genus, species, noun, verb*) or names placed upon speeches (such as *definition, statement, syllogism*). We can also distinguish them from names placed upon many

things *not* signifying what they are and from names placed upon many things with *other* thoughts or meanings in mind.

We place names upon things before we place names upon names. And we place names upon things before we place names in speeches, such as in definitions or in statements or in syllogisms. Thus, in two senses, the *Categories* is about the *first* placing of names.

But in the *Categories*, Aristotle brings out the distinction and order of the names of the genera and species of things. The distinction of the names of the highest genera of things (the genera which are not species) is before other distinctions. The second distinction is that of the names of what are placed under one of these highest genera.

The highest genera are distinguished by how a name can be said of individual or first substances. The *Categories* is about names said either univocally or denominatively of individual substances. It is about the distinction of such names into ten genera by what they signify when said of individual substances.

Names are said of individual substances, such as Socrates or Lassie, either univocally, signifying what it is (as the names *man, dog, animal* etc.), or denominatively, signifying how much it is, or how it is, or how it is toward something, or where it is, or when it is, or how it is laid out, or how it is outfitted, or its acting upon (another) or its undergoing (from another).

Names said denominatively of individual substances can also be said univocally of the species placed under them.

Hence, the names considered in the *Categories* are ordered in two ways. One is from individual substances and the other is from each highest genus. Beginning from individual substances, we can order the names by how they are said of individual substances. And beginning from each highest genus, we can order the names of genera and the species under them. These two orders are of the names considered in the *Categories* among themselves.

Since we are said to place the less universal *under* the more universal, we might call the ordering of species under their highest genera

the *vertical* ordering of these names. And the ordering of them from individual substances could be called in contrast their *horizontal* ordering.

The above fits the first and second parts of the *Categories* (what the Latin tradition calls the *ante-predicaments* and the *predicaments*). But the third part (what the Latin tradition calls the *post-predicaments*) is about names equivocal by reason. (In this way, it is more like the fifth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* which is about distinguishing the names equivocal by reason used in wisdom and in the axioms (and to some extent everywhere). Some have even doubted whether the third part should be part of the same work. But perhaps the question of whether or how the post-predicaments complete the *Categories* is out of place in a Proemium

The philosopher is a lover of wisdom and wisdom is a knowledge of all things in some way.

The *Categories* is for the sake of understanding what things are. It is a beginning for understanding what things are. (Since every thing is either a substance or exists in substance as in a subject, for example, such a distinction (in the *Categories*) is a beginning of understanding what things are.)

DUANE H. BERQUIST

ALBERT AT THE CROSS ROADS OF LOGIC

Albert the Great stands at the crossroads of logic. There seems to be a certain hesitation or ambivalence when he touches upon a question that can be seen as crucial in one's approach to logic. It is a question about the very aim or intention of the logician. And hence it affects our whole understanding of logic. Is it the aim or intention of the logician to consider names and, later on, speeches composed of names? Or is it by accident and some subsequent necessity that the logician is led to consider words or names? Albert seems to stand somewhere between Boethius in a tradition that goes back to the Greek Neo-Platonic commentators on the logical works of Aristotle and the later Cajetan in a tradition begun by the Arabs such as Avicenna. Before looking at Albert's fence-straddling, we should consider separately the two positions. Perhaps this can be done simply by looking at two texts: one from Boethius and the other from Cajetan following Avicenna. Both texts are from their respective commentaries on the *Categories* of Aristotle where the question first arises.

Following the Greek Neo-Platonic commentators on Aristotle's Categories, Boethius distinguishes between two placings of names: the placing of names upon things and the placing of names upon names. Since things exist before names, we necessarily first place names upon things. We place names such as *man*, *dog*, or *cat* upon different things. Then after we have named things, we have names that we can come back upon and also name. Thus we call names like *man*, *dog*, or *cat* by the name *noun*. The placing of names upon things is thus called by Boethius and the Greek Neo-Platonic commentators the first placing of names. And the placing of names upon names is called by them the second placing of names. Boethius then in continuity with the Greek commentators say that the intention of Aristotle's *Categories* is the first placing of names or, rather, the names so placed:

> And the first placing is that names are placed upon things, but the second that the names themselves are designated by other names...The intention in this work therefore is to discuss the first names of things and the vocal sounds signifying them.[1]

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[1]"et est prima positio, ut nomina rebus imponerentur, secunda vero ut aliis nominibus ipsa nomina designaretur...In hoc igitur opere haec intentio est, de primis rerum nominibus, et de vocibus res significantibus disputare..." Boethius,

Cajetan is, of course, aware that illustrious men (as he puts it) have before him said that the intention of the *Categories* is names or vocal sounds signifying incomplex things. He is also prepared to admit that in some way this position can be sustained. But then he thinks it is necessary to recall what Avicenna has said in the beginning of his *Logic* :

> ...nevertheless it is necessary to be mindful of what has been said in the best way by Avicenna in the beginning of his *Logic*, namely that to consider about vocal sounds is not the business of logic by intention, but necessity forces it to this, because we cannot express, teach, unite and order things thus conceived without words. For if we were able to complete all these things without exterior words, content only with interior speech, or these things came to be by other signs, vocal sounds would not be considered.[2]

Whence Cajetan thinks it is necessary to conclude that the *Categories* of Aristotle is chiefly about things rather than names:

> And on account of this, if it is asked whether vocal sounds or things are chiefly considered here, it ought to be answered that it is about things, not absolutely, but as conceived in an incomplex way and signified by consequent necessity.[3]

In Categorias Aristotelis, Liber Primus, PL Vol. 64m pp. 159-160 - All translations by the author of this paper.

[2]"..memores tamen esse oportet eius quod optime ab Avicenna in principio suae Logicae dicitur, scilicet quod considerare de vocibus non est logici negocii ex intentione, sed necessitas ad hoc compulit, quoniam res sic conceptas nonnisi verbis exprimimus, docemus, adunamus et ordinamus. Si enim absque verbis exterioribus haec omnia explere possemus, solo sermone interiori contenti, aut aliis signis haec fierent, de vocibus tractandum non esset." Cajetan, *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Prologus (Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1953), p. 3

[3]"Et propterea si quaeratur, de vocibus an de rebus principaliter hic tractetur, respondendum est quod de rebus non absolute sed incomplexe conceptis et consequenti necessitate significatis." Cajetan, *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Prologus (Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1953), p. 3

The disagreement between Cajetan and Boethius (or between Avicenna and the Greek Commentators) is not as to whether logic considers names or things. Both would see the logician's consideration as extending to both names and things in some way. Further, they would both see thoughts as involved in the logician's consideration of either names or things. Cajetan, for example, says that the *Categories* is about things, not absolutely, but as conceived in an incomplex way and signified by consequent necessity. The Greek Commentators speak of the *Categories* as being about vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts.[4] The Greek Commentators and Boethius would also see the logician as talking sometimes about things as named through thoughts. Yet when they speak of the *skopos* or intention or aim of the *Categories*, they always put vocal sounds or names first. The difference, then, is not simply one of emphasis, but of order, of the order in which one uses names and things and thoughts in defining the aim or intention of a book in logic.

When we say that the difference is one of order, we do not mean in the order of importance. The Greek commentators and Boethius do not think that names are more important than things or thoughts. They put names first because of the instrumental character of logic. This is why they call Aristotle's works in logic the *organon*, the tool. We can now turn to some texts of Albert which seem to follow Avicenna and now Boethius.

In the *Tractatus* on the nature of logic, at the beginning of his *Commentaria in De Praedicabilibus*, Albert criticizes an opinion which is like that of the Neo-Platonic commentators and Boethius. And he indicates that he is following Avicenna here. The central text is as follows:

> They say that the subject of logic in general is speech, insofar as it designates the things which are signified through it. Avicenna attacks this opinion saying that speech of itself signifies nothing. If it signified something of itself, it would signify that always and among all which is false. It takes therefore signification from the will of the one instituting it. Man however uses such speech as it thus signifies a concept to himself and to another...Whence the logician uses speech to himself and to another *per accidens* and

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[4]See the commentaries on the *Categories* by Porphyry, Ammonius, Philoponus, Olympiodorus, Simpliicus and Elias in the *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, Berlin: Academicae Litterarum Regiae Borussicae, 1887-1900, Vols. IV, VIII, XII, XIII, XVIII

> not *per se* because he is not able to proceed to making known what is unknown without signifying speech.[5]

Although seeing words as necessary for man in his thinking, Albert here speaks of speech as being *per accidens* to the logician. The reason is apparently that words signify not by nature, but by human agreement. Even though one might say that this must be a weak sense of *per accidens* since Albert here admits the necessity of words, nevertheless one could never say that the aim or intention of the logician or some logical work, like the *Categories*, is about words or names signifying things through thoughts. The *per accidens* is always outside of one's intention or, at least, of one's primary intention. And as in the passage quoted above from Cajetan, where he holds that the *Categories* is principally about things conceived in an incomplex way (without affirmation or negation) and by a consequent necessity signified, Albert also speaks at times as if logic is about things as they are in the mind and consequently signified. This can be seen in the following passage from the same *Tractatus* on the nature of logic:

> Since logic however considers all things insofar as they are in the soul or in the understanding of the one who seeks to come to a knowledge of the unknown through what is known to him, on account of these things, he considers vocal sound signifying by agreement, both what and how it signifies.[6]

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[5]"dicunt logicae generalis subjectum esse sermonem, prout est designativus rerum quae significantur per ipsum. Quam opinionem impugnat Avicenna dicens, quod sermo de se nihil significat: si enim aliquid de se significaret, semper et apud omnes illud significaret: quod falsum est. Significationem ergo accipit a placito instituentis.Tali autem sermone (secundum quod sic significativus est concepti) utitur homo ad seipsum et ad alium...Propter quod logicus et ad se et ad alterum utitur sermone per accidens et non per se: quia sine sermone designativo procedere non potest ad notitiam faciendam ejus quod ignotum est." Albert the Great, *Commentaria in De Praedicabilibus*, Tractatus I, Caput IV; Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1951, p. 9

[6]"Quia enim logica omnia considerat prout sunt in anima sive in intellectu ejus, qui quaerit per notum sibi venire in notitiam ignoti: gratia horum considerat de voce significante ad placitum, et quid et qualiter significet." Albert the Great, *Commentaria in De Praedicabilibus*, Tractatus I, Caput V; Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1951, p. 12

Albert had already quoted Avicenna's distinction about things considered either in their essential principles or according to their existence in singulars outside the mind or according to their existence in the reason; and that logic considers things in this third way.[7]

But when Albert comes to comment on the *Categories* and the *Peri Hermeneias* of Aristotle, his position is closer to the concrete one of the Greek commentators and Boethius. First, of all, when he does say that logic is in some way about things, he will explain that way (or begin to explain it) by using words or speech rather than by the remote from the senses explanation through the way things are in the mind or conceived incomplexly. This comes up naturally in his explanation of the first distinction in the *Categories* where Aristotle is clearly talking about things in some way:

> And they are called univocal in an opposite way to the equivocal, namely things called univocally by one name so that things are referred to being said and to speech; because otherwise what was said would not pertain to logic for things considered in themselves and not as they stand under speech, pertain to the Philosopher and not to the logician.[8]

And in his commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias*, he says the following in determining to what part of philosophy the book belongs:

> It is not a part of essential or real philosophy, but of rational or speech-concerned [*sermocinalis*]; for it considers being standing under speech [*ens stans sub sermone*].[9]

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[7]Albert the Great, *Commentaria in De Praedicabilibus* , Tractatus I, Caput II; Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1951, pp. 5-6

[8]"Et dicuntur univoca per oppositum modum ad aequivoca, res scilcet univocatae in nomine uno, ut res ipsa ad dici et ad sermonem referatur, quia aliter non esset logicum quod dicitur, quia res in se considerata, non secundum quod stat sub dictione, non ad logicum, sed ad Philosophum pertinet." Albert the Great, *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis* Tractatus I, Caput III; Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1954, p. 10

[9]"Non enim est pars philosophiae essentialis vel realis, sed rationalis sive sermocinalis: considerat enim ens stans sub sermone."Albert the Great,

Since we name and speak about things insofar as we know them in some way, this distinction of Albert is, of course, in harmony with what Avicenna and Cajetan say about the way the logician considers things. But it should be noted that it begins in a way closer to the senses since names or speeches can be heard.

But such a way of speaking can also lead us back to the position of Boethius and the Greek Commentators on the *Categories* of Aristotle. That such a transition is not fanciful as applied to Albert's thinking can be seen in this passage from his commentary on the *Categories*:

> Since it has been already proven in the antecedents to logic that one does not come to a knowledge of the unknown through the known except by speech disposed for signifying, whether a man inquires by himself through interiorly disposed speech, or inquires with another through speech exteriorly put forth, it follows of necessity that the order of the predicables can not be determined except as the predicable is designated under a vocal sound...whence it is necessary to consider the predicables as they are signified by vocal sounds; whence Boethius says that this science, namely the book of the *Categories*, is about the ten vocal sounds signifying the first genera of things.[10]

There is a transition in this text from the necessity of speech in our thinking or for our thinking to the necessity of considering the order of the predicables

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Commentaria in Peri Hermeneias Aristotelis, Tractatus I, Caput I; Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1951, p. 4

[10]"Quia autem jam in antecedentibus ad logicam probatam est, quod ad scientiam incogniti per cognitum non devenitur, nisi per dispositum sermonem ad signficandum, sive homo inquirat apud seipsum per interius dispositum sermonem, sive inquirat apud alium per sermonem exterius prolatam, sequitur de necessitate, quod ordo praedicabilium non potest determinari, nisi secundum quod sub voce habet praedicabile designari...Propter quod praedicabilia oportet considerare secundum quod vocibus significantur: propter quod dicit Boetius quod haec scientia, scilicet libri praedicamentorum, est de decem primis vocibus prima genera rerum significantibus." Albert the Great, *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis* Tractatus I, Caput I; Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1954, p. 2

insofar as it stands under speech; and from this Albert comes to the position of Boethius that the *Categories* is about vocal sounds.

One last text from Albert shows to what extent he inclines to the position of Boethius and the Greek commentators. In the beginnings of his commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias*, Albert states the position of Boethius without any attribution. And what is especially significant about this passage is that it involves a distinction between the *Categories* and the *Peri Hermeneias* in regard to vocal sound or speech. Albert admits that the *Categories* is closer to things in that the meaning of the vocal sounds it considers is according to the properties of thing. This is the passage:

> The way of signifying in vocal sound differs in the *Categories* and here. In the *Categories,* the beginning of signification is from the thing and ends in the vocal sound. For the book of the *Categories* is about ten vocal sounds signifying the first principles and according to the properties of things, not of vocal sounds. But here in the science of interpretation...the beginning is from speech or vocal sound and it ends in the thing.[11]

Albert's hesitation between these two positions or his making use of both is not simply an inability to decide which is correct. It would be a mistake to regard either position as simply false. And the proponents of either position would not regard the other position as simply false. In this respect, Albert's ambivalence is perhaps well taken in that there is an element of truth in both positions. What is more, perhaps both positions can be sustained in some way as Cajetan says.[12] Yet there is a difference between the two positions and it is not without importance for our understanding of and approach to logic. It is perhaps not without significance that Albert follows the position of Avicenna

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[11]"Differt autem modus significandi in voce in *Praedicamentis* et hic. In *Praedicamentis* enim est inchoatio significationis a re et terminatur in voce. Est enim liber *Praedicamentorum* de decem vocibus prima principia significantibus, et secundum rerum proprietates, non vocum. Hic autem in scientia de interpretatione...est inchoatio a sermone sive voce, et terminatur in rem." Albert the Great, *Commentaria in Peri Hermeneias Aristotelis,* Liber I, Tractatus I, Caput II; Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1951, p. 7

[12]Cajetan, *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis,* Prologus (Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1953), p. 3

more in his *Tractatus* on the nature of logic and the position of Boethius when he actually comments on the first two logical works of Aristotle. This will appear when we ask which position is better and why.

The position of Boethius and the Greek commentators is better for a number of reasons. First, it preserves the character of logic as a tool or an art about tools. Names and speeches can be clearly seen to be tools for ordering our thoughts. The teacher, for example, uses them to order the thoughts of his students. And no one can clearly examine his own thoughts and try to put them in order without expressing them in words. But to say that logic is about things as they exist in our reason or as they are conceived in an incomplex way makes logic seem to be a theoretical science in the full sense, more about things than the tools of knowing things. Man needs tools that can be sensed and names and speeches fit this requirement very nicely.

A second reason why the position of Boethius and the Greek commentators is better is that it fits the teaching of logic to beginners. The beginner can more easily see that names exist and that things are named (since both names and some things, at least, can be sensed) than that things exist in our reason in some way. Further, he can be led from the diverse ways we name things to see that thought in some way intervenes in the naming process. He is led in this way from what he can sense (names and things) to what he cannot sense (thoughts and that things are in reason). The position of Avicenna fits more the wise man or metaphysician who is trying to understand why logic exists and why it is true and necessary because it has a foundation in reality; that is, in things.

A third reason why the position of Boethius and the Greek commentators is better is that it fits the text of Aristotle which both groups of thinkers are presumably trying to follow and expound. It is important to note here that at the crucial point where Aristotle first distinguishes the ten categories,[13] Albert keeps the key word *signifies* in his paraphrase[14] while Cajetan's paraphrase

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[13]Aristotle, *Categories,* Chapter 4, 1b 25-28

[14]Albert the Great, *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Tractatus I, Caput VII; Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1954, p. 22

leaves this out.[15] . It is, of course, names or vocal sounds that *signify* while things are *signified*.

One cannot, however, deny the importance of the position of Avicenna for the wiseman's defense of the scientific (in the sense of the *Posterior Analytics*) character of logic. The necessary truth of logic cannot be defended (as has been said) without finding a foundation for it in reality; that is, in things.

We can see perhaps then some reason why Albert should make more use of the position of Avicenna in the *Tractatus* on the nature of logic and follow Boethius more in the exposition of the logical works of Aristotle. For the first is closer to the work of the wise man and the latter to the actual teaching of logic. But Albert's somewhat eclectic approach does not lead him to distinguish clearly the reasons for using both of these positions.

Duane H. Berquist

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[15]Cajetan, *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis* , (Quebec: Les Presses Universitaires Laval, 1953), p. 23

THE SKOPOS OF THE CATEGORIES

Skopos is the Greek word for target. The *skopos* of a book or of a reasoned-out knowledge is the target aimed at therein. The determination of the skopos is fundamental in the proemium which paves the way for our reason in approaching any book or reasoned-out knowledge. Aristotle, for example, in his proemium to wisdom (at the beginning of the *Metaphysics)* first determines in general that wisdom aims at causes and then, in particular, at the first cause(s).

The Greek Commentators, in their proemia to Aristotle's *Categories*, determine at length the skopos of that work, first in general and then in particular. Their general determination of the skopos is important not only for the *Categories*, but also for logic as a whole.

GENERAL DETERMINATION OF THE SKOPOS OF THE *CATEGORIES*

Greek Commentators, like Ammonius Hermias, determine the skopos of the *Categories* in general by tying a knot in our reason from the opposite opinions and arguments of their predecessors about the skopos of the *Categories* and then untying this knot.

THE KNOT

The knot comes from the difference of opinion about the skopos of the *Categories* and what can be said in support of each opinion. The difference of opinion was that some said the *Categories* was about things; others, that it was about vocal sounds; and yet others, that it was about thoughts. Something can be said for and against each of these opinions.

The division Tôn œntwn (of beings) in Chapter 2 would seem to be a division of things rather than of thoughts or vocal sounds. The distinction between substance and accident is met here, and this is a distinction between things. Later various accidents (for example, quantity, quality etc.) are distinguished and this is also a distinction between things. The *Categories* then, it would seem, are about these things: substance, quantity, quality, etc.

On the other side, it is argued that the consideration of being as being, or things as things, belongs to metaphysics (as is shown in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics* by Aristotle) and not to logic. But the *Categories* belongs to logic.

The division Tôn legoménwn (of that which is said) beginning Chapter 2 seems to be a division of vocal sounds. One part of this division is either an affirmation or a negation (as is clear from Chapter 4) which are species of statement which is defined as a vocal sound in the *Peri Hermeneias*. Hence, the other member of the division, those said without any intertwining, must also be vocal sounds, especially since they are said in Chapter 4 not to be by themselves an affirmation or negation, but only by being combined or intertwined do they form an affirmation or a negation. If these latter are vocal sounds, what makes them up (those said without intertwining) must also be vocal sounds.

Further, it is said in Chapter 4 that "each of those said without intertwining signifies either substance or how much etc." But it is not things that *signify* (things are *signified*) but vocal sounds that signify. Hence, Aristotle is talking about vocal sounds when he speaks of *those said without intertwining*.

But the consideration of vocal sounds as vocal sounds belongs to grammar. It seems to be a lowering of the dignity of logic to say it is about vocal sounds.

In the beginning of Chapter 10, after he has considered substance, quantity, etc., Aristotle refers to them as *genera*. Moreover, he gives rules for ordering genera, their differences and species in the Chapter 3. But genera, differences, species and other such universals would seem to be in the mind or in our thoughts. Genus and species are differences in our thoughts, not differences in things. When I say that Socrates is a man and that he is an animal, *man* and *animal* do not differ as two things but as a more general thought and a more particular thought of what Socrates is.

But the consideration of thoughts as such pertains to the third book *About the Soul*.

The above is a sample of the dialectical discussion of whether the skopos of the *Categories* is things or thoughts or vocal sounds. Each of these positions was held by some thinker before the Greek Commentators whose works we have.

If there is a part of the truth in each of the above positions, it is good to have a dialectical discussion about them. For such a discussion will help to bring out these elements of the truth without making us think that anyone of them is the whole truth. Such a *manuductio* corresponds to the nature of our reason which sees a part of the truth before it sees the whole. Further, one man often sees one part of the truth and another man, another part, so that it is only through the efforts of many that the whole truth is eventually seen by later thinkers.

Later thinkers continue to dwell upon what is found in these three positions. We may take Thomas Aquinas as a witness here. There is a text where Thomas seems to say that logic is about the nature of things. The example in this text is also found in the *Categories*. The text also contrasts logic with grammar as is done in the dialectic above:

> passio potest sumi dupliciter: vel quantum ad naturam rei prout logicus et naturalis passionem considerat..vel quantum ad modum significandi, prout grammaticus considerat.[1]

But there are also texts in Thomas from which someone might draw the conclusion that the *Categories* is about concepts or thoughts:

> De his igitur quae pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, id est de his quae simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in libro *Praedicamentorum*.[2]

Finally, there are texts in Thomas where he seems to say that the *Categories* is about simple sayings or *dictiones* which are vocal sounds:

> Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro *Praedicamentorum* de simplicibus dictum est, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum *triplex* potest esse consideratio. *Una* quidem, secundum quod absolute significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consideratio pertinet ad librum *Praedicamentorum*.[3]

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[1] *In II Sent.*, Dist XXXV, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 5

[2] *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Proemium, n. 2

[3] *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio I, n. 5

One might thus draw from these and other texts of Thomas some confirmation that there is an element of truth in each of the above positions discussed dialectically by the Greek Commentators.

UNTYING THE KNOT

The untying of the knot and the determination of the skopos of the *Categories* in general is made by the Greek Commentators, like Ammonius Hermias, in three ordered steps. The first step is that the skopos involves all three; that is, things, thoughts and vocal sounds (words or names). The second is that the logician talks about any one of these only in its connection with the other two. The third step is that the *Categories* is about names signifying things through thoughts. This last step is. of course, only a general determination of the skopos of the *Categories*. After that, the Greek Commentators begin a determination of the skopos in particular.

FIRST STEP IN UNTYING THE KNOT

One cannot untie a knot without examining it closely. Indeed, a close examination of the knot above leads to the first step in untying it. The more carefully one examines the different positions above and the reasons which can be given for them, the more one sees that there is an element of truth in each of them. The first step then in untying this knot is to see that skopos of the *Categories* involves all three. One could say in general that logic is about things, thoughts and vocal sounds. Here we might bring in Thomas Aquinas as a witness again.

When Thomas paves the way for our consideration of logic in his two proemiums to logic (his major proemium at the beginning of his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* and his minor proemium at the beginning of his commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias*), he does not begin with the above three (things, thoughts and vocal sounds). Rather he begins by saying that logic is about three acts of our reason which he distinguishes. Further, in the major proemium especially, he brings out that logic is the art which directs these three acts. Logic is an art that helps reason order its own acts. From this starting-point, we can see how Thomas regards thoughts and vocal sounds first and later even things in some way as pertaining to the skopos of logic. A fundamental text for seeing this connection in Thomas' mind between ordering the acts of reason and considering thoughts and vocal sounds is the following:

> Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat concepetus suos ad invicem, et signa conceptuum, quia sunt voces significativae.[4]

If logic helps reason order its own acts, and reason orders its own acts by ordering its own thoughts and the vocal sounds that signify them, then logic (if it is to help reason order its own acts) must consider thoughts and the vocal sounds that signify them. Hence, Thomas, later in the same text determines that logic is about the order in our thoughts and vocal sounds:

> Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum perficitur, secundum...diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae...Ordo autrem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad *rationalem philosophiam*, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinvicem, et ordinem principiorum adinvicem et ad conclusiones.[5]

Does Thomas see any connection between logic being about the acts of reason and being about things? There is one text where a certain connection is made through the *intentions of reason:*

> Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica autem est de operationibus rationis; logica etiam erit de his quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de *intentionbus* rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent.
>
> Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subiectis. Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, *syllogismum, enunciationem*, *praedicatum*, aut aliquid huiusmodi.[6]

In the first part of this text, Thomas sees a certain connection between logic and things through the intentions of reason *quae ad omnes res se habent*. But in the second, he seems to deny that logic is about things. Albert the Great also sees logic as about intentions and not things, but in the very text where he says this, he sees that this consideration of intentions cannot be divorced from things:

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[4]*In I Ethicorum*, Lectio I, n. 1

[5]*In I Ethicorum*, Lectio I, n. 2

[6](*In I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lectio XX, n. 171

> Quamvis enim logicus intentiones rerum considerat, et non res: principaliter tamen logicus intentiones considerat relatas ad res: et sic considerat res stantes sub intentionibus quas considerat.[7]

Does Albert contradict himself when he says in the first sentence that the logician considers the intentions of things and *not* things and in the last sentence when he says that the logician considers things standing under the intentions which he considers? I think this would be a sophistical refutation of Albert based on the mistake of simply and in some respect. He denies that logic is about things and affirms that logic is about things standing under intentions. He admits that logic is about things in some way (*secundum quid*) and denies that it is about things simply (*simpliciter*, without any qualification or addition). Thomas also affirms that logic is about things in this way:

> Sed dicendum quod secundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis. Et ideo quantum ad praedicationem, quae est actus rationis...Sed Philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia.[8]

To consider things *secundum quod sunt entia* is to consider things simply or without qualification (one is considering things as things), but to consider things *as they are in reason* or *as they stand under the intention of universality* is to consider them in some respect or *secundum quid*. That logic considers things only in some respect is also clear from another text of Thomas:

> Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei.[9]

What Thomas says here, that logic considers *modum praedicandi* is reflected in the Latin words in the first part of logic, the *praedicabilia* and the *praedicamenta*. It is also seen in the Greek word that gives its name to the *Categories*.

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[7] *Comm. In Priora Analytica* , Bk. II, Tract VII, Cap. X, Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, pp. 164b-165a

[8] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIII, n. 1576

[9] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVII, n. 1658

One can also reason that logic must be about things in some way because it is ordered to knowing things.

SECOND STEP IN UNTYING THE KNOT

The second step in untying the knot and determining the skopos of the *Categories* in general is to show that it is about each of these three (vocal sounds, things and thoughts) only in connection or order with the other two.

This is seen most clearly in the case of vocal sounds. The logician is not interested in vocal sounds as such, but only insofar as they signify. But what do they signify? They signify our thoughts about things or they signify things through our thoughts. The Greek Commentators point out with reason that the philosopher is not concerned with thoughts that have no foundation in things, that are not about things. Likewise, we can say that vocal sounds signify the things we want to know, as when we use the name of a thing in asking what it is. But vocal sounds signify things only through thoughts. Hence, when the logician speaks of vocal sounds, he must bring in explicitly or implicitly both thoughts and things.

This line of argument is fully in accord with the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. Thomas also insists that logic is interested in vocal sounds only insofar as they signify:

> Sed quia Logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio vocum, quae est immediata ipsis conceptionibus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius; significatio autem litterarum, tanquam magis remota, non pertinet ad eius considerationem, sed magis ad considerationem grammatici.[10]

Although Thomas says that vocal sounds signify immediately concepts or thoughts, they do not do so without reference to things at last. This part of Thomas' teaching is beautifully brought out in part of his explanation of why Aristotle says that vocal sounds signify the *passions* of the soul when by *passions* he means the conceptions or thoughts of reason::

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[10]*In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio ll, n. 13

> Utitur autem potius nomine *passionum* quam *intellectuum*...quia significatio vocum refertur ad conceptionem intellectus, secundum quod oritur a rebus per modum cuiusdam impressionis vel passionis.[11]

Since logic is ordered to knowing things, logic is interested in vocal sounds insofar as they signify things. But here it is even clearer that we must bring in thoughts also. For we name things insofar as we know them or have some thoughts of them. As Thomas says:

> secundum autem quod res sunt nobis notae secundum hoc a nobis nominatur[12]

A sign of this is that the order in naming follows the order in knowing, not the order in things; for we name sensible things first etc. Further, it is not possible that vocal sounds signify things immediately:

> Non enim potest esse quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen *homo* naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. Unde non potest esse quod significet immediate hominem singularem; unde Platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam *ideam* hominis separatam. Sed quia hoc secundum suam abstactionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate et eis mediantibus res.[13]

Thus if logic is about vocal sounds signifying things, it must also bring in what is between them - namely, thoughts.

If logic is about things in some way, it must consider them in reference to thoughts and vocal sounds. Logic cannot consider things as things for this is the matter of metaphysics. (Likewise, the matter of logic cannot be natural or political things as such.) The way logic considers things is exemplified in the first two definitions of Chapter 1 of the *Categories*. There we learn that things can be named equivocally or univocally. But it is impossible to consider things in this way without bringing in names and thoughts. For names are vocal sounds

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[11] *In I Peri Hermeneias,* Lectio II, n. 16

[12] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lect I, n. 751

[13] Thomas Aquinas, *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio II, n. 15

and whether a name is said equivocally or univocally of things depends upon the thought (or thoughts) we have in mind when saying the name of those things. If logic considers things as named, it must also consider them as known in some way - for we name things as we know them. And if we know them in some way, they must be in our mind. But they are not in our mind without our having some thought about them.

Although one can say that logic considers things as they are in our reason, it is much more concrete or sensible to say that logic is about things as named (since a name is sensible) which (since we name things as we know them) will lead to the more abstract truth that it considers them as they are in the mind. Albert the Great in his commentary on this part uses this concrete way of distinguishing between the logician and the metaphysician or philosopher:

> Et dicuntur univoca per oppositum modum ad aequivoca, res scilicet univocatae in nomine uno, ut res ipsa ad dici et ad sermonem referatur, quia aliter non esset logicum quod dicitur: quia res in se considerata, non secundum quod stat sub dictione, non ad logicum, sed ad Philosophum pertinet.[14]

When we say that logic is about thoughts. we must be careful to keep it distinct from the study of the soul. The Greek Commentators point out that the consideration of thoughts belongs as such to the *De Anima*. This is why Aristotle is so brief in his consideration of thoughts in the *Peri Hermeneias* when he shows that written words signify vocal sounds, vocal sounds signify thoughts and the latter are likenesses of things. Aristotle excuses himself from a more lengthy consideration of thoughts which he says belongs to another consideration, that of the soul. Here is Thomas' commentary on the passage:

> excusat se a diligentiori harum consideratione: quia quales sint animae passiones, et quomodo sunt rerum similitudines, dictum est in libro *De Anima*. Non enim hoc pertinet ad logicum negocium, sed ad naturale.[15]

In what way then is logic about thoughts? Logic is about ordering our thoughts for the sake of knowing things. But how can one order thoughts for the sake of knowing things without making any reference to things? Logic considers the

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[14] *De Praedicamentis*, Tract I, Cap. III, ed. Doyon, p. 10a

[15] *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio II, n. 22

order in our thoughts that is useful for knowing things; and hence, it cannot consider thoughts without making reference to things.

Likewise, is it possible for reason to order its thoughts without using vocal sounds to signify them? Reason doesn't even know clearly what it thinks before it expresses its thought in words. The Poet puts this well in the words of Miranda to Caliban:

> .....I pitied thee
> Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour
> One thing or other; when thou didst not, savage,
> Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like
> A thing most brutish, I endow'd thy purposes
> With words that made them known.[16]

If reason could order its thoughts without using vocal sounds (like an angel), logic would not be about vocal sounds. But then we would not be animals with reason and there would be no need for logic.

This ends the second step in the untying of the knot and the general determination of the skopos of the *Categories*. It adds to the first step, which was that the skopos includes things, thoughts and signifying vocal sounds, the important clarification that it is about each of these in reference to the others, about each of them in order to the other two.

THIRD STEP IN UNTYING THE KNOT

We now come to the third step in the untying of the knot and the determination of the skopos of the *Categories* in general. Although the *Categories* (and the whole of logic) is in some way about things, thoughts and vocal sounds, the Greek Commentators do not think that the *Categories* (and logic as a whole) is about each of these equally in any order. Rather they are unanimous in saying that the *Categories* and logical treatises of Aristotle in general are about *vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts*. (One could add here that they are, of course, speaking about vocal sounds signifying by human agreement or custom rather than by nature.)

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[16]Shakespeare, *Tempest,* Act I, Sc. 2

The beginning for this consideration is the *Peri Hermeneias*. There Aristotle makes very clear that the book is about vocal sounds. In his proemium, he enumerates what he is going to consider in the book (noun, verb, negation, affirmation, enunciation and speech); and when he comes to define them, he puts vocal sound or voice that signifies by human agreement as the genus in each definition. The *proemium* and the division of the *tractatus* all revolve around vocal sounds, as Thomas explains:

> Praemisso proemio, Philosophus accedit ad propositum exequendum. Et quia ea, de quibus promiserat se dicturum, sunt voces significativae complexae vel incomplexae, ideo praemittit tractatum de *significatione* vocum: et deinde de vocibus significativis determinat de quibus in proemio se dicturum promiserat. Et hoc ibi, *Nomen ergo est vox significativa* etc.[17]

From this solid basis, one can reason in two ways that the other treatises of logic are also about vocal sounds. First, one can reason from part to part. If the *Peri Hermeneias* is one part of logic and is about vocal sounds, then likewise the treatises in the other parts of logic will be about their own vocal sounds. And more particularly, if the *logos* in the definition of enunciation is that complex vocal sound called speech (rather than a composite thought), then likewise the logos in the definition of syllogism or definition is to be understood in the same way as a speech.

There is a second and stronger way of reasoning. Since what is considered in the logic of the first act becomes a part of the statement or enunciation considered in the *Peri Hermeneias*, and the statement in turn becomes a part of what is considered in the logic of the third act (e.g., syllogism) then since the statement is a vocal sound so also must be what are put together in statements or put together from statements.

A third way of reasoning from the *Peri Hermeneias* can be used in the case of the *Categories* and of definition. In the *Peri Hermeneias*, Aristotle speaks of written words as signifying spoken words and spoken words as signifying thoughts. but he does *not* say that thoughts signify things. And, of course, things do not signify anything in this context. But the subject of the *Categories,* those said without any intertwining[18] signify either substance or how much etc.

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[17]*In Peri Hermenias*, Lectio II, n. 11

[18]See *Categories,* Chapter 4, 1b 25 seq.

as Aristotle says in the *Categories* and likewise, definition signifies the what it is, as Aristotle notes in the *Topics*.[19] Although some scholastic might want to make the word sign analogous and extend it to thoughts, Aristotle does not seem to do so in the fundamental text on signification of the *Peri Hermeneias* (He says there that the written word is a sign of the spoken and the spoken, of the thought, but he does not say the thought, of the thing.) Hence, it is reasonable to say that in the *Categories* and in the definition of definition, he is speaking of vocal sounds. (Further, it is easy to argue that if either of these last two is a vocal sound, the other must be so too. Definitions are put together from what is studied in the *Categories*.)

The *Categories* are thus in general about vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts. One could ask why not say vocal sounds signifying thoughts about things. This second is not false but the first is more sensible. No thought is able to be sensed but some things can be sensed. We bring in what cannot be sensed last and point it out through its middle position between two sensibles.

THE SKOPOS OF THE *CATEGORIES* IN PARTICULAR

But since other logical treatises are about vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts, it is necessary to determine the skopos of the *Categories* in particular. Greek Commentators, such as Ammonius Hermias, determine the skopos of the *Categories* in particular in three ordered steps. The first is familiar to students of the *Peri Hermeneias*. Vocal sounds signifying by human agreement either have parts that signify by themselves (as do definitions, statements and other speeches) or they do not have such parts (as the name *animal* or *man*). The *Categories* is about the second kind of vocal sound which does not have parts signifying by themselves.

This suffices to separate the subject of the *Categories* from the principal subjects of the logic of the second and third acts which are speeches (that is, vocal sounds having parts that signify by themselves), namely the *statement* and the *syllogism*. This would also separate the *Categories* from any book on definition or division which are also speeches as we have just defined *speech*. But since in considering statement and syllogism, we also consider parts do them which do not or need not signify something separately (such as noun and verb in the statement and terms in the syllogism), it is also necessary to

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[19]Book I, Chapter 5, 101b 38

consider the difference between the simple vocal sounds belonging to the *Categories* and those considered in books on statement and syllogism.

The Greek Commentators ask this question in particular: what is the difference between the consideration of simple vocal sounds or names in the *Categories* and in the *Peri Hermeneias* which follows it? The distinction they make is between the *first placing* of names and the *second placing* of names. What is this distinction?

In the beginning there were things, but no names. Then man placed names upon things calling this a *man* and that a *horse* etc. This is the first placing of names, the placing of names upon things. Then, man by a second consideration came back over the names of things and called some of them *nouns* and some of them *verbs*, depending upon whether they signified with or without time. This was as second placing of names, *not* a placing of names upon things, but a placing of names *upon names*.

Boethius, following the Greek Commentators, explains it thus:

> prius breviter hujus operis aperienda videtur intentio, quae est hujusmodi: rebus praejacentibus, et in propria principaliter naturae constitutione manentibus, humanum solum genus exstitit, quod rebus nomina possit imponere. Unde factum est ut sigillatim omnia prosecutus hominis animis singulis vocabula rebus aptaret. Et hoc quidem, verbi gratia, corpus, hominem vocavit, illud vero lapidem, aliud lignum, aliud vero colorem. Et rursus quicunque ex se alium genuisset, patris vocabulo nuncupavit. Mensuram quoque magnitudinis proprii forma nominis terminavit, ut diceret bipedale esse, aut tripedale, et in aliis eodem modo.
>
> Omnibus ergo nominibus ordinatis, ad ipsorum rursus vocabulorum proprietates figurasque reversus est, et hujusmodi vocabuli formam, quae inflecti casibus possit, nomen vocavit; quae vero temporibus distribui, verbum.
>
> Prima igitur illa fuit nominum positio, per quam vel intellectui subjecta vel sensibus designaret. Secunda consideratio, qua singulas proprietates nominum flgurasque perspicerent, ita ut primum nomen sit ipsum rei vocabulum: ut, verbi gratia, cum quaelibet res homo dicatur. Quod autem ipsum vocabulum, idest homo, nomen vocatur, non ad significationem nominis ipsius refertur, sed ad figuram, idcirco quod possit casibus inflecti.
>
> Ergo prima positio nominis secundum significationem vocabuli facta est, secunda vero secundum figuram:
>
> et est prima positio, ut nomina rebus imponerentur, secunda vero ut aliis nominibus ipsa nomina designaretur...

> In hoc igitur opere haec intentio est, de primis rerum nominibus, et de vocibus res significantibus disputare, non in eo quod secundum aliquam proprietatem figuramque formantur, sed in eo quod significantes sunt...
>
> Est igitur hujus operis intentio de vocibus res significantibus, in eo quod significantes sunt pertractare.[20]

Without discussing or agreeing with everything that Boethius says here, we may note that he distinguishes in at least two ways the first and second placing of names. I am not sure that these two ways are equivalent. One of them seems to be more basic. We place names upon things and then we place names upon names. Since we must place names upon things before we can place names upon names, the former may be called the *first* placing of names and the latter, the *second* placing of names.

Thomas makes a somewhat similar distinction in the following passage:

> Nec tamen hoc nomen "ratio" significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen sapientiae vel per aliud nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hoc nomen "definitio," et alia nomina secundae impositionis.[21]

Here Thomas distinguishes between *nomen rei* and the *nomen secundae impositionis*.

It is very necessary not to confuse the distinction Thomas touches upon here and that other more common distinction he makes between the first and second (and possibly a third etc.) imposition of a name. One should not confuse the second imposition of the *same* name with name of second imposition. Thomas is here distinguishing between names of things and names of intentions. And since we place names upon things before we place names upon intentions, we may call names of things, names of first imposition or placing upon; and names of intentions, names of second imposition or placing upon. But in the more common distinction, we are talking about one and the same name that is first placed upon one thing and then carried over and placed upon a second thing because of its likeness or ratio to the first.

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[20] *In Categorias Aristotelis*, Liber Primus, in PL, Vol. 64, pp 159-160

[21] *In I Sent.*, Dist. II, Q. I, Art. III, Ad 1

Although *names of intentions* in the text from Thomas and *names of names* in the text of Boethius following the Greek commentators are not identical, they are both distinguished against *names of things*. Now names that we consider in the *Categories*, such as *substance, quantity, quality* etc., seem to be names of things while names like *noun* and verb in the *Peri Hermeneias* are names of names or names of intentions. Although the Greek Commentators do not take up the question, this would also seem to distinguish the *Categories* from the *Isagoge*. The *Isagoge* is about genus, difference, species, property and accident. These are also names of names or names of intentions.

We should note however that Thomas does not use this distinction when he must separate the consideration of simple vocal sounds (sounds whose parts do not signify anything by themselves) in the *Peri Hermeneias* from that of the *Categories:*

> Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro *Praedicamentorum* de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum *triplex* potest esse consideratio.
>
> *Una* quidem, secundum quod absolute significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consideratio pertinet ad librum *Praedicamentorum*.
>
> *Alio modo*, secundum rationem, prout sunt partes enunciationis; et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro; et ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et verbi: de quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum tempore vel sine tempore, et alia huiusmodi, quae pertinent ad rationem dictionum, secundum quod constituunt *enunciationem*.
>
> *Tertio modo*, considerantur secundum quod ex eis constituitur ordo syllogisticus, et sic determinantur de eis sub ratione terminorum in libro *Priorum*.[22]

This distinction reminds one of that made in practical philosophy. Ethics considers what an individual man should do; domestics, what the family should do; and politics, what the city should do. But since the father of a family is an individual man and the king or a citizen of a city is an individual man, why is it necessary to consider what an individual man should do in the family or in the city if this has already been considered in the ethics? One could say that what an individual man as such should do is considered in ethics while what he should do as a part of the family or the city is considered in domestics and politics. In

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[22] *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio I, n. 5

domestics, the individual man is considered as a father or son or something of this sort; and in politics, the individual man is considered as a king or citizen or something of this sort.

If we compare Thomas' distinction with that of the Greek Commentators, we can bring them closer by pointing out another order in the placing of names. We place names upon things before we place them in statements. And since statements are in turn placed in syllogisms (see the definition of syllogism), there is then a third placing of the original names. They were placed first upon things; second, in statements; and third, in syllogisms. Logic is ordered to a knowledge of things. If we did not place names upon things *before* we placed them in statements, our statements would not be about things. And if our statements were not about things, then when we placed them in syllogisms (and other arguments), we would not be reasoning about things which would defeat the whole purpose of logic.

The Greek Commentators say that the *Categories* are about names of things or about the first placing of names which is the placing of names upon things. Indeed, the *Categories* begins with definitions of the two ways in which things can have a name in common or two ways in which one name can be placed upon many things.

Having arrived at this position on the skopos of the *Categories*, Greek Commentators, like Ammonius Hermias, ask whether the *Categories* are about all names of things or about the first placing of all names upon things. Here they say that such names are unlimited and no science can take up the unlimited, Rather such names are brought under ten universal names or vocal sounds. They then enumerate ten names which are those given by Aristotle in the beginning of Chapter Four of the *Categories*.

In their proemia, the Greek Commentators, like Ammonius Hermias, do not explain how names of things may be brought under these ten names. But in their explanation of the ante-predicaments, we can find further elucidation on this question. The rules of Chapter Three of the *Categories* are especially important here.

We have follow at length the determination of the skopos of the *Categories* by the Greek Commentators and Boethius with some comparisons to texts of Thomas Aquinas and Albert the Great. This determination also touches upon the general question of the skopos of Aristotle's logical treatises. We are

not unaware that a number of serious questions and objections can be made about many parts of this determination. Rather it is with a view to the importance of these questions and objections for understanding the skopos of the *Categories* and, in general, logical treatises, that we have gone through that determination of the skopos of the *Categories*.

Two questions stand out in our mind now. The first is whether the genus in the definition of the skopos of an Aristotelian logical treatise is a vocal sound or more precisely, vocal sound signifying by human agreement (hence, either a name or a speech, depending upon whether it has parts that signify by themselves or not).

The second question is whether any other logical treatise is about names of things or names placed upon things. Men are more apt to think this of the *Categories* than of any other treatise.

One can argue dialectically on both sides of these questions. Perhaps the kind of knot produced in our mind by this dialectic will be useful in the discovery of some truth (if we can untie it).

Duane H. Berquist

THE SKOPOS OR AIM OF THE *CATEGORIES*

Logica habet maximam difficultatem. And in particular, thinkers have always found it difficult to determine the skopos or aim of the *Categories;* a sign of which is their disagreement on this skopos. For these reasons and because the *Categories* is the first treatise in logic (the reasoned-out knowledge necessary for all the rest) which has come down to us from Aristotle, one should follow the advice of Friar Laurence to Romeo:

> Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast.

The Greek Commentators on the *Categories* help us to proceed wisely and slowly towards the skopos of this book by their going through a number of steps in determining that skopos. As Aristotle determines the skopos of wisdom in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, first in general (showing that it is about causes) and then in particular (showing that it is about the *first* causes), so also the Greek Commentators determine the skopos of the *Categories* in a number of steps going gradually from the general to the particular. Perhaps the fullest enumeration of these steps in order is first given by Ammonius Hermias although there are thinkers after him who also go through these steps.

Ammonius goes through seven steps in determining the skopos of the *Categories* although some of these steps are not fully developed by him. The first four of these steps (although applied to the skopos of the *Categories*) could have an application to the skopos of any treatise in logic. Although especially relevant to the determination of the skopos of the *Categories,* they seem to touch upon more general matters than the last three which are necessary to separate the skopos of the *Categories* from that of other treatises in logic. Perhaps it would be best to enumerate in order these steps before taking them up one by one. We may give first the four more general steps and then, second, the three more particular steps.

The first step is a dialectical disputation as to whether the skopos is things or thoughts or vocal sounds. Reasons from the text are given for each position.

The second step is resolution of this doubt or, at least, the first step in the resolution of this doubt. This step consists in seeing that there is an element of truth in each position or that the skopos of the *Categories* includes all three: things, thoughts and vocal sounds.

The third step consists in seeing that logic or the *Categories* can be about each of these or any one of them, only if the other two are brought in.

Thus, for example, logic or the *Categories* is about things only insofar as they are signified by vocal sounds through thoughts. Or it is about vocal sounds only insofar as they signify things through thoughts or insofar as they signify thoughts about things. Or it is about thoughts of things signified by vocal sounds.

The fourth step consists in seeing that the chief skopos is vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts.

The above four steps, although they are taken in regard to the skopos of the *Categories* and the questions in them are asked about the skopos of the *Categories*, could nevertheless be taken in regard to logic as a whole. One could ask, for example, whether logic is about things or thoughts or vocal sounds. The skopos or aim of a book is *what it is about*.

Since the *Categories* is the first book in logic by Aristotle that has come down to us, it is especially necessary to go through these more general steps in determining its skopos or what it is about. Further, these questions arise more forcefully in the case of the *Categories* than in any other treatise of logic. (For example, in what other treatise of logic would the commentator be more led to ask whether the book is about things than in the *Categories*?)

The next three steps taken by Ammonius and some of the other commentators are necessary to distinguish the skopos of the *Categories* from that found in other logical treatises and to limit that skopos to what can be accomplished within logic.

The first step is to separate the vocal sounds considered in the *Categories* from the principal ones considered in the *Peri Hermeneias* and in the *Prior Analytics* and the other books about the syllogism and the other forms of argument. The *Categories* is about simple vocal sounds whose parts do not signify anything by themselves while the statement or enunciation considered in the *Peri Hermeneias* and the syllogism and other kinds of argument considered in the *Prior Analytics* and the books following it are about speeches, that is, about vocal sounds having parts that signify something by themselves.

But a second step is necessary. Although the *Peri Hermeneias*, the *Prior Analytics* and the books following are chiefly about speeches or vocal sounds composite in their signification, these books also define those simple vocal sounds that make them up; as in the *Peri Hermeneias*, Aristotle not only defines the statement or enunciation, but also the simple vocal sounds that make up a statement - the noun and the verb. Here the Greek Commentators distinguish between the first placing of simple vocal sounds which is *upon things* from a second placing of simple vocal sounds which is *upon vocal sounds themselves*.

If we use the word *name* for any simple vocal sound (that is, a vocal sound not having parts that signify by themselves) and do not limit it to nouns, it can be said that we first place names upon things and then our reason comes back upon these names and recognizes some as nouns and some as verbs and hence puts names upon these names, calling some *nouns* and some *verbs*. The latter placing of names is called the *second* placing of names since we *first* place names upon things. The *Categories,* the Greek Commentators say, is about the first placing of names.

Combining the first step (which is more fully that the *Categories* is about simple vocal sounds signifying simple things through simple thoughts) with the second step, we now arrive at the position that the *Categories* is about the *first placing of simple vocal sounds signifying simple things through simple thoughts*. But such vocal sounds are not limited, and it is not possible in an art or science to go through the unlimited. Hence, it is necessary to limit the consideration of such vocal sounds and their signification to some number which can be done by considering what they signify generically (for there are only ten highest genera of what is signified by these names - substance, quantity etc.) This constitutes the third and perhaps last step in the determination of the skopos of the *Categories.*

All of the above seven steps are not found in all the Greek Commentators. Some steps are considered more fully by some than by others. Sometimes some of these steps are not under their consideration of the skopos, but under some other consideration, such as that of the title of the book (which naturally bears upon the skopos of the book).

Are these seven steps necessary in determining the skopos of the *Categories*? I do not think that one can understand well the skopos of the *Categories* without going through these seven steps. Some of these steps may not be fully explained or defended by the Greek Commentators. Questions could be raised about the sufficiency of their consideration of some of these steps (especially about the seventh step and perhaps the sixth step, and the fourth step may puzzle many).

We shall now go through each one of these steps, one by one. We shall go through each step, drawing upon various Greek Commentators in the explanation of each step. Further, in these seven steps, we shall bring in texts from Thomas Aquinas (and perhaps occasionally other Latin commentators) that seem to confirm or correct or complete what the Greeks say.

STEP ONE

The first step is a dialectical disputation as to whether the *Categories* is about things or vocal sounds or thoughts. Something can be said for and against each of these, especially the first two.

The division of beings in Chapter 2 would seem to be a division of things rather than thoughts or vocal sounds. The distinction between substance and accident is met here and this is a distinction between things. Later various accidents (e.g., quantity and quality etc.) are distinguished and this is also a distinction between things. The *Categories* then is about these things: substance, quantity, quality and so on.

On the other side, it is argued that the consideration of being as being (or thing as thing) belongs to wisdom or metaphysics (as is shown in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics)* and not to logic. But the *Categories* belongs to logic.

The division of those said in Chapter 2 seems to be a division of vocal sounds. One part of this division is either an affirmation or a negation (as is clear from Chapter 4) which are species of enunciation or statement that is defined as a vocal sound in the *Peri Hermeneias*. Hence, the other member of the division (those said without any intertwining) must also be vocal sounds, especially since they are said in Chapter 4, not to be by themselves an affirmation or negation, but only by being combined or intertwined do they form an affirmation or negation. But if the latter are composite vocal sounds, what makes them up (those said without intertwining) must also be vocal sounds.

Further, it is said in Chapter 4 that "each of these said without intertwining signifies either substance or how much etc." But it is not things that *signify* (things are *signified)* but vocal sounds that signify. Hence, Aristotle is talking about vocal sounds when he speaks of those *said without intertwining*.

But the consideration of vocal sounds as vocal sounds belongs to grammar. It seems to be a lowering of the dignity of logic to say it is about vocal sounds.

In the beginning of Chapter 10, after he has considered substance, quantity etc., Aristotle refers to them as *genera*. Moreover, he gives rules for ordering genera, their species and differences, in Chapter 3. But genera, differences, species and other such universals would seem to be in the mind in our thoughts. Genus and species are differences in our thoughts, not differences in things. When I say that Socrates is a *man* and that he is an *animal*, *man* and *animal* do not differ as two things, but rather as a more general and a more particular thought of what Socrates is.

But the consideration of thoughts as such pertains to the third book *On the Soul*.

The above is a sample of the dialectical discussion of whether the skopos of the *Categories* is things or thoughts or vocal sounds. Each of these positions was held by some thinker *before* the Greek Commentators whose works we have.

If there is a part of the truth in each of the above three positions, it is good to have a dialectical discussion about them. For such a discussion will bring out those elements of the truth without making us think that anyone of them is the whole truth. Such a manuductio corresponds to the nature of our mind which, as Aristotle points out in the *Metaphysics*,[1] sees a part of the truth before it see the whole truth. Further, one man often sees one part of the truth and another man, another part of the truth, so that it is only through the efforts of many that the whole truth is eventually seen by later thinkers.

There is a text of Thomas Aquinas (pointed out by Msgr. Dionne) which seems to say that logic is about things, about the nature of things. The example in this text is also found in the treatise of the *Categories* in particular. The text also contrasts logic with grammar as is done in part of the dialectic above. Here is the text:

> passio potest sumi dupliciter: vel quantum ad naturam rei prout logicus et naturalis passionem considerat...vel quantum ad modum significandi, prout grammaticus considerat.[2]

But there are also texts in Thomas from which someone might draw the conclusion that the *Categories* is about concepts or thoughts:

> De his igitur quae pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, idest de his quae simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in libro *Praedicamentorum*.[3]

Finally, there are texts in Thomas where he seems to say that the *Categories* is about simple *dictiones* which are vocal sounds:

> Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro *Praedicamentorum* de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum *triplex* potest esse consideratio. *Una*

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[1]Book Two, Chapter 1

[2]*In II Sent.*, Dist. XXXV, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 5

[3]*In I Peri Hermeneias*, Proemium, n. 2

> quidem, secundum quod absolute significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consideratio pertinent ad librum *Praedicamentorum*....[4]

One might thus draw from different texts of Thomas some confirmation that there is an element of truth in each of the above positions discussed dialectically by the Greek Commentators. Hence, it is good to discuss each of these positions, trying to bring out the element of truth in each without exaggeration, by arguing dialectically for and against each.

THE SECOND STEP

The second, third and fourth steps pertain to the solution of the problem(s) raised by the dialectic of the first step. The second step is a natural result of perfecting the first step. Once the dialectic is perfected, the mind begins to see that there is an element or part of the truth in each of the three positions; the skopos of logic and of the *Categories* in particular must somehow involve all three: things, thoughts and vocal sounds. The text of Aristotle itself touches upon all three as brought out in the dialectic.

We have seen above that Thomas speaks of each of these three in different texts on logic, but we can consider more formally now whether Thomas thinks that logic is about all three in some way. This is the second step.

When Thomas paves the way for our consideration of logic in his two proemia to logic (his major proemium at the beginning of his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* and his minor proemium at the beginning of his commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias* - both of these proemia are a proemium to the whole of logic, especially the major one), he does not begin with the above three (things, thoughts and vocal sounds). Rather he begins by saying that logic is about three acts or operations of reason which he distinguishes. Further, in the major proemium especially, he brings out that logic is the art which directs these three acts. Logic is an art which helps reason order its own acts. From this starting-point, we can see how Thomas regards thoughts, vocal sounds and even things in some way as pertaining to the skopos of logic.

A fundamental text for seeing the connection in Thomas' mind between ordering the acts of reason and considering thoughts and vocal sounds is the following:

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[4] *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio I, n. 5

> Alius autem est ordo, quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, puta cum ordinat conceptus suos adinvicem, et signa conceptuum, quia sunt voces signficativae.[5]

If logic helps reason order its own acts, and reasons orders its own acts by ordering its own thoughts and the vocal sounds that signify them (as Thomas says here), then logic must consider thoughts and vocal sounds that signify them. Otherwise logic could not help reason order its own acts; for, as has been said, reason orders its own acts only by considering and ordering its own thoughts and the vocal sounds that signify them. If we want to help someone, we must first see what that one is doing. Hence, Thomas concludes that logic or rational philosophy must be about the order in our vocal sounds and in our thoughts if it is to bear upon the order which reason makes in its own act:

> Et quia consideratio rationis per habitum perficitur, secundum...diversos ordines quos proprie ratio considerat, sunt diversae scientiae...Ordo autem quem ratio considerando facit in proprio actu, pertinet ad rationalem philosophiam, cuius est considerare ordinem partium orationis adinivcem, et ordinem principiorum adinvicem et ad conclusiones.[6]

Does Thomas see any connection between logic being about the acts of reason and being about things? There is a connection through the *intentions of reason*:

> Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica autem est de operationibus rationis; logica etiam erit de his, quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de *intentionibus* rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent.
>
> Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subiectis. Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, *syllogismum*, *enunciationem*, *praedicatum*, aut aliquid huiusmodi.[7]

In the first part of this text, Thomas sees a certain connection between logic and things through the intentions of reason *quae ad omnes res se habent*. But in the second part, he seems to deny that logic is about things. Albert the Great also sees logic as about intentions and not things, but in the very text where he says this, he sees that this consideration of intentions cannot be entirely divorced from things:

> Quamvis enim logicus intentiones rerum considerat, et non res: principaliter tamen logicus intentiones considerat relatas ad res: et sic considerat res stantes sub intentionibus quas considerat.[8]

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[5] *In I N. Ethicorum,* Lectio I, n. 1

[6] *In I N. Ethicorum,* Lectio I, n. 2

[7] *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lectio XX, n. 171

Does Albert contradict himself when he says in the first sentence that the logician considers the intentions of things and *not* things and in the last sentence when he says that the logician considers things standing under the intentions which he considers? I think this would be a sophistical refutation of Albert based on the mistake of simply and in some respect. He denies that logic is about things and affirms that logic is about things standing under intentions. He admits that logic is about things in some way (*secundum quid*) and denies that it is about things simply (*simpliciter*, without any qualification or addition). Thomas also affirms that logic is about things in this way:

> Sed dicendum quod secundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in Praedicamentis. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis. Et ideo quantum ad praedicationem, quae est actus rationis...Sed Philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia.[9]

Here it is clear that logic is about things *in some way* (secundum quid), but the consideration of things as such belongs to the first philosopher (and the consideration of natural things as such to the natural philosopher, etc.). This is also clear from another text of Thomas:

> Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei.[10]

What Thomas says here, that logic considers *modum praedicandi*, is reflected in the Latin words in the first part of logic, the *praedicabilia* and the *praedicamenta*. It is also seen in the Greek word that gives its name to the *Categories*.

STEP THREE

The third step consists in seeing that logic and the *Categories* in particular are not about one of these without reference to the other two. This is seen most clearly in the case of vocal sounds. The logician is not interested in vocal sounds as such, but only insofar as they signify. But what do they signify? They signify our thoughts about things or they signify things through our

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[8]*Comm. In Priora Analytica* , Bk. II, Tract VII, Cap. X, Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, pp. 164b-165a

[9]*In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIII, n. 1576

[10]*In VII Metaphysicorum,* Lectio XVII, n. 1658

thoughts. The Greek Commentators point out with reason that the philosopher is not concerned with thoughts that have no foundation in things, that are not about things. Likewise, we can say that vocal sounds signify the things we want to know, as when we use the name of a thing in asking what it is. But vocal sounds signify things only through thoughts. Hence, when the logician speaks of vocal sounds, he must bring in explicitly or implicitly both thoughts and things.

This line of argument is fully in accord with the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas. Thomas also insists that logic is interested in vocal sounds only insofar as they signify:

> Sed quia Logica ordinatur ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio vocum, quae est immediata ipsis conceptionibus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem considerationem ipsius; significatio autem litterarum, tanquam magis remota, non pertinet ad eius considerationem, sed magis ad considerationem grammatici.[11]

Although Thomas says that vocal sounds signify immediately concepts or thoughts, they do not do so without reference to things at last. This part of Thomas' teaching is beautifully brought out in part of his explanation of why Aristotle says that vocal sounds signify the *passions* of the soul when by *passions* he means the conceptions or thoughts of reason:

> Utitur autem potius nomine *passionum* quam *intellectuum*...quia significatio vocum refertur ad conceptionem intellectus, secundum quod oritur a rebus per modum cuiusdam impressionis vel passionis.[12]

Since logic is ordered to knowing things, logic is interested in vocal sounds insofar as they signify things. But here it is even clearer that we must bring in thoughts also. For we name things insofar as we know them or have some thoughts of them. As Thomas says:

> secundum autem quod res sunt nobis notae secundum hoc a nobis nominatur[13]

A sign of this is that the order in naming follows the order in knowing, not the order in things; for we name sensible things first etc. Further, it is not possible that vocal sounds signify things immediately:

> Non enim potest esse quod significent immediate ipsas res, ut ex ipso modo significandi apparet: significat enim hoc nomen *homo* naturam humanam in abstractione a singularibus. Unde non potest esse quod significet immediate

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[11] *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio II, n. 13

[12] *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio II, n. 16

[13] *In V Metaphysicorum,* Lect I, n. 751

> hominem singularem; unde Platonici posuerunt quod significaret ipsam *ideam* hominis separatam. Sed quia hoc secundum suam abstractionem non subsistit realiter secundum sententiam Aristotelis, sed est in solo intellectu; ideo necesse fuit Aristoteli dicere voces significant intellectus conceptiones immediate et eis mediantibus res.[14]

Thus if logic is about vocal sounds signifying things, it must also bring in what is between them - namely, thoughts.

If logic is about things in some way, it must consider them in reference to thoughts and vocal sounds. Logic cannot consider things as things for this is the task of wisdom or metaphysics. (Likewise, the matter of logic cannot be natural or political things as such.) The way logic considers things is exemplified in the first two definitions of Chapter 1 of the *Categories*. There we learn that things can be named equivocally or univocally. But it is impossible to consider things in this way without bringing in names and thoughts. For names are vocal sounds and whether a name is said equivocally or univocally of things depends upon the thought (or thoughts) we have in mind when saying the name of those things. If logic considers things as named, it must also consider them as known in some way - for we name things as we know them. And if we know them in some way, they must be in our mind. But they are not in our mind without our having some thought about them.

If logic is a tool for knowing things and things are known only when they are in our mind (logic is concerned with getting things into our mind), then logic must consider things insofar as they are in our mind. But they are in our mind when we think about them and have thoughts about them. Hence, if logic is about things in this way, it must also consider things in reference to our thoughts. But how could man or logic talk about our thoughts of things without using words? Albert the Great points this out:

> ad scientiam incogniti per cognitum non devenitur, nisi per dispositum sermonem ad signficandum, sive homo inquirat apud seipsum per interius dispositum sermonem, sive inquirat apud alium per sermonem exterius prolatam.[15]

Albert the Great also insists that logic must consider things insofar as they stand under words:

> Et dicuntur univoca per oppositum modum ad aequivoca, res scilicet univocatae in nomine uno, ut res ipsa ad dici et ad sermonem referatur, quia aliter non esset logicum quod dicitur:

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[14]Thomas Aquinas, *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio II, n. 15

[15]*De Praedicamentis,* Tract I, Cap. I, ed. Doyon, p. 2

> quia res in se considerata, non secundum quod stat sub dictione, non ad logicum, sed ad Philosophum pertinet.[16]

When we say that logic is about thoughts. we must be careful to keep it distinct from the study of the soul. The Greek Commentators point out that the consideration of thoughts as such belongs to the *De Anima*. This is why Aristotle is so brief in his consideration of thoughts in the *Peri Hermeneias* when he shows that written words signify vocal sounds, vocal sounds signify thoughts and the latter are likenesses of things. Aristotle excuses himself from a more lengthy consideration of thoughts which he says belongs to another consideration, that of the soul. Here is Thomas' commentary on the passage:

> excusat se a diligentiori harum consideratone: quia quales sint animae passiones, et quomodo sunt rerum similitudines, dictum est in libro *De Anima*. Non enim hoc pertinet ad logicum negocium, sed ad naturale.[17]

In what way then is logic about thoughts?

Logic helps reason to order its thoughts for the sake of knowing things. Reason must also order its thoughts when about to do or make something, but such an order of thoughts is not the concern of logic. If logic helps reason to order its thoughts for the sake of knowing *things*, then how can logic be about ordering our thoughts *without any reference to things*? Logic then must be about thoughts with some reference to things.

Likewise, is it possible for reason to order its thoughts without using vocal sounds to signify them? Reason doesn't even know clearly what it thinks before it expresses its thought in words. The Poet puts this well in the words of Miranda to Caliban:

> .....I pitied thee
> Took pains to make thee speak, taught thee each hour
> One thing or other; when thou didst not, savage,
> Know thine own meaning, but wouldst gabble like
> A thing most brutish, I endow'd thy purposes
> With words that made them known.[18]

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[16]*De Praedicamentis*, Tract I, Cap. III, ed. Doyon, p. 10a

[17]*In I Peri Hermeneias,* Lectio II, n. 22

[18]Shakspeare, *Tempest*, Act I, Sc. 2

If reason could order its thoughts without using vocal sounds (like an angel), logic would not be about vocal sounds. But then we would not be animals with reason and there would be no need for logic.

This ends our consideration here of the third step. It adds to the second step, which was that the skopos includes things, thoughts and vocal sounds, the important clarification that it is about each of these three only in reference to each other or about each of them in reference to the other two.

STEP FOUR

Although logic is about things, thoughts and vocal sounds and it can talk about any of them in reference to the others, the Greek Commentators do not think that the logical treatises of Aristotle are equally about each of these in reference to the others. Rather they are unanimous in saying that these treatises (including the *Categories*) are about *vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts*. They all put vocal sounds first as the genus in the definition of the skopos of the *Categories*.

The beginning for this consideration is the *Peri Hermeneias*. There Aristotle makes very clear that the book is about vocal sounds. In his proemium, he enumerates what he is going to consider in the book (noun, verb, negation, affirmation, enunciation and speech); and when he comes to define them, he puts vocal sound or voice (phone) that signifies by human agreement as the genus in each definition. The *proemium* and the division of the *tractatus* all revolve around vocal sounds, as Thomas explains:

> Praemisso proemio, Philosophus accedit ad propositum exequendum. Et quia ea, de quibus promiserat se dicturum, sunt voces significativae complexae vel incomplexae, ideo praemittit tractatum de *significatione* vocum: et deinde de vocibus significativis determinat de quibus in proemio se dicturum promiserat. Et hoc ibi, *Nomen ergo est vox significativa* etc.[19]

From this solid basis, one can argue in two ways that the other treatises of logic are also about vocal sounds that signify by agreement. One can reason from part to part, using the kind of argument called *example*. And one can argue that what is considered in the logic of the first act becomes a part of a statement and that statements make up syllogisms and other arguments,

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[19]*In Peri Hermenias*, Lectio II, n. 11

considered in the logic of the third act. Hence. since statements are voices or vocal sounds, so also what are put together into statements or put together from statements, must also be vocal sounds.

I used to wonder how to translate the Greek word *logos* which is the genus in the definition of syllogism and the definition of definition. In particular, my question was whether Aristotle was defining the *logos* in words or the *logos* in the mind which was signified by those words. The solution I then gave was this. Aristotle is chiefly interested in the *logos* in the reason and only secondarily in the *logos* in words, insofar as the latter signifies the former. Hence, although the definition could be adapted easily to both according as we took either sense of *logos*, it should be taken as referring primarily to the *logos* in the reason and only secondarily as referring to the *logos* in words. Hence, when I translated the definition of syllogism into English, I would translate *logos* by *argument* (which is or could be something in reason) rather than by *speech* which in English names the *logos* in words. Likewise, in translating the definition of definition, I would try to avoid translating by *speech* which would again limit it to the *logos* in words. But here I had difficulty in finding one word (as I had found the word *argument* to translate *logos* in the definition of syllogism). I experimented with clumsy circumlocutions like *a composition of thoughts* etc.

I now think that these former attempts to translate the genus in the definitions of definition and syllogism were mistaken. Further, I have come to think that the reason I gave for translating in that way, has a fundamental defect in it.

One could argue against my attempts at translation first by the argument called *example*. The definitions of syllogism, definition and statement all have as their first part or genus the word *logos*. If I was correct in trying to translate *logos* as the *logos* in reason in the definitions of syllogism and definition, then likewise, I should translate *logos* in the definition of statement *as in reason*. But Aristotle in the *Peri Hermeneias* defines the *logos* in the definition of statement as a voice or vocal sound (phione), not as a thought or combination of thoughts. Hence, there was something wrong in my attempted translation and, consequently, in the reason I gave for so translating.

Further, since a syllogism is made up of statements, one could also reason from statement being in vocal sounds to syllogism being something in vocal sounds, a speech. Even though we give the statement or enunciation another name when it becomes part of the syllogism, corresponding to its new status as a premiss (in Latin this is *propositio*) the premiss is still a statement. As Albert states:

> propositio et enuntiatio non differant secundum substantiam et secundum id quod sunt propositio et enuntiatio, differunt tamen secundum esse, et secundum intentiones nominum.[20]

Hence, I was wrong in not translating *logos* in the definition of syllogism as *speech* or some other word indicating it was something in vocal sounds (or in not understanding *argument* as something in vocal sounds). Consequently, too there was something wrong in the reason why I tried to translate in this way.

If the *logos* in both the definitions of statement and syllogism is a vocal sound (in particular, a speech), why not also the *logos* in the definition of definition? Indeed, if statements and syllogisms are sometimes made out of definitions, and the former are vocal sounds, so too must the definitions out of which they are made. But there are also other reasons for thinking that Aristotle is defining the definition in words.

When Aristotle is teaching us how to define in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*, he gives us a warning not to define by metaphors (end of Chapter 12). Since the metaphor is a word, he could hardly give this warning if the definition was not in words. But words are vocal sounds. Hence, the *logos* in the definition of definition is that vocal sound or voice called a *speech*.

Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*, gives this definition of definition:

> definitio est oratio significans quod quid est[21]

This definition has three parts as does Aristotle's definition of definition at the beginning of Chapter 5 of Book One of the *Places* (*Topics*). The three parts of each definition clearly corresponds to each other. But we are here concerned only with the first part of the definition, the genus in each. Where Aristotle has *logos*, Thomas has *oratio*. But *oratio* (being connected with *oro* and *os*, meaning mouth) corresponds to *speech* in English, just as *orator* does to *speaker*. It is significant that in the translation of *logos* in the definition of definition (and for that matter, in the definitions of statement and syllogism) into Latin, Thomas uses *oratio* rather than *ratio*. The former (*oratio*) refers more to speech and vocal sounds while the latter (*ratio*) can refer more to thought.

In the seventh book of the *Metaphysics*, when he discusses definition, Aristotle also calls it a *logos* (at the beginning of Chapter 10, 1034b 20). The

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[20] *Commentaria in Liber I Priorum Analyticorum,* Tractatus I, Caput II, ed. Doyon, p. 4r

[21] *In II Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lectio II, n. 419

Latin translation used by Thomas does not use *oratio* here, but *ratio* which word surely lends itself to an understanding of definition as something in thoughts. But notice how Thomas in his commentary on this passage does not understand it this way:

> Dicit ego primo, quod omnis "definitio est quaedam ratio", idest quaedam compositio nominum per rationem ordinata.
>
> Unum enim nomen non potest esse definitio, quia definitio oportet quod distincte notificet principia rerum quae concurrunt ad essentiam rei constituendam; alias autem definitio non sufficienter manifestaret essentiam rei.
>
> Et propter hoc dicitur in primo *Physicorum*, quod definitio dividit "definitum in singulare", idest exprimit distincte singula principia definiti. Hoc autem non potest fieri nisi per plures dictiones: unde una dictio non potest esse definitio, sed potest esse manifestiva eo modo, quo nomen minus notum manfestatur per magis notum.
>
> Omnis autem ratio partes habet, quia est quaedam oratio composita et non simplex nomen.[22]

If then the other logical treatises are about vocal sounds, it is reasonable (reasoning from part to part) to say, as do all the Greek Commentators, that the *Categories* is about *vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts*.

Further, we can argue as Porphyry does (and many of the Commentators following him) from what Aristotle says after he has said that each of those said without intertwining signifies either substance or quantity etc. After this, he says[23] that none of those said without intertwining by itself is said in an affirmation, but that by intertwining affirmation or negation comes to be. But affirmation and negation are defined in the *Peri Hermeneias* as vocal sounds or voices. Hence, what makes them up must be the same.

One could also reason from definition being a composition of names ordered by reason. Since what are considered in the *Categories* are used in definition, they must be names and hence vocal sounds.

Thus, we can agree with the fourth step of the Greek Commentators, that the *Categories* is about *vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts*.

The defect in the reason that led us to think that Aristotle was defining what is in reason rather than what is in words is not hard to see. Even though thoughts are more important than vocal sounds and vocal sounds are for the

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[22]*In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 1460

[23]Chapter 4, 2a 5-10

sake of thoughts, it does not follow that logical treatises are about thoughts except in the way indicated in steps two and three. If you ask me what is a smile?" or "What is a frown?" I would put in my definition first that it is a facial expression that signifies. Then I would add the emotion or feeling which a smile or a frown signifies. Suppose mirth or merriment is what a smile signifies. Mirth may be more important than a smile and a smile may be for the sake of signifying mirth. But yet the genus of smile is not mirth or merriment, but a facial expression signifying the same. There is in the face a sign of what is within us.

Thomas Aquinas has written a treatise on the sacraments. The genus of a sacrament is *sign* in its first meaning (a sensible sign). Strictly speaking, the seven sacraments are not seven *graces*, but seven signs signifying and causing seven graces (if there is no impediment). In defining sacrament as a sign, Thomas is not saying that sensible signs are more important than graces or denying that these sensible signs are for the sake of the graces that they cause. Likewise we are not maintaining that vocal sounds are more important than thoughts or denying that they signify and are for the sake of thoughts. Just as sacraments are both tools and signs, so also the vocal sounds considered by the logician are both tools and signs. Perhaps we should develop a bit this double aspect with the help of some texts of Thomas.

In the following passage, Thomas gives us a good summary of the centuries old teaching that logic is not studied for its own sake, but is a tool and about tools:

> scientiae speculativae, ut patet in principio *Metaphysicorum*, sunt de illis quorum cognitio quaeritur propter seipsa.
>
> Res autem de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur ad cognoscendum propter seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias.
>
> Et ideo logica non continetur sub philosophia speculativa quasi principalis pars, sed sicut quoddam reductum ad eam, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et definitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in speculativis scientiis indigemus.
>
> Unde secundum Boetium in *Comment. super Porphyrium* (L. 1, cap. 3) non tam est scientia quam scientiae instrumentum.[24]
>
> [adminiculum: I a prop, a support, *the pole on which the vine is trained* I Transf. aid help]

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[24] *In Boetii de Trinitate*, Lectio II, Q. I, Art. 1, Ad 2

Thomas teaches us clearly that speech and its parts can be be used as instruments or tools:

> ratio potest etiam uti oratione et eius partibus quasi instrumentis.[25]

The use of speech and its parts as tools or instruments is not considered entirely by logic. There are, for example, speeches such as commands, prayers etc. which are tools used by reason to get someone to do something. Logic is not concerned with the use of speech and its parts for such purposes. But before we go further along this line, we must consider how speech and its parts are to be defined as instruments or tools of reason:

> oratio, quamvis non sit instrumentum alicuius virtutis naturaliter operantis, est tamen instrumentum rationis, ut supra dictum est.
>
> Omne autem instrumentum oportet definiri ex suo fine, qui est usus instrumenti: usus autem orationis, sicut et omnis vocis significativae, est significare conceptionem intellectus....
>
> duae autem sunt operationes intellectus, in quarum una non invenitur veritas vel falsitas, in alia autem invenitur verum et falsum. Et ideo orationem enunciativam definit ex significatione veri et falsi, dicens quod *non omnis oratio est enunciativa, sed in qua verum vel falsum est*...
>
> Dicitur autem in enunciatione esse verum et falsum, sicut in *signo* intellectus veri vel falsi: sed sicut *in subiecto* est verum vel falsum in mente, ut dicitur in libro *Praedicamentorum*, ab eo quod res est vel non est, oratio vera vel falsa est.[26]

Here we see that speech is a tool of reason insofar as it signifies. Hence, statement and definition are defined by what they signify. Likewise the parts of speech and, in particular, those said without any intertwining (the subject of the *Categories*) are defined by what they signify or how they signify. (Notice by the way how vocal sounds, thoughts and in a more remote way things enter into the discussion of statement above.)

It is difficult, if not impossible, for reason to use a tool that is not sensible. The teacher uses vocal sounds as a tool to order the thoughts of the student. But even when a man tries to order his own thoughts by himself, he needs to use vocal sounds even if he only imagines them in his head.

STEP FIVE

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[25] *In I Peri Hermeneias,* Lectio VI, n. 81)

[26] Thomas Aquinas, *In I Peri Hermeneias*. lectio VII, nn. 83-84

The skopos of the *Categories* so far has been determined in a general way that does not distinguish it from the skopos of other logical treatises. For every logical treatise is in some way about vocal sounds signifying things through thoughts. Hence, the part of the determination of the skopos that we have seen so far is proportional to the first part of Aristotle's determination of the skopos of the *Metaphysics* or wisdom in which he shows that wisdom is about causes. This is common to wisdom and other forms of reasoned-out knowledge. The part of the determination of the skopos of the *Categories* beginning with Step Five will separate the skopos of the *Categories* from that of other logical treatises. This is proportional to the second part of Aristotle's determination of the skopos of wisdom where he shows that it is about the *first cause*, thus separating it from all other forms of reasoned-out knowledge. (We should note that the skopos in the *Metaphysics* is not the subject of wisdom, but its goal. Further, in the *Metaphysics* we are concerned with the skopos of one whole reasoned-out knowledge while in the *Categories* we are concerned with the skopos of one part of a reasoned-out knowledge)

There is an interesting text of Thomas where he enumerates the chief subjects of the three parts of logic which corrrespond to the three acts of reason:

> Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, *syllogismum*, *enunciationem, praedicatum*, vel aliquid huiusmodi.[27]

The syllogism is without doubt the principal subject of the logic of the third act of reason (which is reasoning). Indeed, someone might say that it is the principal subject of logic as a whole:

> Inter species autem argumentationis praecipua est syllogismus. Propter quod quidam dixerunt quod logica tota est de syllogismo et partibus syllogismi: determinantes commune subjectum logicae secundum id quod est subjectum principale.[28]

There are, of course, other species of argumentation (*species* is here used *communiter loquendo*) considered in the logic of the third act, but the principal one is the syllogism:

> De his vero quae pertinent ad tertiam operationem determinat in libro *Priorum* et in consequentibus in quibus agitur de syllogismo *simpliciter* et diversis

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[27] *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lectio XX, n. 171

[28] Albert the Great, *De Praedicabilibus,* Tract. I, Caput IV, ed. Doyon, p. 8r

> syllogismorum et argumentationum speciebus quibus ratio de uno procedit ad aliud.[29]

There is no difficulty in seeing that the subject of the logic of the second act of reason is the enunciation or statement:

> De his quae vero pertinent ad secundam operationem, scilicet de enunciatione affirmativa et negativa, determinat Philosophus in libro *Peri Hermeneias*.[30]

But does St. Thomas think that *praedicatum* is the chief subject of the logic of the first act?

Someone might challenge the interpretation of the above text of Thomas on the subject of logic and assert that, after having enumerated the chief subjects of the third and second acts (syllogism and enunciation), he was not also stating the chief subject of the logic of the first act when he adds *praedicatum*. But why should he give the chief subjects of the third and second acts, but not of the first?

A student of Albert the Great might question making *praedicatum* the chief subject of the logic of the first act for two reasons. First, if the first act of reason is perfected by definition, and hence there is a consideration of definition in the logic of the first act (as Albert teaches, even though such a part has not come down to us from Aristotle) then it would be definition that is the principal subject of the logic of the first act. Second, in talking about the *Categories* and the *Isagoge,* Albert uses the words *praedicamentum* and *praedicabile* respectively, not *praedicatum* (which he uses more to name the four problems of the *Topics*)

In his two *Proemia* to logic, Thomas speaks only of the *Categories* belonging to the logic of the first act. In the minor proemium:

> De his igitur quae pertinent ad primam operationem intellectus, idest de his quae simplici intellectu concipiuntur, determinat Aristoteles in libro *Praedicamentorum*.[31]

And in the major proemium:

> Una enim actio intellectus est intelligentia indivisibilium sive incomplexorum, secundum quam concipit quid est res. Et haec operatio a quibusdam dicitur

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[29]St. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio in Libros Peri Hermeneias* , Liber I. Proemium, Marietti ed., n. 2

[30]Thomas Aquinas, *In I Peri Hermenias,* Proemium n. 2

[31]*In I Peri Hermeneias*, Proemium, n. 2

> informatio intellectus sive imaginatio per intellectum. Et ad hanc operationem rationis ordinatur doctrina, quam tradit Aristotles in libro *Praedicamentorum*.[32]

However, someone might respond that Thomas here is speaking only of the books of Aristotle that have come down to us and is not determining the question of what is the chief subject of the logic of the first act. There are many texts where Thomas does link definition with the first act. Here are three such texts:

> sicut in actibus exterioribus est considerare operationem et operatum, puta aedificationem et aedificatum; ita in operibus rationis est considerare ipsum actum rationis, qui est intelligere et ratiocinari, et aliquid per huiusmodi actum constitutum. Quod quidem in speculativa ratione primo quidem est definitio; secunda, enunciatio; tertio vero, syllogismus vel argumentatio.[33]

> The understanding however forms two things by two of its operations. For by its operation which is called the understanding of indivisibles, it forms a definition; by its operation in which it composes and divides, it forms a statement or something of this kind.[34]

> veritas et falsitas proprie invenitur in secunda operatione, et in signo ejus quod est enuntiatio, et non in primo, vel signo eius quod est definitio, nisi secundum quid.[35]

Did Aristotle write a book on definition for the logic of the first act and it has been lost? Or did he never get around to writing such a book? Or did he think the consideration of definition in Book II of the *Posterior Analytics* and in the *Topics* (esp. Book VI) sufficient and another consideration in the logic of the first act superfluous?

We cannot consider here whether there should be a consideration of definition in the logic of the first act. But without saying whether Thomas thinks there is or is not such a consideration, we can say that in the logic of the first act that has come down to us from Aristotle the subject of the *Categories* is a *praedicatum* according to St. Thomas. And if we understand *praedicatum* in a restricted sense, we are very close to determining the subject of the *Categories*. A principal text from St. Thomas on this restricted sense of

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[32] *In I Post. Analyticorum*, Proemium, n. 4

[33] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, q. 90, a. 1, ad 2

[34] *In I Super Ioannem*, Lect 1, n. 25

[35] *In I Sent.*, Q. V. Art I, Ad 7

praedicatum is found in his commentary on the first book of the *Posterior Analytics* :

> cum praedicatur accidens de subiecto, non praedicatur per aliquod aliud subiectum; cum autem praedicatur subiectum de accidente, vel accidens de accidente, fit praedicatio ratione eius quod subiicitur termino posito in subiecto; de quo quidem praedicatur aliud accidens accidentaliter, ipsa vero species subiecti essentialiter.
>
> Et quia in quolibet praedictorum modorum utimur nomine *praedicationis,* et sicut possumus nomina ponere, ita possumus ea restringere; imponamus sic nomina in probatione sequenti, ut *praedicari* solum dicamus illud, quod dicitur hoc modo, scilicet non ratione alterius subiecti.
>
> Illud vero quod dicitur illo modo, scilicet ratione alterius subiecti, velut cum subiectum praedicatur de accidente, vel accidens de accidente, non dicatur praedicari, vel si dicatur praedicari, non dicitur praedicari *simpliciter,* sed *secundum accidens*.
>
> Et accipiamus semper illud, quod se habet per modum *albi*, ex parte praedicati, id autem, quod se habet per modum *ligni*, accipiatur ex parte subiecti.
>
> Hoc ergo supponamus praedicari semper, in probatione sequenti, quod praedicatur de eo, de quo praedicatur *simpliciter*, et non *secundum accidens*. Et ratio quare debemus sic uti vocabulo praedicationis, haec est: quia loquimur in materia demonstrativa, demonstrationibus autem non utuntur nisi talibus praedicationibus.
>
> Deinde cum dicit: *Quare autem in quod* etc., ostendit differentiam praedicatorum *per se* ad invicem.
>
> Et circa hoc duo facit: primo distinguit praedicata ad invicem secundum diversa genera; secundo, ostendit differentiam praedicatorum: ibi: *Amplius substantiam quidem* etc.
>
> Dicit ergo primo, quod quia nos praedicari dicimus solum illud, quod praedicatur non secundum aliud subiectum, hoc autem diversificatur secundum decem praedicamenta; sequitur quod omne quod sic praedicatur, praedicetur aut *in quod quid est*, idest per modum *substantialis* praedicati, aut per modum *qualis*, vel *quanti* vel alicuius alterius praedicamentorum, de quibus actum est in *Praedicamentis*.[36]

St. Thomas also uses the word *praedicatum* in this restricted sense in one of the principal texts where he explains briefly the distinction of predicates according to the ten categories or praedicaments:

> Sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad subiectum *tripliciter* se potest habere..

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[36]Lectio XXXIII, nn. 281-283

> *Uno modo* cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur.
>
> *Secundo modo* ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quae quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute...vel inest ei non absolute...
>
> *Tertio modo* ut praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod est extra subiectum...[37]

In a rough way, then, we may say with Thomas that *praedicatum* or some kind of *praedicatum* is the subject of the *Categories*. But how would we define this *praedicatum* or predicate and how would it differ from the chief or principal subject of the other acts (enunciation and syllogism)?

If the subject of every logical treatise is a vocal sound, then the *Categories* must also be about a vocal sound. Hence, *praedicatum* must be a vocal sound. But it is not a speech or *oratio*, a vocal sound having parts that signify by themselves. It is rather a name (*nomen*) than a speech (*oratio*), as Thomas seems to indicate in discusssing a position of Avicenna on the predicates found in the genera of accidents:

> Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. Nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti, in quantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum.[38]

The *praedicatum* then, which is the subject of the *Categories* is a *name*. More precisely it is a *name said of many things univocally* (in the sense of Chapter 1 of the *Categories*). But we need not explain or defend the whole of this definition of *praedicatum* now. Knowing the genus *name* is sufficient for separating the skopos of the *Categories* from that of the chief subjects of the logic of the second and third acts. Both enunciation or statement and syllogism are clearly speeches or vocal sounds composite in their signification or vocal sounds having parts that signify by themselves; but name is a vocal sound simple in its signification. This difference is also sufficient to separate *praedicatum* from the other kinds of argumentation considered in the logic of the third act It also separates *praedicatum* from definition (wherever one puts it in logic) since a definition is also a speech.

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[37] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, nn. 891-892

[38] *In V Metaphysicorum*., Lectio IX, n. 894

STEP SIX

To say that the *Categories* is about vocal sounds whose parts do not signify anything by themselves separates the subject of the *Categories* from the principal subjects in the logic of the second and third acts which have parts that signify something by themselves. But since in considering statement and syllogism, we also consider parts of them which do not have or need not have parts that signify by themselves (such as noun and verb in the statements and term in the syllogism), it is also necessary to consider the difference between the simple vocal sounds belonging to the treatise of the *Categories* and those treated of in the books on statement and the syllogism. Thomas Aquinas distinguishes them thus:

> Si quis autem quaerat, cum in libro *Praedicamentorum* de simplicibus dictum sit, quae fuit necessitas ut hic rursum de nomine et verbo determinaretur; ad hoc dicendum quod simplicium dictionum *triplex* potest esse consideratio.
>
> *Una* quidem, secundum quod absolute significant simplices intellectus, et sic earum consideratio pertinet ad librum *Praedicamentorum*.
>
> *Alio modo,* secundum rationem, prout sunt partes enunciationis; et sic determinatur de eis in hoc libro; et ideo traduntur sub ratione nominis et verbi: de quorum ratione est quod significent aliquid cum tempore vel sine tempore, et alia huiusmodi, quae pertinent ad rationem dictionum, secundum quod constituunt *enunciationem*.
>
> *Tertio modo,* considerantur secundum quod ex eis constituitur ordo syllogisticus, et sic determinantur de eis sub ratione terminorum in libro *Priorum*.[39]

This is similar to a distinction which is made in practical philosophy. What a man should do belongs to three considerations and treatises: ethics, domestics and politics. We can say at first that ethics is about what an individual man should do while domestics is about what the family should do and politics about what the city or nation should do. And because an individual man is not a community of men as is a city or the family, we have distinguished the principal subject of these sciences. But since domestics and politics also consider what individual men should do (for example, what a father or a king or a citizen should do), it is necessary further to distinguish what the difference is between ethics and domestics and politics when they talk about what one man should do. And there we find a distinction proportional to that above. Ethics considers what one man

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[39] *In I Peri Hermeneias*, Lectio I, n. 5

should do considered absolutely or simple as a man (rather than a beast or angel). Domestics considers what one man should do as a part of the family and, hence, as a father or a son. Politics considers one man insofar as he is apart of the city such as a king or a legislator or merely a citizen.

The Greek Commentators also address themselves to this question, but in a more particular way and with a different distinction. They aim mainly at distinguishing between the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* and in the *Peri Hermeneias*. The distinction they see is between the *first placing* of names and the *second placing* of names. We must first understand this distinction and, second, see whether it is sufficient to distinguish the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* and the *Peri Hermeneias*. A third consideration will then be necessary to see if this distinction is useful or sufficient for separating the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* from all other considerations of simple vocal sounds in logic.

It is easy to misunderstand what the Greek Commentators mean here by the *first* and *second placing* of names. There are, indeed, at least three ways in which we can speak of a first and second placing of names. In two of these, we speak of the first and second placing of the *same* name.

We sometimes place a name upon one thing and then carry over this same name and place it upon another thing in reference to the first. Thus the name *road* is placed upon the pavement over which we walk or drive. And because when we walk or drive down this pavement, one part comes *before* or *after* another; we carry over this name *road* and place it upon the before and after in our knowledge which has a certain likeness to the original road.

A second way in which we could understand the first and second placing of names is this. We first place a name upon a thing and then second, we place that name in a statement. And when we place the statement in a syllogism (in Latin, they are named from this placing *propositiones*), the same name has consequently been placed a third time as a major or a middle or a minor term.

A third meaning of the *first and second placing* of names is the one used by the Greek Commentators here. In the beginning, there were no names, but there were things. Then man placed names upon things, calling this a *man* and that a *horse* etc. This is the first placing of names, the placing of names upon things. Then man, by a second consideration, came back over the names of things and called some of them *nouns* and some of them *verbs,* depending upon whether they signified with time or without time.

Boethius, following the Greek Commentators, explains it thus:

> prius breviter hujus operis aperienda videtur intentio, quae est hujusmodi: rebus praejacentibus, et in propria principaliter naturae constitutione manentibus, humanum solum genus exstitit, quod rebus nomina possit imponere. Unde factum est ut sigillatim omnia prosecutus hominis animis singulis vocabula rebus aptaret. Et hoc quidem, verbi gratia, corpus, hominem vocavit, illud vero lapidem, aliud lignum, aliud vero colorem. Et rursus quicunque ex se alium genuisset, patris vocabulo nuncupavit. Mensuram quoque magnitudinis proprii forma nominis terminavit, ut diceret bipedale esse, aut tripedale, et in aliis eodem modo.
>
> Omnibus ergo nominibus ordinatis, ad ipsorum rursus vocabulorum proprietates figurasque reversus est, et hujusmodi vocabuli formam, quae inflecti casibus possit, nomen vocavit; quae vero temporibus distribui, verbum.
>
> Prima igitur illa fuit nominum positio, per quam vel intellectui subjecta vel sensibus designaret. Secunda consideratio, qua singulas proprietates nominum fIgurasque perspicerent, ita ut primum nomen sit ipsum rei vocabulum: ut, verbi gratia, cum quaelibet res homo dicatur. Quod autem ipsum vocabulum, idest homo, nomen vocatur, non ad significationem nominis ipsius refertur, sed ad figuram, idcirco quod possit casibus inflecti.
>
> Ergo prima positio nominis secundum significationem vocabuli facta est, secunda vero secundum figuram:
>
> et est prima positio, ut nomina rebus imponerentur, secunda vero ut aliis nominibus ipsa nomina designaretur...
>
> In hoc igitur opere haec intentio est, de primis rerum nominibus, et de vocibus res significantibus disputare, non in eo quod secundum aliquam proprietatem figuramque formantur, sed in eo quod significantes sunt...
>
> Est igitur hujus operis intentio de vocibus res significantibus, in eo quod significantes sunt pertractare.[40]

If we compare these three senses of the first and second placing of names. we can see that in the first two, it is the *same* name that is placed first, second and sometimes more. But in the third sense, it is not the same name that is placed. Rather one name is placed upon a thing and then *another* name is placed upon the first name. The name *dog*, for example, is placed upon the familiar four-footed animal. And then *another* name, *noun* is placed upon the name *dog*. But in the first and third senses, we speak also of a first and second *placing upon* (*impositio*) of names, but not in the second sense.

Having seen which meaning of the *first and second placing of names* the Greek Commentators and Boethius have in mind, we can ask whether this distinction is sufficient to separate the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* from that in the *Peri Hermeneias*.

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[40]*In Categorias Aristotelis*, Liber Primus, in PL, Vol. 64, pp 159-160

This distinction does help us to separate the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* from that in the *Peri Hermeneias* if we say that the *Categories* is about names like *substance, quantity* and *quality* and the *Peri Hermeneias* is a about names like *noun* and *verb*. Names like *substance*, *quantity* and *quality* are names of things or names placed upon things while names like *noun* and *verb* are names of names or names placed upon names.

Yet using this distinction does raise certain questions. The first question is about how this distinction can be used at all within logic to distinguish between various parts of logic; and the second question is, assuming that this distinction can be used within logic, whether it is the best way of separating the consideration of simple vocal sounds in the *Categories* from that in the *Peri Hermeneias*.

One rare place where Thomas makes a similar distinction is in his commentary on the *Sentences* :

> Nec tamen hoc nomen "ratio" significat ipsam conceptionem, quia hoc significatur per nomen sapientiae vel per aliud nomen rei; sed significat intentionem hujus conceptionis, sicut et hoc nomen "definitio", et alia nomina secundae impositionis.
>
> Et ex hoc patet secundum, scilicet qualiter ratio dicatur esse in re. Non enim hoc dicitur, quasi ipsa intentio quam significat nomen rationis, sit in re; aut etiam ipsa conceptio, cui convenit talis intentio, sit in re extra animam, cum sit in anima sicut in subjecto: sed dicitur esse in re, inquantum in re extra animam est aliquid quod respondet conceptioni animae, sicut significatum signo.[41]

Here Thomas distinguishes between *nomen rei* and *nomen rationis*. We might also call the *nomen rationis* here a *nomen intentionis* ("ipsa intentio quam significat nomen rationis") Finally, he puts names that signify the intention of a concept like *definition* among *nomina secundae impositionis*. Would then a *nomen rei* be called a *nomen primae impositionis*?

It is important to see that when St. Thomas here uses the the phrase *nomina secundae impositionis*, he is not referring to the *secunda impositio* of one and the same name. He is making a distinction similar to that above in the third meaning of *first and second placing* of a name, but the second placing here is the placing of a name upon an intention rather than upon a name.

We may now approach our first problem or question:

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[41] *In I Sent.* Dist. II, Q. I, Art. III, Ad 1 & 2

> aliae scientiae sunt de rebus, et aliae de intentionibus intellectis[42]

If other sciences are about things and about intentions, to which of these two groups does logic belong? Thomas seems to touch upon the answer here:

> Et quia circa omnia quae in rebus sunt habet negotiari ratio, logica autem est de operationibus rationis: logica etiam erit de his, quae communia sunt omnibus, idest de *intentionibus* rationis, quae ad omnes res se habent. Non autem ita, quod logica sit de ipsis rebus communibus, sicut de subiectis.[43]

Hence, it would seem that all the names belonging to logical treatises would be names of intentions rather than of things even though these intentions have a remote foundation in things. All names in logic would seem to be like the word *genus* :

> Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est exta animam; et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit; sicut significatum hujus nominis "genus" non est similitudo alicujus rei extra anima existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis; et huiusmodi intentionis licit proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. et similiter est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et hujusmodi.[44]

If logic is about intentions and not things, then the names considered in logical treatises should be names of intentions and not names of things. There is an interesting example of the reverse case objected to in the article on the definition of *person* in the *Summa Theologiae* :

> 3. Praeterea nomen intentionis non debet poni in definitione rei. Non enim esset bona assignatio, si quis diceret, *homo est species animalis*: *homo* enim est nomen rei, et *species* est nomen intentionis. Cum igitur *persona* sit nomen rei (significat enim substantiam quandam rationalis naturae), inconvenienter *individuum* quod est nomen intentionis, in eius definitione ponitur...
>
> Ad tertium dicendum quod, quia substantiales differentiae non sunt nobis notae, vel etiam nominatae non sunt, oportet interdum uti differentiis accidentalibus loco substantialium, puta si quis diceret: *ignis est corpus simplex, calidum et siccum:* accidentia enim propria sunt effectus formarum substantialium, et manifestant eas.

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[42] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Caput XI

[43] *In I Post. Anal.*, Lectio XX, n. 171

[44] *In I Sent.* Dist. II, Q. I, Art. III, Ad 2

> Et similiter nomina intentionum possunt accipi ad definendum res, secundum quod accipiuntur pro aliquibus nominibus rerum quae non sunt posita. Et sic hoc nomen *individuum* ponitur in definitione personae, ad designandum modum subsistendi qui competit substantiis particularibus.[45]

Can we accept then what the Greek Commentators and Boethius say about the *Categories*, that it is about names placed on things? These commentators are not saying the reverse of what Thomas says in the above reply; that is, they are not saying that we are using names of things because we lack names of intentions. Rather they are simply saying that we are talking about names of things without any mention of intentions.

We have seen above in the Second Step that logic is about things *secundum quid* and that *principaliter logicus intentiones considerat relatas ad res*, but these two truths do not seem sufficient for a whole treatise in logic to be chiefly about names of things rather than of intentions.

But logic considers the common way of proceeding in reasoned-out knowledge. And in every reasoned-out knowledge, we place names upon things. Hence, the placing of names upon things belongs to the consideration of logic.

Yet to this someone might object that it perhaps belongs to logic to consider how we place names upon things, but the actual placing of names upon things belongs to the reasoned-out knowledge that considers those things. It belongs to political philosophy, for example, to place names upon the various kinds of government or to consider the names which have been placed upon various kinds of government; and to ethics, to place names upon the various virtues and vices or to consider the names which have been placed upon them.

We must now try to untie these difficulties. We have seen before that logic is not about things *simpliciter*. It is not true to say that logic is about things unless we qualify this or add to it some diminution, for logic is about things only *secundum quid*. Nevertheless, logic is ordered to knowing things. Further, as Albert says, although logic considers intentions and not things, it nevertheless considers intentions chiefly as related to things. Finally we have pointed out that logical treatises are about vocal sounds and the first part of logic about names. Our solution of these difficulties must start from these truths.

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from logic being ordered to a knowledge o things (without being itself a knowledge of these things). The logic of the third act would not be interested in syllogisms and

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[45]Prima Pars, Q. 29, Art. 1, Obj. 3 and Ad 3

other arguments if these were not useful for knowing things. Likewise, the logic of the second act would not be interested in statements if statements were not about things, if statements were not true or false because of the way things are. Finally the logic of the first act would not be interested in names if we did not place names upon things or if things were not named by us. Always *there is some order to knowing things* in everything considered by the logician.

Since logic's order to knowing things is seen most easily in the logic of the third act, the logic of arguments; and the logic of the second act is ordered to the third act, and the logic of the first act to the second; we can reason from the interest in things in the third act to that in the second and from there to the first. If a syllogism or other argument is to bear upon things, then the statements composing it must be about things. And if a statement is going to be about things, the names in the statement must be placed upon things.

If we do not place names upon things, we cannot make statements about things. And if we cannot make statements about things, we cannot reason about things.

If the logic of the first act is about names (the *Isagoge* and the *Categories*), it must be about names of things in some way. It must consider names said of things or names placed upon things or even the placing of names upon things. If names were considered without any reference to things, the logic of the first act would lose any order to knowing things. Consequently the whole of logic would be cut off from any reference to things.

But in what way and to what extent can logic be concerned about the placing of names upon things? Does its concern extend to how we place names upon things? And if it does, is that the limit of its consideration? Or does it also distinguish the names placed upon things?

The famous question discussed in the *Cratylus*, whether names are placed upon things by nature or by human agreement, is to this part of logic like the question of innate knowledge is to the *Posterior Analytics*. Perhaps it is a fundamental principle in this part of logic that names are placed upon things by convention and not by nature.

Since logic is order to reasoned-out knowledge which is a knowledge of the universal and not of the singular as such, it is clearly interested in names said of many things rather than in names said of only one individual. Hence, it makes this distinction and proceeds to consider names said of many things. Can logic make this distinction? Yes if it is based on the distinction of universal and individual, a distinction in intentions.

When logic takes up *name said of many things*, it distinguishes between names said univocally and names said equivocally and names said proportionally, of many things. This is also a distinction that logic is able to make because it is based upon the intentions of these names or their ratios.

Logic is not so much interested in the name said of many things (purely) equivocally. For such names are said of many things by chance and no reasoned-out knowledge is about what is by chance. Hence, the consideration of names said of many things by chance is extremely brief (as is the consideration of accidental being in Book VI of the *Metaphysics*). Further, such names are not useful in coming to know one meaning from the other, as is the proportional name. Moreover, men are rarely if ever deceived by the equivocation of such names in universal matters (as they are by the equivocation by design of proportional names).

We shall leave for another occasion what logic can say about names said proportionally of many things.

The *Isagoge* of Porphyry enables us to divide *name said of many things univocally* in a way that is clearly within the ability of logic. Every name said of many things univocally signifies either their genus or their difference or their species or their property or an accident of them. This distinction is again based on the intentions which logic considers (chiefly as related to things).

In the *Isagoge*, we learn how the same thing can be a genus and a species, but in comparison to what is below and what is above it. Then we learn that there is a genus which is not a species and a species which is not a genus, that there is a highest genus and a lowest species. In the *Categories*, we learn the names of the highest genera which turn out to be ten in number. But can the placing of names upon things in logic extend so far as to take up even the names placed upon the ten highest genera? This is possible only if these ten are distinguished by something proper to logic's consideration. What is proper to logic's consideration is brought out well by Thomas:

> Logicus enim considerat modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei. Unde quicquid respondetur ad quid est, dicit pertinere ad quod quid est; sive illud sit intrinsecum, ut materia et forma; sive sit extrinsecum, ut agens et finis. Sed Philosophus qui existentiam quaerit rerum, finem vel agentem, cum sint extrinseca, non comprehendit sub quod quid erat esse. Unde si dicamus, domus est aliquid prohibens a frigore et caumate, logice loquendo significatur quod quid erat esse, non autem secundum considerationem Philosophi.[46]

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[46] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVII, n. 1658

A beautiful distinction of the way of logic and the way of natural philosophy is that the former proceeds *per viam praedicationis* and the latter *per viam motus:*

> Attamen diversitatem materiae ab omnibus formis non probat Philosophus per viam motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis philosophiae, sed per viam praedicationis, quae est propria Logicae, quam in quarto huius dicit affinem esse huic scientiae. Dicit ergo, quod oportet aliquid esse, de quo omnia praedicta praedicentur; ita tamen quod sit diversum esse illi subiecto de quo praedicentur, et unicuique eorum quae de "ipso praedicantur," idest diversa quidditas et essentia.[47]

And this is necessary for distinguishing diverse genera in logic:

> Hic ostendit quot modis dicuntur aliqua diversa genere; et ponit duos modos respondentes ultimis duobus modis generis...
>
> Primo igitur modo dicuntur aliqua genere diversa, quia eorum primum subiectum est diversum. sicut primum subiectum coloris est superficies, primum autem subiectum saporis est humor...
>
> Alio modo dicuntur diversa genere, quae dicuntur "secundum diversam figuram categoriae", idest praedicationis entis...
>
> Primus autem modus diversitatis secundum genus consideratur magis a naturali, et etiam a philosopho, quia est magis realis. Secundus autem modus consideratur a logico, quia est rationis.[48]

And in another passage:

> ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi...Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi."[49]

We are about at the limit of the consideration of logic in distinguishing names placed upon things. The species of these highest genera cannot be distinguished by diverse modes of predication. And, hence, Aristotle, for the most part, does not in the *Categories* divide these highest genera into their species with the notable exception of quantity and quality. But why he names the species into which quantity and quality are first divided is not necessary to our consideration of the skopos of the *Categories*. (A clue to this is perhaps found in the comparisons Thomas Aquinas makes of these with the distinction of the meanings of these names in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*.)

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[47]Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio II, nn. 1287-1289

[48]Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphys*, Lectio XXII, n. 1124-1127

[49]Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphys*, Lectio IX, n. 890

STEP SEVEN

We have really covered Step Seven in the last step in seeing how far the logician can go in distinguishing names placed upon things without stepping into some other reasoned-out knowledge.

The Greek Commentators do not, I think, develop enough the reason for this limitation of logic's consideration of names placed upon things. Some of them seem to be content to say that no reasoned-out knowledge can consider the unlimited and the multitude of names placed upon things are without any limit. This is insufficient because the logician could draw the limit somewhere else further on than he does if there was not some reason why logic is limited here.

The limit of the logician's distinction would seem to be based upon his proceeding *per viam praedicationis*. The Greek Commentators seem to say rightly that logic is concerned with some names placed upon things, but without seeing precisely how it is able to do this in a way proper to logic or from beginnings proper to logic. Hence, they perhaps do not see fully why its consideration of names placed upon things is limited and why the limits come where they do.

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DIVISION OF THE *CATEGORIES*

- BEFORE THE GENERA OF CATEGORIES CHAPTERS 1-4
  - THE NAMES TO BE DISTINGUISHED
    - Three definitions of things as named: chapter one
    - The division of those said: first part of chapter two
  - THE DISTINCTION OF THE NAMES
    - What is presupposed to the distinction
    - The division of beings: 2nd part of chapter two
    - Rules of praedicamental order: chapter three
    - Distinction of the names by the ten genera: chapter four
- THE GENERA OF CATEGORIES CHAPTERS 5-9
  - SUBSTANCE: CHAPTER 5
    - What is contained in genus of substance
    - Their properties
  - GENERA OF ACCIDENTS INWARDLY DENOMINATING SUBSTANCE: CHAPTERS 6-8
    - Quantity: chapter six
      - Quantities per se and per accidens
      - The properties of quantity
    - Relation or toward something: chapter seven
      - The first definition of toward something
      - The properties of toward something
      - The second definition of toward something
      - Another property following second definition
    - Quality: chapter eight
      - The forms of quality (howness) and how
      - The properties of quality
      - Reply to an objection
  - GENERA OF ACCIDENTS OUTWARDLY DENOMINATING SUBSTANCE: CH. 9

AFTER THE GENERA OF CATEGORIES CHAPTERS 10-15

DISTINCTION AND ORDER: CHAPTERS 10-13

Opposites

The four kinds of opposite: chapter ten

Brief distinction of four kinds of opposites

Each kind considered in particular, showing also the difference of each from the others

Contrariety in particular: chapter eleven

Whether a thing has only one contrary (when it has a contrary)

The existence of contraries

Not necessary if one contrary is, the other is

Two contraries cannot belong to the same at the same time

Contraries are about the same or have the same subject

Contraries and genera: contraries are in the same genus or in contrary genera or are contrary genera

Before and together or at once

Senses of the word *before:* chapter twelve

The manifest four senses in order

Another sense more hidden and most important

Senses of the word *together* or *at once:* chapter thirteen

THE SPECIES OF MOTION: CHAPTER 14

SENSES OF THE WORD *TO HAVE:* CHAPTER 15

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CHAPTER ONE OF THE *CATEGORIES*

The first chapter of the *Categories* contains three definitions. These three definitions are not parts of one division or distinction, but the first and second definitions could be regarded as making a distinction between two ways that things can have a name in common. But the third definition (if it can be called a definition) is not distinguishing another way that things can have a name in common. Rather it is considering a distinction between a name such as *healthy* and *health* or between *virtuous* and *virtue*.

Things can have the same name in common *equivocally* or *univocally*, we learn from the first two definitions.

When they have the same name in common equivocally, the definition of what each is according to the name is other. When the same name is said of them equivocally, the definition of what is meant by that name is not common, but there is a definition private to each of them.

When they have the same name in common univocally, the definition of what each is according to the name is the same. When the same name is said of them univocally, the definition of what is meant by that name is common to both.

We should note that the sense of *univocal* here is more narrow than in the beginning of logic. Things are named *univocally* here when the definition of their substance, or what they are, is the same; not just in general when the meaning of the word is the same.

In the *Isagoge* of Porphyry, genus, difference, species, property and accident are all said univocally of many things. But only genus and species signify the same *what it is* when said of those many things (although difference signifies how they are what they are). Aristotle takes univocally in this more narrow sense here because he intends chiefly the ordering of genera and species under their highest genera.

Aristotle uses the *same* name (the Greek word for animal whence we get our words *zoo* and *zoology*) to exemplify both ways in which things can have a name in common (distinguished in the first two definitions). Why does he do this?

One can begin to answer this question by seeing the distinction between a name *being equivocal* and a name *being said equivocally of many things.* A name is equivocal (either by chance or by reason) because it has more than one meaning or sense. But such a name can be said of many things univocally when it is said of them by only one of its meanings. The word *bat*, for example, is an equivocal word for it can mean the wooden tool used by the baseball player to hit the ball or it can mean the flying rodent. When it is said of both of these, it is said equivocally of them. But when it is said of a number of baseball bats, it is said univocally of them. For it is said of them according to only one of its meanings. Most words said univocally of many things are in fact equivocal words. Names of the genera and species ordered under their highest genera in the *Categories* can be equivocal words (that is words having more than one meaning). But they are ordered insofar as they are said univocally of many things. *Body* in one of its meanings is placed under substance as a species and it is also a genus of living body and non-living body. But *body* is also in another of its meanings placed under continuous quantity as a species.

We can also ask why Aristotle takes two substances (man and ox) as examples of things named univocally rather than two accidents. Perhaps it is because we see *what it is* in substance before in accident. One of the meanings of *substance* is *what it is*. And a sign of this is the speech used to refer to this as the *logos of ousia* or *substance, the definition of what it is*. Hence, we learn in the seventh book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* (the *Metaphysics)* that either there is definition only of substance, or if of accident, only in some secondary way.

In the first two definitions of Chapter One, Aristotle is pointing out two ways in which *things* can have a name in common. Since we have asserted that the *Categories* is chiefly about names signifying things through thoughts, the question arises why does Aristotle begin with things rather than from names.

Some of the Greek Commentators (who also assert that the *Categories* is about names) answer this question by saying that the signification of names can be known only in reference to things. Although the latter statement is true, it does not show why Aristotle begins from things, but only that reference to things must be brought in when discussing names. Aristotle could also have made use of things if he had defined *name said equivocally of many things* rather than *things named equivocally*. Why then does he begin from things?

The basic reason is that logic is ordered to knowing things. Hence, if things were not named, the consideration of names would not be a chief part of logic. Hence, Aristotle begins from things to show that the consideration of names belongs to logic.

It does not follow from Aristotle's beginning with things that the *subject* of the *Categories* is more things than names. The goal of a science may be more known than its subject and a middle term for showing what its subject is. The goal of wisdom (to know the first cause), for example, is more known to us than, and is a middle term for showing, the subject of wisdom (being and the one). In the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle shows that wisdom aims at causes and more precisely at the first causes, but it is not until the fourth book that he shows through this that its subject is being as being.

Moreover, logic and the *Categories* is about things in some way. It is about things insofar as they are in reason or known by reason; as Thomas Aquinas explains:

> ...secundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione.[1]

Things are named insofar as they are in reason or known by reason. Therefore, since we name things as they are known (by reason), to speak of things as named is also to speak of them insofar as they are in reason. Things are placed in or under the categories insofar as they are named in some way. He begins from things since things are before names. The *Categories* is also about the first placing of names: the placing of names upon things.

Moreover, thoughts that have no foundation in things have no place in a reasoned out knowledge. The reason why some things can be named univocally and others, only equivocally is founded in those things. Unless there is a remote foundation in things for the way they are named or the ways names are said of them, logic could not be a sure guide. To use Aristotle's examples, there is a foundation in man and the ox for their being named univocally by the name *animal* (for their having not only a name in common, but the definition of what it is being the same when that name is said of each). Likewise, there is a foundation in the man and the image

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[1] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIII, n. 1576

(whether a painting or a statue)) for the word *animal* (the Greek word can mean not only an image of an animal) being said equivocally of them.

A comparison to something Aristotle does in the beginning of the eighth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* may be useful here. When Aristotle is giving the reasons for considering friendship in ethics and political philosophy, he gives as one reason that it is *natural*. Someone might say that this is a reason to consider it in *natural* philosophy rather than in ethics and political philosophy. But if there were nothing naturally good or bad, there would be no ethics and political philosophy. Although ethics and political philosophy are not about the natural as such, but about what is by choice and custom, nevertheless the judgment of what is good or bad in the things that are by choice and custom is founded on what is by nature good or bad. By virtue and vice, one is disposed well or badly with respect to one's nature as an animal with reason and to one's natural end as such an animal.

The first two definitions of Chapter One and the distinction involved in them would seem to be ordered most of all to the distinction and ordering of genera and species under their highest genera. Hence, we are interested in those things named univocally or the names said univocally of many things. But there are also things named equivocally in the *Categories*. Substance and accident are called *beings* or *things* equivocally. They have the name *being* or *thing* equivocally. And in the post-predicaments, we distinguish senses of words equivocal by reason.

The third definition of Chapter One has a much different purpose that the first two. Things are named *denominatively* so they can be said of another thing. We cannot say truly that Socrates is *virtue* or *justice* and that a dog is *health*. But we can truly say that Socrates is *virtuous* or *just* and that a dog is *healthy.* When Aristotle first distinguishes the nine genera of accidents in the Fourth Chapter, he will speak *denominatively.* And this is necessary, for as we shall see there, the ten genera are distinguished by how something can be said of individual substances. And accidents can be said of individual substances only denominatively. But when he orders genera and species of accidents under their own highest genera, there is no need to speak denominatively. We can place courage, moderation and justice as species under virtue and likewise we could place courageous, moderate and just under virtuous. But only the latter could be said of Socrates.

What is denomination and what is it to be named denominatively?

Perhaps the first thing to be considered is the difference between logical and grammatical denomination or what denomination means in these

two arts. And before this difference, there is another one as regards the nature of things or what they are. In a text which Msgr. Dionne first called to my attention, Thomas Aquinas pointed out a likeness of logic and natural philosophy in distinction from grammar. The former are about the nature of things while the latter is more concerned with the words themselves. In talking about passion or undergoing, the logician and the natural philosopher, in distinction from the grammarian, consider undergoing as regards the nature of the thing. Here is the text:

> passio potest sumi dupliciter: vel quantum ad naturam rei prout logicus et naturalis passionem considerat, et hoc modo non oportet omnem poenam passionem esse, sed quamdam poenam, scilicet poenam sensus; vel quantum ad modum significandi, prout grammaticus considerat, et sic illud passive dicitur quod a verbo passivo derivatur.[2]

As Albert the Great teaches us, logical denomination is not the derivation of one word from another, but from the name of the nature itself. In the Chapter on things named denominatively, St. Albert distinguishes between denomination in grammar and in logic:

> Quamvis secundum grammaticam justitia derivetur a justo, tamen secundum naturam et rationem denominationis et denominati, a justitia formatur justus. Grammaticus enim nominum modos et formas attendit: et quia in declinatione sic declinatur justus, justi, addita tia fit justitia: ideo dicit justitiam formari vel derivari a justo: hoc enim modo justum a justitia formari non potest. Natura autem denominationis e contrario est: quia denominans est alienam naturam informans: et ideo nomen illius naturae praeintelligere oportet.[3]

Albert explains that three things are necessary for denomination as the word is used in logic:

> In denominatione ergo haec tria necessaria sunt, scilicet natura aliena, subjecto extrinsecus aptata et circumposita, in principali et denominativo eadem res significata, et diversi modi significandi.[4]

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[2] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist XXXV, Q. 1, Art . 1, Ad 5
[3] *De Praedicamentis*, Tractatus I, Caput IV, ed. Doyon, p. 14a
[4] *De Praedicamentis*, Tractatus I, Caput IV, ed. Doyon, p. 14b

The *from something* of the definition touches upon the alien nature, the *differing in case or ending* that they do not differ in their principal signification but in the mode of signifying only, and the last part *are called according to the name* that the alien nature is brought to the subject in some way.

Thomas states that denomination strictly speaking is according to how an accident is toward a subject when explaining that the *loved* is not a denomination from *love*, but as its object:

> denominatio proprie est secundum habitudinem accidentis ad subjectum. Sic autem dilectum non denominatur a dilectione, sed magis sicut objectum.[5]

Thus denomination is from what is like a form, but as Thomas explains elsewhere it does not have to be really a form:

> illud a quo aliquid denominatur, non oportet quod sit semper forma secundum rei naturam, sed sufficit quod significetur per modum formae, grammatice loquendo. Denominatur enim homo ab actione et ab indumento, et ab aliis huiusmodi, quae realiter non sunt formae.[6]

However, when the nine genera of accidents are signified denominatively in the *Categories,* they signify only accidents for the reason Thomas gives when rejecting the position of Avicenna. Consider this more at length.

What do names like *colored* and *virtuous* signify? And can they be placed in a Category? What is the difference in meaning between *colored* and *color?* (Or between *virtuous* and *virtue?)* It is a mistake to think that *color* means the quality and *colored* the substance that has this quality. Or that *virtue* means the quality and *virtuous* the substance that has the quality. This is the error of Avicenna as Thomas explains:

> Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico *album* et *musicum*. Nam *album* ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen *album* significat subiectum ex consequenti,

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[5] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum,* Dist XVII, Q. I, Art. V, Ad 2
[6] *De Potentia*, q. 7, Art. 10, Ad 8

> inquantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. *Albedo* enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a Philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est.[7]

The difference between *colored* and *color* (or between *virtuous* and *virtue)* is thus not in what they chiefly signify because they both signify the same quality. They differ in that *colored* (or *virtuous)* signifies this accident *per modum accidentis* while *color* signifies this accident *per modum substantiae* (as does *virtue)*. From the above text, it can also be seen that *colored* is placed in a category. (If one examines the above text carefully, one will also see that it confirms the position that the *praedicatum* which is the subject of the *Categories* is a *nomen* or name.)

If *colored* signified a substance with a color, it would be accidental being in the sense of the fifth book of *Wisdom* (Or *Metaphysics).* Accidental being there does not mean accident as distinguished from substance, but accidental as distinguished from as such or per se. The distinction of being according to the figures of predication, the ten highest genera, is one of the two main distinctions of being as such or through itself.

We have said that Chapter One contains three definitions while Chapter Two will contain two divisions: the division of those said and the division of beings. This is also the way Cajetan speaks in his commentary on the *Categories*.[8] This seems correct because in Chapter Two he begins with what is to be divided and then gives the division into parts

But since division and distinction are before definition, is there some division or distinction implied in the definitions of Chapter One?

There seems to be two distinctions implied in Chapter One. The three definitions do not correspond to one distinction or division. They are not parts of one division.

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[7] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 894

[8] Cajetan, *De Praedicamentis* ed Doyon, p. 13B: "diffinitionibus tribus praeponendis iam completis, divisiones inchoat."

The first two definitions imply a distinction which can be made with one name or two names. Things can have a name in common with or without the same definition of what it is that is meant when that name is said of each of them. The baseball bat and the bat in the belfry have the name *bat* in common, but the definition of what it is for each to be a bat is not the same. The square and the oblong have in common the name *quadrilateral* and the definition of what it is for each to be a quadrilateral is the same. In these examples, we used two different names, *bat* and *quadrilateral*. But in Aristotle's examples, one name, *animal*, was used (but with different things having that name).

But the third definition corresponds to a distinction between two names, one of which *in meaning* is derived from the other. This is, for example, the distinction between *healthy* and *health* or between *virtuous* and *virtue* or between *wise* and *wisdom* or between *good* and *goodness*. In the first two examples, the first word is derived from the second. But in the last two examples, the second word seems to be derived from the first. However, as far as the *meaning* of these words is concerned (and the logician is concerned with words only insofar as they *mean* something), the first word is derived from the second in all four examples. For to say that the body is *healthy* means that it *has health*. And to say that Socrates is *virtuous* means that Socrates *has a virtue*. And to say that Aristotle is *wise* means that he *has wisdom.* And to say that someone is *good* means that they *have goodness*.

The distinction of these two names is important for the logic of the *Categories,* for the logic of definition, for natural philosophy, and for theology; but in different ways.

In the logic of definition, there is a distinction between the definition of the concrete such as *healthy* and the abstract such as *health*. The subject of an accident is found diversely in its definition when the accident is taken in abstraction and concretely. The subject is a difference when the abstract is defined. One might define health as the good condition of the body. But if we defined healthy, body would be a genus. For the healthy is a body in good condition. Thomas explains:

> accidens dupliciter potest accipi.
>
> Uno modo in abstracto; et sic consideratur secundum propriam rationem; sic enim assignamus in accidentibus genus et speciem; et hoc modo subiectum non ponitur in definitione accidentis ut

> genus, sed ut differentia, ut cum dicitur: Simitas est curvitas nasi.
>
> Alio modo possunt accipi in concreto; et sic accipiuntur secundum quod sunt unum per accidens cum subiecto; unde sic non assignantur eis nec genus nec species, et ita verum est quod subiectum ponitur in definitione accidentis ut genus.[9]

The natural philosopher wants to understand change. And following Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle, he discovers that change is between contraries. But when the natural philosopher considers that change is between contraries, he sees an important difference between the contraries health and sickness and the contraries healthy and sick. Health never becomes sickness, or sickness, health. But the healthy can become sick, and the sick can become healthy. For the healthy involves health and what has the health (the body) and the latter can lose its health and become sick. Likewise, the sick signifies sickness in a body which can lose that sickness and acquire the opposite health. Hence, in some way, at least by happening, if not as such, the healthy can be said to become sick, and the sick can become healthy. The natural philosopher sees that if the body was its health, it could never become sick. And if the body was its sickness, it could never become healthy. Thus change is between composed things, things composed of the pure contrary and its subject.

The theologian finds the limitation of our words and thoughts in speaking of God who is good and wise, but altogether simple. Since God is completely simple, He is whatever He is said to have. When we say that God is good and wise etc., we seem to admit in our way of speaking, some composition in Him. And to avoid this, we say that God is goodness itself and wisdom itself. But when we say this, we seem to be saying that he is that by which something is good and wise etc. rather than being good and wise Himself. Hence, we must also say that He is good, wise etc. Neither way of speaking, derived from our understanding of material things (where form and what has it are not the same) is adequate to speaking about God.

But the logician in the *Categories* considers this distinction because the abstract name cannot be *said of* substance, but the denominative can. And the genera of categories are distinguished by how something can be *said of* individual substances. But when the logician considers a genus of accidents by itself, he can use the abstract name of a genus or species.

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[9] *De Veritate*, Q. 3, Art. 7, Ad 2

Further, the logician in the *Categories* takes the denominative as signifying only the accident *per modum accidentis* and not also its subject when he is distinguishing the ten highest genera.

Aristotle in Chapter One, with marvelous brevity,[10] shows the three ways things are named that are relevant to the treatise of the *Categories*. Some of the Greek Commentators at this point bring in other ways that things are named, But Aristotle (*brevitati studens)* defines only those ways things are named that are necessary for understanding the *Categories*. As happens many times, three is enough.

To see fully the necessity of these three definitions for the *Categories* and their order requires a long discourse. As one proceeds, one perceives that these three definitions are necessary for the rest of the ante-predicaments and that the order in which they are given in Chapter One corresponds somewhat to their use in the remaining ante-predicaments.

But before entering into this longer discourse, one can perhaps indicate briefly the necessity and order of these three definitions by comparison to the skopos or aim of the *Categories*. We name things as we know them. But we know things in a confused way before we know them distinctly. Hence, we first name things equivocally calling them things or beings before we separate them under highest genera which involves naming them univocally. And the names of the highest genera are also said univocally of what is below them while things in some genera (the genera of things that exist in another subject) are said denominatively of first substances.

An understanding of things named equivocally or of names said equivocally of many things is necessary for understanding well the division or distinction of beings. Things such as substance and accident are said *to be* equivocally, or *being* is said equivocally of substance and accident.

The division of those said is necessary for determining the skopos or the subject of the *Categories* (those said without intertwining) and distinguishing it from the subject of the *Peri Hermeneias* (something said with intertwining, the statement or enunciation). Substance and accident can be said with or without intertwining.

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[10]"*brevitati studens"* to use the phrase of Thomas in his commentary on the *Peri Hermeneias*, n. 53

The second definition of Chapter One is clearly relevant to the three rules of Chapter Three. These rules are concerned with placing species under the highest genera and dividing genera by appropriate differences so as to see how species and differences are ordered under diverse highest genera. This is by an order of univocal predication and hence the second definition of Chapter One is relevant here. The highest genera are said with one meaning of the species below them and, if these species have species below them, they are also said univocally of them. Likewise, the differences are said univocally of the species below them.

The third definition of Chapter One, the definition of things named denominatively, is necessary for understanding the division of the meaning or signification of those said without intertwining according to ten highest genera or for distinguishing those ten highest genera themselves. The reason for this is that accidents (which we already know to exist in a subject, substance, from the division of beings) must be named denominatively before they can be said of substance; and the highest genera can be distinguished in logic only by the diverse ways they are said of first substances. Hence, the nine genera of accidents must be named denominatively before they can be distinguished from substance and each other by the diverse ways they are said of first substances. This is why when Aristotle distinguishes them in Chapter Four; he names them denominatively, (but when he considers each genus of accident by itself, he may speak univocally, but not denominatively.)

In the definitions of things named equivocally and univocally, Aristotle does not merely say that the *logos* according to the name is the same, but he adds *of the substance* (*ousia*). In Latin, this is translated *ratio substantiae*. What is the meaning of this addition?

Cajetan is correct, I think, in saying that this addition restricts univocal to the essential or what pertains to the nature. Here, we see the *univocal* is taken more strictly or in a more limited way than in the *Isagoge*. In the *Isagoge*, we say that every name said of many things univocally signifies either their genus or difference or species or property or accident. *Univocal* here means with the same meaning or thought in mind. But the first three (genus, difference and species) signify something inside the nature or substance of the things and the last two (property and accident) signify something outside the nature (even though property signifies something following upon the nature). But here in the beginning of the *Categories*, *univocal* is limited to genus, difference and species. Or perhaps it is even limited to genus and species which signify substance or what it is (Difference

signifies *how* a thing is *what it is.)* This is the way Aristotle uses *univocal* in the chapter on substance[11] where he refers to this definition. Thomas Aquinas sometimes takes *univocal* in the broad sense as in the case of the disjunctive argument of the *Summa contra Gentiles* [12] and sometimes in the strict or narrow sense as in explaining a passage in Aristotle's *Metaphysics:*

> quod hic dicitur, non potest intelligi de univoca praedicatione secundum quod genera praedicantur de speciebus, in quarum definitionibus ponuntur; quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo; sed oportet hoc intelligi de denominativa praedicatione, sicut cum album praedicatur de homine; alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis. Unde subiungit, quod alia genera praedicentur hoc modo de substantia, scilicet denominative, substantia vero praedicatur de materia denominative.
>
> Non est ergo intelligendum, quod substantia actu existens (de qua hic loquimur) de materia praedicetur praedicatione univoca, sive quae est per essentiam. Iam enim supra dixerat, quod materia non est quid, neque aliquid aliorum. Sed intelligendum est de denominativa praedicatione, per quem modum accidentia de substantia praedicantur.[13]

The reason why Aristotle takes *univocal* in the restricted sense here is that he is aiming at the ten highest genera and what can be placed under them and ordered by univocal predication, the species and in some way differences. Species are placed more directly under genera than are differences. (If we wish to place matter under the genus substance, the above text from the *Metaphysics* indicates that it would not be by univocal predication as here understood, but by denominative predication.)

By way of summary, we can give some questions and their answers.

What is the reason for the first two definitions?

The logic of the first act of reason is ordered to knowing what things are. Since we begin to know what things are by knowing their genus, we need to know how to place things in their genus. Things are not placed in a genus (or species) insofar as they are named equivocally. Rather things are placed in a genus insofar as they are so named univocally. Hence, we see the need

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[11] *Categories,* Chapter 5, 3a 15 and 3a 33-3b 9
[12] Bk. I, Ch. 32
[13] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio II, nn. 1288-1289

for the first two definitions to find how things as named can or cannot be placed under some genus

Why does he define things named equivocally before those named univocally?

The division of beings must come before the distinction of the genera of categories because the latter will be distinguished by how something can be said of individual substances and the latter is arrived at by the division of beings. Substance and accident are called *being* equivocally. But things will be placed under one of the ten highest genera insofar as they are named univocally.

What is the reason for the third definition?

When he distinguishes the Categories, the genera of accidents are named denominatively, but not when each genus is divided into its species. Diverse genera of accidents are distinguished by diverse way of denominating substance. Hence, there is a need to speak of denomination in the ante-predicaments.

Why is the third definition last?

In the division of beings, accident is not said denominatively. Accidents are first said denominatively when the ten genera are distinguished.

APPENDIX

What is meant by the *logos of the ousia* in the first two definitions? Perhaps *logos* is more universal than definition in the strict sense. Consider Thomas' teaching here in the Latin word for *logos* which is *ratio:*

> ...ratio, prout hic sumitur, nihil aliud est quam id quod apprehendit intellectus de significatione alicujus nominis: et hoc in his quae habent definitionem, est ipsa rei definitio, secundum quod Philosophus dicit, IV *Metaphy.*, text. 11: "Ratio quam significat nomen est definitio." Sed quaedam dicuntur habere rationem sic dictam, quae non definiuntur, sicut quantitas et

> qualitas, et hujusmodi, quae non definiuntur, quia sunt genera generalissima. Et tamen ratio qualitatis est id quod significatur nomine qualitatis; et hoc est illud ex quo qualitas habet quod sit qualitas. Unde non refert, utrum illa quae dicuntur habere rationem, habeant vel non habeant definitionem.[14]

If the species immediately under a highest genus have a name common to them univocally, but a genus that is not a species cannot be defined in the strict sense, then we would have to understand *logos* not as the definition of what it is, but as the same thought of what it is

And what is the meaning of *ousia* or *substance* in the first two definitions of chapter one? The following text of Thomas gives the two meanings of *substance* in the ante-predicaments:

> ...substantia duplicitur dicitur, ut ex V *Metaphysicorum,* text. 15, patet.
>
> Uno enim modo dicitur substantia, secundum quod significat rationem primi praedicamenti: et hoc est vel forma, vel materia, vel compositum, quod per se in genere est.
>
> Alio modo dicitur substantia illud quod significat quid in omnibus rebus, sicut dicimus quod definitio significat rei substantiam: et hoc modo quidquid positive dicitur, in quocumque genere sit, substantia est vel substantiam habet.[15]

Why does Aristotle gives examples from substance in the definition of things named univocally? But does this mean that accidents cannot be named in this way? Thomas explains Aristotle's teaching in the seventh book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy:*

> ...dicendum est, sicut in praedicta solutione est dictum, quod quod quid est et definitio non est accidentium, sed substantiarum: aut oportet secundum alium modum solvendi dicere, quod definitio dicitur multipliciter sicut et quod quid est.
>
> Ipsum enim quod quid est, uno modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid. Alio modo significat singula aliorum

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[14] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio II, Quaest I, Art. III, Solutio
[15] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXVII, Quaest I, Art. I, Solutio

praedicamentorum, sicut qualitatem et quantitatem et alia hujusmodi talia.

Sicut autem ens praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, non autem similiter, sed primum de substantia, et per posterius de aliis praedicamentis, ita et quod quid est, simpliciter convenit substantiae, "aliis autem alio modo", idest secundum quid.

Quod enim "aliquo modo", idest secundum quid aliis conveniat quid est, ex hoc patet, quod in aliis praedicamentis respondetur aliquid ad quaestionem factam per quid. Interrogamus enim de quali sive qualitate quid est, sicut quid est albedo, et respondemus quod est color. Unde patet, quod qualitas est de numero eorum in quibus est quod quid est.

Non tamen simpliciter in qualitate est quid est, sed quid est qualitatis.

Cum enim quaero quid est homo, et respondetur, animal; ly animal, quia est in genere substantiae, non solum dicit quid est homo, sed etiam absolute significat quid, id est substantiam.

Sed cum quaeritur quid est albedo, et respondetur, color, licet significet quid est albedo, non tamen absolute significat quid, sed quale. Et ideo qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Invenitur enim in qualitate quid huiusmodi, ut cum dicimus quod color est quid albedinis. Et hoc quid, magis est substantiale quam substantia.

Propter hoc enim quod omnia alia praedicamenta habent rationem entis a substantia, ideo modus entitatis substantiae, scilicet esse quid, participatur secundum quamdam similitudinem proportionis in omnibus aliis praedicamentis; ut dicamus, quod sicut animal est quid hominis, ita color albedinis, et numerus dualitatis; et ita dicimus qualitatem habere quid non simpliciter, sed huius. Sicut aliqui dicunt logice de non ente loquentes, non ens est, non quia non ens sit simpliciter sed quia non ens est non ens. Et similiter qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed quid qualitatis.[16]

[16] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IV, n. 1331-1334

This sense of substance is also found in the sense of *how* which is that of the species-making difference. Thomas repeats the teaching of Aristotle in the fifth book of *Wisdom:*

> ....unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur "differentia substantiae," idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt, quae intrat in definitionem substantiae.[17]

Is the example of things named equivocally an example of things named purely equivocally? Consider this text of Thomas:

> hoc nomen *animal* imponitur non ad significandum figuram exteriorem, in qua pictura imitatur animal verum, sed ad significandum naturam, in qua pictura non imitatur; et ideo nomen animalis de vero et picto aequivoce dicitur; sed nomen *scientiae* convenit creaturae et Creatori secundum id in quo creatura Creatorem imitatur; et ideo non omnino aequivoce praedicatur de utroque.[18]

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[17] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVI, n. 987
[18] *De Veritate*, Q. 2, Art. 11, Ad 8

CHAPTER TWO OF THE CATEGORIES

The Second Chapter of the *Categories* contains two divisions or distinctions: the division of those said and the division of beings.

The division of those said in Chapter Two is necessary to separate the *Categories* from the *Peri Hermeneias*. The division of those said is into those said with intertwining and those said without intertwining. Aristotle gives two examples of those said with intertwining ("man runs" and "man wins"). Both are examples of a statement or enunciation which is the principal subject of the *Peri Hermeneias*. Those said without intertwining are exemplified here: “man”, “ox”, “runs”, “wins. And in Chapter Four, Aristotle says that each of those said *without* intertwining signifies either substance or how much or how etc. which brings us to the ten highest genera, the principal subject of this book. This division is necessary then to see what the book is aiming at, those said without intertwining rather than those said with intertwining.

The first question about this division of those said is what is being divided, *the said*. What is said - words or thoughts or things? Clearly, it is words that are said here. This can be seen from the members of the division. One member is statement or enunciation, and this, we know from the *Peri Hermeneias* consists of words, of vocal sounds signifying by convention. Whatever is under the other member is said in Chapter Four to *signify* either substance or how much or how etc. But it is not things that *signify*, but they are signified. Nor does Aristotle speak of thoughts as signifying things, but rather as passions of things. Thus, for example, in the beginning of the *Peri Hermeneias*, he speaks of written words as signifying spoken words and the latter as signifying thoughts, but of thoughts as passions or likenesses of things because they are the result of reason being acted upon in some way by things.

There is a disagreement between Cajetan and the Greek Neo-platonic commentators on this division. Cajetan thinks it is more things that are said than words while the neo-Platonists say that it is words.

But there is a difference between calling this a division of *vocal sounds signifying by agreement* (as in the *Peri Hermeneias*) and a division of *those said*. For things are not *vocal sounds*, but things are in some way *said*. Thomas, for example, in the following passage, seems to speak as if things are in some way said:

> Eorum enim, quae dicuntur voce, quaedam sunt in rebus extra animam, quaedam autem sunt in anima tantum. Album enim et nigrum sunt extra animam; sed rationes horum sunt in anima tantum. Posset autem aliquis credere quod verum et falsum sunt etiam in rebus sicut bonum et malum; ita quod verum sit quoddam bonum, et falsum sit quoddam malum: hoc enim oporteret si verum et falsum essent in rebus. Verum enim quamdam perfectionem naturae significat, falsum vero defectum. Omnis autem perfectio in rebus existens, ad perfectionem et bonitatem naturae pertinet, defectus vero et privatio ad malitiam. Sed ipse hoc negat; dicens quod verum et falsum non sunt in rebus, ita quod verum rationis sit quoddam bonum naturae, et falsum sit quoddam malum; sed "sunt tantum in mente", idest in intellectu...[1]

But because in Chapter Four, Aristotle will take one part of this division (those said without intertwining) and say that they *signify* either substance or how much or how etc., it seem more correct to say with the Neo-Platonic commentators that *those said* are vocal sounds rather than things

The second question is about the meaning of *intertwining* (*sumploke*) used in the division. Aristotle's examples of those said with intertwining are both statements. Does he mean to exclude only the intertwining of natures found in a statement such as "man runs," or does he also mean to exclude from being in one category other kinds of intertwining of natures? Albert and Cajetan are surely correct in excluding not only "man runs" but also "white man" from any one category although their parts can be put into different categories. This is clearly in accord with Aristotle's distinction of accidental being from being as such in the fifth book of *Wisdom* (or the *Metaphysics*) since there *white man* is put with accidental being and the categories under being as such.

It should be noted, however, that Aristotle in Chapter Two says simply *without intertwining* while in Chapter Four when dividing this, he says *by no intertwining*. Hence, in Chapter Two, he is perhaps mainly concerned with separating what is placed in a highest genus from the intertwining found in statements. But after he has distinguished substance and accident in the division of beings, it is necessary to exclude what signifies an intertwining of substance and accident (whether by two words as in *white man* or by chance in one word like *negro* meaning a black man). Albert and Cajetan also would exclude the intertwining found in a definition, but this is not clear. But surely

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[1] *In VI Metaphysicorum,* Lectio IV, nn. 1230-1231

those said with any intertwining of diverse natures cannot be placed as a species in or under one highest genus.

In the second part of this chapter, Aristotle gives a division or distinction of beings into four. Usually when we divide into more than three, we are combining more than one division. We may be giving the result of a division and a subdivision or we may be criss-crossing two divisions. Aristotle here seems to be criss-crossing two divisions by contradictories. One pair of contradictories is *said of another* and *not said of another.* The other pair is *exist in another* and *not exist in another*.

The order in which Aristotle enumerates the four is to give first what is said of another but does not exist in another. This could be called universal substance. Second he gives individual accident, what exists in another, but is not said of another. Third he places universal accident which is both said of another and exists in another. And last, he places what neither exists in another, nor is said of another – individual substances.

He follows this same order of enumeration of parts in the book *About the Poetic Art* (the *Poetics*) when distinguishing the parts of a plot (except there is no fourth part – the one with the two negatives). He gives first the beginning which is *before* something, but *not after* anything. Then the end which is *after* something, but *not before* anything. And last, the middle which is both *before* something and *after* something. (There cannot be a part of the plot which is neither before nor after anything.) Perhaps the reason for this order of enumeration is to see the distinction between the two which are to be affirmed and denied by giving those two cases where only one is affirmed and the other denied before the case where both are found (which comes for another reason before the case where both are denied in the *Categories).*

The reason for this is also that opposites along side each other or next to each other stand out more. And placing the opposites with one affirmative and one negative first help us to see the distinction between the two terms. This is especially important in the present division where *said of* and *exist in* might be confused by someone as meaning the same if at first both are affirmed or both negated. There is perhaps also a reason for the order within each pair of opposites and perhaps more than one reason. Logic is interested in the universal before the singular and its seems reasonable to place two affirmatives before two negatives. Thus universal substance and

individual accident come first and then universal accident and individual substance last.

The examples of each of the four are chosen by Aristotle with great care. For substance, he chooses man (for universal substance) and this man or that ox (for individual substances). The substantial unity of man is most known to us and even the substantial unity of an ox (or some other animal) is more known to us than that of a plant or a rock. For accidents, he chooses an example of one in the soul (science or reasoned out knowledge) and one in the body (color).

Two questions come to mind about this division. What kind of a division is this? And what is being divided?

It is not the division of a (composed) whole into its parts. It is not the division of a genus into its species. It is not the division of a subject by its accidents or of an accident by its subjects or of an accident by its accidents.

It seems closest to the distinction of a name into its meanings or senses. But if it is the distinction of a name, *being,* into its senses, then *being* should be in the singular rather than plural. Moreover, the distinction of the word *being* into its senses belongs to the wise man, the first philosopher. What is it doing in logic?

But the distinction of *being* into its senses does seem to be involved in this distinction of beings. For we distinguish between *being* in the sense of substance which does not exist in another subject and in the sense of accident which exists only in another subject. In this text, Thomas speaks of the division between substance and accident as between the division of the univocal and the equivocal:

> ...est duplex modus dividendi commune in ea quae sub ipso sunt, sicut est duplex communitatis modus.
>
> Est enim quaedam divisio univoci in species per differentias quibus aequaliter natura generis in speciebus participatur, sicut animal dividitur in hominem et equum, et hujusmodi;
>
> alia vero divisio est ejus quod est commune per analogiam, quod quidem secundum perfectam rationem praedicatur de uno dividentium, et de altero imperfecte et secundum quid, sicut ens

dividitur in substantiam et accidens, et in ens actu et in ens potentia: et haec divisio est quasi media inter aequivocum et univocum.[2]

Nevertheless, this division of beings is different from the distinction of the senses of the word *being* given in the fifth book of *Wisdom.* By criss-crossing a distinction in things (that between existing or not existing in a subject, or between substance and accident) and a distinction in our knowledge seen only by reason (the distinction between the universal and the singular or between what is or is not said of a subject), we get a distinction of things as they are in reason. And such a distinction is proper to logic.

The distinction of beings here is a distinction of beings or things as they are in our knowledge or reason. Now as Boethius says, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. And Aristotle here distinguishes between universal substance, singular accident, universal accident, and singular substance. Thomas points out in regard to substance that the first philosopher does not consider universal substance to be substance, but the logician speaks thus for they do not consider things in the same way:

Dicit quod substantia dicitur, quae non est de subiecto: et dicitur universale semper de aliquo subiecto: ergo universale non est substantia.

Videtur autem ratio haec non valere. Dictum est enim in *Praedicamentis*, quod de ratione substantiae est, quod non sit in subiecto. Praedicari vero de subiecto non est contra rationem substantiae. Unde ponuntur ibi secundae substantiae quae praedicantur de subiecto.

Sed dicendum quod secundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis. Et ideo quantum ad praedicationem, quae est actus rationis, dicit quod praedicatur "de subiecto", idest de substantia subsistente extra animam.

Sed Philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia; et ideo apud eius considerationem non differt esse in

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[2] *Scriptum In Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XLII, Quaest I, Art. III, Solutio

> subiecto et de subiecto. Hic enim accipit dici de subiecto, quod est in se aliqua res et inest alicui subiecto existenti in actu. Et hoc impossibile est esse substantiam. Sic enim haberet esse in subiecto. Quod est contra rationem substantiae: quod etiam in *Praedicamentis* est habitum.[3]

Why does Aristotle call it a distinction of *beings*, rather than of *that which is in reason?* Perhaps the reasons are like those we give for why he begins from things in chapter one. Logic is ordered to knowing things and has a foundation in things and is about things insofar as they are in reason.

But when Aristotle distinguishes the senses of *being* in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*, they can be reduced, as Thomas teaches us there, to four senses, of which substance and accident are the first and second senses. Why are the third and fourth senses not found in the distinction TWN ONTWN, the distinction of beings (or things) here in the *Categories?* And what does this do to the claim that logic is about all things in some way, just as reason is open to all of them? Answering these questions will cast light, not only on that ante-predicament which is the the distinction TWN ONTWN, but also on the post-predicaments of opposites and motion.

Does *subject* have one meaning in the four parts of this division? When we say that something is *said of a subject* and something *exists in a subject,* does the word *subject* mean the same? Surely the way the singular is under the universal and substance is under accidents is not the same.

What is meant by *said of a subject*? The examples given are examples of something said univocally in the narrow sense of chapter one. Accidents here are not named denominatively so they are not said of substance. *Man* is said of this man and the next man univocally and likewise *science,* of grammar

How does definition of *in subject* separate from all else? Cajetan sees the need for excluding the rest of the eight senses of *being in* distinguished in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*)?

Aristotle excludes from the sense here of being in a subject, the sense of part in whole and the sense of being in something one can exist apart

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[3] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIII, n. 1575-1576

from. The second, third and fourth senses of *being in* refer to a part being in a whole and the first, seventh, eight and somewhat the sixth are excuded by something being able to exist apart from what it is in.

Why is this division of beings between the two continuous divisions of those said (in the first part of this chapter) and of those said without intertwining by what the latter signify (in Chapter Four)?

The distinction of those said without intertwining as signifying either substance or how much or how etc. presupposes the division of beings. For the ten genera of categories are distinguished, as Thomas will teach us, by how something can be said of individual substances. And we distinguish individual substances from all other things in the division of beings.

The distinction of those said without intertwining presupposes the distinction between substance and accident given in the division of beings. For one of the genera is substance and the other nine are genera of accidents.

Moreover, when Aristotle adds without *any* intertwining or according to *no* intertwining, he perhaps wants to exclude not only the intertwining in a statement, but also that of substance and accident and of accident with accident.

Further, it is clear from the distinction of beings that accidents signified in the abstract (such as the words *color* or *justice*) cannot be said of substance univocally (in the narrow sense), but only denominatively. And this latter way of predicating must be used in distinguishing the highest genera of accidents by the ways they are said of substance (one as the measure of substance or how much; another as the disposition of substance or how it is etc.).

Further, the distinction between the universal and the singular in both substance and accident is necessary as a basis both for the rules of Chapter Three for placing the less universal under the more universal in a category until we reach the singular and also for the possibility through the rules of Chapter Three for reducing the signification of all those said without intertwining in a general way under the ten heads (the ten highest genera).

APPENDIX

In this text, Thomas distinguishes the senses of *substance* here and in the first chapter:

> Unde patet quod fere eadem est divisio substantiae hic posita, cum illa quae ponitur in *Praedicamentis*. Nam per subiectum intelligitur hic substantia prima. Quod autem dicit genus et universale, quod videtur ad genus et species pertinere, continetur sub substantiis secundis.
>
> Hoc autem quod quid erat esse hic ponitur, sed ibi praetermittitur, quia non cadit in praedicamentorum ordine nisi sicut principium. Neque enim est genus neque species neque individuum, sed horum omnium formale principium.[4]

What are the "definitions" of substance and accident in this division as we have named the parts? Thomas, folowing Avicenna, gives an explanation in this text:

> Ad secundum dicendum quod, sicut probat Avicenna in sua *Meta.*, per se existere non est definitio substantiae; quia per hoc non demonstratur quidditas ejus, sed esse ejus. Et sua quidditas non est suum esse; alias non posset esse genus, quia esse non potest esse commune per modum generis, cum singula contenta in genere differant secundum esse. Sed definitio vel quasi definitio substantiae est res habens quidditatem, cui acquiritur esse vel debetur non in alio. Et similiter esse in subjecto non est definitio accidentis, sed e contrario res cui debetur esse in alio...et si aliquando hoc dicatur definitio accidentis, praedicto modo intelligenda est definitio dicta; quia aliquando ab auctoribus definitiones ponuntur causa brevitatis non secundum debitum ordinem, sed tanguntur illa ex quibus potest accipi definitio.[5]

This text of Thomas, following Avicenna is useful towards understanding better the distinction between the universal (esp. the genus or species) and the singular and less universal:

> Respondeo dicendum, quod in divinis non potest esse universale et particulare. Et hujus ratio potest quadruplex assignari:

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[4] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio II, n. 1275

[5] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. I, Ad Primam Quaestionem, Ad 2

> primo, quia secundum Avicennam, II parte *Logicae*, cap. II, ubicumque est genus et species, oportet esse quidditatem differentem a suo esse, ut prius dictum est [Distinctio VIII, Q. I, Art. I]; et hoc in divinis non competit;
>
> secundo, quia essentia universalis non est eadem numero in suis inferioribus, sed secundum rationem tantum; essentia autem divina est eadem numero in pluribus personis;
>
> tertio, quia universale exigit pluralitatem in his quae sub ipso continentur vel in actu vel in potentia: in actu sicut est in genere, quod semper habet plures species; in potentia sicut in aliquibus speciebus quarum forma, quantum est de se, possibilis est inveniri in multis, cum omnis forma de se est communicabilis; sed quod inveniatur tantum in in uno, est ex parte materiae debitae illi speciei, quae tota adunatur in uno individuo, ut patet in sole, qui constat ex tota sua materia; et ista pluralitas est secundum numerum, qui numerus est simpliciter fundatus in substantiali distinctione: tres autem personae non numerantur tali numero, ut dictum est, et ideo essentia non habet rationem universalis;
>
> quarto, quia particulare semper se habet ex additione ad universale. In divinis autem propter summam simplicitatem, non est possibilis additio, et ideo nec universale nec particulare.[6]

Some rather subtle distinctions in naming the singular (especially in the genus of substance) are contained in this text of Thomas:

> Dicendum quod cum omne particulare habeat respectum ad naturam communem et ad proprietates, potest secundum utrumque respectum nominari, tum per nomen primae impositionis, tum per nomen secundae intentionis.
>
> Hoc enim nomen, *res naturae*, est nomen primae impositionis, significans particulare per respectum ad naturam communem.
>
> Hoc vero nomen, *suppositum*, est nomen secundae impositionis, significans ipsam habitudinem particularis ad naturam

[6] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XIX, Quaest IV, Art. II, *Utrum in divinis sit totum universale*, Solutio

communem, inquantum subsistit in ea; particulare vero, inquantum exceditur ab ea.

Sed quia accidentia consequuntur naturam, ideo omne nomen designans particulare secundum respectum ad proprietates, designat etiam ipsum per respectum ad naturam communem.

Hoc ergo potest fieri dupliciter: - vel per nomen primae impositionis; et sic est *hypostasis* communiter in omnibus substantiis, *persona* vero in rationalibus substantiis; - vel per nomen secundae impositionis; et sic est *individuum* inquantum est indivisum in se, *singulare* vero inquantum est divisum ab aliis, unde singulare est idem quod divisum.

Est etiam alia differentia attendenda inter ista; quia quaedam istorum significant communiter particulare in quolibet genere, sicut *particulare, individuum* et *singulare*; quaedam vero tantum particulare in genere substantiae, sicut *res naturae, suppositum, hypostasis et persona.*[7]

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[7] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio VI, Quaest. I, Art. I, Solutio I

CHAPTER THREE OF THE *CATEGORIES*

Chapter Three contains three statements which govern the ordering of genera and species and their differences under the highest genera. Cajetan in his commentary sees the title of this book to mean either the ten highest genera or the praedicamental orders of which these ten are the heads or beginnings:

> Nomen libri est Categoriae, id est praedicamenta, id est co-ordinationes decem generum, vel ipsa decem genera, quae capita sunt coordinationum: de his enim tractat liber hic.[1]

The first statement is this: When something is said of another as a subject, whatever is said of the predicate will also be said of the subject.

The words *as a subject* in this statement must be understood of essential predication (according to Cajetan) or univocal predication in the narrow sense (according to Simplicius). And indeed Aristotle's example confirms this understanding. When *man* is said of a *particular man* and *animal* is said of *man*, will not *animal* also be said of the particular man.

If we understand this said of another *as a subject* to mean *by univocal predication* as in the definition of things named univocally in the first chapter, the first statement is saying that what is said of the predicate signifies also in a general way what the subject is. If Socrates is a man (that is what he is) and man is an animal (that is what man is in general), then animal also in an even more general way says what Socrates is. And this will be true all the way up to the highest genus, so that Socrates is a living body, a body and a substance.

It is not difficult to see that this first statement is the beginning of the order in each category from the highest genus through the species immediately under it to those under the immediate species and so on down to the lowest species and even the individuals at the bottom.

The second and third statements are about the differences whereby the genera are divided and their species distinguished.

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[1] *De Praedicamentis,* ed. Doyon, p. 5

The second statement is that the differences of other genera, and which are not ordered under one another, are other in kind. One animal may differ from another by being two-footed, but one science does not differ from another by being two-footed.

It is important to note (as Albert and Cajetan do) that the words *not ordered under one another* must be understood to include not only the case where one genus is under another genus, but also the case where two genera or species are under the same genus. Not only do dog and quadruped have a difference in common, but also dog and cat even though cat is not under dog or vice-versa.

The third statement says that when a genus is under another genus, the differences of the higher genus can be also differences of the lower genus.

The order of these statements can be seen from species being placed more directly under genera than differences in the predicamental order and from Aristotle's making use of the first statement in explaining why subalternate genera are not like those in the second statement.

We have already indicated a reason why the division of beings comes before the statements of Chapter Three. In turn, it is not difficult to see why these statements must be understood before the division of the signification in general (according to the highest genera) of those said without intertwining in Chapter Four. If the less universal was not seen to be ordered under the more universal so that the latter was said of the former and included in its meaning or signification, it would not be possible to divide the signification of everything said without intertwining under ten heads or highest genera.

APPENDIX

In this text, Thomas distinguishes between what is placed per se and properly in a genus and what can be led back to a genus:

> ...in genere continetur aliquid dupliciter:
>
> vel per se et proprie, sicut species, et ea quae recipiunt praedicationem generis;

> vel per reductionem, sicut principia generis, ut materia et forma ad substantiam, et unitas et punctus ad quantitatem; quamvis neutrum sit quantitas.
>
> Ita etiam nulla negatio vel privatio est in genere per se: quia non habet aliquam quidditatem nec esse; sed reducitur ad genus affirmationis, secundum quod in non esse intelligitur esse, et in negatione affirmatio, ut dicit Philosophus in II *Elench.*, cap. IV, quia omnis privatio per habitum cognoscitur, et remotio per positionem; et sic etiam non relatio est in genere relationis, quamvis ea de quibus dicitur ista negatio non sint in illo genere.[2]

If the genus of the species must be said of what the species is said, one can also point out that one of the species of the genus must also be said of what the genus is said of:

> de quocumque praedicatur genus, necesse est aliquam eius speciem praedicari, sive sit praedicatio univoca sive denominativa.[3]

Thomas points out an interesting likenesss of genus to matter in this text:

> ...genus quodammodo est pars speciei similis materiae. Unde sicut in natura ex pluribus materiis sufficientibus non ordinatis non fit aliquid unum; ita etiam plura genera non possunt venire ad constitutionem speciei unius.[4]

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist. XIX, Quaest IV, Art. II, *Utrum in divinis sit totum universale*, Solutio:

In a text of great subtlety, Thomas brings out many things about the universal whole and its parts when showing that in God there is no universal whole:

> Respondeo dicendum, quod in divinis non potest esse universale et particulare. Et hujus ratio potest quadruplex assignari:

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[2] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVIII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad 3
[3] Thomas Aquinas, *In I Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XII, n. 196
[4] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio VII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Quaestiuncula I, Ad 3

> primo, quia secundum Avicennam, II parte *Logicae*, cap. II, ubicumque est genus et species, oportet esse quidditatem differentem a suo esse, ut prius dictum est[5] ; et hoc in divinis non competit;
>
> secundo, quia essentia universalis non est eadem numero in suis inferioribus, sed secundum rationem tantum; essentia autem divina est eadem numero in pluribus personis;
>
> tertio, quia universale exigit pluralitatem in his quae sub ipso continentur vel in actu vel in potentia: in actu sicut est in genere, quod semper habet plures species; in potentia sicut in aliquibus speciebus quarum forma, quantum est de se, possibilis est inveniri in multis, cum omnis forma de se est communicabilis; sed quod inveniatur tantum in in uno, est ex parte materiae debitae illi speciei, quae tota adunatur in uno individuo, ut patet in sole, qui constat ex tota sua materia; et ista pluralitas est secundum numerum, qui numerus est simpliciter fundatus in substantiali distinctione: tres autem personae non numerantur tali numero, ut dictum est, et ideo essentia non habet rationem universalis;
>
> quarto, quia particulare semper se habet ex additione ad universale. In divinis autem propter summam simplicitatem, non est possibilis additio, et ideo nec universale nec particulare.[6]

And in replying to an objection that there is a universal whole in God, Thomas brings out the important principles or beginnings that the *modus praedicandi proportionatur ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio* and that *sermo sit rei subjectus:*

> 1. Videtur quod in divinis sit totum universale. Quidquid enim praedicatur de aliquo substantialiter et non conversim, praedicatur de ipso ut totum universale de parte subiectiva. Sed essentia divina, vel Deus, hoc modo praedicatur de Patre: Pater enim est essentia divina, sed non quicumque est essentia divina est Pater. Ergo ibi est totum universale.

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[5] Distinctio VIII, Q. I, Art. I

[6] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XIX, Quaest IV, Art. II, *Utrum in divinis sit totum universale*, Solutio

> Ad primum igitur dicendum, quod modus praedicandi proportionatur ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio; cum, secundum Hilarium, IV *De Trinit*., 14, col. 107, t. II, sermo sit rei subjectus. Unde sicut nulla res in creaturis invenitur similis ex toto unitati essentiae in tribus personis, sed secundum aliquid: ita etiam nullus modus praedicandi in creaturis est similis huic modo praedicandi quod essentia vel Deus de tribus personis praedicatur. Dico igitur, quod secundum id quod tactum est in objectione, habet similitudinem cum modo praedicandi totius universalis, sed differt secundum alia quae supra dicta sunt.[7]

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[7] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XIX, Quaest IV, Art. II, Obj. 1 & Ad 1

CHAPTER FOUR OF THE *CATEGORIES*

In the Fourth Chapter, Aristotle divides those said by no intertwining by what they signify. He says that those said without any intertwining signify either substance or how much or how or towards something or where or when or to be laid out or to have or to act upon or to undergo.

What does the middle word exclude in *by no intertwining?*

Although Aristotle wants to exclude most of all the intertwining of a statement in which there is the true or the false, perhaps by adding the word *no* to what he had said in the division of those said, he intended to deny not only the intertwining in a statement, but also the intertwining of natures in *ens per accidens* such as white man. Even if we used one name such as *negro* to mean a black man, one could not put it in one genus. For to be a man and to be black or white is not the same thing.

Why does he say *signifies?*

This indicates that he is speaking of names of things here, not of things as named, as in the First Chapter. Likewise, it confirms that the division of those said was a division of vocal sounds.

Aristotle does not always enumerate all of these ten when he touches upon them. But in the *Categories* and in the book *About Places* (*Topics*)[1], he enumerates all ten. He enumerates the ten in these two places in exactly the same order and with exactly the same name for each with one exception. Instead of calling the first, *substance* (*or* ousia), he calls it in the *About Places* (*Topics*) *What it is* (or *ti esti*)

The ten in the *Categories* are called the genera of predicates in the *About Places* (*Topics*). In English, we are accustomed to call the ten highest genera the *categories.* But the Greek word translated by *categories* is in the text from the *About Places* (*Topics*) used for that of which the ten are the genera. Perhaps a *category* in that sense is whatever is *said of* individual substances either univocally (in the narrow sense of Chapter One of the *Categories*) or denominatively. And such *said ofs* or *categories* come under one of ten genera.

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[1] Book One, 103b 20-39

The following text of Thomas helps us to understand the use of *what it is* in the above text from the *Places:*

> ...dicendum est, sicut in praedicta solutione est dictum, quod quod quid est et definitio non est accidentium, sed substantiarum: aut oportet secundum alium modum solvendi dicere, quod definitio dicitur multipliciter sicut et quod quid est.
>
> Ipsum enim quod quid est, uno modo significat substantiam et hoc aliquid. Alio modo significat singula aliorum praedicamentorum, sicut qualitatem et quantitatem et alia hujusmodi talia.
>
> Sicut autem ens praedicatur de omnibus praedicamentis, non autem similiter, sed primum de substantia, et per posterius de aliis praedicamentis, ita et quod quid est, simpliciter convenit substantiae, "aliis autem alio modo", idest secundum quid.
>
> Quod enim "aliquo modo", idest secundum quid aliis conveniat quid est, ex hoc patet, quod in aliis praedicamentis respondetur aliquid ad quaestionem factam per quid. Interrogamus enim de quali sive qualitate quid est, sicut quid est albedo, et respondemus quod est color. Unde patet, quod qualitas est de numero eorum in quibus est quod quid est.
>
> Non tamen simpliciter in qualitate est quid est, sed quid est qualitatis.
>
> Cum enim quaero quid est homo, et respondetur, animal; ly animal, quia est in genere substantiae, non solum dicit quid est homo, sed etiam absolute significat quid, id est substantiam.
>
> Sed cum quaeritur quid est albedo, et respondetur, color, licet significet quid est albedo, non tamen absolute significat quid, sed quale. Et ideo qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Invenitur enim in qualitate quid huiusmodi, ut cum dicimus quod color est quid albedinis. Et hoc quid, magis est substantiale quam substantia.
>
> Propter hoc enim quod omnia alia praedicamenta habent rationem entis a substantia, ideo modus entitatis substantiae, scilicet esse quid, participatur secundum quamdam similitudinem

> proportionis in omnibus aliis praedicamentis; ut dicamus, quod sicut animal est quid hominis, ita color albedinis, et numerus dualitatis; et ita dicimus qualitatem habere quid non simpliciter, sed huius. Sicut aliqui dicunt logice de non ente loquentes, non ens est, non quia non ens sit simpliciter sed quia non ens est non ens. Et similiter qualitas non habet quid simpliciter, sed quid qualitatis.[2]

How are the ten distinguished?

They are distinguished by a diverse way of being said of individual substances. The praedicamenta or categories are so-called because they are distinguished *secundum diversum modum praedicandi*, by a diverse way of being said of first substance. Thomas explains well that this is how they are distinguished and hence called *praedicamenta* in Latin:

> ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi..
>
> ...Propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse significet idem...[3]

In another text, Thomas says the modus praedicandi follows the *ratio* of the genus instead of a diverse way of being:

> ratio generis, quam consequitur modus praedicandi.[4]

Even things that may be the same in substance can pertain to diverse categories because of a diverse way of being said of something:

> Sed si actio et passio sunt idem secundum substantiam, videtur quod non sunt diversa praedicamenta.
>
> Sed sciendum quod praedicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos praedicandi. Unde idem, secundum quod

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[2] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IV, n. 1331-1334
[3] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 890
[4] *Scriptum super Lib. I Senteniarum*, Dist. XXII, Expositio Textus

> diversimode de diversis praedicatur, ad diversa praedicamenta pertinet.
>
> Locus enim, secundum quod praedicatur de locante, pertinet ad genus quantitatis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur denominative de locato, constituit praedicamentum ubi.
>
> Similiter motus, secundum quod praedicatur de subiecto in quo est, constituit praedicamentum passionis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur de eo a quo est, constituit praedicamentum actionis.[5]

Thomas takes Aristotle's figure of predication to mean one mode of being said of in this text:

> Unum vero genere sunt, quae conveniunt in figura 'praedicationis', idest quae habent unum modum praedicandi.
>
> Alius enim est modus quo praedicatur substantia, et quo praedicatur qualitas vel actio; sed omnes substantiae habent unum modum praedicandi, inquantum praedicantur non ut in subiecto existentes.[6]

But why then does Aristotle not use *tropus* or *way* here? Perhaps Aristotle has in mind the praedicamental order from the highest genus down to the lowest species or even the individuals. Indeed the first statement in the third chapter had a likeness to the beginning of the syllogism (the *dici de omni*) where the word *figure* is also used. Figure is defined by limits or limits.

When Aristotle first distinguishes the categories he uses denominatives like album, not albedo, quale and not *qualitas*. Later when he distinguishes the species of quality, he uses the word *quality*. The genera of accidents can be distinguished in part by a *diversum modum denominandi* which is involved in the *modi praedicandi* of accidents as distinguished from that of substance.

When an accident is signified by a denominative, it signifies per modum accidentis:

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[5] *In XI Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 2313
[6] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio VIII, n. 878

> Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico *album* et *musicum*. Nam *album* ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen *album* significat subiectum ex consequenti, in quantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a Philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est.[7]

Thomas agrees with Averroes in this matter and disagrees with Avicenna:

> ...subjectum non includitur in significatione nominis significantis accidens concretive, ut dicit Commentator, V *Metaphy*., text. 14 quamvis Avicenna, VI *Natural*., part. I, cap. II, contrarium senserit.[8]

The concrete names signify per modum inhaerentiae:

> Licet autem modus essendi accidentium non sit ut per se sint, sed solum ut insint, intellectus tamen potest ea per se intelligere, cum sit natus dividere ea quae secundum naturam coniuncta sunt. Et ideo nomina abstracta accidentium significant entia quae quidem inhaerent, licet non significant ea per modum inhaerentiae. Essent autem significata per huiusmodi nomina non entia, si non inessent in re.
>
> Et quia ista in abstracto significata videntur non entia, magis videntur entia nomina accidentium concreta. Magis autem videtur "aliquid entium esse vadens et sedens et sanans" quia determinatur eis aliquod subiectum per ipsam nominis significationem, inquantum significantur in concretione ad subiectum. Hoc autem subiectum est substantia. Et ideo unumquodque talium nominum, quae significant accidens in concreto, "apparet in tali categoria", idest videtur importare

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[7] Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 894

[8] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum,* Distinctio XVIII, Quaest. I, Art. II, Ad 3

> praedicamentum substantiae; non ita quod praedicamentum substantiae sit pars significationis talium nominum (album enim, ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat); sed inquantum huiusmodi nomina significant accidentia ut inhaerentia substantiae. Bonum autem aut sedens non dicitur "sine hoc", idest sine substantia. Significat enim accidens concretum substantiae.[9]

One could distinguish the nine genera of accidents from substance as already seen in the *division of beings* in Chapter Two. And since accidents are said denominatively of substance, we could distinguish the first three genera of accidents from the last six because in the first three, substance is being denominated from something *within* it while in the last six it is being denominated from something *outside* of it. Thomas distinguishes these two denominations in this text:

But something can be denominated from something *within* or something *outside* of it:

> Duplex est modus quo aliquid denominative praedicatur.
>
> Denominatur enim aliquid ab eo quod extra ipsum est, sicut a loco dicitur aliquis esse *alicubi*, et a tempore *aliquando:*
>
> aliquid vero denominatur ab eo quod inest, sicut ab albedine *albus*.
>
> A relatione vero non invenitur aliquid denominari quasi exterius existente, sed inhaerente: non enim denominatur aliquis pater nisi a paternitate quae ei inest.[10]

And this corresponds to the distinction between the first group of accidents (how much or quantity, how or quality and towards something or relation) to each of which Aristotle devotes a separate chapter (chapter 6, 7 & 8) and the last six genera of accidents, which he only exemplifies again in chapters 9. Part of the reason for the longer and fuller consideration of the first three is because they denominate substance from something existing in the

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[9] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio I, nn. 1254-1255

[10] Thomas Aquinas, *S. C. Gentiles*, II, Caput 13

substance. And this diverse way of denominating is tied to the nature of the genus, as Thomas explains:

> ...secundum diversam naturam generis diversus est modus denominationis.
>
> Quaedam enim genera secundum rationem suam significant ut inhaerens, sicut qualitas et quantitas, et hujusmodi; et in talibus non fit denominatio nisi per formam inhaerentem, quae est principium secundum aliquod esse substantiale vel accidentale.
>
> Quaedam autem significant secundum rationem suam, ut ab alio ens, et non inhaerens sicut praecipue patet in actione. Actio enim, secundum quod est actio, significatur ut ab agente; et quod sit in agente, hoc accidit sibi inquantum est accidens. Unde in genere actionis denominatur accidens per id quod ab eo est, et non per id quod principium ejus est, sicut dicitur actione agens; nec tamen actio est principium agentis, sed e converso.
>
> Et si per impossibile poneretur esse aliquam actionem quae non esset accidens non esset inhaerens, et tamen denominaret agentem et tunc agens denominaretur per id quod ab eo est, et in eo non est inhaerens. Sed quia cujuslibet actionis principium est aliqua forma inhaerens, ideo aliquid potest dici agens duobus modis; vel ipsa actione, quae denominat agentem, et non est principum ejus; vel forma, quae est principium actionis in agente, et secundum quid principium agentis; sicut dicimus ignem moveri sursum motu proprio et levitate.[11]

How are the ways of *being said of* divided in particular down to each of the highest genera?

The logical and understandable division of anything is usually into two or three parts. When someone divides into more than three, he usually is combining more than one division into either two or three. He may divide into two or three and subdivide one of the parts or he may criss-cross two divisions into two or three. We have seen that Aristotle's division of beings into four is the result of criss-crossing two divisions by contradictories into two. Thomas, in the two places where he shows how the ten genera of

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[11] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXII, Quaest I, Art. I, Solutio

Aristotle are distinguished, follows the rule of two or three, dividing always into three or two and subdividing into two. Indeed, one could say that he gives eight divisions to arrive at the ten of Aristotle. He first divides into three and subdivides the second and the third parts into two until he has arrived at each of the ten. (The first part contains only one genus, namely substance.)

The first text where Thomas shows how the ten are distinguished is in his Exposition of the third book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*):

> Sed restat circa hoc duplex dubitatio. Prima quidem quia, si actio et passio sint unus motus, et non differunt nisi secundum rationem, ut dictum est, videtur quod non debeant esse duo praedicamenta, cum praedicamenta sint genera rerum.
>
> Item, si motus vel est actio vel passio, non invenietur motus in substantia, qualitate, quantitate et ubi, ut supra dictum est; sed solum continebitur in actione et passione.
>
> Ad horum igitur evidentiam sciendum est quod ens dividitur in decem praedicamenta non univoce, sicut genus in species, sed secundum diversum modum essendi. Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi. Praedicando enim aliquid de aliquo altero, dicimus hoc esse illud: unde et decem genera entis dicuntur decem praedicamenta.
>
> Tripliciter autem fit omnis praedicatio.
>
> Unus quidem modus est, quando de aliquo subiecto praedicatur id quod pertinet ad essentiam eius, ut cum dico *Socrates est homo*, vel *homo est animal;* et secundum hoc accipitur praedicamentum *substantiae*.
>
> Alius autem modus est, quando praedicatur de aliquo id quod non est de essentia eius, tamen inhaeret ei. Quod quidem vel se habet ex parte materiae subiecti, et secundum hoc est praedicamentum *quantitatis* (nam quantitas proprie consequitur materiam: unde et Plato posuit magnum ex parte materiae); aut consequitur formam, et sic est praedicamentum *qualitatis* (unde et qualitates fundantur super quantitatem, sicut color in superficie, et figura in lineis vel in superficiebus); aut se habet per respectum ad alterum, et sic est praedicamentum *relationis* (cum enim dico *homo est pater*, non praedicatur de homine aliquid absolutum, sed respectus qui ei inest ad aliquid extrinsecum.

Tertius autem modus praedicandi est, quando aliquid extrinsecum de aliquo praedicatur per modum alicuius denominationis: sic enim et accidentia extrinseca de substantia praedicantur; non tamen dicimus quod homo sit albedo, sed quod homo sit albus. Denominari autem ab aliquo extrinseco invenitur quodammodo communiter in omnibus, et aliquo modo specialiter in iis quae ad homines pertinent tantum.

Communiter autem invenitur aliquid denominari ab aliquo extrinseco, vel secundum rationem causae, vel secundum rationem mensurae; denominatur enim aliquid causatum et mensuratum ab aliquo exteriori.

Cum autem quatuor sint genera causarum, duo ex his sunt partes essentiae, scilicet materia et forma: unde praedicatio quae possit fieri secundum haec duo, pertinet ad praedicamentum substantiae, utpote si dicamus quod homo est rationalis, et homo est corporeus. Causa autem finalis non causat seorsum aliquid ab agente: intantum enim finis habet rationem causae, inquantum movet agentem. Remanet igitur sola causa agens a qua potest denominari aliquid sicut ab exteriori. Si igitur secundum quod aliquid denominatur a causa agente, est praedicamentum *passionis*, nam pati nihil est aliud quam suscipere aliquid ab agente: secundum autem quod e converso denominatur causa agens ab effectu, est praedicamentum *actionis*, nam actio est actus ab agente in aliud, ut supra dictum est.

Mensura autem quaedam est extrinseca et quaedam intrinseca. Intrinseca quidem sicut propria longitudo uniuscuiusque et latitudo et profunditas: ab his ergo denominatur aliquid sicut ab intrinseco inhaerente; unde pertinet ad praedicamentum quantitatis.

Exteriores autem mensurae sunt tempus et locus: secundum igitur quod aliquid denominatur a tempore est praedicamentum *quando;* secundum autem quod denominatur a loco, est praedicamentum *ubi* et *situs*, quod addit supra *ubi* ordinem partium in loco. Hoc autem non erat necessarium addi ex parte temporis, cum ordo partium in tempore in ratione temporis importetur: est enim tempus numerus motus secundum prius et

posterius. Sic igitur aliquid dicitur esse *quando* vel *ubi* per denominationem a tempore vel a loco.

Est autem aliquid speciale in hominibus. In aliis enim animalibus natura dedit sufficienter ea quae ad conservationem vitae pertinent, ut cornua ad defendendum, corium grossum et pilosum ad tegendum, ungulas vel aliquid huiusmodi ad incedendum sine laesione. Et sic cum talia animalia dicuntur armata vel vestita vel calceata, quodammodo non denominantur ab aliquo extrinseco, sed ab aliquibus suis partibus. Unde hoc refertur in his ad praedicamentum substantiae: ut puta si diceretur quod homo est *manuatus* vel *pedatus*.

Sed huiusmodi non poterant dari homini a natura, tum quia non conveniebant subtilitati complexionis eius, tum propter multiformitatem operum quae conveniunt homini inquantum habet rationem, quibus aliqua determinata instrumenta accomodari non poterant a natura: sed loco omnium inest homini ratio, qua exteriora sibi praeparat loco horum quae aliis animalibus intrinseca sunt. Unde cum homo dicitur armatus vel vestitus vel calceatus, denominatur ab aliquo extrinseco, quod non habet rationem neque causae, neque mensurae: unde est speciale praedicamentum, et dicitur *habitus*.

Sed attendendum est quod etiam aliis animalibus hoc praedicamentum attribuitur, non secundum quod in sua natura considerantur, sed secundum quod in hominis usum veniunt; ut si dicamus equum phaleratum vel sellatum seu armatum.

Sic igitur patet quod licet motus sit unus, tamen praedicamenta quae sumuntur secundum motum, sunt duo, secundum quod a diversis rebus exterioribus fiunt praedicamentales denominationes. Nam alia res est agens, a qua sicut ab exteriori, sumitur per modum denominationis praedicamentum passionis: et alia res est patiens a qua denominatur agens. Et sic patet solutio primae dubitationis.

Secunda autem dubitatio de facili solvitur. Nam ratio motus completur non solum per id quod est de motu in rerum natura, sed etiam per id quod ratio apprehendit.

De motu enim in rerum natura nihil aliud est quam actus imperfectus, qui est inchoatio quaedam actus perfecti in eo quod

movetur: sicut in eo quod dealbatur, iam incipit esse aliquid albedinis. Sed ad hoc quod illud imperfectum habeat rationem motus, requiritur ulterius quod intelligamus ipsum quasi medium inter duo; quorum praecedens comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, unde motus dicitur actus; consequens vero comparatur ad ipsum sicut perfectum ad imperfectum vel actus ad potentiam, propter quod dicitur actus existentis in potentia, ut supra dictum est.

Unde quodcumque imperfectum accipiatur ut non in aliud perfectum tendens, dicitur terminus motus et non erit motus secundum quem aliquid moveatur; utpote si aliquid incipiat dealbari, et statim alteratio interrumpatur.

Quantum igitur ad id quod in rerum natura est de motu, motus ponitur per reductionem in illo genere quod terminat motum, sicut imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum, ut supra dictum est. Sed quantum ad id quod ratio apprehendit circa motum, scilicet esse medium quoddam inter duos terminos, sic iam implicatur ratio causae et effectus: nam reduci aliquid de potentia in actum, non est nisi ab aliqua causa agente. Et secundum hoc motus pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis: haec enim duo praedicamenta accipiuntur secundum rationem causae agentis et effectus, ut dictum est.[12]

A TRANSLATION OF THE MIDDLE OF THE ABOVE INTO ENGLISH

...being is divided into ten predicaments [said ofs], not univocally, as a genus into species, but by diverse ways of being. But the ways of being are proportional to the ways of being said of. For in saying one thing of another, we say this is that. Whence also the ten genera of being are called the ten predicaments [categories or said-ofs].

But all predication [saying of] comes to be in one of three ways.

One way is when that which is said of some subject pertains to its nature, as when I say *Socrates is a man* or *man is an animal*. And by this is taken the predicament [category or said of] *substance*.

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[12] *In III Physicorum*, Lectio V, nn. 321-324

Another way is that in which there is said of something what is not of its nature, but nevertheless exists in it. This is had either on the part of the matter of the subject and by this there is the predicament [category or said of] *quantity*, for quantity properly follows matter - whence also Plato laid down the large on the side of matter; or it follows form, and this is the predicament [category or said-of] *quality* - whence also qualities are founded upon quantity, as color in surface and figure in lines or surfaces; or it is had in regard to another, and thus it is the predicament [category or said-of] *relation* - for when I say *a man is a father*, nothing absolute is said of the man, but a regard which is in him to something extrinsic.

The third way of *being said of* is when something extrinsic is said of something by way of some denomination - for thus also, intrinsic accidents are said of substance; for we do not say man is whiteness, but that man is white.

But to be denominated from something extrinsic is found in one way commonly in all and in some way specially in those things that pertain only to man.

But commonly, something is found to be denominated from something extrinsic, either by reason of cause or by reason of measure; for something is denominated caused and measured by something outside of it.

There being, however, four kinds of cause, two of these are parts of the nature: namely, matter and form - whence the being said of which could come from these two belongs to the said-of substance, as if we should say that man is rational or man is corporal. And the final cause does not cause anything by itself apart from the agent - for the end has the sense of a cause to the extent that it moves the agent. There remains therefore only the agent cause by which something is able to be denominated as from the exterior.

Thus therefore, as something is denominated from the agent cause, there is the predicament [category or said-of] *undergoing.* For undergoing is nothing other than receiving something from an agent. But conversely, as the agent cause is denominated from the effect, there is the predicament *acting*

upon. For acting upon is an act from the agent in another, as has been said.

Some measure is extrinsic and some intrinsic. Intrinsic, as each thing's own length and width and depth. From these, something is denominated as from something existing within; whence it pertains to the predicament quantity.

The extrinsic measures, however, are time and place. Hence, as something is denominated from time, there is the predicament [category or said-of] *when*. However, as something is denominated from place, there is the predicaments [categories or said-ofs] *where* and *position,* which adds above *where* an order of parts in place. This however was not necessary to add on the part of time since the order of parts in time is implied in the definition of time - for time is the number of motion according to its before and after. Thus something is said to be *when* or *where* by denomination from time or from place.

There is however something special in man. For nature has sufficiently given the other animals those things which pertain to the conservation of life, as horns for defense, a thick and hairy hide for covering, hoofs or something of this sort for walking without injury. And thus when such animals are called armed or clothed or shod, they are not denominated from something extrinsic, but from some of their own parts. Whence this refers in them to the predicament *substance*, as if it were said that man is with hands or footed.

But these sorts of things could not have been given to man by nature, both because they are not suitable to the subtlety of man's complexion and because of the many forms of operation which belong to man insofar as he has reason for which some determined instruments could not have been adapted by nature, but in place of all these, there is reason within man by which he prepares for himself exterior things in place of those which are intrinsic to the other animals. Whence, when man is called armed or clothed or shod, he is named from something extrinsic which has neither the notion of cause nor of measure. Whence it is a special predicament [category or said-of] and is called *habit*. [*outfitted*]

> But it should be noted that this predicament is attributed to other animals, not as they are considered in their own nature, but as they come into the use of man; as if we call a horse decorated or saddled or armed.

The other place where Thomas distinguishes the ten is in his exposition of the fifth book of *Wisdom* (the *Metaphysics*):

> Distinguit modum entis per se: et circa hoc tria facit. Primo distinguit ens, quod est extra animam, per decem praedicamenta, quod est ens perfectum. Secundo, ponit alium modum entis, secundum quod est tantum in mente...Tertio dividit ens per potentiam et actum: et ens sic divisum est communius quam ens perfectum. Nam ens in potentia, est ens secundum quid tantum et imperfectum...
>
> Dicit ergo primo, quod illa dicuntur esse secundum se, quaecumque significant figuras praedicationis. Sciendum enim est quod ens non potest hoc modo contrahi ad aliquid determinatum, sicut genus contrahitur ad species per differentias. Nam differentia, cum non participet genus, est extra essentiam generis. Nihil autem posset esse extra essentiam entis, quod per additionem ad ens aliquam speciem entis constituat: nam quod est extra ens, nihil est, et differentia esse non potest. Unde in tertio huius probavit Philosophus, quod ens, genus esse non potest.
>
> Unde oportet, quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia "quoties ens dicitur", idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, "toties esse significatur", idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi. Quia igitur eorum quae praedicantur, quaedam significant quid, idest substantiam, quaedam quale, quaedam quantum, et sic de aliis; oportet quod unicuique modo praedicandi, esse significet idem; ut cum dicitur homo est animal, esse significat substantiam. Cum autem dicitur, homo est albus, significat qualitatem, et sic de aliis.
>
> Sciendum enim est quod praedicatum ad subiectum tripliciter se potest habere.

Uno modo cum est id quod est subiectum, ut cum dico, Socrates est animal. Nam Socrates est id quod est animal. Et hoc praedicatum dicitur significare substantiam primam, quae est substantia particularis, de qua omnia praedicantur.

Secundo modo ut praedicatum sumatur secundum quod inest subiecto: quod quidem praedicatum, vel inest ei per se et absolute, ut consequens materiam, et sic est quantitas: vel ut consequens formam, et sic est qualitas: vel inest ei non absolute, sed in respectu ad aliud, et sic est ad aliquid

Tertio modo ut praedicatum sumatur ab eo quod est extra subiectum: et hoc dupliciter.

Uno modo ut sit omnino extra subiectum: quod quidem si non sit mensura subiecti, praedicatur per modum habitus, ut cum dicitur, Socrates est calceatus vel vestitus. Si autem sit mensura eius, cum mensura extrinseca sit vel tempus vel locus, sumitur praedicamentum vel ex parte temporis, et sic erit quando: vel ex loco, et sic erit ubi, non considerato ordine partium in loco, quo considerato erit situs.

Alio modo ut id a quo sumitur praedicamentum, secundum aliquid sit in subiecto, de quo praedicatur ut agere. Nam actionis principium in subiecto est. Si vero secundum terminum, sic praedicabitur ut in pati. Nam passio in subiectum patiens terminatur.

Quia vero quaedam praedicantur, in quibus manifeste non apponitur hoc verbum Est, ne credatur quod illae praedicationes non pertineant ad praedicationem entis, ut cum dicitur, homo ambulat, ideo consequenter hoc removet, dicens quod in omnibus huiusmodi praedicationibus significatur aliquid esse. Verbum enim quodlibet resolvitur in hoc verbum Est, et participium. Nihil enim differt dicere, homo convalescens est, et homo convalescit, et sic de aliis. Unde patet quod quot modis praedicatio fit, tot modis ens dicitur.

Nec est verum quod Avicenna dicit, quod praedicata, quae sunt in generibus accidentis, principaliter significant substantiam, et per posterius accidens, sicut hoc quod dico album et musicum. Nam album ut in praedicamentis dicitur, solam qualitatem significat. Hoc autem nomen album significat subiectum ex consequenti, in

> quantum significat albedinem per modum accidentis. Unde oportet, quod ex consequenti includat in sui ratione subiectum. Nam accidentis esse est inesse. Albedo enim etsi significet accidens, non tamen per modum accidentis, sed per modum substantiae. Unde nullo modo consignificat subiectum. Si enim principaliter significaret subiectum, tunc praedicata accidentalia non ponerentur a Philosopho sub ente secundum se, sed sub ente secundum accidens. Nam hoc totum, quod est homo albus, est ens secundum accidens, ut dictum est.[13]

The two distinctions of the ten are very much alike. But a brief comparison of the two is in order.

Both in his commentary on the third book of *Natural Hearing* and in his commentary on the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* or *First Philosophy,* Thomas Aquinas arrives at the ten categories by eight divisions following the rule of two or three.

There is one division into three and seven divisions into two. The division into three is the same in both commentaries and is also the first in both.

Five of the seven divisions into two are the same in both, and two are different.

Two of the five which are the same in both are the division of the second part of the division into three into two and the sub-division of one of these into two more.

The different divisions are found in two of the five divisions necessary to distinguish the third part of the first division eventually into the six remaining genera.

The division of those based on cause and effect is the same as is also the division of those based on measure as well as the subdivision of one of those based on measure.

But the first division of the last six genera in both is different and consequently one of the subsequent divisions must be other.

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[13] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, nn. 889-894

For in the third book of *Natural Hearing*, to be outfitted or to have is divided against the remaining five because it is found specially in man and the remaining five are found in common.

But in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics,* to be outfitted or to have with the three based on outside measure are distinguished from acting upon and undergoing. For the former are denominating from something entirely outside and the latter from something partly inside and partly outside.

Hence, in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics,* it is necessary to divide outfitted or to have against the three based on outside measure. And in the third book of *Natural Hearing*, it is necessary to divide the three based on outside measure against the two based on cause and effect.

But the division and the sub-division of those based on extrinsic measure is the same in both as well as the division of the two based on cause and effect (or which are from something partly inside and partly outside),

The following text (which has been placed with relation) is entered here for the sake of comparing the basis for the distinction of the species of relation with the basis for the distinction of those common genera in which something is denominated from what is outside of it.

> Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur.
>
> Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam vel secundum quantitatem, vel secundum virtutem activam seu passivam. Ex his enim solum duobus attenditur aliquid in uno, respectu extrinseci.
>
> Mensuratur enim aliquid non solum a quantitate intrinseca, sed etiam ab extrinseca.
>
> Per virtutem etiam activam unumquodque agit in alterum et per passivam patitur ab altero;
>
> per substantiam autem et qualitatem ordinatur aliquid ad seipsum tantum, non ad alterum, nisi per accidens; scilicet secundum quod qualitas, - vel forma substantialis aut materia, - habet rationem virtutis activae vel passivae, et secundum quod in eis consideratur aliqua ratio quantitatis, prout unum in substantia facit idem, et unum in qualitate simile, et numerus,

> sive multitudo, dissimile et diversum in eisdem, et dissimile secundum aliquid magis vel minus altero consideratur: sic enim albius aliquid altero dicitur.
>
> Et propter hoc Philosophus in V *Metaph*. species assignans relationis, quasdam ponit ex quantitate causatas, quasdam vero ex actione et passione.[14]

A somewhat similar distinction of circumstances is found in the following text where the distinction of circumstances of moral act is considered:

> Secundum autem quod ad moralem pertinent, potest aliter earum numerus accipi. Proportio enim actus ad finem potest accipi vel secundum id quod est in ipso actu, vel secundum id quod est extra.
>
> Si primo modo: aut quantum ad speciem actus, et sic est quid: aut quantum ad modum ipsius; et sic est quomodo.
>
> Si autem per comparationem ad extra; vel per comparationem ad causam vel per comparationem ad mensuram.
>
> Si primo modo: vel ad causam finalem, et sic est cur, vel ad causam efficientem vel instrumentalem, et sic est quibus auxiliis, vel principalem, et sic est quis.
>
> Si autem per comparationem ad mensuram: aut ad locum, et sic est ubi, aut ad tempus, et sic est quando.[15]

The order in which Aristotle enumerates the ten and the order in which he considers them is the same, except for the reversal of the order of toward something or relation and how or quality. The order in which they are enumerated follows their order in comparison to substance and quality is before relation. But the order in which they are considered in particular is relation before quality. The reason for this will be seen in the Chapter on relation. It is connected with the correction of the Platonic definition of relation which would include some qualities. Something like this reversal of order is also found in the *Isagoge* of Porphyry where the five predicables are

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[14] Thomas Aquinas, *De Potentia*, Q. 7, Art. 9, Corpus

[15] *Scriptum Super LIb. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XVI, Quaestio III, Art. I, Ad secundam quaestionem

enumerated in the order genus, difference, species, property and accident. But specie is considered before difference. This is because genus and species are defined and hence known in relation to each other even though difference is closer to the genus and making the species. We need to note that order of learning or knowing need not be identical with the order of being or in things.

What is the order of the ten? Why substance before the rest?

> Et quod ad substantiam omnia alia referantur sicut ad ens primum, manifestat quia omnia alia entia, scilicet qualitas, quantitas et huiusmodi dicuntur secundum rationem substantiae. Dicitur enim quantitas ex hoc quod est mensura substantiae, et qualitas ex hoc quod est quaedam dispositio substantiae; similiter in aliis.[16]

Why are how much or quantity, how or quality and toward something or relation before remaining six?

If we order them by their closeness or distance from substance (since substance comes first), how much, how and toward something come before the last six because the former denominate substance from something in it and the latter from something outside of it. Hence, the former are obviously closer to substance.

Why quantity and quality before toward something?

One reason is that, even as a particular kind of accident, quantity and quality are something of substance, but relation as a particular kind of accident is completed in its meaning by comparison to something outside:

> in quolibet novem generum accidentis est duo considerare. quorum unum est esse quod competit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidens. Et hoc communiter in omnibus est inesse subiecto: accidentis enim esse est inesse.
>
> Aliud quod potest considerari in unoquoque, est propria ratio uniuscuiusque illorum generum.
>
> Et in aliis quodem generibus a relatione, utpote quantitate et qualitate, etiam propria ratio generis accipitur secundum

[16] *In IX Metaphysicorum*, Lectio I, n. 1768

> comparationem ad subiectum: nam quantitas dicitur mensura substantiae, qualitas vero dispositio substantiae.
>
> Sed ratio propria relationis non accipitur secundum comparationem ad illud in quo est, sed secundum comparationem ad aliquid extra.[17]

Another reason why quantity and quality are placed before relation is that relation are based on quantity and quality or they belong to substance through some quantity or quality:

> Inter accidentia vero quidam ordo considerandus est. Nam inter omnia accidentia propinquius inhaeret substantiae quantitas dimensiva. Deinde qualitates in substantia recipiuntur quantitate mediante, sicut color mediante superficie: unde et per divisionem quantitatis, per accidens dividuntur. Ulterius autem qualitates sunt actionum et passionum principia; et relationum quarundam, ut sunt pater et filius, dominus et servus, et alia huiusmodi. Quaedam vero relationes immediate ad quantitates consequuntur: ut maius et minus, duplum et dimidium, et similia.[18]

Why quantity before quality?

One reason is that some qualities, at least the sensible ones and figure belong to substance through quantity, as pointed out in the last text. Other more subtle reasons are to be found in the following text from Thomas:

> Sciendum autem quod substantia corporalis habet quod sit subjectum accidentium ex materia sua, cui primo inest subjici alteri.
>
> Prima autem dispositio materiae est quantitas; quia secundum ipsam attenditur divisio ejus et indivisio, et ita unitas et multitudo quae sunt prima consequentia ens; et propter hoc sunt dispositiones totius materiae, non hujus aut illius tantum.

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[17] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 28, Art 2, C
[18] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Capitulum LXIII

> Unde omnia alia accidentia mediante quantitate in substantia fundantur, et quantitas est prior eis naturaliter. Et ideo non claudit materiam sensibilem in ratione sua, quamvis claudat materiam intelligibilem, ut dicitur in VII *Meta.* (1036a 8-9; Lectio X, nn. 1496-1497)
>
> Unde ex hoc quidam decepti fuerunt, ut crederent dimensiones esse substantiam rerum sensibilium; quia remotis qualitatibus nihil sensibile remanere videbant nisi quantitatem, quae tamen secundum esse suum dependet a substantia, sicut et alia accidentia.
>
> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod prima accidentia consequentia substantiam sunt quantitas et qualitas. Et haec duo proportionantur duobus principiis essentialibus substantiae, scilicet formae et materiae, quia quantitas respondet materiae - unde magnum et parvum Plato posuit differentias materiae - sed qualitas ex parte formae. Et quia materia est subjectum primum quod non est in alio, forma autem est in alio, scilicet materia; ideo magis appropinquat ad hoc quod est non esse in alio quantitas quam qualitas, et per consequens quam alia accidentia.
>
> Ad secundum dicendum quod quantitas dimensiva secundum suam rationem non dependet a materia sensibili, quamvis dependeat secundum suum esse; ideo in praedicando et subjiciendo accipit modum substantiae et modum accidentis; unde lineam dicimus et quantitatem et quantam, et magnitudinem et magnam.[19]

The closeness of dimensions to material substance is especially seen in the order of undetermined dimensions to substance in this text from Thomas:

> ...Sicut enim Commentator dicit in I *Phys.*, et in lib. *De substantia orbis* (cap. 1), in materia generabilium et corruptibilium oportet intelligere dimensiones interminatas ante adventum formae substantialis; alias non posset intelligi divisio materiae, ut in diversis partibus materiae diversae formae substantiales essent. Hujusmodi autem dimensiones post adventum formae substantialis accipiunt esse terminatum et completum. Quidquid autem intelligitur in materia ante adventum formae substantialis, hoc manet idem numero in generato et in eo ex quo generatur,

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[19] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. I, Ad Tertiam Quaestionem & Ad 1 & Ad 2

> quia remoto posteriori oportet remanere prius. Dimensiones autem illae interminatae se habent ad genus quantitatis sicut materia ad genus substantiae.[20]

And in another text of Thomas:

> ...forma substantialis materialis aliquo modo habet ordinem ad dimensiones, cum dimensiones interminatae praeintelligantur in materia ante formam substantialem.[21]

In the discussion of the Eucharist, Thomas often points out the closeness of dimensions to material substance:

> ...vel ipsi dimensioni virtute divina dabitur natura materiae propter propinquitatem ad ipsum..
>
> Ad secundum.....tamen quantum ad aliquid dimensiones interminatae magis sunt propinquae materiae corporali quam corpus spiritui.[22]

Why are where, when, to be laid out, and to have before to act upon and to undergo?

Perhaps the reason is that the former are more tied to quantity which comes before quality while the latter are tied to qualities:

> ...in actionibus naturalibus formae substantiales non sunt immediatum et proximum actionis principium, sed agunt mediantibus qualitatibus activis et passivis, sicut propriis instrumentis, ut dicitur in II *De anima*, quod calor naturalis est quo anima agit.[23]

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[20] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad Quartam Quaestionem

[21] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. III, Ad Primam Quaestionem, Ad 3

[22] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad Quartam Quaestionem & Ad 2, Whether something can be generated from the dimensions etc. in eucharist

[23] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad Secundam Quaestionem

This also agrees with quality being connected with the form of substance and quantity with the matter:

> ...agere non est nisi rei per se subsistentis. Et ideo neque materia agit neque forma, sed compositum: quod tamen non agit ratione materiae, sed ratione formae quae est actus et actionis principium.
>
> Et quia quantitas se tenet ex parte materiae et qualitas ex parte formae, ideo quantitas non agit nisi mediante qualitate quae est per se actionis principium. Unde qualitates sunt sensibiles primo, quantitates secundo.[24]

Why does *where* come before *when*?

The following text is useful for understanding the order of where and when:

> ...accidentia quaedam denominant illud in quo sunt, sicut albedo; et talia intelliguntur creata in creatione suorum subjectorum, si sunt de illis quae esse primum consequuntur, ut figura et quantitas, et hujusmodi.
>
> Quaedam autem denominant etiam illud in quo non sunt ut in subjecto, sicut locus. Non enim est locus corporis continentis in quo est ut in subjecto, sed corporis contenti: et tempus est numerus omnium motuum, etsi primo ejus in quo est ut in subjecto, scilicet motus primi mobilis, per quem omnes alii numerantur, ut in X *Metaph*. dicitur.
>
> Sed tamen alia est ratio de tempore et de loco: quia locus est idem per essentiam quod superficies corporis locantis; tempus autem non est idem numero cum aliquo accidente in substantia fundato: et praeterea locus totum complementum suum habet in re; sed temporis ratio aliquo modo completur ex actione animae numerantis; unde magis habet rationem extrinseci quam locus; et ideo potius connumeratur primo creatis quam locus, vel aliud aliquod accidens.[25]

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[24] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad Primam Quaestionem

[25] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaestio I, Art. V, Ad. 2

And some other texts on the same:

> ...locus est superficies corporis locantis; et ideo creatio loci cum creatione corporalis naturae intelligitur.[26]

> ...per opus creationis instituta est tota creatura quantum ad esse suum informe; unde quae non possunt duci ad unum informe principium, quod est materia, faciunt numerum in operibus creationis.
>
> Substantia enim et accidens non reducuntur in unam materiam, quia accidentis pars materia non est, et ideo non conveniunt in materia ex qua. Potest tamen dici aliquo modo accidens convenire cum substantia in materia in qua, secundum quod accidens est in substantia: et ideo illud accidens quod est sicut extra mensurando denominans, substantiae connumeratur, scilicet tempus.[27]

A likeness between *to have* and *to act upon* and *to undergo* is seen in the following text:

> ...quamvis hoc quod est accidens in se, possit esse aliquo modo substantia alicui, ut color albedini; tamen quod est in se substantia, non potest esse accidens alicujus, quamvis conjunctio unius substantiae ad alteram possit esse accidens, ut sic una substantia alteri accidentaliter advenire dicatur, sicut vestis homini.
>
> Sed hoc non potest esse nisi dupliciter: vel quod conjungatur ei secundum contactum, sicut vestis homini vel sicut dolium vino; aut sicut mobile motori, sicut Angelus conjungitur corpori quod assumit.[28]

The following text gives another reason why *to have* is placed next to acting upon and undergoing:

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[26] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaestio I, Art. V, Ad. 1

[27] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XII, Quaestio I, Art. V, Solutio

[28] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio VI, Quaest. III, Art II, Responsio

Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 1, corpus

> Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens and id quod habetur: sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium.
>
> Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio: sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum.
>
> Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum: unde Philosophus dicit, in V *Metaphys.*, quod *habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti*, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum Habitus: de quod dicit Philosophus, in V *Metaphys.*, quod *inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius*.[29]

APPENDIX

But there is some difference between the consideration of genus by the logician and the natural philosopher and the wise man:

> Hic ostendit quot modis dicuntur aliqua diversa genere; et ponit duos modos respondentes ultimis duobus modis generis...
>
> Primo igitur modo dicuntur aliqua genere diversa, quia eorum primum subiectum est diversum: sicut primum subiectum coloris est superficies, primum autem subiectum saporis est humor...
>
> Alio modo dicuntur diversa genere, quae dicuntur "secundum diversam figuram categoriae", idest praedicationis entis...

---

[29] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 1, corpus

> Patet autem ex dictis quod aliqua continentur sub uno praedicamento, et sunt unum in genere hoc modo secundo, quae tamen sunt diversa genera primo modo. Sicut corpora caelestia et elementaria, et colores et sapores. Primus autem modus diversitatis secundum genus consideratur magis a naturali, et etiam a philosopho, quia est magis realis. Secundus autem modus consideratur a logico, quia est rationis.[30]

And another text on the same:

> aliqui sunt unius generis logice loquendo, quae naturaliter non sunt unius generis, sicut illa quae communicant in intentione generis quam logicus inspicit, et habent diversum modum essendi: unde in X Metaph. dicitur quod de corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus nihil commune dicitur nisi communitate nominis.[31]

A Brief Comparison of the Two Divisions of the Six Genera by Thomas

Physics

communiter in omnibus
- secundum rationem causae
  - *actio*
  - *passio*
- secundum rationem mensurae
  - from time: *quando*
  - from place: *ubi* & *situs*

specialiter in hominibus: *habitus*

The distinction is closer to that between natural and artificial. *Habitus* is considered more at length, why these cannot be by nature in man.

Metaphysics

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[30] Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XXII, n. 1124-1127

[31] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist III, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 2

omnino extra subjectum
- by what is not a measure: *habitus*
- by what is a measure
  - from time: *quando*
  - from place: *ubi* & *situs*

secundum aliquid in subjecto
- principium: *actio*
- terminus: *passio*

Distinction is more in comparison to substance. This is more the division and order of the *Categories*. The affinity of logic and metaphysics.

Aristotle's Examples for the Genera of Categories

substance: man, horse	the substantial unity of these is most known to us in that order
quantity: two cubits, three cubits	continuous quantity is more sensible than number and more clearly an accident and measure of some substance
quality: white, grammatical	sensible quality first and then immaterial but seen in outside speech, examples from third and first species of quality where contraries are found (which distinguishes form substance and quantity), in senses of quality in *Metaphysics* second species eliminated and fourth reduced to quale quid or essential difference and first species reduced to third
toward something: double and half, greater	relations based on quantity more known to us

where: in Lyceum, in market-place	Aristotle is lecturing in the Lyceum and students leave to go to market-place
when: yesterday, last year	examples taken from past
to act upon: to cut, to burn	clearly sensible change, not operations
to undergo: to be cut, to be burned	clearly sensible change, not operations

Albert the Great, the teacher of Thomas, had divided the ten somewhat differently than Thomas. We give it here in his text and then in outline form:

Albert, *De Praedicamentis*, Tractatus I, Caput VII, Laval Ed, p. 24:

> ...praedicabile de aliquo, aut est *substantia*, aut est accidens: et haec divisio est per opposita immediate, quae reducuntur ad affirmationem et negationem, sicut ens per se et non per se....
>
> ens in alio ut in subjecto...in duo secundum Aristotelem dividi habet. Accidens quidem aut est accidens secundum inesse, aut secundum aliquem modum ad aliud se habere.
>
> Si autem est accidens sive aliquod cadens secundum absolutum inesse, tunc aut inest secundum materiam, quae potentia divisibilis est et extensibilis et numerabilis ad formarum susceptionem, quae in quantum potentia primo invenitur in materia: aut inest absolute secundum potentiam formae, quae est perfectiva materiae ad actum et operationem. Si primo modo inest, tunc est *quantitas*. Si autem secundo modo inest, tunc est *qualitas* quae dispositio est substantiae ad operationes aliquas et ad actus.

Si autem non est accidens secundum esse absolutum, hoc cadit ad substantiam secundum id quod est aliquo modo habere se substantiam ad aliud: tunc non potest esse nisi duobus modis: aut enim id aliquo modo se habere ad aliud causatur a substantia comparata ad aliud, aut ab illo extrinseco comparato ad substantiam de qua praedicatur.

Si primo modo, tunc iterum non est nisi duobus modis: aut enim est in comparatione simplici ad aliud, aut secundum comparationem partium ad totum in seipso consideratum.

Et si est in secundo modo, est *situs* vel *positio*. Si autem est primo: aut secundum comparationem ortam a forma, aut secundum comparationem a toto simul. Et si est praedicabile secundum comparationem ortam a forma, est *actio:* unde dicit Averroes, quod actio nihil aliud est, nisi comparatio agentis ad patiens. Si autem comparatio illa est orta a materia, tunc est pati: propter quod idem Averroes dicit quod *passio* est comparatio patientis ad agens secundum quod agens est.

Si autem oritur a toto, non potest oriri, nisi per aliquem actum totius, quo innascitur comparatio illa, et tunc est *ad aliquid* sive *relatio*.

Si autem oritur comparatio ab aliquo extrinseco comparato ad subjectum, de quo fit praedicatio, illud extrinsecum, aut est adjacens tantum, aut adjacens et applicatum.

Si autem est adjacens tantum, et ex adjacentia simplici comparatum, aut est adjacens ei quod est cum motu et esse distenso. Si primo quidem est ortum ab adjacentia extrinseca, tunc est *ubi*. Si autem comparatio est orta ab adjacentia extrinseci secundo modo, tunc est praedicamentum *quando*.

Si autem oritur ab adjacente extrinseco et applicato, tunc st praedicamentum *habitus*.

Nec possunt plura praedicari secundum adjacentiam extrinsecam.

ALBERT'S DIVISION IN OUTLINE FORM

praedicabile de aliquo,

aut est *substantia*,

aut est accidens

secundum inesse

inest secundum materiam: *quantitas*

inest absolute secundum potentiam formae: *qualitas*

secundum aliquem modum ad aliud se habere (aliquo modo habere se substantiam ad aliud)

causatur a substantia comparata ad aliud

in comparatione simplici ad aliud
secundum comparationem ortam a parte (missing in text)
ortam a forma: *actio*
ortam a materia: *passio*

secundum comparationem ortam a toto simul (per aliquem actum totius, quo innascitur comparatio illa): *Ad aliquid* sive *relatio*

secundum comparationem partium ad totum in seipso consideratum: *situs* vel *positio*

causatur ab illo extrinseco comparato ad substantiam de qua praedicatur

aut est adjacens tantum
ex adjacentia extrinseca simplici comparatum: *ubi*

adjacens ei quod est cum motu et esse distenso: *quando*

aut adjacens et applicatum (ab adjacente extrinseco et applicato): *habitus*

Albert also follows the logical rule of two or three to arrive at the ten highest genera. But he divides them into two first while Thomas divides them into three. Both divisions are good. And they are in harmony for one can divide, as we have seen, the accidents into two which are the second and the third parts of Thomas' division. But here there is a major difference for

Aristotle puts relation with quantity and quality in his division and Albert puts it with the last six. Albert has here made a mistake, I think. And Thomas' division is more in accord with Aristotle's giving a long consideration to relation like for substance, quantity and quality. Nevertheless, Albert's mistake is a sign that relation is well ordered by Aristotle after quantity and quality and before the last six. It is closer to the last six than quantity and quality are.

Albert's distinction between quantity and quality is like that of Thomas. Albert's division of the six (leaving out relation) does separate *where* and *when* and *to have* in one part and *to act upon* and *to undergo* in another. But unlike Thomas he has *to be laid out* in the same part as *to act upon* and *to undergo* while Thomas puts it with *where* and *when* and for good and more understandable reasons. Here is, I think, another mistake of Albert. But Albert's placing acting upon and undergoing with towards another is interesting to compare with Thomas' explanation of acting upon and undergoing in the *Metaphysics.*

Duane H. Berquist

SUBSTANCE - CHAPTER 5

The fifth chapter has two parts. The first part is about the distinction and order of first and second substance. And the second part is about the properties of substance.

Unlike what he does in the chapters on quantity and quality (where he distinguishes the first species of these highest genera), Aristotle does not distinguish the first species of substance. Perhaps the reason for this is that it is a question for the wise man to investigate and determine whether there are immaterial substances as well as the material substances known to all of us. If there are, the first division of substance would be into material and immaterial substances. But this would not be clear to a beginner. And therefore Aristotle gives another distinction or division, that between first and second substance.

What kind of distinction is this between first and second substance?

Thomas explains that the division or distinction of substance into first and second is not a division of a genus into its species, but a division of a genus by diverse ways of being:

> ...Cum dividitur substantia in primam et secundam, non est divisio generis in species, cum nihil contineatur sub secunda substantia quod non sit in prima, -
>
> sed est divisio generis secundum diversos modos essendi. Nam secunda substantia significat naturam generis secundum se absolutam; prima vero substantia significat eam ut individualiter subsistentem.
>
> Unde magis est divisio analogi quam generis.
>
> Sic ergo persona continetur quidem in genere substantiae, licet non ut species, sed ut specialem modum existendi determinans.[1]

First substance is neither said of another, nor does it exist in another. Hence, it is chiefly substance, first and most of all substance. The wise man, who considers things in themselves, would consider only first substance to

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[1] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia*, Q. 9, Art 2, Ad 6

be substance. Thomas explains why in logic, though, Aristotle will also call *substance* the species in which first substance is and the genus in which is that species:

> Dicit quod substantia dicitur, quae non est de subiecto: et dicitur universale semper de aliquo subiecto: ergo universale non est substantia.
>
> Videtur autem ratio haec non valere. Dictum est enim in *Praedicamentis*, quod de ratione substantiae est, quod non sit in subiecto. Praedicari vero de subiecto non est contra rationem substantiae. Unde ponuntur ibi secundae substantiae quae praedicantur de subiecto.
>
> Sed dicendum quod secundum logicam considerationem loquitur Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*. Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni universalitatis. Et ideo quantum ad praedicationem, quae est actus rationis, dicit quod praedicatur "de subiecto", idest de substantia subsistente extra animam.
>
> Sed Philosophus primus considerat de rebus secundum quod sunt entia; et ideo apud eius considerationem non differt esse in subiecto et de subiecto. Hic enim accipit dici de subiecto, quod est in se aliqua res et inest alicui subiecto existenti in actu. Et hoc impossibile est esse substantiam. Sic enim haberet esse in subiecto. Quod est contra rationem substantiae: quod etiam in *Praedicamentis* est habitum.[2]

The distinction between first and second substance could also be said to be a distinction of two meanings of the word *substance.* We have already met another sense of that word in the first two definitions of Chapter One. This is a good place to distinguish the meanings of the word *substance* in this book of the *Categories.* There is a text where Thomas in replying to an objection distinguishes the four meanings of substance that we meet in the *Categories:*

> 7. Item, substantia in usu Latinorum aequivocatur ad essentiam et hypostasim. Cum ergo dicitur, persona est substantia

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[2] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIII, n. 1575-1576

> individua aut ponitur pro essentia aut pro hypostasi. Si pro hypostasi: hypostasis autem est substantia particularis aut individua; videtur quod superflue additur "individua". Si pro essentia: cum individuatio ponatur circa subjectum, quae individuatio in divinis est per distinctionem proprietatis; sequeretur quod proprietas distingueret essentiam. Et praeterea, cum multiplicato definito multiplicetur definitio, sicut plures homines sunt plura animalia rationalia, etc., sequitur quod plures personae sunt plures essentiae; quod est inconveniens.
>
> Ad septimum dicendum, quod substantia dicitur quatuor modis.
>
> Uno modo substantia idem est quod essentia; et sic substantia invenitur in omnibus generibus, sicut et essentia; et hoc significatur, cum quaeritur: Quid est albedo? Color.
>
> Alio modo significat individuum in genere substantiae, quod dicitur substantia prima, vel hypostasis.
>
> Tertio modo dicitur substantia secunda.
>
> Quarto modo dicitur substantia communiter prout abstrahit a substantia prima et secunda, et sic sumitur hic, et per individuum, quasi per differentiam trahitur ad standum pro substantia prima...[3]

After the distinction of first substance and second substance, Aristotle takes up the order of them. First substance is before all other things because they either are said of it or exist in it. Hence, if the first substances should cease to be, all other things would cease to be. But the species (of first substance) is more substance than the genus because it is closer to first substance and because it is like first substance (the subject underlying everything) in that it is the subject of which genus is said. But one first substance is not more substance than another and one lowest species (or species that is not a genus) is more substance than another such species.

At the end of the first part, Aristotle points out that reasonably only the species and genera of first substances should be called substances

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[3] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXV, Quaest. I, Art. I, Obj. 7 & Ad 7

secondarily and not accidents, because only the former say what the first substances are.

In the second part of the chapter, Aristotle gives properties of substance. They fall into two groups of three. The first group pertains to substance alone while the last three can belong to something else.

In the first group, Aristotle gives a property of substance common to first and second substance, a property of second substance, and a property of first substance.

The property common to both is that they are not in a subject. This belongs to their differences as well.

The property of second substance is to be said only univocally (in the narrow sense of the First Chapter). This is true of differences in this genus also.

The property of first substance is to be a this something (the *hoc aliquid* of the Latins). A this something is something by itself, distinct from all other things, and complete in its nature.

The second group of properties revolves around contraries.

The first property is not to have a contrary. This is a property shared by quantity, which perhaps points to its closeness to substance.

The second property is not to be said more or less. This seems to follow upon not having a contrary. This property is also shared by quantity.

The third property is to be susceptible of contraries while remaining one in number. This seems to be a property of first substance.

APPENDIX

How in the book *About Places* can substance be called *what it is* when this is found in all genera and their species?

There are two reasons for this. The genera of categories are distinguished by how they are said of first substances. Only substance is said of individual substances signifying what it is. And second, only substance has definition and therefore a what it is. Or if the others do, it is so in a second way, as Aristotle shows in the seventh book of *Wisdom,* the *Metaphysics*.

Aristotle does not divide substance and toward something (at least not clearly) into their species as he does quantity and quality. One reason can be seen from the greater difficulty of the former. This difficulty can be seen from the two causes of difficulty in the second book of *Wisdom,* the *Metaphysics*. The cause of the difficulty in knowing immaterial substances is in us and the cause of the difficulty of knowing *toward something* is in the thing. One can also show their difficulty in comparison to quantity and quality because the latter, or at least some of their species, are per se sensible while substance and toward something are not per se sensible; and the beginning of our knowledge is in the senses. The division of substance into its species would be into material and immaterial substance, into bodies and the separated substances. But it is one of the chief and most difficult to answer questions of wisdom whether there are immaterial substances in addition to the material ones known to us.

For the logician there can be genus and species in the separated substances, but not for the wise man or the natural philosopher:

> genus et differentia possunt accipi dupliciter.
>
> Uno modo secundum considerationem realem, prout considerantur a metaphysico et naturali et sic oportet quod genus et differentia super diversis naturis fundentur;
>
> Et hoc modo nihil prohibet dicere quod in substantiis spiritualibus non sit genus et differentia, sed sint formae tantum et species simplices.
>
> Alio modo secundum considerationem logicam et sic genus et differentia non oportet quod fundentur super diversas naturas, sed supra unam naturam in qua consideratur aliquid proprium, et aliquid commune.

> Et sic nihil prohibet genus et differentias ponere in substantiis spiritualibus.[4]

Why does he not divide substance into matter and form and composite, as in the second book *About the Soul* and in *Wisdom?*

This is known *per viam motus*, which is proper to natural philosophy and to wisdom using natural philosophy. But the logician wants to consider substance as it is known by reason or is in reason where it is *said of* another or *not said of* another. Moreover, this division is a division of material substance in particular rather than of substance in general which the logician is considering here. Further, matter and form, being *parts* of a substance cannot be contained directly in the praedicamental order. A part is not in substance *quasi directe contentum sub eo:*

> ...substantia, secundum quod est genus, non proprie praedicatur de parte. Manus enim si esset substantia, cum sit animata, esset animal - nihil enim est in genere quasi directe contentum sub eo, nisi quod habet naturam aliquam complete - tamen dicitur manus esse substantia, secundum quod substantia dividitur contra accidens; et similiter dico de natura humana in Christo. Cum igitur dicitur quod omnis substantia particularis est hypostasis, intelligendum est de illis quae directe recipiunt praedicationem; et haec sunt quae significantur ut res completae per se subsistentes.[5]

The hypostasis of the Word is secundum quid in the genus of substance:

> ...hypostasis Verbi, quamvis non sit in genere substantiae simpliciter, inquantum est hypostasis Verbi; tamen inquantum est hypostasis humanae naturae, est in genere substantiae, sicut est in specie hominis. Non enim hypostasis ordinatur ad genus vel speciem, nisi per naturam quam habet.[6]

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[4]*Quaestio Disputata de Anima*, Art. 7, Ad 17

[5]*Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio VI, Quaest. I, Art. I. Quaestiuncula I, Ad 1

[6]*Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio VI, Quaest. I, Art. I. Quaestiuncula I, Ad 2

DIVISION OF CHAPTER FIVE ON SUBSTANCE

Distinction of 1st & 2nd substance or what is contained in genus of substance

- Distinction between first & second substance: what each is

- Order of first and second substances
  - Order of first substance to all other things (of division of beings)
  - Order of second substances among themselves (species more substance than genus)
  - No such order among first substances or among species
    - One first substance is not more substance than another.
    - Likewise, one species is not more substance than another.

- Reasons why only what is said of first substance as a species or genus should be called (second) substance

Their properties

- First three properties
  - Not in a subject - property of both, but also of difference.
  - Said only univocally - property of second substances (& differences)
  - This something - property of first substances

- Second three properties
  - Does not have a contrary. - property of both (also of quantity)
  - Is not said more or less - property of both
  - Susceptible of contraries while remaining one in number - property of 1st substance

Duane H. Berquist

QUANTITY - CHAPTER SIX

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, Aristotle distinguishes the species of quantity and then separates quantities by happening or per accidens from those that are quantities as such or quantities per se (which are the species of quantity). In the second part, he gives three properties of quantity.

Aristotle distinguishes the species of quantity in two ways. He does so in both, by looking at their parts and seeing something they have or do not have. He then unfolds each of these ways.

The understanding of quantity and its species is properly done by looking at its parts. For every quantity consists in some multiplication of parts:

> Omnis quantitas in quadam multiplicatione partium consistit: et propter hoc numerus est prima quantitatum. Ubi ergo pluralitas nullam differentiam operatur, ibi nec aliquid quod quantitatem consequitur aliquam differentiam facit.[1]

Moreover, the first sense of *whole* and *part* is in quantity, as is clear from the fifth book of *Wisdom*. So it is natural to distinguish the kinds of quantity by their parts.

In the fifth book of *Wisdom,* Aristotle distinguishes quantity in general from other wholes by the parts into which it can be divided. It is divided into parts that are in it (somewhat) in act and each of which is apt to be something one and a this something:

> Primo ponit rationem quantitatis; dicens, quod quantum dicitur quod est divisibile in ea quae insunt.
>
> Quod quidem dicitur ad differentiam divisionis mixtorum. Nam corpus mixtum resolvitur in elementa, quae non sunt actu in mixto, sed virtute tantum. Unde non est ibi tantum divisio quantitatis; sed oportet quod adsit aliqua alteratio, per quam mixtum resolvitur in elementa.

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[1] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber I, Capitulum LXIX

> Et iterum addit, quod utrumque aut singulum, est natum esse "unum aliquid", hoc est aliquid demonstratum.
>
> Et hoc dicit ad removendum divisionem in partes essentiales, quae sunt materia et forma. Nam neutrum eorum aptum natum est esse unum aliquid per se.
>
> secundo...Ponit species quantitatis; inter quas primae sunt duae; scilicet multitudo sive pluralitas, et magnitudo sive mensura. Utrumque autem eorum habet rationem quanti, inquantum multitudo numerabilis est et magnitudo est mensurabilis. Mensuratio enim proprie pertinet ad quantitatem.
>
> Definitur autem multitudo sic. Multitudo est, quod est divisibile secundum potentiam in partes non continuas. Magnitudo autem quod est divisibile in partes continuas.[2]

This seems to be another way of making known quantity in reference to substance – other than measure of substance. And it also shows how close quantity is to substance and, therefore, that it is rightly ordered immediately after it in the *Categories.* And it is fitting in wisdom to define quantity in comparison to substance which is the chief subject of wisdom. The first part of this definition separates quantity from the universal whole which has its parts in it only in ability and the second part separates it from the whole composed of matter and form and from the whole that is a definition.

Further, since (composing) parts are like matter, this reminds us of Albert and Thomas distinguishing quantity and quality in correspondence with the matter and form in substance.

But the distinction of the species of quantity must be based on other differences of their parts. In the fifth book of *Wisdom,* the fifth book *After (meta) the (ta) Books in Natural Philosophy (phusika),* Aristotle distinguishes between those having continuous parts and those not having continuous parts. Perhaps, he here includes both definitions of the continuous (that fitting natural philosophy; what is divisible forever – and that fitting logic: whose parts meet at a common limit or boundary).

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[2] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XV, n. 977-978

Some quantities have parts that do not have a common limit or boundary while others do have such a limit. The former are called *discrete* and include number and speech. The latter are called *continuous* and include the line, surface, body and also time and place. The parts of number and speech do no have a common limit while the parts of a line have a point in common and the parts of a surface, a line. Likewise, the parts of a body can have a surface or plane in common; the past and future in time are both bounded by the now; and the parts of place are continuous, corresponding to the parts of the body that it contains.

The definition of continuous given here is proper to logic for the reason Thomas gives when comparing it to the other definition given in natural philosophy:

> Circa primum considerandum est quod *continuum* invenitur a Philosopho dupliciter definitum.
>
> Uno modo definitione formali, prout dicitur in *Praedicamentis* quod continuum est *cuius partes copulantur ad unum communem terminum:* unitas enim continui est quasi forma ipsius.
>
> Alio modo definitione materiali, quae sumitur ex partibus, quae habent rationem materiae, ut dicitur in II *Physicorum:* et sic definitur hic, quod continuum est *quod est divisibile in semper divisibilia.* Nulla enim pars continui potest ese indivisibilis: quia ex indivisibilibus non componitur aliquod continuum, ut probatur in VI *Physicorum.*
>
> Et satis convenienter haec definitio ponitur hic, alia autem in *Praedicamentis:* quia consideratio naturalis versatur circa materiam, consideratio autem logici circa rationem et speciem.[3]

The distinction that Aristotle seems to make in enumerating the species of continuous quantity between line, surface, body on the one hand, and time and place[4] on the other, appears in the discussion of quantity in the fifth book of *Wisdom:*

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[3] *In I De Caelo et Mundo*, Lectio II, n. 9

[4] The way one measures place is like the way the way one measures surface or body, but like time in being an outside measure. Perhaps this is why it is placed after both surface and body and time. But just as the genera of categories seem to be distinguished by something close to questions (for

> Sciendum est autem, quod Philosophus in *Praedicamentis* posuit tempus quantitatem per se, cum hic ponat ipsum quantitatem per accidens;
>
> quia ibi distinxit species quantitatis secundum diversas rationes mensurae
>
> Aliam enim rationem mensurae habet tempus, quod est mensura extrinseca, et magnitudo, quae est mensura intrinseca. Et ideo ponitur ibi ut alia species quantitatis.
>
> Hic autem considerat species quantitatis quantum ad ipsum esse quantitatis. Et ideo illa, quae non habent esse quantitatis nisi ex alio, non ponit hic species quantitatis, sed quantitates per accidens, ut motum et tempus.
>
> Motus autem non habet aliam rationem mensurae quam tempus et magnitudo. Et ideo nec hic nec ibi ponitur species quantitatis species.
>
> Locus autem ponitur ibi species quantitatis, non hic, quia habet aliam rationem mensurae, sed non aliud esse quantitatis.[5]

In this text, we should also note Thomas' statement that Aristotle in the *Categories* distinguishes the species of quantity *secundum diversas rationes mensurae.* Hence, when Aristotle wants to show that *logos* or

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example: what is it, how, where) so the species of quantity have a generic likeness to their genus - so two questions: "How much room do you have?" and "How big is the sofa?" The sofa must fit the wall as an exterior measure. Perhaps there is a connection in the way that place is put after time among the species of continuous quantity and *being laid out* after *where* and *when* in the order of the genera of categories. The last has something in common with each of the two before. Possibly the same is true of *to act upon* and *to undergo* being last in the genera of categories if they share something with those which denominate from within and those which denominate from outside.

[5]Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XV, n. 986

speech is a quantity (which is not as evidently so as number), he points out that it is *measured* by the long and short syllable.

This is proper to logic because a measure is that by which the quantity or size of something is made known to reason and logic considers things insofar as they are in reason. (Some Latin dictionaries give the word *size* as the equivalent of *mensura*.) Hence, just as the logician considers the species or genus of a first substance to be substance (calling it *second substance*) but the wise man who considers things as being does not; so likewise he considers what have a *different measure* to be different species of quantity which the wise man does not when their *being* is not different

And in the concrete name of this Category or highest genus in English, we say *how much* or *how many;* and *how* asks for a definite measure or measurement. (The Greeks and Latins have one word for what is common to *how much* or *how many* as we could use the word *how large* or *how big* for either a crowd that is numbered or a board that is continuous. When we say that this genus is *how much* or *how many*, the word *how* also being out that the much and the many belong to this genus as measured or numbered.

And the reason why Aristotle puts number and discrete quantity before continuous quantity is connected with this. For measure is found first or more perfectly in number since the one is simpler and absolute and indivisible. Moreover, number is more like definition than is a line and therefore closer to substance and the nature of things. (This is also the reason why habit or disposition is given as the first species of quality. For by habit one is well or ill disposed towards one's nature.) A number can be measured by the indivisible one, but a line cannot be measured by the indivisible point. Moreover, any two numbers can always both be measured by one, but two lines do not always have a common measure. It is perhaps significant that Aristotle puts discrete quantity and number in particular before continuous quantity even though their difference is stated affirmatively for continuous quantity and negatively for discrete quantity. (But when he comes to the second difference, he places those whose parts have a position in comparison to each other before those which do not; so that, with the exception of time, continuous quantities are exemplified before number and speech.)

Moreover, the property peculiar to quantity, to be equal or unequal, supposes something that has been measured and by quantities that have a common measure. Hence, a line and a surface cannot be equal or unequal.

This distinction by measure is seen more in the species of discrete and continuous quantity than in the distinction between the discrete and the continuous. For example, we can measure a line by the inch or foot but we cannot measure the square or room in inches or feet. Instead, we must measure it in or by square inches or square feet. And if we are trying to fit a sofa in a room, we might ask separately how long is the sofa and how much room do you have for it.

Why are the species of quantity more distinguished in the *Categories* than those of substance or toward something?

Since measuring is an act of reason (mens), it seems more appropriate in logic, the science of reason, to distinguish what can be distinguished by *diversas rationes mensurae*.

Quantity, then, is the measured and the species of quantity are distinguished by their measure. Measure is what separates quantity and the one in the genus of quantity from the one which is convertible with being and the multitude opposed to it:

> pluralitas sive multitudo absoluta, quae opponitur uni quod convertitur cum ente, est quasi genus numeri; quia numerus nihil aliud est quam pluralitas et multitudo mensurabilis uno.
>
> Sic igitur unum, secundum quod simpliciter dicitur ens indivisibile, convertitur cum ente. Secundum autem quod accipit rationem mensurae, sic determinatur ad aliquod genus quantitatis, in quo proprie invenitur ratio mensurae.
>
> Et similiter pluralitas vel multitudo secundum quod significat entia divisa, non determinatur ad aliquod genus. Secundum autem quod significat aliquid mensuratum, determinatur ad genus quantitatis, cuius species est numerus.
>
> Et ideo dicit quod numerus est pluralitas mensurata uno, et quod pluralitas est quasi genus numeri.
>
> Et non dicit quod sit simpliciter genus; quia sicut ens genus non est, proprie loquendo, ita nec unum quod convertitur cum ente, nec pluralitas ei opposita. Sed est quasi genus, quia habet aliquid de ratione generis, inquantum est communis.

> Sic igitur accipendo unum quod est principium numeri et habet rationem mensurae, et numerum qui est species quantitatis et est multitudo mensurata uno, opponuntur unum et multum, non ut contraria, ut supra dictum est de uno quod convertitur cum ente, et pluralitate sibi opposita; sed opponuntur sicut aliqua eorum quae sunt ad aliquid, quorum scilicet unum dicitur relative, quia alterum refertur in ipsam. Sic igitur opponuntur unum et numerus, inquantum unum est mensura et numerus est mensurabilis.[6]

The second division of quantity is into those having parts that have a position or placing toward each other and those which do not have such a placing or position. In some quantities the parts are laid out toward each other and in other quantities they are not. The same species are separated by this difference as by the previous difference (discrete and continuous) *with one important difference*. Time, although a continuous quantity, does not have parts that are laid out toward each other for the past and the future do not exist together. This also seems to bring in another formal consideration of parts; that is, by how they are united in a whole.

It is possible to divide the same genus into species in more than one way. Number is sometimes divided into odd and even, and sometimes into prime and composite (and perhaps it could also be divided into perfect and imperfect). This is connected with the reason Thomas gives in his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* why no difference is convertible.

We have seen two divisions by contradictories in the second chapter give rise to four parts. But when we criss-cross two divisions by contradictories, we do not always get four parts. When Aristotle, for example, divides the parts of a plot by the contradictories *before & not before* and *after & not after*, there could not be a part of the plot which is neither before anything nor after anything. Likewise, when we divide quantity by two contradictories, we do not get four parts. A quantity either has parts that have a common limit or not; and it has parts that either have a position toward each other or not. Line, surface, body and place have parts that have a common limit and that have a position toward each other. Number and speech have parts that have neither a common limit nor position toward each other. Time has parts that have a common limit, but not position towards

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[6]Thomas Aquinas, *In X Metaphysicorum*, Lectio VIII, nn. 2090-2093

each other. But there is no quantity whose parts have a position toward each other, but no common limit. This does not seem to be a real possiblity.

If Aristotle had divided quantity a second time by the natural differences of divisible forever and not divisible forever, there would have been the same members exactly in both divisions.

Why does Aristotle divide quantity twice and quality only once?

Perhaps there is a special reason for emphasizing quantity having parts in position. We generally say that accidents are individualized by their subject or substance in which they exist. But quantities that have position are individualized by themselves:

> Habet autem et hoc proprium quantitas dimensiva inter accidentia reliqua, quod ipsa secundum se individuatur. Quod ideo est, quia positio, quae est *ordo partium in toto*, in eius ratione includitur: est enim quantitas *positionem habens*.[7]

This again brings out the closeness of quantity to substance. And this also perhaps explains why the order of the species is reversed in the second division because, according to this difference, continuous quantities having parts in position toward each other have a special connection with, or likeness to, substance.

And in another passsage, Thomas touches upon this closeness of quantity to substance:

> Distinguit modos quantitatis; et cira hoc tria facit.
>
> Primo distinguit quantum in id quod est quantum per se, sicut linea, et id quod est quantum per accidens, sicut musicum.
>
> Secundo...distinguit quantum per se; quod quidem est duplex.
>
> Quaedam enim significantur per modum substantiae et subiecti, sicut linea, vel superficies, vel numerus. Quodlibet enim isorum substantialiter est quantum, quia in definitione cuiuslibet ponitur

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[7] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, IV, Caput 65 One should distinguish this *positio* from the positio which is a category. The later could perhaps be defined as the *ordo partium in loco* And what should be said of the positio in dispositio? And the positis in definition of syllogism?

> quantitas. Nam linea est quantitas continua secundum longitudinem divisibile, finita: et similiter est de aliis.
>
> Quaedam vero per se pertinent ad genus quantitatis, et significantur per modum habitus, vel passionis talis substantiae....
>
> Sciendum autem est, quod quantitas inter alia accidentia propinquior est substantiae. Unde quidem quantitates esse substantias putant, scilicet lineam et numerum et superficiem et corpus. Nam sola quantitas habet divisionem in partes proprias post substantiam. Albedo enim non potest dividi, et per consequens nec intelligitur individuare nisi per subiectum. Et inde est quod in sola quantitatis genere aliqua significantur ut subiecta, alia ut passiones.[8]

Moreover, that the divisions include the same species with the exception of time, shows a special place for time. Although time is a continuous quantity, it is also very much the number of something. And like number, it parts have order, but not position. That the parts of time have order is important in the *Categories* because, as we have seen in Thomas, this is a reason why in the last six highest genera, there are two genera connected with place and only one with time. But even more important is that *before* and *after* have their first meaning in time. (And Aristotle exemplifies the second meaning with number where there also is order without position.) There are very important connections between time and reason. Time would not be fully without reason; and the definition of reason as reason is through before and after (As Shakespeare has taught us, reason is the ability to look before and after) and the first sense of before and after is in time. Further, the *Categories* is ordered to the *Peri Hermeneias* and the truth of statements whose formal part is the verb that signifies with time.

After Aristotle has distinguished the species of quantity, he distinguishes quantities through happening from quantities through themselves. The above species are quantities through themselves, and other things are quantified through them and not through themselves. Thus, As Aristotle says, there is much white when the *surface* which is white is large or a trip is long when the *time* it takes is long.

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[8]*In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XV, nn. 979-981, 983

Why does he distinguish per and per accidens quantities, but not substances or qualities thus?

Part of the reason is that quantity is the subject of certain qualities and this again brings out the order of these two highest genera.

The first property of quantity given by Aristotle is that it does not have a contrary. Aristotle spends the most time on this property which quantity shares with substance. Some confuse relations that follow upon quantity with quantity and Aristotle speaks at some length to refute this mistake. Large and small, for example, might seem to be contrary quantities, but they belong to the genus relation or towards something. The same quantity can be called large and small, but towards other things. If they were contraries, contraries would belong to the same thing at the same time, and something would be contrary to itself.

Aristotle seems to exclude place from this property. Yet the definition of contraries seems to get its words from place because we say that contraries are the species *furthest apart* in any genus.

The second property of quantity is also shared with substance (This again will show that quantity is closer to substance than quality) and follows upon the first property. One quantity is not more or less than another. One three is not more or less three than another. One three foot line is not more or less three feet long than another.

The third property of quantity is to be equal or unequal. This is a property in a more strict sense of the word than the first two properties.

APPENDIX

There is a connection between number and the continuous:

> ...secundum Avicennam, tract. III *Metaph.*, cap. V, unitas et numerus quae considerat arithmeticus non sunt illa unitas et multitudo quae inveniuntur in omnibus entibus; sed solum

> secundum quod inveniuntur in rebus materialibus, secundum quod pluralitas causatur ex divisione continui; ex hoc enim possunt inveniri omnes illae passiones in numeris quas arithmetici demonstrant, sicut multiplicatio et aggregatio, et hujusmodi, quae fundantur supra divisionem infinitam continui. Unde est infinitas in numero, secundum Philosophum, III *Physic,* text 55, et ideo etiam talis unitas est potentia omnis numerus.[9]

Is the number which is a species of quantity, numbering number or numbered number? If numbering number is the same as *numerus absolutus* in the following text and *non enim numerus absolutus a rebus numeratis est nisi in intellectu*, and the categories are a division of being outside the soul or reason, then the number which is a species of quantity would be *numerus qui est in rebus numeratis*. Time is also a numbered number.

> 4. Praeterea. ubicumque est numerus, ibi est totum et pars. Si igitur in Deo sit numerus personarum, erit in Deo ponere totum et partem: quod simplicitati divinae repugnat.
>
> ad quartum dicendum quod numerus est duplex: scilicet numerus simplex vel absolutus, ut duo et tria et quatuor; et numerus qui est in rebus numeratis, ut duo homines et duo equi.
>
> Si igitur in divinis accipitur numerus absolute sive abstracte, nihil prohibet in eo esse totum et partem: et sic non est nisi in acceptione intellectus nostri; non enim numerus absolutus a rebus numeratis est nisi in intellectu.
>
> Si autem accipiamus numerum prout est in rebus numeratis, sic in rebus quidem creatis, unum est pars duorum, et duo trium, ut unus homo duorum, et duo, trium: sed non est sic in Deo, quia tantus est Pater quanta tota Trinitas, ut infra patebit.[10]

On the other hand, a number like *two men* or *two horses* seems to involve more than one highest genus. Moreover, logic considers things insofar as they are in reason and abstract number is in reason only. In another text,

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[9] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XXIV, Quaest I, Art. I, Ad 2

[10] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. XXX, Art. I, 4 & Ad 4

Thomas compares the foundation in things which what is known by mathematical abstraction has with logical intentions such as genus:

> ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam.
>
> Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine "homo" et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans illum intellectum proprie de re dicatur.
>
> Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit, sicut significatum hujus nominis "genus" non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis; et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et hujusmodi.
>
> Aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum, neque remotum, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam vere: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa.
>
> Unde patet secundum, scilicet quod ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re: et hoc contingit proprie quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei.[11]

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[11] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist II, Q. 1, Art. III, Solutio

The unity of number is difficult to understand. Here are some texts that touch upon the problem of the unity of number and the solution of the problem.

Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist. XXIV, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad 3 & Ad 4:

> Ad tertium dicendum, quod aggregatio et hujusmodi sunt passiones numeri qui consequitur divisionem continui, ut Avicenna dicit, tract. III *Metaph*., cap. V; et hunc numerum constat in Deo non esse.
>
> Ad quartum dicendum, quod in numero absoluto pluralitas habet quamdam compositionem et aggregationem, quae est minus certa quam unum, quod est principium ipsius; et ideo non solum quantum ad intellectum, sed etiam quantum ad rem est mensurabilitas multitudinis talis per unitatem.
>
> Sed in numero relationum vel personarum non est aliquis ordo certitudinis vel compositionis in re; et ideo numerus in Deo non est multitudo mensurata, nisi forte secundum acceptionem intellectus tantum, qui componit etiam quae composita non sunt secundum quod diversa ex eis intelligit, secundum quod etiam propositiones affirmativas in divinis format.

In this text, Thomas speaks of number as a *heaping up* (*coacervatio*) of those distinct in their nature

> 2. Praeterea, sicut quantitas continua integratur ex suis partibus, ita et numerus. Sed in divinis est numerus personarum, scilicet ternarius, cujus quaedam pars est unum et duo. Ergo videtur quod sit ibi totum integrale.
>
> Ad secundum dicendum, quod in divinis unitas vel dualitas non est pars ternarii nisi secundum rationis acceptionem. Cujus ratio est, quia alio modo est numerus in rebus divinis et in rebus creatis, et alio modo unitas. Cum enim unum sit quod est indivisum in se et divisum ab aliis, unumquodque autem creatum per essentiam suam distinguatur ab aliis; ipsa essentia creati, secundum quod est indivisa in se et distinguens ab aliis, est unitas ejus, et plures unitates constituentes numerum personarum creatarum, sunt

> plures essentiae congregatae secundum numerationem, ita quod nihil est in una quod sit in alia secundum numerum idem. Sic ergo numerus in rebus creatis habet rationem distinctionis et cujusdam coacervationis distinctorum per essentiam, et ex hoc habet rationem totius integralis. Unitas autem personalis est ipsa proprietas relativa distinguens unam personam ab alia, et non essentiam ipsius personae; unde tres personae non sunt differentes per essentiam, cum una numero essentia sit in tribus personis. Et ideo non potest ibi esse coacervatio, sed tantum distinctio. Et propter hoc numerus non habet rationem totius integralis, nisi forte secundum quod in ratione coadunantur rationes proprietatum personalium. Sed per hoc non erit integratio alicujus rei, sed in ratione tantum.[12]

And in this text, Thomas speaks of the ones as not being simply one and therefore a species if they are heaped up:

> Cum enim componatur ex multis unitatibus, aut non est unus simpliciter, sed unitates aggregantur in eo per modum coacervationis, quae non facit simpliciter unum, et per consequens nec ens in aliqua specie constituunt: et sic numerus non est aliqua species entis; aut si numerus est unus simpliciter, et non per seipsum, dicendum et quid facit eum unum ex multis unitatibus: quod non est assignare.[13]

Dionysius, as Thomas explains, sees that number, even though it is in some way opposed to the one, partakes of unity:

> Quod autem omnia participent uno, probat per id de quo minus videtur, scilicet per numerum qui quodammodo opponitur uni, sicut divisum indiviso: *omnis* enim *numerus participat* uno sive numerus accipiatur secundum se, ut significatur cum dicitur binarius vel ternarius sive accipiatur numerus secundum quod denominat aliquam partem, ut cum dicimus dimidium vel tertium vel decimum.[14]

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[12] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XIX, Quaest IV, Art. I, *Utrum in divinis sit totum integrale*, Obj. 2 & Ad 2

[13] *In VIII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio III, n. 1725

[14] *In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, Caput XIII, Lectio II, n. 974

Thomas explains that simply and properly only those things which come together *univocally* in something one can be numbered together:

> ...quamvis Deus et creatura non conveniant in aliquo uno secundum aliquem modum convenientiae, tamen est considerare communitatem analogiae inter Deum et creaturaram, secundum quod creaturae imitantur ipsum prout possunt. Unde aliquo modo potest connumerari aliis rebus, ut dicatur quod Deus et angelus sunt duae res, non tamen simpliciter et proprie, sicut creaturae ad invicem connumerantur, quae univoce in aliquo uno conveniunt. Et ex hoc non sequitur quod Deus sit pars alicujus, vel quod Deus et angelus sint aliquid majus quam Deus; sed quod sint plures res.[15]

This raises incidentally the question whether the number ten of the categories, or highest genera, is a number which is a species in the category of quantity. For the ten genera do not come together univocally in something one.

In another passage, Thomas adds to coming together in one species or genus what comes together in some *order:*

> *unum existens, quod est* in genere creaturarum, *est numerabile*, idest quaedam pars numeri: omne enim quod est unum in creaturis, connumeratur alteri cum quo convenit aut specie aut genere aut in aliquo ordine.[16]

A similar problem arises about the parts of a definition:

> Ex pluribus enim actu existentibus non fit unum simpliciter, nisi sit aliquid uniens et aliquo modo ligans ea ad invicem.
>
> Sic ergo, si secundum diversas formas Socrates esset animal et rationale, indigerent haec duo, ad hoc quod unirentur simpliciter, aliquo quod faceret ea unum. Unde cum hoc non sit assignare, remanebit quod homo non erit unum nisi aggregatione;
>
> sicut acervus, qui est secundum quid unum et simpliciter multa.

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[15] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXIV, Quaest I, Art. I, Ad 4
[16] *In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, Caput XIII, Lectio III, n. 991

> Et ita etiam non erit homo ens simpliciter, quia unumquodque intantum est ens, inquantum est unum.[17]

And in another text:

> Et secundum hunc modum Democritus recte dicit, quod impossibile est unum fieri ex duobus, et ex uno fieri duo. Est enim intelligendum, quod duo in actu existentia, nunquam faciunt unum. Sed ipse non distinguens inter potentiam et actum, posuit magnitudines indivisibles esse substantias. Voluit enim, quod sicut in eo quod est unum, non sunt multa in actu, ita nec in potentia. Et sic quaelibet magnitudo est indivisibilis.
>
> Vel aliter. Recte, inquam, dixit Democritus, supposita sua positione, qua ponebat magnitudines indivisibiles esse etiam rerum substantias, et sic semper esse in actu, et ita ex eis non fieri unum.
>
> Et sicut est in magnitudinibus, ita est in numero, si numerus est compositio unitatum, sicut a quibusdam dicitur. Oportet enim quod vel dualitas non sit unum quid, sive quicumque alius numerus, sive quod unitas non sit actu in ea. Et sic dualitas non erunt duae unitates, sed aliquid ex duabus unitatibus compositum. Aliter numerus non esset unum per se et vere, sed per accidens, sicut quae coacervantur.[18]

In this text, Thomas sees the unity of number and syllable in order:

> compositum quandoque sortitur speciem ab aliquo uno quod est forma, ut patet in corpore mixto; vel compositio ut patet in domo; vel ordo, ut patet in syllaba et numero. Et tunc oportet quod totum compositum sit unum simpliciter.
>
> Quandoque vero compositum sortitur speciem ab ipsa multitudine partium collectarum, ut patet in acervo et populo, et aliis huiusmodi: et in talibus totum compositum non est unum simpliciter, sed solum secundum quid.[19]

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[17]Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio Disputata de Anima*, Art. 11, corpus
[18]*n VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIII, n. 1589
[19]*In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVII, n. 1673

DIVISION OF CHAPTER SIX ON QUANTITY

Quantities per se and per accidens
- Quantities per se
  - Two divisions of quantity into its species

  - Species of the first division defined, divided into their species, and definition shown to belong to each of the species
    - Definition of discrete quantity, its species, and that definition fits each species
    - Definition of continuous quantity, its species, and that definition fits each species

  - Species of the second division (into those having or not having position) divided into their species

- Quantities per accidens distinguished from those per se

The properties of quantity
- Does not have a contrary
- Is not said more or less
- Equal or unequal

Duane H. Berquist

TOWARDS SOMETHING - CHAPTER SEVEN

The chapter on *toward something* is divided into three parts.

The first part includes a definition of toward something and then the properties of toward something are considered. Up to this point, the division of this chapter would seem to be like that of substance and of quantity.

But then an objection is made to the first definition. A second definition is proposed. And another property is brought out. From the objection and second definition, we can see the distinction between what the Latins called *relativa secundum dici* and *relativa secundum esse*. We can also see the surprising order of considering toward something before quality even though the latter is in being or causality before toward something.

The third part of the chapter is very brief in which Aristotle notes the difficulty of considering toward something.

The first definition of toward something is those things, which in what they are, are said of another or toward another in some way. There is a distinction between the first examples given by Aristotle and then the second ones he gives. The first examples are purely towards something such as greater or lesser and (more distinct ones) such as double and half. But the second examples he gives are mainly of qualities primarily which have some toward something *following upon* what they are.

Aristotle then considers the properties of toward something thus defined. He first considers properties that belong to some of those that are said toward something and then the stricter properties.

The first property is to have a contrary. This fits those said toward another which are qualities, such as virtue and vice, but not those which are purely toward something such as double or half.

The second property is to admit or more and less. This also fits those said toward another which are qualities, but only some of those purely said toward

another. One thing may be more or less like another, but one thing is not more or less double than another.

Aristotle then turns to two stricter properties.

The first is that what is said toward something will have that something said reversibly towards it. If the master is said to be the master of the slave, then reversibly the slave is the slave of the master. This would not seem to be true in some cases. If the correlative has not been stated correctly, it does not seem to be reversible. If the slave, for example, is said to be the slave of a *man*, the man is not said to be the *man of the slave*. But if one takes the correct correlative of *master*, then reversibly the master is the *master of the slave*. The reverse may take a different ending or preposition. Knowledge is knowledge *of* the known and the known is known *by* knowledge. Sometimes it may be necessary to coin a word to state the proper correlative.

The second stricter property is that the correlatives are together by nature. But here Aristotle says that this is true of the purely relatives such as double and half. But it is not true of relatives that are qualities such as knowledge and sense. What knowledge and sense are of can be before them and without them.

At this point, Aristotle raises an objection or difficulty which leads him to reject or modify the first definition of toward something. Each part of a substance can be said to be of another: for example, the hand of a man or the head of a man. If the first definition of towards something is correct, then substance would a collection of relations. Hence, there is need to look again at the definition of toward something to avoid this absurd consequence of it.

Aristotle then modifies the original definition to that whose (whole) *being or nature* is to be towards something (and not just *said* to be of another).

He then gives another property of toward something, which is that if one of the correlatives is known so is the other. They are known together.

Aristotle ends the chapter on towards something by noting the difficulty of the matter.

Having given an outline of the chapter, we can come back on a number of things.

First, we should concentrate on the name of this genus. It is correctly translated *toward something* (*ad aliquid* in Latin for the *pros ti* of the Greek) rather than by the word *relation*. Thomas Aquinas points out how the more abstract word is not said toward something:

> Ponit tres modos, quibus aliqua dicuntur ad aliquid non secundum se, sed secundum aliud...Secundus modus est, quando aliqua abstracta dicuntur ad aliquid, quia concreta habentia illa abstracta ad aliud dicuntur; sicut aequalitas et similitudo dicuntur ad aliquid, quia simile et aequale ad aliquid sunt. Aequalitas autem et similitudo secundum nomen non dicuntur ad aliquid.[1]

Moreover, to speak of a relation between two things is to speak as if there is one accident between them. Thomas touches upon this in the following text:

> ...quidam dixerunt, ut Avicennna , tract III *Met.*, c. X, dicit, quod eadem numero relatio est in utroque extremorum;
>
> quod non potest esse, quia unum accidens non est in duobus subjectis; et ideo dicendum, quod in utroque extremorum est una relatio
>
> differens ab alia in quibusdam secundum speciem, sicut in illis quae diversis nominibus utrinque nominantur, ut paternitas et filiatio;
>
> sed in quibusdam non differunt specie, sed numero tantum, sicut quando utrumque est unum nomen ut in similitudine et aequalitate; et tunc relatio quae est in uno sicut in subjecto, est in altero sicut termino, et e converso;
>
> et ideo relatio secundum esse suum, prout in re fundamentum habet, non est medium, sed extremum, sed secundum respectum est medium; unde patet quod realiter distinguuntur.[2]

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[1] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVII, nn. 1030-1031

[2] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVII, Quaestio I, Art I, Ad 2

The question also arises why towards something is considered before how or quality. Aristotle had distinguished the first four genera in the order of nature, but in the order of teaching, he places toward something before quality. Porphyry has a similar change in the *Isagoge*. He enumerates the five predicables in the order of nature: genus, difference, species, property and accident. But he considers, in the order of teaching, genus and species before difference. The reason there seems to be that genus and species are defined and, hence known, toward each other. But why is there this reversal of order here?

This text of Albert shows some of the difficulty of untying this knot:

> Ex hoc iterum ulterius patet ratio ordinis, quod post praedicamentum quantitatis inter genera accidentium praedicamentum hoc est ordinandum, quia scilicet quantitas propinquissima est substantiae, cum substantia ordinanda est. Propter quod etiam quantitatis diffinitiones quamvis concernant materiam, non tamen concernunt hanc vel illam sensibilem, et sunt propter hoc de necessitate mathematicae scientiae. Aliorum autem accidentium diffinitiones et passiones concernunt materiam sensibilem et habent plus de accidentalitate, et minus appropinquant ad substantiam. Et cum inter illa plus habet de accidentalitate ad aliquid, ut dictum est, merito praeponitur inter illa.
>
> Et hoc dico salva pace Boetii, qui aliam causam assignat hujus ordinationis: dicit enim quod quia in ordine discretae quantitatis est primum et secundum, quae relationem et comparationem dicunt, et quia tam in praedicamento substantiae quam in praedicamento quantitatis resultant genus et species quae sunt relativa, ideo statim post ista duo ponitur relatio, quamvis qualitas secundum naturam qualitatis sit ante relationem. Quae ratio non est sufficiens, sicut cuilibet bene consideranti facile patere potest.[3]

Cajetan's text also has some difficulties in its solution, I think:

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[3]Albert, *De Praedicamentis*, Tractatus IV, De Praedicamento Ad Aliquid Caput II, Laval ed. p. 115

> Post praedicamentum quantitatis statim tractat de genere ad aliquid, quum quantitatem maxime sequitur ad aliquid et iam in praedicamento quantitatis sermo de ad aliquid inceptus est, ubi de magno et parvo disputatum est; et iterum in praedicamento qualitatis de ipso habendus est sermo, licet naturae ordine post qualitatem et actionem et passionem sit.[4]

I think the chief reason is connected with the two definitions of this chapter.

> 6a 36-37: "Those are said to be toward something which, as regards what they are, are said to be of another or in some other way toward another."
>
> 8a 31-32: "Those are toward something whose being is toward something in some way."

The first definition is said to be Platonic.[5] But this definition is so broad as to include the parts of substance and qualities that have a relation following upon them. The *nature* of quality and the parts of substance are not primarily to be toward something; and the second definition limits this genus to that whose whole being or nature is to be in some way toward another. Since this book is about names signifying what things are, we must take into account the distinction between something whose whole nature is to be toward something and something whose fundamental nature is not that, even though it may have some relation following upon it.

How should *esse* be understood in the second definition of toward something?

It should be understood for the nature, not the existence of relation. Sometimes *being* means the nature of a thing. The next two texts give the same threefold distinction of *esse*, but the second also explains the meaning of *esse* in the second definition of toward something as *nature,* not being in the sense of existence.

> ...secundum Philosophum, V *Meta*. (D 7. 1017a31035; L. 9, nn. 895-896) *esse* duobus modis dicitur.

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[4]Cajetan, *De Praedicamentis*, Laval ed. p. 65

[5] See *Sophist* 255d and *Republic* 438a 7-b1 and *Parmenides* 133d

> Uno modo, secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis, secundum quod est copula; et sic, ut Commentator ibidem dicit (text 6) dicit, *ens* est *praedicatum accidentale*. Et hoc esse non est in re, sed in mente quae conjungit subjectum cum praedicato, ut dicit Philosophus in VI *Meta.*..
>
> Alio modo (1017a, 22-27; L. 9, nn. 889-895) dicitur esse quod pertinet ad naturam rei, secundum quod dividitur secundum decem genera. Et hoc quidem esse in re est, et est actus resultans ex principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus lucentis.
>
> Aliquando tamen esse sumitur pro essentia, secundum quam res est; quia per actus consueverunt significari eorum principia, ut potentiae vel habitus.[6]

Another important text for understanding the word *esse* in this definition:

> 1. Videtur quod relationes ipsae non sint essentia divina. Aut enim quae relative in Deo dicuntur, sunt relativa secundum esse aut tantum secundum dici. Sed non tantum secundum dici; quia sic incideret haeresis Sabellii, ut supra in notula Hilarii habitum est. Ergo sunt relativa secundum esse. Sed talium relationum, secundum Philosophum, in *Prae.,* cap. "ad aliquid" esse, est ad aliud se habere. Ergo cum essentiae divinae esse non sit ad aliud se habere, sed sit esse absolutum, videtur quod non sit idem cum relatione quae secundum esse ad aliud est.
>
> Ad primum igitur dicendum quod relationes istae non sunt tantum secundum dici ad aliquid, sed etiam secundum esse. Sed sciendum, quod *esse* dicitur tripliciter.
>
> Uno modo dicitur *esse* ipsa quidditas vel natura rei, sicut dicitur quod definitio est oratio significans quid est esse; definitio enim quidditatem rei significat.
>
> Alio modo dicitur *esse* ipse actus essentiae, sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus, est animae actus; non actus secundus, qui est operatio, sed actus primus.

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[6] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio VI, Quaest II, Art. II, Responsio

> Tertio modo dicitur *esse* quod significabat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod *est* dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae sicut supra de veritate dictum est.
>
> Dico igitur, quod cum dicitur: *Ad aliquid sunt, quorum esse est ad aliud se habere*, intelligitur de esse quod est quidditas rei, quae definitione significatur; quia ipsa natura relationis per quam constituitur in tali genere, est ad aliud referri: et non intelligitur de esse quod est actus essentiae; hoc enim esse habet relatio, ex his quae causant ipsum in subjecto secundum quod esse non referur ad aliud, sed ad subjectum, sicut et quodlibet accidens.
>
> Et sic dico, quod non oportet quod esse essentiae divinae sit ad aliud se habere; quia illud esse in quo paternitas et essentia uniuntur, significatur ut esse quod est actus essentiae; non autem uniuntur in esse quod significat definitio rei; quia alia est ratio paternitatis, qua ad aliud refertur, et alia ratio essentiae.[7]

And as every student of the seventh book of *Wisdom* (the seventh book *After the Books in Natural Philosophy*) knows, Aristotle often contracts his phrase *what was to be* to *to be*.

We can now examine the distinction between relations made in the two definitions. There is a fundamental distinction of relations made in Latin between the *relativa secundum dici* and the *relativa secundum esse.* This distinction tells us nothing about whether the relations are *real* or *of reason* and should *not* be confused with the distinction between real relations and relations of reason. A fundamental text on the distinction between *relativa secundum dici* and the *relativa secundum esse* is this text of Thomas:

> ...distinctio ista relativorum secundum esse et secundum dici, nihil facit ad hoc quod sit relatio realis.
>
> Quaedam enim sunt relativa secundum esse quae non sunt realia, sicut dextrum et sinistrum in columna;

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[7] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXIII, Q. I, Art. 1, 1 and Ad 1

> et quaedam sunt relativa secundum dici, quae tamen important relationes reales, sicut patet de scientia et sensu.
>
> Dicuntur enim relativa secundum esse, quando nomina sunt imposita ad significandas ipsas relationes;
>
> relativa vero secundum dici, quando nomina sunt imposita ad significandas qualitates vel aliquid huiusmodi principaliter, ad quae tamen consequuntur relationes.
>
> Nec quantum ad hoc differt, utrum sint relationes reales vel rationis tantum.[8]

The first definition in this chapter would include relativa secundum dici.

In another text where Thomas considers the distinction between *relativa secundum esse* and *secundum dici*, he states that the relativa secundum dici that signify chiefly a quality belong in another predicament than relation or toward something:

> ...aliquando enim nomen imponitur ad significandum ipsam habitudinem; sicut hoc nomen "dominus" et hujusmodi, quae sunt relativa secundum esse, et alia dicta de Deo, sunt quidem relativa, quia etiam significant ex primo suo intellectu habitudinem quae secundum rationem est in Deo; sed ex consequenti faciunt intellectum essentiae, secundum quod talis habitudo fundatur in aliquo essentiali.
>
> Aliquando autem nomen imponitur ad significandum illud supra quod fundatur habitudo, sicut hoc nomen *scientia*, qualitatem quam consequitur respectus quidam ad scibile. Unde ista talia non sunt relativa secundum esse, sed solum secundum dici. Unde ista principaliter dant intelligere rem alterius praedicamenti, et ex consequenti important relationem.[9]

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[8] *De Potentia*, Q. 7, Art. 10, Ad 11

[9] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. II, Solutio

In the following text, Thomas explains why power or ability and science should be placed in the category of quality even though they has a relation:

> licet potentiae conveniat ratio principii, quod in genere relationis est, tamen id quod est principium actionis vel passionis, non est relatio, sed aliqua forma absoluta; et id est essentia potentiae;
>
> et inde est quod Philosophus ponit potentiam non in genere relationis, sed qualitatis, sicut et scientiam, quamvis utrique aliqua relatio accidat.[10]

This also seems to confirm the necessity of the second definition to exclude the *relativa secundum dici* that the first definition admits.

We do *not* mean that the distinction between the two definitions is that between the *relativa secundum dici* and *secundum esse.* For under the first definition come both *relativa*. But the second definition excludes the *relativa secundum dici* from being placed chiefly in this genus. The first definition of toward something is not a definition of relatives *secundum dici*, but it includes them. But the second definition is of relatives *secundum esse* and thus excludes relatives *secundum dici*.

There is another universal distinction of relations which should not be confused with the distinction between relativa secundum dici and relativa secundum esse. This is the distinction between real relations and relations of reason. Thomas points out this possible confusion in replying to an objection and give examples showing how a relation *secundum dici* can be *real* and a relation *secundum esse* of *reason:*

> 4. Praeterea, illa relativa in quibus non est relatio secundum rem, invenimus esse ad aliquid secundum dici tantum, sicut scibile, de quo dicit Philosophus , V *Metaphys*., text. 20, quod est relatum quia aliud refertur ad ipsum. Sed de Deo dicuntur quaedam relativa quae sunt ad aliquid et secundum suum esse, ut dominus, rex et hujusmodi. Ergo saltem illa aliquam relationem realem in Deo significant.

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[10]*De Potentia*, Q. 2, Art. 2, corpus

> Ad quartum dicendum, quod illud non facit ad propositum; quia de utrisque relativis inveniuntur aliqua quae important relationem realem, et quae important relationem rationis; sicut *idem* importat relationem rationis, quamvis sit relativum secundum esse; et *scientia* importat relationem realem, quamvis sit relativum secundum dici.[11]

Relations of reason would not be put in the category of toward something since the categories pertain to a division of real being. This is clear from the distinction of being in the fifth book of *Wisdom*. But is Aristotle's second definition of toward something meant to exclude relations of reason as well as *relativa secundum dici?* Perhaps the use of *to be* in the second definition for nature indicates that one is thinking of being in things and not just in reason. When Hamlet says to be or not to be: that is the question, he is speaking of being in things, not in reason.

Some have thought that all relations are something of reason and not in things, but this is a mistake. But the reason for this mistake is the weakness in being of relations. Thomas speaks of this weakness:

> ...ea quae sunt ad aliquid, remotiora videntur esse a substantia quam alia genera, ex eo quod sunt debilioris esse. Unde et substantiae inhaerent mediantibus aliis generibus, sicut aequale et inaequale, duplum et dimidium, mediante quantitate. Movens autem et motum, pater et filius, dominus et servus, mediante actione et passione. Et hoc ideo, quia substantia est per se existens; quantitas autem et qualitas sunt entia in alio; sed relativa non solum sunt in alio, sed ad aliud.[12]

The reality, or existence in things, of some relations is from their being accidents or having a cause in their subject. Relation is something (real) in creatures as having a cause in its subject. The following text of Thomas is useful for understanding what is responsible for a relation being real:

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[11] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum* , Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. III, Obj. 4 & Ad 4

[12] *In XII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IV, n. 2456

> relatio secundum rationem sui generis, in quantum est relatio, non habet quod sit aliquid, sed solum quod sit ad aliquid.
>
> Quod sit vero aliquid secundum rem, habet ex illa parte qua inest, vel ut idem secundum rem, ut in divinis, vel ut habens causam in subiecto, sicut in creaturis.[13]

Relation, as Thomas explains, is not an accident from its being alone toward something:

> Illud autem quod ad aliquid dicitur, non habet rationem accidentis ex hoc quod est ad aliquid, sed solum ex hoc quod inest; et inde est quod sola relatio secundum rationem sui generis cum substantia remanet in divinis, nec tamen est ibi accidens.[14]

Whence some relations are of reason only because they have no foundation in the thing of which they are said:

> ...in relatione sint duo: scilicet relationis respectus, quo ad alterum refertur, in quo consistit relationis ratio; et iterum ipsum esse relationis, quod habet secundum quod in aliqua re fundatur, vel quantitate, vel essentia, vel aliquo huiusmodi: consideraverat relationes...secundum respectum in quo relationis ratio consistit, ex quo non habet quod aliquam rem inhaerentem imponat [importet]. Unde etiam inveniuntur aliquae relationes nihil realiter in re ponentes...et propter hoc dixit eas assistentes vel exterius affixas. Illae enim proprie relationes dicuntur exterius affixae et assistentes, quae cum proprie non habent fundamentum in re, tantummodo ex habitudine alterius ad rem de qua dicuntur, adveniunt; sicut dextrum in columna, quod dicitur de ipsa per hoc quod homo eam ad sinistram habet...[15]

In the distinction of the ten highest genera, Thomas separated quantity and quality from toward something because the former are said *absolutely*. What

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[13]*De Potentia,* Q. 2, Art. 5, corpus
[14]*Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, Quodlibetum Septimum, Q. I, Art. 4, c
[15]Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXIII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Solutio

are said absolutely place something in that in which they are by what is private to what they are, but a relation does not have to do this:

> ...ea quae absolute dicuntur, secundum proprias rationes ponunt in eo aliquid in quo dicuntur, ut quantitas et qualitas, et hujusmodi. Unde nihil horum invenitur quod non realiter sit in Deo, de quo vere et proprie dicitur; et propter hoc non possunt de aliquo ex tempore dici, nisi illud mutetur per susceptionem ejus quod prius non habuit. Sed relatio secundum rationem suam non habet quod ponat aliquid in eo de quo dicitur, sed ponit tantum habitudinem ad aliud; unde invenitur aliqua relatio...non realiter existens in eo de quo dicitur; et ideo in talibus habitudines illae de novo dicuntur non per mutationem ejus, sed illius ad quod dicitur...[16]

The following text of Thomas brings out well what relation has in common with the other accidents and what is proper or private to it:

> in quolibet novem generum accidentis est duo considerare. quorum unum est esse quod competit unicuique ipsorum secundum quod est accidens. Et hoc communiter in omnibus est inesse subiecto: accidentis enim esse est inesse.
>
> Aliud quod potest considerari in unoquoque, est propria ratio uniuscuiusque illorum generum.
>
> Et in aliis quodem generibus a relatione, utpote quantitate et qualitate, etiam propria ratio generis accipitur secundum comparationem ad subiectum: nam quantitas dicitur mensura substantiae, qualitas vero dispositio substantiae.
>
> Sed ratio propria relationis non accipitur secundum comparationem ad illud in quo est, sed secundum comparationem ad aliquid extra.[17]

From what does relation have existence in things?

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[16]Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. I, Soluti

[17]*Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 28, Art 2, C

> Est enim natura relationis ut in aliis rerum generibus causam habeat, quia minimum habet de natura entis, ut Commentator, XII *Meta.*, (text.10), dicit.
>
> Unde quamvis relatio per se non terminet motum, quia *in "ad aliquid" non est motus*, ut probatur in V *Phys.* (225b, 11), tamen ex hoc quod motus terminatur per se ad aliquod ens, de necessitate consequitur relatio aliqua. Sicut ex hoc quod motus alterationis terminatur ad albedinem, consequitur relatio similitudinis ad omnia alba; similiter etiam ex hoc quod motus generationis terminatur ad formam, consequitur haec relatio secundum quam materia esse sub forma dicitur...[18]

Although how much, how and toward something are said of substance by reason of something in it, there is an important difference in the ratio of toward something and the ratio of quantity and quality, in understanding what they are.

> ...relatio in hoc differt a quantitate et qualitate:
>
> quia quantitas et qualitas sunt quaedam accidentia in subiecto remanentia;
>
> relatio autem non significat, ut Boetius dicit [in libro *de Trinitate*], ut in subiecto manens, sed ut in transitu quodam ad aliud.....
>
> Quod autem attribuitur alicui ut ab eo in aliud procedens non facit compositionem cum eo, sicut nec actio cum agente.
>
> Et propter hoc etiam probat Philosophus V *Phys.*, quod in *ad aliquid* non potest esse motus: quia, sine aliqua mutatione eius quod ad aliud refertur, potest relatio desinere ex sola mutatione alterius, sicut etiam de actione patet, quod non est motus secundum actionem nisi metaphorice et improprie; sicut exiens de otio in actum mutari dicimus, quod non esset si relatio vel actio significaret aliquid in subiecto manens.[19]

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[18] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio II, Quaest. I, Art. III, Solutio III
[19] *De Potentia*, Q. 7, Art. 8, corpus

For the goodness of the teaching, we can make more explicit the species of toward something with the help of some texts of Thomas. Here is a text towards the species of relation based on their foundations:

> Dicendum ad primam quaestionem quod unio relatio quaedam est.
>
> Omnis autem relatio, secundum Philosophum, V *Meta*., (1020b 26-32) fundatur vel supra quantitatem, aut quod reducitur ad genus quantitatis, aut supra actionem vel passionem.
>
> *Unum* autem reducitur ad genus quantitatis quasi principium quantitatis discretae. Et supra ipsam fundatur identitas, secundum quod est unum in substantia; aequalitas, secundum quod est unum in quantitate; similitudo, secundum quod est unum in qualitate.
>
> *Unitio* autem est quaedam actio vel passio qua ex multis efficitur aliquo modo unum; et hanc actionem sequitur ista relatio quae est *unio*.
>
> Relationum autem tam harum quam illarum - quaedam innascuntur ex motu utriusque; et tunc oportet quod illae relationes sint realiter in utroque extremorum, sicut paternitas et huiusmodi - quaedam autem innascuntur ex motu unius sine immutatione alterius, quod accidit in his quorum unum dependet ad alterum; et in talibus relatio est secundum rem in eo quod dependet ad alterum, in altero vero est secundum rationem tantum.
>
> Cum igitur in incarnatione non sit aliqua mutatio facta in divina natura, sed in humana quae tracta est ad unitatem in persona divina, erit haec relatio, scilicet *unio*, secundum rem in natura humana, in divina secundum rationem tantum, secundum quod dicit Philosophus in V *Meta*., (1021a 28-29) quod "aliqua sunt relativa non quia ipsa referuntur, sed quia alia referuntur ad ipsa".
>
> Unde unio secundum rem creatura quaedam est.
>
> Ad tertium dicendum quod unio quae de Deo praedicatur non est neque Creator neque creatura; quia prout in ipso est, non est aliquid secundum rem, sed secundum rationem tantum.

> Non tamen ratio est falsa, quia fundatur super relationem creaturae ad Creatorem; sicut est etiam de aliis relativis quae ex tempore de Deo dicuntur, ut Dominus et hujusmodi.[20]

The following text divides the species of toward something in a way proportional to that in which Thomas distinguishes *where* and *when* etc. from *acting upon* and *undergoing*.

> Oportet ergo in ipsis rebus ordinem quemdam esse; hic autem ordo relatio quaedam est. Unde oportet in rebus ipsis relationes quasdam esse, secundum quas unum ad alterum ordinatur.
>
> Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam vel secundum quantitatem, vel secundum virtutem activam seu passivam. Ex his enim solum duobus attenditur aliquid in uno, respectu extrinseci.
>
> Mensuratur enim aliquid non solum a quantitate intrinseca, sed etiam ab extrinseca.
>
> Per virtutem etiam activam unumquodque agit in alterum et per passivam patitur ab altero;
>
> per substantiam autem et qualitatem ordinatur aliquid ad seipsum tantum, non ad alterum, nisi per accidens; scilicet secundum quod qualitas, - vel forma substantialis aut materia, - habet rationem virtutis activae vel passivae, et secundum quod in eis consideratur aliqua ratio quantitatis, prout unum in substantia facit idem, et unum in qualitate simile, et numerus, sive multitudo, dissimile et diversum in eisdem, et dissimile secundum aliquid magis vel minus altero consideratur: sic enim alius aliquid altero dicitur.
>
> Et propter hoc Philosophus in V *Metaph*. species assignans relationis, quasdam ponit ex quantitate causatas, quasdam vero ex actione et passione.[21]

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[20] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum* , Distinctio V, Quaest. I, Art. I, Solutio I & Ad 3

[21] *De Potentia*, Q. 7, Art. 9, Corpus

In this text, Thomas sees one more cause of relation besides quantity and action & passion:

> Ratio autem istorum modorum haec est. Cum enim relatio, quae est in rebus, consistat in ordine quodam unius rei ad aliam, oportet tot modis huiusmodi relationes esse, quot modis contingit unam rem ad aliam ordinari.
>
> Ordinatur autem una res ad aliam, vel secundum esse, prout esse unius rei dependet ab alia, et sic est tertius modus.
>
> Vel secundum virtutem activam et passivam, secundum quod una res ab alia recipit, vel alteri confert aliquid; et sic est secundus modus.
>
> Vel secundum quod quantitas unius rei potest mensurari per aliam; et sic est primus modus.[22]

Whence relation is a *res naturae* and has its unity or multiplicity:

> ...relationes differunt in hoc ab omnibus aliis generibus, quia ea quae sunt aliorum generum, ex ipsa ratione sui generis habent quod sint res naturae, sicut quantitates ex ratione quantitatis, et qualitates ex ratione qualitatis; sed relationes non habent quod sint res naturae ex ratione respectus ad alterum. Inveniuntur enim quidam respectus qui non sunt reales, sed rationales tantum: sicut scibile refertur ad scientiam, non aliqua reali relatione in scibile existente, sed potius quia scientia refertur ad ipsum, secundum Philosophum in V Metaphys.
>
> Sed relatio habet quod sit res naturae ex sua causa, per quam una res naturalem ordinem habet ad alterum: qui quidem ordo naturalis et realis est ipsis ipsa relatio; unde dextrum et sinistrum in animal sunt relationes reales, quia consequitur quasdam naturales virtutes; in columna autem sunt respectu rationis tantum secundum ordinem animalis ad ipsam.

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[22] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVII, n. 1004

> Ex eodem autem habet aliquid quod sit ens et quod sit unum; et ideo contingit quod est una relatio realis tantum propter unitatem causae, sicut patet de aequalitate. Propter unam enim quantitatem est in uno corpore una aequalitas tantum, quamvis sint respectus plures, secundum quos diversis corporibus dicitur esse aequale. Si autem secundum omnes illos respectus multiplicarentur realiter relationes in uno corpore, sequeretur quod in uno essent accidentia infinita vel indeterminata.
>
> Et similiter magister est una relatione magister omnium quos idem docet, quamvis sint multi respectus...
>
> Sic etiam unus homo secundum unam realem filiationem est filius patris sui et matris suae, quia una nativitate unam naturam ab utroque accepit.[23]

Again, whence relation has reality and unity or multiplicity

> in Christo est una tantum filiatio secundum rem, quamvis sint plures respectus relativi secundum rationem....
>
> in hoc differt ad aliquid ab aliis generibus: quod alia genera ex propria sui ratione habent quod aliquid sint; sicut quantitas ex hoc ipso quod est quantitas, aliquid ponit; et similiter est de aliis; sed ad aliquid ex propria sui generis ratione non habet quod ponat aliquid, sed ad aliquid: unde inveniuntur quaedam ad aliquid quae nihil sunt in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum: quod in aliis generibus non contingit. Et quamvis ad aliquid ex ratione sui generis non habeat quod ponat aliquid, non tamen habet ex ipsa generis ratione quod nihil ponat, quia sic nulla relatio esset aliquid in rerum natura, unde ad aliquid non esset unum de decem generibus.
>
> Habet autem relatio quod sit aliquid reale, ex eo quod relationem causat. Cum enim in aliquo invenitur aliquid reale, per quod ad alterum dependeat et comparetur, tunc dicimus realiter comparari vel dependere vel referri; sicut aequalitas relatio realis ponitur ex virtute quantitatis, quae aequalitatem causat.

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[23] *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, Quodlibet Primum, Q. II, Art. 1, c

> Quia vero ex eodem res habet esse et unitatem, ideo realis unitas relationis pensanda est ex ipso relationis fundamento vel causa; et quia una est quantitas, per quam pluribus sum aequalis, in me non est nisi una relatio realis aequalitatis habens respectum ad plures; similiter quia una nativitate ex patre et matre genitus fui, una filiatione reali dicor fiius utriusque, quamvis multiplicentur respectus.[24]

Again, whence relation has reality (whence relatio sit aliquid in rerum natura) and unity or multiplicity

> sicut in I lib. (d. 26, q. 2, a. 2) dictum est, relatio non habet ex hoc quod ad alterum dicitur, quod sit aliquid in rerum natura; sed hoc habet ex eo quod relationem causat, quod est in re quae ad alterum dicitur. Et quia ex eo res habet unitatem et multitudinem ex quo habet esse; ideo secundum id in quo relatio fundatur, de ea judicandum est, utrum sit secundum rem una vel plures.
>
> Sunt ergo quaedam relationes quae fundantur super quantitatem, sicut aequalitas quae fundatur super unum in quantitate. Et cum unitas quantitatis non sit nisi una in una re, inde est quod per unam aequalitatem est res aequalis omnibus quibus aequalis dicitur.
>
> Aliae vero relationes fundantur super actionem et passionem. Et in istis considerandum est quod una passio respondet duabus actionibus, quando neutrum agens sufficit per se ad actionem complendam; sicut est in eo qui una nativitate nascitur ex patre et matre. Unde in patre et matre sunt duae relationes secundum rem, sicut et duae actiones; sed in nato est una relatio secundum rem, secundum quam refertur ad patrem et matrem, sicut et passio una.
>
> Item considerandum est quod quaedam relationes non innascuntur ex actionibus secundum quod sunt in actu, sed magis secundum quod fuerunt; sicut aliquis dicitur pater postquam ex actione est effectus consecutus. Et tales relationes fundantur super id quod in actione ex agente relinquitur, sive sit dispositio sive habitus sive aliquod jus aut potestas vel quidquid aliud est hujusmodi.

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[24] *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, Quodlibet Nonum, Q. II, Art. 3, c

> Sed quia hoc quod relinquitur ex actionibus unius speciei, non potest esse nisi unum; inde est quod tales relationes etiam secundum rem non multiplicantur secundum diversas actiones, sed magis sunt unum secundum id quod ex actione relinquitur. Et propter hoc non sunt diversae relationes secundum rem in patre uno qui generat plures filios, nec in magistro uno qui docet plures discipulos.
>
> Si autem sint actiones plures secundum speciem, causant etiam plures relationes specie differentes.[25]

Again, whence relation has reality and unity or multiplicity:

> Unitas enim relationis vel eius pluralitas non attenditur secundum terminos: sed secundum causam vel subiectum.
>
> Si enim secundum terminos attenditur, oporteret quod quilibet homo in se duas filiationes haberet: unum qua refertur ad patrem, et aliam qua refertur ad matrem. Sed recte consideranti apparet eadem relatione referri unumquemque ad suum patrem et matrem, propter unitatem causae. Eadem enim nativitate homo nascitur ex patre et matre: unde eadem relatione ad utrumque refertur. Et eadem ratio est de magistro qui docet multos discipulos eadem doctrina, et de domino qui gubernat diversos subiectos eadem potestate.
>
> Si vero sint diversae causae specie differentes, ex consequenti videntur specie differre. Unde nihil prohibet plures tales relationes eidem inesse. Sicut si aliquis est aliquorum magister in grammatica et aliorum in logica, alia est ratio magisterii utriusque: et ideo diversis relationibus unus et idem homo potest esse magister vel diversorum vel eorundem secundum diversas doctrinas.
>
> Contingit autem quandoque quod aliquis habet relationem ad plures secundum diversa causas, eiusdem speciei: sicut cum aliquis est pater diversorum filiorum secundum diversos generationis actus. Unde paternitas non potest species differre: cum actus generationum sunt iidem specie. Et quia plures formae eiusdem

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[25] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist VIII, Art. V, Resp., nn. 57-59

> speciei non posssunt simul inesse eidem subiecto, non est possibile quod sunt plures paternitates in eo qui est pater plurium filiorum generatione naturali. Secus autem esset si esset pater unius generatione naturali, et alterius per adoptionem.[26]

APPENDIX

The distinction between real relations and relations of reason is not made much in the *Categories.* This is a very difficult distinction to understand fully. Likewise, the distinction among the relations of reason is difficult to understand. We here give some fundamental texts from Thomas, which are useful to begin to understand these difficult matters.

Sometimes both relatives are real, sometimes both are not real, sometimes one is and the other is not:

> ...relativorum invenitur triplex diversitas.
>
> Quaedam sunt quorum utrumque importat relationem non in re existentem, sed in ratione tantum; sicut quando ens refertur ad non ens, vel relatio ad relationem, vel aliquid hujusmodi, ut supra dictum est.
>
> Quaedam vero quorum utrumque relationem realem importat, sicut Pater et Filius.
>
> Quaedam vero quorum alterum importat relationem realem, et alterum relationem rationis tantum, sicut scientia et scibile.
>
> Et hujusmodi diversitatis ratio est, quia illud supra quod fundatur relatio, quandoque invenitur in altero tantum, et quandoque in utroque;
>
> ut patet quod relatio scientiae ad scibile fundatur supra apprehensionem secundum esse spirituale. Hoc autem esse

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[26] *Summa Theologiae*, Tertia Pars, Q. 35, Art. 5, C;

> spirituale in quo fundatur relatio scientiae, est tantum in sciente et non in scibili, quia ibi est forma rei secundum esse naturale.
>
> E contrario est de amante et amato, quia relatio amoris fundatur super appetitum boni; bonum non est aliquid existens tantum in anima, sed etiam in rebus. Unde dicit Philosophus, VI *Metaphys.,* text. 2, quod bonum et malum sunt in rebus; verum et falsum in anima; et ideo dicit Avicenna, tract. III *Metaph.*, cap. X, quod in amante et amato, in utroque relativorum est invenire dispositionem per quam refertur ad alterum; non in sciente et scibili; et ideo utrobique relatio realis est; sic etiam aequalitas, quae immediate fundatur supra quantitatem, quae in utroque est.[27]

The major text dividing relations of reason and what is necessary for a real relation:

> sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere:
>
> Uno modo secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur; et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad invicem.
>
> Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi, videlicet quod intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet illum ordinem intellectus non adveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi. Et huiusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei quod est in intellectu, sed ei quod est in re.
>
> Et hoc quidem contingit secundum quod aliqua non habentia secundum se ordinem, ordinate intelliguntur; licet intellectus non intelligat ea habere ordinem, quia sic esset falsus.

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[27] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. III, Ad 3

Ad hoc autem quod aliqua habeant ordinem, oportet quod utrumque sit ens, et utrumque distinctum (quia eiusdem ad seipsum non est ordo) et utrumque ordinabile ad aliud.

Quandoque autem intellectus accipit aliqua duo ut entia, quorum alterum tantum vel neutrum est ens: sicut cum accipit duo futura, vel unum praesens et aliud futurum, et intelligit unum cum ordine ad aliud, dicens alterum esse prius altero; unde istae relationes sunt rationis tantum, utpote modum intelligendi consequentes.

Quandoque vero accipit unum ut duo, et intelligit ea cum quodam ordine: sicut cum dicitur aliquid esse idem sibi; et sic talis relatio est rationis tantum.

Quandoque vero accipit aliqua duo ut ordinabilia ad invicem, inter quae non est ordo medius, immo alterum ipsorum essentialiter est ordo: sicut cum dicit relationem accidere subiecto; unde talis relatio relationis ad quodcumque aliud rationis est tantum.

Quandoque vero accipit aliquid cum ordine ad aliud, inquantum est terminus ordinis alterius ad ipsum, licet ipsum non ordinetur ad aliud: sicut accipiendo scibile ut terminum ordinis scientiae ad ipsum, nomen scibilis relative significat; et est relatio rationis tantum. Et similiter aliqua nomina relativa Deo attribuit intellectus noster, in quantum accipit Deum ut terminum relationis creaturarum ad ipsum; unde huiusmodi relationes sunt rationis tantum.

3. Praeterea, hoc nomen *Dominus* relationem significat, cum sit relativum secundum esse. Sed Deus est Dominus non secundum rationem tantum. Ergo nec huiusmodi relationes sunt in Deo secundum rationem tantum.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod sicut aliquis est idem sibi realiter, et non solum secundum rationem, licet relatio sit secundum rationem tantum, propter hoc quod relationis causa est realis, scilicet unitas substantiae quam intellectus sub relatione intelligit: ita potestas coërcendi subditos est in Deo realiter, quam intellectus intelligit in ordine ad subditos propter ordinem subditorum ad ipsum; et propter hoc dicitur dominus realiter, licet relatio sit rationis tantum.

> Et eodem modo apparet quod Dominus esset, nullo existente intellectu.[28]

In the above text, Thomas would seem to distinguish about five kinds of relation of reason. But he distinguishes them first into two. All relations of reason are either attributable to things only as they are in the understanding or to them as they are outside the reason. Some relations of reason, such as genus and species, are said of things only insofar as they are in reason (where they are universal).

The relations of reason that are said of things in themselves are of four kinds whereby they depart in some way from what is required for a real relation:

(1) when one or both of the things between whom there is relation does *not exist* (outside the mind); as today is before tomorrow

(2) when the things are *not distinct* outside the soul; as Socrates is the same as Socrates

(3) when one is not orderable to the other because it is itself a relation or order; as a relation to its subject

(4) when the foundation of the relation is founding only one which is really toward the other, but not vice-versa; as the known to the knowledge or knower

Perhaps in the first three, there is a relation of reason in both relatives. But in the last, only in one.

There seem to be two most universal divisions or distinctions of relations that we find in Thomas.

Every relation is either a real relation or a relation of reason.

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[28] *De Potentia,* Q. 7, Art. 11, c.

Every relative is either a relative secundum dici or a relative secundum esse

There is a danger in understanding *dici* and *esse* in the second distinction and confusing them with the first two.

One could criss-cross the two divisions, but would this give four kinds or only three kinds:

	Real relations	Relations of reason
Relativa secundum dici	scientia & sensus (important relationes reales)	???
Relativa Secundum Esse	double & half father & son	dextrum et sinistrum in columna Dominus idem genus & species ??

DIVISION OF CHAPTER SEVEN: TOWARD SOMETHING OR RELATION

The first definition and some properties
- The first definition of toward something
  - The first definition
  - Definition exemplified (in two kinds of example)
- The properties of toward something
  - Weaker properties
    - Some of the above have a contrary and some do not
    - Some said more or less and some not
  - Stronger properties
    - Said in return with another
      - Shown in some

Qualification
Objection and its solution
Together by nature
Where this is true
This is not so in some cases
Knowledge and the knowable
Sense and the sensible

The second definition and another property
The second definition of toward something
The difficulty from parts of substance & defect of first definition
Solution: the second definition
How it is towards first definition: first definition more universal

Another property of those whose whole nature is towards something
- if one knows determinately one of those toward something, he knows also that to which it is.

The difficulty of the matter

Duane H. Berquist

QUALITY - CHAPTER 8

This chapter can be divided into three parts. In the first part, Aristotle "defines" quality and distinguishes its species. In the second, he considers the properties of quality. In the third, he returns to the connection of some qualities with toward something.

In the first part, Aristotle defines the Greek word for quality by its concrete correspondent, just as the Latins could define *qualitas* by *qualis.* This is difficult to imitate in English. It is as if we used the word *howness* for quality and defined *howness* as *that by which we are said to be how we are.* Then, Aristotle distinguishes four species or forms of quality. Finally, returning to the original definition, he points out that *how we are* is said denominatively from the above species.

The first species or form of quality is habit and disposition. Habits are more stable and longer lasting than dispositions. Reasoned out knowledge and moral virtues are habits, but health and sickness are dispositions. But a habit can also be called a disposition in the broad sense for by a habit we are disposed in some way. Thus the word *disposition* could be used in general for this species or genus of quality and then be kept for the disposition in particular that is easily movable while the other species, adding something noteworthy (stability and long lastingness), gets the new name of *habit*.

The second species or genus of quality is natural ability or inability. Thomas puts the powers of the soul in this species.

The third species of genus of quality is undergoing qualities and undergoings. The latter are transitory and thus are something imperfect in the genus of quality. They are called undergoing qualities because the senses undergo them. Hence, some call these sensible qualities. But some are called undergoing because they are the result of those having them undergoing something. Thomas alludes to the distinction here of undergoing quality and undergoings in this text:

> ...nulla potentia passiva potest in actum exire nisi completa per formam sui activi per quam fit in actu; quia nihil operatur nisi secundum quod est in actu.
>
> Impressiones autem activorum possunt esse in passivis dupliciter. Uno modo per modum passionis, dum scilicet potentia

> passiva est in transmutari; alio modo per modum qualitatis et formae, quando impressio activi jam facta est connaturalis ipsi passivo; sicut etiam Philosophus in *Praedicamentis* (c. 8, 9a 28) distinguit passionem et passibilem qualitatem.[1]

The fourth species of quality is figure and form

When Aristotle has finished distinguishing these four species, he says there may be others; but these are the ones mainly spoken of.

In the third part of the first part, Aristotle states that *how one is* is said denominatively from the above.

In the second chief part of the chapter, Aristotle considers three properties of quality, the first two fitting only some species and the last being a property in a stricter sense.

The first property is to have a contrary, which Aristotle exemplifies, in the first and third species of quality. This is significant because the second and fourth species do not seem to have contraries. But not every species under the first and third have a contrary either. A connection between the first and third species is seen in the fifth book of *Wisdom* (the fifth book *After the Books in Natural Philosophy*) where these two senses are joined. Simplicius says that contrariety is found in other genera as they have something of quality in them.[2]

The second property is to be said more and less. Again, Aristotle exemplifies this in the first and third species. But the fourth species, he says, does not admit of more or less. One circle is not more or less a circle than another.

The third property is more a strict property. By its quality, a thing is like or unlike another thing.

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[1] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio XIV, Art. 1, Solutio II

[2] Recall the question in lectio 11 of the first book of *Natural Hearing* whether there is contrariety in substance or not. Aristotle reasoning from both the affirmative and the negative. But on the side of the differences is found the contrariety and difference is said in *quale quid* or how it is what it is. Likewise, in quantity. And it is the relatives secundum dici that were contrary.

The third chief part of the chapter returns to the connection of quality with toward something. Some qualities are said to be toward another by their genus. Each science is knowledge *of* something. Nothing prevents these from being put in two highest genera. Although fundamentally in quality, the relation following upon them is in toward something

We can now try to penetrate more these points with the help of some texts from Thomas.

Quality is defined by how.[3] The word *how* seems to signify the limit or determination of a thing. This can be seen when the word is used in combination as in quantity being called *how much* or *how many.* If I say many friends are coming for dinner or many students are coming to the party, and you (who have to prepare the food and drink for them) ask "How many are coming", you want me to limit them to some number. LIkewise, when the difference is defined as signifying *how* something is what it is, it is limiting the genus to one or some of its species. Likewise, when we ask how is this done or made or known, we want the way to be determined.

The connection between how and limit can also be seen by the correspondence of the four meanings of *how* in the fifth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* and the four meanings of *limit* therein. Limit can also be connected with the species of quality through the senses of how. And the reduction of the senses of *how* to two in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, also points to the distinction of the first and third (and perhaps second) species of quality from the last.

By quality or howness, *how something is* is said. But this is how *simpliciter*, not how much or how many as by quantity or how towards another by relation or how something is what it is as in species-making difference. Cajetan in his commentary on the *Categories:*

> Vel, et in idem redit, licet determinans potentiam substantiae secundum esse accidentale qualitas sit, quia tamen qualitatis ratio attenditur penes determinationem potentiae rei et solum genus hoc consistit in ipsa determinatione subjecti et distinguitur secundum quod diversimode subjecti potentiam determinat, ideo

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[3] . *Cassell's Latin-English:* qualis, -e (from quam, as talis from tam)
quam (acc. of quae, analogous to tam) *how, in what way*

> qualitatis sibi et rationem et nomen vindicavit, ita tamen quod, ut dictum est, omne aliud accidens ut determinat potentiam subjecti qualitatis rationem sapiat et nomen quodammodo habeat; et haec appropriatio nominis qualitatis fuit causa quare qualitas descripta est per *quale* simpliciter...[4]

Commentators are rightly puzzled by Aristotle's second statement in this chapter, that quality is among those things said in many ways. In the 5th book of *Wisdom (Metaphysics)*, he distinguishes four senses. How can three species of quality be three meanings of how? The species of quality seem distinguished more like the senses of a word than by opposites as in the division of a genus. This seems contrary to species which have one meaning in their genus. There seems more real diversity among the species or genera of quality. Quality seems to be less one genus than quantity. In his commentary on the senses of quality in wisdom, Thomas compares them with the species of quality in the *Categories:*

> Hic distinguit modos qualitatis: et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit quatuor modos qualitatis. Secundo reducit eos as duos...
>
> Dicit ergo primo, quod unus modus qualitatis est secundum quod qualitas dicitur "differentia substantiae", idest differentia, per quam aliquid ab altero substantialiter differt. Et propter hoc dicitur quod differentia praedicatur in quale quid....Hunc autem modum qualitatis Aristoteles in *Praedicamentis* praetermisit, quia non continetur sub Praedicamento qualitatis, de quo ibi agebat. Hic autem agit de significationbus huius nominis, *qualitas.*
>
> Secundum ponit....Dicit quod alius modus qualitatis vel qualis est secundum quod immobilia et mathematica dicuntur qualia. Mathematica enim abstrahunt a motu, ut in sexto huius dicetur. Mathematica enim sunt numeri et magnitudines; et in utrisque utimur nomine *qualis*. Dicimus enim superficies esse quales, inquantum sunt quadratae vel triangulares. Et similiter numeri dicuntur quales, inquantum sunt compositi...Dicuntur enim numeri quales ad similitudinem superficiei "et solidi", idest corporis....Hic autem modus qualitatis est quarta species in *Praedicamentis* posita.

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[4] Cajetan, *Commentaria in De Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, M.H. Laurent, O.P., pp. 172-173 ?

Tertio ponit....Dicit, quod etiam qualitates dicuntur passiones substantiarum mobilium, secundum quas corporas per alterationem mutantur, ut calidum, frigidum, et huiusmodi. Et hic modus pertinet ad tertiam speciem qualitatis in *Praedicamentis* positam.

Quartam ponit...Dicit quod qualitas sive quale dicitur quarto modo secundum quod aliquid disponitur per virtutem et vitium, vel qualitercumque per bonum et malum, sicut per scientiam et ignorantiam, sanitatem et aegritudinem, et huiusmodi. Et haec est prima species qualitatis in *Praedicamentis* posita.

Praetermittit autem inter hos modos secundam qualitatis speciem, quia magis comprehenditur sub potentia, cum non significetur nisi ut principium passioni resistens; sed propter modum denominandi ponitur in *Praedicamentis* inter species qualitatis. Secundum autem modum essendi magis continentur sub potentia, sicut supra posuit.

Deinde...Reducit positos modos ad duos; dicens quod quale dicitur aliquid fere secundum duos modos, inquantum alii duo de quatuor reducuntur ad alios duos. Horum autem unus principalissimus est primus modus, secundum quam differentia substantiae dicitur qualitas, quia per eum aliquid significatur informatum et qualificatum. Et ad hunc modum reducitur qualitas, quae est in numeris, et in mathematicis aliis, sicut quaedam pars. Huiusmodi enim qualitates sunt quasi quaedam differentiae substantiales substantiarum. Nam ipsa significantur per modum substantiae potius quam alia accidentia, ut in capitulo de quantitate dictum est. Sunt enim huiusmodi qualitates differentiae substantiarum "aut non motarum, aut non inquantum sunt motae"....

Secundus modus principalis est, ut passiones motarum inquantum mota, et etiam differentiae motuum dicantur qualitates. Quae quidem dicuntur differentiae motuum, quia alterationes differunt secundum huiusmodi qualitates, sicut calefieri et infrigidari secundum calidum et frigidum. Et ad hunc modum reducitur ille modus secundum quam vitium et virtus dicitur qualitas. Hic enim modus est quasi quaedam pars illius. Virtus enim et vitium ostendunt quasdam differentias motus et actus secundum bene et male. Nam virtus est, per quam se aliquis habet bene ad agendum et patiendum; vitum autem

> secundum quod male. Et simile est de aliis habitibus sive intellectualibus, ut scientia, sive corporalibus, ut sanitas.
>
> Sed tamen bene et male maxime pertinet ad qualitatem in rebus animatis; et praecipue in habentibus "prohaerisim" idest electionem. Et hoc ideo, quia bonum habet rationem finis. Ea vero, quae agunt per electionem, agunt propter finem. Agere enim propter finem maxime competit rebus animatis...[5]

We can see that the four senses of quality in wisdom do not correspond exactly to the four species of quality in the *Categories.* There is one in each that is not found in the other. Thomas explains why the second species of quality is not under the meanings of quality in wisdom:

> Praetermittit autem inter hos modos secundam qualitatis speciem, quia magis comprehenditur sub potentia, cum non significetur nisi ut principium passioni resistens; sed propter modum denominandi ponitur in *Praedicamentis* inter species qualitatis. Secundum autem modum essendi magis continentur sub potentia, sicut supra posuit.[6]

The wise man is interested in the ways of being and ability or power more readily comes under the division of being into act and ability, or act and potency, than the division of being according to the figures of predication. Moreover, the second species is more a beginning than an end; and *how* signifies more a limit or end than a beginning.[7] One might also note in passing that the reason given here for it being a species in the *Categories* - *propter modum denominandi* rather than *propter modum essendi* - is a sign of the priority of names over things in the skopos of the *Categories*. Moreover, this might also contain the clue to the logician's considering these things as having a common genus from their common way of denominating substance.

The sense of quality found in wisdom, but not in the genus of quality in logic, is that of the species-making difference. Clearly, this could not be a species of the genus quality in the *Categories* for it is found in every genus which is divided by differences and especially in substance. Moreover, no

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[5] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVI, nn. 987-1000

[6] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVI, n. 995

[7] Is this also the reason why the second species is exemplified more by something other than the mere ability (so that people wonder whether the powers of the soul belong there)?

difference is a species. Further, it does not signify simply *how something is* but *how something is what it is*.

How do we think out the division of *quality* into *four* species? Usually, a logical and understandable division is into two or three. We have seen how both Thomas and Albert distinguish the *ten* highest genera by dividing and subdividing them always into two or three, until they arrive at the ten of Aristotle. Likewise, when Aristotle distinguished five species of continuous quantity, he seemed to touch upon a distinction between the first three and the last two (time and place).

Is it by criss-crossing divisions into two as in the division of being in chapter two or by dividing and sub-dividing? Thomas gives a division into three:

> Philosophus, in *Praedicamentis,* ponit inter quatuor species qualitatis primam, *dispositionem et habitum*...
>
> Proprie enim qualitas importat quendam modum substantiae. Modus autem est, ut dicit Augustinus, *super Gen. ad litteram, quem mensura praefigit:*[8] unde importat quandam determinationem secundum aliquam mensuram.
>
> Et ideo sicut id secundum quod determinatur potentia materiae secundum esse substantiale dicitur qualitas quae est differentia substantiae; ita id secundum quod determinatur potentia subiecti secundum esse accidentale, dicitur qualitas accidentalis, quae est etiam quaedam differentia, ut patet per Philosophum in V *Metaphys*. [9]
>
> Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum esse accidentale, potest accipi vel in ordine ad ipsam naturam subiecti; vel secundum actionem vel passionem quae consequuntur principia naturae, quae sunt materia et forma; vel secundum quantitatem.

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[8] *figo:* to fix, fasten, make fast
praefigo: to fix in front, fasten before

[9] Thomas: Lect. 16, n. 987

Si autem accipiatur modus vel determinatio subiecti secundum quantitatem, sic est quarta species qualitatis. Et quia quantitas, secundum suam rationem, est sine motu, et sine ratione boni vel mali; ideo ad quartam speciem qualitatis non pertinet quod aliquid sit bene vel male, cito vel tarde transiens.

Modus autem sive determinatio subiecti secundum actionem et passionem, attenditur in secunda et tertia species qualitatis. Et ideo in utraque consideratur quod aliquid facile vel difficile fiat, quod sit cito transiens vel diuturnum. Non autem consideratur in his aliquid pertinens ad rationem boni vel mali: quia motus et passiones non habent rationem finis, bonum autem et malum dicitur per respectum ad finem.

Sed modus et determinatio subiecti in ordine ad naturam rei, pertinet ad primam speciem qualitatis, quae est habitus et dispositio: dicit enim Philosophus, in VII *Physic*., loquens de habitibus animae et corporis quod sunt *dispositiones quaedam perfecti ad optimum; dico autem perfecti, quod est dispositum secundum naturam*. Et quia *ipsa forma et natura rei est finis et cuius causa fit aliquid*, ut dicitur in II *Phys.*;[10] ideo in prima specie consideratur bonum et malum; et etiam facile et difficile mobile, secundum quod aliqua natura est finis generationis et motus.

Unde in V *Metaphys*. Philosophus definit habitum, quod est *dispositio secundum quam aliquis disponitur bene vel male*. Et in II Ethic dicit quod *habitus sunt secundum quos ad passiones nos habemus bene vel male*.

Quando enim est modus conveniens naturae rei, tunc habet rationem boni: quando autem non convenit, tunc habet rationem mali.

Et quia natura est id quod primum consideratur in re, ideo habitus ponitur prima species qualitatis.[11]

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[10] 198b, 13-16, Lectio II, n. 6; 194a, 21-29, Lectio IV, nn. 6-7

[11] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 2, corpus

Why does Thomas use *modus* to distinguish the species of quality? If *modus* is determined by measure and the species of quantity are distinguished by measure (Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XV, n. 986: "Philosophus in *Praedicamentis*...distinxit species quantitatis secundum diversas rationes mensurae."), why should Thomas use the word *modus* to lead into the distinction of the species of quality? But it can also have the sense of boundary or limit.[12] Perhaps we are to understand *modus* in this way when trying to understand the species of quality. In the above text, Thomas uses the words *modus* and *determinatio* as synonyms.[13] To be measurable, a quantity must also be limited. As Shakespeare says of mother earth in *Timon of Athens:* "Common mother, thou, whose womb immeasurable and infinite breast teems and feeds all."; the infinite or unlimited is immeasurable. And in the *The Winter's Tale*, Act II, Sc. 1:

> With thoughts so qualified as your charities
> Shall best instruct you, measure me

And in one edition, the note gives - qualified: moderated

And in *King John*, Act V, Sc. 1:

> This inundation of mistemper'd humour
> Rests by you only to be qualified.
>
> [qualified: moderated in Yale Shakespeare note]

Modus also has the sense of *way*. Both words can be nouns corresponding to the word *how*. The *mode* or *way* of doing something is *how* you do it. The *mode* or *way* of knowing is *how* you know. Now the word *qualis* in Cassell's Latin dictionary is said to be derived from *quam* meaning how:

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[12] Cassell's dictopnary:
modus: Ia: a measure, standard of measure
II Transf. A size, quantity length
B. 1. measure, bound, limit, boundary [hence determination ?]
2. moderation, control
C. order rule
D manner, mode, fashion, way, method

[13] *determinatio:* boundary, end
determino: to bound, fix the limits of determine
termino: to bound, limit

quam: how, in what manner

qualis: (from *quam* as *talis* from *tam*): of what sort, what kind of

When we ask the quantitative questions "how much?" or "how many?", does the word *how* indicate limited and therefore measurable? If someone says that he expects *many* people or that it will take *many* days, we ask *how* many seeking a more precise answer, but also a determination or limit. It is curious to note that the limit of a continuous quantity is either not continuous or not continuous in the way that is of which it is the limit.

One could also divide the four into two. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, when investigating the genus of virtue and vice, Aristotle asks which of three they are. These three are the first three species of quality. Thomas in his commentary explain what these three have in common

> tria sunt in anima, scilicet passiones, potentiae et habitus...Nihil autem est in anima, quod est operationis principium, nisi aliquid horum trium.[14]

The fourth species is not a principle of any operation as is clear from there being no motion in geometry. Good and bad are used to get at the genus of virtue and vice. The first reason why virtue and vice are neither passion nor potency is in terms of good and bad which also separate the fourth species from the first.

There is a problem about the distinction of the species of quality which Thomas considers in a couple of objections and solves in replying to them:

> 1. Quia, ut dictum est, habitus, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur *dispositio secundum quam bene aut male disponitur dispositum*. Sed hoc contingit secundum quamlibet qualitatem: nam et secundum figuram contingit aliquid bene vel male esse dispositum, et similiter secundum calorem et frigus, et secundum omnia huiusmodi. Ergo habitus non est determinata species qualitatis.
>
> 2. Praeterea, Philosophus, in *Praedicamentis*, caliditatem et frigiditatem dicit esse dispositiones vel habitus, sicut aegritudinem et sanitatem. Sed calor et frigus sunt in tertia

[14]*In II Ethicorum*, Lectio V, n. 290

> specie qualitatis. Ergo habitus vel dispositio non distinguuntur ab aliis speciebus qualitatis.
>
> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod dispositio ordinem quendam importat, ut dictum est. Unde non dicitur aliquis disponi per qualitatem, nisi in ordine ad aliquid. Et si addatur *bene vel male*, quod pertinet ad rationem habitus, oportet quod attendatur ordo ad naturam, quae est finis.
>
> Unde secundum figuram, vel secundum calorem vel frigus, non dicitur aliquis disponi bene vel male, nisi secundum ordinem ad naturam rei, secundum quod est conveniens vel non conveniens. Unde et ipsae figurae et passibiles qualitates, secundum quod considerantur ut convenientes vel non convenientes naturae rei, pertinent ad habitus vel dispositiones: nam figura, prout convenit naturae rei, et color, pertinent ad pulchritudinem; calor autem et frigus, secundum quod conveniunt naturae rei, pertinent ad sanitatem. Et hoc modo caliditas et frigiditas ponuntur a Philosopho in prima specie qualitatis.
>
> Unde patet solutio ad secundum. Licet a quibusdam aliter solvitur ut Simplicius dicit, in *Commento Praedicamentorum*. [15]

We can compare here the four senses of *limit* or *end* with the four senses of quality in wisdom and with the four species of quality in the *Categories*. But first we give Thomas" exposition of Aristotle's text in wisdom on the word *limit:*

> Primo ponit rationem termini; dicens, quod terminus dicitur quod est ultimum cuiuslibet rei, ita quod nihil de primo terminato est extra ipsum terminum; et omnia quae sunt eius, continentur intra ipsum. Dicit autem "primi" quia contingit id, quod est ultimum primi, esse principium secundi; sicut nunc quod est ultimum praeteriti, est principium futuri.
>
> Secundo ponit quatuor modos, quibus dicitur terminus;

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[15] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 2, Utrum habitus sit determinata species qualitatis, Obj. 1 & 2 and Ad 1 & 2

quorum primus est secundum quod in quolibet specie magnitudinis, finis magnitudinis vel habentis magnitudinem, dicitur terminus; sicut punctus dicitur terminus lineae, et superficies corporis, vel etiam lapidis habentis quantitatem

Secundus modus est similis primo, secundum quod unum extremum motus vel actionis dicitur terminus, hoc scilicet ad quod est motus, et non a quo: sicut terminus generationis est esse, non autem non esse; quamvis quandoque ambo extrema motus dicantur terminus largo modo, scilicet a quo et in quod, prout dicimus, quod omnis motus est inter duos terminos.

Tertius modus dicitur terminus, cuius causa fit aliquid, hoc enim est ultimum intentionis sicut terminus secundo modo dictus est ultimum motus vel operationis.

Quartus modus est secundum quod substantia rei, quae est essentia et definitio significans quod quid est res, dicitur terminus.

Est enim terminus cognitionis. Incipit enim cognitio rei ab aliquibus signis exterioribus quibus pervenitur ad cognoscendum rei definitionem, quo cum perventum fuerit, habetur perfecta cognitio de re.

Vel dicitur terminus cognitionis definitio, quia infra ipsam continentur ea, per quae scitur res. Si autem mutetur una differentia, vel addatur, vel subtrahatur, iam non erit eadem definitio.

Si autem est terminus cognitionis, oportet quod sit rei terminus, quia cognitio fit per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam.

Concludit comparationem termini ad principium; dicens quod quoties dicitur principium, toties dicitur terminus, et adhuc amplius; quia omne principium est terminus, sed non terminus omnis est principium. Id enim ad quod motus est, terminus est, et nullo modo principium est: illud vero a quo est motus, est principium et terminus, ut ex praedictis patet.[16]

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[16]*n V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIX, nn. 1044-1049

And now a brief comparison of these four senses to the senses of how or quality in wisdom and to the fours species of quality in the *Categories.*

The first sense of *limit* is connected with the second sense of *how.*
The second sense of *limit* is connected with the third sense of *how*.
The third sense of *limit* is connected with fourth sense of *how.*
The fourth sense of limit is connected with first sense of *how*.

The first sense of *limit* is connected with the fourth and last species of quality.
The second sense of *limit* is connected with the third and to some extent also the second species of quality.
The third sense of *limit* is connected with the first species of quality which involves the good and the bad, which are determined, by the end or purpose.
The fourth sense corresponds more to substantial quality in a definition. Note how the order is reversed.

There follows some texts on particular species of quality in particular.

We have already seen why the Philosopher place *potentia* in quality rather than in relation:

> licet potentiae conveniat ratio principii, quod in genere relationis est, tamen id quod est principium actionis vel passionis, non est relatio, sed aliqua forma absoluta; et id est essentia potentiae;
>
> et inde est quod Philosophus ponit potentiam non in genere relationis, sed qualitatis, sicut et scientiam, quamvis utrique aliqua relatio accidat.[17]

The word *natural* modifying ability is necessary. (Aristotle, *Categories*, 9a 15-17) For acquired abilities are in the first species of quality.

Thomas clearly places the powers of the soul in the second species of quality:

> cum potentia animae non sit eius essentia, oportet quod sit accidens; et est in secunda species qualitatis.[18]

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[17]*De Potentia*, Q. 2, Art. 2, corpus
[18]*Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 77, Art. 1, Ad 5

And another text from Thomas placing the powers of the soul in the second species of quality:

> si potentiae animae non sunt ipsa essentia animae (et manifestum est quod non sunt aliae substantiae), sequitur quod sint accidentia in aliquo novem generum contenta. Sunt enim in secunda specie qualitatis, quae dicitur potentia vel impotentia naturalis.[19]

Three texts from Thomas on the third species of quality:

> Omnis alteratio fit secundum qualitatem sensibilem, quae est tertia species qualitatis. Secundum illa enim alterantur corpora, quibus primo corpora ab invicem differunt; quae sunt sensibiles qualitates: ut gravitas et levitas, durities et mollities quae percipiuntur tactu.....Huiusmodi enim sunt quaedam passiones sub genere qualitatis contentae; et dicuntur *passiones*, quia passionem ingerunt sensibus vel quia ab aliquibus passionibus causantur, ut in *Praedicamentis* dicitur.[20]

> Huic enim generi alludit hoc commune nomen quod est *alteratio:* nam *alterum* solet dici quod differt secundum qualitatem. Loquimur autem nunc de qualitate, non secundum quod quale invenitur in genere substantiae, secundum quod differentia substantialis dicitur praedicari *in eo quod quale* sed de quali *passivo*, quod continetur in tertia specie qualitatis, secundum quod quale dicitur aliquid pati aut non pati, ut calidum et frigidum, album et nigrum, et huiusmodi.[21]

> Philosophus in VII Physic. probet quod in prima et quarta specie qualitatis non est motus alterationis, sed solum in tertia, quae dicitur passio vel passibilis qualitas: et propter hoc forte signanter dixit quod alteratio est transmutatio in passionibus.[22]

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[19]*De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. 11, C
[20]*In VII Physicorum*, n. 910
[21]*In V Physicorum,* Lectio IV, n. 6679
[22]*In I De Generatione et Corruptione*, Lectio X, n. 74

In this text on the fourth species of quality, Thomas also sees a distinction between form and figure:

> dicit ergo primo, quod praeter qualitates sensibiles, maxime videtur esse alteratio in quarta specie qualitatis, quae est qualitas circa quantitatem, scilicet *forma* et *figura;* et in prima specie qualitatis, quae continet sub se *habitus* et *dispositiones*.
>
> ...considerandum est quod forma et figura in hoc ab invicem differunt, quod figura importat terminationem quantitatis; est enim figura, quae termino vel terminis comprehenditur: forma vero dicitur, quae dat esse specificum artificiato; formae enim artificiatorum sunt accidentia.[23]

Appendix

Thomas uses the teaching of this chapter in theology when discussing the genus of grace. In this text, Thomas identifies grace as a quality and places it in the first species of quality:

> 3. Praeterea, gratia est qualitas quaedam. Sed manifestum est quod non est in quarta specie qualitatis, quae est *forma et circa aliquid constans figura* : quia non pertinet ad corpus. Neque etiam in tertia est: quia non est *passio vel passibilis qualitas*, quae est in parte animae sensitiva, ut probatur in VII *Physic*.; ipsa autem gratia principaliter est in mente. Neque iterum est in secunda specie, quae est *potentia vel impotentia naturalis*: quia gratia est super naturam; et non se habet ad bonum et malum, sicut potentia naturalis. Ergo relinquitur quod sit in prima specie, quae est *habitus vel dispositio*. Habitus autem mentis sunt virtutes: quia etiam ipsa scientia quodammodo est virtus, ut supra dictum est. Ergo gratia est idem quod virtus.
>
> Ad tertium dicendum quod gratia reducitur ad primam speciem qualitatis. Nec tamen est idem quod virtus: sed habitudo quaedam quae praesupponitur virtutibus infusis, sicut earum principium et radix.[24]

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[23] *In VII Physicorum,* Lectio V, n.n 914-915

[24] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 110, Art. 3, Obj. 3 & Ad 3

And in another text where Thomas does the same, he notes that grace is a quality not known by the philosophers:

> ...gratia ad genus qualitatis reducitur, et ad primam speciem qualitatis; nec proprie tamen naturam habitus habet, cum non immediate ad actum ordinet; sed est velut habitudo quaedam, sicut sanitas se habet ad corpus. Et ideo dicit Chrysostomus quod gratia est sanitas mentis; unde non computatur nec inter scientias, nec inter virtutes, nec inter alias qualitates quas philosophi numeraverunt; quorum non fuit tractare nisi habitus naturales et acquisitos.[25]

And a third text where Thomas also notes the difference of this quality which is grace from those known by the philosophers:

> ...gratia est in prima specie qualitatis, quamvis non proprie possit dici habitus, quia non immediate ordinatur ad actum, sed ad quoddam esse spirituale quod in anima facit, et est sicut dispositio quae est respectu gloriae, quae est gratia consummata. Nihil tamen simile gratiae in accidentibus animae quae Philosophi sciverunt, invenitur: quia Philosophi non cognoverunt nisi illa animae accidentia quae ordinantur ad actus naturae humanae proportionatos.[26]

Another interesting text of Thomas using this genus in theology is on character in the sacraments:

> ...characterem in sacramentis quibusdam imprimi, omnes Moderni confitentur; sed in modo ponendi ipsum in anima partim differunt, et partim conveniunt. Conveniunt quidem in hoc quod omnes dicunt per characterem importari relationem triplicem. Est enim character signum distinctivum et configurativum....Differunt autem in hoc, quod quidam ponunt istis relationibus non subesse aliquod accidens absolutum, sed immediate in anima fundari istas relationes. Hoc autem esse non potest, quia signum per formam quam sensibus vel intellectui imprimit, facit aliquid in cognitionem venire. Similiter etiam nihil distinguitur ab alio nisi per aliquam

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[25]*Scriptum super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVI, Quaest.I, Art. V, Ad 1
[26]*De Veritate*, Q. 27, Art. 2, Ad 7

formam. Similitudo etiam est relatio super unitate qualitatis fundata, ut dicitur in V *Meta*. Unde patet quod quaelibet illarum relationum quam importat character, requirit aliquam formam substratam; et cum non sit forma substantialis, quia forma substantialis in sacramentis non datur, relinquitur quod forma substrata sit qualitas quaedam, cujus unitas consignificationis similitudinem facit.

Et ideo quidam dicunt quod non est in aliqua quatuor specierum qualitatis, et tamen est in genere qualitatis, innitentes illi verbo Philosophi in *Praedicamentis* (*Categ*. c. 8, 10a 25) *Fortasse,* inquit, *apparebunt alii qualitatis modi*.

Sed hoc est fuga quaedam, quia quamvis sint alii modi qualitatis, tamen omnes reducuntur ad has species: quod patet ex hoc quod nulla alia species inveniri adhuc potuit.

Et ideo dicunt alii quod est in quarta specie qualitatis, quia ipsa configuratio quam character suo nomine exprimit, importat unitatem figurae, quae est in specie quarta qualitatis. Et quidam dicunt hanc figuram esse crucem Christi.

Sed hoc non potest stare, quia aut figura proprie accipitur, aut metaphorice. Si proprie accipitur, sic importat terminationem quantitatis dimensivae quam constat in anima non esse. Si autem metaphorice dicatur, tunc oportet quod metaphora reducatur ad proprietatem, quia res non ponitur in genere per id quod de eo metaphorice dicitur: sicut non dicitur quod Apostoli sint in genere qualitatis, quia eis dictum est *Matt* V, 14, *Vos estis lux mundi*. Nec poterit aliquid in quarta specie qualitatis inveniri quod sit in anima secundum proprietatem. Unde character de quo loquimur non potest fundari supra qualitatem quartae speciei.

Et ideo quidam dicunt quod est in tertia specie qualitatis, eo quod sensui spirituali infert quandam mulcebrem passionem, inquantum animam ornat et decorat.

Sed hoc iterum non potest stare, quia sicut probat Philosophus in VII *Phys*. (244b 14 - 245a 5) tertia species qualitatis non est nisi in sensibili parte animae. Character autem a nullo ponitur in hac parte animae, sed in intellectiva. Et praeterea illae qualitates semper habent ordinem ad aliquam transmutationem corporalem, vel quam inferunt, vel a qua causantur.

Et ideo alii dicunt quod est in prima specie qualitatis, et est quasi media inter dispositionem et habitum. Inquantum est difficile mobilis, convenit cum habitu, inquantum autem non est ultima perfectio, sed ad gratiam disponit, cum dispositione convenit.

Sed hoc non potest stare, quia, secundum Philosophum in II *Eth*. *habitus est quo habemus nos ad passiones bene vel male*. Et universaliter consideranti haec apparet differentia inter habitum et potentiam, quia potentia est qua possumus aliquid simpliciter, habitus autem quo possumus illud bene vel male: sicut intellectus quo consideramus, scientia qua bene consideramus, concupiscibilis qua concupiscimus, temperantia qua bene concupiscimus, intemperantia qua male. Et similiter est de *dispositione*, quia dispositio nihil aliud est quam quidam habitus incompletus. Cum ergo character ordinetur ad aliquid simpliciter, non ad illud bene vel male, quia sacerdos potest conficere bene vel male, non potest esse quod qualitas supra quam fundatur relatio characteris sit habitus, sed magis potentia.

Unde relinquitur quod non sit in prima specie qualitatis; sed magis reducitur ad secundam, ut quidam alii dicunt. Et hoc sic patet. Sicut enim cujuslibet existentis in aliqua natura, sunt aliquae operationes propriae, ita etiam in spirituali vita regenerati, ut Dionysius dicit in 2 c. *Eccles. Hier.*. Ubicumque autem sunt operationes propriae, oportet quod sint principia propria illarum operationum. Unde sicut in aliis rebus sunt potentiae naturales ad proprias operationes, ita etiam renati ad vitam spiritualem habent quasdam potentias, secundum quod possunt illa opera...

Ad secundum dicendum quod reducitur ad secundam speciem qualitatis, et est aliud modus ab illo quem Philosophus ibi ponit; quia Philosophus non cognoscebat nisi operationes naturales, et ita nonnisi potentias naturales. Constat autem quod apud nos oportet ponere potentias spirituales, sicut potentiam conficiendi et absolvendi et hujusmodi, et quod ad secundam speciem qualitatis reducantur: sicut habitus infusi in eadem specie qualitatis sunt cum habitibus naturalibus vel acquisitis.[27]

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[27]*Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio IV, Quaestio I, Art. 1, Responsio & Ad 2

This text also is interesting because of Aristotle's remark that there might be other species of quality besides the four he has distinguished? How are we to understand *tropos* at 10a 25?[28] Thomas takes the division into four as complete in the above text on character.

Could understanding be also in the first species of quality?

DIVISION OF CHAPTER EIGHT: QUALITY

Quality in itself
- The definition of quality (or howness)

- The forms or species of quality (howness)
  - The four forms of quality
    - Habit and disposition
      - They are under one species of quality
      - Their difference shown
      - How one is called the other
    - Natural ability or inability
    - Undergoing qualities and undergoings
      - They are a third genus
      - Examples
      - Showing that they are qualities
      - Why they are called *undergoing* qualities
      - The distinction between undergoing qualities and undergoings
    - Figure and form

  - Are there other tropoi of quality?

- *How* (*poios* or*qualis*) is said denominatively from the above

Quality in its properties
- Have contrary (but not all) and they are in same genus
- Said more or less (except especially figure)
- Like and unlike (strict property)

Quality in comparison to toward something
- Objection about quality and toward something

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[28] This does not necessarily mean other species. See for example the two tropoi of habit, in the beginning of the *Parts of Animals*, 639a 2-3.

Reply to objection (genus and species and the rules of chapter 3)
Putting same in two genera.

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LAST 6 CATEGORIES - CHAPTER 9

Chapter Nine is very brief and our text may be incomplete.

What Aristotle does first in the text we have is to point out how to act upon and to undergo admit of contraries and more and less. This shows the connection between to act upon and to undergo with quality. Since where and when and to be laid out are connected with place and time which are quantities, we can see one reason why they are placed before to act upon and to undergo. Having or to be outfitted has a likeness to both and is therefore placed rightly in the middle.

Then there is a reference to an earlier text where Aristotle says that the Greek word for *to be laid out* is said denominatively from position (like if we were to say to be positioned).

Aristotle then exemplifies where, when, and to have or to be outfitted.

Finally, Aristotle says that enough has been said about the genera laid down before (in Chapter Four).

Where is put before *when* because time is more extrinsic than place. But why is *to be laid out*, which is the order of parts in place, put after *when?* Since both where and to be laid out are connected with place (and when, with time), why is to be laid out not put next to where instead of after when. Perhaps the reason given by Thomas why there is no highest genus to when like to be laid out is to where gives us a clue. Since time is the number of the before and after in motion, order is more in the definition of time than in the definition of place. So there is another highest genus for the order of parts in place, but no other highest genus for the order of parts in time since this is already included in the understanding of time. Thus to be laid out is like where in that it is *in place* and like when insofar as it involves *an order* of parts. Hence, like in the division of beings in chapter two, where Aristotle enumerated universal substance first and individual accident second and then universal accident (which is like universal substance in being said of another and like individual accident in existing in another), so here he orders to be laid out after the two that it resembles. In a

similar order in the book *About the Poetic Art*, Aristotle defines beginning, and then end, and last middle. (He speaks there as if beginning and end are contrary.) This order of enumeration gives us a more distinct knowledge of what is being enumerated. This order could also be involved in the placing of *to act upon* and *to undergo* after where, when, to be laid out, and to outfitted if we follow Thomas' exposition in the fifth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* that these four are taken from something wholly outside and to act upon and to undergo from something partly inside and partly outside. To act upon and to undergo would then have something like quantity and quality and toward something and something like where and when and to be laid out and to be outfitted.

The last six highest genera do not seem to be accidents in the same way as quantity, quality and toward something. Consider this text of Thomas:

> tempus comparatur ad unum tantum motum, sicut accidens ad subiectum; scilicet ad motum primi mobilis, quo mensurantur omnes alii motus.
>
> Ad alios autem motus comparatur sicut mensura ad mensuratum;
>
> sicut ulna comparatur ad virgam ligneam sicut ad subiectum, ad pannum autem qui per eam mensuratur, sicut ad mensuratum tantum;
>
> et ideo non sequitur quod unum accidens sit in multis subiectis.[1]

To be in time is to be measured by time, but is it something in the thing measured by time? Likewise, is to be in this room, something in me? And to be clothed, is that something in me? Consider this text of Thomas:

> Ea enim quae habenti aliquam naturam adveniunt nec tamen pertinent ad integritatem naturae illius, vel accidentia esse videntur, ut albedo et musica; vel accidentaliter se habere ad ipsum, sicut anulus, vestimentum, domus, et similia.[2]

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[1] *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. 9, Ad 11

[2] *Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber IV,Capitulum XLI*

Thomas here seems to distinguish between what are *accidentia* and what *accidentaliter se habere*. Although both relation and the last six involve something outside of us, the *beginning* of toward something is *in* us while the beginning of the last six is outside of us. But to act upon and to undergo seem more to be in the thing. Consider this text of Thomas:

> ...actio ex hoc quod est actio, consideratur ut ab agente; in quantum vero est accidens, consideratur ut in subjecto agente...subtracta materia, tollitur calefactio, liceat maneat calefactionis causa.[3]

When we say that some quantities are from parts that have position, does *position* mean the same as when we say that sitting and standing are positions? There is a difference between the order of parts in a whole and the order of parts in place.

If acting upon and undergoing are the same as motion (if the water *becoming hot* is in some way the same as the water *being heated* or the *heating* of the water), then why is not motion the category rather than acting upon and undergoing?

Perhaps motion does not introduce a new mode or way of denominating a thing, especially as far as what there is of motion in act in things. And perhaps what is added by reason is not in things which the *Categories* is about. Thus what is becoming hot is now warm and this denominates a substance as quality does.

In what category would understanding and loving and sensing be found?

Surely not in acting upon as Simplicius seems to put them. Although Aristotle gives as examples here of undergoing to be pleased and to be pained, he may be using here examples from Plato. Could understanding and loving and sensing be placed under disposition as another tropos? In the *De Anima* and in the seventh book of *Natural Hearing,* sensing and understanding are distinguished from alteration. And since act and ability are in the same genus,

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[3] *De Potentia*, Q. 7, Art. 9, Ad 7

the form by which reason knows can exist in full act when one actually understands and between full act and ability when possessed habitually. Does Thomas speak of this somewhere?

Appendix

Albert the Great, *Commentaria in De Praedicamenta Aristotelis*, Tractatus VI. Caput I, Laval ed., p. 179:

> Ad aliquid autem praedicat id quod est comparatum ad aliquid, qui modus immixtus est omnibus sex praedicamentis, et ideo ut principium ad alia praemitti debuit.
>
> Habita etiam qualitate et qualibus, quae etiam generalem modum praedicandi in quale habent, qui quodamodo inest omnibus aliis.
>
> Propterea etiam praemitti debuit, ut hic substantia praecederet ut omni subjectum, quantitas ut subjectum ad physicum, ad aliquid ut modus aliorum comparatus, quale autem et qualitas ut modum praedicandi dans residuis omnibus.
>
> Restat autem dicere de his quae non habent res absolutas praedicare nec modum praedicandi habent ab illis absolutum: habent enim modum relationis et qualitatis, et addunt aliquid super utrumque per quod efficiuntur specialia praedicamenta.
>
> Propter quod ipsa sex genera causantur ab aliis quatuor, quae praehabita sunt, et non causantur ab ipsis sicut inferiora causantur a superioribus, quia si hoc ita esset, continerentur in eis, sicut in suis generibus, sed causantur ex comparationibus supradictorum generum ad aliud....

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THE FOUR KINDS OF OPPOSITE - CHAPTER 10

The first three post-predicaments are connected. Opposition is the basis of formal distinction and distinction is before order which consists in a before and after. Since nothing is before or after itself, there is always some distinction between what is before and what is after. Reason therefore always sees some distinction before it sees a before and after.[1] The third post-predicament is the word *together*, what is neither before nor after. And there is the same knowledge of opposites.

The distinction and order of the highest genera has been found in what has gone before. But we also want to see the basis for the distinction and order of genera and species under the highest genera. Genera and species are distinguished by *opposition* and a genus is *before* its species but the species into which a genus is immediately divided are *together*. So the distinction and placing of genera and species are connected with these three post-predicaments. The logic of the *Categories* is giving the basis for this although it will be the work of other forms of reasoned out knowledge to complete this.

This chapter can be divided into three parts. In the first part, Aristotle briefly enumerates or names the four kinds of opposites and exemplifies each. In the second part, he considers each kind of opposite in particular. In the third part, he considers the differences of these opposites not already shown in the particular consideration of them.

In the first part, he names the opposites which are those toward something or relatives, contraries, lack and having, and affirmation and negation. He then exemplifies each.

In the second part, he considers each kind in particular. And first those said toward something. Aristotle here points out something that separates this kind of opposites from the other three kinds. They are said to be of each other or in some other way toward each other. Thus father is the father of his son

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[1] We see also in the fifth book of *Wisdom* that Aristotle also takes up *opposition* and *before* together in the same order. Hence, also Anaxagoras attributed to the greater mind both the distinction of things and their order.

and the son is the son of his father. But contraries like virtue and vice are not said to be of each other. A virtue is not the virtue of a vice or a vice, the vice of a virtue. Likewise, sight is not the sight of blindness, or blindness, the blindness of sight. And affirmation is not the affirmation of negation, or negation, the negation of affirmation.

Contraries are not said to be of each other, but one is said to be contrary to the other. Some contraries have something between them and these are contraries where neither necessarily belongs to their subject. But other contraries have nothing in-between them and these are the contraries where one or the other must belong to their subject.

Lack and having are in the same subject, but not at the same time. A thing is said to lack something when it does not have what it should have and when it should have it. To lack and to have are not the same as the lack or the having, but are opposed in the same way.

The opposition of affirmation and negation is in speech, but what they are said of are opposed in the same way. These opposites can also be called *contradictories*.

In the third part of the chapter, Aristotle shows the differences between the four kinds of opposites that have not been show before. Since he has already shown a difference between relatives and contraries, he needs to show that lack and having are not opposed as relatives or as contraries; and then that affirmation and negation are opposed differently than all the other three.

Aristotle shows that lack and having are not opposed as those toward something in the same way that contraries are not relatives. Sight is not the sight of blindness and blindness is not the blindness of sight.

But that lack and having are not opposed as contraries is shown by Aristotle in two ways.

In the first way, he shows that in contraries that have a middle, one of the contraries does not necessarily belong to its subject while a subject either lacks what it should have or has it. And in the contraries that have no middle, some necessarily have one of the contraries (as fire is hot), which again is not true of lack and having.

The other way that Aristotle shows a difference between contraries and lack & having is that there is change between contraries in both directions (as a man becomes sick and then again healthy) while the man who become blind from seeing does not return to seeing from being blind.

Affirmation and negation are separated from the other three kinds of opposites because one of these is always true and the other false.

We can now consider some of these points at greater length.

In what order does Aristotle enumerate the four kinds of opposites?

Since towards something is one of the ten genera of predicates and has been considered at some length before, he begins from things opposed as relatives.

But this is not the order from what is most opposed to what is least opposed. This latter order would be exactly the reverse. When Aristotle enumerates the four kinds of cause, he begins from the cause most known (matter) and ends with the cause of the causality of all the others (the end or that for the sake of which). He begins in a way with what is least a cause.

Aristotle divides opposites into four kinds. However, it is difficult for our reason to understand fully a division or distinction into more than two or three. A logical and understandable division is usually into two or three.

In one text, Thomas divides the four kinds of opposites into two, dividing relatives against the other three:

> Primo enim dicit quot modis dicuntur opposita; quia quatuor modis; scilicet contradictoria, contraria, privatio et habitus, et ad aliquid.
>
> Aliquid enim contraponitur alteri vel opponitur aut ratione dependentiae, qua dependet ab ipso, et sic sunt opposita relative.
>
> Aut ratione remotionis, quia scilicet unum removet alterum quod quidem contingit tripliciter.

> Aut enim totaliter removet nihil relinquens, et sic est negatio.
>
> Aut relinquit subiectum solum, et sic est privatio.
>
> Aut relinquit subiectum et genus, et sic est contrarium. Nam contraria non sunt solum in eodem subiecto, sed etiam in eodem genere.[2]

Another logical and understandable way to divide the four is into two parts of two each. Thomas, in the this text, divides toward something and contraries against the last two:

> ...opposita reducuntur in idem genus in quo vel utrumque est per se, ut patet in contrariis et relativis; vel unum est per se et alterum per reductionem, ut patet in privatione et habitu, et affirmatione et negatione; unde habitum est in XXVIII dist. I libri ab Augustino, quod in eodem genere est genitus et non genitus...
>
> ...peccatum omissionis non est peccatum originale, sed actuale; nec dicitur actuale quasi in aliquo actu existat, sed quia ad genus actus reducitur cujus negatio est; sicut Augustinus ingenitum in genere relationis ponit, ut habitum est in I libro, dist. XXVIII, et iterum sicut actus est in potestate voluntatis, ita et negatio ejus.[3]

We could divide contradiction against the other three. One way in which contradiction can be distinguished from the rest is because in it *non importatur aliqua convenientia*. (Aristotle in the text also points out another reason for distinguishing contradiction from the others: one must be true and other false about anything). From this it follows that the opposition of affirmation and negation is the first and greatest opposition and the cause of all opposition and distinction, as Thomas teaches us:

> affirmatio et negatio dicuntur maxime opponi, quia in eis non importatur aliqua convenientia: in privative enim oppositis importatur convenientia quantum ad subjectum, quia nata sunt fieri

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[2] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XII, n. 922

[3] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum* , Distinctio XXXV, Quaest. I, Art. III, Ad 1 & Ad 2

> circa idem: in contrariis autem et relativis etiam quantum ad genus, quia scilicet sunt in eodem genere. Unde in utraque oppositione utrumque extremorum significatur per modum entis et naturae cujusdam.
>
> Illud autem in quo invenitur aliquid non permixtum contrario, est maximum et primum in genere illo, et causa omnium aliorum; et ideo oppositio affirmationis et negationis, cui non admiscetur aliqua convenientia, est prima et maxima oppositio, et causa omnis oppositionis et distinctionis; et ideo oportet quod in qualibet alia oppositione includatur affirmatio et negatio, sicut primum in posteriori. Unde plura requiruntur ad alias oppositiones quam ad oppositionem contradictionis, quia se habent ex additione ad ipsam.
>
> Unde non oportet quod, si contrarietas non inveniatur nisi in diversis realiter, quod affirmatio et negatio inveniatur in diversis realiter [in obj,: essentia non est generans, Pater est generans, ergo they are not the same] immo sufficit etiam distinctio rationis ad affirmationem et negationem, cum quaelibet distinctio, ut dictum est, includat affirmationem et negationem: et talis distinctio, scilicet rationis, est inter essentiam et personam. Sed opposita relative aliquando requirunt diversitatem vel distinctionem realem: et talia sunt quae divinas personas distinguunt; aliquando autem distinctionem rationis tantum, ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem.[4]

We could also divide into three by no agreement, agree in subject and agree in subject and genus.

We should also note that affirmation and negation are included in every opposition:

> Impossibile quod dicitur secundum nullam potentiam, sed secundum se ipsum, dicitur ratione discoherentiae terminorum. Omnis autem discoherentia terminorum est in ratione alicuius oppositionis; in omni autem oppositione includitur affirmatio et negatio, ut probatur X *Metaph.*; unde in omni tali impossibili implicatur affirmationem et negationem esse simul.[5]

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[4] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist V, Q. I, Art I, Ad 1

[5] Thomas Aquinas, *De Potentia*, Q. I, Art. 3, corpus

And in another text:

> contradictio includitur in omnibus aliis tamquam prius et simplicus. Opposita secundum quodcumque oppositionis genus impossibile est simul existere. Quod quidem contingit ex hoc, quod alterum oppositorum de sui ratione habet negationem alterius. Sicut de ratione caeci est quod non sit videns. Et de ratione nigri quod non sit album. Et similiter de ratione filii est quod non sit pater eius cuius est filius.[6]

What is the order of the four kinds of opposite?

Aristotle would seem to order the four kinds of opposites by their likeness and difference. But why begin with relatives rather than contradiction? One reason is because he has already had a chapter on toward something. Again, because one opposite is said to be the opposite of another, there is something like toward something in all opposites. Moreover, this post-predicament is ordered to distinguishing species and genera under the highest genus where they belong, and only relatives and contraries can be species or genera.

Substance and accident were distinguished in chapter two by contradictories. Species are distinguished by contraries more in quality than in quantity and substance where we divide by contradictories:

> naturaliter loquendo de genere et differentia, oportet differentias esse contrarias: nam materia super quam fundatur natura generis, est susceptiva contrariorum formarum.
>
> Secundum autem considerationem logicam sufficit qualiscumque oppositio in differentiis; sicut patet in differentiis numerorum, in quibus non est contrarietas; et similiter est in spiritualibus substantiis.[7]

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[6] *In X Metaphysicorum*, Lectio VI, n. 2041

[7] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio Disputata de Anima*, Art. 7, Ad 18

Appendix

DIVISION OF CHAPTER TEN: THE FOUR KINDS OF OPPOSITE

Brief distinction of four kinds of opposites
- Enumeration of the four kinds (Notice tà & one word only in first two)
- The four kinds exemplified

Each kind considered in particular
- Towards something - said of each other
- Contraries
  - Not said of each other, but one the contrary of the other
  - Some have an intermediary and some do not
- Lack and having
  - Both in same subject (but not at same time)
  - When a thing is said to lack in strict sense
  - To lack and to have not the same as the lack or having, but opposed in same way
- As affirmation and negation
  - (the things?) under affirmation and negation are not aff. and neg. but are opposed in the same way

The differences of the opposites (not already shown)
- Lack and having
  - Not opposed as relatives or towards something (Not said of one another or turned around)
  - Not opposed as contraries
    - Shown from contraries having and not having a middle
    - Shown from change between contraries
- Affirmation and negation - shown from one of these always true and other false

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CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONTRARIETY IN PARTICULAR

This chapter is divided into three parts. In the first part, Aristotle considers contraries in themselves. In the second part, he considers contraries in comparison to their subject. And in the third part, he considers contraries in comparison to genera.

In the first part, Aristotle considers whether a thing has only one contrary (if it has a contrary); and whether it is necessary if one contrary exists, that the other one also exists. The first of these seems to have an exception in vices, because not only is vice the contrary of virtue, but the vice in excess to the vice in defect. (There is something like this in statements when the contrary statements *every man is sitting* and *no man is sitting* are also opposed to the true statement.) As regards the second point, health could be without sickness, unlike relatives where double could not be without half being.

In the second part, Aristotle considers that two contraries cannot belong to the same subject at the same time. Socrates cannot both be healthy and sick at the same time. But contraries are in the same subject for health and sickness are both found in the body although not at the same time.

In the third part, Aristotle shows a threefold distinction of contraries in comparison to genera. Contraries may be in the same genus (as virtue and vice are in habit) or in contrary genera (as justice and injustice may be in virtue and vice) or they may be contrary genera (as good and bad).

We often say that contradictories have nothing in common; lack and having have a subject in common; but contraries have both a subject and a genus in common. And this as regards contraries is brought out in the second and third parts of this chapter. But there is some distinction among contraries as to how they are to genera.

Socrates in the *Protagoras* tries to show by induction that something is contrary to only one. If contraries are the species furthest apart in the same genus, it seems that a species can be contrary to only one. But there is the example of vice being opposed both to the virtue (which is in the middle) and to the vice which is at the opposite extreme. However, perhaps the third part of

this chapter can come to our rescue. Perhaps vice is opposed to virtue and to vice, but not in the same genus. Virtue and vice are contrary in the same genus which is habit. And courage, for example, is in the genus of virtue and both cowardice or cowardliness and foolhardiness are in the genus vice. Courage, then, by reason of its genus is contrary to both cowardliness and foolhardiness insofar as both are opposed to right reason. In that sense it is contrary to one because it is contrary to both insofar as they have something one in common which is to be opposed to right reason. But in the genus vice, cowardliness and foolhardiness are contraries.

Are good and bad opposed as contraries or as having and lack?

The following text of Thomas clearly distinguishes the two main ways in which good and bad can be opposed:

> Ad secundum dicendum, quod si consideretur malum per se sive in abstracto, sic malum opponitur bono ut privatio; si autem consideretur malum per accidens, sicut est in actione vel habitu, sic opponitur bono ut contrarium, ut prodigalitas liberalitati, et timiditas fortitudini.[1]

The following text more fully distinguishes the two main ways in which good and bad can be opposed:

> Ad secundum dicendum, quod si consideretur malum per se sive in abstracto, sic malum opponitur bono ut privatio; si autem consideretur malum per accidens, sicut est in actione vel habitu, sic opponitur bono ut contrarium, ut prodigalitas liberalitati, et timiditas fortitudini.[2]

Are good and bad opposed as contraries or as having and lack? Thomas illuminates this:

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[1] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum* , Distinctio XXXIV, Quaest. I, Art. II, Utrum malum sit quoddam ens positive, Ad 2

[2] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum* , Distinctio XXXIV, Quaest. I, Art. II, Utrum malum sit quoddam ens positive, Ad 2

> In malis ergo hoc modo dictis est talis ordo, quod id quod est per se malum, primo dicitur, et omnia alia per relationem ad id; et secundum gradum tenet malum per accidens, quod est subiectum mali quod dicitur malum ex hoc quod privationem quae per se malum est, in se habet; et in tertio gradu est id quod dicitur malum per accidens sicut causa inducens malum; hoc enim non habet in se de necessitate privationem, sed facit aliquid esse privationem habens.
>
> Unde primum dicitur absolute malum, et secundum in ordine ad primum, et tertium in ordine ad secundum.
>
> Dicendum ergo quod malum nominat non ens. Unde illud quod quod per se malum est non ponit aliquid, sed dicitur esse ut privatio. Malum vero quod est subiectum privationis est aliquid positive, sed non ex eo quod malum est, sicut oculus est aliquid, sed non ex eo quod caecus est: quia caecitas non est in eo nisi ut negatio visionis. Quod autem dicitur malum ut causa mali, in se quidem consideratum, est aliquid; sed in ordine ad effectum, ratione cujus malum dicitur, etiam privative dicitur. Dicitur enim malum ex hoc quod privationem inducit, et sic etiam ratio non entis in ipsum redundat causaliter, sicut et ratio mali.[3]

In the following text of Thomas, we learn that the lack which is the first sense of the bad is a *being of reason*, and yet it is still said to be in things:

> 19. Praeterea, si bonitas non esset aliquid, nihil esset bonum. Ergo similiter si malitia non est aliquid, nihil est malum. Sed constat multa mala esse. Ergo malitia aliquid est.
>
> Ad decimumnonum dicendum, quod ens dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo secundum quod significat naturam decem generum; et sic neque malum neque aliqua privatio est ens neque aliquid.
>
> Alio modo secundum quod respondetur ad quaestionem an est; et sic malum est, sicut et caecitas est.

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[3] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum* , Distinctio XXXIV, Quaest. I, Art. II, Utrum malum sit quoddam ens positive, Solutio

> Non tamen malum est aliquid; quia esse aliquid non solum significat quod respondetur ad quaestionem an est, sed etiam quod respondetur ad quaestionem quid est.
>
> 20 Sed dicendum, quod malum non est ens naturae aut moris, sed ens rationis. Sed contra est quod Philosophus dicit in VI Metaphysicorum, quod bonum et malum sunt in rebus, sed verum et falsum sunt in intellectu. Ergo malum non est ens rationis tantum, sed est aliquid in rebus naturalibus.
>
> Ad vicesimum dicendum, quod malum quidem est in rebus, sed ut privatio, non autem ut aliquid reale; sed in ratione est ut aliquid intellectum: et ideo potest dici, quod malum est ens rationis et non rei, quia in intellectu est aliquid, non autem in re; et hoc ipsum quod est esse intellectum, secundum quod aliquid dicitur ens rationis, est bonum; bonum enim est aliquid intelligi.[4]

Are good and bad contraries with an intermediate (esp. in moral matter)? Thomas points out a distinction in answering this question:

> 1. Videtur quod aliqua actio indifferens inveniatur in actibus humanis. Nihil enim potest esse medium inter bonum et malum, nisi indifferens, quod neque bonum neque malum est. Sed bonum et malum sunt contraria mediata, ut in *Praedicamentis* dicitur. Ergo aliqua actio est indifferens
>
> Ad primum ergo dicendum...quod Philosophus appelat malum non omnem actum inordinatum, sed solum illum qui nocivus est respectu alterius; unde dicit in IV *Ethic., cap. XV, quod prodigus, quia causa iactantiae sua inordinate expendit, non est malus sed vanus:* et similiter de multis aliis vitiis dicit; et sic patet quod ipse strictius accipit malum quam nos dicentes omnem actum inordinatum esse malum.[5]

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[4] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*. Q. I, Art. 1, Utrum malum sit aliquid, Objs. 19 & 20 and Ad 19 & 20

[5] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XL, Quaest. I, Art. 5, Obj. 1 & Ad 1

Like the above consideration of whether good and bad can be contraries is the question whether good and bad can be contrary *differences:*

> Ad tertium dicendum, quod malum per se vel abstracte sumptum non est differentia specifica; sed malum per accidens vel concrete acceptum; omnia enim moralia ex fine speciem consequuntur. Ex ordine autem ad debitum finem specificatur bona actio et bonus habitus, ratione cujus bonum differentia specifica ponitur habitus et actionis moralis; mala vero actio specificatur ex ordine ad finem indebitum, cui admiscetur privatio finis debiti, ex quo ratio mali incidit. Unde patet quod non sola privatio specificat malum habitum et actionem; sed positio ordinis ad finem quemdam cum privatione debiti finis; et sic patet quod malum, secundum quod differentia, non est malum per se, sed per accidens vel concretive sumptum.[6]

We can also ask the reverse question whether differences are contrary. Thomas teaches the following distinction in this regard:

> naturaliter loquendo de genere et differentia, oportet differentias esse contrarias: nam materia super quam fundatur natura generis, est susceptiva contrariorum formarum.
>
> Secundum autem considerationem logicam sufficit qualiscumque oppositio in differentiis; sicut patet in differentiis numerorum, in quibus non est contrarietas; et similiter est in spiritualibus substantiis.[7]

Aristotle speaks as if good and bad can be contrary genera. Is he speaking of genus strictly or in a looser sense? In the following text, Thomas distinguishes these two senses of *genus*, and answers the question according to each:

> Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod genus dupliciter potest accipi. Uno modo proprie, prout praedicatur de pluribus in eo quod quid est, et sic neque bonum neque malum sunt genera, sed sunt in transcendentibus quia bonum et ens convertuntur. Alio modo

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[6] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum* , Distinctio XXXIV, Quaest. I, Art. II, Utrum malum sit quoddam ens positive, Ad 3

[7] *Quaestio Disputata de Anima*, Art. 7, Ad 18

> communiter, ut genus dicatur omne id quod sua communitate multa ambit et continet, et sic bonum et malum dicuntur genera omnium contrariorum: quia, ut In I *Physic*., text. 80, dicitur omnia contraria hoc modo se habent, quod alterum est nobilius et alterum vilius; et ideo illud quod est vilius privationem in se includit, sicut nigrum in respectu ad album, et frigidum in respectu ad calidum: propter quod in I *De generat*. text. 18, dicitur, quod frigus est privatio caloris; et per hunc modum semper alterum contrarium pertinet ad bonum, et reliquum ad malum; unde etiam Pythagoras ponebat duos ordines rerum: unum boni, sub quo colligebat omnia perfecta, ut dextrum, triangulam, aequilaterum et similia; et alterum mali, sub quo ponebat omnia quae imperfectionem implicant, ut sinistrum, feminam et hujusmodi.[8]

And in another text on whether good and bad can be contrary genera, Thomas discusses the end of this chapter where Aristotle seems to affirm this:

> 11. Praeterea, quod non est aliquid, non potest esse genus, quia non entis non sunt species, ut dicit Philosophus IV Physic. Sed malum est genus: dicitur enim in Praedicamentis, quod bonum et malum non sunt in genere, sed sunt genera aliorum. Ergo malum est aliquid.
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> Ad undecimum dicendum, quod verbum illud Philosophi difficultatem habet, quia si malum et bonum non sunt in genere, sed sunt genera, cassatur decem Praedicamentorum distinctio;
>
> et ideo, ut Simplicius dicit in Commento Praedicamentorum, quidam solventes dixerunt, quod verbum Philosophi sic est intelligendum, quod bonum et malum sunt genera contrariorum, scilicet virtutis et vitii, non tamen sunt in genere contrario, sed in qualitate. Sed expositio haec non videtur conveniens, quia istud tertium membrum non differt a primo quod ponit, scilicet quod quaedam contraria sunt in uno genere.
>
> Unde Porphyrius dixit, quod contrariorum quaedam sunt univoca, et ista sunt vel in uno genere proximo, ut album et nigrum in genere

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[8] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum* , Distinctio XXXIV, Quaest. I, Art. II, Utrum malum sit quoddam ens positive, Ad 1

coloris, quod est primum membrum divisionis ab Aristotele positum; vel in contrariis generibus proximis, sicut castitas et impudicitia, quae sunt sub virtute et vitio, quod est secundum membrum; quaedam vero sunt aequivoca, sicut bonum quod circuit omnia genera, sicut et ens, et similiter malum; et ideo bonum et malum dixit non esse nec in uno genere nec in pluribus, sed ipsa esse genera, prout genus potest dici id quod genera transcendit, sicut ens et unum.

Simplicius vero ponit duas alias solutiones: quarum una est, quod bonum et malum dicuntur genera contrariorum, in quantum unum contrariorum est defectivum respectu alterius, sicut nigrum respectu albi, et amarum respectu dulcis; et sic omnia contraria quodammodo reducuntur ad bonum et malum, prout omnis defectus pertinet ad rationem mali. Unde in I Physic. dicitur, quod semper contraria comparantur ad invicem ut melius et peius.

Alia solutio est, quod Aristoteles dixit hoc secundum opinionem Pythagorae qui posuit duos ordines rerum; quorum unus comprehenditur sub bono, et alius sub malo. Multoties enim in logica utitur exemplis non veris secundum opinionem propriam, sed probabilibus secundum aliorum opinionem.

Et sic patet secundum praedicta quod non oportet ponere quod malum sit aliquid.[9]

Can contrariety be found properly in every genus?

Manifestum est enim quod propriae passiones causantur ex principiis subiecti, quae sunt materia et forma. Si igitur propriae passiones ignis et aquae sunt contrariae, cum contrariorum sint contrariae causae, videtur quod formae substantiales sint contrariae. Item in X *Metaphys*. probatur quod omne genus dividitur per contrarias differentias: differentiae autem sumuntur a formis, ut in VIII eiusdem libri habetur.

Dicendum est igitur quod contrarietas differentiarum, quae est in omnibus generibus, attenditur secundum communem radicem

[9] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, Q. I, Art. 1, Obj. 11 & Ad 11

contrarietatis, quae quidem est excellentia et defectus, ad quam oppositionem omnia contraria reducuntur, ut in primo huius habitum est. Omnes enim differentiae dividentes aliquod genus, hoc modo se habent, quod una earum est ut abundans, et alia ut deficiens respectu alterius. Propter quod Aristoteles dicit in VIII *Metaphys.*, quod definitiones rerum sunt sicut numeri, quorum species variantur per additionem et subtractionem unitatis.

Non tamen oportet quod in quolibet genere sit contrarietas secundum propriam rationem huius et illius speciei; sed solum secundum communem rationem excellentiae et defectus. Quia enim contraria sunt quae maxime distant, oportet quod in quocumque genere invenitur contrarietas, quod inveniantur duo termini maxime distantes, inter quos cadunt omnia quae sunt illius generis.

Nec hoc sufficeret ad hoc quod in illo genere esset motus, nisi de uno extremo in aliud contingeret continue pervenire.

In quibusdam ergo generibus hae duae conditiones desunt, ut patet in numeris. Quamvis enim omnes species numerorum differant secundum excellentiam et defectum; tamen non est accipere duo extrema maxime distantia in illo genere: est enim accipere minimum numerum, scilicet dualitatem, non tamen maximum. Similiter inter species numerorum non est continuitas; quia quaelibet species numerorum formaliter perficitur per unitatem, quae indivisibilis est, et alteri unitati non continua. Et similiter etiam est in genere substantiae.....

In qualitatibus autem tertiae speciei manifeste apparet contrarietas secundum utramque rationem: et quia qualitates possunt intendi et remitti, ut sic possit esse continuus motus de qualitate in qualitatem; et quia invenitur maxima distantia in uno genere inter duo determinata extrema, sicut in coloribus inter album et nigrum, in saporibus inter dulce et amarum.

In quantitate autem et loco, alterum istorum manifeste invenitur, scilicet continuitas: sed aliud, scilicet maxima distantia determinatorum extremorum, non invenitur in eis, si secundum communem rationem quantitatis et loci accipiantur; sed solum secundum quod accipiuntur in aliqua re determinata; sicut in aliqua

> specie animalis vel plantae est aliqua minima quantitas, a qua incipit motus augmenti, et aliqua maxima, ad quam terminatur. Similiter etiam in loco inveniuntur duo termini maxime distantes per comparationem ad motum aliquem, a quorum uno incipit motus, et in aliud terminatur, sive sit motus naturalis sive violentus.[10]

Every genus is divided by contrary differences communiter loquendo. All differences have themselves in this way, that one excels and the other is deficient. But is this lack strictly speaking? "a beast, no more". But does two lack something which three has? This is not a lack in the strict sense. For two should not have another or third unit.

Appendix

DIVISION OF CHAPTER ELEVEN: CONTRARIETY IN PARTICULAR

Contraries in themselves
- Whether a thing has only one contrary (when it has a contrary)
- The existence of contraries - not necessary if one contrary is, the other is

Contraries in comparison to their subject
- Two contraries cannot belong to the same at the same time
- Contraries are about the same or have the same subject

Contraries in comparison to genera: contraries are in the same genus or in
- contrary genera or are contrary genera

[The above division corresponds to the understanding of contraries in their *convenientia:* they have a common subject and a common genus]

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[10]*n V Physicorum*, Lectio III, nn. 663-665

BEFORE - CHAPTER 12

A CARRYING OVER FROM GREEK INTO ENGLISH OF CHAPTER TWELVE

One thing is said to be *before* another in four ways.

First and most strictly according to time, by which one thing is older and more ancient than another. For something is said to be older or more ancient in that its time has been longer.

Second, that whose existence does not follow reversibly, as one is before two. If two exists, it follows right away that one exists; but if one exists, it is not necessary that two exist; so that the existence of the other does not follow reversibly from the one. Thus the *before* is such that from it, existence does not follow reversibly.

In a third way, *before* is said according to a certain order, as in the sciences and speeches. The order of before and after belongs to the demonstrative sciences: the elements are in order before the diagrams; and in grammar, the letters are before the syllables. Likewise, in speeches, the proemium comes in order before the narration.

Further, besides the aforesaid, the better and more honorable seems to be before by nature. For even the many say that those honored or loved by them come *before* with them. But this is perhaps the strangest of the ways.

Before would seem to be said in that many ways.

There would seem to be another way *before* is said in addition to the above. Of those things whose existence follows reversibly, the cause in whatever manner of existence to the other would reasonably be said to be before by nature. That there are such things is clear. The existence of a man follows reversibly in existence to the true statement about him. For if a man exists, the statement by which we say the man exists is true. But the true statement is in no way a cause of the thing being, but the thing being would seem to be a cause in some way of the statement being true. For the statement is said to be true or false as the thing is or is not.

Thus, one thing is said to be *before* another in five ways.

Aristotle distinguishes the four *central* senses of the word *before* in this chapter and then he brings in a "fifth" sense of *before*. I say *'fifth"* sense because this sense is *not fifth in order*, nor is it one of the four central senses of the word *before*. But it is the *crowning* sense of the word *before*.

The first sense of *before* is in time: today is before tomorrow and yesterday is before today.

The second sense of *before* is in being. This is said to be before that when this can be without that, but not vice-versa. Thus one is before two and bricks are before a brick wall.

The third sense of *before* is in the discourse of reason. Thus in geometry, the definitions are before the postulates and the beginnings are before the demonstrations.

The fourth sense of *before* is better. Man is before beast in this sense.

Aristotle seems to have completed his task at this point. He has distinguished in order the central senses of *before* (not all the senses, but the central senses). But then he adds another sense. The cause is said to be *before* the effect even if they are together in time. This is the crowning sense of *before* since the end of reason is to know what and why and that is to know the cause.

This sense is not fifth in order for it is more like the second sense than the fourth. But because it is the chief sense of the wise man, it can be placed with the central senses as one of the chief senses. Thus there are five chief senses of the word *before*.

In this text, Thomas defines order by before and after and points out that distinction is presupposed to order:

> ordo in ratione sua includit...rationem prioris et posterioris; unde secundum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo aliquorum secundum quos aliquis altero prius dicitur et secundum locum et secundum tempus et secundum omnia huiusmodi.
>
> Includit etiam distinctionem quia non est ordo aliquorum nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc magis praesupponit nomen ordinis quam significet.[1]

Since nothing is before or after itself, one must see some distinction between what is before and what is after before one can see that one is before or after the other. This also shows, as we have said before, why opposites, the basis of formal distinction, are placed immediately before the word *before* both here in the *Categories* and in the fifth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*.

Aristotle does not distinguish all the senses of *before*, but its *central* senses. The word *before* is a word equivocal by reason. Like the word *beginning* which is the first word in the fifth book of *Wisdom,* or the word *in* or *to be in* in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing,* the word *before* is equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios. The first meaning in each is based on the most known ratio and the other meanings are ordered by their greater or lesser likeness to the first meaning. But when another meaning is so like the first meaning that it is not a step towards the second meaning (that is, being more like it than the first meaning) it is attached to the first meaning from the side rather than in a straight line forward to the second. This can be seen in Thomas' explanation of the word *in* in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* and his explanation of the word *beginning* in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics.* In both commentaries, Thomas explains that there are other senses of the word besides those given by Aristotle. But these should be reduced to one of those given because of a close likeness. Thus *in time* is reduced to *in place* and the beginning of motion or time to beginning of a magnitude. Likewise, to some of the later meanings there may be others that can be attached to them on the side. Aristotle subtly gives us the central meanings of these words, but there are other meanings, which can be led back to one or another of these central meanings.

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[1] *Scriptum super Lib.I Sententiarum*, Dist. XX, Quaest. I, Art. III, Solutio I

The first meaning or sense of a word equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios is the ratio most known and this is the one closest to the senses where all our knowledge begins.

Since as the Poet says in *Troilus and Cressida,* "Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs", clearly the before and after in motion is most known to us. And since time is defined by this before and after (while motion is defined by act and ability), the first central sense of before and after is that in time as Aristotle teaches us here. (This is also connected with the reason Thomas gives for two genera of predicates from place and only one from time.) But to this central sense could be led back the before and after in motion and in the magnitude over which something moves. The closeness of the before and after in time, in motion and in place is seen in the similes of the Poet in one of his sonnets:

> Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore
> So do our minutes hasten to their end
> Each changing place with that which goes before
> In sequent toil all forwards do contend.

The second sense of *before* is in being. This sense can also be seen in the sensible world, but is less striking because things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. Aristotle takes a mathematical example to show that this second sense is different from the first for there is no motion in mathematical things. Yet this sense is still sensible. Bricks can be without a brick wall, but not vice-versa. Moreover, what is before in being is usually in our world before in time also, as the bricks are before the brick wall both in time and in being. But what is before in being need not also be before in time. If I print by pen the word *cat*, the letter *c* would be before the word *cat* both in time and in being. But if I had a stamp with *cat* on it, the letter and the word would come to be at the same time on the paper. Yet *c* would still be before *cat* in being. If I cut slices of bread from a loaf with a knife, one slice is before two and two before three in time as well as in being. But if they slice it in a machine at the bakery, the loaf goes from no slices to fourteen or fifteen all at once. Nevertheless, two would still be before three in being

Thomas notes the connection of time and number with order together in this text:

> Rationem autem tam temporis quam numeri sequitur ordo, quia una species numeri naturaliter est alia prior et tempus est etiam numerus motuum secundum prius et posterius.[2]

The third central sense of *before* is in the discourse of reason as Aristotle's examples show. This is not in the sensible world like what is before in being can be. But it has a real likeness to before in being. Just as some things can be without other things, but not vice-versa, so likewise some things can be known without knowing other things, but not vice versa. I can know what a stone is without knowing that *a dog is not a stone*, but not vice-versa. I can know what a number is without knowing what a perfect number is, but not vice-versa. Thus knowing *what a stone is* is before knowing that *a stone is not a dog* and knowing *what a number is* is before knowing *what a perfect number is.*

To this third *central* sense is reduced any before and after in our knowledge.

The fourth central sense of *before* is before in goodness or better. This comes last for it is much unlike the other senses. What is better is often after in the other three senses. What is before in generation is imperfect and comes under what is before in time. The brick wall or brick house is better than the bricks and the word is better than the letters. Reason guess before it knows and thinks about something before understanding, but it is better to know than to guess and to understand something than to think about it. Hence, it is easier to pun on this sense and the first sense (or a sense attached to the first) for they are so far apart. In Helena's confession to the countess, Shakespeare puns on the fourth sense of *before* and a sense attached to the first (just as the pun "I see said the blind man, but he couldn't see at all" puns on the first and last senses of *see)*:

> Then I confess,
> Here on my knee, before high heaven and you
> That before you, and next unto high heaven,
> I love your son

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[2] *In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, Caput IV, Lectio III, n. 310

We can now ask the tongue-twister question. In which sense of *before* is one sense of *before* before another sense?

Since we name things as we know them or are at least aware of them, the order in naming clearly follows the order in knowing. Therefore, one sense of *before* comes before another sense in the third central sense of *before*.

After Aristotle has distinguished in order the four central senses of the word *before* and seems to be done, he adds another sense of *before.* Is this fifth sense fifth in order? I do not think so for then it would be more like the fourth sense than any other sense. The sense in which the cause is said to be before the effect is most like the second sense of before. Consider this text of Thomas:

> illud a quo non convertitur consequentia essendi, est naturaliter prius et quodammodo principium.
>
> Sed unum est huiusmodi quia *sine uno non* invenitur aliqua *multitudo*, sed invenitur aliquod *unum* absque omni *multitudine*.
>
> Unum igitur est prius omni multitudine et principium eius.
>
> Cuius signum apparet in numeris, quia *unitas* est *ante omnem numerum*, qualitercumque multiplicetur.[3]

As the effect depends upon the cause, so also what is after in being also depends upon what is before in being.

Aristotle takes an example of a cause which is together in time and being with its effect to show that this sense of *before* is different from before in being or before in time. But a cause may precede its effect in time or duration when it causes its effect by some motion:

> Fuit autem difficile considerare generationem Filii Patri coaeternam, propter assuefactionem humanae cognitionis in consideratione productionis rerum naturalium, in quibus una res ab alia per motum producitur;

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[3]*In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, Caput XIII, Lectio II, n. 977

> Res autem producta per motum in esse prius esse incipit in principio quam in termino motus.
>
> Cum autem principium motus de necessitate terminum motus duratione praecedat, quod necesse est propter motus successionem, nec possit esse motus principium vel initium sine causa ad producendum movente; necesse est ut causa movens ad aliquid producendum praecedat duratione id quod ab ea producitur.[4]

A cause may precede its effect in time and sometimes not in time:

> 1. Videtur quod Christus non potuerit mereri in instanti suae conceptionis. 1. Nullus enim meretur nisi agendo. Sed prius est esse rei quam ejus agere. Ergo in primo instanti conceptionis, quando Christus primo esse habuit secundum humanam naturam, mereri non potuit....
>
> 3. Praeterea. Quidquid Christus habuit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, habuit ab alio, non a se. Sed meriti sui ipse ipse causa fuit. Ergo in primo instanti conceptionis non meruit.
>
> Ad primum igitur dicendum quod esse est prius quam agere natura, non tempore de necessitate.
>
> Ad tertium dicendum quod illud quod Christus habuit in primo instanti suae conceptionis, scilicet meritum, et ab alio habuit, scilicet inquantum ad meritum exigitur gratia, et a seipso habuit, inquantum meritum procedit ab libero arbitrio. Non enim semper necessarium est ut causa causatum tempore praecedat, sed quandoque sufficit quod pracedat natura.[5]

What is the cause of the generation of something need not be together with that thing:

> ...*poenitentia timore servili concipitur, qui poenam respicit*. Nec oportet quod timor servilis et poenitentia sint simul; quia timor servilis non est causa esse ipsius poenitentiae, sed quasi

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[4]Thomas Aquinas, *De Potentia*, Q. 3, Art, 13, corpus
[5]Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist XVIII, Art III, Objs. 1 & 3 & Ad 3

> generationis ejus: sicut etiam sumptio medicinae est causa sanitatis, non tamen sunt simul.[6]

Although the sense in which the cause is said to be before the effect is led back to the second central sense, it deserves being brought out because it is the crowning sense of *before* for reason. Reason reaches its perfection and end by looking before and after in the sense of cause and effect.

Since there are many kinds of cause, something can be both before and after in the crowning sense according to different kinds of cause:

> ...omnis prioritas secundum ordinem naturae aliquo modo reducitur ad ordinem causae et causati; quia principium et causa sunt idem.
>
> In causis autem contingit quod idem est causa et causatum, secundum diversum genus causae, ut patet in II *Phys*. (195a 5); et in V *Metaph*. (1013a 23): sicut ambulatio est causa efficiens sanationis, et sanatio est causa finalis ambulationis. Et similiter de habitudine quae est inter materiam et formam; quia secundum genus causae materialis materia est causa formae quasi sustentans ipsam, et forma est causa materiae quasi faciens eam esse actu, secundum genus causae formalis.
>
> Ex parte autem cause materialis se tenet secundum quamdam reductionem omne illud per quod materia efficitur propria hujus formae, sicut dispositiones et remotiones impedimentorum. Et ideo in generatione naturali quando corruptio unius est generatio alterius per hoc quod forma una inducitur et alia expellitur, remotio formae praeexistentis se tenet ex parte causae materialis. Et ideo secundum ordinem causae materialis praecedit naturaliter introductionem alterius formae, sed secundum ordinem causae formalis est e converso.
>
> Et quia forma et finis et agens incidunt in idem numero vel specie, ideo etiam in ordine causae efficientis introductio formae prior est; quia forma prior introducta est similitudo formae agentis, per quam agens agit.

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[6]*Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Dist XIV, Quaest. I, Art II, Ad primam quaestionem, Ad 4

> Et similiter in ordine causae finalis: quia natura principaliter intendit introductionem formae, et ad hanc ordinat expulsionem omnis ejus cum quo non potest stare formae intentio.
>
> Unde cum gratiae infusio et remissio culpae...se habeat sicut introductio unius formae et expulsio alterius, constat quod secundum ordinem causae materialis remissio culpae praecedit infusionem gratiae; sed secundum ordinem causae formalis, efficientis et finalis, infusio gratiae natura prior est. Et propter hoc etiam utrumque invenitiur dici causa alterius. Infusio enim gratiae est causa remissionis culpae per modum causae formalis; sed extirpatio vitiorum dicitur operari virtutum ingressum per modum causae materialis.[7]

Another text on being before and after according to different causes:

> ...aliquo modo gratiae infusio et culpae remissio praecedunt; aliquo autem modo praedicti motus: quod patet ex simili in generatione naturali quae est terminus alterationis. In eodem enim instanti terminatur alteratio ad dispositionem quae est necessitas et generatio ad formam. Et tamen secundum ordinem naturae utrumque est prius altero aliquo modo; quia dispositio quae est necessitas, praecedit formam secundum ordinem causae materialis; sed forma est prior secundum ordinem causae formalis. Et secundum hunc modum illa qualitas consummata est etiam formalis effectus formae substantialis secundum quod forma substantialis est causa accidentalium.
>
> Et ideo cum isti motus qui sunt in ipsa justificatione impii, sint quasi dispositio ultima ad gratiae susceptionem suo modo, praecedunt quidem in via causae materialis, sed sequuntur in via causae formalis. Et ideo nihil prohibet eos esse formatos, quia hoc ad rationem et perfectionem esse formalis pertinet: sicut qualitates quae introducuntur simul cum forma substantiali, quodammodo formantur per formam substantialem.[8]

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[7]Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XVII, Quaestio I, Art. IV, Ad primam questionem

[8]Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XVII, Quaestio I, Art. IV, Ad secundam questionem

Why is the sense of before in being the central sense rather than the sense in which the cause is before the effect?

Perhaps this casts a little light upon that question. The central sense should be more known to us. And if it is a second or later sense, it should follow closely upon the sense before. But it is a matter of experience that students have more difficulty in seeing that, or how, the cause is before the effect when they are together in time. Students know that two is half of four, but sometimes have difficulty in seeing that it is half of four because it is two rather than the reverse. But what is before in being is often also before in time so they more readily see that and how it is before, as, for example, the bricks are before the brick wall (and they can even be after the wall has been knocked down). We can see here also that before in being is closer to before in time.

Understanding before and after is before defining reason as reason. For reason as reason (as Shakespeare teaches us in Hamlet's Exhortation to Use Reason) is nothing other than the ability for large discourse, looking before and after. And this definition of reason is the reason why it belongs to the wise man most of all to order things and to see the order in things. For wisdom is the highest and greatest perfection of reason which is the ability to look before and after (and before and after define order). The whole of wisdom is ordered to knowing the first cause which is before all other things in other senses as well. God is before all other things in being as well as in the sense in which a cause is before its effect. He is also before all other things in goodness. Next to God in goodness is the order of the universe. And what senses does this involve? Here is an interesting text of Thomas:

> Ordo universi includit in se et conservationem rerum diversarum a Deo institutarum, et motionem earum: quia secundum haec duo invenitur ordo in rebus, secundum scilicet quod una est melior alia, et secundum quod una ab alia movetur.[9]

Appendix

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[9] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 103, Art. 4, Ad 1

DIVISION OF CHAPTER TWELVE: SENSES OF THE WORD *BEFORE*

The distinction in order of the four central senses of *before*.
The crowning sense of before, one of the five chief senses

Does opposition come before distinction?

In what sense of *before* does distinction come before order

In what sense of *before* do before and after come before together?

In what sense of *before* do before and after come before order; beginning, middle and end; and first, second etc. and last?

Duane H. Berquist

ARISTOTLE: CATEGORIES, CHAPTER 13

This chapter can be divided into three parts. In the first part, Aristotle distinguishes three senses of the word *together.* In the second part, he points out that the genus is before its species. And in the third part, he recalls the three senses of the word *together*.

In the first part, he gives as the first sense of *together* those things which come to be at the same time. The second sense is that whose being is convertible (if one is the other also must be), as double and half. The third meaning he gives is that of species by the same division of a genus. Or it could be said that he distinguishes two chief senses of what are together in time and what are together by nature and he subdivides the second into two. Cajetan writes:

> In hoc decimotertio capitulo addit duos modos principales simultatis, scilicet temporis et naturae, sed subdiviso secundo modo in duo membra, tres modi efficiuntur omnes.[1]

In the second part, he shows that the genus is always before one of its species because it can be without them, but not vice-versa.

In the third part, he says that together by nature are those things which are convertible in being, and one not being the cause of the other, and species of the same genus by the same division. But simply or first those things whose coming to be is in the same time.

To what senses of *before* are the second & third senses of *together* opposed?

The second sense is opposed both to the second and to the crowning sense of before. This perhaps indicates a connection between these two senses, as we have indicated in the last chapter.

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[1] *Commentaria in Praedicamenta Aristotelis* , Les Presses Universitaires Laval, Quebec, p. 133

The third sense is opposed somewhat to the second and to the third sense of before. For we could say to some extent that something can be an animal without being a dog, but not vice-versa. And yet second substance cannot exist in things without some first substance and a genus without some species. But genus and species seemed to be distinguished only in our reason so that only there is the genus before the species. There too, the species would seem to be together.

Why does not Aristotle distinguish as many senses of *together* as of *before* (and *after)*?

The logician, and even the moral philosopher, are not much interested in a sense opposed to the fourth sense of *before.* For the knowledge of the philosopher is a knowledge of the universal, not the singular. And as discussed in one reason why good and bad can be said to be the genera of all things, formal distinction (but not material distinction) seems to require that one be better than another. Moreover, Aristotle is chiefly interested in *before* and *together* insofar as they apply to the placing and ordering of genera and species under the ten highest genera. And the senses distinguished are enough for such purposes.

What could be attached to the third sense?

Could we say that reason understands one half of a contradiction to be true and the other half false together?

Appendix

DIVISION OF CHAPTER THIRTEEN

Distinction in order of the central senses of *together*

Genus and species are not together, but the genus before the species

Listing again of the senses of together.

Duane H. Berquist

CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE SPECIES OF MOTION

This chapter is divided into two parts. In the first part, Aristotle distinguishes six species of motion. And in the second part, he considers the opposition of motions.

In the first part, Aristotle enumerates six species of motion in the order of the ten highest genera: coming to be, ceasing to be (which are in substance), growing, shrinking (which are in quantity) alteration (which is in the third species of quality), and change of place (which is in where).

Then in the same part, he shows their differences, especially where this is not altogether manifest. He says that clearly coming to be and ceasing to be are different and likewise growing and shrinking, and even change of place. But alteration might not seem independent of the others so he dwells on this. And then he gives the strange example from geometry of the gnomon addition to a figure, where the same figure is kept, but a greater size is acquired, to show that there can be growth without alteration. All of this is rather puzzling to a natural philosopher who considers alteration as presupposed to growth and change of place as necessary to bring together agent and patient so there can be alteration. Aristotle may be speaking here, as is his way, according to the opinions of his predecessors before his own determination of the truth. The early philosophers thought that growth was merely the accession of like to like in which case it would not require an alteration. And they had difficulty in understanding how there could be inward change in addition to change of place.

In the second part of the chapter, Aristotle considers the opposition of motions. In general, motion is opposed to rest. Coming to be or generation is clearly opposed to ceasing to be or corruption, and growing to shrinking. Change of place is, at least opposed to rest, but if there are contrary places, then a motion up is contrary to a motion down. Alteration is opposed to rest in quality and to the alteration to the contrary quality.

In chapters 10-13, Aristotle had shown how species and genera could be distinguished and ordered and placed under their respective highest genera. In chapter 14, he shows how some other things can be led back to the ten genera though they are not species or genera in them. In particular, he shows how motion can be led back to the ten.

We should first consider what else can be led back to the ten in general, then why motion in particular is led back by Aristotle, and finally we can consider some of the points made by Aristotle in this reduction.

There are at least three kinds of things which, although not species or genera, can be led back to one of the highest genera. In the following text, Thomas distinguishes the two ways in which something can be contained in one of the highest genera:

> ...in genere continetur aliquid dupliciter:
>
> vel per se et proprie, sicut species, et ea quae recipiunt praedicationem generis;
>
> vel per reductionem, sicut principia generis, ut materia et forma ad substantiam, et unitas et punctus ad quantitatem; quamvis neutrum sit quantitas.
>
> Ita etiam nulla negatio vel privatio est in genere per se: quia non habet aliquam quidditatem nec esse; sed reducitur ad genus affirmationis, secundum quod in non esse intelligitur esse, et in negatione affirmatio, ut dicit Philosophus in II *Elench.*, cap. IV, quia omnis privatio per habitum cognoscitur, et remotio per positionem; et sic etiam non relatio est in genere relationis, quamvis ea de quibus dicitur ista negatio non sint in illo genere.[1]

We must distinguish between what is placed under a genus where it belongs as a species and what is led back to some genus through the species with which it is connected. Species and *ea quae recipiunt praedicationem generis* are placed through themselves and properly under a genus but others are led back to some genus because they are the beginnings of a species, or the negation or lack of a species, or something imperfect in that species as a motion whose term or limit is some species.

In the above text it is said that neither the beginnings of a genus or species, nor the negation of them receive the predication of the genus. But they can be reduced to the genus of which they are the beginning, or the negation or lack. In the following text, Thomas shows how motion can also to be reduced to a genus:

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[1] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXVIII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad 3

> ...quilibet motus sit in eodem genere cum suo termino, non quidem ita quod motus qui est ad qualitatem sit species qualitatis, sed per reductionem. Sicut enim potentia reducitur ad genus actus, propter hoc quod omne genus dividitur per potentiam et actum: ita oportet quod motus, qui est actus imperfectus, reducatur ad genus actus perfecti.[2]

And in this text, Thomas again explains how motion is led back to some genus:

> motus reducitur ad genus sui termini, in quantum proceditur de potentia ad actum:
>
> nam in ipso motu terminus motus est in potentia,
>
> et potentia et actus reducuntur ad idem genus.[3]

Other imperfect beings, like motion, can be reduced to one of the genera of categories. Consider this text from Thomas:

> ...virtus agendi proportionatur agenti. Unde alio modo oportet ponere virtutem agendi in agente principali; alio modo in agente instrumentali.
>
> Agens enim principale agit secundum exigentiam suae formae. Et ideo virtus activa in ipso est aliqua forma vel qualitas habens completum esse in natura.
>
> Instrumentum autem agit ut motum ab alio. Et ideo competit sibi virtus proportionata motui; motus autem non est ens completum sed est via in ens quasi medium quid inter potentiam puram et actum purum, ut dicitur in III *Phys.*
>
> Et ideo virtus instrumenti inquantum hujusmodi, secundum quod agit ad effectum ultra id quod competit sibi secundum suam naturam, non est ens completum habens esse fixum in naturam, sed quoddam ens incompletum: sicut est virtus immutandi visum in aere, inquantum est instrumentum motum ab exteriori visibili.

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[2] *In V Physicorum*, Lectio III, n. 661
[3] *De Potentia*, Q. 3, Art. 3, Ad 8

> Et hujusmodi entia consueverunt *intentiones* nominari et habent aliquid simile cum ente quod est in anima quod est ens diminutum, ut dicitur in VI *Metaphysicorum*
>
> Et quia sacramenta non faciunt effectum spiritualem nisi inquantum sunt instrumenta; ideo virtus spiritualis est in eis non quasi ens fixum, sed sicut ens incompletum.
>
> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ens incompletum quod est in anima, dividitur contra ens distinctum per decem genera, ut patet in VI *Meta*. (1026a 35). Et ideo talia entia incompleta, per se loquendo, non sunt in aliquo genere nisi per reductionem: sicut motus quantum ad suam substantiam reducitur ad illud genus in quo sunt termini motus, sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, quamvis ponatur in praedicamento passionis secundum quod importat ordinationem moventis ad motum, ut dicit Commentator in III *Physicorum*.
>
> Unde et virtus haec quae est in sacramentis reducitur ad idem genus in quo est virtus completa principalis agentis quae est qualitas, vel in qua esset, si in genere esset; quia virtus increata non est in aliquo genere.[4]

Thus, in the first three post-predicaments, Aristotle has taught us about the distinction and order of the species and genera which can be placed directly under one of the ten (highest) genera of predicates. (Something can be placed directly under a genus when that genus can be said of it as to what it is.) Now in chapter fourteen, he shows that other things can be distinguished and ordered by the ten genera because they can be reduced or led back to some genus or species placed directly under one of the ten.

There are at least three main kinds of such things.

The beginning of some genus or species can be reduced to the genus of predicates under which that genus or species is directly ordered. Thus, the point is the beginning of the line and the unit is the beginning of a number which are species of quantity. And there is a matter and a form, which are the beginnings of bodies, which are a species of substance.

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[4]*Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula II, Responsio & Ad 1

A second kind is a motion or change which is the becoming, or ceasing to be, of what comes directly under some genus or species in one of the ten genera of predicates. Thus growing is the coming to be of some quantity. And in change of place, one comes to be somewhere. (Under this second kind, we might include some intentional beings because of their imperfect being.)

A third kind is the negation or lack of something directly under one of the ten highest genera of predicates. Thus death is the negation or lack of some genus or species in the genus of substance; and ignorance, of something under the first species of quality, and blindness, of something under the second species of quality.

Of these three, Aristotle shows how a motion can be led back to one of the ten genera of predicates. Why does Aristotle consider how motion can be led back to the ten rather than the way beginnings and negations can be so led?

It should not strike us as impossible, or even as strange, that Aristotle enters into the reduction of only one of the three. Euclid often gives us only one of the cases in a theorem. And as the commentators point out, he will give the most difficult case and leave the remaining cases to the reader's ingenuity. Hence, Proclus and Heath supply these remaining cases.

Thus, Aristotle will often consider the most difficult and/or the most important and/or the most fundamental and leave the rest to others. Thus he considers the axioms about being and non-being and defends them against the sophistical objections to them in the *Metaphysics.* But he leaves to us the defense of the other axioms. Thus Charles de Koninck untied a sophistical objection of Bertrand Russell against the axiom of whole and part.

Now, the reduction of motion to the ten highest genera of predicates is much more difficult than the reduction of negations and lacks to the ten. For one can negate what is in any genus. And it is clear that the negations are reduced to the genus of predicates in which is found what they negate. *Not man* will be reduced to the genus in which man is found and *not just* will be reduced to the genus in which just or justice is a species. But it is difficult to see in which genera are found motion per se and in which only per accidens.

Moreover, there is more difficulty in distinguishing the names of motion by the ten genera than the names of negations. (Motion per se and motion per accidens must be distinguished, etc.)

How opposites are reduced is more manifest and is less a problem, and to some extent it has been done in considering opposites. (Toward something is a genus and contraries in their chapter are compared with genera, and blindness is seen as the lack of sight)

And since motion is the same in some way as acting upon and especially undergoing, it is difficult to see why motion is not placed under those genera, instead of elsewhere. Hence, Thomas goes into the whole distinction of the ten genera in his commentary on the third book of *Natural Hearing* where motion and acting upon and undergoing are considered. Motion is the same act in some way as acting upon and undergoing. Changing one's place and being pushed, and becoming hot and being heated, and so on, seem to be almost the same thing. And in one particular partial enumeration of the highest genera in the seventh book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy,* Aristotle actually uses *motion* in place of acting upon and undergoing. Yet motion is not given as one of the ten either here or in the first book *About Places.* Thus to make clear why motion is not a separate highest genus, this chapter is necessary.

One text of Thomas explaining the imperfection of motion and how it is distinguished from acting upon and undergoing is the following:

> Nam ratio motus completur non solum per id quod est de motu in rerum natura, sed etiam per id quod ratio apprehendit.
>
> De motu enim in rerum natura nihil aliud est quam actus imperfectus, qui est inchoatio quaedam actus perfecti in eo quod movetur: sicut in eo quod dealbatur, iam incipit esse aliquid albedinis.
>
> Sed ad hoc quod illud imperfectum habeat rationem motus, requiritur ulterius quod intelligamus ipsum quasi medium inter duo; quorum praecedens comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, unde motus dicitur actus; consequens vero comparatur ad ipsum sicut perfectum ad imperfectum vel actus ad potentiam, propter quod dicitur actus existentis in potentia, ut supra dictum est.

> Unde quodcumque imperfectum accipiatur ut non in aliud perfectum tendens, dicitur terminus motus et non erit motus secundum quem aliquid moveatur; utpote si aliquid incipiat dealbari, et statim alteratio interrumpatur.
>
> Quantum igitur ad id quod in rerum natura est de motu, motus ponitur per reductionem in illo genere quod terminat motum, sicut imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum, ut supra dictum est.
>
> Sed quantum ad id quod ratio apprehendit circa motum, scilicet esse medium quoddam inter duos terminos, sic iam implicatur ratio causae et effectus: nam reduci aliquid de potentia, non est nisi ab aliqua agente. Et secundum hoc motus pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis: haec enim duo praedicamenta accipiuntur secundum rationem causae agentis et effectus, ut dictum est....
>
> Et quia positum fuit in dubitatione, utrum motus sit actus moventis vel mobilis, et ostensum est quod est actus activi ut ab hoc, et passivi ut in hoc; ad tollendum omnem dubitationem aliquantulum notius dicamus quod motus est actus potentiae activi et passivi.[5]

The imperfect being of motion and time is well brought out by Thomas in this reading:

> Et dicit quod aut oportet dicere quod tempus non sit, si non est anima; aut oportet hoc dicere verius, quod tempus est utcumque ens sine anima, ut puta si contingit motum esse sine anima.
>
> Sicut enim ponitur motus, ita necesse est poni tempus: quia prius et posterius in motu sunt; et haec, scilicet prius et posterius motus, inquantum sunt numerabilia, sunt ipsum tempus.
>
> Ad evidentiam autem huius solutionis considerandum est, quod positis rebus numeratis, necesse est ponere numerum. Unde sicut res numeratae dependent a numerante, ita et numerus earum.

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[5] *In III Physicorum*, Lectio V, n. 324-325

Esse autem rerum numeratarum non dependet ab intellectu, nisi sit aliquis intellectus qui est causa rerum, sicut est intellectus divinus: non autem dependet ab intellectu animae. Unde nec numerus rerum ab intellectu animae dependet: sed solum ipsa numeratio, quae est actus animae, ab intellectu animae dependet.

Sicut ergo possunt esse sensibilia sensu non existente, et intelligibilia intellectu non existente, ita possunt esse numerabilia et numerus, non existente numerante.

Sed forte conditionalis quam primo posuit, est vera, scilicet quod si est impossibile esse aliquem numerantem, impossibile est esse aliquid numerabile: sicut haec est vera, si impossibile est esse aliquem sentientem, impossibile est esse aliquid sensibile. Si enim est sensibile, potest sentiri, et si potest sentiri, potest esse aliquod sentiens; licet non sequatur quod si est sensibile, quod sit sentiens.

Et similiter sequitur quod si est aliquid numerabile, quod possit esse aliquid numerans. Unde si impossibile est esse aliquid numerans, impossibile est esse aliquid numerabile: non tamen sequitur quod si non est numerans, quod non sit numerabile, ut obiectio Philosophi procedebat.

Si ergo motus haberet esse fixum in rebus, sicut lapis vel equus, posset absolute dici quod sicut etiam anima non existente est numerus lapidum, ita etiam anima non existente esset numerus motus, qui est tempus.

Sed motus non habet esse fixum in rebus, nec aliquid in actu invenitur in rebus de motu, nisi quoddam indivisibile motus, quod est motus divisio: sed totalitas motus accipitur per considerationem animae, comparantis priorem dispositionem mobilis ad posteriorem.

Sic igitur et tempus non habet esse extra animam, nisi secundum suum indivisibile: ipsa autem totalitas temporis accipitur per ordinationem animae numerantis prius et posterius in motu, ut supra dictum est.

Et ideo signanter dicit Philosophus quod tempus, non existente anima, est *utcumque* ens, idest imperfecte; sicut et si dicatur quod motum contingit esse sine anima imperfecte.

> Et per hoc solvantur rationes supra posita ad ostendendum quod tempus non sit, quia componitur ex partibus non existentibus. Patet enim ex praedictis, quod non habet esse perfectum extra animam, sicut nec motus.[6]

It is interesting to note, however, that time is a species under quantity in the *Categories*, but motion is a post-predicament and in genera only by reduction. Why should time be a species in a genus and not motion?

Motion in the strict sense (the change from subject to subject) and how it is led back to some genus is shown by Thomas in this passage as well as its distinction from acting upon and undergoing:

> Concludit ergo ex praemissis, quod cum motus sit de subiecto in subiectum, subiecta autem sunt in aliquo genere praedicamentorum; necesse est quod species motus distinguantur secundum genera praedicamentorum, cum motus denominationem et speciem a termino trahat, ut supra dictum est.
>
> Si ergo praedicamenta sunt divisa in decem rerum genera, scilicet in substantiam at qualitatem etc., ut dictum est in libro *Praedicamentorum* et in V *Metaphysicorum;* et in tribus illorum inveniatur motus, scilicet motus qui est in genere quantitatis, et motus qui est in genere qualitatis, et motus qui est in genere ubi, qui dicitur secundum locum.
>
> Qualiter autem motus sit in istis generibus, et qualiter pertineat motus ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis, in tertio dictum est.
>
> Unde nunc breviter dicere sufficat, quod quilibet motus sit in eodem genere cum suo termino, non quidem ita quod motus qui est ad qualitatem sit species qualitatis, sed per reductionem. Sicut enim potentia reducitur ad genus actus, propter hoc quod omne genus dividitur per potentiam et actum: ita oportet quod motus, qui est actus imperfectus, reducatur ad genus actus perfecti.

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[6] *In IV Physicorum*, Lectio XXIII, n. 629

> Secundum autem quod motus consideratur ut est in hoc ab alio, vel ab hoc in aliud, sic pertinet ad praedicamentum actionis et passionis.[7]

Moreover, motion is closer to a species than is the negation or lack of that species. Hence, it more pertains to the logician of the ten genera of predicates to consider how motion can be reduced to the ten than how negations or lacks can be.

And if logic is ordered to knowing things or beings, as is clear from the first two definitions of the *Categories* and the division of beings, it is clear that it is more concerned about motion than negations or lacks. For motion is a thing or being, although an imperfect one, while a negation or lack is at most a thing only in reason or a being of reason.

And as regards the reduction of beginnings, we can see the chief beginnings distinguished in substance and quantity. It is fairly easy to see the point as the beginning of a line (this is the first sense of *beginning*) and the unit as the beginning of number. But matter and form in substance are difficult to know and are known after motion and are known *per viam motus* which is proper to natural philosophy.

Moreover, the distinction of beings in chapter two included substance and accident, but not motion. In one of the distinctions of being, at the beginning of the fourth book of *Wisdom,* Thomas distinguishes four senses of being of which motion is the third. Lest then a wider consideration of being seem to contradict the completeness of the division of beings and the ten highest genera, this chapter was necessary to show how even the various kinds of motion can be led back to the ten highest genera.

If we go back to the division of beings that are criss-crossed with universal and singular in the division of beings, we can see that this is a distinction of the senses of a word equivocal by reason, *being*. When Thomas reduces the plethora of meanings of *being* or *thing* in Book Four of the *Metaphysics* to four (in the order substance, accident, coming to be or ceasing to be of substance or accident, and negation or lack of these), motion is before negation or lack and beginning does not appear. Hence, it is more relevant to one distinguishing and ordering the names of beings to consider the names of motion than of negations or beginnings. Here is the

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[7] *In V Physicorum*, Lectio III, n. 661

text where Thomas distinguishes motion as one of the senses of the word equivocal by reason *being:*

> Sciendum tamen quod praedicti modi essendi ad quatuor possunt reduci.
>
> Nam unum eorum quod est debilissimum, est tantum in ratione, scilicet negatio et privatio, quam dicimus in ratione esse, quia ratio de eis negociatur quasi de quibusdam entibus, dum de eis affirmat vel negat aliquid. Secundum quid autem differant negatio et privatio, infra dicetur.
>
> Aliud autem huic proximum in debilitate est, secundum quod generatio et corruptio et motus entia dicuntur. Habent enim aliquid admixtum de privatione et negatione. Nam motus est actus imperfectus, ut dicitur tertio *Physicorum*.
>
> Tertium autem dicitur quod nihil habet de non ente admixtum, habet tamen esse debile, quia non per se, sed in alio, sicut sunt qualitates, quantitates et substantiae proprietates.
>
> Quartum autem genus est quod est perfectissimum, quod scilicet habet esse in natura absque admixtione privationis, et habet esse firmum et solidum, quasi per existens, sicut sunt substantiae.
>
> Et ad hoc sicut ad primum et principale omnia alia referuntur. Nam qualitates et quantitates dicuntur esse, inquantum insunt substantiae; motus et generationes, inquantum tendunt ad substantiam vel ad aliquid praedictorum; privationes autem et negationes, inquantum removent aliquid trium praedictorum.[8]

Again, the reason why Thomas explained the distinction of the ten genera in his commentary on the third book of *Natural Hearing* is that motion is in some way the same as undergoing (and even acting upon). Why then is it placed in other genera? Thus the reduction of motion to the ten genera is more difficult to make than negations and perhaps even beginnings.

One reason for considering motion among those, which are reduced to or lead back to a category is the following text of Thomas:

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[8] *In IV Metaphysicorum*, Lectio I, nn. 540-543

> Sed si actio et passio sunt idem secundum substantiam, videtur quod non sunt diversa praedicamenta.
>
> Sed sciendum quod praedicamenta diversificantur secundum diversos modos praedicandi. Unde idem, secundum quod diversimode de diversis praedicatur, ad diversa praedicamenta pertinet.
>
> Locus enim, secundum quod praedicatur de locante, pertinet ad genus quantitatis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur denominative de locato, constituit praedicamentum ubi.
>
> Similiter motus, secundum quod praedicatur de subiecto in quo est, constituit praedicamentum passionis. Secundum autem quod praedicatur de eo a quo est, constituit praedicamentum actionis.[9]

Just as it is important to distinguish between place and where and between time and when, so likewise it is necessary to distinguish between motion and acting upon and undergoing. A sign of this is the need of Thomas in discussing motion, acting upon and undergoing in the books of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*) to consider the teaching of the *Categories*. To say motion is in the genera of acting upon or undergoing would be to say that motion is in motion:

> Deinde...probat quod non sit motus in genere actionis et passionis.
>
> Actio enim et passio non differunt subiecto a motu, sed addunt aliquam rationem, ut in tertio dictum est.
>
> Unde idem est dicere quod motus sit in agere et pati, et quod motus sit in motu.[10]

Moreover, change is important for knowing opposites. After the distinction of the four kinds of opposites in Book Five of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* (the *Metaphysics*), Aristotle considers how it can be known that two things are opposites. He gives two ways:

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[9] *In XI Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 2313

[10] Thomas Aquinas, *In V Physicorum*, Lectio III, n. 668

> Ponit duos modos, secundum quos potest cognosci, quod aliqua sunt opposita:
>
> quorum primus est per comparationem ad motum. Nam in quolibet motu vel mutatione, terminus a quo, opponitur termino ad quem. Et ideo ex quibus est motus, et in quae est motus, sunt opposita, ut patet in generationibus. Nam generatio albi est ex non albo, et ignis ex non igne.
>
> Secundo modo per comparationem ad subiectum. Nam illa quae non possunt inesse simul eidem susceptibili, oportet quod adinvicem opponantur, vel ipsa vel ea in quibus sunt. Non enim potest idem corpus simul esse album et nigrum, quae sunt contraria. Homo vero et asinus non possunt de eodem dici, quia habent in suis rationibus differentias oppositas, scilicet rationale et irrationale. Et similiter pallidum et abum; quia pallidum componitur ex nigro, quod est oppositum albo.[11]

Why does he say the *species* of motion which is different from the way of speaking in all the other post-predicaments? If motion is in some way the same as undergoing (and acting upon) and undergoing is a genus, this seems to suggest that motion itself is a genus.

There is one definition of motion in some way in Book Three of *Natural Hearing*. I say *in some way* because one can argue that the words used in the definition are themselves equivocal by reason. Is there one sense of *act*, for example, in the definition of motion?

Even Thomas says that Aristotle defines motion in the third book of *Natural Hearing* and then divides motion into *its species* in the fifth book.

Since motion is the same in substance as *undergoing* and the latter is one genus, it seems that motion should also be one genus. And since time is, as it were, a property of motion, and time is one species of quantity, motion would seem to be somehow like one genus. (Even though someone might reason that time is an extrinsic measure.)

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[11] *In V Metaphysicorum,* Lectio XII, nn. 923-924

In the following text, Thomas would seem to admit univocity for all motions in the intention of the genus, to admit in some way a common genus for all motions:

> motus univocatur ad minus in intentione generis[12]

And in this text, he speaks of the species of motion as coming together equally in the common definition of the genus:

> ...omnes species motus aequaliter conveniunt in ratione communi motus; tamen secundum esse suum proprium, motus localis est prior aliis motibus.[13]

And in the following text, he again speaks of a *commune univocum* for motions:

> ...ea quae dividunt aliquod *commune univocum,* simul sunt quantum ad intentionem generis, quamvis unum possit esse causa alterius quantum ad esse, sicut motus localis est causa aliorum motuum contra quos dividitur.
>
> Sed ea quae dividunt aliquod *commune analogum* se habent secundum prius et posterius, etiam quantum ad intentionem communis quod dividitur, sicut patet de substantia et accidente. Unde ex hoc quod una virtus condividitur alteri, non oportet quod una non sit altera principalior.[14]

The above three texts were taken from the *Scriptum Super Libros Sententiarum*. But in later texts, Thomas seems to deny one common genus of motions:

> Dicitur autem motus unus *genere*, secundum figuras praedicamenti. Omnes enim qui sunt in una coordinatione praedicamenti, possunt dici unus motus in genere: sicut omnis loci mutatio est unus motus in genere, quia est in uno praedicamento *ubi;* differt autem genere ab alteratione, quae est in praedicamento *qualitatis*, ut supra dictum est.[15]

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[12]*Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist II, Q. I, Art 1, Ad 3
[13]*Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XV, Quaest. IV, Art. II, Ad 2
[14]*Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXIII, Quaest II, Art. I, Solutio I, Ad 2
[15]*n V Physicorum*, Lectio VI, n. 696

And in the following passage, Thomas says that, just as there is not one common genus for the ten predicaments, so there is not one for all motions:

> Et sicut non sit aliquid commune decem praedicamentis quod sit genus eorum, ita non est aliquod genus commune omnium motuum. Et propter hoc motus non est aliquod unum praedicamentum distinctum ab aliis praedicamentis; sed sequitur alia praedicamenta.[16]

Perhaps motion is much closer to being a genus or is more a quasi genus than the other post-predicaments and this difference is brought out by Aristotle speaking of the *species* of motion.

To which genera is motion reduced?

In the fifth book of the *Physics,* by a criss-cross division into four and the elimination of one member (as in the division of plot by *before* and *not before* and by *after* and *not after* and the division of looking philosophy by *defining with matter* and *defining without matter* and by *what exists in matter* and *what does not exist in matter*), Aristotle arrives at three. Change is from *affirmative* to *affirmative* (between contraries, motion in strict sense) or from *affirmative* to *not affirmative* (between contradictories, corruption) or from *not affirmative* to *affirmative* (between contradictories, generation) He eliminates from *not affirmative* to *not affirmative* because these are not opposites. He then subdivides motion between contraries in strict sense into three.

One is said to be between contraries and two are said to be between contradictories (in the first division).

But the distinction of motions in the *Categories* is by and in the order of the ten genera. This is a logical one, but not the natural one. In the second book of *Natural Hearing*, Aristotle gives change of place first, then growth, and last alteration. And in the order of natural philosophy, one studies first motion in general, then in particular change of place, alteration, and last growth.

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[16]*In XI Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 2291

Why is there no motion in *to be layed out?* This resembles a bit there being no motion in toward something.

Does motion have more than one contrary? Or is Aristotle using the word *contrary* here broadly to include also lack. Thomas states that rest is more the privation or lack of motion than its contrary in the strict sense:

quies non est negatio motus, sed privatio ipsius[17]

Appendix

DIVISION OF CHAPTER FOURTEEN: THE SPECIES OF MOTION

Distinction of the six species of motion
- Enumeration or naming of the six in the order of the ten genera of predicates

- They are different
  - Where more manifest
  - Where less clear
    - What is altered need not change in other ways
    - What grows need not alter in quality

Opposition of motions
- In general: motion is opposed to rest
- In particular
  - corruption to generation & shrinking to growth
  - change of place opposed to rest in place &to change to contrary place
  - likewise, alteration to rest in quality &to change to contrary quality

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[17] *In IV Physicorum,* Lectio XX, n. 608

CHAPTER FIFTEEN – TO HAVE

In this chapter, Aristotle distinguishes seven or eight ways[1] in which *to have* is said. Having shown how something can be placed under one of the ten highest genera or led back to one of them in chapters ten through fourteen, he now shows how the genera of accidents can be led back to substance which is said *to have* them. That this is the main purpose of this chapter can be seen from the order in which Aristotle gives the seven or eight ways.

The first three ways given by Aristotle are ways in which substance is said to have an accident. The first way is to have a quality, such as a habit or disposition. The second is to have some quantity or size. The third way is the one used by Aristotle to name one of the ten highest genera. He does not exemplify with the other genera because substance is denominated from them as from something exterior to substance (or towards something exterior) more than from something a substance has.

Substance is said to have a quality or quantity or an outfit (and perhaps, in general, an accident, or what exists in it as a subject). But it more has a quality or a quantity than a coat or ring. Although quantity is closer to substance than qualities (at least, the sensible ones and shape), Aristotle gives having a quality here before having a quantity. For quality is more like a form than quantity; and substance having accidents is in general having a form.

The fourth and fifth ways seem to be almost the same. These are the senses in which one is said to have a part or a part in a whole. Substance and quantity are the genera which especially are said to have parts. Aristotle's example is more from substance.

The sixth sense of *to have* is the way in which the container is said to have what it contains. This sense of *to have* corresponds to the sense of *being in* in which something is said to be in its place. Perhaps to this sense can be led back the way in which time has some things.

The seventh way is to have a possession, as to have a house or field.

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[1] The fourth and fifth ways are almost the same.

The fourth through the seventh ways of having something are the ways in which substance is *not* said to have accidents. Substance does not have accident as a part, or have it as something able to be without substance, as the wine can be without its container or the house without its owner.

The eighth and last way is one of reciprocal having. A husband is said to have a wife; and the wife, a husband. Likewise, a father is said to have a son and the son, a father.

The last sense is perhaps the only one of *reciprocal* having, which is especially found in those toward another. This could be found not only in real relations, which are in the genus of towards something, but also in genus and species. (For a genus always has species and a species always has a genus.)

The order in which Aristotle gives these ways of having seems to be dictated by the purpose of this post-predicament which is to lead accidents back to substance as their subject. But notice the reverse order in this text in which Thomas touches in general upon most of the senses given by Aristotle:

> Sed notandum, quod *habere* dicimur aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo sicut possessionem; alio modo sicut quod in nobis est, puta vel sicut forma, vel sicut pars.[2]

He gives the seventh sense of Aristotle first and then touches in general upon the first five senses; for in the first three senses, we could be said to have a form and in the next two senses to have a part. Thomas is giving these more in the order in which they are known by us,[3] but Aristotle is giving first the senses that help us to lead the accidents back to substance which is said to have them, as an accidental form, not as a part or something able to be in separation, like a possession.

There are, at least, four or five other ways in which something is said *to have* which are very relevant to the *Categories*, but not to the end of this post-predicament. However, these four ways have some likeness to the ways distinguished by Aristotle.

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[2] *Super Evangelium S. Ioannis Lectura,* Caput XVI. Lectio IV, n. 2110

[3] Hence, we speak of the “haves” and the “have nots”.

Aristotle does not consider the way in which a genus is said to have species (plural) or a species is said to have a genus (and differences). This pertains more to what has gone before when species are placed under the genus which has them.

Genus and species would also seem to exemplify reciprocal having just as they are said to be in each other and a part of each other (by other senses of *being in* and *part*). Aristotle does not unfold that genus and species are said to have each other reciprocally, because that is not the end of this post-predicament.

Two closely related ways of having also important for the *Categories* are the ways in which a thing is said to have a name (or things are said to have a name in common), or to have a definition. These ways were considered somewhat in the first chapter of the book. Although a thing is said to have a name, a name is not said to have a thing. Likewise, a thing is said to have a definition, but the definition is not said to have a thing.[4] The name or definition is like a possession of the thing whence we speak of the name or definition as belonging to the thing. And we also speak of a definition as a *property* and the *proper* name of a thing.

A name, however, can be said to have senses or to have meanings. This is somewhat like the way in which a place or jar contains something.

Since the genus in one sense is a part of the species and in another sense the species is a part of the genus, there is some likeness to the fourth and fifth ways of having here when we speak of a genus having a species or a species having a genus. But they are also like husband and wife in that they are relative to each other as Porphyry teaches us.

Aristotle also distinguishes the senses of the word *to have* in the fifth book of *Wisdom* (the *Metaphysics*). We should consider that distinction and compare it with that in the last chapter of the *Categories.* Thomas lays out the text of Aristotle thus:

Hic ponit quatuor modos eius, quod est habere:

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[4] Someone might object that the definition contains the thing or its nature.

quorum primus est, secundum quod habere aliquid est ducere illud secundum suam naturam in rebus naturalibus, aut secundum suum impetum in rebus voluntariis. Et hoc modo febris dicitur habere hominem, quia homo traducitur a naturali dispositione in dispositionem febrilem. Et hoc modo habent tyranni civitates, quia secundum voluntatem et impetum tyrannorum res civitatum aguntur. Et hoc etiam modo induti dicuntur habere vestimentum, quia vestimentum coaptatur induto ut accipiat figuram eius. Et ad hunc modum reducitur etiam habere possessionem, quia homo re possessa utitur secundum suam voluntatem.

Secundus modus est, prout illud in quo existit aliquid in proprio susceptibili, dicitur habere illud; sicut aes habet speciem statuae, et corpus habet infirmitatem. Et sub hoc modo comprehenditur habere scientiam, quantitatem, et quodcumque accidens, vel quamcumque formam.

Tertius modus est, secundum quod continens dicitur habere contentum, et contentum haberi a continente; sicut dicimus quod lagena "habet humidum", idest humorem aliquem, ut aquam vel vinum; et quod civitas habet homines, et navis nautas. Et secundum hunc modum etiam dicitur quod totum habet partes. Totum enim continet partem, sicut et locus locatum. In hoc enim differt locus a toto, quia locus est divisus a locato, non autem totum a partibus. Unde locatum est sicut pars divisa, ut habetur in quarto *Physicorum*.

Quartus modus est secundum quod aliquid dicitur habere alterum, ex eo, quod prohibet ipsum operari vel moveri secundum suum impetum; sicut columna dicitur habere corpora ponderosa imposita super eas, quia prohibet ea descendere deorsum secundum inclinationem...Differt autem hic modus a primo. Nam in primo habens, habitum cogebat sequi secundum suum impetum, et sic erat causa motus violenti. Hic autem habens, prohibet habitum moveri motu naturali, unde est causa quietis violentae. Ad hunc autem modum reducitur tertius modus quo continens dicitur habere contenta; ea ratione quia aliter contenta suo proprio impetu singula separentur abinvicem, nisi continens prohiberet; sicut patet in lagena continente aquam, quae prohibet partes abinvicem separi.

Dicit autem in fine, quod esse in aliquo similiter dicitur sicut et habere; et modi essendi in aliquo consequuntur ad modos habendi.

> Octo autem modi essendi in aliquo in quarto *Physicorum* positi sunt; quorum duo, scilicet secundum quod totum integrale est in partibus et e converso, et alius modus secundum quod locatum est in loco, consequuntur ad tertium modum habendi, secundum quod totum habet partes, et locus locatum.
>
> Modus autem secundum quod aliquid dicitur esse in aliquo, ut in efficiente vel movente, sicut quae sunt regni in rege, consequitur primum modum habendi ici positum.
>
> Modus autem essendi in, secundum quod forma est in materia, reducitur ad secundum modum habendi hic positum.
>
> Modus autem quo aliquid est in fine, reducitur ad modum habendi quartum hic positum; vel etiam ad primum, quia secundum finem moventur et quiescunt ea quae sunt ad finem.[5]

Comparison of *to have* in *Categories* and in *Wisdom*

The first two ways in the *Categories* correspond to the second way in the *Metaphysics*.

The third and seventh ways in the *Categories* correspond to the first way given in the *Metaphysics.*

The fourth, fifth and sixth ways in the *Categories* are reduced to the third way in the *Metaphysics*.

The sixth sense in the *Categories* could also correspond somewhat to the fourth way in the fifth book of *Wisdom,* as Thomas explains.

The eighth way in the *Categories* does not seem to reduce to any way in the fifth book of *Wisdom.* This is perhaps in accord with Aristotle calling it the *strangest* way.

The correspondence Aristotle and Thomas see between the ways of *having* and the ways of *being in* are useful, among other reasons, for seeing how the first five senses here correspond to the senses in which accidents are, and are not, said *to be in* substance. For the first two senses especially

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[5] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XX, nn. 1080-1084

correspond to the senses in which accidents are said *to be in* substance which *has* them. And the fourth and fifth senses and the sixth and seventh to the senses in which accidents are not said *to be in* substance and substance is not said *to have* them.

Following Thomas, we can put in a table a comparison of the modes or senses of *to have* in the fifth book of *Wisdom* (*Metaphysics*) and the modes or senses of *being in* in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* (the so-called *Physics*) can be put in some correspondence.

Wisdom	*Natural hearing*
1st to have clothes to have possessions fever has a man tyrant has a city (causa motus violenti)	(7) in power of mover or agent
2nd bronze has form of statue body has sickness substance has accidents have a form (matter?)	(5) form in matter
3rd container has contained jar has wine, bottle has wine whole has parts	(1) in place (2) part in whole
4th column has heavy body placed upon it	(8) in the end or loved (or also to first, those which causa quietis violentae) what are for the end are moved and rest by the end

Thomas does not give the obvious correspondence between

species has genus	(3) genus in species
genus has species	(4) species in genus

But we do not readily say that the parts have a whole, which would correspond to the sixth sense of *in*.

We are more apt to say that a whole has parts or a part than that a part has a whole or parts have a whole.

Perhaps there is a reason for considering the senses of *to have* more in wisdom and logic and the senses of *being in* in natural philosophy.

The first sense of *being in* is in place to which is attached being in time. And the consideration of place and time is most proper to natural philosophy as can be seen in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*).

But having is especially tied to form:

> ...et alius intellectus sit ad hoc quod possit omnia intelligibilia facere in actu; qui vocatur *intellectus agens*, et est sicut habitus quidem.
>
> Huius autem verbi occasione, quidem posuerunt intellectum agentem idem esse cum intellectu qui est habitus principiorum.
>
> Quod esse non potest: quia intellectus qui est habitus principiorum, praesupponit aliqua iam intellecta in actu: scilicet terminos principiorum, per quorum intelligentiam cognoscimus principia: et sic sequeretur, quod intellectus agens non faceret omnia intelligibilia in actu, ut hic Philosophus dicit.
>
> Dicendum est ergo, quod habitus sic accipitur secundum quod Philosophus frequenter consuevit nominare omnem formam et naturam habitum, prout habitus distinguitur contra privationem et potentiam, ut sic per hoc quod nominat eum habitum distinguat eum ab intellectu possibili, qui est potentia.[6]

The reason for considering *to have* in logic and *in* in natural philosophy is proportional to the reason for defining the continuous in logic by its wholeness and in natural philosophy by its divisibility into parts:

> Circa primum considerandum est quod *continuum* invenitur a Philosopho dupliciter definitum.

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[6]Thomas Aquinas, *In III De Anima*, Lectio 10, nn. 728-729

> Uno modo definitione formali, prout dicitur in *Praedicamentis* quod continuum est *cuius partes copulantur ad unum communem terminum*: unitas enim continui est quasi forma ipsius.
>
> Alio modo definitione materiali, quae sumitur ex partibus, quae habent rationem materiae, ut dicitur in II *Physics:* et sic definitur hic, quod continuum est *quod est divisibile in semper divisibilia.* Nulla enim pars continui potest ese indivisibilis: quia ex indivisibilibus non componitur aliquod continuum, ut probatur in VI *Physic*.
>
> Et satis convenienter haec definitio ponitur hic, alia autem in *Praedicamentis:* quia consideratio naturalis versatur circa materiam, consideratio autem logici circa rationem et speciem.[7]

Perhaps the chief end of this post-predicament is to lead accidents back to substance, not as to a genus in which they belong per se and properly or through another, but as their subject. Thus the first five senses of *to have* give us the distinctions necessary for leading back accidents to the substances which have them and in which they (the accidents) are. This would seem to be the reason why these senses are put before the others, not because they are more known.

The distinction of the fourth and fifth senses from the first three corresponds to the distinction in the division of beings where accidents are said to be in a subject, but not as a part in a whole. For an accident is not in substance as a part is in a whole. And a substance does not have an accident as a whole has a part.

Hence, the first senses pertain to substance having an accident, as a quality or a quantity. These two genera of accidents involve intrinsic absolute denomination. A quality more clearly exists in a subject as a form in matter than does quantity, which is easily confused, with substance. And the third sense which pertains to one highest genus, which in Greek is called *to have*.

Just as when he explained in Chapter 2, that accidents are in a subject, not as a part in a whole and or as something that can exist apart from that subject or are incapable of existing apart from that subject, so he also gives

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[7] *In I De Caelo et Mundo*, Lectio II, n. 9

the senses of *to have* which correspond to those senses on the side of substance which is said *to have* accidents, but in a different way or sense from that in which a whole is said have a part (Aristotle's fourth and fifth ways) or a container the contained (Aristotle's sixth sense) and the possessor the possessed (Aristotle's seventh sense). The latter two are senses in which the *had* can be without the haver and vice-versa.

The last sense given by Aristotle is that where *to have* is reciprocal. The other senses of *to have* that are not-reciprocal and that pertain to the leading back of accidents to substance which is said to have accidents in one or two senses and not to have them in three senses.

Aristotle's last sense or way of having is one in which the having is mutual or reciprocal. Here is a fundamental text of Thomas unfolding the distinction between mutual having and a having that is not mutual or convertible:

> Contingit autem ab eodem plura haberi secundum diversos modos, in quibus tamen omnibus semper quod est principalius, habere dicitur: quod autem minus principale, haberi.
>
> Habet enim totum multas partes, ut homo manus et pedes; non autem dicimus e converso, quod manus vel pedes habeant hominem.
>
> Habet etiam unum subiectum multa accidentia, sicut pomum colorem et odorem, et non e converso.
>
> Habet etiam homo aliqua exteriora sicut possessiones et vestes, non e converso.
>
> In solis autem illis quae sunt partes alicuius unius essentiales, aliquando aliquid dicitur habere et haberi ut anima corpus, et corpus animam.
>
> Et similiter inquantum vir et uxor in matrimonio coniunguntur, dicitur vir habere uxorem, et uxor virum.
>
> Et similiter in his quae quae per relationem uniuntur, sicut dicimus quod pater habet filium et filius patrem.[8]

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[8] *De Rationibus Fidei*, Caput 6, n. 987

In the above text, Thomas divides *to have* into two. In the first part, one of two things is (more) said to have the other, but not vice-versa.

Under the first he gives three havings in which one has, but the other is not said to have.

The first is that in which a whole is said to have a part (or parts). This is the fourth and fifth senses or ways of Chapter Fifteen.

The second is the sense in which one subject has many accidents. This corresponds especially to the first and second ways of Chapter Fifteen, and perhaps to the third.

The third sense is that in which one (a man) is said to have possessions or clothing. These correspond to the seventh and third senses of *to have* in the Fifteenth Chapter.

The second part of *to have*, which is a reciprocal having, has three examples, but only one of them is exemplified by Aristotle: husband and wife. The other two examples of Thomas refer to relations and to matter and form perhaps in the genus of substance

Thomas gives two groups of senses of *to have* in this text. The first group contains those where to have is *not* reciprocal and the second group where to have is reciprocal.

Aristotle has all of Thomas' senses in the first group (but not in the same order) and more. (Perhaps, Thomas would put container has contained with whole has parts, just as he has put to have possessions and to have clothes together.)

But Aristotle gives only one of the three Thomas has in the second group. But one could go from Aristotle's example or sense to both of Thomas other senses in that husband and wife are relative and are like soul and body

In the above division by Thomas, where would we place the ways in which a genus is said to have species and the species is said to have a genus?

If genus and species are something like matter and form and are relative to each other, like father and son, they would belong to Thomas' second group.

Moreover, the reciprocal having of genus and species can be understood not only by the two corresponding senses of *in* being together, but also by there being two kinds of whole for the genus is in the species as a part in an integral or composed whole and the species is in the genus as a particular in a universal whole. (This also helps us to understand how the fourth sense of *in* is like those before and after it in different ways.) And this helps us also to see why the whole having a part is not a reciprocal having for the whole being in its parts is in no way like a part in a whole.

This also clearly shows that accidents are not led back to substance as parts to a whole.

Where would we put the way a thing is said to have a name or a definition?

A thing said to have a name or definition, but not the reverse, so that a thing having a name or definition belongs to the first group.

But a name or word is said to have senses or meanings, but it does not seem the reverse. Is this like place having bodies in it?

In the following text, Thomas sees *to have* as a post-predicament because it is common to more than one genus, and gives yet other distinctions or divisions of having, and illumines why to have a quality is here the first sense of *to have.*

> ...hoc nomen *habitus* ab habendo est sumptum. A quo quidem nomen habitus dupliciter derivatur: uno quidem modo, secundum quod homo, vel quaecumque alia res, dicitur aliquid habere; alio modo, secundum quod aliqua res aliquo modo se habet in seipsa vel ad aliquid aliud.
>
> Circa primum autem, considerandum est quod habere, secundum quod dicitur respectu cuiuscumque quod habetur, commune est ad diversa genera. Unde Philosophus inter postpraedicamenta *habere* ponit, quae scilicet diversa rerum genera consequuntur; sicut sunt *opposita*, et *prius et posterius*, et alia huiusmodi.

> Sed inter ea quae habentur, talis videtur esse distinctio, quod quaedam sunt in quibus nihil est medium inter habens and id quod habetur: sicut inter subiectum et qualitatem vel quantitatem nihil est medium.
>
> Quaedam vero sunt in quibus est aliquid medium inter utrumque, sed sola relatio: sicut dicitur aliquis habere socium vel amicum.
>
> Quaedam vero sunt inter quae est aliquid medium, non quidem actio vel passio, sed aliquid per modum actionis vel passionis, prout scilicet unum est ornans vel tegens, et aliud ornatum aut tectum: unde Philosophus dicit, in V *Metaphysicorum*, quod *habitus dicitur tanquam actio quaedam habentis et habiti*, sicut est in illis quae circa nos habemus. Et ideo in his constituitur unum speciale genus rerum, quod dicitur praedicamentum Habitus: de quod dicit Philosophus, in V *Metaphysicorum*, quod *inter habentem indumentum, et indumentum quod habetur, est habitus medius*.
>
> Si autem sumatur habere prout res aliqua dicitur quodam modo se habere in seipsa vel ad aliud; cum iste modus se habendi sit secundum aliquam qualitatem, hoc modo habitus quaedam qualitas est: de quo Philosophus, in V *Metaphys*.., dicit quod habitus dicitur dispositio secundum quam bene vel male disponitur dispositum, et aut secundum se aut ad aliud, *ut sanitas habitus quidam est*. Et sic...habitus est qualitas.[9]

This text gives a distinction between the first two ways or senses of *to have* in this chapter and the third sense. Moreover, it explains why one quality is named *habitus*.

The following text of Thomas helps to distinguish between the way a first substance has a nature and the way it has accidents. It is also important in considering the way in which a species or genus has the *formale principium*. The had is either outside the nature of the haver or not.

> cum recipere terminetur ad habere, sicut ad finem; dupliciter dicitur aliquid esse recipiens, sicut dupliciter est habens.

---

[9] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 1, corpus

Habet enim uno modo materia formam suam, et subiectum accidens, vel qualitercumque habitum est extra essentiam habentis;

habet autem alio modo suppositum naturam, ut hic homo humanitatem; quae quidem non est extra essentiam habentis, immo est eius essentia. Socrates enim est vere id quod homo est.

Genitus ergo in humanis etiam non recipit formam generantis sicut materia formam, vel sicut subiectum accidens, sed sicut suppositum vel hypostasis habet naturam speciei...[10]

Duane H. Berquist

[10] *De Potentia*, Q. 2, Art. 1, Ad 2

DISTINCTION

Necessity and importance of considering distinction

It is necessary to consider distinction because nothing can be understood without distinction. A synonym for *understanding* a thing is *to grasp* it. But one cannot grasp a thing without distinguishing it from everything else, just as the hand cannot grasp something without separating it from other things. Hence, the consideration of distinction is important for all understanding.

Moreover, the beginning of our mistakes is not seeing or understanding a distinction or misunderstanding it. Hence, we say that someone is mixed-up or confused when they are mistaken or apt to be mistaken. Hence, we must consider distinction to avoid mistakes.

Not only is the consideration of distinction important in general for understanding and avoiding mistakes, but it is of the utmost importance for the consideration of the greatest things. This can be seen both in the thinking of the philosopher and that of the Christian.

The philosopher seeks to know the distinction between God and his effects which comes under the more general distinction between a cause and its effect. And nothing is better in the effects or caused things than their distinction and order:

> Optimum autem in rebus causatis est distinctio et ordo ipsarum[1]

The reason for this and why it is before in the intention of the first mover or maker is as follows:

> Quanto enim aliquid est melius in effectibus, tanto est prius in intentione agentis. Optimum autem in rebus creatis est perfectio

[1] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Capitulum 42

> universi, quae consistit in ordine distinctarum rerum: in omnibus enim perfectio totius praeminet perfectioni singularium partium. Igitur diversitas rerum ex principali intentione primi agentis provenit...[2]

Hence, to know the greatest things, the philosopher must have a good knowledge of distinction.

Moreover, to know the first cause is pure act rather than matter, we must know the following distinction between act and ability which Thomas, quoting Aristotle, notes is often used by him:

> Deinde dicit: *Qui vero secundum potentiam, tempore prior in uno est: omnino autem, neque in tempore*. Qua quidem distinctione inter potentiam et actum in pluribus locis utitur: scilicet quod actus secundum naturam est prior potentia; tempore vero, in uno et eodem quod mutatur de potentia in actum, est prior potentia actu; simpliciter vero loquendo, non est potentia etiam tempore prior actu, quia potentia non reducitur in actum nisi per actum.[3]

Christians believe there is a distinction in God between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. This is a *distinction* in God, not a *division* in God. And so the Christian should know the distinction between a distinction and a division. And also the kind of distinction this is. But more important, he should know the kind of distinction there is between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. Thus a Christian should know how important is the consideration of distinction for knowing the greatest things.

What is distinction?

Distinction involves a negation in its meaning:

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[2] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Capitulum 44

[3] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Capitulum 78

> Sed in ratione distinctionis est negatio: distincta enim sunt quorum unum non est aliud.
>
> Unde et prima, quae seipsis distinguuntur, mutuo sui negationem includunt: ratione cuius negativae propositiones in eis sunt immediatae, ut, nulla quantitas est substantia.[4]

This negation adds a second negation in our understanding of the many or multitude since there is already a negation in the understanding of one and the many involves many ones:

> ...unum quod convertitur cum ente, ponit quidem ipsum ens, sed nihil superaddit nisi negationem divisionis.
>
> Multitudo autem ei correspondens addit supra res, quae dicuntur multae, quod unaquaeque earum sit una, et quod una earum non sit altera, in quo consistit ratio distinctionis.
>
> Et sic, cum unum addat supra ens unam negationem – secundum quod aliquid est indivisum in se, - multitudo addit duas negationes, prout scilicet aliquid est in se indivisum, et prout est ab alio divisum. Quod quidem dividi est unum eorum non esse alterum.[5]

Wherever there is a distinction, there must be the opposition of affirmation and negation:

> Ubicumque enim est aliqua distinctio, oportet inveniri negationis et affirmationis oppositionem.
>
> Quae enim secundum nullam affirmationem et negationem differunt, penitus indistincta sunt: oportet enim quod quantum ad omnia unum esset quod et alterum, et sic essent penitus idem, et nullo modo distincta.[6]

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[4] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber I, Capitulum 71

[5] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia*, Q. 9, Art 7, corpus

[6] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Caput 14

The following reading makes this same point even more explicit in that it states that every distinction, whether of things or only in reason, is founded in affirmation and negation:

> de eodem, secundum quod idem est, impossible est aliquid idem affirmare et negare; sed si in aliquo distinguantur, affirmationes et negationes pertinentes ad illam distinctionem de ipso verificari poterunt:
>
> quia omnis distinctio, sive rei sive rationis, fundatur in affirmatione et negatione.[7]

Although the other kinds of opposition can be a basis for distinction, nevertheless the first cause of all opposition and therefore all distinction is the opposition of affirmation and negation:

> affirmatio et negatio dicuntur maxime opponi, quia in eis non importatur aliqua convenientia:
>
> in privative enim oppositis importatur convenientia quantum ad subjectum, quia nata sunt fieri circa idem:
>
> in contrariis autem et relativis etiam quantum ad genus, quia scilicet sunt in eodem genere. Unde in utraque oppositione utrumque extremorum significatur per modum entis et naturae cujusdam.
>
> Illud autem in quo invenitur aliquid non permixtum contrario, est maximum et primum in genere illo, et causa omnium aliorum;
>
> et ideo oppositio affirmationis et negationis, cui non admiscetur aliqua convenientia, est prima et maxima oppositio, et causa omnis oppositionis et distinctionis;
>
> et ideo oportet quod in qualibet alia oppositione includatur affirmatio et negatio, sicut primum in posteriori.

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[7] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist XXXIV, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 2

> Unde plura requiruntur ad alias oppositiones quam ad oppositionem contradictionis, quia se habent ex additione ad ipsam.
>
> Unde non oportet quod, si contrarietas non inveniatur nisi in diversis realiter, quod affirmatio et negatio inveniatur in diversis realiter. [objection was: essentia non est generans, Pater est generans, ergo Pater non est essentia]
>
> immo sufficit etiam distinctio rationis ad affirmationem et negationem: et talis distinctio, scilicet rationis, est inter essentiam et personam.
>
> Sed opposita relative aliquando requirunt diversitatem vel distinctionem realem; et talia sunt quae divinas personas distinguunt: aliquando autem distinctionem rationis tantum; ut cum dicitur idem eidem idem.[8]

Distinction and one

The distinction of the most universals is difficult to understand. Thomas, following Avicenna, distinguishes six of them:

> ...sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia per se intellectui nota, ita investigando quid est unumquodque; alias utrobique in infinitum iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio rerum.
>
> Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae Metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens.
>
> Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet

[8] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. V, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 1

natura est essentialiter ens; unde probat etiam Philosophus in III Metaphysicorum, quod ens non potest esse genus, sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens, in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur.

Quod dupliciter contingit:

uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis. Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. Substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam, quae designet aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus.

Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se; alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad aliud.

Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter quia vel exprimitur in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative.

Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi essentia eius, secundum quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur hoc nomen *res*, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaphysicae, quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen *rei* exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam entis.

Negatio autem consequens omne ens absolute, est indivisio; et hanc exprimit hoc nomen *unum:* nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens indivisum.

Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter.

Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen *aliquid:* dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid; unde sicut ens

> dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur aliquid, in quantum est ab aliis divisum.
>
> Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente: hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia, ut dicitur in III de Anima. In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen *bonum,* ut in principio Ethicorum dicitur quod *bonum est quod omnia appetunt*. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen *verum.* [9]

In this reading, Thomas understands *one* to add to being nothing real, but only a being of reason, a negation of division in itself. But is this negation to be understood as a pure negation or as a privation? One must recall the senses of privation or lack in the Fifth Book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* and then discuss this:

> ...sicut dicitur in V Metaphysicorum, *privatio* tribus modis dicitur:
>
> Uno modo proprie, quando removetur ab aliquo quod natum est habere, et in quo tempore natum et habere; sicut carere visu est privatio visus in homine.
>
> Alio modo communiter, quando removetur ab aliquo quod ipsum quidem non est natum habere, sed genus eius; sicut si non habere visum dicitur esse privatio visus in talpa.
>
> Tertio modo communissime, quando removetur ab aliquo id quod a quocumque alio natum est haberi, non tamen ab ipso nec ab alio sui generis: sicut si non habere visum, dicatur esse privatio visus in planta.
>
> Et haec privatio medium est inter privationem veram et simplicem negationem, habens commmune aliquid cum utroque; cum privatione quidem vera, in hoc quod est negatio in aliquo subiecto,

[9] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, Q. 1 Art. 1, corpus

> unde non competit simpliciter non enti; cum negatione vero simplici, in hoc quod non requirit aptitudinem in subiecto.
>
> Per hunc autem modum unum privative dicitur, et potest simili modo praedicari in divinis, sicut et alia quae simili modo praedicantur in divinis, ut invisibilis et immensus et huiusmodi.[10]

But sometimes Thomas takes *one* as including, not only the negation of division in oneself, but also the negation of being distinct from others:

> ...unumquodque enim, in quantum est unum, est in se indivisum, et ab aliis distinctum.[11]
>
> Sic enim aliquid est ens, sicut et unum; unum autem est quod est in se indivisum et ab aliis divisum: pars autem prout est in toto, non est divisa in actu, sed in potentia tantum: unde non est actu ens neque una, sed in potentia tantum.[12]

Of course the negation that the one has in itself is before the negation it has in being distinct from others. Albert the Great also takes the one sometimes as including both of these negations and in that order:

> ...unum est indivisum in se et ab aliis divisum: indivisum autem in se negatio est, ad quam consequitur divisum esse ab aliis[13]

The identity of being and one (even including the distinction from others) can be seen in the cause of their being and oneness:

> Quaecumque habentia sui esse causam distinguuntur, habent causam suae distinctionis: unumquodque enim secundum hoc fit ens secundum quod fit unum in se indivisum et ab aliis distinctum.[14]

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[10] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia*, Q. 9, Art 7, Ad 11

[11] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio Disputata de Anima,* Art. 3, corpus

[12] Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Physicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 960

[13] Albert the Great, *Commentaria in libris Elenchorum Sophisticorum Aristotelis* , Liber I, Tractatus IV, Caput VII

[14] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Caput 40

The same is the cause of the being of something and of its distinction from others:

> idem autem est causa essendi alicui et distinctionis eius ab aliis[15]

The division negated in the one in itself has also its first root in the opposition of affirmation and negation:

> Sed unum quod cum ente convertitur importat privationem divisionis formalis quae fit per opposita,
>
> cuius prima radix est oppositio affirmationis et negationis.
>
> Nam illa dividuntur adinvicem, quae ita se habent, quod hoc non est illud.[16]

Although one is before the many in thought in that the many is a combination of many ones and therefore the negation in one (in se indivisum) is before the negation in the many (ab aliis distinctum) as Albert says, nevertheless the negation in distinction is before in thought the negation in one. A sign of this is that Thomas is more apt to call the one *undivided* being. Division, however, adds in meaning to distinction. In a man, the body and the soul are distinct. But they are not divided or separated. Otherwise, the man would be dead. If we divide a material substance into body and soul (or more generally, substantial form and matter), this is a division in the mind. Thomas will have to explain that when Aristotle says the many is before one in knowledge, he means the negation in the many is before the negation in the one.

Distinction and understandable

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[15] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Caput 41

[16] Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Metaphysicorum*, Lectio III, n. 566

The one is before the true and understandable in that something must be one before it can be understood:

> verum autem praesupponit unum, cum veri ratio ex apprehensione intellectus perficiatur; unumquodque autem intelligibile est in quantum est unum; qui non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosophus in IV *Metaphysicorum*.[17]

But to grasp something, one must separate it or distinguish it from everything else. Hence, it seems to us that one as including both undivided in itself and divided (or distinct) from others is before understandable.

Distinction and the beginning about contradiction

The axiom about being and non-being (it is impossible to be and not be at the same time in the same way or one cannot affirm and deny the same of the same at the same time and in the same way) is tied with distinction. To deny that axiom would be to deny all distinction:

> Item prohibet ne mente aliquid possimus definire vel determinare.
>
> Prima enim ratio distinctionis consideratur in affirmatione et negatione.
>
> Unde qui affirmationem et negationem unum esse dicit, omnem determinationem sive distinctionem excludit.[18]

Distinction, division, definition

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[17] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate (et Bonitate)*, q. 21, Art. 4, corpus

[18] Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Metaphysicorum,* Lectio IX, n. 660

Distinction is more general than division although they are often used convertibly and division is more general than definition. Division in the strict sense is the distinction of the parts of some whole (whether a composed whole or a universal whole). And the one who defines, divides the defined into its defining *parts* (as Aristotle speaks in the Proemium to the eight books of *Natural Hearing*). But not everyone who divides is defining.

Thus distinction, division and definition are distinguished like beginning, cause and element.

But sometimes we might keep the word *division* for those divisions that are not definitions and the word *distinction* for those distinctions that are not divisions.

Distinction and order

Distinction is presupposed to order:

> ...ordo in ratione sua includit tria, scilicet rationem prioris et posterioris; unde secundum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo aliquorum, secundum quos aliquis altero prius dicitur et secundum locum et secundum tempus et secundum omnia hujusmodi.
>
> Includit etiam distinctionem, quia non est ordo aliquorum nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc magis praesupponit nomen ordinis quam significet.
>
> Includit etiam tertio rationem ordinis, ex qua etiam ordo in speciem trahitur. Unde unus est ordo secundum locum, alius secundum dignitatem, alius secundum originem, et sic de aliis...[19]

[19] Thomas Aquinas, *Super I Sent.,* Dist. 20, Q. 1 Art. 3, Quaestiuncula 1, corpus

This is clear from the axiom of order: nothing is before or after itself. Hence, there must always be some distinction between what is before and what is after. But two things can be distinct without one being before or after the other. And we must see some distinction between two things before we can see that one is before or after the other.

Distinction and the rule of two or three

Reason for the most part should distinguish into two or three.

Reason cannot understand, or understand well, a distinction into more than three, but tries to understand it either by a division into two or three and subdivision into two or three until all are arrived at or by criss-crossing a division into two or three by another division into two or three to get all.

Thus, the distinction of the five predicables or the ten categories or the ten commandments or the seven parts of philosophy or the seven sacraments is understood in the first way and the distinction of the six forms of government or the distinction of four beings in the *Categories* in the second way.

The distinction of distinction: kinds of distinction

There seems to be, at least, two distinctions of all distinctions.

One is between material distinction (or distinction by the division of quantity) and formal distinction (which is by the kinds of opposition):

> Omnis distinctio est aut secundum divisionem quantitatis, quae in solis corporibus est... aut secundum divisionem formalem. Quae sine graduum diversitate esse non potest: cum talis divisio reducatur ad privationem et formam; et sic oportet quod altera formarum condivisarum sit melior et altera vilior. Unde, secundum

> Philosophum, species rerum sunt sicut numeri, quorum unus alteri addit aut minuit.[20]
>
> in rebus enim, remota materiali distinctione, quae in divinis personis locum habere non potest, non inveniuntur aliqua distingui nisi per aliquam oppositionem.
>
> Quae enim nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem, simul esse possunt in eodem, unde per ea distinctio causari non potest: album enim et triangulare, licet diversa sunt, quia tamen non opponuntur, in eodem esse contingit.
>
> Oportet autem supponere, secundum fidei catholicae documenta, quod Spiritus Sanctus a Filio distinguatur: aliter enim non esset trinitas, sed dualitas in personis. Oportet igitur huiusmodi distinctionem per aliquam oppositionem fieri.
>
> Non autem oppositione *affirmationis et negationis:* quia sic distinguuntur entia a non entibus.
>
> Nec etiam oppositione *privationis et habitus:* quia sic distinguuntur perfecta ab imperfectis.
>
> Neque etiam oppositione *contrarietatis*. Quia sic distinguuntur quae sunt secundum formam diversa: nam contrarietas, ut philosophi docent, est *differentia secundum formam*...
>
> Relinquitur igitur unam personam divinam ab alia non distingui nisi oppositione *relationis*.[21]

There seems to be a contradiction between those texts where Thomas sees all opposition as based on the opposition of affirmation and negation (or the opposition of being and non-being) and the rejection of that kind of opposition in the above discussion of the distinction of the divine persons.

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[20] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Caput 44

[21] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber IV, Caput 24

Perhaps we can distinguish between a distinction which is based *only* on being and non-being and a distinction which has a basis in something besides this. Thus, for example, the distinction between virtue and vice is not just between virtue and what is not virtue for even a triangle or nothing is not a triangle. Rather virtue and vice are contrary habits so that vice is not *just* the non-being of virtue. Yet one can truly say that virtue is not a vice and vice is not a virtue.

The other universal distinction of distinctions is that between a distinction of things and a distinction in thought or reason only:

> omnis distinctio, sive rei sive rationis, fundatur in affirmatione et negatione.[22]

> Ad tertium dicendum quod potentia significat principium. Principium autem distinctionem importat ab eo cuius est principium.
>
> Consideratur autem duplex distinctio in his quae dicuntur de Deo, una secundum rem, alia secundum rationem tantum.
>
> Secundum rem quidem, Deus distinguitur per essentiam a rebus quarum est per creationem principium, sicut una persona distinguitur ab alia, cuius est principium, secundum actum notionalem.
>
> Sed actio ab agente non distinguitur in Deo nisi secundum rationem tantum, alioquin actio esset accidens in Deo.
>
> Et ideo respectu illarum actionum secundum quas aliquae res procedunt distinctae a Deo, vel essentialiter vel personaliter, potest Deo attribui potentia, secundum propriam rationem principii. Et ideo, sicut potentiam ponimus creandi in Deo, ita possumus ponere potentiam generandi vel spirandi.

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[22] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist XXXIV, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 2

> Sed intelligere et velle non sunt tales actus qui designent processionem alicuius rei a Deo distinctae, vel essentialiter vel personaliter. Unde respectu horum actuum, non potest salvari ratio potentiae in Deo, nisi secundum modum intelligendi et significandi tantum; prout diversimode significatur in Deo intellectus et intelligere, cum tamen ipsum intelligere Dei sit eius essentia, non habens principium.[23]

Distinction and mistake: confused and mixed up

Reason is often mistaken. A sign of this is the disagreement in our thinking.

The man who considers something from its beginning will get the best understanding of it. What is the beginning of the mistakes of reason?

The beginning of the mistakes of reason is not understanding or misunderstanding some distinction.

The words *mistake* and *error* are common synonyms for the same thing. But they are taken from somewhat different things and suggest different causes of mistake or error in reason. To see this better, we should consider what reason is.

Anaxagoras teaches us that mind or reason distinguishes and orders. And when Shakespeare defines reason by its ability to look before and after, he is defining it by order since before and after are the meaning of order. But in the ability to see order is understood and included the ability to see some distinction for nothing is before or after itself.

The word *mistake* seems to come from the defect of reason in regard to distinction. Hence, we often say that the mistaken person is confused or mixed-up. But *error* comes from the Latin word for *wandering* which is a disordered movement of reason. Hence, *error* seems to be named from a defect of reason

[23] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 4, Ad 3

in regard to order. *Confused* also seems to be mean not only indistinct, but disordered or out of order.

But since distinction is presupposed to order, *mistake* is named from the beginning of reason's defect or failing.

Four kinds of distinction and four kinds of mistake

Aristotle distinguishes thirteen kinds of mistake that the sophist can lead us into if we do not know how to avoid them. There are perhaps thirteen distinctions overlooked by those deceived into making these thirteen kinds of mistake. But perhaps the four kinds of distinction corresponding to the first two kinds of mistake in each group (those from words and those whose cause is outside words) should especially be considered because they are so common.

The first two kinds of mistake from words are the mistake from mixing up the senses of a word and the mistake from mixing up the senses of a speech. The first of these is the most common mistake (says the father of logic). These correspond to the distinction of the senses of a word and the distinction of the senses of a speech.

The first two kinds of mistake from outside words or from things are the mistake from mixing up the through itself or the as such[24] with the through happening or by happening and the mistake from mixing up what is so simply or without qualification and what is so not simply but with qualification. These correspond to the distinction between what is so through itself and what is so through happening and the distinction between what is so simply and what is so not simply, but in some imperfect qualified way.

Understanding these four kinds of distinction help us to understand these four kinds of mistake. And knowing and seeing these four kinds of mistake help us to see the need of understanding these four kinds of distinction.

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[24] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Caput 55: "Esse autem per se consequitur ad formam: per se enim dicimus secundum quod ipsum; unumquodque autem habet esse secundum quod habet formam."

Duane H. Berquist

FOREWORD TO THE ELEMENTS OF EUCLID

Legend has it that Plato put up over the entrance to the Academy the words: Let no one ignorant of geometry come in here. The Philosopher also in his Proemium to Wisdom, in giving the order of wonder, also includes the wonder about the incommensurability of the diagonal and side of a square. And mathematics, as found in Euclid's *Elements,* is one of the three parts of looking philosophy which especially begins in wonder. And among the parts of looking philosophy, the mathematical sciences have an excellence of certitude and clarity. Moreover, Aristotle also states in the thirteenth book of Wisdom or First Philosophy, the thirteenth book *meta* (after) *ta* (the) *phusika* (the books in natural philosophy) that the mathematical sciences especially show the main forms of the beautiful.

A complete foreword to a book should unfold the matter, end, form and author of that book. The matter of a book is what it is about. The end of the book is the reason(s) why knowledge of that matter is sought. The form of the book is the order in which the matter is considered and how it is considered. The author is, of course, who wrote it. The title of the book is explained under one or more of these.

THE MATTER OF THE ELEMENTS

The matter of the *Elements* is both that of geometry, which is a reasoned out knowledge of lines, angles, and especially plane and solid figures (in general, continuous quantity) and also that of arithmetic, which is a reasoned out knowledge of numbers.

THE END OF THE ELEMENTS

The word *mathematician* comes from the Greek word meaning one fond of learning. And this is a sign that knowledge of the above matter was sought as itself the end. Hence, mathematics is one of the three theoretical or looking philosophies distinguished by Aristotle in the sixth book of the *Metaphysics*. The word

theoretical comes from the Greek word for *looking* and looking is for the sake of seeing. Hence, we sometimes speak of *theorems* in geometry for these are things to look at and reason delights in looking at them. And the clarity and certitude with which such things can be known makes the knowledge of them in some way better than every other reasoned out knowledge. (We say *in some way* because, simply or without qualification, knowledge of better things is better knowledge, as Aristotle teaches us in the *Parts of Animals*.)

The above end or purpose of the *Elements* may surprise the slaves of modern customs who think of mathematics as only a practical tool for calculating.

THE FORM OF THE ELEMENTS

The *form* of the *Elements* is both the *order* in which its matter is considered and *how* that matter is considered.

Under the order of the *Elements*, we should consider the division and order of its books and the order in which things are considered even in the same book (as well as in the order of the books).

The *Elements* as a whole seem to be divided into four parts. The first part, Books 1-6, is plane geometry, the reasoned out knowledge of lines, plane angles and especially plane figures (such as triangle, square and circle). The second part, Books 7-9, is a reasoned out knowledge of numbers. The third part, Book 10, is about the irrational or continuous quantities that do not have to each other the ratio of a number to a number. And the fourth part, Books 11-13, is solid geometry, the reasoned out knowledge of solid angles and especially solid figures (such as sphere and cube).

The order in *Euclid's Elements* would seem to be usually the simple before the composed and the equal before the unequal.

The simple before the composed is seen in the whole of geometry in which plane geometry is placed before solid geometry. And within plane geometry, this is also observed. Thus most of the theorems about triangles are found in the first 32 theorems of Book One followed by the theorems about parallelograms. And the fundamental theorems about the parallelogram (Book One, Propositions 33 &34) are show through theorems about the triangle. And this order is followed even

within the definitions beginning geometry. Hence, the point is defined first and then line and then surface. And angle is defined before figures such as triangle. And triangle is defined and divided into kinds before quadrilateral is defined and divided into kinds.

Almost the same as this is the equal before the unequal for the most part. What is more equal is defined before what is less equal or unequal. And sometimes the unequal is defined by the equal or by something in its definition. Euclid defines right angles before acute and obtuse angles. And he does not define acute and obtuse like he defines right angles. He does not say that when a straight line meeting a straight line makes unequal angles, the greater is called obtuse and the lesser acute. Rather he defines the obtuse as greater than a right angle and the acute as less than a right angle. And he defines even number before odd number and one definition of odd number includes even number and the other a negation of part of even number's definition.

The equilateral triangle is defined before the isosceles and the latter before the scalene. And among quadrilaterals, the parallelograms (whose opposite sides and angles are equal are defined before the trapezium whose opposite sides and angles are not. The square is defined first and the rhomboid is defined after the oblong and the rhombus. And the trapezium after the aforesaid parallelograms (whose opposite sides and angles, at least, are equal). And among the first twenty-five theorems or propositions, the equality theorems (1-15) come before the inequality theorems (16-25).

And among the axioms, the equality axioms are given before the inequality axiom (the whole is more than one of its parts).

And in the theorems, the equality theorems come usually before the inequality theorems. And often, in addition, the inequality theorems are proven by the equality theorems. In the rectilinear books, the first one ends with the Pythagorean theorem and its converse. The corresponding inequality theorems for the obtuse triangle and the acute triangle are not given till the end of Book two and both are proven by means of the Pythagorean theorem. And in book One, we prove that angles opposite equal sides are equal (and the converse) before we prove that the angle opposite the greater side is greater than that opposite the lesser side (and its converse). And we prove the latter inequality theorem by the former equality theorem.

In general, both considering the simple before the composed and the equal before the unequal is considering the one before the many. For the simple is more one than the composed. And equality is caused by unity and inequality by multiplicity, as Thomas Aquinas explains (*De Potentia,* Q. 3, Art. 15, corpus):

> aequalitas ab unitate causetur, inaequalitas vero ex multitudine quae vario modo se habet (ratione cuius non est aliquid alteri aequale nisi uno modo, inaequale vero secundum multos gradus.)

The question could be raised why the arithmetical books (and also the "irrational" book) are placed between the books of plane geometry and the books of solid geometry. At first sight, it would seem that the books of solid geometry should immediately follow those of plane geometry. It would seem out of order to place books in arithmetic in the middle of geometrical books. Why this is so can be seen fully only by those who have worked their way through these books. But briefly here it can be said that Euclid follows the principle used also by Thomas in ordering the intermediary books on life of Aristotle. Although natural philosophy as a whole proceeds from the general to the particular, Thomas orders the books on sense and the sensible and on memory and recalling *immediately* after the three books *About the Soul* and before the books on life in general. The reason he gives is as follows:

> Sed quia oportet per magis similia ad dissimilia transire, talis videtur esse rationabiliter horum librorum ordo, ut post librum *de Anima,* in quo de anima secundum se determinatur, immediate sequitur hic liber *de Sensu et Sensato*, quia ipsum sentire magis ad animam quam ad corpus pertinet: post quem ordinandus est liber de somno et vigilia, quae important ligamentum et solutionem sensus. Deinde sequuntur libri qui pertinent ad motivum, quod est magis propinquum sensitivo. Ultimo ordinantur libri qui pertinent ad communem considerationem vivi, quia ista consideratio maxime concernit corporis dispositionem. (*In Librum De Sensu et Sensato Commentarium*, Lectio I, n. 6)

Whoever has studied the fifth and sixth books of the *Elements*, the proportional books, will find the arithmetical theorems in books seven through nine very similar. And therefore they are reasonably ordered after them.

After the order in which the matter is considered, it is necessary to unfold *how* it is considered. Every reasoned out knowledge defines its matter and

demonstrates what belongs to it. Hence, it is necessary to see how things are defined and demonstrated in the *Elements*.

The geometer abstracts from sensible matter and, hence, from motion, but not from what is called understandable matter which is the imaginable matter of the continuous. And, in general, the geometer can see his beginnings in the imagination and it is to the imagination that his judgments return.

For the geometer, the cause is more known than the effect (contrary to what is found in most of our knowledge.) He reasons, for example, from the straightness of the intersecting lines to the effect of this straightness, which is the equality of the opposite angles formed by the intersecting straight lines. In this example, we also see the cause by which the geometer demonstrates, which is the formal cause. The demonstrations of pure mathematics excel in rigor and certitude those in other forms of reasoned out knowledge.

THE AUTHOR OF THE ELEMENTS

Euclid probably received a mathematical education in Athens from the pupils of Plato. Later, Euclid taught in Alexandria and founded a school there. He flourished around 300 B. C. He was after Eudoxus and Theaetetus and before Archimedes.

Duane H. Berquist

FIRST BOOK OF NATURAL HEARING READING ONE

Since understanding and knowing why in all sciences of which there are beginnings or causes or elements, come to be from knowing these (for then we think we know each thing when we know its first causes and first beginnings and as far as its elements), it is clear that in the science of nature one should first try to determine about the beginnings.

But the road from the more known and more certain to us to the more certain and more known by nature is inborn. For the known to us and the known simply are not the same. Wherefore it is necessary to go forward in this way from the more uncertain by nature but more certain to us to what is more certain and more known by nature.

But what is first clear and certain for us is the more confused. Afterwards, by dividing it, the elements and the beginnings come to be known from it.

Hence, one should go forward from the general to the particular.

For the whole is more known by sense. And the general is a kind of whole since the general takes in many things as parts.

Names compared to definitions also undergo the same in some way. For they signify some kind of whole and indistinctly; as circle. But the definition of it divides into particulars.

And children first call all men father, and all women mother, but afterwards separate each of these.

NOTE FOR BOOK ONE OF NATURAL HEARING, READING I

In this reading, which is the Proemium to the eight books of *Natural Hearing*, Aristotle first states the goal of natural philosophy which is to know the causes of natural things and then the order of determination or consideration in natural philosophy which is the general before the particular. He also touches upon its order being *toward matter,* but he does not elaborate upon this.

All the natural philosophers before Aristotle witness to the end or goal of natural philosophy for they all sought the causes of natural things.

When Aristotle reasons out that we should know natural things and their causes in general before in particular, one should not think that he is contradicting himself when he says elsewhere that we know the particular before the general. This would be the mistake from mixing up the senses of a word. For the words *general* and *particular* have different meanings in these two contexts. When Aristotle says elsewhere that we know the particular before the general, the word *particular* means singular or individual. And *general* there means universal. Since we sense before we understand, and the senses know only singulars or individuals while reason understands the universal, particular in the sense of singular comes before general in the sense of universal. Singulars come before universals in our knowledge. But when he says here that the general comes before the particular in our knowledge, both general and particular name a universal. But *general* means the *more* universal and particular, the *less* universal. When we say that Socrates is a particular man, *particular* means individual or singular. When we say that dog is a particular kind of animal, particular means something less universal.

Thus, although singulars come before any universals in our knowledge, among the universals, the more universal comes before the less universal. And the reason Aristotle gives for this is that our reason, as well as our senses, know things in a confused way before distinctly.

Someone might think that, since our knowledge begins with the singulars and the less universal is closer to the singular than the more universal, that therefore the less universal would come before the more universal in our knowledge. But this is to forget that the singular is known by the senses and the universal by reason and reason knows the universal in a confused way before distinctly.

If one set out to identify the kinds of plants on a campus, one's knowledge of those plants would begin with one's senses and therefore with the singular plants. But as one begin to know the kinds of plant there are on campus, which is to know the universal, one would know tree and grass, for example, before the kinds of tree or the kinds of grass. And the reason for this is that to know tree is confused in comparison to knowing the particular kinds of tree and likewise to know grass is not as distinct knowledge as that of the kinds of grass. Further, since the difference between grass and tree is much greater than between different kinds of tree or between different kinds of grass, the former difference is bound to be seen before the latter differences.

The reason Aristotle gives in this reading why we know the general before the particular is that we know in a confused way before distinctly and the general is confused in comparison to the particular which involves more distinction.

But that we know things in a confused way before distinctly, or that the confused is before the distinct in our knowledge, is shown by Aristotle in two ways. He gives a reason *why* this is true and he gives three kinds of examples (under which one could give as many particular examples as one wishes to do) to show *that* we know things confusedly before distinctly. The reason is very profound, but difficult to understand. Hence, we very much need the examples.

The first kind of example is most known to us. It is the sensible put together whole. When we first here a symphony, we do not distinguish the instruments playing clearly. And when we first taste a salad dressing, we do not immediately pick out the ingredients. This kind of example shows that we know the confused before the distinct, which is the reason why we also know the general before the particular. But also since the general is to the particular like a whole to its parts, we can reason that if the whole is known before the parts than the universal whole is also known before the particulars. (The Greek word here for general is taken from the Greek word for whole, just as the word particular is taken from the word *part*.)

The second less known kind of example is the understandable put together whole, the definition. We name a thing before we can define it. But the knowledge we have when we can define it is more distinct. We can name a dog or a chair, but we would have to think for a while to be able to define them.

The third kind of example is from something in the senses that resembles going from the general to the particular. We see something (a singular) on the horizon before we recognize that it is a dog and we recognize that it is a dog before we recognize that it is John's dog, Rover. This is also true in time as well as distance, as in Aristotle's example. When we see twins, it takes time before we can distinguish them.

The reason Aristotle gives why we know things in a confused way before distinctly is that what is more known to us is less known and what is less known to us is more known. A thing is more known when it is known distinctly than when it is known in a confused way. But we know it more in a confused way. It is *more known to me* that I am drinking red wine than that I am drinking Cabernet Sauvignon, but the wine I am drinking is *more known* when it is known to be Cabernet Sauvignon that when it is just known to be red wine.

One could ask why what is more known to us is imperfectly known and what is less known to us is more perfectly known. Since our senses and reason are able to know before they actually know and are ignorant before they know, and to know something in a confused way is between not knowing it at all and knowing it fully, as our senses or reason go from ability to act, they know things in a confused way before distinctly. Since imperfect knowledge comes before perfect knowledge in us, the imperfectly known (which corresponds to imperfect knowledge) is for us before the perfectly known (which corresponds to perfect knowledge). Hence, the imperfectly known or less known is more known to us and the perfectly known or more known is less known to us.

There is something like this in the development of any other ability. If I develop my muscles gradually lifting weights, those I first lift do not result in as great strength as those I do later. But the weights I first lift are more productive of strength *for me* then than would be the heavier ones I can lift later. The latter would hurt rather than develop me in the beginning.

Man loves the private good and sensible good before he loves the common good and the understandable good. But the latter are more lovable, being greater goods. So what is more lovable *to him* in the beginning is less lovable and what is more lovable is in the beginning less lovable *to him*.

The common reason is that the development or education of any ability goes from the imperfect toward the perfect so that what is first for us is the imperfect and what is second or last for us is the perfect.

Since the confused is more known to us than the distinct, and what is more known to us is more certain for us. We are more sure or certain of the confused than the distinct.

However, someone might object that when we are confused, we are mistaken. And how can we be more certain or sure when we are mistaken?

But this objection is a mistake from mixing up two senses of *confused*. When Aristotle says that the confused is more certain, he does not mean by *confused* mixed up or mistaken, but merely indistinct or vague knowledge.

A simple example will bring out the distinction between being mistaken and having an indistinct knowledge. If I think that *a dog is a cat*, I am confused in the sense of being mistaken. But if I think that a dog is an animal, I am not mistaken although I do not distinguish the dog from the cat. I have a confused *knowledge* of dog for the dog is truly an animal.

If I think a glass of cabernet sauvignon is a glass of zinfandel, I am mistaken. But if I think it is a dry red wine, I have a true but confused knowledge, an indistinct knowledge of what I am drinking.

Descartes, in his *Discourse on Method*, seems to identify certitude and clarity or distinction. While Aristotle arrived at his conclusion by a syllogism (the confused is more known to us and what is more known to us is more certain for us), Descartes seems to be influenced by a third figure enthymeme (mathematics is more certain and mathematics is more distinct). The syllogism is, of course, a much stronger argument than a third figure enthymeme. Descartes may also be mixing up different senses of the words *confused* and *clear and distinct*.

Descartes' fundamental mistake can lead to two kinds of error. If he is very sure about something, he thinks he knows clearly and distinctly what it is. If he is sure that he thinks, he thinks he must know distinctly what thinking is. And if he has clear and distinct thoughts about the natural world (like mathematical ones), then they must surely be true.

Some modern physicists have come back to the position of Aristotle that the confused is more certain than the distinct. Pierre Duhem, at the turn of the century (between the 19th and 20th centuries), saw this. Duhem concluded that "There is a sort of balance between precision and certainty: one cannot be increased except to the detriment of the other."[1] And in the physics of the twentieth century, both Louis de Broglie, the father of wave mechanics, and Heisenberg, who formulated the principle of indeterminism in quantum mechanics, came from their own experience to see the truth of Aristotle's position and rejected that of Descartes. Louis de Broglie asserts finally that "we could hold, contrary to Descartes, that nothing is more misleading than a clear and distinct idea."[2] And Heisenberg, in his Gifford Lectures, stated that "Furthermore, one of the most important features of the development and the analysis of modern physics is the experience that the concepts of natural language, vaguely defined as they are, seem to be more stable in the expansion of knowledge than the precise terms of scientific language"[3]

Since the knowledge of the general is more certain or sure or stable than the knowledge of the particular, and knowledge based on common experience is to knowledge that requires some private or special experience as the general is to the particular, it follows that knowledge for which common experience is sufficient is more sure and certain than knowledge based on some private experience. By common experience we mean the experience which all men have and cannot avoid having, such as the experience of whole and part or of change. By private experience, we mean the experience which only some men have, whether by observation or experiment or some other means.

The eight books of *Natural Hearing* require only our common experience of change and natural things while the experimental sciences require some private

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[1]Pierre Duhem, *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory* , Princeton University Press, N.J., 1954, p.179

[2] Louis de Broglie, *The Revolution in Physics*, Chapter 10, Noonday Press, 1960, p. 219

[3] Werner Heisenberg, *Physics and Philosophy*, Harper & Bros., N.Y., p. 200

experience. Since the more sure or certain is not replaced by the less certain, let alone by the uncertain, it is clear why the knowledge we acquire from the eight books of *Natural Hearing* are not replaced by the more exact knowledge and opinions acquired in the experimental sciences of the natural world.

Thomas teaches that merely to consider something in general and in particular alone does not distinguish habits of the mind:

> scire in universali et particulari non diversificat scientiam nisi quantum ad modum sciendi; non autem quantum ad rem scitam, a qua habitus habet unitatem.[4]

However, the experimental sciences differ from the knowledge taught in the eight books of *Natural Hearing* not only by being particular, but also by being mathematical and in being an offshoot of the intertwining of knowledge of natural things with the mechanical arts, the union of natural science and technical science as Heisenberg calls it.

We have said that Descartes' great mistake and that of many others may come partly from mixing up the sense of *confused* meant by Aristotle here ands the bad sense of *confused*. Consider the way Thomas takes the word confusion in this text:

> ...confusio sit ex inordinata permixtione aliquorum.[5]

This disorder is error or a cause of error. Hence, when someone is mistaken, we often say he is "mixed-up".

Likewise, there is a way in which the words *distinct* and *precise* might be used for the certain or firm assent of the mind which could give rise to the mistake of thinking that the distinct is more certain. Consider the use of these words, for example, in the following text of Thomas:

> Quandoque vero intellectus non potest determinari ad alteram partem contradictionis neque statim per ipsas definitiones terminorum, sicut in principiis, nec etiam virtute principiorum, sicut

[4] *De Veritate*, Q. 14, Art. 12, ad 1
[5] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sentientarum*, Dist IV, Q. I, Art. II, Sol. I, In Resp

> in conclusionibus demonstrativis est; determinatur autem per voluntatem, quae eligit assentire uni parti determinate et praecise propter aliquid, quod est sufficiens ad movendum voluntatem, non autem ad movendum intellectum, utpote quod videtur bonum vel conveniens, huic parti assentire. Et ista est dispositio credentis, ut cum aliquis credit dictis hominis quia videtur decens vel utile.....
>
> Sententia autem, ut dicit Isaac et Avicenna (lib. II Metaph.. cap. iv, et lib. VIII cap. vi) est conceptio distincta vel certissima alterius partis contradictionis; assentire autem a sententia dicitur."[6]

Consider also the use of *precise* in this text of Thomas:

> Quidam enim dicunt, quod cum Adam non habuerit simpliciter omnium rerum scientiam, sed quaedam cognoverit, et quaedam ignoraverit....in aliis autem quorum scientiam non habebat, sicut sunt cogitationes cordium et futura contingentia, et singularia a sensu absentia, poterat quidem falsam aestimationem habere, leviter in huiusmodi aliquid falsum opinando, non autem ita quod praecise assensum praeberet. Et ideo dicunt, quod in eum error cadere non poterat, nec iterum falsa pro veris approbare, quia in his designatur praecisus assensus ad id quod est falsum.[7]

If we think of reason when it doubts as not precisely or distinctly adhering to either side of a contradiction, but when it is certain as assenting precisely or distinctly to one side, we might be led astray to think that reason is more certain in its precise knowledge, but uncertain when it is undetermined or confused as to which side is correct. But when you give me a glass of Cabernet Sauvignon, I will assent more firmly to *this is a dry red wine* than to *this is a glass of Cabernet Sauvignon*. But *dry red wine* is confused or indistinct in comparison to *Cabernet Sauvignon.*

The teaching of Aristotle in this Proemium to the eight books of *Natural Hearing* is very useful for logic and understanding some of the order in our thinking.

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[6] *De Veritate,* Q. 14, Art. 2, C

[7] *De Veritate*, Q. 18, Art 6, c

It helps us to understand why distinction, division and definition are so necessary in our thinking. Distinction, division and definition are all necessary for our reason to go from the confused to the distinct. Without distinction, division and definition, our reason would remain in confusion. There are many kinds of distinction, division, and definition which are studied in logic and how they can be made.

This also helps us to understand why we name things before we can define them. And it also helps us to understand why the first part of a definition is the genus to which differences are gradually added.

And it also helps us to understand how mistakes are made by overlooking some distinction that needs to be seen.

There is reason to think also in ethics that part of our problems come from not understanding the general before the particular. Some people try to understand human virtue before they have understood virtue in general. Virtue in general is as universal as a thing having its own act. In this sense, a knife or the eye has a virtue as well as a man. And perhaps we should understand what is good in general and what in general is better before we try to understand what is good for man and what is better for man. In general, what is good? And in general, what is better?

Sometimes students of this Proemium draw a false conclusion as to the order of learning First Philosophy or Wisdom and Natural Philosophy. Consider first the following text of Thomas:

> Philosophus enim primus habet cognitionem rerum in principiis universalibus. Medicus autem considerat res maxime in particulari: unde non accipit immediate principia a primo philosopho, sed accipit immediate a naturali, qui habet principia magis contracta quam primus philosophus. Naturalis autem, cuius consideratio est universalior quam medici, potest accipere immediate principia suae considerationis a primo philosopho.[8]

[8] *De Veritate*, Q. 9, Art. 1. Ad 3

The above explains why act and ability and other common notions studied in First Philosophy can be applied in the eight books of *Natural Hearing* or in the three books *About the Soul.* But it also raises a question. If the more universal comes before the less universal in our knowledge as a rule, should not First Philosophy come before natural philosophy because the subject of the former is more universal than that of the latter? And Thomas seems to follow Avicenna in saying that being (which is most universal) is what our reason first understands.

However, we often overlook a distinction about the being first understood by our reason. Consider this text of Thomas:

> obiectum intellectus est commune quoddam, scilicet ens et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. Unde intellectus potest suum actum intelligere.
>
> Sed non primo, quia nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum;
>
> sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut dictum est;
>
> ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit.[9]

Our reason's own object is the what it is of something sensed or imagined. And since we do not think without images, we are apt to think of what is as bodies and what is in bodies. Hence, as Aristotle notes in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing,* thinkers before him held the opinion that whatever is must be somewhere; and if it is not somewhere, it does not exist. But to be in place is a property of body. Likewise, they identified substance with the matter of bodies. So having no knowledge of anything immaterial and always thinking with images, our reason has in the beginning no reason to separate being from bodies or what is in place. Our reason has difficulty separating things it has never found separated. We can see also like this the great difficulty thinkers have had trying to separate the one which is convertible with being from the one which is the beginning of number. All of this shows the great difficulty of rising to the most universal (being and one) in separation from the continuous and bodies. It is only when the Greeks begin to reason from material and changing things to the

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[9] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 87, Art. 3, Ad 1

existence of something immaterial and unchanging that reason could begin to make this separation. But that reasoning, of course, presupposes what we learn in the eight books of *Natural Hearing* (and the three books *About the Soul*)

Moreover, First Philosophy is chiefly about substance and those things that have more being. But substance and the things that have more being are less known to us than the things that barely are or even are not. Thomas notes this and explains why it is so in the following text:

> accidentia et motus et privationes parum aut nihil habent de entitate; et tamen ista sunt magis nota quoad nos quam substantiae rerum, quia sunt viciniora sensui, cum per se cadant sub sensu quasi sensibilia propria vel communia. Formae substantiales per accidens.[10]

Since Aristotle is going to consider natural things and their causes in general and not descend to the particular in the eight books of *Natural Hearing,* someone might think that he is not going from the confused to the distinct in these books. But as we can see in his discourse on the confused and distinct, there are two movements of reason from the confused to the distinct. One might be called the *horizontal* movement which stays on the same level of universality as when its goes from a put together whole to its parts or from the knowledge to name something to the knowledge to define it, and the other is the *vertical* which descends from the more universal to the less universal. When Euclid moves from triangle to the definition of triangle, he is moving from the confused to the distinct in the horizontal direction, staying on the same level of universality. But when he descends from triangle to the kinds of triangle (such as equilateral, isosceles and scalene), he is proceeding from the confused to the distinct in the vertical direction. But given the two directions in which our reason can move from the confused to the distinct, in which direction should it moves first? Euclid moves from triangle to the definition of triangle before he descends to the particular kinds of triangle. Likewise, he moves from quadrilateral to its definition before he descends to the particular kinds of quadrilateral (square, oblong etc). And there is a reason for moving thus in the horizontal direction first. Unless we know distinctly that a triangle is a plane

[10] Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Metaphysicorum*, lectio II, n. 1304

figure contained by three straight lines, we cannot understand the basis for the division into equilateral, isosceles and scalene and the completeness of that division. Aristotle does the same in natural philosophy, moving first in the horizontal direction, getting a distinct knowledge of nature and natural things in general in the eight books of *Natural Hearing* and then moving vertically to the particulars in the later books of natural philosophy.

The order of consideration in natural philosophy seems to be the contrary of the order in wisdom or first philosophy. For in the latter, reason goes towards the immaterial and to some extent from the less universal to the more universal (thus we proceed from act and ability as found in motion and movable things to a completely universal consideration of them where they can be found even in immaterial things and we ascend from the one which is the beginning of number to the one which is convertible with being).

Aristotle *somewhat* goes twice in natural philosophy from the general to the particular and towards matter. When he goes from the eight books of *Natural Hearing* to the four books *About the Universe* to the two books *About Generation and Corruption*, he is clearly going from the general to the particular and towards matter. But likewise, as he goes from the three books *About the Soul* to the books following upon them, he is going towards matter and from the general to the particular. However, all these books about living bodies are more about growth and changes that are more particular than those considered in the previous books which is why we said *somewhat* at the beginning of this paragraph.

The reason for going twice from the general to the particular and twice towards matter is connected with the distinction between nature and the soul as causes which Aristotle brings out in the second book *About the Soul* (the *De anima*).

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NOTE FOR BOOK ONE OF NATURAL HEARING, READING 2

In the second reading of the First Book of *Natural Hearing*, Aristotle divides the thinking of his predecessors thus:

> Surely it is necessary that there is one beginning or many.
>
> And if one, surely either immovable, as Parmenides and Melissus say, or movable, as the natural philosophers say, some saying the first beginning is air and others, water.
>
> And if many, either limited or unlimited; and if limited but more than one, either two or three or four or some other number; and if unlimited, either as Democritus, one in kind but differing in figure or form, or also contrary.
>
> Those seeking how many are the things that are also sought in the same way. They sought from what first are the things that are, whether one or many, and if many, limited or unlimited, so that they sought the beginning and element, whether one or many.....

This distinction or division of the opinions of the thinkers before Aristotle is a sign of the weakness of human reason. Since no two thinkers have the same position or opinion about the causes of natural things, either all are mistaken or all but one. Human reason is thus usually mistaken, if not always. This is discouraging, to say the least.

And this kind of diversity and opposition in what they think is not unusual in men.

Hence, it is appropriate to ask here and in similar situations: Where do we go from here? How should we act when faced with such a situation?

One reaction, and perhaps the most common, is to despair. The disagreement of men is a sign of their inability to arrive at the truth. If one comes to this conclusion, one either gives up the life of the mind (or at least that part where there is such disagreement) or treats ideas as ping-pong balls (something to knock around but not take serious).

But this despair and giving up goes against our inborn desire to know truth.

But there is a second reaction to the above disagreement. Descartes, in his autobiographical sketch in the *Discourse on Method,* recounts how he suffered something of the above despair or discouragement. But then his desire to know reviving, he decided to set aside these disagreeing thinkers (since they must not have found the truth if they cannot agree) and do it himself.

Now although this reaction avoids the despair and giving up, it seems to manifest a certain boldness in the pursuit of truth. If everyone else has failed, what reason is there to think that by yourself you will succeed rather than add another opinion to an already too long list? This do-it-yourself approach lacks the fear of mistake that Socrates saw as so necessary for the philosopher.

Is there another way to go from this disagreement of thinkers than the above two?

Is there a way to go forward with the help of those who disagree? Such a way would avoid the despair of those who give up and the boldness of the one who tries to do it by himself.

One such way is suggested by Empedocles in this magnificent fragment:

> For narrow are the means spread throughout the limbs and many are the miseries that burst in and blunt the thoughts. And having seen only a small part of life during their lives, and doomed to early death, they are lifted up and carried off like smoke, and believing only that which each one meets with as he is driven every way, they boast of having found the whole. But things are not thus seen or heard by men or grasped by their minds. You, however, since you

> have withdrawn to here, shall not learn more than mortal wisdom can attain.[1]

Empedocles states that men, starting from the narrow means of knowing which are the senses and prevented by the miseries of human life from sharpening their thoughts and not living very long, are apt to see only a part of the truth although in their pride they may boast of having seen the whole. Thus when thinkers of some ability and prominence disagree, it is likely that each of them has seen some part of the truth which they may exaggerate into being the whole truth. By comparing them, we can pick out the parts of truth divided among them, seeing what is strong in their thought and what is weak therein. When the Achaean or Greek army meets the Trojan, the weak men on both sides tend to go down and the strong men to survive the first clash. If we could gather up those who remain on both sides, we would have a better army than either of the original ones. We would have both Hector and Achilles in our army. Thus one way of going forward with the help of those who disagree is to gather the parts of truth divided among them.

Another way of going forward with the help of those who disagree is to find something they have in common, despite their disagreement. This way of going forward is suggested by the fragments of Heraclitus on following the common. These fragments almost seem to be a commentary on the situation Aristotle finds when he divides here the opinions of his predecessors on the causes of natural things and the way of going forward from that situation. A brief consideration of those fragments is in order here.

In this fragment, Heraclitus makes a statement that most men would tend to agree with even without seeing fully what it means:

> We should not act and speak like those asleep.[2]

Those who are asleep are cut off from their senses and perhaps following their imagination. Some even when awake are doing this and this is not good. But in the following fragment, Heraclitus sees something else:

> For the waking there is one world, and it is common; but when men sleep, each one turns aside into a private [world].[3]

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[1] Empedocles, DK 2

[2] Heraclitus, DK 73

In this fragment, Heraclitus is hinting that the awake are aware of the true world which is one and common to all who know it while those who are asleep have turned aside to many private worlds that are false. (The word *idiot* comes from the Greek word for private.)

When we read the opinions of the natural philosophers before Aristotle and see the division of their disagreement in this reading, we are apt to apply the words of Heraclitus to them. They are like those asleep. They seem to have turned aside from the one true world and each one has turned to his own private world which is false.

What is the way out of this sleep? It must be by a return to the common. In the following fragment, Heraclitus urges this way out:

> Therefore, we ought to follow what is common. Although reason is common to all, the many live as if having a private wisdom.[4]

In the first statement here, Heraclitus urges us to follow what is common. But what is common? In the second statement, he tells us one thing which is common: reason. And then, as if saying in opposition to this, "the many live as if having a private wisdom." If reason is common to all and wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, then wisdom should also be common and not private. Moreover, if wisdom is most of all knowledge of the truth (as Aristotle shows in the second book of *Wisdom)*, and truth is a good common to all as Socrates says, then wisdom should be common and not private.

In another fragment, he touches upon wisdom or thinking as common depending upon how we translate the first word which can be translated as *to think* or *to be wise:*

To be wise is common to all.

To think is common to all.[5]

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[3] Heraclitus, DK 89

[4] Heraclitus, DK 2

[5] Heraclitus, DK 113

To be wise is common to all who are wise. This means that wisdom is a common good, a good that all can share in it. Wisdom cannot be the private good of any man. Since wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, wisdom could not be common to all if reason was not also common to all. But if we translate the first word by *to think*, it might seem false if we mean that everyone thinks the same. Everyone thinks, but not the same. But maybe Heraclitus means that when we do not think the same, it is because of a defect or failure to think, a defect or lack in our thinking.

In another fragment, Heraclitus urges us to listen, not to him, but to reason:

> It is wise, listening not to me, but to reason, to agree that all things are one.[6]

But someone might say that there is only your reason, my reason and the next man's reason. There is no reason to listen to besides my reason, your reason and the next man's reason. What does it mean to listen to reason and not to me or to yourself? Perhaps it means to listen to what is *common* to your reason, my reason and the next man's reason. This is also what is natural to reason, as to look for order and unity as in the rest of the fragment.

One more fragment from Heraclitus which is a key as we shall see, for much of what Aristotle does in the rest of the First Book of *Natural Hearing*

> Those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all, as much as a city is strong in its law, and even more so. For all human laws are fed by one divine law which governs as far as it wishes and is more than sufficient for all.[7]

As life together in the city demands a common law, so also the life of the mind together depends upon something common to all or both. Sometimes one man teaches another and sometimes men converse, often disagreeing with each other. When the teacher leads the student to see or understand something the student has not already seen, he must use what is known already to the student. But he could not use what is already known to the student if it was not already known to him (the teacher) also. Hence, the teacher leads the student

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[6] Heraclitus, DK 50

[7] Heraclitus, DK 114

to something which at first only the teacher knows but through what is known in common by himself and the student. And when men disagree in conversation, they need to get back to something common to both of them, which they can use to decide between them. Otherwise, they get nowhere.

These fragments of Heraclitus suggest another way of going forward with the help of those who disagree. This is to find something common to them despite their disagreement and become strong in it so that one can judge what is or is not in harmony with the common and what does or does not follow from it.

Thus, Empedocles and Heraclitus suggest two ways of going forward with the help of those who disagree, both of which avoid the despair of giving up and the boldness of trying to do it all by oneself.

Both ways are good, but which should be done first? Should one first try to gather the parts of truth that are divided among them or should one try to see if they have something in common and try to become strong in that?

If one should begin with what is more known to us, what is common to all would seem to be the place to begin. For what everyone sees in some way would seem to be more known to us than what one man sees and another does not.

And this is what Aristotle does especially in the Eighth Reading and in Readings Ten through Thirteen. In the Eighth Reading, he finds a common thought about change among those who said there was one beginning and a common thought about change among those who said there were many beginnings. And in the beginning of the Tenth Reading, he finds a common basis among *all* the natural philosophers. And through the rest of that Reading and the Eleventh Reading, he becomes strong in that common basis or common understanding by going through a number of steps. And in the Twelfth Reading, he finds a common understanding of all men about change or becoming and in the rest of that Reading and in the Thirteenth Reading, he becomes strong in this common basis. And in the Fifteenth Reading, after pointing out the difference in thinking between himself and Plato, he reasons from a common understanding they share to his position being the correct one.

Thus we see that in the First Book of *Natural Hearing*, Aristotle is very much following the advice of Heraclitus who urges us to find what is common and to become strong in it.

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ARISTOTLE, FIRST BOOK OF NATURAL HEARING (PHYSICS), READING EIGHT

But as the natural philosophers speak, the ways are two. For those making one the underlying body, either one of the three or something other, denser than fire but more rare than air, generate other things by condensation and rarefaction, making many things. These are contraries, and in general excess and defect; just as Plato said the large and the small, except that he makes these matter and the form one while they make the underlying matter one and the contraries differences and forms.

But others separate out from the one the contraries existing within it, just as Anaximander says; and whoever says the one and the many are, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras - for these separate out other things from the mixture. They differ from each other in that the former makes a going around in a circle of these while the latter makes the separation once; and the one makes these unlimited, alike in parts and contraries, while the other, only those called the elements.

ARISTOTLE, FIRST BOOK OF NATURAL HEARING (PHYSICS), READING TEN

All make the beginnings contraries - those saying that the whole is one and not moved, for Parmenides makes the hot and the cold beginnings but calls them fire and earth, and those saying the rare and the dense, and Democritus, the full and the empty, of which he said that one is as being and the other as non-being. Further, by position, figure and order. And these are the genera of contraries: above and below, before and behind of position, angular and with angle, straight and circular of figure. It is clear, then, that all make the beginnings contraries in some way.

And this reasonably. for it is necessary that the beginnings be neither from each other, nor from other things, and all things from them. And these belong to the first contraries. They are not from others by reason of being first. They are not from each other on account of being contraries. But one must consider by reason how this takes place.

One should first grasp that, of all the things that are, nothing is apt either to act upon or undergo any chance thing by any chance thing, nor does anything just come to be from anything, unless someone takes this by happening. For how could white come to be from musical if musical did not happen to belong to not white or to black. But white comes to be from the not white and not from everything thus, but from black or the inbetweens. And musical comes to be from not musical except not from everyone, but form unmusical or if something is between these. Nor is it first corrupted into any chance things; as white not into musical except sometimes by happening, but into the not white, and not into any chance one, but into the black or the inbetween. And likewise the musical into non-,musical and this not into any chance one, but into unmusical or if something is between the same.

This is found likewise in other things since things which are not simple but composed have the same ratio. But because the opposite dispositions are not named, it is hidden that this happens. For necessarily everything harmonized comes to be from the unharmonized and the harmonized is corrupted into disharmony and this not into any chance one but the opposite. It makes no difference to speak of harmony or order or composition. For it is clear that there is the same reason. but house and statue and anything else comes to be in the same way. For house comes to be from these things not being

composed, but divided thus; and the statue and each of the shaped things from the shapeless. and of these, some are order and some, composition.

If then this is true, what-comes-to-be comes to be and what-is-corrupted is, either from contraries or into contraries and the things inbetween these. But the things inbetween these are from the contraries, as colors from white and black; so that all things which come to be by nature are contraries or from contraries.

Almost all the others, then have followed as far as up to this, as we have said before. for all, although laying it down without a reason, nevertheless say that the elements and what are called beginnings by them are contraries - as if being forced by the truth itself.

They differ from each other, however, in that some take those that come before and others those that come after; and some the more known by reason while others the more known by sense. For these lay down hot and cold and those, moist and dry; while others, the odd and the even or hate and love as the causes of generation. and these differ from each other in the aforesaid ways.

Thus they say the same thing in some way and something different from each other. Other just as it seems to many; the same however insofar as proportional. for they take from the same co-ordinated series. For some contraries contain while others are contained. In this way they speak similarly and differently. And worse and better. And some the more known by reason while other, by sense, as has been said before. For the universal is known by reason and the singular by sense. For reason is of the universal but sensation of the particular; as the large and the small by reason, the rare and the dense by sense.

It is clear then that the beginnings should be contraries.

NOTE FOR BOOK ONE, READING TEN

In the Second Reading, Aristotle divided the opinions of the philosophers before him on the beginning or causes of natural things. This division makes clear what seems to be their almost complete disagreement. No two philosophers seem to say the same thing.

This is discouraging, but Aristotle does not despair and give up, as so many others have done faced with this common situation in the history of human thinking.

But his hope of still finding the truth is balanced by the fear of mistake so he is not so bold as to seek the truth by himself alone.

Rather he seems in many, if not all, the readings to be following the advice of the central thinker in human thought, Heraclitus. Heraclitus had said that “Those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all”.

In the eighth reading, Aristotle finds a common thought among those who said there was one beginning or cause and also a common thought among those who said there were many beginnings.

Those who said there was only one beginning, although they differed as to what this one beginning was, agreed that things came to be by the condensation or rarefaction of this one matter.

Those who said there were many beginnings, although disagreeing as to what those many were, agreed that those many were mixed together or segregated (separated in kind). When we compare, for example, Anaxagoras and Empedocles, at first we see only disagreement. Empedocles says that matter is the four elements (earth, air, fire and water) while Anaxagoras says that matter is made up of an infinity of infinitely small pieces of everything. And Empedocles says that the mover or movers are love and hate while Anaxagoras speaks of the greater mind as the mover. But Empedocles says that love mixes the four elements together and hate segregates them while Anaxagoras speaks of how everything was mixed together in matter, and the greater mind as beginning to segregate or to separate them. Thus they both speak of mixture and segregation.

Now in the beginning of the Tenth Reading, Aristotle reaches a common thought or understanding shared by all the Greek natural philosophers. They all understand change by contraries. For some use dense and rare and others use mixed and segregated. And both these pairs are contraries. And when we consider them more at length, we see that besides sharing one of these two pairs of contraries, they also often bring in some other pair of contraries. Empedocles speaks of love and hate; Democritus, of the full and the empty; Parmenides, of the hot and the cold, Pythagoras, of the odd and even. Thus all their thinking about change involves contraries.

When we stand back with our wider knowledge of human history, we can see that, unknown to Aristotle, in the center of civilization furthest from Greece, the Chinese, men are also trying to understand change by contraries. For in the classic Book of Changes, the *I Ching*, the Chinese are trying to understand change by the Yin and the Yang, the male and the female principles, represented by the unbroken and broken lines. “East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet”, said Kipling, and there is much truth this saying. But here they do meet in trying to explain change by contraries.

And when we look at the modern scientists, we meet contraries many times when they try to explain change. Thus Helmholtz tried to explain all change by attraction and repulsion between unalterable particles. And others tried to explain the motion of the earth by a balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces. And Newton said that for every action there is an equal and opposite reaction. And some have spoke of matter as condensed energy and energy as rarefied matter.

Thus it seems that anyone who thinks about change and tries to understand it, whether in the East or the West, in ancient or in modern times, comes up with some kind of contraries to explain it. We can see then how sage was the advice of the central thinker, Heraclitus, when he urged us to follow what was common.

We can enumerate a number of statements about change and contraries. Change is between contraries. Change is from one contrary to the other. We even say that in change, one contrary becomes the other (as the hot becomes cold and the healthy become sick and vice-versa), although this has a certain appearance of involving a contradiction. For something will be what it becomes. So if one contrary becomes the other, one contrary will be the other. But this involves a contradiction.

But the advice of Heraclitus, not only urges us to find what is common, but to become *strong* in it.

Aristotle will go through a number of steps to become strong in what is common to all natural philosophers. Perhaps the greatest step is in the next reading, but most of this Tenth Reading contains steps whereby Aristotle becomes stronger in the common understanding of change by contraries.

We can distinguish perhaps five steps in this Reading which Aristotle takes to become stronger in this common understanding.

First he gives a reason for what everyone is saying without giving a reason. He gives a reason why the first beginnings should be the first pair of contraries. The reason or middle term is a definition of what we all understand by first beginnings.

They are not from anything else or from each other, but everything else is from them. If they were from anything else, those other things would be the first beginnings of them. If one was from the other, both would not be a first beginning, but one would be the beginning of the other. And of course, beginnings must have something proceeding from them and from the first beginnings everything else must proceed.

The major premiss of the argument is thus obvious for one term is the definition of the other. We can lay down then the major premiss thus: what are not from anything else, or one from the other, but all else from them are the first beginnings.

If we can then show that these three elements of the definition of first beginnings belong to the first pair of contraries, we can syllogise that the first pair of contraries are the first beginnings, thus giving a reason for what everyone is saying without giving a reason.

That change is between contraries and from one contrary to the other and that even in some way one contrary can be said to become the other is shown by induction. This induction was begun by Heraclitus as we can see in his fragments. Then Socrates in the *Phaedo* made an induction to show this statement which he wanted to use in his first reasoning to the immortality of the soul. And Aristotle also shows it here by induction.

One could also give as a sign of the truth of this connection of change with contraries the fact that we do not recognize change without contraries. To show this simply. If we know that X is soft at ten o'clock and cold at eleven o'clock, we do not know that a change has taken place for the same thing could be soft and cold like ice cream. But if it was soft at ten o'clock and hard at eleven o'clock, or it was hot at ten o'clock and cold at eleven o'clock, we would know that a change had taken place. For contraries like soft and hard, or hot and cold, cannot belong to the same thing at the same time.

Moreover, no one thinks that change is remaining the same, but rather becoming other or different which involves some kind of contrariety.

So everything seems to come to be from its contrary.

But if the beginnings are contrary, one cannot reduce one of them to the other because of their opposition.

But to satisfy the third element of the definition (not from anything else), one must take not just any pair of contraries, but the first pair for one pair of contraries can give rise to another pair, as hot and cold make the butter soft and hard.

Thus we can see the truth of the minor premiss that the first pair of contraries are not from anything else or reduced to each other, but everything else is from them (since everything is from its contrary and if these are secondary contraries they are from the first ones).

In this way, then, we are able to syllogize in the first figure what everyone is saying without giving a reason.

This is the first step Aristotle takes in this Reading to become strong in what is common to all.

Another step Aristotle takes is to see that this beginning thought about change is not an hypothesis which according to Einstein is something freely imagined. If something were freely imagined, everyone who thinks about change, East or West, ancient or modern, would not have it. For freedom and imagination lead to diversity. Rather it seems something unavoidable when we think about change. It is, as Aristotle says here, forced on the mind by truth itself, even

without knowing a reason that can be given for it. This is why everyone who thinks about change seems to come up with it.

The third step Aristotle takes to become strong in what is common to all is to consider the differences of thinkers in selecting the first pair of contraries. For some judge this more by their senses, as those who said that hot and cold are first, while others took a pair that struck reason as first, such as odd and even or love and hate. In different ways, then, it is clear that they both thought not just any pair of contraries but those that seemed to be first.

A fourth step Aristotle takes to become strong in what is common to all is to see the ways in which, despite all their disagreement, they were all saying the same.

One way, of course, is already evident. They were all saying the same in general, but not in particular. They were all saying in general that the beginnings were contraries although they disagreed as to which pair of contraries in particular were first. This is a striking confirmation of what we learned in the First Reading of this book. There we learned that the general is more known and more sure for us than the particular. Now men clearly agree more about the more known to us and tend to disagree more about the less known to us. Hence, the fact that they all agree in general and disagree in particular here about contraries is a good sign of the truth taught in the First Reading.

But Aristotle now adds a second way in which they are all saying the same. They are all saying the same proportionally. (I am using the word proportion to name the likeness of ratios.) To use a mathematical likeness where proportions are first seen. If one thinker said the beginnings were two and three and another said they were four and six and yet another said they were eight and twelve, at first sight we might see only disagreement. But on second thought, we might notice that eight is twelve as four is to six, as two is to three. They are all saying the same proportionally. Likewise, in the case of the natural philosophers. For the dense is to the rare as the mixed is to the segregated as love is to hate as the full is to the empty as hot is to cold.

A fifth step Aristotle takes to become strong is brought out by Thomas who unfolds another meaning in the words “and worse and better”. In each pair of contraries, one member seems better or more positive and the other worse or lacking something. Love seems better or more positive than hate. The empty is surely lacking something compared to the full. The dense has more matter than

the rare in the same volume. (A mug of yellow beer than a mug of beer foam which is rarefied beer). The mixed has something that the segregated does not have. And the cold seems to lack something the hot has. The importance of lack will come out in the Thirteenth Reading of this First book of *Natural Hearing*.

In the following text, Thomas distinguishes the ways in which something is said to come to be *from* its opposite per se and per accidens:

> ...Si ly *ex* nominet causam, non fit aliquid ex opposito nisi per accidens, ratione scilicet subiecti.
>
> Si vero nominet ordinem, tunc fit aliquid ex opposito etiam per se;
>
> unde et privatio dicitur principium esse fiendi, sed non essendi.
>
> Hoc autem modo dicitur aliquid fieri ex nihilo...[1]

And in this text, Thomas gives an interesting distinction on the order of the introduction of a form and the elimination of its contrary

> ...quamvis ex parte recipientis prius sit expulsio contrarii quam introductio formae, tamen ex parte causae agentis est prius introductio formae, quia non expellitur contrarium nisi introducendo formam.[2]

In a play or drama, the poet or playwright represents a change in the fortunes of the main characters. This change in a tragedy is from happiness to misery (or wretchedness) and in a comedy it is the reverse. These (happiness and misery) are contraries so there is a harmony between what the philosopher discovers about change and the change represented by the poet. When Juliet is discovered apparently dead on her wedding-day, there is a change to the contrary as noted in these words of her father:

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[1] *De Potentia*, Q. III, Art. 1, Ad 16

[2] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum* , Distinctio I, Quaestio II, Art. IV, Ad Quaestiuncula III, Responsio

> All things that we ordained festival
> Turn from their office to black funeral -
> Our instruments to melancholy bells,
> Our wedding cheer to a sad burial feast,
> Our solemn hymns to sullen dirges change,
> Our bridal flow'rs serve for a bury'd corse,
> And all things change them to the contrary.[3]

Shakespeare also touches upon the four principal passions as they relate to these contrary movements in the plots of tragedy and comedy in these words of Edgar:

> Yet better thus, and known to be contemn'd,
> Then still contemn'd and flatter'd. To be worst,
> The lowest and most dejected things of fortune,
> Stands still in esperance, lives not in fear.
> The lamentable change is from the best;
> The worst returns to laughter.[4]

When Aristotle states that this common beginning in the thought of the Greek natural philosophers about change (that it is by contraries) seems to be forced on their mind by truth itself, he touches upon a distinction in the beginnings of our thinking. In the book *On the Universe* (called in Latin the *de Coelo et Mundo*), he speaks of another kind of beginning which is more like the hypothesis in modern science. These two passage touching upon two kinds of beginning in our thinking can be laid down together here to make clear their distinction. We give first the passage from the present Reading and then that from the book *On the Universe:*

> They all say that the elements and what they call the beginnings are contraries although they lay this down without giving a reason, as if being forced by the truth itself.[5]

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[3] Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, Act IV, Sc. 4

[4] *King Lear*, Act IV, Sc. 1

[5] Aristotle, *Physics*, Book One, Chapter 5, 188b 27-30

> It happens that, in speaking about the phenomena, they say things that do not agree with the phenomena. The cause of this is not taking well first principles, but wishing to reduce all things to some determined opinions...For these men, on account of their love of those principles, seem to do the same as those maintaining positions in dialectic. They endure everything that follows as though having true principles; as if there were not some principles which ought to be judged from their results, and especially from the end result. Now the end of a science that makes is the product while of natural science it is always what appears authoritatively according to the senses.[6]

In the first passage, Aristotle is talking about a beginning or principle in our thinking that is forced on the mind by truth itself. Such a beginning does not seem to be like the beginning called an hypothesis in modern science. Einstein said that the hypothesis is *freely imagined.* What is freely imagined is not apt to be the same for everyone who thinks about something. But everyone who thinks about change, ancient and modern, East and west, comes up with some contrariety to explain change.

But in the second passage, Aristotle speaks of the need for a principle or beginning in our thought which is more like the hypothesis in modern science. Such a beginning must be judged, he says, by its consequences.

Aristotle sees this second kind of beginning in the study of natural things as like the beginning in dialectic where Socrates, for example, asks what you think and then deduces from what you think conclusions which can be compared to other things you think, or even to other things known or thought to be so, to see if they are in harmony or in contradiction.

Aristotle also sees that this second kind of beginning is like the beginning in the productive arts or sciences where we say that the proof of the pudding is in the eating and not in the recipe. The recipe is like an hypothesis to be judged by its result when something is made according to it.

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[6] Aristotle, *On the Universe*, Book Three, Chapter 7, 306a 6-18

Aristotle also saw that the Pythagoreans accustomed to the first kind of beginning from geometry sought it everywhere, not seeing the need for another kind of beginning as one goes from the very general in the beginning of our study of natural things to the particular.

Christian Huygens, in the early years of modern science, was also able to see that there are these two beginnings in our thinking. In the Preface to his *Treatise on Light,* he writes:

> There will be seen in it [the Treatise] demonstrations of those kinds which do not produce as great a certitude as those of Geometry, and which even differ much therefrom, since whereas the Geometers prove their Propositions by fixed and incontestable Principles, here the Principles are verified by the conclusions to be drawn from them; the nature of these things not allowing of this being done otherwise.[7]

Huygens distinguishes between two kinds of beginning or principle in our thought. One is judged by its consequences, by the conclusions that follow from it; but the other is that by which the conclusions that follow from it are judged. The former is found in experimental science and the latter in geometry (and also, as Aristotle had seen, in the beginning or very general study of natural things.)

If one is accustomed to one of these beginnings only, he may think that all beginnings are similar. This shows the great influence of custom upon our thinking. Thus the Pythagoreans sought in the particular study of natural things, or what we might call the experimental sciences of nature, the kind of beginning they had in geometry. But we moderns, who are immersed in the experimental sciences and therefore accustomed only to the second kind of beginning, often seek that kind of beginning everywhere (even in geometry). But Aristotle and Huygens rise above this enslavement to custom and see that there are these two kinds of beginning and that they should be sought in different places.

It seems to escape the modern slave of custom (who thinks that every beginning is an hypothesis to be tested by its consequences) that he uses a beginning which cannot be so tested. We test an hypothesis by deducing its consequences and seeing whether they agree with experiment and observation or are contradicted thereby. We reject or modify an hypothesis that is

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[7] Christian Huygens, Preface to his *Treatise on Light*, Dover Publications, p. vi

contradicted by observation or experiment. And thus we take as a beginning in our work that something cannot both be and not be. Now this beginning about being and non-being cannot be tested by seeing whether its consequences are contradicted or not for that procedure proceeds from the impossibility of something both being and not being. Some thinkers deny this beginning because something seems to contradict it. And this is to say that it is not so because it is so.

When Aristotle sees that the natural philosophers before him are all saying the same thing proportionally, we see another major example of the role of proportion in our knowledge. It might be good here to elaborate a bit the extremely important role of proportion in our knowledge. We are taking the word *proportion* here in the sense of a *likeness of ratios*, not in the sense of a ratio. A ratio is the order or relation of one thing to another. This can be seen not only in numbers, but also in other things; just as four is to six as two is to three, so also seeing is to the eye as hearing is to the ear.

The ability to see a proportion is the greatest part of the fourth tool of the dialectician which is useful for inductions, hypothetical or if-then syllogisms, and definitions. Here is a translation of Aristotle's words on the fourth tool:

> One should consider the likeness of things in other genera; as this is to that, so something other is to another; for example, as knowledge is to the knowable, so sensation is to the sensible; and as this is in that, so something other is in another; for example, as sight is in the eye, so understanding is in the soul; and as calmness is in the sea, so stillness is in the air.
>
> One ought to be exercised especially in those far apart, for we will be able to see with ease the likeness in other cases.
>
> One should also consider things which are in the same genus, to see if something the same belongs to all; for example, to man and horse and dog. For to the extent that the same belongs to these, they will be in that way alike...

> The consideration of the like is useful for inductive arguments and for hypothetical syllogisms and for the rendering of definitions.[8]

Aristotle considers proportion among the ways of investigating why in the *Posterior Analytics:*

> Further, another way is to select by proportion. For it is not possible to take something one which pounce and spine and bone ought to be called. But something will follow these, just as if they were one nature.[9]

Thomas comments on this passage:

> Then...he shows how to investigate the reason why, by reducing to something common by analogy; and he says that another way of investigating the reason why is to select something common by analogy; that is, by proportion. For it is possible to take something proportionally one which is not the same in species or genus, as the pounce of the cuttlefish and the spine of fish and the bones of land animals. For all these agree by proportion because spines are to fish in the same way as bones to land animals. And some things follow this analogous community because of the unity of proportion, just as if they had one common nature of genus or species, as to be covered with flesh.[10]

Proportion is not only useful in reasoning and defining, but also for understanding a difficult to understand ratio by a like, but more easily grasped ratio.

Pierre Duhem, besides being a physicist, is famous for his studies in the history of physics and the method of physics. Listen to these words of his about *analogy* which is the Greek word for proportion:

> The history of physics shows us that the search for analogies between two distinct categories of phenomena has perhaps been

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[8] Aristotle, *About Places* (misleadingly "translated" usually as the *Topics*) Book I, Chapters 17-18, The Fourth Tool of Dialectic

[9] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, Book II, Chapter 13

[10] Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Posterior Analytics*, Book II, Lectio XVII, n. 563

> the surest and most fruitful method of all the procedures put in play in the construction of physical theories.[11]

Einstein, in his book giving the history of some of the main theories of physics, states:

> It has often happened in physics that an essential advance was achieved by carrying out a consistent analogy between apparently unrelated phenomena. In these pages we have often seen how ideas created and developed in one branch of science were afterwards successfully applied to another.[12]

Seeing proportions is important many times in this First Book of *Natural Hearing,* as it is in all of Aristotle's books. The First Reading in this book, for example, required the seeing of many proportions. The general is to the particulars, as a whole is to its parts. The general is to the particular as the confused is to the distinct, etc. And in this Reading, it helps us to see how the early natural philosophers are in some way saying the same, despite all their disagreements.

Duane H. Berquist

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[11] Pierre Duhem, *The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory* , Princeton University Press, 1954, p. 95

[12] Albert Einstein, *The Evolution of Physics*, Simon and Shuster, N.Y., p. 270

ARISTOTLE, FIRST BOOK OF NATURAL HEARING (PHYSICS), READING ELEVEN

The next to be said is whether there are two or three or more beginnings.

For one is not possible because contraries are not one.

Unlimited is not possible because what-is would not be knowable.

And there is one contrariety in every one genus, and substance is one genus.

And because it possible from the limited, it is better from the limited, as Empedocles. For he is thought to explain all things as much as Anaxagoras from the unlimited.

Further, some contraries are before others and others come to be from each other, as sweet and bitter, white and black, while the beginnings ought always to remain.

Hence, it is clear from these things that they are neither one nor unlimited.

Seeing that they are limited, there is some reason for making them not only two. For someone might ask how either density is apt by its nature to make rareness something, or this, density. Likewise in any other contrariety. For love does not bring together hate and make something from the same, nor hate from that; but both, some third thing. Some however take many from which they build the nature of what is.

In addition to these things, someone might have doubts if no one placed another nature under the contraries. For we see that no substance is contrary. But the beginning ought not to be said of any subject for there would be a beginning of the beginning. For the subject is a beginning and seems to be before that which is said of it.

Further, we do not say that substance is contrary to substance. How then would substance be from what is not substance? Or how could non-substance be before substance?

Whence if someone should hold the former reason and this to be true, it is necessary, if both of them are to be saved, that some third thing underlie; as water or fire or something inbetween these. It seems more the inbetween. For fire and earth and air and water are twined together with contrarieties. Hence, those making the underlying other than these, do not act unreasonably; of the others, those saying air - for air has the least sensible differences of the others; next, water.

But all shape this one thing by contraries, by density and rareness, and by the more and the less. These however are, in general, excess and defect, as has been said before. And the same opinion that the one and excess and defect are beginnings of existing things seems to be ancient, except not in the same way. For the ancients say the two act upon and the one undergoes while some of the latter say rather the contrary - the one acts upon and the two undergo.

To say then that the elements are three would seem to have some reason for those considering from these and other such things, as we have said.

But to say more than three would seem no longer to have a reason. For one is enough to undergo. If however four things exist, there will be two contrarieties. and it will be necessary that another inbetween nature will exist separately for each. If, however, being two, they are able to generate from each other, the other one of the contrarieties would be superfluous.

At the same time, it is impossible for there to be many first contrarieties. For substance is one genus of being, so that the beginnings differ from each other only in being before and after, but not in genus. As there is always one contrariety in one genus, all the contraries seem to be led back to one.

It is clear then that the element is neither one nor more than two or three. But which of these, as we have said, has great difficulty.

NOTE FOR BOOK ONE, READING ELEVEN

Aristotle goes forward in this Reading chiefly from the two contrary beginnings brought out in the Tenth Reading to the necessity of a third beginning. He also will bring out how the earlier philosophers saw the need for a third thing (or things) besides the two contraries.

However, he sets this main advance in the context of the question how many beginnings are there. And he answers this question in three steps.

First he eliminates the extremes or the answers furthest apart. There cannot be just one beginning or an infinity of beginnings. He shows that there cannot be just one since the beginnings are contrary and nothing is contrary to itself. There must be *at least* two since contraries come in pairs. Then he eliminates as an answer that there is an infinity of beginnings by four arguments which we will consider shortly.

Having shown that there are at least two beginnings, he then asks does anything force us to go to more than two. For if two were enough, then, by the beginning or principle of fewness, it is better to stop there. He then shows by three arguments that the two contraries are not enough to explain change and that a third beginning is necessary. We shall consider these arguments below.

Then after bringing out how the earlier thinkers seem to have seen also that there are three beginnings, Aristotle asks whether it is necessary to go beyond three. And by two arguments which we shall consider, he shows that three is enough.

It is interesting to note how often, not only here, but elsewhere, three is enough. In the book *On the Universe*, Aristotle notes a sign of this which is that three is the first number about which we say *all*.

Thus besides the two chief kinds of philosophy, looking philosophy and practical philosophy, there is need of a third kind of philosophy which is logic, the tool of philosophy. And this is enough.

And there can be only three kinds of looking philosophy (natural philosophy, mathematical philosophy and first philosophy or wisdom) as Aristotle shows in the sixth book of *Wisdom* and Boethius in the *de Trinitate.*

Likewise, there are just three kinds of practical philosophy as Thomas explains in his proemium to the *Nicomachean Ethics.*

And logic has three parts, corresponding to there being just three acts of reason to be directed, as Thomas shows in his two Proemia to logic.

The reader can amuse himself by going through the arts and sciences and seeing how often three is enough even though it is not always the case. And this between taking his three meals a day.

We have noted already that Aristotle is quick to eliminate the answer that there is only one beginning of change for in the previous Reading it has been brought out abundantly that change is by contraries and contraries are two.

If we examine the four arguments given by Aristotle against the answer that there are an infinity of beginnings, it can be seen that the first and the third are based on the beginning of fewness and that they are two of those used against Anaxagoras' position in the Ninth Reading. They are the same as the first and the last arguments given there (to the discussion of which we refer the reader). The second and the fourth arguments here reason from the beginnings being contraries and what we know about contraries, the second argument using the definition of contraries and the fourth proceeding from the truth that one pair of contraries gives rise to another pair.

In the second argument, Aristotle reasons that the first beginnings are in the genus substance since this is before all the genera of accidents. And if the beginnings are contraries, there cannot be an infinity of beginnings in substance since there can be only one pair of contraries in any one genus. This follows from contraries being the species furthest apart in a genus, as black and white are contraries in the genus color. Just as there can be many pairs of points equidistant from each other on a straight line, but only one pair that are furthest apart (namely the end points), so in one genus there can be only one pair furthest apart although there can be many pairs the same distance apart.

In the fourth argument, Aristotle reasons that if contraries are the beginnings and the beginnings are infinite, then every pair of contraries would have to be first beginnings. But this is not possible since some contraries are causes of

other pairs as hot and cold cause the butter to be soft and hard, and wet and dry cause the sponge to be soft and hard.

Aristotle next asks whether two is enough and then by three arguments, he reasons that a third beginning is necessary.

The first of these is the strongest and it unties the apparent contradiction in change which Heraclitus had pointed out. In change, one contrary is said to become the other. We all say this. The hot becomes cold and the hard becomes soft and the wet becomes dry and vice-versa. The healthy becomes sick and the sick become healthy. Since *becomes* means *comes to be*, we seem to be saying that one contrary comes to be the other. If this is so, then day is night, as Heraclitus said in one fragment, and the waking are the sleeping and the living are the dead and so on, as he said in another fragment. And if we say that the healthy cannot be sick (for this involves a contradiction) and therefore cannot come to be sick, the healthy will always be healthy and likewise for the same reason, the sick will always be sick. There will be no change. But if one contrary is the other, there will not be any change either since change is from one contrary to the other.

We have here the first major step forward in our thinking by untying a contradiction. And perhaps most of the major steps forward in our subsequent knowledge have been by untying or breaking down contradictions, real or apparent, that have blocked and stopped us for a time from going forward.

This seems to be the first major step forward in our thinking by untying a contradiction for it is the first major contradiction we meet. Because things in motion or changing things first catch the attention of our senses (where our knowledge begins) and all change seems to be between contraries or to involve one contrary becoming the other, this is the first contradiction blocking the way forward for us.

The importance of untying or breaking down contradictions to go forward in our knowledge is considered by Aristotle in the beginning of the third book of *Wisdom or First Philosophy* (the *Metaphysics*). And scientists like Einstein and Niels Bohr and theologians like Augustine and Thomas have asserted and shown the universal importance of seeing and untying contradictions to go forward.

The way Aristotle unties this apparent contradiction in all change can be seen by considering one pair of contraries. When the healthy become sick, does health itself become sickness or sick? Or when the sick become healthy, does sickness now become health or healthy? This would involve a contradiction. There must be a third thing, which is neither sickness nor health, in which sickness or health can be, but not at the same time. This third thing is able to be healthy and able to be sick, but it is not actually both at the same time. When it is actually one, it is able to be the other. But if it becomes the other, it ceases to be the one it was.

We are forced by the contradiction to recognize the ability of this third thing.

If we take the contraries concretely, as healthy and sick, rather than as health and sickness, we need to recall from the First Reading of this book how the knowledge sufficient to use a name is confused compared to, for example, that had when we can define. Likewise, when we say *the healthy become sick*, the word *healthy* makes no distinction between health and the body in which the health is. But the body and its health are not the same thing for the body can lose its health. If the body and its health were the same thing, the body could never become sick for health itself cannot be sick. Untying the contradiction brings reason from a confused knowledge of the contraries that are said to become each other to a distinct knowledge that separates the contrary in the pure or abstract sense and its subject. We see that what changes is always composed of the contrary in the pure sense and the subject in which that contrary exists. We can also see here why we can say that *the healthy become sick* even though it is impossible for the healthy to be sick. In like manner, we can say that *a pianist cooked dinner* if the cook happens to be a pianist even though he did not do so *as* pianist. So likewise, the body, which happens to be healthy, becomes sick. The body as such becomes sick and because to be healthy happens to it before, we say that the healthy become sick, speaking accidentally or by happening. But this case is more difficult to see since the cook is not necessarily a pianist before he cooks dinner, but the body is necessarily healthy before it becomes sick.

In theology, we can reason from this statement that *what changes is always composed* and the statement that *God is not composed* to the conclusion that *God does not change*.

Now what has been said of the change between healthy and the sick can be said of any other change between contraries. If the hard becomes soft,

hardness itself cannot become soft or softness. For hardness is that by which the hard is hard (formally speaking) and that cannot be soft, let alone softness by which the soft is soft. A third thing is the subject of hardness and softness, but not at the same time. It is able to be hard and soft, but not both at the same time.

Thus by untying the first major contradiction or apparent contradiction our reason meets, Aristotle goes forward in two ways. He goes forward from seeing that two things, the contraries taken purely, are not enough to seeing that there must be a third beginning or thing involved, the subject in which these contraries are (but never both at the same time). And he goes forward from a confused knowledge of the contraries (taken concretely, as hard rather than hardness) to a distinct knowledge of the contraries as composed of the contrary in the strict or pure sense and the subject of that contrary.

And he also sees how the third thing is to the contraries.

If we take the contraries concretely, such as hard and soft, the third thing is able to be both of them, but not at the same time. And when it is actually one of them, it is able to be the other. But if it becomes the other, it will cease to be the former. Thus butter, for example, can be hard or soft, but not both at the same time. And when it is actually hard, it can becomes soft, but if it becomes soft, it will cease to be hard. We are thus introduced against to the ability to be formed in various ways and the strange kind of reality which is this ability for opposites.

And if we take the contraries purely or abstractly, such as hardness and softness, the third thing is to them as their subject, but not of both of them at the same time.

The second and third arguments for a third beginning in change are based on the statement that the contraries are accidents, such as hardness or softness, health and sickness, etc.

Since substance is more fundamental than accidents, if the contrary accidents are beginnings, then even more so is the substance which is their subject.

And if only the contrary accidents were beginnings, then accidents would have to be the beginning of substance. But how could accidents be the source of substance?

After thus showing that there are three things found in every change, Aristotle shows how his predecessors also seem to have seen this. For besides condensation and rarefaction, they had an element that was condensed or rarified. And besides mixture and segregation, they had the four elements or atoms or something else that was mixed or segregated.

Having shown that two beginnings was not enough, but a third was necessary (and what this third was and how it was to the two contraries), Aristotle in the end of this Reading asks whether three is enough. And he gives two reasons for saying three is enough.

One reason is that change is possible with this third beginning while it was impossible with just the two contraries. Hence, we are not forced to go to more beginnings to have change or to make it possible.

Then, he recalls that substance is one genus and in one genus there is only one contrariety. So this contrariety and its subject are enough.

The diligent reader, like Thomas, will note that Aristotle apparently contradicts himself in this Reading. For in the beginning when reasoning against there being an infinity of beginnings and now when reasoning that three are enough, he assumes that there is one contrariety in substance. But in the middle, when reasoning that there is a third beginning besides the contraries, he reasons in the second and third arguments from contrariety being found only among accidents and one substance not being contrary to another.

As Thomas points out, Aristotle is reasoning dialectically in some of these arguments. A dialectical syllogism is from probable opinions and the probable is apt to have some part of the truth, but not necessarily the whole truth. The demonstrator never reasons from both sides of a contradiction, but the dialectician can if there is apart of the truth on both sides.

In accidents, there are both contrary *species* and contrary *differences*. For example, virtue is contrary to vice. And if virtue is a good habit and vice, a bad habit, their differences, good and bad, are also contrary. But in substance, species, like man and dog, do not seem to be contrary. But if man is a rational

animal and dog is an irrational animal, there seem to be contrary differences (rational and irrational). Thus, if there are contrary differences but not contrary species in substance, there is some truth to saying there is contrariety in substance and some truth in saying one substance is not contrary to another. Hence, both statements are probable.

We have emphasized the first argument whereby Aristotle shows that a third thing or beginning is necessary in change because this has necessity while the second and third arguments are dialectical. The first argument is also very important as being perhaps the first major example of how our reason goes forward by untying or breaking down contradictions.

In the Twelfth and Thirteenth Readings, Aristotle will find a common basis and become strong in it with complete necessity. And we shall see there how he corrects a bit what has been shown in Readings Ten and Eleven.

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ARISTOTLE, FIRST BOOK OF NATURAL HEARING (PHYSICS), READING TWELVE

Let us speak therefore in this way: first considering about every becoming. For it is according to nature to state first the general and then to consider what is proper about each thing.

We say that one thing comes to be from another, saying either the simple or the composed. I mean this thus: there is man who becomes musical and there is the non-musical which becomes musical or the non-musical man who becomes a musical man. I call simple man and non-musical which come to be something and simple the musical which is coming to be. I call composed, both what is coming to be something and what comes to be, as when we say the non-musical man becomes a musical man.

Of these, this is not only said to become that, but also from this, as musical from non-musical, but this is not said in all. For musical has not come to be from man, but man has become musical.

Of those coming to be something as we say the simple comes to be, the one comes to be remaining, but the other not remaining. For man remains having become musical and is a man, but non-musical and unmusical neither simply nor composed remain.

Having determined these things, one can take this from all the things which come to be, if someone looks at them as we have said, that it is necessary always for something to underlie which comes to be something; and this even if it is one in number, is not of one sort. I mean the same by sort and definition. For it is not the same to be man and to be unmusical.

And the one remains while the other does not remain. the one not opposed remains for the man remains while the non-musical and the unmusical does not remain, nor the composed from both, as the unmusical man.

And something comes to be from something and not this becomes something is said more in those not remaining, as musical comes to be from unmusical, but not from man. But sometimes it is said likewise in those remaining - for we say the statue comes to be from bronze, not the bronze

comes to be a statue. But this from the opposite and not remaining is said in both ways: both this comes to be from this, and this comes to be this - both the musical comes to be from the unmusical and the unmusical comes to be musical. Hence likewise in the composed. For it is said both that the musical comes to be from the unmusical man and the unmusical man comes to be musical.

Since coming to be is said in many ways, and of these one is not said to come to be, but to come to be this, while to come to be is said simply of substances only; concerning the others, it is clear that something underlies what comes to be - for how much and how and towards another and when and where come to be with something underlying because only substance is said of no other underlying subject, but all others of substance. That substance and whatever simply is, comes to be from something underlying will become clear to one considering. For there is always something that underlies, from which what comes to be is, as the plants and the animals from seed.

Of the things which come to be, some come to be by changing shape, as the statue; some by addition, as the growing; some by subtraction, as the statue of Hermes from the stone; some by putting together, as the house; some by alteration, as those changed in matter. It is clear that all things thus coming to be, come to be from some underlying subjects.

So it is clear from the aforesaid that everything which comes to be is always composed; and there is something which has come to be and there is something which comes to be it, and this is twofold - either the underlying subject or the opposite. I mean the opposed as the unmusical, the underlying as the man; and the unshaped and the unformed and the disordered the opposed, but the bronze or the stone or the silver the underlying.

NOTE FOR BOOK ONE, READING TWELVE

In Readings Twelve and Thirteen, Aristotle does something like what he has done in the Tenth and Eleventh Readings. He follows again the advice of Heraclitus to become strong in what is common to all. Like in those previous Readings, he finds a common thought or understanding about change or becoming and then goes through a number of steps to become strong in that common understanding.

But there are a number of very essential differences between these two findings of a common understanding and the becoming strong in it.

In the Tenth and Eleventh Readings, he found a common basis among all the natural philosophers. But in Reading Twelve, Aristotle will find a common understanding among all men.

A second difference is that there was some probability in the way he became strong in Ten and Eleven. But in Reading Thirteen, he will try to become strong with complete necessity. And hence, he will correct a little what was said in the Tenth and Eleventh Readings.

A third difference is that he is trying to understand more how there can be change even of substance.

Perhaps a fourth difference can be noted. In Ten and Eleven, he was more trying to find what is within every *change*. In Twelve and Thirteen, he is more trying to find what is within every *becoming.* The words *becoming* and *change,* if they are speaking of the same, are perhaps looking at it differently. The word *becoming* is looking at what is coming to be in a change. But *change* is as much, if not more, looking at what the change is from.

Although Aristotle found that there were three things in every change, just as he finds three things in every becoming here, he is more explicit here that only two of these are causes *as such* of what comes to be.

Aristotle begins from the ways all men speak about becoming and finds in those ways of speaking signs that they know in some confused way at least that

there are three things involved in every becoming. Men not only say that this becomes that, but they use two names for the this that becomes that. When the butter is put in the refrigerator, we could say that the butter becomes hard or that the soft becomes hard or we could say that the soft butter becomes hard. And then Aristotle points out that men use the preposition *from* with one of the names of the this that becomes that, but not with the other. We might say that when the soft butter is put in the refrigerator, it goes from soft to hard. But we would not say that it goes from butter to hard.

Likewise, when the wet cloth is hung out to dry, we might say it goes from wet to dry, but not from cloth to dry.

And when a sick man becomes healthy, he goes from being sick to being healthy, but we would not say that he goes from being a man to being healthy.

Then after looking at the ways we all speak about becoming, Aristotle looks at the things named by the two names we give to the this that becomes that. One he sees is the name of something that remains in the becoming and the other is the a name of something that is lost in the becoming. In the examples already given, *butter* is the name of something that remains when the soft butter becomes hard while *soft* is the name of something that is lost in that becoming. Likewise, when the wet cloth becomes dry, *cloth* is the name of something that remains and *wet* is the name of something that is lost in that becoming. Likewise when the sick man becomes healthy, *man* is the name of something that remains while *sick* is the name of something that is lost in that becoming.

Now if we compare this difference in things with that difference in the way we speak (of using the word *from* with one name and not the other), we see a correspondence. Men tend to use the word *from* with the name of what is lost in becoming and *not* with the name of what remains. In the above examples, we use the word *from* with *soft, wet* and *sick* which are the names of what are lost in those three becomings and not with the words *butter, cloth* and *man* which are the names of what remain in those three becomings. This is a sign that, in using two names for the this that becomes that, men are somewhat aware of the difference in what they are naming. For they use the word *from* with the name of what is lost rather than with the name of what remains. And the preposition *from* seems to imply that which is left behind or lost.

Aristotle then considers how many things are found in every becoming. Now when this becomes that, there is of course this and that. But since this in one way remains and in another is lost, there must be three things in every becoming. Further a sign that the two names of the this are not mere synonyms is that we use the word *from* with one and not the other.

Now it should be noted that in determining how many *things* are in every becoming, Aristotle first reasons from a difference seen in things, that when this becomes that, something of this remains and something is lost. Clearly what remains and what is lost cannot be the same. Then he gives a sign that they are not the same which is drawn from our use of the word *from*. The reason for this order is clear. Clearly the main reason for saying that butter and soft cannot be the same thing in reality is that one remains and one is lost in the becoming. That we use the word *from* with the name of one and not the other is, at best, a sign of this truth. The main reason for what is found in things must be drawn from them and not from our way of speaking.

But in the beginning of this Reading, Aristotle started from our way of speaking because he was looking for a sign of our common thinking or understanding of becoming and our ways of speaking about becoming reveal a common understanding.

After showing that three things are found in every becoming, Aristotle manifests something that he presupposed somewhat. And to see better what he is doing, we should distinguish three truths about becoming and how they are to our reason.

One truth is that in every becoming something comes to be. The second truth is that *what comes to be* comes to be from something. And the third truth is that this something from which it comes to be is twofold, involving something that remains and something that is lost in the becoming.

Now the first of these truths is altogether obvious. There is no becoming if nothing comes to be, just as there is no motion if nothing moves. So Aristotle in no way tries to manifest or show this truth. (Just as in the second book, he will not try to show that nature exists.)

The second truth Aristotle presupposed since all the Greek natural philosophers agreed that one cannot get something from nothing. But as a kind of afterthought, he does now manifest it by two inductions. For it is not as obvious as the first truth and there are some, even in modern times, who speak as if one could get something from nothing.

He mainly upfront tried to show what people might not see right away, that what something comes to be from is twofold, in part remaining and in part being lost.

The two inductions, by which he shows that all becoming starts from something, differ in that the first is taken from the things that come to be and the second from the ways they comes to be. The thing that comes to be is either an accident or a substance. Since accidents exist only in substance, one must have a substance before an accident can come to be. And even substances seem to come to be from something, as a plant or animal from a seed of some sort. Likewise, it is clear from the common ways that things come to be that one does not start from nothing. If one molds a statue, it is out of clay or some material. If the mighty river comes to be by the addition of streams running together, we do not get something large by adding nothing to nothing. If something comes to be by abstraction, as the statues of Michelangelo, he did not chip away at nothing, but at a slab of marble. If something comes to be by being together as a house, we do not nail nothing to nothing. If we want make tea, we alter the water from cold to hot, we do not alter nothing to hot, or heat up nothing.

Thus Aristotle concludes that there are three things found in every becoming: the subject or matter which remains throughout the becoming, what it becomes or the form added to this, and the contrary or opposite which is lost in the becoming.

In the following text, Thomas indicates how we can say that this comes to be that and this comes to be *from* that:

> sicut patet in I Phys., "hoc fit hoc", dicimus in permanentibus, per se, sed in non permanentibus, per accidens.

> Sed "ex hoc fit hoc", dicitur proprie in non permanentibus. Dicimus enim: "Ex non albo fit album."
>
> Et si aliquando dicatur aliquid fieri ex permanente, hoc est inquantum intelligitur cum permanente aliquid non permanens, sicut cum dicitur "Ex aere fit statua", intelligitur ex aere infigurato.
>
> Et sic patet quod haec locutio: "Hoc fit hoc", exprimit identitatem subjecti.
>
> Haec autem locutio: "Ex hoc fit hoc", principaliter exprimit ordinem terminorum adinvicem, et sic per consequens quandoque unitatem subjecti. Unde quandoque importat tantum ordinem sine hoc quod importet subjectum, ut cum dicitur: "Ex mane fit meridies", idest post, ut dicitur in II Meta."[1]

Something of this same teaching is found in the following passage of Thomas:

> dupliciter dicitur aliquid fieri ex aliquo: scilicet ex privatione et ex subiecto, quod dicitur materia...Dicitur autem magis aliquid fieri ex privatione quam ex subiecto, sicut magis dicitur aliquis fieri sanus ex laborante, quam ex homine.
>
> Sed hoc fieri hoc magis dicimus in subiecto quam in privatione. Magis enim dicimus proprie quod homo fit sanus, quam quod laborans.[2]

When you say, for example, that you are *going* home and your mother says that you are *coming* home, both of you are speaking of the same trip or voyage. But you are looking at your trip from the point of view of the point of departure while your mother is looking at it from the end-point or point of arrival. Hence, you call it *going home* and your mother calls it *coming home*. In the following text, Thomas sees *mutatio* or *change* as naming the motion more from the

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[1] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum* , Dist. XI, Q. II, Art. I, Ad Tertiam Quaestionem, C.

[2] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio VI, n. 1415

removal of what was the starting-point of the motion and becoming, as we have said, from that to which the motion tends or its end

> ...mutatio imponitur pro remotione ejus a quo est motus, sed fieri pro adeptione ejus ad quod motus terminatur:
>
> a Deo autem nullo modo aliquid removetur, et si adveniat habitudo aliqua secundum rationem; unde etsi dicatur fieri aliquid, non debet dici mutari in illud.[3]

And in another text, he teaches this more succinctly:

> ...mutari proprie dicitur per remotionem a termino a quo; fieri autem dicitur per accessum ad terminum ad quem.[4]

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[3] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum,* Distinctio XXX, Quaest. I, Art. I

[4] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Tomus III, Distinctio VII, Quaest. II, Art. I, Ad 1

ARISTOTLE, FIRST BOOK OF NATURAL HEARING (PHYSICS), READING 13

If there are causes and beginnings of the things which are by nature, from which they first are and come to be, not by happening, but by what each is said to be according to its substance, it is manifest then that everything comes to be from the underlying subject and the form. For musical man is put together from man and musical in some way. For you break apart the definition into these thoughts. It is clear then that the things which become, come to be from these.

The underlying subject is one in number, but two in sort. For the man and the gold and generally the matter, can be numbered. The one is more a this something and what becomes does not come to be from it by happening. but the form is one. As the order or the musical art or any one of the other things said in this way.

Whence it is on the one hand that the beginnings ought to be said to be two while on the other hand there are three. And it is that in one way they are contraries, as if one were to say the musical and the unmusical or the hot and the cold or the harmonious and the inharmonious; and in another way it is not - for it is impossible for contraries to be acted upon by each other. But this is untied due to the underlying subject being other - for this is not contrary. Thus the beginnings are neither more than the contraries in a way, but two so as to speak in number, nor again entirely two because to be other belongs to these. For to be a man and to be unmusical are other, and to be unformed and to be bronze are other.

It has been said then how many are the beginnings in the becoming of natural things and in what way how many. And it is clear that something ought to underlie the contraries And that the contraries are two. In a way, the other is not necessary. For it will be enough that one of the contraries make the change by its presence and absence.

The underlying nature is knowable by proportion. For as bronze is toward statue or wood towards bed or the matter and the unformed towards any of the things having form before it receives the form, thus the same has itself toward substance and this something and what is. This then is one beginning, not thus being one or existing as the this something; one of which there is the

definition; further the lack, the contrary to this. In what way these are two and in what way more has been said in the above.

First then it has been said that only contraries are the beginnings. Later that it is necessary that something underlie and there be three. From the present it is clear what is the difference of the contraries and how the beginnings are to each other, and what is the underlying subject. Whether the form or the underlying subject is substance is not yet clear. But that the beginnings are three and how three and what the way of these is clear. How many then and which are the beginnings can be considered from these things.

NOTE FOR BOOK ONE, READING THIRTEEN

In this Reading, Aristotle teaches perhaps three things that have not been shown before and he also brings together what has been taught here and in some previous readings, showing how these things can be said and summarized in various ways.

The first new teaching here is that of the three things found in every becoming only two are causes *as such* or *through themselves* of what comes to be. When we examine and take apart by reason what comes to be, we see that it is put together from the underlying subject or matter which remains in the becoming and the form or act it has acquired in the becoming. The contrary or opposite of the form has been lost and is not a part of what has come to be. Hence it is not an intrinsic cause of what comes to be. (We could add that it is not an extrinsic cause either for the contrary is opposed to what comes to be rather than making it or being its end.) Thus when the butter is put into the refrigerator, what comes to be is hard butter. If we take apart by reason hard butter, we see that it includes butter and hardness. The softness, from which the becoming began, isn't a part of what has come to be. (Nor did the softness make the butter hard.) Likewise, when the sick man becomes healthy. What has comes to be is a healthy man. If we take apart by reason a healthy man, we can see that it involves a man and health. But the contrary sickness is not part of the healthy man. (Nor did the sickness make the man healthy.)

Aristotle then points out that what is said to become something is one in subject but two in definition. We can say, for example, that the man becomes healthy and the sick becomes healthy. We are not talking of two subjects becoming healthy because in that case we would have two healthy ones at the end of the becoming. Rather the one subject of becoming is defined or described in two ways, as man and as sick. But one (man) is what as such or through itself becomes healthy and the other (sick) is said to become healthy only because it *happens* to what as such becomes healthy.

Aristotle then shows on the basis of the teaching not only in this Reading, but also on that in Readings Ten and Eleven, the ways in which we can say that the beginnings are two or three. If we take, for example, the contraries concretely, we might say there are only two things in change, such as the hard and the soft. But if we distinguish the hardness and the softness purely or abstractly from their subject, there are three things in every change. Likewise, we saw in

reading Twelve that we can speak of three things in every becoming. But now we see that there are only two beginnings if we speak of the causes *as such* of what comes to be.

In showing how we can speak truly or correctly of both two and three beginnings here, Aristotle is giving us an important addition to the Rule of Two or Three. Reason usually divides or distinguishes into two or three. Hence, reason often seeks to know whether it should divide into two or into three. But there are many things that can be divided correctly into two and into three. And there are various ways in which this can take place. Sometimes, for example, we might say that there are only two kinds of philosophy: looking and practical. At other times, we might say there are three kinds, adding logic to the above two. Was it incorrect then to speak before of there being only two kinds of philosophy? No, because there are only two *chief* or *principal* parts of philosophy. But if we wish to include the *tool* of philosophy, which is logic, as part of philosophy (although not a chief part), we can say there are three parts. We could divide name said of many things into two or three. We could say that a name is said of many things either univocally or equivocally. That is, it is either said of many things with the same meaning in mind when said of each or with other meanings in mind when said of each. The name said equivocally of many things can be divided again into two either by chance or by reason. In the former there is no connection or order among the meanings, no reason why they should have the same name, but in the other, there is a connection or order among the meanings and therefore a reason why they have the same name. But sometimes Thomas divides *name said of many things* into three. Either it is said with exactly the same meaning when said of each (univocally) or it is said with entirely different meanings of each (equivocally or purely equivocally), or it is said with meanings partly the same and partly different of each (analogously). A statement can be divided into noun and verb or it can be divided into subject, predicate and copula. A plot can divided into beginning, middle and end or into the tying of the knot and the untying of the knot. Government can be divided into rule by the one or by the few or by the many. It can also be divided into just and unjust. There are many reasons why we sometimes divide the same thing into two and into three, but we cannot go into this now.

Next Aristotle teaches us that change is not always between contraries or their intermediaries. And here he seems to correct a bit what was said in the Tenth Reading. Contraries, strictly speaking, are the species or forms furthest apart in

the same genus. But here Aristotle teaches us that becoming is not always from the contrary *form*. Sometimes it begins merely from the *lack* of a form.

This is most easily seen in human things. When a man becomes virtuous, he does not always start from being vicious. Vice is the contrary of virtue. They are both in the genus of habit and are the habits furthest apart. If I bring up a boy or girl to be just, they may come to have the virtue of justice without ever having had the vice of injustice. But if I try to reform the criminal in prison, I would be starting from the contrary vice. Now it is easier or more possible to bring up a boy or girl to be just than it is to reform the criminal. For the criminal has a real habitual inclination to the opposite of virtue and will resist one in the way the boy or girl will not. Likewise, it is easier to bring a girl up to be chaste than to make chaste a prostitute because the latter is habitually inclined to the opposite of the virtue and will resist becoming chaste much more than the girl who merely lacks the virtue in the beginning.

Likewise, to convince someone of your opinion, he does not have to have first a contrary opinion. He may merely lack your opinion. And it is easier to convince him if he has no opinion than if he has the contrary opinion.

Likewise, the teacher teaches someone who does not know the truth yet, but that person is not necessarily mistaken. The man who is mistaken about something, thinks falsely about it. His thinking is contrary to the true thinking. But some student might be merely ignorant of what is true without thinking anything false about it. The slave-boy in the *Meno* is mistaken about how to double a square. But not everyone who learns how to double a square is mistaken about it first. He may merely be ignorant of it. Socrates' first conversation with the slave-boy (in which he shows the slave-boy that he is mistaken) would be unnecessary if he was merely ignorant.

In teaching us that change may not always start from the contrary form, but sometimes from merely the lack of the form to be acquired, Aristotle is also bringing out what is necessarily found at the beginning of coming to have a form. One necessarily lacks that form. Even the one who has the contrary form, necessarily lacks the form he is going to come to have. But the one who lacks the form he is going to come to have does not necessarily have also the contrary form. Hence, we see how in Reading Ten Aristotle was not determining the truth with complete necessity, but with some necessity and some probability. One may usually have the contrary form, but one necessarily lacks the form he is going to come to have.

After this, Aristotle comes to the most difficult thing to understand in the First Book of *Natural Hearing*. This is the first matter, the matter or subject underlying change of substance.

Before trying to understand something, it is perhaps necessary to know how to understand it.

Aristotle teaches us that the first matter can be known only by a proportion; that is, by a likeness of ratios.

What is the reason for this? And what is the proportion by which the first matter can be known?

Ability is knowable only by the act for which it is an ability. But the first matter by itself is only ability. Therefore, it is not knowable by itself.

The first matter is to man and dog (or any other material substances) as clay is to sphere and cube.

In order to understand a proportion, it is necessary to know in what way the two ratios are alike.

If we say, for example, that four is to six as two is to three, it would be to *misunderstand* the proportion if we think that as two is an even number and three, an odd number, so four must be an even number and six an odd number. The likeness is not in this that as one is the ratio of an even number to an odd number, so is the other ratio. Likewise, if someone thought that as two is to three is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number, so the ratio of four to six is the ratio of a prime number to a prime number.

Rather the likeness consists in this. Four is the same parts of six that two is of three. If we think that six is three two's and four is two of these three parts, the we can understand how it is like two and three. For just as two is two of the three parts of three, so likewise, four is two of the three parts of six.

So in what way is the ratio of the first matter to man and dog, like the ratio of clay to sphere and cube?

At first we see many differences. Man and dog are two substances while sphere and cube differ only accidentally. The two shapes are accidents. And clay is an actual substance while the first matter is not. In what way then are these two ratios alike?

But just like the clay is *able to be* a sphere or a cube, but not at the same time, so likewise the first matter is *able to be a man or a dog,* but not at the same time.

And as the clay when it is actually a sphere is able to be a cube, but when it becomes a cube it is no longer a sphere; so the first matter when it is a man is able be a dog, but when it becomes actually a dog, it is no longer a man.

Thus the first matter, considered by itself, although it never could exist by itself, is pure ability. It is obviously not an actual substance. And clearly accident cannot exist as underlying substance. Hence, it is substance in ability and consequently pure ability. It is ability, of course, in the passive sense; the ability to be or to be a substance. This is also why it cannot be known by itself for ability is knowable only by its order or relation to act.

In the following text, Thomas says that changes comes to be from opposites, speaking per se:

> ...solum ex oppositis, per se loquendo, fiunt mutationes, ut probatur in primo Physicorum. Ex nigro enim aliquid fit album per se loquendo. Dulce autem non fit ex nigro nisi per accidens, inquantum dulce convenit esse album.[1]

This does not mean that one opposite as such becomes the other for one opposite as such cannot be the other and therefore as such cannot come to be it. But one can say that change is between opposites as such.

In the following text, Thomas distinguishes the kinds of the two terms which are found in every coming to be or change:

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[1] *In X Metaphysicorum,* Lectio IX, n. 2101

In qualibet enim generatione vel mutatione est duos terminos invenire; scilicet terminum a quo, et terminum ad quem. Uterque autem diversimode invenitur in diversis.

In quibusdam enim terminus a quo est aliquid contrarium perfectioni acquirendae; sicut nigredo est contraria albedini, quae per dealbationem acquiritur.

Quandoque vero perfectio acquirenda non habet contrarium directe; sed praecedunt in subiecto dispositiones quae sunt contrariae dispositionibus ordinantibus ad perfectionem inducendam, sicut in corporis animatione.

Quandoque vero nihil praesupponitur nisi privatio sive negatio introducendae formae; sicut in aere iluminando praecedunt tenebrae, quae per lucis praesentiam removentur.

Similiter etiam terminus ad quem, quandoque est unus tantum, ut in dealbatione terminus ad quem est albedo;

quandoque vero sunt duo termini ad quem, quorum unus ad alium ordinatur, sicut patet in alteratione elementorum, cuius terminus unus est dispositio quae est necessitas, alius autem ipsa forma substantialis.

In acceptione igitur cognitionis quantum ad terminum a quo invenitur praedicta diversitas, quia quandoque in accipiente scientiam praeexistit error contrarius scientiae acquirendae;

quandoque vero dispositiones contrariae, sicut impuritas animae, aut immoderata occupatio circa res sensibiles vel aliquid aliud;

quandoque vero praeexistit solummodo cognitionis privatio vel negatio, sicut cum in cognitione de die in diem proficimus...

Ex parte autem termini ad quem est invenire in acceptione cognitionis duos terminos. Primus est id quo intellectus perficitur ad aliquid cognoscendum; sive sit forma intelligibilis, aut lumen intelligibile, vel quodcumque cognitionis medium. Secundus autem

> terminus est ipsa cognitio, quae exinde procedit, quae est ultimum in acceptione cognitionis.[2]

In the following text, Thomas speaks of the introduction of a new form and the elimination of the contrary form or lack as one in subject, but two in definition:

> illuminatio et purgatio se habent in acquisitione scientiae angelicae sicut generatio et corruptio in acquisitione formae naturalis; quae quidem sunt unum subiecto, differunt autem ratione.[3]

But he still sees an order among the two:

> effectus enim positivi alicuius formae ordine naturae praecedunt effectus privativos. Non enim lumen pellit tenebras nisi per hoc quod illuminat. Et ita gratia per hoc culpam pellit, quod iustificat. Remoto antem priori, removetur posterius.[4]

In this text, Thomas points out that the first matter, although in ability to all the substantial forms, receives them in a certain order:

> Quamvis autem generatio fiat ex non ente quod est in potentia, non tamen fit quodlibet ex quocumque; sed diversa fiunt ex diversis materiis. Unumquodque enim generabilium habet materiam determinatam ex qua fit, quia formam oportet esse proportionatam materiae. Licet enim materia prima sit in potentia ad omnes formas, tamen quodam ordine suscipit eas. Per prius enim est in potentia ad formas elementares. Et eis mediantibus secundum diversas proportiones commixtionum est in potentia ad diversas formas: unde non potest ex quolibet immediate fieri quodlibet, nisi forte per

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[2] *De Veritate*, Q. 9, Art. 3, c
[3] *De Veritate*, Q. 9, Art. 3, Ad 3
[4] *Ad Romanos*, IV, Lectio II, n. 350

> resolutionem in primam materiam. Et hoc est contra Anaxagoram qui posuit quod quodlibet fit ex quolibet.[5]

And another text where Thomas illuminates this order in which the first matter is in ability to diverse forms:

> In actibus autem formarum gradus quidam inveniuntur. Nam materia prima est in potentia primo ad formam elementi. Sub forma vero elementi existens est in potentia ad formam mixti: propter quod elementa sunt materia mixti. Sub forma autem mixti considerata, est in potentia ad animam vegetabilem: nam talis corporis anima actus est. Itaque anima vegetabilis est in potentia ad sensitivam; sensitiva vero ad intellectivam. Quod processus generationis ostendit: primo enim in generatione est fetus vivens vita plantae, postmodum vero vita animalis, demum vero vita hominis.[6]

The following is a text where Thomas brings out the likeness and difference of substantial form and accidental form and something of their order:

> forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et partim differunt.
>
> Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu.
>
> Differunt autem in duobus.
>
> Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum. Forma autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens: subiectum enim eius est ens in actu.
>
> Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali quam in eius subiecto: et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto.

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[5] *In XII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio II, n. 2438

[6] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber III, Caput 22

> Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali: unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti. Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis: inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum.
>
> Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente: nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum; productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum.
>
> Secundo autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia cum minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est propter completionem subiecti...
>
> accidens causaur a subiecto secundum quod est actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia.
>
> Ad secundum dicendum quod subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis. Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium activum; quarumdam autem sicut susceptivum.
>
> Ad tertium dicendum quod emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam transmutationem; sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem, sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat, ut ex luce color.[7]

And in the following text, Thomas will distinguish three kinds of composition in things, including the distinction between the composition of the two forms and their subject or matter:

> ...compositio philosophica et naturalis est multiplex.

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[7] *Summa Theologiae,* Prima Pars, Q. 77, Art. 6, c.

Est enim compositio mixti ex elementis; et in hac compositione loquitur Philosophus quod oportet formam mixti esse aliam omnino ab ipsis elementis.

Est etiam compositio formae substantialis et materiae, ex qua resultat tertium, scilicet forma speciei: quae quidem non est aliud omnino a materia et forma, sed se habet ad eas ut totum ad partes.

Est etiam compositio subiecti et accidentis in qua non resultat aliquid tertium ex utroque: et talis est compositio potentiae et habitus.[8]

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[8] *De Veritate,* Q. 16, Art 1, Ad 16

INTRODUCTORY NOTE FOR READINGS NINE, FOURTEEN AND FIFTEEN

These Readings can be approached in part by something Aristotle insists upon in the *Nicomachean Ethics.* There he insists upon the importance of beginnings and the necessity of distinguishing them from each other and from other things. Thomas paraphrases this teaching of the Philosopher in his commentary on it:

> Et dicit quod homo debet insistere ad hoc, quod singula principia pertranseat, scilicet eorum notitiam accipiendo et eis utendo, secundum quod nata sunt cognosci et studendum qualiter determinentur in hominis cognitione, ut scilicet sciat distinguere principia abinvicem et ab aliis. Cognitio enim principiorum multum adiuvat ad sequentia cognoscenda. Principium enim videtur plus esse quam dimidium totius. Quia scilicet omnia alia quae restant continentur virtute in principiis. Et hoc est quod subdit, quod per unum principium bene intellectum et consideratum, multa fiunt manifesta eorum, quae quaeruntur in scientia.[1]

There are three beginnings brought out in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Readings: matter, form and the lack of form. And among other things, it is important to distinguish these three from each other, as Thomas says about beginnings in the above passage.

The distinction between form and lack of form, however, does not seem to be in need of elaboration since their distinction is altogether obvious. Since the lack of form is the non-being of form (in a subject capable of that form), to confuse form with lack of form would be to see no difference between being and non-being. This would be to admit that something can both be and not (at the same time and in the same way) which reason naturally recognizes to be impossible.

But men do sometimes confuse matter and form. They confuse the ability that is matter with the act that is form. They imagine to be actual in matter what is there only in ability. (In a similar way, Locke imagined what is in a genus in ability to be somehow actually therein.) The position of Anaxagoras on matter gets into most of the difficulties Aristotle shows in Reading Nine because he falsely imagined what can come to be out of matter to be actually therein.

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[1] *In I N. Ethicorum*, Lectio XI, n. 138

Thomas gives as a reason why Aristotle considers the position of Anaxagoras in particular (rather than that of the other natural philosophers) that his opinion seems to assign a common cause of all the species of motion. But it seems to us that the critique of Anaxagoras' position is even more useful in showing the difficulties one gets into when one confuses the ability of matter with the act that is form. Socrates made a similar mistake in the *Meno* when he maintains that the slave-boy *actually* knew how to double a square before their conversation because the way to double a square comes out of the slave-boy's answers. The slave-boy was *able* to know how to double a square from what he knew already, but that is not to *actually* know it. Indeed when first asked how to do so, the slave-boy is mistaken as to how to do it (when he says double the side). If you know the length and width of a rectangle, you are *able* to know its area. But you do not *actually* know it before you multiply the two numbers.

And in the Fifteenth Reading, Aristotle is reasoning against Plato and perhaps others who confused matter and lack of form. Although Thomas says at the beginning that Aristotle will here exclude the errors coming from ignorance of privation or lack, he says later that they did not distinguish between matter and privation of form and hence attributed to matter what belongs to privation or lack. They are misunderstanding then matter as well as lack. If one does not distinguish between matter and lack or privation, one would seem to be mistaken about both or apt to attribute what belongs to either one to the other.

And in the Fourteenth Reading, the doubts arising from ignorance of matter or passive ability, involves seeing to some extent the distinction of matter or ability both from form or what is (actual) and from lack or non-being or what is not.

We have taken the liberty, then, of considering the Ninth Reading with the Fourteenth and Fifteenth as being together useful for the distinction of the beginnings, matter, form and lack of form.

Duane H. Berquist

ARISTOTLE, FIRST BOOK OF NATURAL HEARING (PHYSICS), READING NINE

Anaxagoras would seem to have thought the beginnings unlimited in this way because he assumed the common opinion of the naturalists to be true, that nothing comes to be from what is not. For on account of this, they speak thus: all things were together and coming to be such is alteration while others say it is putting together and separating. Further he reasoned from contraries coming to be from each other. Therefore, they exist within.

For if everything that come to be necessarily comes to be either from what is or from what is not, and of these, coming to be from what is not is impossible (for all those treating about nature are of one mind about this), he thought the rest followed necessarily - that coming to be was from what is and exists within, but on account of the smallness of their sizes to be from what is unable to be sensed by us. Hence, he said that everything is mixed with everything because he saw everything coming to be from everything.

They appear different and are called other from each other by that which excels through great number in the mixture of the unlimited things. There is not any whole purely white or black or sweet or flesh or bone, but that of which each thing has the most seems to be the nature of that thing.

If then the unlimited as unlimited is unknown, the unlimited in multitude or magnitude would be unknown as to how much it is and the unlimited in kind would be unknown as to what kind it is. But the beginnings being unlimited both in multitude and in kind, it would be impossible to know the things from them. For we think we know the composed when we know from which, and how many, things it is.

Further, if it is necessary that that whose part can be of any size in largeness and smallness - I mean one of those parts existing within the whole and into which it can be divided - can itself be of any size; and if it is impossible that an animal or a plant be just any size in largeness or smallness; it is clear that neither is any one of the parts. For the whole will be similar. But flesh and bone and such are the parts of animal and fruits of the plants. It is clear then that it is impossible that flesh or bone or something other be just any size in the direction of the larger or the smaller.

Further, if all such things exist within each other and do not come to be, but the within is separated while it is named from the more; and if anything comes to be from anything, as water is separated from flesh And flesh from water while every limited body is taken up and away by a limited body; it is clear that it is not possible for each thing to be within each thing. For taking away flesh from water and again another coming to be from the rest by separation, even if always the separated is smaller, nevertheless it will not go beyond some magnitude in smallness; so that if the separation stops, not all will be in all - for flesh does not exist within the remaining water; if however it does not stop but always there is a taking away, in a limited magnitude there will be equal limited magnitudes unlimited in multitude. This however is impossible.

In addition to these, if every body necessarily becomes less when something is taken away, and the how much of flesh is determined in largeness and smallness, it is clear that from the smallest piece of flesh, no body will be separated. There would be something smaller than the smallest.

Further, in the unlimited bodies, there will exist now unlimited flesh and blood and brain separated from each other, but nevertheless existing and each unlimited. But this is unreasonable.

It is not knowingly said that it will never be entirely separated, but it is correctly said. For the accidents are not separated. If then the colors and the habits are mixed and if they are separated, there will be something white and healthy, not being anything other, nor of a subject. So that the mind seeking the impossible would be absurd if it wants to separate. For to do this is impossible both according to quantity and according to quality: according to quantity because there is not a smallest magnitude and according to quality because the accidents are not separable.

Nor does he rightly take the coming to be of similar things. for it is possible that it be divided as clay into clay; yet it may not be possible. And there is not the same way as bricks from house and house from bricks; thus water and air both are and come to be from each other.

It is better to take fewer and limited beginnings which Empedocles does.

NOTE FOR BOOK ONE, READING NINE

In this reading, Aristotle recalls the arguments by which Anaxagoras arrived at his position about matter. He then reasons against that position by eight arguments.

It is interesting to note that those studying elementary particles in the twentieth century arrived at a position similar to that of Anaxagoras and for similar reasons. They saw in their experiments that out of any elementary particle you can eventually get all the others. And they thought that you cannot get something out of nothing. So the well known formula among them was, as Heisenberg says, “every elementary particle is composed of all the rest.”

One can group the arguments of Aristotle against the position of Anaxagoras somewhat differently than Thomas does in his division and order of them.

The eighth, fifth and first arguments have something in common in that they are all based on the beginning or principle of fewness. This beginning of natural philosophy can be stated thus: fewer beginnings or causes are better if they are enough. Nature is modest, as Shakespeare said, and does not affect the pomp of superfluous causes, as Newton said, and many other before and after them.

This is most clear in the eighth argument. Empedocles and Anaxagoras both try to explain how things can keep on coming to be forever in this world. But Empedocles explains it with a limited multitude of causes: the four elements and love & hate. Love brings them together and hate separates them. This can go on forever because what love joins, hate can always separate. And what hate has separated, love can always join again. But instead of this circle, Anaxagoras has only the greater mind separating things out of the one matter forever; and to do this, there must be an infinity of things in matter to be separated out.

The fifth argument shows how far Anaxagoras has departed from fewness. For in saying universally that inside of everything there is an infinity of infinitely small pieces of everything else, he must also say that inside of each one of those infinitely small pieces there is an infinity of infinitely small pieces of everything else, and inside of each one of these the same and so on infinitely. There are infinite multitudes inside of infinite multitudes inside of infinite multitudes and so on infinitely, One could hardly depart more from fewness (or simplicity as some say).

In the first argument, the beginning of fewness is also implied. Aristotle says that if matter is composed of an infinity of different things, then we could never know it; just like we could never know a word that has an infinity of letters. But someone might say what does this prove. Maybe man is unable to know things. But man has a natural desire to know things and Anaxagoras especially exemplifies this since he gave his life to the study of the natural world. But if nature is modest and does nothing superfluous, it does not give man a natural desire for the impossible. And we see also that for other natural desires like hunger and thirst there is an object to satisfy them. So the beginning or principle of fewness also underlies the first argument.

It is interesting to note also that these three arguments have something in common with the whole development of the physical sciences in modern times. For Galileo, Kepler and Newton stated this beginning of fewness (which some call the principle of simplicity) and this has been a guiding beginning all the way down to the present as Heisenberg and Einstein and others tell us.

The second, third and fourth arguments should also be considered together. For what is shown in the second argument is used in the third and fourth arguments.

In the second argument, Aristotle reasons against the position that the parts of animals, plants etc can be infinitely small or fall below any size, as Anaxagoras maintains. Aristotle uses an if-then syllogism. If the parts can fall below any size, then the whole can fall below any size (for the whole is composed of the parts). But the whole (animal, etc) cannot fall below any size (for we see in our experience of animals and plants, that there are limits as to how big or small they are). Therefore, the parts cannot fall below any size, but there must be a smallest size or piece of each.

From the conclusion of the second argument, Aristotle reasons in the third argument to the overthrow of another position of Anaxagoras. If there is a smallest piece of flesh and bone etc., anytime flesh or bone comes from something, at least that amount must be taken out. But if the same *amount* is continually taken out of a finite or limited body, eventually that body will be exhausted. For there cannot be an infinity of the same *amount* in a limited of finite body. Thus things would eventually stop coming to be which is contrary to the opinion of Anaxagoras and the other Greek natural philosophers.

If one could take the same *ratio* each time, one could go on forever. One could take half of the whole and then half of the half remaining and so on forever. But the piece being taken would get smaller and smaller without end. But if there is a smallest piece (as shown in the second argument), a smallest amount, one cannot take the same ratio forever, but, at least, that smallest amount. So eventually a finite body would be exhausted and things would not come to be forever out of it.

In the fourth argument, Aristotle reasons from the conclusion of the second argument to overthrow yet another position of Anaxagoras. If there is a smallest piece of flesh, for example, there cannot be any bone in that smallest piece of flesh. For if there were, only part of the smallest piece of flesh would be flesh and then there would be a piece of flesh smaller than the smallest, which is obviously impossible.

It can be seen that Aristotle overthrows the positions of Anaxagoras in the reverse order in which they were arrived at.

The second, third and fourth arguments have something in common with the physics of the twentieth century as distinguished from that of the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries. For both quantum theory and special relativity theory, the two foundations of the physics of the twentieth century, are based upon there being limits to the quantity of natural things.

And in particular, there is a likeness to quantum theory which involves a limit in the direction of the small, the quantum of action or energy (while special relativity involved a limit in the direction of the large, the speed of light being the maximum speed possible in the universe).

The sixth and seventh arguments are more particular in their critique of the position of Anaxagoras.

The sixth argument points out that Anaxagoras has not clearly distinguished between substance and accident. The greater mind would be trying to move apart, not only one substance from another, but also accidents from substance. Now although it is possible to separate the bone of the chicken from its skin and place them apart, it is not possible to do so with the bone and its color.

The difficulties Anaxagoras is led into in arguments 2,3 & 4 and also in 8, 5 and 1 follow from his inability to distinguish between ability and act or from his

trying to put actually into matter everything that it is able to become. But we can see from the sixth argument that he has also not seen clearly the other distinction of what is, the distinction between substance and accident. The first distinctions of being as such in things are between substance and accident and between act and ability:

> Statim enim in prima entis divisione invenitur hoc quidem perfectum, scilicet ens per se et ens actu: aliud vero imperfectum, scilicet ens in alio et ens in potentia.[1]

The critique of Parmenides and Melissus also proceeded in large part from pointing out their ignorance of these distinctions. Although the consideration of these distinctions as such belongs to wisdom (whose subject is being as being), they enter into the difficulty of understanding matter and motion.

The seventh argument from the distinction of the ways that things come to be can be expanded by the induction in the twelfth reading from the many common ways that things come to be.

One could ask why Aristotle considers more at length the position of Anaxagoras on matter than that of the other natural philosophers. He says elsewhere that, if we listen to what Anaxagoras is trying to say rather than what he actually says, we will see that he is close to the truth about matter. But it seems to me also that the difficulties, which Anaxagoras (and others) would be in who falsely imagine that everything that can come to be out of matter to be actually in there, force reason to begin to see that these things can be in matter only in ability.

In the Twelfth Reading of the First book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* (the *Metaphysics*), Aristotle speaks of Anaxagoras as being close to an understanding of matter, but not quite able to understand it by his mixture of what is in the ability of matter. Thomas comments there on the likeness and difference of these two:

> Et haec est vera natura materiae, ut scilicet non habeat actu aliquam formam, sed sit in potentia ad omnes; quia et ipsum mixtum non habet in actu aliquid eorum quae in eius mixtionem conveniunt, sed potentia tantum. Et propter hanc similitudinem

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[1] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Capitulum XCV

> materiae primae ad mixtum, videtur posuisse mixtionem praedictam, licet aliqua differentia sit inter potentiam materiae, et potentiam mixti.
>
> Nam miscibilia, etsi sint in potentia in mixto, tamen non sunt in eo in potentia pure passiva. Manent enim virtute in mixto. Quod ex hoc potest patere, quia mixtum habet motum et operationes ex virtute corporum miscibilium, quod non potest dici de his, quae sunt in potentia in materia prima.
>
> Est et alia differentia: quia mixtum etsi non sit actu aliquid miscibilium est tamen aliquid in actu: quod de materia prima dici non potest. Sed hanc differentiam videtur removere Anaxagoras ex hoc, quod non posuit particularium aliquam mixtionem, sed universalem omnium.[2]

The parts of animals and plants are closer to being in act than are the elements in a mixed body:

> Omne enim quod est in actu, oportet esse ab aliis distinctum, quia res una dividitur ab alia per suum actum et per formam...Quando autem ea, quae ponuntur partes, fuerint separata abinvicem dissoluto toto, tunc quidem sunt entia in actu, non quidem ut partes, sed ut materia existens sub privatione formae totius. Sicut patet de terra et igne et aere, quae quando sunt partes corporis mixti, non sunt actu existentia, sed potentia in mixto; cum vero separantur tunc sunt in actu existentia, et non partes. Nullum enim elementorum 'antequam digeratur', idest antequam per alterationem debitam veniat ad mixtionem, et fiat unum mixtum ex eis, est unum cum alio, nisi sicut cumulus lapidum est unum secundum quid, et non simpliciter. Quamvis enim omnes partes sint in potentia, tamen maxime poterit aliquis opinari partes animatorum et partes animae esse propinquas, ut fiant actu et potentia, idest ut sint in potentia propinqua actui. Et hoc ideo, quia corpora animata sunt corpora organica habentia partes distinctas secundum formam; unde maxime sunt propinqua ad hoc quod sint in actu. Et hoc ideo quia habent principium motus ab aliquo determinato, cum

[2] *In I Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XII, n. 196

> una pars moveat aliam...Sed tamen quamvis istae partes...animatorum sunt propinquae actui, nihilominus sunt omnia in potentia, quando totum fuerit unum et continuum per naturam...Ante enim quam surculus insertus uniatur plantae, est in actu; postea vero est in potentia.[3]

Anaxagoras puts into matter actually all that it is able to be. Hence, coming to be is for him only a change of place. The distinction of things by the greater mind is a separation of them by a change of place. Thomas himself says that the distinction of things is most of all shown through the change of place by which they are separated:

> Distinctio autem aliquorum maxime manfestatur per motum localem, quo ab invicem separantur.[4]

And indeed the word in logic for difference in Latin and in Greek (diaphora) has the etymology of *carry apart*.

Connected with this is that Anaxagoras, like Empedocles, and perhaps all the early natural philosophers, think that the only kind of change is change of place. Thomas gives a reason why we use names belonging to change of place in talking about other kinds of change:

> Quia enim motus localis sit naturaliter primus motuum, ut probatur in VIII Physicorum, utimur nominibus pertinentibus ad motum localem, in alteratione et in omnibus motibus: sicut etiam nomen distantiae derivatum est a loco ad omnia contraria, ut dicitur in X Metaphys.[5]

But it would seem even more so that we name things as we know them. And because change of place is more known and understood by us than any other change, we carry over names from it to other kinds of change. We speak of *becoming* or *coming to be* and something *becoming hot* and something *coming into* existence or *going out* of existence. But the words *coming* and *going* seem to pertain first to change of place. People speak of something being made *out*

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[3] Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVI, nn. 1633-1636

[4] *Summa Theologiae,* Prima Pars, Q. 70, Art. I, c

[5] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 67, Art. 2, Ad 3

of matter and the first meaning of *out* corresponds to the first meaning of *in* which pertains to place. If things are imagined to come out of matter as if out of a place, they would be actually in the matter, they would be actual in the matter. When Aristotle defines matter, he says that it is *that from which something comes to be, existing within it.* But place does not exist in that which comes to be out of it. Rather the reverse was true. The thing that came out of a place was in that place and is no longer in it. We can see or imagine something in a place, but we can neither sense nor imagine something to be in the ability of matter. If we imagine something to be in matter, we imagine it to be actual there. Ability is known only by its relation or order to act and it is reason that knows one thing in relation or order to another. We can understand with difficulty the ability of matter, but we can neither sense nor imagine that ability.

Perhaps it would be good to pause here and look at the before and after in our consideration of change.

The consideration of change would seem to come before every other consideration of our mind. Since sensing comes before understanding in our knowledge, things sensed come before all other things in our knowledge. And since, as Shakespeare says, "things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs", it would seem that change and changing things are considered by our mind before anything else.

But *within* our consideration of change, there is a before and after. We can begin to look at this before and after from the following statement: Change of place is *before* every other kind of change *in our knowledge*.

One sign of this is that many who studied change of place denied there was any other kind of change or tried to reduce all other apparently different kinds of change to change of place. This is true both of ancient thinkers such as Empedocles, Anaxagoras and Democritus, and also of modern mechanists. But we do not find the reverse; that is, men asserting other kinds of change, but denying the existence of change of place.

Another sign of this is the science of mechanics. Mechanics which considers change of place, was the first part (in time) of modern science to be perfected, and it can be without the other parts, but they cannot be without it.

A third sign is that names from change of place are carried over and placed upon other kinds of change; for example, *going from* cold *to* hot, *coming*

into existence and *going out* of existence, quantum *jumps* and so on. And we name things in the order that we know them.

If change of place is the only kind of change, the whole of natural science would be about change of place. There would be no part before or after the study of change of place. But if change of place is not the only kind of change, one should consider change in general *before* change of place and other kinds of change *after* change of place.

Actually men are sure there are other kinds of change besides change of place (for example, death), but they deny this in words because of the great difficulty in understanding how any other kind of change is possible. No other kind of change is possible without the ability which Aristotle was the first to bring out clearly (so far as the nature of ability admits of being known) and which was not seen in modern science until perhaps quantum theory.

An interesting account of a conversation touching upon the limits of natural quantities between Count Harry Kessler and Einstein is recorded by the former:

> En route Kessler asked if relativity applied to atoms. He recorded their conversation in his diary:
>
> > Einstein said no: size (the minuteness of the atom) comes into it here.
> >
> > So size, measurement, greatness and smallness, must be an absolute, indeed almost the sole absolute that remains, I said.
> >
> > Einstein confirmed that size is the ultimate factor, the absolute that cannot be got away from. He was surprised that I should have hit on this idea, for it is the deepest mystery of physics, the inexplicabilty and absoluteness of size. Every atom of iron has precisely the same magnitude as any other atom of iron, no matter where in the universe it may be. Nature knows only atoms, whether of iron or

> hydrogen, of equal size, though human intelligence can *imagine* atoms of varying magnitude.[6]

Thomas gives a somewhat unique reason for this limit in divisibility of natural quantity as distinguished from the abstract mathematical continuous quantity:

> ...si partes in parvitate superabundantes, separantur a toto, rationabiliter videtur quod non possunt permanere propter parvitatem virtutis conservantis, quia virtus corporalis dividitur secundum divisionem magnitudinis, ut patet in septimo *Physicorum;* et ideo minima separata convertuntur in corpus continens, puta aërem vel aquam, sicut patet de aliquo liquore saporoso, qui infunditur in mari.
>
> Et ex hoc patet, quare corpus mathematicum est divisibile in infinitum, in quo consideratur sola ratio quantitatis in qua nihil est repugnans divisioni infinitae.
>
> Sed corpus naturale, quod consideratur sub tota forma, non potest in infinitum dividi, quia, quando iam ad minimum deducitur, statim propter debilitatem virtutis convertitur in aliud. Unde est invenire minimam carnem, sicut dicitur in primo *Physicorum:* nec tamen corpus naturale componitur ex mathematicis.[7]

Thomas also thought that there was a limit to how far a natural body could be rarified:

> ...sit certus terminus rarefactionis ad quem naturale corpus pervenire potest, qui est raritas ignis...[8]

The following very subtle text of Thomas casts some light on the difficulties in the position of Anaxagoras and how he got into them (as well as many other things):

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[6] *Einstein, A Life*, by Denis Brain, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., N. Y. , 1996, Chapter 17, p, 118

[7] *In Librum De Sensu et Sensato Commentarium,* Lectio XV, n. 220

[8] In II *De Anima*, Lectio XX, n. 494

Dicendum, quod multis error accidit circa formas ex hoc quod de eis iudicant sicut de substantiis iudicatur.

Quod quidem ex hoc contingere videtur, quod formae per modum substantiarum signantur in abstracto, ut albedo, vel virtus, aut aliquid huiusmodi; unde aliqui modum loquendi sequentes, sic de eis iudicant ac si essent substantiae.

Et ex hinc processit error tam eorum qui posuerunt latitationem formarum, quam eorum qui posuerunt formas esse a creatione. Aestimaverunt enim quod formis competeret fieri sicut competit substantiis; et ideo non invenientes ex quo formae generentur, posuerunt eas vel creari, vel praexistere in materia;

non attendentes, quod sicut esse non est formae, sed subiecti per formam, ita nec fieri, quod terminatur ad esse, est formae, sed subiecti. Sicut enim forma ens dicitur, non quia ipsa sit, si proprie loquamur, sed quia aliquid ea est; ita et forma fieri dicitur, non quia ipsa fiat, sed quia ea aliquid fit: dum scilicet subiectum educitur de potentia in actum.

Sic autem et circa augmentum qualitatum accidit; de quo aliqui locuti sunt ac si qualitates et formae substantiae essent. Substantia autem augeri dicitur, in quantum ipsa est subiectum motus quo pervenitur de minori quantitate in maiorem qui motus augmenti dicitur.

Et quia augmentum substantiae fit per additionem substantiae ad substantiam; quidam aestimaverunt, quod hoc modo caritas, sive quaelibet virtus infusa, augeatur per additionem caritatis ad caritatem, vel virtutis ad virtutem, aut albedinis ad albedinem: quod omnino stare non potest.

Nam non potest intelligi additio unius ad alterum nisi praeintellecta dualitate. Dualitas autem in formis unius speciei non potest intelligi nisi per alietatem subiecti. Formae enim unius speciei non diversificantur numero nisi per subiectum.

Si igitur qualitas additur qualitati, oportet alterum duorum esse: vel quod subiectum addatur subiecto, ut puta quod unum album

addatur alteri albo; aut quod aliquid in subiecto fiat album, quod prius non fuit album, ut quidam posuerunt circa qualitates corporeas; quod etiam improbat Philosophus in IV *Physicorum*. Cum enim aliquid fit magis curvum, non curvatur aliquid quod prius curvum non fuit, sed totum fit magis curvum. Circa qualitates autem spirituales, quarum subiectum est anima, vel pars animae impossibile est etiam hoc fingere.

Unde quidam alii dixerunt caritatem, et alias virtutes infusas, non augeri essentialiter; sed quod dicuntur augeri, vel in quantum radicantur fortius in subiecto, vel in quantum ferventius vel intensius operantur.

Sed hoc quidem dictum aliquam rationem haberet, si caritas esset quaedam substantia habens per se esse absque substantia; unde et Magister Sententiarum [lib. I *Sentent*., dist. 17], aestimans caritatem esse aliquam substantiam, scilicet ipsum Spiritum sanctum, non irrationabiliter hunc modum augmenti posuisse videtur.

Sed alii, aestimantes caritatem esse qualitatem quamdam, penitus irrationabiliter sunt locuti.

Nihil enim est aliud qualitatem aliquam augeri, quam subiectum magis participare qualitatem; non enim est aliquod esse qualitatis nisi quod habet in subiecto. Ex hoc autem ipso quod subiectum magis participat qualitatem, vehementius operatur; quia unumquodque agit in quantum est actu; unde quod magis est reductum in actum, perfectius agit.

Ponere igitur quod aliqua qualitas non augeatur secundum essentiam, sed augeatur secundum radicationem in subiecto, vel secundum intensionem actus, est ponere contradictoria esse simul.

Et ideo considerandum restat quomodo aliquae qualitates et formae augeri dicuntur; et quae sunt quae augeri possunt.

Sciendum est ergo, quod cum nomina sint signa intellectuum, ut dicitur I *Periher*.; sicut ex magis notis cognoscimus minus nota, ita ex magis notis minus nota nominamus.

Et inde est quod, quia motus localis est notior inter omnes motus, ex contrarietate secundum locum derivatur nomen distantiae ad omnia contraria inter quae potest esse aliquis motus; ut dicit Philosophus X *Metaph*.

Et similiter, quia motus substantiae secundum quantitatem est sensibilior quam motus secundum alterationem; inde est quod nomina convenientia motui secundum quantitatem derivantur ad alterationem. Et inde est quod, sicut corpus quod movetur ad quantitatem perfectam dicitur augeri, et ipsa quantitas perfecta dicitur magna respectu imperfectae; ita illud quod movetur de qualitate imperfecta ad perfectam, dicitur augeri secundum qualitatem; et ipsa qualitas perfecta dicitur magna respectu imperfectae. Et quia perfectio uniuscuiusque rei est eius bonitas; ideo Augustinus dicit, quod in his quae non magna mole sunt, idem est esse maius quod melius.

Moveri autem de forma imperfecta ad perfectam, nihil est aliud quam subiectum magis reduci in actum; nam forma actus est; unde subiectum magis percipere formam, nihil est aliud quam reduci magis in actum illius formae. Et sicut ab agente reducitur aliquid de pura potentia in actum formae; ita etiam per actionem agentis reducitur de actu imperfecto in actum perfectum.

Sed hoc non contingit in omnibus formis, propter duo.

Primo quidem ex ipsa ratione formae; eo scilicet quod id quod perficit rationem formae, est aliquid indivisibile, puta numerus. Nam unitas addita constituit speciem: unde binarius aut trinarius non dicitur secundum magis et minus; et per consequens non invenitur magis et minus neque in quantitatibus quae denominatur a numeris, puta bicubitum vel tricubitum, neque in figuris, puta triangulum et quadratum; et in proportionibus, puta duplum et triplum.

Alio modo ex comparatione formae ad subiectum; quia inhaeret ei modo indivisibili.

Et propter hoc forma substantialis non recipit intensionem vel remissionem, quia dat esse substantiale, quod est uno modo: ubi

enim est aliud esse substantiale, est alia res; et propter hoc Philosophus, VIII *Metaphys.*, assimilat definitiones numeris.

Et inde est etiam quod nihil quod substantialiter de altero praedicatur, etiam si sit in genere accidentis, praedicatur secundum magis et minus; non enim dicitur albedo magis et minus color.

Et propter hoc etiam qualitates in abstracto signatae, quia signantur per modum substantiae, nec intenduntur nec remittuntur; non enim dicitur albedo magis et minus, sed album.

Ad decimum dicendum, quod omnibus qualitatibus et formis est communis ratio magnitudinis quae dicta est, scilicet perfectio earum in subiecto.

Aliquae tamen qualitates, praeter istam magnitudinem seu quantitatem quae competit eis per se, habent aliam magnitudinem vel quantitatem quae competit eis per accidens; et hoc dupliciter.

Uno modo ratione subiecti; sicut albedo dicitur quanta per accidens, quia subiectum eius est quantum; unde augmentato subiecto, augmentatur albedo per accidens. Sed secundum hoc augmentum, non dicitur aliquid magis album, sed maior albedo, sicut et dicitur aliquid maius album; non enim aliter praedicantur ea quae pertinent ad hoc augmentum, de albedine, et de subiecto ratione cuius albedo per accidens augeri dicitur. Sed hic modus quantitatis et augmenti non competit qualitatibus animae, scilicet scientiis et virtutibus.

Alio modo quantitas et augmentum attribuitur alicui qualitati per accidens, ex parte obiecti in quod agit: et haec dicitur quantitas virtutis; quae magis dicitur propter quantitatem obiecti vel continentiam; sicut dicitur magnae virtutis qui magnum pondus potest ferre, vel qualitercumque potest magnam rem facere, sive magnitudine dimensiva, sive magnitudine perfectionis, vel secundum quantitatem discretam; sicut dicitur aliquis magnae virtutis qui potest multa facere. Et hoc modo quantitas per accidens potest attribui qualitatibus animae, scilicet scientiis et virtutibus.

Sed tamen hoc interest inter scientiam et virtutem: quia de ratione scientiae non est quod se extendat in actum respectu omnium obiectorum: non enim est necesse quod sciens omnia scibilia cognoscat. Sed de ratione virtutis est quod in omnibus virtuose se agat. Unde scientia potest augeri vel secundum numerum obiectorum, vel secundum intensionem eius in subiecto; virtus autem uno modo tantum.

Sed considerandum est, quod eiusdem rationis est quod aliqua qualitas in aliquid magnum possit, et quod ipsa sit magna, sicut ex supradictis patet; unde etiam magnitudo perfectionis potest dici magnitudo virtutis.[9]

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[9] *Quaestio Disputata de Virtutibus in Communi*, Art. 11, corpus & Ad 10

ARISTOTLE, FIRST BOOK OF NATURAL HEARING (PHYSICS), READING FIFTEEN

Some others have touched upon the same, but not sufficiently. For they agree that something comes to be simply from what is not, insofar as Parmenides spoke rightly. Then it seems to be the same that, if something is one in number, it is also only one in ability.

But this differs much. For we say matter and lack are other. And one of these is non-being by happening, the matter; but the lack, through itself; and the one is near and a substance in some way, the matter; but the other, in no way.

Some likewise make non-being the large and the small, either together or each apart, so that this kind of triad is wholly other than that. For they got this far, that some nature should underlie, but they make this one. And even if someone makes it a duality, calling it the large and the small, nevertheless he does the same; for he overlooks the other.

The staying under nature is a cause with the form of what comes to be, as a mother. But the other part of the contrariety would seem to be (to one applying his mind) to be harmful to the same and not to be at all. For there being something divine and good and desirable, one of them we say is contrary to this.

The other however is apt to desire and want this according to its nature. But to some it would happen that the contrary desires its own corruption. But surely the form is not such as itself to desire itself because it is not needy; nor the contrary, for contraries corrupt each other; but this is the matter, as if the woman, the man, and the ugly, the beautiful - except not the ugly as such but by happening; nor the woman, but by happening.

It passes away and comes to be in one way; in another way, not. As regards what is in it, it passes away through itself - for it is the lack in it that passes away. However, according to ability, not through itself; but it is necessary for it to be ingenerable and incorruptible. for if it comes to be, it would be necessary for something first to underlie, from which it comes to be existing within, not by happening. If it passed away, it would come to this at last; so it would have passed away before it passed away.

But about the beginning as form, whether it is one or many and what sort it is, it is the work of first philosophy to determine with certitude. But concerning natural and corruptible forms, we will speak in the things to be shown later. Let it be determined thus by us that there are beginnings, and what they are and how many in number. We shall speak again, starting with another beginning.

NOTE FOR BOOK ONE, READING FIFTEEN

This text of Thomas shows how difficult it is to separate matter from lack of form when our reason tries to understand matter by itself without form:

> Mundus dicitur factus ex invisa materia, non quia informis materia tempore praecesserit, sed ordine naturae.
>
> Et similiter privatio non fuit aliquo tempore in materia ante omnem formam, sed quia materia absque forma intellecta cum privatione etiam intelligitur.[1]

We see in the later Platonists the continuation of this identification of matter with the non-being of lack or privation. Consider this passage from Plotinus:

> Investigation will show us that matter has not reality and is not capable of being affected. Matter must be bodiless - for body is a later production, a compound made by matter in conjunction with some other entity. Matter is no limit or bound, for it is mere indetermination; it is not a power, for what does it produce? It lives on the farther side of all these categories and so has no title to the name of being. It will be more plausibly called a non-being and this in the sense not of movement (away from being) or of station (in not being) but of veritable non-being.[2]

And another passage from Plotinus:

> By this non-being, of course, we are not to understand something that simply does not exist, but only something of an utterly different order from authentic being...the non-being we are thinking of is rather an image of being or perhaps something still further from an image.[3]

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[1] *De Potentia*, Q. 4, Art. 1, Ad 6 in second objections
[2] Plotinus, *Enneads*, III, Book 6, Chapter 7
[3] Plotinus, *Enneads*, I, Book. 8, Chapter 3

St. Augustine is puzzled as to how to speak of this strange reality that is matter:

> For the mutability of mutable things is simply their capacity for all the forms into which mutable things can be changed. But what is this?..If it were allowable to say that it is a nothing which is in some way something, or that it is and yet is not, that is what I should say.[4]

And in this text, Augustine almost seems to identify matter with non-being:

> However, what is not a body is either soul or something better than soul. For there is nothing lower than all bodies because, even if someone will suggest the matter from which a body is made, since it lacks all form, is rightly called nothing.[5]

At other times, Augustine speaks of matter as being in some way although close to nothing:

> Yet this almost-nothing, since it was not absolutely nothing, must have been from Him from whom all is that in any way is.[6]

Aristotle in this Reading first shows how the Platonists arrived at their position identifying matter and lack, or matter and what is not. He then shows the difference of his own position which is that matter and lack are distinct. Lack is *through itself*, or as lack, non-being while matter *as such* is not although non-being can happen to it. And matter is almost a substance (for it is able to be a substance or is a substance in ability or potency) while lack is in no way a substance, either in act or in ability.

But when Aristotle wants to reason that his position is correct and Plato's is a mistake, he finds a thought common to himself and Plato. He is still following the advice of the central thinker, Heraclitus. They share a common thought

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[4] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, Book 12, Chapter 6

[5] St. Augustine, *De div. quaest. LXXXIII*, q. 54

[6] St. Augustine, *Confessions*, Book 12, Chapter 15

about form, a very profound understanding of form. Form is something godlike, good and desirable. Since God is pure act, every form, insofar as it is an act, is like God. And because act is the perfection of ability, and the perfection of a thing is its good and the good is desirable, form is also good and desirable. From this common understanding of form, Aristotle reasons that Plato should also distinguish between matter and lack of form. For if we compare matter and lack of form to form, one of them (lack of form) seems to be bad because it is opposed to form which is good. But the matter is not opposed to the form, but is perfected by it. Because of this order of matter to form as its perfection and good, we can say (carrying over the word *desire* and giving it a somewhat new meaning) that matter desires form. But in no way can we say that lack of form desires form as its good and perfection. For form eliminates lack of form. How can matter and lack of form be the same if the one is perfected by form and the other is destroyed by form.

We might say in daily life that the sick desire to be healthy and the ugly want to be beautiful and the weak want to be strong. But is it the sick *as such* that want to be healthy or the ugly *as such* that want to be beautiful and the weak *as such* that want to be strong. For the good is what all want. But health is not the good of sickness. Rather it eliminates it. Likewise beauty takes away ugliness and strength, weakness. It is something else that *as such* wants to be healthy, beautiful and strong. It is the body that wants to be healthy and beautiful and strong for health and beauty and strength are perfections of the body and therefore the good of the body. Hence, we should distinguish between the body and its sickness or weakness or ugliness. To be a body and to be sick or to be ugly or to be weak are not the same thing. Aristotle reasons in like manner that matter and lack of form cannot be the same since matter is perfected by form which is therefore the good of matter while lack of form is eliminated by form. Matter in that sense is said to want or desire form. But it would make no sense to say that lack of form desires form for then it would want its own destruction. If form is the perfection of matter and the destruction or elimination of lack of form, it is clear that matter and lack of form are not the same and should be distinguished.

St. Augustine seems to have reasoned against the Manichean position that matter is something bad in the same way that Aristotle reasoned against Plato's identification of matter and lack of form. Since lack of form is opposed to form which is good, lack seems to be something bad. And if we do not distinguish then between matter and its lack of form, we will begin to think that

matter is something bad (as Plotinus said) Here are some of Augustine's words in his major work against the Manicheans:

> Nor on this account ought this hyle which cannot be perceived through any sensible species but which can, with difficulty, be conceived through the privation of all form, be called evil. For it has a capacity for form, since if it were not able to receive form imposed by the maker, it would certainly not be called matter. But if form is something good, whence things are called well-formed which excel in it, just as things which excel in beauty are called beautiful, then, without doubt, even the capacity for form is something good.[7]

Since hyle (the Greek word for matter) is capable of form and form is good, matter is also good (although not as good as form). But lack of form as such is not capable of form and is rather opposed to it. Augustine does not seem to have read Aristotle's *Physics* and therefore he seems to have arrived at the same argument against the same error on his own. Great minds run in the same current.

Aristotle's way of reasoning can be shown by a likeness to the way we could show the distinction between the mind and ignorance. Suppose someone were to say that we can only teach the ignorant (and Socrates might add, those who know they are ignorant). Therefore you are teachable and can learn because you are ignorant. This position is confusing the mind which is the ability to learn and to know with the ignorance that happens to it before it learns something.

We might, imitating Aristotle, begin by saying that our position is that the mind and ignorance are not the same. For ignorance as such is not-knowing, but the mind as such is not not-knowing although it happens to the mind to not know. And the mind is almost knowing for it is the ability to know, but ignorance is neither actually knowing nor able to know.

But suppose our adversary agreed that God was all-knowing and good and therefore that knowledge is something godlike, good and desirable. We could then like Aristotle compare ignorance and mind to knowledge. And ignorance, being opposed to knowledge which is good and desirable, would seem to be

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[7] St. Augustine, *De Natura Boni Contra Manichaeos*, C. 18, P.L. 556-557)

something bad. But mind, being capable of knowing, is good or ordered to the good. The mind wants to know, we could say, because it is perfected by knowing. But ignorance cannot desire knowledge for knowledge eliminates ignorance. So if ignorance were to desire knowledge, it would desire its own destruction.

One could reason against the mistake of Sartre in *Being and Nothingness* in the same way. Sartre identifies the freedom of man with non-being. And someone might think this by the following consideration. When, for example, I go to the restaurant, if I am truly free to choose between say steak and chicken, then before I choose, my will is undetermined. This indetermination is what makes me free. If my will were already determined to choose steak, I would not be free.

Sartre is confusing my freedom or ability to choose with the indetermination in my will before I choose. But these can be seen to be not the same if we compare them with a third thing, the choice. The ability to choose is for the sake of choice and therefore choice is the good of the ability to choose. But the indetermination or lack of choice before I choose is opposed to choice and eliminated by my choice. My freedom is my ability to choose and the ability to choose could therefore be said to desire to choose. But the lack of choice could not be said to desire or want choice for that will destroy the lack of choice.

The mistake of identifying matter and the lack of form, and the mistake of identifying the mind and its ignorance, and the mistake of identifying the will or the ability to choose with the indetermination or lack of choice before choosing seem all to be a mistake from the accidental or what happens. The mistake of the accidental deceives even the wise, says Aristotle in the book *About Sophistical Refutations.* And it seems to us that we are especially deceived by what happens when it necessarily happens. It necessarily happens to matter before it is formed to lack that form. And it necessarily happens to the mind before it learns to be ignorant. And it necessarily happens to the will to be undetermined before it chooses. And what necessarily comes before seems to be a cause of what comes to be. But it need not be a cause as such of what comes to be. Hegel's famous phrase "the portentous power of the negative" seems to make universal the mistake in all of the above.

In this text, Thomas, following Averroes, shows that the desire of matter for form is not some action or doing of matter, but rather its order and relation to form as its perfection and good:

> appetitus formae non est aliqua actio materiae, sed quaedam habitudo materiae ad formam, secundum quod est in potentia ad ipsam, sicut Commentator exponit in primo *Physicorum*.[8]

In this text, Thomas explains two senses in which something is said to be for the sake of another, one of which is true of matter:

> Est enim aliquid propter alterum dupliciter.
>
> Uno modo propter eius operationem, sive conservationem vel quicquid huiusmodi est quod consequitur ad esse: et huiusmodi sunt posteriora eo propter quod sunt; sicut vestimenta sunt propter hominem, et instrumenta propter artificem.
>
> Alio modo est aliquid propter alterum, idest, propter esse eius: et sic quod est propter alterum, est prius tempore et natura posterius. Hoc autem modo corpus est propter animam: sicut et omnis materia propter formam.[9]

We are also given the clue to understanding the bad in this Reading. The word *bad* is equivocal by reason, but in the order of its meanings, the first is always some lack. In this text, Thomas unfolds the truth that the bad is a privation or lack in the strict sense and points out the distinction between being bad *simpliciter* and in some way:

> Malum quidem in substantia aliqua est ex eo quod deficit ei aliquid quod natum est et debet habere: si enim homo non habet alas, non est ei malum, quia non est natus eas habere; si etiam homo capillos flavos non habet, non est malum, quia etsi natus sit habere, non tamen est debitum ut habeat; est tamen malum si non habeat manus, quas natus est et debet habere, si sit perfectus, quod tamen non est malum avi. Omnis autem privatio, si proprie et

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[8] *De Potentia*, Q. 4, Art. 1, Ad 2 in second objections

[9] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Capitulum LXXXIX

> stricte accipiatur, est eius quod quis natus est habere et debet habere. In privatione igitur sic accepta semper est ratio mali.
>
> Materia autem, cum sit potentia ad omnes formas, omnes quidem nata est habere, nulla tamen est ei debita: cum sine quavis una earum possit esse perfecta in actu. Quaelibet tamen earum est debita alicui eorum quae ex materia constituuntur: nam non potest esse aqua nisi habeat formam aquae, nec potest esse ignis nisi habeat formam ignis. Privatio igitur formae huiusmodi, comparata ad materiam, non est malum materiae: sed comparata ad id cuius est forma, est malum eius, sicut privatio formae ignis est malum ignis.
>
> Et quia tam privationes quam habitus et formae non dicuntur esse nisi secundum quod sunt in subiecto, si quidem privatio sit malum per comparationem ad subiectum in quo est, erit malum simpliciter: sin autem, erit malum alicuius, et non simpliciter. Hominem igitur privari manu, est malum simpliciter: materia autem privari forma aeris, non est malum simpliciter, sed est malum aeris.[10]

The second sense of bad is what lacks something. And the third sense of bad is what causes a lack. Thus because blindness is bad, it is bad to be blind or to be a blind man. And because that is bad, we can also say that to blind someone is bad.

Toward the end of this Reading, Aristotle points out that, in some way, the first matter always remains under change although it is under different forms successively. The first matter is in some way incorruptible. In another way, the first mover will be shown in Eighth Book to be incorruptible. The changing ultimately depends upon something unchanging. Even the modern physicists base everything on the conservation laws.

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[10] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Capitulum V & VI

NOTE ON THE EIGHT BOOKS OF NATURAL HEARING

Importance of understanding the eight books of *Natural Hearing*

The eight books of *Natural Hearing* (the so called *Physics*) by Aristotle are about change and changing, or changeable, things in general.

There are reasons why change and changing things should be what are first considered by our reason.

Our knowledge starts with our senses and as the Poet says:

> Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs

Hence, we think first about change or changing things.

But as Aristotle shows in the first reading of the first Book of *Natural Hearing,* we know things in general before in particular. Therefore, our thinking begins with the consideration of changing things in general. And this is what the eight books of *Natural Hearing* are about.

The above helps us to begin to see the fundamental place of the eight books of *Natural Hearing* in our thinking.

And it seems that if we do not understand change, we do not understand anything. If we do not understand change, we do not understand changing things. And if we do not understand changing things, we do not understand unchanging things. For unchanging things are understood in part at least by the negation of changing things, as the word *unchanging* suggests. And if we do not understand changing or unchanging things, we do not understand anything.

And we must understand change and changing things in general before in particular for the reasons Aristotle gives in the proemium to the eight books of *Natural Hearing.* We must understand what a number is before we can understand what a prime number is or what a perfect number is. But we can understand what is a number without understanding what is a prime number or

what is a perfect number. We can understand what is a four footed animal without understanding what is a horse, but the reverse is not possible.

Thus it seems that we must understand change and changing things in general before we can understand anything else. And thus the eight books of *Natural Hearing* would seem to be a foundation of all our thinking.

Heraclitus is reported to have said that all things flow, nothing abides. He has many followers in the history of human thought. If what he says is true, than all things are changing things. And there is nothing else to understand but changing things. And we must begin to understand them in general before we can understand them in particular. Thus the eight books of *Natural Hearing* are about what must be understood before anything else can be understood.

And if those who have sought to find some unchanging things, or who think there are unchanging things, have reasoned to their existence from changing things and to how they are by negating what is found in changing things as such, even for them the consideration of changing things in general must come before trying to understand anything else.

Not only do we learn what is the beginning of reasoning to the unchanging in the eight books of *Natural Hearing*, but to some extent we reason to the unchanging. In the end of the first book of *Natural Hearing* we learn in what way the first matter remains through all change, as Anaximander had already pointed out. And in the seventh and eighth books of *Natural Hearing*, we learn that motion or change depends upon a mover and moved movers upon an unmoved mover. And in these ways, we come to the unchanging from a study of change and changing things. We reason that the changing depends upon the unchanging and thus we reason from effects to causes.

There are other ways in which the eight books of *Natural Hearing* enable us to know by negation unchanging things. The definition of eternity, for example, (which belongs to a consideration of the unchanging since only the unchanging is eternal) involves a number of negations of what is found in time and in things measured by time and also negations of what belongs to the now of time and what is in the now of time.

There are other ways in which the eight books of *Natural Hearing* are a foundation of all our thinking.

Since we consider motion and the thing in motion, we also consider place and time since motion takes time and the thing in motion is somewhere or in some place. But motion (especially change of place), the body in motion, place and time are all continuous. Therefore, it is clear that we cannot fully understand motion, what is in motion, place and time without understanding the continuous. Hence, in the sixth book of *Natural Hearing*, Aristotle thinks out the philosophy of the continuous. The philosophy of the continuous not only helps us to understand motion, the thing in motion, place and time, but also geometry and numbers.

An understanding of the continuous is a foundation of geometry because geometry is about continuous quantity. And number arises from the division of the continuous. Hence, because the continuous is divisible forever, number can get larger forever.

And knowledge of the continuous is presupposed to seeing that thinking is not continuous, as Aristotle reasons in the first book *About the Soul*. And we can reason out that our universal reason is not a body when we reason out that it is not continuous since every body is continuous.

And one must understand the continuous before one can understand why in material and mathematical things there can be many individuals of the same kind, but not in immaterial things.

Indeed all our thinking involves the continuous and time (either affirmatively or negatively) for we do not think without images, which are continuous, and in time. Indeed the first philosophers thought that everything must be somewhere or in some place. And both place and what is in place (a body) are continuous. They could not imagine what is not continuous. If our reason thinks about something that is not continuous, it must negate the continuous and, hence, even there the continuous is found in our thinking.

Thus that part of the eight books of *Natural Hearing* which is the philosophy of the continuous is a foundation of all our thinking.

A key word in all our thinking is the preposition *in.* When we think out anything, we are thinking it *out* in a sense corresponding to one of the meanings of *in*. And since the word *in,* or *to be in,* is equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios, *thinking out* is also equivocal by reason. In the fourth book of *Natural Hearing,* Aristotle thinks out the central senses of *in* or *being in* which Thomas orders in the way which Aristotle teaches us in the fifth book of *Wisdom* (the *Metaphysics*). Since philosophy is result of thinking out things, Aristotle is helping us to see how all philosophy is acquired when he thinks out the senses of *in* or *being in*.

The reason why the senses of *in* or *being in* are distinguished in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* is that the word is equivocal by reason and its first meaning (by greater or lesser likeness to which the other meanings arise and are ordered) is that of being in a place. And the consideration of place belongs to the consideration of change which is the subject of the eight books of *Natural Hearing.* And place as such is considered in the first part of the fourth book of *Natural Hearing*.

An understanding of the distinction and order of the senses of *in* or *being in* is important, of course, for many other things besides being necessary to understand what it is to think out something. For example, the distinction between the senses of *in* is necessary to understand the distinction between substance and accident and their definitions for these involve *in*. And thinkers are always confusing the way things are in the ability of matter, or in the ability of the maker, with the senses in which something is actually in another. (Here we see how often reason is mistaken by mixing up the senses of a word equivocal by reason.)

Two of the highest genera in the *Categories* are a result of one kind of denomination from place. And place itself appears as a species in the genus of quantity. And here we see again how important is an understanding of place.

It is very difficult for us to know and understand that there are things which are not in place. The natural philosophers before Plato and Aristotle thought that everything must be in place; and if something is not in place, it does not exist. If it were true that everything that exists must be in some place, an understanding of place would be relevant to understanding all things. To be in place would be a property of being as being. And even if we can come to know that some things are not in place, we must know what place is before we can even know what it means not to be in place.

We can begin to see a little from the foresaid that the consideration of place in the first part of the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* is a contribution, not only to our knowledge of change and changing things, but also to almost all our knowledge.

Since reason as reason is nothing other than the ability for large discourse, looking before and after (as Shakespeare teaches us in his *Exhortation to Use Reason*), understanding the use of reason requires us to understand the words *before* and *after*. The word *before*, like the word *in,* is equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios. The first meaning, or the first central sense of the word, is in time. And the other meanings arise and are ordered by their greater or lesser likeness to the sense in time. Thus the consideration of time in the second part of the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* is important for the whole use of reason. However, Aristotle distinguishes and orders the central senses of this word in the *Categories*. But he says in the third book *About the Soul* that man is the animal which has the sense of time. Indeed our life is very much in time. Man begins to rise above the other animals when he does not merely live in the here and now. One of the ten highest genera in the *Categories* is by one kind of denomination from time. And time itself is a species of continuous quantity in the *Categories*. We have spoken before of the need to understand time before one can understand eternity. The definition of eternity, which comes from Boethius, presupposes both an understanding of time and the now of time, both of which are thought out in this second part of the fourth book of *Natural Hearing*.

A sign of the universal and fundamental place of the continuous in our knowledge is many of the most universal words which are found in the axioms
And to some extent everywhere. These words are all equivocal by reason. And in most of them, our reason begins with the sense of meaning that is continuous or in the continuous. This is true of the words *beginning* and *end* or *limit* as can be seen from the fifth book of *Wisdom* and of the words *before* and *after* as can be seen in the *Categories.* It is also true of the words *in* and *out* as we learn from the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* and Thomas's commentary thereon. This is also true of the words *whole* and *part* as can be seen also from the fifth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*. And the first meaning of per se *one* given is that of the continuous and then the indivisible in the continuous, as the point. The word *form,* so important and key in philosophy, seems to have

come from the shape of the continuous. A *road* in our knowledge or a *line* of reasoning or a *line* of poetry are not continuous, but they are named from carrying over a word placed upon something continuous. Yet other words point to the continuous as at the beginning of our thinking, and thus to the fundamental importance of the philosophy of the continuous in the sixth book of *Natural Hearing*. It is difficult to rise above the continuous in our thinking; and often when we are trying to think of something not continuous, we fall back upon the more known continuous. Thus we imagine our soul to be an air-like body in the shape of a man or to be indivisible like the point which has a place in the continuous.

The distinction between ability and act is most universal and foundational for the whole of philosophy, as we see in the fifth and ninth books of *Wisdom.* But we first use this distinction in the first book of *Natural Hearing* when trying to understand what is found in everything that changes. And this distinction is before understanding the definition of motion or change in the third book of *Natural Hearing*. And even the more universal consideration of act and ability in the ninth book of *Wisdom* (the *Metaphysics*) begins from the consideration of act and ability in change.

And the definition of motion or change in the third book of *Natural Hearing* is a beginning for seeing the dependence of motion upon a mover and eventually the existence of the unmoved mover.

And the distinction of matter and form as the inward beginnings of movable things or beings is a stepping stone for seeing act and ability as the intrinsic beginnings of being as being in the twelfth book of *Wisdom*.

And in seeing the distinction of matter, form and lack of form at the end of the first book of *Wisdom,* we also can begin to understand good and bad universally.

The second book of *Natural Hearing* is essential

The distinction of the natural and the artificial is basic to all our thinking and this is treated in the second book of *Natural Hearing.*

The definition of nature brings out why the consideration of the natural philosopher should be about motion or change and therefore why the eight books of *Natural Hearing* are about motion or change in general. For nature is defined as a beginning of motion and rest in that in which it is.

The word *nature* is of such universal importance that it appears again in the fifth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*. Like every key and universal word in philosophy, *nature* is equivocal by reason. But although a full consideration of the distinction and order of its senses is made in the fifth book of *Wisdom*, we meet a number of those senses here and thus make an important beginning. And since wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accord with nature (as the central thinker in human thought, Heraclitus, teaches us), we must understand what is meant by *nature* in this ruling statement so we may be directed by its truth.

And when Socrates is pressured by Cebes to come up with a necessary argument for the immortality of the soul, to give a reason why it must be immortal, he returns to his experience of natural philosophy for an understanding of causes. For it is the natural philosophers who first sought the kinds of cause there are in things. Hence, when Aristotle is seeking confirmation that there are just four kinds of cause in things, he turns back to the natural philosophers. Although it belongs more to the wise man to determine how many kind of cause there are, we first see the kinds of cause there can be in the study of natural things. Thus, the second book of *Natural Hearing,* where the kinds of cause are distinguished, is essential to all of philosophy where causes are looked for.

And the obscure causes called luck and chance receive their fundamental consideration here.

And the whole of practical philosophy depends upon the answer to the question discussed in the second book of *Natural Hearing,* whether nature acts for an end. If nature makes things for an end, man (and his parts) may have an end by nature. And a knowledge of this end will be the beginning for thinking of what to do or not do in this life.

In the fifth book of *Natural Hearing,* we learn the original reason for the distinction of the particular sciences of nature into physics, chemistry and biology. After this distinction had become customary, men no longer learned

the reason for it, and then they begin to make mistakes in dividing, as Heisenberg points out.

From scratching the surface of the eight books of *Natural Hearing* above, we can begin to see how important it is to understand them. But as we enter into the depths of these books, this will become even more manifest. Indeed it is hardly an exaggeration to say that ignorance of the eight books of *Natural Hearing* is ignorance of philosophy.

The name *Natural Hearing* rather than *the Physics*

The word *physics* is a poor translation of the title of Aristotle's work in that one does not see the word *nature* in it. The word *nature* in English keeps something of a connection with the original meaning of *natura* in Latin or *phusis* in Greek which is that of birth. (Consider the words *pre-natal, post-natal, nativity, native* etc.) But the word *physics* today more calls to mind the mathematical experimental science developed by Galileo, Kepler, Newton and their successors.

The two words in the Greek title of the work can be carried over into English as *Natural Hearing,* or more fully, the eight books of *Natural Hearing.* Although some see this title as indicating only that they were delivered as lectures rather than something published, to the close reader of them the title is very illuminating. This hearing is *natural* for three reasons.

First, of course, we are hearing about natural things. These eight books are about things that are by the cause called *nature* which cause is defined in the second book and distinguished especially from the cause called *art*, the other main cause of the things around us.

Second, we are learning from nature as a teacher. Kant said that we learn from nature in the physical sciences as the judge learns from the witness, not as the student learns from his teacher. But in the eight books of *Natural Hearing*, we are learning from nature as from a teacher. Since hearing is the sense of learning from another, it is significant that the eight books are called *Natural Hearing*. Heraclitus also emphasizes the sense of hearing in the Royal Fragment:

> Wisdom is to speak the truth and to act, according to nature, giving ear thereto.

The third reason why this can be called *Natural Hearing* is that it is close to what we naturally understand, as is seen especially in the first book of *Natural Hearing*.

Duane H. Berquist

NOTE FOR BOOK TWO ABOUT THE SOUL, READINGS 1-4

Aristotle was the first philosopher or thinker or man to understand what the soul is by definition. This is a major accomplishment. The whole first book *About the Soul* was about the wondering and thinking of the first philosophers about what the soul is. But today we do not even wonder what the soul is. We do not even think about what the soul is, let alone understand what it is. What is wrong with us? We will never understand something if we do not even think about it.

The first four readings are about thinking out the definition of the soul. As Thomas explains, we must think out six different divisions or distinctions before we are in a position to think out the definition of the soul. And we must also think out the distinction of these six divisions, why some are on the side of the soul and some on the side of its subject. And then we must think out the demonstration of the definition of the soul.

The divisions from which Aristotle begins to investigate the definition of the soul are not understood distinctly today. The reason for the two sets of divisions or distinctions, the reason why the investigation of the definition of the soul requires this is not understood, or not well understood, today. The distinction of the ten highest genera takes us back to the *Categories* of the Philosopher, a work neglected and rarely understood today. Most today do not even know the *Isagoge* which is necessary to understand the *Categories*. The second distinction on the side of the soul rather than its subject presupposes the thorough understanding of the first book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*). The third distinction, between first and second act, is seen by reason that looks before and after. Likewise, divisions or distinctions on the side of the soul's subject are confused today such as the distinction between the natural and the artificial brought out in the second book of *Natural Hearing* by the Philosopher. And some claim to see no real distinction between the living and the non-living.

Thomas often follows his teacher, Aristotle, in thinking about what the soul is. Thomas approaches the definition by division in this text:

> Sic igitur, cum sit triplex substantia, scilicet compositum, materia, et forma, et anima non est ipsum compositum, quod est corpus habens vitam: neque est materia, quae est corpus subiectum vitae: relinquitur per locum a divisione quod anima sit substantia, sicut

> forma vel species talis corporis, scilicet corporis physici habentis in potentia vitam.[1]

He also syllogizes to the definition:

> Quod autem ut forma propria anima corpori uniatur, sic probatur.
>
> Illud quo aliquid fit de potentia ente actu ens, est forma et actus ipsius. Corpus autem per animam fit actu ens de potentia existente: vivere enim est esse viventis; semen autem ante animationem est vivens solum in potentia, per animam autem fit vivens actu. Est igitur anima forma corporis animati.
>
> Amplius. Quia tam esse quam etiam operari non est solum formae neque solum materiae, sed coniuncti, esse et agere duobus attribuitur, quorum unum se habet ad alterum sicut forma ad materiam: dicimus enim quod homo est sanus corpore et sanitate, et quod est sciens scientia et anima, quorum scientia est forma animae scientis, et sanitas corporis sani. Vivere autem et sentire attribuitur animae et corpori: dicimur enim et vivere et sentire anima et corpore. Sed anima tamen sicut principio vitae et sensus. Est igitur anima forma corporis.
>
> Adhuc. Similiter se habet tota anima sensitiva ad totum corpus sicut pars ad partem. Pars autem ita se habet ad partem quod est forma et actus eius: visus enim est forma et actus oculi. Ergo anima est forma et actus corporis.[2]

Thomas here uses the word *principium* in the second argument while Aristotle in his demonstration of the first definition of the soul had used the word *first.* But in creatures, at least, the word *beginning* or *principium* is always the same as *first*. For a beginning is *what is first in being or becoming or knowing* as the Philosopher says in the fifth book of *Wisdom*.

In the following text, Thomas shows a likeness in the reasoning of Aristotle that the soul is the form of the body and his own reasoning that the undergoing understanding (*Intellectus possibilis*) is formally united to us:

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[1] *In II De Anima,* Lectio I, n. 221

[2] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber I, Capitulum LVII

> Amplius. Id quo aliquid operatur, oportet esse formam eius: nihil enim agit nisi secundum quod est actu; actu autem non est aliquid nisi per id quod est forma eius; unde et Aristoteles probat animam esse formam, per hoc quod animal per animam vivit et sentit. Homo autem intelligit, et non nisi per intellectum: unde et Aristoteles, inquirens de principio quo intelligimus, tradit nobis naturam intellectus possibilis. Oportet igitur intellectum possibilem formaliter uniri nobis, et non solum per suum obiectum.[3]

Thomas sometimes even reasons against the mistake of thinking the soul to be itself a body:

> Fuerunt autem et alii magis errantes, ponentes animam esse corpus. Quorum opiniones licet fuerint diversae et variae, sufficit eas hic communiter reprobare.
>
> Viventia enim, cum sint quaedam res naturales, sunt composita ex materia et forma. Componuntur autem ex corpore et anima, quae facit viventia actu. Ergo oportet alterum istorum esse formam, et alterum materiam. Corpus autem non potest esse forma: quia corpus non est in altero sicut in materia et subiecto. Anima igitur est forma. Ergo non est corpus: cum nullum corpus sit forma.
>
> Adhuc. Impossibile est duo corpora esse simul. Anima autem non est seorsum a corpore dum vivit. Non est igitur anima corpus.
>
> Amplius. Omne corpus divisibile est. Omne autem divisibile indiget aliquo continente et uniente partes eius. Si igitur anima sit corpus, habebit aliquid aliud continens et illud magis erit anima: videmus enim, anima recedente, corpus dissolvi. Et si hoc iterum sit divisibile, oportebit vel devenire ad aliquod indivisibile et incorporeum, quod erit anima: vel erit procedere in infinitum, quod est impossibile. Non est igitur anima corpus.
>
> Item. Sicut supra probatum est, et in VIII Physicorum probatur, omne movens seipsum componitur ex duobus, quorum alterum est

[3] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber II, Capitulum LIX

> movens et non motum, et alterum est motum. Sed animal est movens seipsum: movens autem in ipso est anima, motum autem est corpus. Anima igitur est movens non motum. Nullum autem corpus movet nisi motum, ut supra probatum est. Anima igitur non est corpus.
>
> Praeterea. Supra ostensum est quod intelligere non potest esse actio alicuius corporis. Est autem actus animae. Anima igitur, ad minus intellectiva, non est corpus.[4]

This mistake arises from false imagination. Because we never think in this life without imagining, and images are continuous, we are apt to think of everything as extended like a body which can be imagined. Hence, people imagine the soul to be an airlike substance which is a fine body.

Those who think of the soul as a form first think of it as an accidental form like Simmias who thinks of it as the harmony of the body in the *Phaedo*. But the soul is the substantial form of a living body. It is important here to understand the distinction between a substantial form and an accidental form while also seeing there a likeness. A text where Thomas brings out the differences of these forms as well as their likeness:

> forma substantialis et accidentalis partim conveniunt, et partim differunt.
>
> Conveniunt quidem in hoc, quod utraque est actus, et secundum utramque est aliquid quodammodo in actu.
>
> Differunt autem in duobus.
>
> Primo quidem, quia forma substantialis facit esse simpliciter, et eius subiectum est ens in potentia tantum. Forma autem accidentalis non facit esse simpliciter; sed esse tale, aut tantum, aut aliquo modo se habens: subiectum enim eius est ens in actu.
>
> Unde patet quod actualitas per prius invenitur in forma substantiali quam in eius subiecto: et quia primum est causa in quolibet genere, forma substantialis causat esse in actu in suo subiecto.

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[4] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber I, Capitulum LXV

> Sed e converso, actualitas per prius invenitur in subiecto formae accidentalis, quam in forma accidentali: unde actualitas formae accidentalis causatur ab actualitate subiecti. Ita quod subiectum, inquantum est in potentia, est susceptivum formae accidentalis: inquantum autem est in actu, est eius productivum.
>
> Et hoc dico de proprio et per se accidente: nam respectu accidentis extranei, subiectum est susceptivum tantum; productivum vero talis accidentis est agens extrinsecum.
>
> Secundo autem differunt substantialis forma et accidentalis, quia cum minus principale sit propter principalius, materia est propter formam substantialem; sed e converso, forma accidentalis est propter completionem subiecti...
>
> accidens causatur a subiecto secundum quod est actu, et recipitur in eo inquantum est in potentia.
>
> Ad secundum dicendum quod subiectum est causa proprii accidentis et finalis, et quodammodo activa; et etiam ut materialis, inquantum est susceptivum accidentis. Et ex hoc potest accipi quod essentia animae est causa omnium potentiarum sicut finis et sicut principium activum; quarumdam autem sicut susceptivum.
>
> Ad tertium dicendum quod emanatio propriorum accidentium a subiecto non est per aliquam transmutationem; sed per aliquam naturalem resultationem, sicut ex uno naturaliter aliud resultat, ut ex luce color.[5]

In the third distinction necessary for understanding what the soul is, Aristotle has distinguished between first and second act, using the example of science and consideration. The soul like science is a first act. But in this text, Thomas point out a distinction between these two first acts:

> similitudo inter animam et scientiam attenditur secundum quod utraque est actus primus, non autem quantum ad omnia.

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[5] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 77, Art. 6, c.

> Unde non oportet quod anima sit immediatum principium operationum, sicut scientia.[6]

In the demonstration of the definition of the soul, one could say that it goes from effect to cause as Thomas explains. But perhaps it could also be seen as going from the end to the form for the operations by the soul could be considered to be its end. In the demonstration of the definition of demonstration by its matter from or by the definition of demonstration by its end, consider Thomas' words on it:

> Deinde...definit syllogismum demonstrativum per comparationem ad finem suum, qui est scire. Circa quod tria facit. Primo ponit quod scire est finis syllogismi demonstrativi sive effectus eius, cum scire nihil aliud esse videatur, quam intelligere veritatem alicuius conclusionis per demonstrationem.[7]

Thomas here speaks of *scire* as the *finis* or end of the demonstrative syllogism and also as the *effectus* or effect. So someone might say that he is reasoning from a cause for end is the cause of causes or someone might say that he is reasoning from an effect. The second corollary after the distinction of the four kinds of cause is that things can be causes of each other, but only by different kinds of cause. Thus exercise is the cause of health in the sense of a maker. And health is the cause of exercise in the sense of end or that for the sake of which. Hence, to reason from health to exercise could be said to reason from an effect to its cause and also in another way from a cause to its effect. But in the *Posterior Analytics,* the definition from the end or from the effect is first learned and then from this is demonstrated the definition from the matter. But in the second book *About the Soul*, the definition from effect or from end (?) is learned second before it is used to demonstrate the first definition which is arrived at by the six divisions.

Regarding the word *body* in the first distinction of the three on the side of the subject of the soul, we need to consider what Thomas points out in this text:

> Sciendum est autem quod, licet idem secundum nomen possit esse genus et materia, non tamen idem eodem modo acceptum. Materia enim est pars integralis rei, et ideo de re praedicari non potest. Non

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[6] *Quaestio Disputata de Anima*, Art. 12. Ad 14

[7] *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum,* Lectio IV, n. 36

> enim potest dici quod homo sit caro et os. Genus autem praedicatur de specie. Unde oportet quod significet aliquo modo totum. Sicut enim propter hoc quod est innominata privatio, aliquando simplici nomine materiae significatur materia cum privatione, ut supra dictum est, quod aes accipitur pro aere infigurato, cum dicimus quod ex aere fit statua; ita etiam quando forma est innominata, simplici nomine materiae intelligitur compositum ex materia et forma, non quidem determinata, sed communi; et sic accipitur ut genus. Sicut enim compositum ex materia et forma determinata est species, ita compositum ex materia et forma communi est genus.
>
> Et hoc in pluribus patet. Corpus enim potest accipi, et ut materia animalis, et ut genus. Si enim in intellectu corporis intelligatur substantia completa ultima forma, habens in se tres dimensiones, sic corpus est genus, et species eius erunt substantiae perfectae per has ultimas formas determinatas, sicut per formam auri, vel argenti, aut olivae, aut hominis. Si vero in intellectu corporis non accipiatur nisi hoc, quod est habens tres dimensiones cum aptitudine ad formam ultimam, sic corpus est materia.
>
> Et similiter est de voce. Si enim in intellectu vocis includatur ipsa vocis formatio in communi secundum formam quae distinguitur in diversas formas literarum et syllabarum, sic vox est genus. Si autem in intellectu vocis accipitur solum substantia soni, cui possibile est advenire praedictam formationem, sic vox erit materia literarum. Ex quo etiam patet quod vox, secundum quod est genus, non potest esse sine speciebus. Non enim potest esse sonus formatus, quin aliquam determinatam formam habeat huius vel illius literae. Sed si omnino careret forma literali prout est materia, sic inveniretur sine literis, sicut aes invenitur absque his quae fiunt ex aere.[8]

How are we to understand *body* in the first division or distinction on the side of the subject of the soul? If Aristotle implicitly contrasts body as the known substance with the immaterial substances hardly known to us, he would seem to be taking *body* as a genus. However, consider the words of Thomas here in the commentary on the second book *About the Soul:*

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[8] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, nn. 1546-1548

> Dixit autem "habentis vitam potentia" et non simpliciter habentis vitam.
>
> Nam corpus habens vitam intelligitur substantia composita vivens. Compositum autem non ponitur in definitione formae. Materia autem corporis vivi est id quod comparatur ad vitam sicut potentia ad actum: et hoc est anima, actus, secundum quem corpus vivit. Sicut si dicerem quod figura est actus, non quidem corporis figurati in actu, hoc enim est compositum ex figura et corpore, sed corporis quod est subiectum figurae, quae comparatur ad figuram sicut potentia ad actum.[9]

Thomas says that the composite (of matter and form) is not placed in the definition of the form. Hence, the body in the definition of the soul would seem to be the *matter* rather than the *genus* body.

But in a text from the *Summa Theologiae* replying to an objection, he seems to take body for the composite. Here is the objection and Thomas' reply:

> 1. Dicit enim Philosophus, in II de Anima, quod anima est actus corporis physici potentia vitam habentis. Comparatur igitur anima ad corpus, sicut forma ad materiam. Sed corpus habet aliquam formam substantialem per quam est corpus. Ergo ante animam praecedit in corpore aliqua forma substantialis...
>
> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Aristoteles non dicit animam esse actum corporis tantum, sed actum corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis et quod talis potentia non abiicit animam. Unde manifestum est quod in eo cuius anima dicitur actus, etiam anima includitur; eo modo loquendi quo dicitur quod calor est actus calidi, et lumen est actus lucidi; non quod seorsum sit lucidum sine luce. Et similiter dicitur quod anima est actus corporis etc., quia per anima et est corpus, et est organicum, et est potentia vitam habens. Sed actus primus dicitur in potentia respectu actus secundi, qui est operatio. Talis enim potentia est non abiiciens, idest non excludens, animam.[10]

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[9] *In II De Anima*, Lectio 1, n. 222

[10] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 76, Art. 4

In the following text, again in replying to an objection, Thomas distinguishes between the two ways in which a subject can be placed in the definition of a form:

> 15...Philosophus dicit in II De Anima quod anima est actus corporis physici organici. Hoc igitur quod comparatur ad animam ut materia ad actum, est iam corpus physicum organicum: quod non potest esse nisi per aliquam formam, qua constituatur in genere corporis. Habet igitur corpus humanum suum esse praeter esse animae...
>
> Ad decimumquintum dicendum quod in definitionibus formarum aliquando ponitur subiectum ut informe, sicut cum dicitur: 'motus est actus existentis in potentia'. Aliquando autem ponitur subiectum formatum, sicut cum dicitur "motus est actus mobilis", lumen est actus lucidi. Et hoc modo dicitur anima "actus corporis organici physici", quia anima facit ipsum esse corpus organicum, sicut lumen facit aliquid esse lucidum.[11]

In the following text, Thomas gives what is perhaps a third way of understanding *body* in the definition of the soul:

> 2. Praeterea Philosophus dicit in II de Anima, quod est actus corporis organici potentia vitam habentis. Corpus ergo physicum organicum potentia vitam habens comparatur ad animam ut materia ad formam. Sed hoc, scilicet corpus physicum organicum, non est nisi per aliquam formam substantialem. Ergo illa forma substantialis, quaecumque sit, praecedit in materia substantiam spiritualem, quae est anima rationalis; et eadem ratione aliae formae consequentes, quae sunt anima sensiblis et vegetabilis...
>
> Ad secundum dicendum quod cum forma perfectissima det omnia quae dant formae imperfectiores, et adhuc amplius; materia, prout ab ea perficitur eo modo perfectionis quo perficitur a formis imperfectioribus, consideratur ut materia propria, etiam illiusmodi perfectionis quam addit perfectior forma super alias; ita tamen quod non intelligatur haec distinctio in formis secundum essentiam, sed solum secundum intelligibilem rationem. Sic ergo ipsa materia

[11] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima*, Art. 1, 15 & Ad 15

> secundum quod intelligitur ut perfecta in esse corporeo susceptivo vitae, est proprium subiectum animae.[12]

When Thomas says that the higher form gives the perfection which the lower form gives and something more, he does not mean that it gives the perfection which the lower form gives in the same way, but in a better way. Consider this text of Thomas on sensible in man and the horse:

> quamvis homo et equus in hoc conveniant quod est sensibile, non tamen oportet quod anima sensibilis sit unius rationis in homine et equo: quia homo et equus non sunt unum animal in specie; unde in homine anima sensibilis est multo nobilior quam in aliis animalibus quantum ad principales actus, ut patet in actibus interiorum sensuum, et in operatione tactus, qui est principalis sensus: in omni enim toto potestativo potentia inferior superiori conjuncta perfectior invenitur, ut potestas praepositi multo excellentior est in rege. Anima autem sensibilis in homine per essentiam conjungitur animae rationali.[13]

If the sensing soul in man and in the beast were put by themselves in a genus, they would not be of one genus:

> ...si anima sensibilis quae est in brutis, et anima sensibilis quae est in homine, collocarentur secundum se in genere vel specie, non essent unius generis; nisi forte logice loquendo secundum aliquam intentionem communem.
>
> Sed id quod est in genere vel specie proprie, est compositum, quod utrobique est corruptibile.[14]

Although Aristotle distinguishes between nature and soul here, the power of nature in included in that of soul:

> in superiori semper includitur virtus inferioris, sicut in anima etiam est virtus naturae.[15]

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[12] *De Spirit. Creaturis*, Art. 3, 2 & Ad 2
[13] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist XVIII, Q. II, Art. III, Ad 4
[14] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestio Disputata de Anima*, Art. 11, Ad 14
[15] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist 3, Q. 2, Art. 3, Ad 1

The distinction between nature and soul is like the distinction between two and three. Three contains two, but it is divided against what is just two.

The soul, being a substantial form, is in each part of the body, but it perfects the body composed of tools first and as such, and the individual parts in order to the whole:

> corpus organicum est perfectibile ab anima primo et per se;
>
> singula autem organa et organorum partes, ut in ordinem ad totum, sicut dictum est.[16]

This is why each part is not an animal although it has the soul:

> anima non est in qualibet parte corporis primo et per se, sed in ordine ad totum, ut dictum est;
>
> et ideo non quaelibet pars animalis est animal.[17]

But there is a difference in this between the imperfect animals and the perfect animals:

> in animalibus in quibus figura partis fere est conformis figurae totius, pars recipit animam ut quoddam totum: quare decisa vivunt.
>
> In animalibus tamen perfectis, in quibus figura partis multum differt a figura totius, pars non recipit animam sicut totum et primum perfectible, ut decisa vivat; recipit tamen animam in ordine ad totum, ut coniuncta vivat.[18]

And although the soul is the act of each part, it is the act of one part more perfectly and chiefly:

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[16] Thomas Aquinas, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. 4, Ad 13

[17] Thomas Aquinas, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. 4, Ad 2

[18] Thomas Aquinas, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis*, Art. 4, Ad 9

> licet anima sit actus cuiuslibet partis corporis, non tamen uniformiter omnes partes corporis perficuntur ab ea, ut dictum est; sed una altera principalius et perfectius.[19]

The parts of a living body are very close to being in act as Thomas teaches us in this text:

> Omne enim quod est in actu, oportet esse ab aliis distinctum, quia res una dividitur ab alia per suum actum et per formam..Quando autem ea, quae ponuntur partes, fuerint separata abinvicem dissoluto toto, tunc quidem sunt entia in actu, non quidem ut partes, sed ut materia existens sub privatione formae totius.
>
> Sicut patet de terra et igne et aere, quae quando sunt partes corporis mixti, non sunt actu existentia, sed potentia in mixto; cum vero separantur tunc sunt in actu existentia, et non partes. Nullum enim elementorum "antequam digeratur", idest antequam per alterationem debitam veniat ad mixtionem, et fiat unum mixtum ex eis, est unum cum alio, nisi sicut cumulus lapidum est unum secundum quid, et non simpliciter.
>
> Quamvis enim omnes partes sint in potentia, tamen maxime poterit aliquis opinari partes animatorum et partes animae esse propinquas, ut fiant actu et potentia, idest ut sint in potentia propinqua actui. Et hoc ideo, quia corpora animata sunt corpora organica habentia partes distinctas secundum formam; unde maxime sunt propinqua ad hoc quod sint in actu. Et hoc ideo quia habent principium motus ab aliquo determinato, cum una pars moveat aliam...Sed tamen quamvis istae partes...animatorum sunt propinquae actui, nihilominus sunt omnia in potentia, quando totum fuerit unum et continuum per naturam...Ante enim quam surculus insertus uniatur plantae, est in actu; postea vero est in potentia.[20]

The Council of Vienna (1311-1312) seems to have confirmed Aristotle's understanding of what the soul is:

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[19] Thomas Aquinas, *De Spiritualibus Creaturis,* Art. 4, Ad 8

[20] *In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVI, nn. 1633-1636

> Fidei catholicae fundamento, *praeter quod* teste Apostolo *nemo potest aliud ponere*, firmiter inhaerentes, aperte cum sancta matre ecclesia confitemur, unigenitum Dei Filium in his omnibus, in quibus Deus Pater exsistit, una cum Patre aeternaliter subsistentem, partes nostrae naturae simul unitas, ex quibus ipse in se verus Deus exsistens fieret verus homo, humanum videlicet corpus passibile et animam intellectivam seu rationalem, ipsum corpus vere per se et essentialiter informantem, assumpsisse ex tempore in virginali thalamo ad unitatem suae hypostasis et personae...Porro doctrinam omnem seu positionem, temere asserentem aut vertentem in dubium, quod substantia animae rationalis seu intellectivae vere ac per se humani corporis non sit forma, velut erronea ac veritati catholicae fidei inimicam praedicto sacro approbante concilio reprobamus, diffinientes, ut cunctis nota sit fidei sincerae veritas ac praecludatur universis erroribus aditus, ne subintrent, quod quisquis deinceps asserere, defendere seu tenere pertinaciter praesumpserit, quod anima rationalis seu intellectiva non sit forma corporis humani per se et essentialiter, tanquam haereticus sit censendus.[21]

And the Fifth Lateran Council (1512-1517) again confirms this:

> Hoc sacro approbante concilio damnamus et reprobamus omnes asserentes animam intellectivam mortalem esse, aut unicam in cunctis hominibus et haec in dubium vertentes: cum illa non solum vere per se et essentialiter humani corpori forma existat, sicut in canone felicis recordationis Clementis papae V praedecessoris nostri in generali Viennensi concilio edito continetur, verum et immortalis, et pro corporum quibus infunditur multitudine singulariter multiplicabilis, et multiplicata et multiplicanda sit.[22]

How is the soul compared to its powers? A fundamental text of Thomas:

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[21] Concilium Viennense, 1311-1312, Decreta,[1], *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta*, Herder, 1962, pp. 336-337

[22] Concilium Lateranense V, 1512-1517, Sessio VIII, *Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta*, Herder, 1962, p. 581

> essentia animae comparatur ad potentias et sicut principium activum et finale, et sicut principium susceptivum, vel seorsum per se vel simul cum corpore; agens autem et finis est perfectius, susceptivum autem principium, inquantum huiusmodi, est minus perfectum.[23]

If the powers of the soul proceed from the soul *naturally* and nature is determined to one, how is this possible? Part of the answer:

> ab uno simplici possunt naturaliter multa procedere ordine quodam.
>
> Et iterum propter diversitatem recipientium.
>
> Sic igitur ab una essentia animae procedunt multae et diversae potentiae, tum propter ordinem potentiarum: tum etiam secundum diversitatem organorum corporalium.[24]

The proceeding of the powers of the soul from it might seem to be in the way indicated in this text:

> Si autem ipsa divina substantia est causa accidentis quod sibi inest; impossibile est autem quod sit causa illius secundum quod est recipiens ipsum, quia sic idem secundum idem faceret seipsum esse in actu; ergo oportet, si in Deo est aliquod accidens, quod secundum aliud et aliud recipiat et causet accidens illud, sicut corporalia recipiunt propria accidentia per naturam materiae et causant per formam. Sic igitur Deus erit compositus. Cuius contrarium superius probatum est.[25]

But how can the soul give rise to the powers which are in it as a subject (the understanding and the will)?

Thomas admits a difference in the nobility and purity of soul as a result of the matter into which they are poured:

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[23] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars. Q. 77, Art 7, C
[24] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 77, Art. 6, Ad 1
[25] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber I, Caput 23

cum omnis perfectio infundatur materiae secundum capacitatem suam, natura animae ita infundetur diversis corporibus, non secundum eamdem nobilitatem et puritatem.[26]

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[26] *Scriptum Super Librum I Sententiarum*, , Dist VIII, Q. V, Art. II, Ad 6

NOTE FOR BOOK TWO ABOUT THE SOUL, READINGS 5-6

Powers or abilities of the soul are distinguished by their acts, but sometimes they give their name to those acts. Thomas explains when this is so:

> actus qui est absolute actus potentiae, denominatur ab ipsa potentia;
>
> actus vero qui est unius secundum ordinem ad aliam, non denominatur ab aliqua earum: sicut scire neque a ratione neque ab intellectu nominatur.[1]

In the following text, Thomas shows two ways in which the genera of the powers of the soul can be distinguished:

> genera potentiarum animae distinguuntur dupliciter: uno modo ex parte obiecti; alio modo ex parte subiecti, sive ex parte modi agendi, quod in idem redit.
>
> Si igitur distinguantur ex parte obiecti, sic inveniuntur quinque potentiarum genera...Si autem distinguantur ex parte subiecti vel modi agendi, sic sunt tria genera potentiarum animae: scilicet vegetativum, sensitivum et intellectivum.
>
> Operatio enim animae tripliciter potest se habere ad materiam.
>
> Uno modo ita quod per modum naturalis actionis exerceatur; et talium actionum principium est potentia nutritiva, cuius actus exercentur qualitatibus activis et passivis, sicut et aliae actiones materiales.
>
> Alio modo ita quod operatio animae non pertingat ad ipsam materiam, sed solum ad materiae conditiones, sicut est in actibus potentiae sensitivae: in sensu enim recipitur species sine materia, sed tamen cum materiae conditionibus.

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[1] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist. XXIV, Q. I, Art 3, Ad 1

> Tertio modo ita quod operatio animae excedat et materiam et materiae conditiones; et sic est pars animae intellectiva.
>
> Secundum igitur has diversas potentiarum animae participationes contingit aliquas duas potentias animae ad invicem comparatas in idem vel diversum genus reduci. Si enim appetitus sensibilis et intellectualis qui est voluntas, considerentur secundum ordinem ad obiectum, sic reducuntur in unum genus, quia utriusque obiectum est bonum. Si vero considerentur quantum ad modum agendi, sic reducuntur in diversa genera; quia appetitus inferior reducetur in genus sensitivi, appetitus vero superior in genus intellectivi.
>
> Sicut enim sensus non apprehendit suum obiectum sine conditionibus materialibus; sic et appetitus sensibilis in suum obiectum fertur, in bonum scilicet particulare. Appetitus vero superior in suum obiectum tendit per modum quo intellectus apprehendit; et sic quantum ad modum agendi voluntas ad genus intellectivi reducitur.
>
> Modus autem actionis provenit ex dispositione agentis; quia quanto fuerit agens perfectius, tanto est eius actio perfectior. Et ideo si considerentur huiusmodi potentiae secundum quod egrediuntur ab essentia animae, quae est subiectum earum, voluntas invenitur in eadem coordinatione cum intellectu; non autem appetitus inferior, qui in irascibilem et concupiscibilem dividitur.[2]

When the powers of the soul are distinguished in the second way (*ex parte subiecti, sive ex parte modi agendi*), they are distinguished into three, which is also the way in which the three kinds of soul are distinguished. We could also distinguish the powers of the soul into two: those in which the object acts upon the power and those in which the power acts upon the object. But Aristotle distinguishes the powers into five kinds.

And in replying to an objection based on Aristotle himself sometimes placing the will in reason, Thomas again touches upon this distinction:

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[2] *De Veritate*, Q. 10, Art. 1, Ad 2

> 2. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in III *de Anima*, voluntas in ratione est. Ergo vel est idem quod ratio, vel pars rationis. Sed ratio est eadem potentia cum intellectu. Ergo et voluntas.
>
> Ad secundum dicendum, quod potentia dupliciter potest considerari: vel in ordine ad obiectum, vel in ordine ad essentiam animae, in qua radicatur.
>
> Si ergo voluntas consideretur in ordine ad obiectum, sic ad aliud genus animae pertinet quam intellectus; et sic voluntas contra rationem et intellectum distinguitur, ut dictum est, in corp. art.
>
> Si vero voluntas consideretur secundum id in quo radicatur, sic cum voluntas non habet organum corporale, sicut nec intellectus, voluntas et intellectus ad eamdem partem animae reducentur.
>
> Et sic quandoque intellectus vel ratio sumitur prout includit in se utrumque; et sic dicitur quod voluntas est in ratione. Et secundum hoc rationale includens intellectum et voluntatem dividitur contra irascibile et concupiscibile.[3]

The above text also shows a way of defending Socrates' division of the parts of the soul in the *Republic*. Socrates' division there has often seemed to me deficient in that it does not distinguish the will from reason on the one hand and from *thumos* and *epithumia* on the other hand. Hence, Socrates has no single power in which to place justice, as we do in the will. But one can see a defense of Socrates' division or a way of understanding it as good in this subtle text from Thomas:

> in appetitu inferiori est quaedam naturalis inclinatio, qua quodammodo naturaliter cogitur appetitus ut in appetibile tendat. Sed superior appetitus non determinatur ad alterum, quia superior appetitus liber est, non autem inferior.
>
> Et inde est quod motus inferioris appetitus non invenitur attribui potentiae apprehensivae, quia causa illius motus non est ex apprehensione, sed ex inclinatione appetitus; sed motus appetitus

[3] *De Veritate*, Q. 22, Art. 10, Utrum Voluntas et intellectus sint eadem potentia, Obj. 2 and Ad 2

> superioris attribuitur suae apprehensivae, scilicet rationi, quia superioris appetitus inclinatio in hoc vel illud ex iudicio rationis causatur.
>
> Et inde est quod vires motivas distinguimus per rationalem, irascibilem, et concupiscibilem, in parte superiori nominantes quod apprehensionis est, in inferiori vero quod appetitus.[4]

Turning how in particular to the distinction of the powers of the soul by their acts and objects. A text of Thomas:

> secundum hoc diversificatae sunt potentiae, quod diversitas actuum diversa principia requirebat a quibus elicerentur. Cum autem obiectum comparetur ad actum sicut terminus, terminis autem specificentur actus, ut patet in V Phys., oportet quod actus penes obiecta distinguantur; et ideo obiectorum diversitas, potentiarum diversitatem inducit.[5]

Some had said that the acts and objects of the powers are only a sign of their distinction. But Thomas says that they are in some way the cause of their distinction insofar as every ability is for the sake of act and, hence, act, is the end of the power or ability:

> Sed si diligenter consideretur, in utrique potentiis inveniuntur actus et obiecta non solum esse signa diversitatis, sed causae aliquo modo. Omne enim cuius esse non est nisi propter finem aliquem, habet modum sibi determinatum ex fine ad quem ordinatur...Omnis autem potentia animae, sive activa sive passiva, ordinatur ad actum sicut ad finem, ut patet in IX Meta.[6]

But when one distinguishes the acts by their objects, Thomas does not say that the objects are the end or purpose of the acts, but rather:

> Cum autem obiectum comparetur ad actum sicut terminus, terminis autem specificentur actus, ut patet in V Physicorum, oportet quod

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[4] *De Veritate,* Q. 15, Art. 3, corpus
[5] *De Veritate*, Q. 15, Art. 2, C
[6] *De Veritate*, Q. 15, Art. 2, corpus

> actus penes obiecta distinguantur; et ideo obiectorum diversitas, potentiarum diversitatem inducit.[7]

Hence, although there is a sort of proportion when we say the powers are distinguished by their acts and the acts by their objects, the relation of the acts to the powers and that of the acts to the objects is not the same in that one is the *finis* and the other a *terminus* or *limit*. The necessity of Book V of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*) for understanding *terminis autem specificentur actus* is another reason for studying the eight books of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*) before the three books *About the Soul* (the *De Anima*). The word *terminus* must be studied more here with the help of the fifth book of *Wisdom* (the *Metaphysics*) and *the Fifth book of Natural Hearing*. Since *terminus* can also mean *end* in the sense of that for the sake of which (that is the third sense in the fifth book of *Wisdom*, the second sense of terminus or limit must be distinguished from the third sense. (The second sense there is close to *the Fifth Book of Natural Hearing*).

Some other texts on distinguishing acts by their objects or terms can be considered here. The following text shows a way of going from the specific difference of motion being determined by its limit to the same for operation:

> Specifica autem differentia cujuslibet motus vel operationis, accipitur penes terminum ad quem.[8]

And in the following text, Thomas goes so far as to say that no motion or operation or going forward is specified by itself, but only by its beginning or limit or end:

> Nulla autem processio nec operatio nec motus habet speciem a se, sed sortitur speciem a termino vel a principio.
>
> Unde nihil est dictu, quod processiones aliquae distinguantur seipsis; sed oportet quod distinguantur penes principia vel penes terminos.[9]

But not every difference of act or object can lead to a difference of power or habit:

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[7] *De Veritate*, Q. 15, Art. 2, corpus
[8] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. X, Q. III, Art. I, Sol. II, Resp (n. 117)
[9] *De Potentia*, Q. 10, Art. 2, corpus

> Non autem quaelibet diversitas actuum facit differentiam potentiarum et habituum, sed illa tantum quae est ex diversitate objectorum, a quibus actus specificantur, sicut motus a terminis. Solum autem illa differentia terminorum facit diversam speciem motus quae attenditur secundum illam rationem secundum quam terminat motum. Unde quod descensus terminetur ad aquam vel ad terram, non facit diversam speciem motus localis; quia motus localis non erat ad terram vel aquam inquantum huiusmodi, sed inquantum deorsum sunt. Generationes autem differunt secundum speciem quae terminantur ad formas aquae et terrae. Et similiter objecta diversa non diversificant actus secundum speciem, nisi sit diversitas secundum illam rationem secundum quam est objectum. Videre enim album et nigrum non sunt diversi actus secundum speciem; quia utrumque est objectum visus secundum unam rationem, inquantum scilicet sunt colorata visibilia actu per lucem.[10]

There is another very interesting distinction Thomas points about the two kinds of diversity there can be in the objects of the powers:

> Sed obiectorum diversitas dupliciter attendi potest: uno modo secundum naturam rerum; alio modo secundum rationem. Diversitas obiectorum secundum naturam rerum, ut calor et sapor: secundum diversam rationem obiecti, ut bonum et verum.[11]

The first distinction is found only in powers with a bodily organ. (This is not to deny the possibility of the second distinction also sometimes being found there - but Thomas is perhaps not explicit about this point here.) But such a distinction cannot be found in the powers without a bodily organ which are three: the undergoing understanding, the acting upon understanding and the will:

> Cum autem potentiae quae sunt actus determinatorum organorum, non possint se extendere ultra suorum organorum dispositionem (non enim potest esse organum corporale unum et idem omnibus naturis cognoscendis accomodatum); oportet de necessitate quod

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[10] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXXIII, Q. I, Art. I, Sol. I, Resp

[11] De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 2, corpus

> potentiae quae sunt organis affixae, circa quasdam naturas determinatae sunt: scilicet circa naturas corporeas.[12]

But there is a difference in the lack of universality between the inward senses and the outward ones. The following text touches upon two differences between the imagination and the common sense. Imagination regards all natural bodies in common by reason of quantity and figure while the common sense regards all natural bodies insofar as they have a *vis activa* or *immutativa*. Hence, the imagination also extends to mathematical things while the common sense does not. (This may be significant for the judgment of the mathematician and why he has a good understanding only secundum quid. Touch and common sense are closely related.) We can see from this also how the common sense is more closely related to the outward senses (in which there is, as seen below, a "diversum modum immutandi")

> Operatio enim quae per organum corporeum exercetur, non potest se extendere ultra naturam corpoream. Sed cum in natura corporea inveniatur aliquid in quo omnia corpora conveniunt, aliquid vero in quo diversa corpora diversificantur; possibile erit aptare unam potentiam corpori alligatam omnibus corporeis secundum id quod commune habent; sicut imaginativa prout omnia corpora communicant in ratione quantitatis et figurae et consequentium (unde non solum ad naturalia, sed ad mathematica se extendit); sensus vero communis prout in omnibus corporibus naturalibus, ad quae solum se extendit, invenitur vis activa et immutativa.[13]

In the outward senses there is a distinction even more particular (We should note the difference in universality between the inward senses and the outward senses and how the inward above approach more closely to the complete universality of reason. But even the outward senses escape some of the limitation of matter.):

> Quaedam vero potentiae aptantur his in quibus corpora diversificantur, secundum diversum modum immutandi; et sic est visus circa colorem, auditus circa sonum, et sic de aliis.

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[12] De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 2, corpus
[13] De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 2, corpus

> Ex hoc igitur quod pars sensitiva animae utitur organo in operando, duo ipsam consequuntur: scilicet quod not potest ei attribui aliqua potentia respiciens commune obiectum omnibus entibus; sic enim iam transcenderet corporalia; et iterum quod possibile est in ea inveniri diversas potentias secundum diversam naturam obiectorum propter conditionem organorum, quae aptari potest huic vel illi naturae.[14]

But it is quite different for the powers that do not have an organ or bodily tool:

> Illa vero pars animae quae non utitur organo corporeo in opere suo, non remanet determinata, sed quodammodo infinita, inquantum est immaterialis; et sic eius virtute se extendit ad obiectum commune omnibus entibus.
>
> Unde commune obiectum intellectus dicitur esse quod quid est, quod in omnibus generibus entium invenitur...
>
> Unde impossibile est quod in parte intellectiva distinguuantur potentiae ad diversas naturas obiectorum; sed solummodo secundum rationem diversam obiecti, prout, scilicet, secundum diversam rationem in unam et eamdem rem, quandoque actus animae fertur. Et sic bonum et verum in parte animae diversificant intellectum et voluntatem:[15]

Thomas continues showing, in a most interesting way, how "bonum et verum" differ not by "diversas naturas obiectorum" but rather "secundum diversam rationem obiecti", making use of the distinction between form and end:

> in verum enim intelligibile fertur intellectus ut in formam, cum oporteat eo quod intelligitur, intellectum esse informatum; in bonum autem fertur ut in finem.
>
> Unde a Philosopho in *VI Metaphys*. dicitur verum esse in mente, bonum et malum in rebus; cum forma sit intus, et finis extra. Non

[14] De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 2, corpus
[15] De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 2, corpus

> autem eadem ratione finis et forma perficit: et sic bonum et verum non habent eamdem rationem obiecti.[16]

The above text is most interesting in the comparison it makes between form and end and the difference between the true and the good pointed out in the Sixth Book of *Wisdom* (the *Metaphysics*). One is also reminded of the definition of the good as *perfectivum alterius per modum finis*. (A note about the difficulty of translating *ratio obiecti:* One can more translate "non enim eadem ratione est obiectum" - "it is not an object for the same reason".)

Thomas then goes on to distinguish the acting upon understanding and the undergoing understanding by the diverse reasons why the understandable is an object for both.

> Sic etiam circa intellectum agens et possibilis intellectus distinguuntur. Non enim eadem ratione est obiectum aliquid in quantum est in actu et inquantum est in potentia, aut inquantum agit et patitur: intelligibile enim actu, est obiectum intellectus possibilis agens quasi in ipsum, prout exit de potentia in actum; intelligibile vero in potentia est obiectum intellectus agentis, prout fit per intellectum agentem, intelligibile actu.[17]

In the following text, Thomas points out in particular the distinction of powers corresponding to how they are to the what it is of things:

> Scientificum autem et ratiocinativum diversae quidem potentiae sunt, quia quantum ad ipsam rationem intelligibilis distinguuntur. Cum enim actus alicuius potentiae se non extendat ultra virtutem sui obiecti, omnis operatio quae non potest reduci in eamdem rationem obiecti, oportet quod sit alterius potentiae, quae habet aliam rationem obiecti.
>
> Obiectum autem intellectus est quod quid est, ut dicitur in III De Anima: et propter hoc, actio intellectus extenditur quantum potest extendi virtus eius ad quod quid est. Per hanc autem primo ipsa principia cognita fiunt, ex quibus cognitis ulterius ratiocinando pervenitur in conclusionum notitam: et hanc potentiam quae ipsas

[16] De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 2, corpus
[17] De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 2, corpus

> conclusiones in quod quid est nata est resolvere, Philosophus scientificum appellat.
>
> Sunt autem quaedam in quibus non est possibile talem resolutionem facere ut perveniatur usque ad quod quid est, et hoc propter incertitudinem sui esse; sicut est in contingentibus in quantum contingentia sunt. Unde talia non cognoscuntur per quod quid est, quod erat proprium obiectum intellectus, sed per alium modum, scilicet per quamdam coniecturam de rebus illis de quibus plena certitudo haberi non potest. Unde ad hoc alia potentia requiritur.
>
> Et quia haec potentia non potest reducere rationis inquisitionem usque ad suum terminum quasi ad quietem, sed consistit in ipsa inquisitione quasi in motu, opinionem solummodo inducens de his quae inquirit; ideo quasi a termino suae operationis haec potentia ratiocinativum vel opinativum nominatur.[18]

The following text of Thomas casts some light upon the distinction of objects that gives rise to a distinction of the genera of powers and that which gives rise to a distinction of species within a genus:

> cum distinctio potentiarum attendatur penes actus et obiecta, non quaelibet obiectorum differentia ostendit diversitatem potentiarum; sed differentia obiectorum, inquantum obiecta sunt; non autem accidentalis differentia quae accidit obiecto secundum quod et obiectum...
>
> Et quando quidem differentiae essentiales obiectorum inquantum obiecta sunt, sumuntur ut dividentes per se aliquod speciale obiectum animae, ex hoc diversificantur potentiae et non genera potentiarum; sicut sensibile nominat non obiectum animae simpliciter, sed quoddam obiectum quod praedictis differentiis per se dividitur. Unde visus, auditus et tactus sunt diversae potentiae speciales ad idem genus potentiarum animae pertinentes, scilicet ad sensum.

[18] *De Veritate,* Q. 15, Art. 2, Ad 3

> Sed quando differentiae acceptae dividunt ipsum obiectum communiter acceptum, tunc ex tali differentia innotescunt diversa genera potentiarum. Dicitur autem aliquid esse obiectum animae secundum quod habet aliquam habitudinem ad animam. Ubi ergo invenimus diversa rationes habitudinis ad animam, ibi invenimus per se differentiam in obiecto animae, demonstrantem diversum genus potentiarum animae.
>
> Res autem ad animam invenitur duplicem habitudinem habere: unam secundum quod ipsa res est in anima per modum animae, et non per modum sui; aliam secundum quod anima comparatur ad rem in suo esse existentem.
>
> Et sic obiectum animae est aliquid dupliciter. Uno modo in quantum natum est esse in anima non secundum esse proprium, sed secundum modum animae, id est spiritualiter; et haec est ratio cognoscibilis in quantum est cognoscibile. Alio modo est aliquid obiectum animae secundum quod ad ipsum anima inclinatur et ordinatur secundum modum ipsius rei in seipsa existentis; et haec est ratio appetibilis in quantum est appetibile. Unde cognoscitivum in anima et appetitivum constituunt diversa genera potentiarum.
>
> Unde, cum intellectus sub cognoscitivo comprehendatur, voluntas autem sub appetitivo, oportet voluntatem et intellectum esse potentias etiam genere diversas.[19]

The distinction between powers that act upon their object and powers that are acted upon by their object also seems to be a distinction that gives rise to a distinction of genera of powers rather than to a distinction of species of genera. The vegetative powers and perhaps the locomotive powers act upon their objects (if we think of the latter as actively moving the body) while the sense powers and the undergoing understanding (but not the acting upon understanding) and the desiring powers are acted upon by their objects.
Then the distinction in the above text would separate the knowing powers (the senses and the undergoing understanding) from the desiring powers. But why does Aristotle separate the knowing powers, the sense powers and the understanding, as genera of powers, but not the distinction of the desiring powers?

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[19] *De Veritate*, Q. 22, Art. 10, corpus

The following text is important for seeing why sense and reason are diverse genera of powers but not sense appetite and rational appetite (even though the distinctions would seem proportional):

> voluntas et appetitus sensibilis non distinguitur directe per hoc quod est sequi apprehensionem hanc vel illam; sed ex hoc quod est determinare sibi inclinationem, vel habere inclinationem determinatam ab alio: quae duo exigunt potentiam non unius modi. Sed talis diversitas requirit diversitatem apprehensionum...Unde quasi ex consequenti accipitur distinctio appetitivarum virium penes distinctionem apprehensivarum, et non principaliter.
>
> sensus et intellectus differunt per rationes apprehensibilis inquantum est apprehensibile, propter hoc quod ad diversa genera pertinent potentiarum. Sensus enim tenet in apprehendendo particulare, intellectus autem in apprehendendo universale.
>
> Appetitus vero superior et inferior non differunt per differentias appetibilis inquantum est appetibile, cum in idem tendat bonum quandoque uterque appetitus; sed differunt penes diversum modum appetendi...Et ideo sunt quidem diversae potentiae, sed non diversa potentiarum genera.[20]

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[20] *De Veritate*, q. 22, Art. 4, Ad 4

NOTE FOR BOOK THREE ABOUT THE SOUL, READING 11

Thomas, in his Proemium to logic, returns to this text when distinguishing three acts of reason directed by logic. The first two are discussed here, to which Thomas adds a third which is reasoning. The first act can be without the second, but the reverse is not possible. Likewise, the second can be without the third, but the reverse is not possible.

What reason understands by the first act must be one in one of the three ways indicated by Aristotle. These three ways are also distinguished in the First Book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*) when Aristotle reasons against the position of Parmenides and Melissus that being is one.

Truth also presupposes unity:

> Veritas in nostro intellectu ex hoc est quod adaequatur rei intellectae. Aequalitatis autem causa est unitas, ut patet in V *Metaphysicorum*.[1]

Hence, we can begin to see that one is before true and understandable.

In the following text, Thomas unfolds the reason why the understanding cannot consider many things at once and manifests the reason by a likeness:

> ea quae cognoscuntur diversis rationibus, intellectus non potest simul considerare: quia non potest consignari diversis similitudinibus simul, sicut nec corpus diversis figuris; sed ea quae cognoscuntur una ratione, vel quorum unum est ratio alterius, nihil prohibet simul intelligi.[2]

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[1] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber I, Capitulum LXII

[2] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist. X, Art IV, Ad 3

NOTE FOR BOOK THREE ABOUT THE SOUL, READING 12

In understanding a proportion or likeness of ratios, one must see in what way the two ratios are alike and unlike. When we say that four is to six as two is to three, we do not mean that both are a ratio of prime numbers or of an even number to an odd number. They are unlike each other in these ways. But the likeness consists in this, that four is the same parts of six that two is of three. In the following text, Thomas points out the likeness but also the difference in the ratios of Aristotle's proportion in this reading:

> ut enim Philosophus dicit in III de Anima, phantasmata se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicut sensibilia ad sensum, ut colores, qui sunt extra animam, ad visum; unde, sicut species quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a rebus ipsis, et per eam cognitio sensus continuatur ad ipsas res sensibiles; ita intellectus noster abstrahit speciem a phantasmatibus, et per eam cognitio eius quodammodo ad phantasmata continuatur.
>
> Sed tamen tantum interest; quod similitudo quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a re ut ab obiecto cognoscibili, et ideo res ipsa per illam similitudinem directe cognoscitur; similitudo autem quae est in intellectu, non abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut ab obiecto cognoscibili, sed sicut a medio cognitionis, per modum quo sensus noster accipit similitudinem rei quae est in speculo, dum fertur in eam non ut in rem quamdam, sed ut in similitudinem rei.
>
> Unde intellectus noster non directe ex specie quam suscipit, fertur ad cognoscendum phantasma, sed ad cognoscendum rem cuius est phantasma.
>
> Sed tamen per quamdam reflexionem redit etiam in cognitionem ipsius phantasmatis, dum considerat naturam actus sui, et speciei per quam intuetur, et eius a quo speciem abstrahit, scilicet phantasmatis: sicut per similitudinem quae est in visu a speculo accepta, directe fertur visus in cognitonem rei speculatae; sed per quamdam reversionem fertur per eamdem in ipsam similitudinem quae est in speculo.

> Inquantum ergo intellectus noster per similitudinem quam accepit a phantasmate, reflectitur in ipsum phantasma a quo species abstrahit, quod est similitudo particularis, habet quamdam cognitionem de singulari secundum continuationem quamdam intellectus ad imaginationem.[1]

Some have misunderstood Aristotle here when he says that the soul understands nothing without an image. And since the image is in the body, they think that the soul cannot understand without the body and therefore it is not immortal as he taught in the Tenth Reading. But as he has shown before, the act of understanding the universal is not in the body. But if the understanding soul could not be except in the body, it would do nothing except in the body.

In the following text, when considering how the habits of reasoned out knowledge can remain in the separated soul, Thomas shows why the soul understands in the body turning to an image, but not when outside the body:

> 2. Sed dicendum, quod scientia evacuatur adveniente gloria, non quantum ad scientiam, sed quantum ad modum quo nunc intellectus inquirendo et convertendo se ad phantasmata speculatur. - Sed contra, modus iste est de essentia scientiae; ablato autem aliquo essentiali, non potest rei substantia remanere. Ergo non potest ipsa secundum suam substantiam remanere isto cessante."
>
> Ad secundum dicendum, quod modus iste cognoscendi non est essentialis ex parte sui, sed ex parte subiecti, cui secundum statum viae talis modus intelligendi competit. Hoc autem per se solum essentiale est scientiae secundum seipsum, ut per eam scibilia cognoscantur. Et ideo quando variatur status subiecti, variatur modus cognoscendi, non tamen habitus scientiae.
>
> 3. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in II Ethicorum, omnes habitus ex actibus acquisiti, reddunt similes actus illis actibus ex quibus acquisiti sunt. Sed scientia quam nunc habemus, acquisita est ex talibus considerationibus quibus ad phantasmata convertimur et procedimus conferendo. Ergo non potest talis scientia nisi tales

[1] *De Veritate,* Q. 2, Art. 6, c

> actus reddere. Frustra ergo remaneret scientia, tali modo scientiae cessante.
>
> Ad tertium dicendum, quod unus actus potest dici alteri similis dupliciter.
>
> Uno modo quantum ad speciem actus, quam trahit a materia circa quam est. Et sic habitus acquisitus semper reddit actum similem illi actui a quo generatus est; sicut fortia faciendo efficitur aliquis fortis, et fortis effectus fortia facit.
>
> Alio modo quantum ad modum qui sequitur dispositionem subiecti: et sic non oportet actus praedictos esse similes. Constat enim quod actus ex quibus fortitudo politica acquiritur, sunt actus cum tristitia et sine dilectione effecti; actus autem qui sequuntur habitum, sunt faciliores, et cum delectatione, vel saltem sine tristitia. Ita videmus in scientia, quod homo in considerando aliquid acquirit scientiam illorum, et sciens illa potest considerare eadem, tamen alio modo quam ante, quia iam non inquirit, sed contemplatur quod prius inquisiverat.
>
> Et sic nihil prohibet actus qui redduntur ab habitibus in statu gloriae, habere alium modum.[2]

One should particularly note the comparison to the moral virtues whose acts differ from those that produced them because of the disposition of the subject rather than a difference from the species of the act.

In the following text, Thomas points out how the image is not the *propinquum et proprium* object of the reason and why and what is:

> ille modus cognoscendi accidit scientiae ex statu ejus in quo est. Non enim phantasma est objectum propinquum et proprium intellectus, cum sit intelligibile in potentia, non actu; sed species intellecta est per se objectum ejus.[3]

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[2] *De Veritate*, Q. 20, Art 3, 2 & Ad 2, 3 & Ad 3

[3] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXXI, Q. II, Art. IV, Ad 5

Thomas explains in this text why Aristotle speaks in the *Third Book About the Soul* only of reason's way of understanding while the soul is in the body:

> 4. Praeterea, secundum Philosophum in III de Anima, sicut se habet sensus ad sensibilia, sic se habet intellectus ad phantasmata. Sed sensus nihil potest sentire nisi sensibilia ei repraesententur. Ergo nec anima humana aliquid potest intelligere nisi repraesententur ei phantasmata. Sed non repraesentantur ei post mortem; quia illa non repraesentantur nisi in aliquo organo corporali. Ergo anima post mortem non potest intelligere.
>
> Ad quartum dicendum, quod Philosophus, in III de Anima non loquitur nisi de intellectu corpori coniuncto; alias consideratio de intellectu ad naturalem non pertineret.[4]

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[4] *De Veritate*, Q. 19, Art 1, 4 & Ad 4

NOTE FOR BOOK THREE ABOUT THE SOUL, READING 13

Notice the order in which Aristotle has shown the distinction between thinking and imagining and between thought and image. In the Fourth Reading or Lectio of this third book About the Soul, Aristotle has shown that thinking and imagining are distinct because I can imagine something without having any reason for so doing, but I cannot think that something is so without having some reason to think so. I can imagine now myself winning a million dollars in the sweepstakes. But I cannot think that I have won when I have not even bought a ticket. This is to distinguish thinking from imagining by the third act of reason for to give a reason for thinking something is to reason. But at the end of this reading, Aristotle first distinguished image from the thought which is true or false which is to distinguish thinking from imagining by the second act of reason. Finally, he distinguishes thought from the image because it is about the universal while the image is always of the singular. This last difference is the most basic or first difference, but it is perhaps the hardest to see while the one from reasoning is the easiest to see.

In English, the word *idea* may mean an image or a thought. We can see in John Locke and George Berkeley the confusion of the two. Consider the confusion in this passage from Berkeley's *Treatise* where he quotes Locke:

> 13. To give the reader a yet clearer view of the nature of abstract ideas and the uses they are thought necessary to, I shall add one more passage out of the *Essay on Human Understanding*, which is as follows:
>
> > "*Abstract ideas* are not so obvious or easy to children or the yet unexercised mind as particular ones. If they seem so to grown men, it is only because by constant and familiar use they are made so.
> >
> > For when we nicely reflect upon them, we shall find that general ideas are fictions and contrivances of the mind, that carry difficulty with them, and do not so easily offer themselves as we are apt to imagine.
> >
> > For example, does it not require some pains and skill to form the general idea of a triangle (which is yet none of the most abstract, comprehensive, and difficult); for it must be neither oblique nor

> rectangle, neither equilateral, equicural, nor scalenon, but *all and none* of these at once?
>
> In effect, it is something imperfect that cannot exist, an idea wherein some parts of several different and *inconsistent* ideas are put together.
>
> It is true the mind in this imperfect state has need of such ideas, and makes all the haste to them it can, for the *conveniency of communication and enlargement of knowledge,* to both which it is naturally very much inclined.
>
> But yet one has reason to suspect such ideas are marks of our imperfection.
>
> At least this is enough to show that the most abstract and general ideas are not those that the mind is first and most easily acquainted with, nor such as its earliest knowledge is conversant about. [Book IV, Chapter VII, Sec. 9]

> If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no. And this, methinks, can be no hard ask for anyone to perform. What more easy than for anyone to look a little into his own thoughts, and there try whether he has, or can attain to have, an idea that shall correspond with the description that is here given of the general idea of a triangle, which is "neither oblique nor rectangle, equilateral, equicrural nor scalenon, but all and none of these at once."?[1]

Although one can *understand* the universal, what is common to all triangles, and indeed define what is common to all of them, leaving aside their differences, one cannot *imagine* triangle in general. Any attempt to do so will result in the confusion of Locke. Any triangle one imagines will be a particular kind and not

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[1] George Berkeley, *A Treatise Concerning The Principles of Human Knowledge*, Introduction, n.13, in *The English Philosophers From Bacon To Mill*, Modern Library Ed., p. 516

fit all triangles. Locke tries to combine them by running together as it were many images of the particular kinds of triangle. The universal idea (that is thought) of triangle, he thinks, is then all and none of the particulars. And Berkeley will deny we have any universal ideas as such.

In the following text, Thomas insists upon the role of likeness in knowing:

> ratio causae et causati non est ratio cognitionis, nisi quatenus causatum similitudinem habet suae causae, et e converso. Unde si in uno angelo ponamus similitudinem alterius, praeter hoc quod sit causa vel causatum eius remanebit sufficiens ratio cognitionis, cum cognitio sit per assimilationem.[2]

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[2] *De Veritate*, Q. 8, Art. 7, ad 2

NOTE FOR BOOK THREE ABOUT THE SOUL, READINGS 14-16

Thomas often explains that *motion* does not properly name the act of sensing or understanding. But it can be more applied to the act of the desiring power:

> Actus enim apprehensivae virtutis non ita proprie dicitur motus, sicut actio appetitus:
>
> nam operatio virtutis apprehensivae perficitur in hoc, quod res apprehensae sunt in apprehendente;
>
> operatio autem virtutis appetitivae perficitur in hoc quod appetens inclinatur in rem appetibilem.
>
> Et ideo operatio apprehensivae virtutis assimilatur quieti:
>
> operatio autem virtutis appetitivae magis assimilatur motui.[1]

The reason given here goes back to the fundamental difference between knowing and loving or wanting. Knowing is perfected by the known being in the knower (in an immaterial way) while love or wanting puts the lover in the thing loved. For the same reason, we speak of the act of desire as an *inclination:*

> actus voluntatis nihil aliud est quam inclinatio consequens formam intellectam, sicut appetitus naturalis est inclinatio consequens formam naturalem.
>
> Inclinatio autem cuiuslibet rei est in ipsa re per modum eius.
>
> Unde inclinatio naturalis est naturaliter in re naturali; et inclinatio quae est appetitus sensibilis, est sensibiliter in sentiente; et similiter inclinatio intelligibilis, quae est actus voluntatis, est intelligibiliter in intelligente, sicut in principio et in proprio subiecto. Unde Philosophus hoc modo loquendi utitur in II de Anima, quod voluntas in ratione est. Quod autem intelligibiliter est in aliquo intelligente, consequens est ut ab eo intelligatur...[2]

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[1] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 81, Art. 1, c.
[2] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 87, Art. 4, C

In this argument, Thomas speaks of thinking as being through the *informing* of the soul and desire or affection through the inclining of it:

> Item. Deus non minus cognoscit substantias intelligibiles quam ipse, vel nos, substantias sensibiles: cum substantiae intellectuales sint magis cognoscibiles, puta magis in actu existentes. Informationes autem et inclinationes substantiarum sensibilium cognoscuntur et a Deo et a nobis. Cum igitur cogitatio animae sit per informationem quandam ipsius; affectio autem sit quaedam inclinatio ipsius ad aliquid, nam et ipsam inclinationem rei naturalis appetitum naturalem dicimus; relinquitur quod Deus cogitationes et affectiones cordium cognoscat.[3]

Intention is also used for the act of the desiring power:

> intentio est virtutis appetitivae actus: quae quidem est duplex. Una sensitiva...Alia autem est vis appetitiva intellectiva.[4]

But what is unique in the will, as Thomas points out, is that it can be a cause of it own inclination and is not coerced by its object:

> appetitus naturalis inest omnibus potentiis animae et partibus corporis respectu proprii boni; sed appetitus animalis qui est boni determinati, ad quod non sufficit naturae inclinatio, est alicuius potentiae determinatae vel voluntatis vel concupiscibilis vel irascibilis.
>
> Et inde est quod omnes aliae vires animae coguntur a suis objectis praeter voluntatem; quia omnes aliae habent appetitum naturalem tantum respectu sui objecti; voluntas autem habet praeter inclinationem naturalem aliam cujus est ipse volens causa.[5]

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[3] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber I, Capitulum LXVIII

[4] Thomas Aquinas, *De Malo*, Q. 16, Art. 11., Ad 3

[5] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVII, Q. I, Art. II, Resp

In the following text, Thomas says that sense desire and will are not distinguished *directly* by their following different kinds of grasping or knowing:

> voluntas ab appetitu sensibili non distinguitur directe per hoc quod est sequi apprehensionem hanc vel illam; sed ex hoc quod est determinare sibi inclinationem, vel habere inclinationem determinatam ab alio. Sed talis diversitas requirit diversitatem aprehensionum, ut ex praedictis, artic. praecedente ad 2, patet. Unde quasi ex consequenti accipitur distinctio appetitivarum virum penes distinctionem apprehensivarum et non principaliter.
>
> ...sensus et intellectus differunt per rationes apprehensibilis in quantum est apprehensibile, propter hoc quod ad diversa genera pertinent potentiarum. Sensus enim tenet in apprehendendo particulare, intellectus autem in apprehendendo universale.
>
> Appetitus vero superior et inferior non differunt per differentiam appetibilis in quantum est appetibile, cum in idem tendat bonum quandoque uterque appetitus; sed differunt penes diversum modum appetendi, ut ex dictis artic. praecedente., patet. Et ideo sunt quidem diversae potentiae, sed non diversa potentiarum genera.[6]

What he means by *directly* here is not altogether clear. But he says elsewhere that the distinction of the desiring powers by the kind of grasping giving rise to them is per se and by their own objects:

> appetibili non accidit esse apprehensum per sensum vel intellectum, sed per se ei convenit: nam appetibile non movet appetitum nisi inquantum est apprehensum. Unde differentiae apprehensi sunt per se differentiae appetibilis. Unde potentiae appetitivae distinguuntur secundum differentiam apprehensorum, sicut secundum propria obiecta.[7]

In this text, Thomas specifies the grasping or knowing necessary to elicit the act of the desiring power:

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[6] *De Veritate*, Q. 22, Art. 4, Ad 1 & Ad 4

[7] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 80, Art. 2, Ad 1

> sicut appetitus rationis non sequitur quamlibet apprehensionem rationis, sed quando aliquid apprehenditur ut bonum; ita et appetitus sensibilis non surgit nisi quando apprehenditur ut conveniens. Hoc autem non fit per sensum exteriorem qui apprehendit formas sensibiles, sed per aestimationem quae apprehendit rationes convenientis et nocivi quas sensus exterior non apprehendit.[8]

And in this text, Thomas again presents some precisions on what in the knowing powers gives to desire and how:

> ad sensualitatem aliquid pertinet dupliciter: vel sicut existens de essentia ejus, et sic videtur tantum appetitivam partem continere; vel sicut praeambulum ad ipsum, sicut et ratio ad liberum arbitrium pertinet...
>
> et hoc modo etiam vires apprehensivae pertinent ad sensualitatem, licet secundum quemdam ordinem:
>
> quia aestimativa proprie se habet ad eam sicut ratio practica ad liberum arbitrium quae etiam est movens;
>
> imaginatio autem simplex et vires praecedentes se habent magis remotae, sicut ratio speculativa ad voluntatem.[9]

Natural desire also differs from will in that the inclination of the former is not determined by itself, but that of the latter is. Hence, the latter is free. Sense desire is in the middle partaking in something of freedom, but not entirely:

> in hoc differt appetitus naturalis et voluntarius quod inclinatio naturalis appetitus est ex principio extrinseco, et ideo non habet libertatem, quia 'liberum est quod est causa sui'; inclinatio autem voluntarii appetitus est in ipso volente, et ideo habet libertatem voluntas.

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[8] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist XVII, Art. I, Sol. II, Ad 2

[9] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum,* Dist. XXIV, Q. II, Art. 1, Ad 2

> Sed inclinatio appetitus sensitivi partim est ab appetente, inquantum sequitur apprehensionem appetibilis; unde dicit Augustinus quod animalia moventur visis; partim ab objecto, inquantum deest cognitio ordinis in finem, et ideo oportet quod ab alio cognoscente finem, expedientia eis provideantur. Unde ad ea naturali inclinatione moventur. Et propter hoc non omnino habent libertatem, sed participant aliquid libertatis.[10]

Thomas speaks in this text of an imitation or likeness of liberty in sense desire, but sees this inclination as not entirely free because of the materiality of the reception of the sensing soul:

> Quia vero in substantia spirituali sensitiva, licet recipiantur formae rerum sine materia, non tamen omnino immaterialiter et absque materiae conditionibus, ex hoc quod recipiantur in organo corporali; ideo inclinatio in eis non est omnino libera, quamvis in eis aliqua libertatis imitatio vel similitudo sit. Inclinatur enim per appetitum in aliquid ex seipsis, in quantum ex apprehensione aliquid appetunt; sed inclinari in id quod appetunt, vel non inclinari, non subiacet dispositioni eorum.[11]

But the will can be entirely free because it is immaterial like the universal reason. In some ways, the will is even more detached from the body than the reason:

> voluntas neque quantum ad actum neque quantum ad objectum dependet ex organo corporali: quia objectum suum ab intellectu accipit.[12]

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[10] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist XXVII, Q. I, Art. II, in Resp

[11] *De Veritate,* Q. 23, Art. 1, c

[12] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist VIII, Q. I, Art. V, Sol.

In this text, Thomas distinguishes between pain and sadness which, strictly speaking, are not the same although sometimes the words are used somewhat synonymously:

> in dolore et tristitia duo inveniuntur, scilicet contrarietas contristantis et dolorem inferentis ad contristatum et dolentem, et perceptio ejus; et quantum ad haec duo tripliciter differunt.
>
> Primo quantum ad contrarietatem: quae quidem in dolore attenditur quantum ad ipsam naturam dolentis quae per laesivum corrumpitur; sed in tristitia quantum ad repugnantiam appetitus ad aliquid quod quis odit.
>
> Secundo quantum ad perceptionem: quae quidem in dolore semper est secundum sensum tactus, ut dictum est; in tristitia autem secundum apprehensionem interiorem.
>
> Tertio, quantum ad ordinem istorum duorum, quia dolor incipit in laesione et terminatur in perceptione sensus, ibi enim completur ratio doloris; sed ratio tristitiae incipit in apprehensione et terminatur in affectione. Unde dolor est in sensu sicut in subjecto, sed tristitia in appetitu. Ex quo patet quod tristitia est passio animalis, sed dolor est magis passio corporalis.
>
> Quandoque tamen tristitia, large loquendo, dolor dicitur. Unde Augustinus (in psalm XLII) distinguit dolorem animae, secundum se qui proprie dicitur tristitia, et dolorem animae per corpus, qui proprie dicitur dolor.[13]

In a later text in the same work, Thomas says that pleasure and joy can be distinguished in the same or analogous way:

> Qualiter autem tristitia et dolor differant, supra 15d. dictum est. Eodem etiam modo differunt delectatio sensibilis et gaudium.[14]

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[13] *Scriptum Super Lib.III Sententiarum*, Dist XV, Q. II, Art. III, Sol. II, Resp

[14] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVI, Q. I, Art. III, Resp

And in the following text, he again distinguishes between pleasure and pain on the one hand and joy and sadness on the other. But note how he uses the words here:

> delectatio causatur ex conjunctione convenientis. Conveniens enim adveniens perficit id cui advenit et quietat inclinationem in illud. Et haec quietatio secundum quod est percepta, est delectatio. Unde Plato (Eth. VII 1152b 13, l. 11, X 1172b 28, l. 2) dixit quod delectatio est 'generatio sensibilis', idest cognita 'in naturam', idest connaturalis. Unde in his quae cognitionem non habent, non est delectatio aliquo modo.
>
> In quodlibet autem conveniens non habenti cognitionem est duplex inclinatio: scilicet appetitus naturalis et appetitus animalis. Et utraque inclinatio quietatur per rem praesentem, et utraque etiam quietatio percipitur; unde ex utraque parte delectatio causatur.
>
> Delectatio ergo quae est quietatio appetitus naturalis, invenitur in omni potentia cui conjungitur suum objectum; delectatio vero quae est quietatio appetitus animalis, est tantum in concupiscibili vel voluntate.
>
> Prima autem delectatio dicitur tantum delectatio, proprie loquendo, et opposita passio dolor; secunda delectatio habet etiam nomine gaudii et opposita passio dicitur tristitia.
>
> Unde quamvis delectatio et dolor sint aliquo modo in omnibus potentiis animae, tamen gaudium et tristitia sunt tantum in concupiscibili vel voluntate.[15]

And in this text, Thomas speaks of how pleasure can be found in the irascible:

> Ad tertium dicendum quod in quantum spes est de difficili arduo non delectat sed magis affligit, cum ex hoc ipso sit distans; sed inquantum est de bono possibili acquiri sic facit delectationem, quia sicut quod est in potentia jam habet inchoationem sui esse, ita

[15] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum,* Dist. XXVII, Q. I, Art. II, Ad 3

quod apprehenditur ut possibile adipisci, apprehenditur ut jam quodammodo praesens. Et ideo spes delectationem facit; et haec delectatio non est in concupiscibili, sed in irascibili.

Ad quintum dicendum quod objectum irascibilis est bonum difficile, quod quandoque habet bonitatem ex ordine ad aliud. Unde in actu vel motu irascibilis est duplex terminus.

Primus est proximus, secundum quod terminatur in objectum proprium, ut quando consequitur victoriam. Et quia objectum proprium irascibilis habet difficultatem, ideo non est delectabile alicui simpliciter, sed est delectabile ei secundum hanc vim, cujus actus est perfectus per hoc quod pertingit ad objectum proprium quod jam consecutum est; sicut quando aliquis delectatur de hoc quod vincit, quamvis simpliciter sensibilem dolorem de vulneribus sustineat et de fatigatione tristitiam habeat; et ideo haec delectatio non est concupiscibilis, sed est proprie irascibilis, sicut delectatio quae est in actu videndi est propria ipsius visus.

Secundus terminus est ultimus finis in quem objectum proprium ordinatum est. Hoc autem est aliquid quod secundum seipsum est conveniens et delectabile, sicut quod animal postquam vicit aliud animal utitur ad libitum voluntate propria; et haec delectatio pertinet ad concupiscibilem.

Irascibilis enim ad conservationem concupiscibilis ordinatur, ut scilicet propter difficultatem intervenientem delectatio conveniens non praetermittatur. Et ideo dicit Damascenus in II lib. quod 'ira est audax concupiscentiae vindex' et propter hoc etiam dicit Philosophus in VIII (VI?) De Animalibus quod animalia pugnant ad invicem propter cibum et propter coitum, quia circa has delectationes praecipue est concupiscibilis.[16]

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[16] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum,* Dist. XXVI, Q. I, Art. II, AD 3 & Ad 5

THE MATTER AND ORDER OF WISDOM

This paper presupposes an understanding of the Proemium to Wisdom which Aristotle gives in the beginning of first book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy,* the first of the fourteen books *After* (meta) *the* (ta) *Books in Natural Philosophy* (phusika)[1]and a reading of the fourteen books enough to follow a thinking out of the matter and order of wisdom.

By the *matter* of wisdom is meant all that wisdom is about. This includes not only what it is first and chiefly about, but also what it is about in a second or even third way. It is difficult to know all that wisdom is about and the order in which it is about all these and even the order in which we learn that it is about these. No one can come to know all this at once. But we can come to know this *paulatim,* step by step.

Aristotle teaches us much about the matter and order of wisdom in the fourteen books of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*, but he does not make everything explicit. And knowing the matter and order of wisdom also helps us to understand the order of the fourteen books. But even there, we can only see part of what wisdom is about and its order at one time.

The beginning and cornerstone of any consideration of what wisdom is about is the Proemium to Wisdom given by Aristotle in the first part of Book

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[1]Perhaps the best way to begin to understand the Proemium is to read it carefully with the exposition of Thomas Aquinas. The Proemium occupies the first two chapters of Book One (980a 21-983a 23) and is the text for the first three Lectios of Thomas' Exposition of the first book. Thomas' division of the Proemium is also given in Aristotle's epilogue to the Proemium in which he recalls what he has done in the reverse order he has done it, going back from where he has ended. (He follows this same reverse order in his epilogue to the Proemium in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.) The division into Lectios corresponds more to the parts of the Proemium than the division into chapters. The first two Lectios correspond to the two parts of the first part of the Proemium and the third Lectio to the second part of the Proemium. The second chapter begins in the middle of the first part and includes the second part of the Proemium.

One. There we learn mainly that wisdom is about causes[2] and most of all about the first causes or cause.[3] But we also meet a six part description of the wise man or wisdom[4] and a four part consideration of the kind of knowledge that is wisdom[5] and many other things. It is possible to reason from these to the rest of what wisdom is about. We shall presuppose the reader's knowledge of this proemium here and an understanding of it which is best gotten with the help of Thomas Aquinas' exposition. As is his way elsewhere, Aristotle does *not* give a private opinion about wisdom in the proemium, but he clarifies our *common* thoughts about wisdom and the wise man, and thinks out and reasons out from them an understanding of the goal of wisdom and the kind of knowledge it is.

Aristotle and Thomas reason along at least two different lines from the Proemium to what wisdom is about. We could compare the Proemium to a point where many lines meet. That same point is the beginning of many different lines. Likewise, the Proemium to Wisdom is the beginning of many distinct investigations or lines of inquiry into what wisdom is about and the consideration or determination of them.

Following Aristotle and Thomas, we shall reason in the first part of our paper to a determination of the chief matters of wisdom and the order in which they should be considered.

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[2]This is seen especially when Aristotle manifests in three ways that we consider the man of art or science to be wiser than the man of experience because the former knows why and the latter, only that it is so.

[3]Aristotle could show that wisdom is about the first cause(s) from what he used to show that wisdom is about causes. But instead he thinks out a six part description of the wise man and wisdom from our common thoughts about them and uses this to show that wisdom is about the first cause(s). The conclusion becomes even more undeniable.

[4]The wise man knows all things in some way; he knows things difficult for man to know; he is more certain or sure than other men; he is more able to teach; he has knowledge most desirable for its own sake; and he orders all others.

[5]Wisdom is looking knowledge, knowledge for the sake of understanding, not for making or doing; wisdom is liberal knowledge, being for its own sake; wisdom is not a human possession, but more divine; and wisdom is the most honorable and best knowledge because the most divine.

In the second part of our paper, we shall reason following Aristotle and Thomas to the secondary matters of wisdom and the order in which they should be considered.

In the third part of our paper, we shall reason to the tertiary matters of wisdom.

In the fourth part of our paper, we shall try to resolve some of the remaining questions about the order of the books of the *Metaphysics*. By *remaining* questions, we mean those whose answers are not immediately clear from the determination of the matter and order of wisdom

PART ONE

We can reason from wisdom being about the first cause or causes (as its goal) to wisdom being about being as being and the one (as its subject), as Aristotle does in the beginning of the fourth book of *Wisdom or First Philosophy*

In the Proemium to Wisdom, Aristotle had pointed out two differences between experience and an art or science. The former is a knowledge of singulars and the latter is a knowledge of the universal (what is common to many and said of many). And by experience we know only that something is so while art or science is perfected in knowing why something is so.

The more things to which extends the cause aimed at in a science or the more things of which it is a cause, the more universal is its subject. An example will illustrate this beginning. If the king of a city or nation is a cause of more than the general of the army, the science about the king will also be about something more universal (said of more) than the science about the general. Thus, the science about the king would talk about the citizen since the king's causality extends to all citizens. But the science about the general would consider the soldier since his causality extends to all the soldiers under his command. Now in our citizen army, every soldier is a citizen. But every citizen is not a soldier. *Citizen* is said of more than *soldier* just as the king of the city or nation is a cause of more than the general of the army.

The reason why ethics considers in general all the goods of man while the art of cooking does not is that ethics aims at the end of the whole of human life while the art of cooking aims at good-tasting food.[6] The end that ethics aims at is the end of more things than the end aimed at by the art of cooking.

Thus, if wisdom aims at the first cause or causes of all things, its subject must be said of all things. But it is *being* that is said of everything that is. Hence, wisdom must be about being as being.[7]

One could also reason to this from the first attribute in the six part description of the wise man: the wise man know all things insofar as this is possible for man. But it is not possible for man to know all things in particular for there is an infinity of them and reason cannot go through an infinity of things one by one. But reason can know even an infinity of things in general by knowing what is said of them. For example: the mathematician knows that *no odd number is even* and in knowing this he knows in general an infinity of things since both odd number and even number are said of an infinity of things. If the wise man then knows all things so far as is possible for man, he must know them in general by knowing what is said of all things. And this is being.

Since being and one are convertible, Aristotle goes on to show that the subject of wisdom is not only being as being, but also the one and the many. But we will leave to the reader of the fourth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* the fuller understanding of why the reasoned out knowledge of being as being is also a knowledge of the one and the many.

After he has shown that the subject of wisdom is being and one, Aristotle also shows that wisdom is about the axioms, the statements known through themselves by all, such as that *the whole is greater than its part*.

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[6]This is why the division of all human goods into the goods of the soul and the goods of the body and outside or exterior goods belongs to ethics and politics and not to the art of cooking.

[7]We are touching here upon the part of the reasoning that connects the knowledge whose goal is the first cause(s) with the reasoned out knowledge of being as being. Whether there is a reasoned out knowledge of being as being is another question.

It is one thing to know that reason must consider the axioms and not just assume and use them and another to see that this consideration should belong to the wise man.

At first sight, it would seem that reason need only assume and use the axioms since these statements are not in need of proof and are known by all men. However, the words in these statements are equivocal by reason and most men have never distinguished the senses of those words, let alone seen the order among those senses.[8] There is also an order among the axioms which all men do not see. The axiom about contradiction is the natural beginning of all the axioms. Hence, a consideration of the axioms is necessary to achieve a completely distinct and ordered knowledge of them.

Moreover, from ignorance of the senses of the words in the axioms and from seeming contradictions that reason runs into in many things it thinks about, some have come to doubt, in words at least, some of the axioms and even the one which is the natural beginning of all of them, the axiom about contradiction. And most men are unable to answer these sophistical objections to the axioms.

Thus, for a completely distinct and ordered knowledge of the axioms and to answer the objections against them, it is necessary for reason to consider the axioms as well as use them. But where or to whom does this consideration belong?

After it has been seen that wisdom is about being as being, it can be reasoned that the consideration and defense of the axioms belongs to wisdom. For the words in the axioms pertain to being as being as is seen first in the axiom which is the natural beginning of them, the axiom about contradiction: *it is impossible to be and not be in the same way at the same time.* Since the axioms are also beginnings common to all reasoned out knowledge, they must pertain to being as being. For this is common to the subjects of all reasoned out knowledge.

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[8]In words equivocal by chance, there is no order among the meanings. But in words equivocal by reason there is an order among the meanings. For reason is defined by order as is clear from the first definition of reason. Reason is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after.

One could also reason from the third attribute of the wise man (he is more certain than others) that he considers the axioms, as Thomas does in his exposition or laying out of the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics:*

> Because wisdom is most certain and the beginnings of demonstrations are more certain than the conclusions, it is necessary that the wise man not only know those things which are concluded from the beginnings of demonstrations about those things which it considers, but also that it say what is true about the first beginnings themselves. The wise man does not demonstrate them; but it does belong to him to make known the common things, such as whole and part, equal and unequal, and others of this sort, which being known, the beginnings of demonstrations become known. Whence to the wise of this kind, it pertains to dispute against those denying the beginnings, as is clear in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*.[9]

This exhausts, perhaps, what wisdom is about insofar as it is a knowledge of *things*. Wisdom is a knowledge of the first causes, a knowledge of being as being and one, and a knowledge of the axioms (which are also about things). And in the rest of Book Four through Book Fourteen, Aristotle hardly does anything else but consider these three.

In the rest of Book Four, he considers the axiom of contradiction which is the natural beginning of all the axioms. Book Five could be considered as both the beginning of the consideration of being as being and the one as one. Since the words *being* and *one* and all the other words that pertain to their parts or causes or properties are equivocal by reason and it is therefore necessary to distinguish in order the senses of these words as he does in Book Five to know

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[9]*In VI Ethicorum* , Lectio V, n. 1182: "..quia sapientia est certissima, principia autem demonstrationum sunt certiora conclusionibus, oportet quod sapiens non solum sciat ea quae ex principiiis demonstrationum concluduntur circa ea quae de quibus considerat; sed etiam quod verum dicat circa ipsa principia prima: non quidem quod demonstrat ea: sed inquantum ad sapientes pertinet notificare communia, puta totum et partem, aequale et inaequale, et alia huiusmodi, quibus cognitis principia demonstrationum innotescunt. Unde et ad huiusmodi sapientem pertinet disputare contra negantes principia, ut patet in quarto *Metaphysicae.*"

what we are talking about. But these are also the words used in the axioms so that the distinction in order of the meanings of these words could also be considered as the end of the consideration of the axioms.

The consideration of being as being in Books Six through Nine is about all the senses of being distinguished in Book Five. There is a brief consideration of accidental being and being as true in Book Six where it is also shown that these are not the main concern of the wise man in his study of being. The main consideration of being is made in Books 7-9: Books Seven and Eight are about substance and Book Nine about act and ability or potency. In Book Ten, Aristotle considers the one and the many.

The last four books of the *Metaphysics* are devoted to the discovery of the first cause(s). In Book Eleven and the first part of Book Twelve, Aristotle gathers what is useful from the earlier parts of wisdom and also from the philosophy of nature to investigate and know the first cause(s). He determines the truth about the first cause(s) in the second part of Book Twelve and in Books Thirteen and Fourteen he gives his final refutation of the positions of the Platonists about the first causes and immaterial substances.

Thus, after showing in the Proemium that wisdom is about the first causes, and in the beginning of Book Four that wisdom is about being as being and the one, and immediately after that in Book Four that wisdom is also about the axioms, almost the whole rest of the fourteen books is devoted to the consideration of these three.

When we compare the order in which Aristotle shows that wisdom is about the first causes, about being as being and the one, and about the axioms, and the order in which he considers each of them, they seem contrary. For the first thing he shows that wisdom is about (the first causes) is the last thing he considers and the last thing he shows wisdom is about (the axioms) is the first that he considers. If we can understand these "contrary" orders, we will have understood most of the order of wisdom and of the fourteen books of *Wisdom* as a whole.[10]

Both the order in which Aristotle shows that wisdom is about these three and the order in which he takes up those three follow the first beginning about

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[10]What is not explained by this is, of course, mainly Book One after the Proemium and Books Two and Three.

the order in our knowledge. This beginning is natural or inborn: we should go from what is more known to us to what is less known to us. This is the beginning for understanding most of the order of wisdom as seen in Aristotle's fourteen books of *Wisdom*. This beginning helps us to see as a whole the order of the proemium in the beginning of Book One and Books Four through Fourteen. For almost all of this can be reduced to following that beginning in determining in order three things that wisdom is about and in the order in which those three are considered.

It is perhaps easier to see that Aristotle is following this beginning in considering the axioms before being as being and the one, and these before the first causes. The axioms are the statements known through themselves by all men, such as that *the whole is greater that its part* and *nothing is before itself*. Such statements are the statements most known to us. For the statements known through themselves are obviously more known to us than the statements that are known through proof by other statements. And the statements known through themselves *by all men* are more known to us than those known through themselves *by the wise or learned*. And since the first cause is the cause of being as being, and effects are more known to us than causes, being as being is also more known to us than the first cause or causes.

But does this first beginning about order in our knowledge also explain the order in which Aristotle shows that wisdom is about these three? It might seem a paradox at first that what is most known to us (the axioms) should be least known to us to belong to wisdom and what is least known to us (the first causes) should be most known to us to belong to wisdom.

However, this is not such a paradox if we consider more carefully what is most known to us about wisdom. No one praises someone as wise for knowing less than others or even just as much as others. We praise someone as wise because they excel others in knowledge and know things difficult to know. Everyone thinks that wisdom names the most excellent knowledge of reason. And if asked whether wisdom comes in the beginning or in the middle or at the end of our knowledge, everyone is apt to answer at the end. Hence, the last thing one would think is that wisdom is about what everyone knows, the axioms. Who would think, at first, that wisdom is about statements that are obvious to everyone?

Likewise, since a knowledge of things in general would seem imperfect in comparison to a knowledge of things in particular, the most excellent knowledge

and the greatest perfection of reason would not seem to be a knowledge of the most general.

And Aristotle's proemium is a witness to this. When comparing experience with art or science, he does not show that the man of art or science is wiser than the man of experience because the former knows the universal and the latter only singulars. Indeed, from this difference he reasons that experience is in some way superior to art or science. Since doing is in the singular, the man of experience may succeed where the man of mere universal knowledge fails. For what is done is singular. The doctor does not cure man, but this man. Rather, Aristotle reasons that the man of art or science is wiser than the man of mere experience because the former knows why and the latter only that it is so. And in the second part of the proemium, when Aristotle wants to manifest that wisdom is the most honorable and best knowledge, he does not reason from its being most universal, but from its being most divine, being about the first cause which is God, and this being the kind of knowledge which God would have most of all.

Since then *all* understand by *wisdom* a knowledge that is best and most excellent, it is more known to us that wisdom is about the first cause than about what is most general, let alone about what everyone knows (the axioms). Someone might wonder whether man can know the first cause of all things, but no one would doubt that the man who has got that far is to be called wise.

And since the one who reasons well to know something must reason from what is more known to us to what is less known to us, one can see that Aristotle follows this rule throughout these two orders.[11] He reasons from wisdom being about the first causes to its being about being as being and he reasons from the latter to its being about the axioms. Then he reasons from the axioms and other beginnings to a knowledge of being as being and he reasons from a knowledge of being as being (and especially of the order of act and ability) and other things to a knowledge of the first cause as pure act rather than matter which is in (passive) ability or potency.

Thus when we see that Aristotle follows the order from what is *more known to us* to what is *less known to us,* both in determining what wisdom is

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[11]The two orders here are the order in which he shows that wisdom is about these three and the order in which the truth about these three is determined.

about and in determining the truth about these, we can see the major order of wisdom as a whole and that it cannot be otherwise.

We can also see in these two orders of reasoning how complete is wisdom. As Aristotle teaches us in the beginning of the first book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*), what is more known or knowable by us is less known or knowable by nature or less knowable simply. And what is less knowable by us is more knowable by nature or simply. This is seen both in our knowing things in a confused way before distinctly and in our generally knowing effects before causes. But in going from the axioms to the first cause, the wise man is going from what is most known to us (in statements) to what is most known by nature (the first cause).[12] Thus, the wise man seems to go almost from the beginning to the end of the natural road in our knowledge.[13] The natural road goes from the more known to us to the more known simply. And among statements, the axioms are *most* known to us and therefore come first or at the beginning. And the first cause, especially being pure act, is what is *most* known or most knowable by nature.[14]

And when we add that nothing seems to come between the consideration of the axioms and being as being so that the two studies seem to be in a way continuous and nothing comes between the study of being as being and the knowledge of the first cause so that they also seem to be continuous, the completeness of wisdom seems perfect. We call syllogisms *continuous* when the

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[12]The first cause is most known by nature or most knowable simply because it is pure act and something is knowable to the extent it is in act. This is shown in Book Nine of the *Metaphysics*

[13]This is true especially insofar as that road is found in reason.

[14]There are other ways in which the wise man goes from what is most known to us to what is most known by nature *in things*. The act which is most known to us is motion, but motion is the act which is least actual, being the act of what is in ability insofar as it is in ability. In going then from motion to the unmoved mover who is pure act, we are going from the act which is most known to us but least knowable by nature to the act which is least known to us but most knowable by nature. This movement of reason is the largest discourse of reason in one sense of *largest*. It goes between the acts which are the furthest apart. Also, in Books 11 & 12, Aristotle combines these because he goes from the first axiom and imperfect being, both accidental being and motion, in Book 11 to material substance in the first part of Book 12 and to immaterial substance and the first cause in the second part of Book 12.

conclusion of one is a premiss in the other; the end of one is a beginning of the other. As we saw before, the fifth of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* could be considered as both the end of the consideration of the axioms and the beginning of the consideration of being as being and the one.

Since the words in the axioms are names equivocal by reason, the fifth book of *Wisdom* is useful for understanding the axioms more distinctly since there are distinguished in order the senses of those words. And it is also useful for solving the sophistical objections against them from mixing up the senses of those words. (See *whole* and *part*, for example, and the mistake from mixing up their two senses.[15]) But at the same time, the distinction of these words is the beginning of a consideration of being as being and the one. The words in the axioms are also the names of being and one and their parts and causes and properties.

The fifth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* can thus be considered as the end of the consideration of the axioms and the beginning of the consideration of being as being and the one as one. Hence, the consideration of the axioms by the wise man and his consideration of being as being and the one as one could be said to be *continuous* insofar as the end of one is also the beginning of the other. Thus, nothing could fit, it seems, in-between them.

Likewise, the consideration of being as being and the consideration of the first cause(s) seems in some way to be continuous. For the consideration of being is mainly a consideration of substance and the consideration of substance in books seven and eight is completed in book twelve when not only is recalled

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[15]The sophist could argue thus: animal is only a part of what man is. Man is not just an animal; he is an animal with reason. But animal includes not only man, but also dog and cat and horse etc. Therefore, what is only a part of man is greater than man or includes more than man. This is an example of the mistake from mixing up the senses of a word. There are two senses of *whole* at least, the composed whole which is put together from its parts but not said of them, and the universal whole which is said of its parts, but not put together from them. The mistake here arises from confusing animal as a composing part of the definition of man which is a composed whole and man as a subject part of the universal whole animal. If one stays with the same sense of whole and part, the whole is always greater than its part. The composed whole always has more than one part and the universal whole is always said of more than one of its parts is said of.

that teaching in the first part of the book, but when the truth about the separated or immaterial substances is considered in the second part of that book. And it was for the sake of these substances that we chiefly went through a study of material substances in Books seven and eight. But these immaterial substances are also the first causes. Thus the end of the consideration of being as being, insofar as it is mainly a consideration of substance, is completed together with the determination of the first causes. Thus although Book Twelve does not immediately follow Books Seven and Eight, it is true that the end of the consideration of substance is also a consideration of the first causes. And in this way there is a continuity.

Aristotle calls substance first being and substance is first compared to accidents and motion and privations. But then, he calls the immaterial substances the first substances. God who is a substance in the broad sense of *ens per se* (although not in the genus of substance) is both the first being and the first cause in the fullest sense since there is no being before God and no cause before God. When we see that the first being and the first cause are the same, we see how close is the consideration of being as being and the consideration of the first cause.

This is seen also very clearly in regard to the other chief division of being which is into act and ability, the subject of Book Nine. After considering ability and act in the first two parts of the book, Aristotle then considers their order which means their before and after. It is there that we learn that act is before ability in definition and knowledge, in perfection and goodness, and, simply speaking, in time. Since *first* is defined by before, understanding this order is the beginning for finding the first being and, therefore, the first cause.

Aristotle could go immediately to a determination of the first cause from the consideration of being as being and the one as one, but in Book Eleven and the first part of Book Twelve, he recalls what is useful for the consideration of the first cause, not only from this reasoned out knowledge, but also from natural philosophy.[16] This reminds one of the Proemium where he could reason from the man who knows the cause as being wiser than the man who only knows that it is so, to the conclusion that the wise man in the full sense must be the man who knows the first cause. But instead he thinks out a six part

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[16]One could perhaps add that we need to recall things from the third book *About the Soul* before we can understand the operation of the first cause.

description of wisdom or the wise man from common thoughts about them and then reasons to the conclusion that wisdom is about the first cause(s).

Three is often enough or all there is of something. And the three chief matters of wisdom seem to be all there could be. Since it is natural to go in the discourse of reason from what is more known to us to what is more known by nature, the first of these is about what is most known to us (the axioms) and the last about what is most known by nature (the first cause). Hence, we seem in a way to have gone from the beginning to the end of the natural way of knowing. And since the first is continuous in a way with the second and the second, as we have seen, with the third, there does not seem to be anything that could have been left out in-between. Thus these three seem to be a most significant example of three is enough or all. The three things considered by the wise man seem most complete because they go from what is most known to us (in statements) to what is most known by nature (the first cause) without anything being able to come in between except the consideration of being as being. We have a beginning, middle and end. We seem to have another example where three is enough.

Every reasoned out knowledge is about its subject which it seeks to know in the light of the causes of that subject. But wisdom differs from other forms of reasoned out knowledge, not only because it seeks the *first* causes, but also because it is about the axioms. And in the latter way, it seems to be in the genus of understanding as well as in the genus of reasoned out knowledge. Aristotle, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, speaks of it as both:

> It is clear that wisdom is the most certain reasoned out knowledge. It is necessary therefore that the wise man knows not only what is from the beginnings, but that he also speak the truth about the beginnings. Therefore, wisdom will be both understanding (nous)and reasoned out knowledge (episteme), having the head as it were, being the reasoned out knowledge of the most honorable.[17]

And Thomas commenting on these words also notes that wisdom is both:

> Wisdom, insofar as it says what is true about the beginnings, is understanding (*Intellectus*), but insofar as it knows those things which are concluded from the beginnings, it is reasoned out

[17]*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book VI, 1141a 16-20

> knowledge (*scientia*). It is distinguished however from reasoned out knowledge (*scientia*) taken in general on account of the eminence which it has among all the forms of reasoned out knowledge: for it is the virtue of all reasoned out knowledge.[18]

Thomas also explains why Aristotle calls wisdom the *head* of all the forms of reasoned out knowledge:

> Wisdom is not just any reasoned out knowledge, but a reasoned out knowledge of the most honorable and divine things, so that it has the aspect of a head among all the forms of reasoned out knowledge. For just as the motions and operations of all the other members are directed through the senses which are in the head, so wisdom directs all the other forms of reasoned out knowledge, insofar as all the other take their beginnings from it.[19]

Although Aristotle usually speaks of wisdom as a reasoned out knowledge (episteme) or as a knowledge over a road (methodos), the above excellence is reason to distinguish it as a more perfect habit or virtue than reasoned out knowledge. And in the *Summa Theologiae*, Thomas makes this point:

> Wisdom is a reasoned out knowledge (*scientia*), insofar as it has that which is common to all reasoned out knowledge which is that it demonstrates conclusions from beginnings. But because it has something of its own above all other forms of reasoned out knowledge, which is that it judges about all, and not only as regards conclusions, but also as regards the first beginnings; therefore it

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[18] *In VI N. Ethicorum* , Lectio V, n. 1183: "...sapientia, inquantum dicit verum circa principia est intellectus, inquantum autem scit ea quae ex principiis concluduntur, est scientia. Distinguitur tamen a scientia communiter sumpta propter eminentiam quam habet inter alias scientias: est enim virtus quaedam omnium scientiarum."

[19] *In VI N. Ethicorum* , Lectio VI, n. 1184: "...sapientia non est qualitercumque scientia, sed scientia rerum honorabilissimarum ac divinarum, ac si ipsa habeat rationem capitis inter omnes scientias. Sicut enim per sensus, qui sunt in capite, diiriguntur motus et operationes omnium aliorum membrorum, ita sapientia dirigit omnes alias scientias, dum ab ea omnes aliae sua principia supponunt."

> can be considered as a more perfect virtue than reasoned out knowledge.[20]

But just as there is reason to distinguish wisdom from reasoned out knowledge, there is also reason to separate it from (natural) understanding. The distinction of the three virtues of theoretical or looking reason is not even to be considered the division of a genus into its species:

> Whence, if someone considers rightly, these three virtues are not distinguished equally from each other, but in a certain order; just as in potential wholes, of which one part is more perfect than another, as the reasonable soul is more perfect than the sensing soul, and the sensing, than the vegetative. For in this way, reasoned out knowledge (*scientia* or *episteme*) depends upon natural understanding (*intellectus* or *nous*) And both of these depend upon wisdom (*sapientia* or *sophia*) as upon the most chief one which contains under itself both understanding and reasoned out knowledge, as judging the conclusions of reasoned out knowledge and their beginnings.[21]

Once we see that wisdom is in a way both understanding and reasoned out knowledge or that it contains, like a potential whole that is more perfect, both reasoned out knowledge and (natural) understanding, we can understand better how it has three chief matters. For insofar as it is understanding or contains more perfectly natural understanding, its matter is the axioms. But insofar as it

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[20]*Summa Theologiae* , Prima Secundae, Q. 57, Art. 2, Ad 1: "...sapientia est quaedam scientia, inquantum habet id quod est commune omnibus scientiis, ut scilicet ex principiis conclusiones demonstret. Sed quia habet aliquid proprium super alias scientias, inquantum scilicet de omnibus iudicat; et non solum quantum ad conclusiones, sed etiam quantum ad prima principia: ideo habet rationem perfectioris virtutis quam scientia."

[21]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* , Prima Secundae, Q. 57, Art. 2, Ad 2: "...Unde, si quis recte consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab invicem, sed ordine quodam; sicut accidit in totis potentialibus, quarum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc enim modo, scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem."

is reasoned out knowledge or contains reasoned out knowledge in perfection, it has a subject (being as being) whose causes (the first causes) it seeks to know.

PART TWO

If wisdom goes from the statements *most known to us* to the first cause which is *most known by nature or simply* through a consideration of being as being and the one and the many, and the middle is *continuous* with the first and with the last, there does not seem to be room for anything else that wisdom could be about. But if we make another beginning of the proemium and proceed along another road, we will find that wisdom is about something else although in a quite secondary way. For wisdom is first and chiefly about its subject and its end or goal.

In the beginning of the second book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*, the second book *After the Books in Natural Philosophy* Aristotle considers *how man is towards knowing truth*. Thomas gives in his exposition there a reason why this consideration belongs to wisdom:

> The consideration of truth is different in first philosophy and in the other particular sciences. For each particular science considers some particular truth about a limited genus of things, as geometry about the magnitudes of things and arithmetic about numbers. But first philosophy considers the universal truth about things. And therefore it belongs to this philosopher to consider how man is towards knowing truth.[22]

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[22] *In II Metaphysicorum* , Lectio I, n. 273: "Aliter autem se habet consideratio philosophiae primae circa veritatem, et aliarum particularium scientiarum. Nam unaquaeque particularis scientia considerat quamdam particularem veritatem circa determinatum genus entium, ut geometria circa rerum magnitudines, arithmetica circa numeros. Sed philosophia prima considerat universalem veritatem entium. Et ideo ad hunc philosophum pertinet considerare quomodo se habeat homo ad veritatem cognoscendam."

This reason is based on the Proemium because there we learn that wisdom is a looking science whose end is truth rather than a practical science whose end is doing or making. And we also learned that it is about all things[23] and most universal in its consideration.

But after Aristotle has shown how man is towards knowing truth, he also seems to give another reason why the consideration of how man is towards truth should belong to wisdom. But this reason is more from the end or goal of the wise man (to know the first cause) than from the description of the wise man (in which it is stated that the wise man knows all things in some way). He first shows that the consideration of truth belongs more to the looking sciences than to the practical ones because it is the end of the former to know truth while the end of the latter is doing or making and because the former consider eternal truths while the latter more contingent truths. And then Aristotle shows that among the looking sciences, the knowledge of truth most of all belongs to wisdom. For when the same belongs to two things, but to one because of the other, it belongs more to the cause. If hot belongs to the fire and the air around the fire, but to the air around the fire because of the fire, it belongs more to the fire. The fire is hotter than the air. This is very important in every part of philosophy. Hence, if true belongs to the cause and the effect, but to the effect because of the cause, it belongs more to the cause. Therefore, the first cause must be most true.

Thus from the Proemium as another beginning, we can reason to wisdom being about how man is towards knowing truth.

But if it belongs to the wise man to consider how man is towards knowing truth, would it not for the same reasons belong to the wise man to consider the ways of knowing or coming to know truth? Indeed, this is what Aristotle begins to consider in the end of Book Two.

Perhaps, there is art in separating the consideration of how man is towards knowing truth *in the beginning* of Book Two and the start of the consideration of the ways of knowing or coming to know truth *at the end* of the

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[23]This is the first part of the six part description of the wise man or wisdom in the proemium.

book by the reason for these two considerations belonging to wisdom in the middle of the book.[24]

It is not hard to see that we should know how man is towards knowing truth before we consider the ways of coming to know truth. Unless we know how man is towards knowing truth, we can not discover the ways he must come to know truth. This will become more clear when we consider what comes under these two considerations.

Under *how man is towards knowing truth*, the philosopher first considers that knowing truth is in one way difficult for man and in another easy. He then shows the three ways in which it is easy. Next, he shows that the cause of the difficulty in knowing can be either in the things we are trying to know or in the weakness of our reason, and that the latter is the chief cause. Finally, he considers the ways in which one man is helped by another in knowing truth. Even in the pursuit of truth, man is a social animal.

Under *the ways of knowing or coming to know truth*, Aristotle is not as explicit and leaves it to us to see all that the wise man must consider. He goes to some of the more difficult things and the ones which are most necessary for wisdom and leaves it to us to fill out the whole picture with the hints he gives in various places. Fortunately, we have Thomas Aquinas, Boethius, Msgr. Maurice Dionne[25] and others to help us follow up these hints.

There are, at least, two distinctions which the wise man should bring out among the ways of knowing or coming to know truth. And he must see the order among those distinguished. The wise man must distinguish between discovery by oneself and learning from another and find their order. And he

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[24]Plato had done something similar in his great introduction to logic (the art of defining and reasoning) in the dialogue called the *Meno*. In the beginning, he introduces us to the art of defining and in the end to the art of reasoning. But he has separated these two by a middle part on what is common to both: coming to know what you do not know through what you do know. Both in defining and in reasoning, we come to know the unknown through what is known already.

[25]Charles De Koninck thought that Msgr. Dionne was the wisest man of his generation, the greatest philosopher he had met in either Europe or America. Considering the greatness of De Koninck himself, this is no mean testimony to Dionne.

must distinguish and see the order among the roads followed in discovery or learning.

Discovery by oneself, of course, comes before learning from another in that someone must discover something that others do not know before he could teach it to others. But it is also important to see that teaching and learning should imitate the way of discovery. Thus, the way of learning is not substantially different from the way of discovery. And if we see how others discovered in the past, it may help us in the future to discover something else.

Book One of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* after the Proemium could be said to be ordered to judging whether Aristotle can learn wisdom from his predecessors. But an examination of their thinking shows that they had not even understood clearly the distinction of the four kinds of cause, let alone arrived at a knowledge of the first cause or causes. Hence, Aristotle must discover the first cause(s) even though this will not be without their help. And in the beginning of Book Three,[26] he shows the need t o doubt well before we can find the truth about these things. The beginning of Book Three is indeed a most important teaching on how discovery is made, especially in those forms of reasoned out knowledge which are more difficult than mathematics.

The careful reader might wonder why Book Two comes between the discourse of Book One after the Proemium which shows that Aristotle cannot simply learn wisdom from the thinkers before but must discover it himself and Book Three which begins with subtle and profound teaching on how we discover and begins that process. The second surely comes after the first, but why not *immediately* after. This question will be answered in the fourth part of this article.

The wise man should also distinguish the roads and ways of coming to know truth. But Aristotle does not do this explicitly in the third and last part of Book Two. Nevertheless, Aristotle does consider in various places the roads and ways of going forward and touches upon their order, without explicitly making the distinction in one place. To avoid confusion, we should make explicit here the distinction.

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[26]995a 24-995b 3 Thomas expounds this in the first Lectio of his commentary on that book.

Before making explicit the distinction, we should know what is being distinguished. Aristotle speaks sometimes of a road and sometimes of the way of going forward along this road. Thus in the proemium at the beginning of the first book of *Natural Hearing* (The *Physics*), Aristotle speaks thus:

> The road from the more known and more certain to us to the more certain and more known by nature is inborn. For the known to us and the known simply are not the same. Whence it is necessary to go forward in this way from the more uncertain by nature, but more certain to us to the more certain and more known by nature.

We do not intend to expound or explain the above words here, but we give them to show the connection of the words *road* and *to go forward in this way.* These two correspond like a distance and the motion over that distance. We learn in the sixth book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*), that the motion over a distance or road is divided as is that distance or road. Likewise, the before and after in the motion along a road follows or corresponds to the before and after in the road over which one moves. In likeness to this, we can speak of a road or order in the things we know or consider as they are in our knowledge and our thinking follows this order. The order in our thinking follows the order in our thoughts.

But Aristotle often does not speak as fully as in this text. He will simply speak of the way (tropos) (way) of reasoned out knowledge (episteme)). Thus, in the second book of *Wisdom:*

> Hence, one should be educated how each should be received since it is absurd to seek at the same time reasoned out knowledge and the way of reasoned out knowledge.[27]

Thomas Aquinas likewise often speaks briefly of the *modus* of a *scientia* or reasoned out knowledge.

But in his commentary on the third part of the second book of *Wisdom*, Thomas distinguishes between the common way of proceeding in reasoned out knowledge and the private way of proceeding in each reasoned out knowledge. Aristotle in the text is speaking of the latter and does not distinguish the two. Thomas reasons that just as a man should learn the private way of each

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[27] *Metaphysics*, Book Two, 995a 12-14

reasoned out knowledge in its beginning, so he should learn logic before the other forms of reasoned out knowledge since logic considers the common way of proceeding in reasoned out knowledge:

> He says first therefore that because diverse [thinkers] sought the truth in diverse ways, it is necessary that a man be instructed in which way what is said in each reasoned out knowledge should be received . And because it is not easy for man to grasp two things at once, but when he pays attention to two, he is not able to grasp either; it is absurd that a man seek at the same time reasoned out knowledge and the way of reasoned out knowledge.
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> And because of this one ought first to learn logic before the rest of reasoned out knowledge because logic treats of the common way of going forward in all the other forms of reasoned out knowledge. The private way of each reasoned out knowledge should be considered in each reasoned out knowledge around its beginning.[28]

Thomas' distinction here between the common way of going forward in reasoned out knowledge and the private way of going forward in each reasoned out knowledge does not include every way of going forward in our knowledge. It was Msgr. Dionne who first made explicit to my knowledge the universal distinction of the ways of proceeding.[29] Dionne was thinking in addition of the natural way of proceeding which Aristotle touches upon in the text we have seen from the Proemium to the eight books of *Natural Hearing*. Since as we have seen in that text that one is said to proceed or go forward along a road, we could also speak of three roads in our knowledge.[30] We can now make more

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[28]*In II Metaphysicorum*, Lectio V, n. 335

[29]Some of us who studied under Msgr. Dionne can still remember the semester when his class followed a logic class at Laval University. The logic professor had begun with this text from the commentary on the *Metaphysics* saying there are *two* ways of proceeding. Msgr. Dionne, in the class following, began with the words that there are *three* ways of proceeding. I remember turning to another student who had the same reaction: did we hear correctly?

[30]In a conversation of the author with Msgr. Dionne on the Proemium to the *Physics*, Msgr. made the point, looking at the text of Moerbeke, that *via* was more concrete than *modus procedendi*. Likewise, I think it best to distinguish

explicit this distinction into three roads to which correspond three ways of proceeding or going forward. We can gather from the texts of Aristotle where he touches upon these roads that he had distinguished them and seen their order. But we do not have in the fourteen books of *Wisdom* or elsewhere, to my knowledge, an explicit distinction of them and an elucidation of their order. But such a distinction and ordering could belong only to the wise man because of his priority in the consideration of truth. We cannot here enter into a full consideration of the distinction and order of the roads and ways of going forward in our knowledge, but some understanding of them is necessary to see fully the matter and order of wisdom.

Since a road in our knowledge is an order or a before and after in our knowledge; and nature and reason make order; the roads in our knowledge are either made by nature or by reason.

The first road in our knowledge is the one made by nature and is the road from the senses into reason. Since man is by nature an animal with reason, the road from the senses into reason is natural for man. Animal is defined by sense and what is generic is before in time and generation what is specific. And genus is taken from matter and difference from form, and matter is not only before form in generation, but also matter is for the sake of form, as Aristotle shows in the second book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*) Since nature is first in a thing, the natural road in our knowledge must be the first road therein.

There are also roads in our knowledge made by reason. These presuppose the natural road and are acquired with the help of it.

First there is the road from reasonable guesses to reasoned out knowledge. This road is studied in logic. Aristotle showed us how to reason from probable opinions which are reasonable guesses in the *About Places* (the *Topics)* and the *common* road of reasoned out knowledge in the *Prior and Posterior Analytics.*

Although reason is common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge since they are acquired by the use of reason, the subject of each reasoned out knowledge is private to it. Hence, in addition to the common road of reasoned out knowledge, there are private roads of reasoned out knowledge

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first the roads in our knowledge and then speak of the ways of going forward along these roads.

corresponding to the different subjects. (When we say *private*, we mean private to that reasoned out knowledge although it is common to everyone who knows how to acquire that knowledge.) The private road of each reasoned out knowledge should be considered in the beginning of that knowledge since it must fit the matter considered therein.

The distinction and order of these roads belongs to the wise man since the consideration of truth belongs most of all to him. But he also considers some of these roads more than others.

The consideration of the natural road belongs to the wise man most of all for three reasons. From the sixth attribute of the wise man, that he orders all others, we can see one reason for the consideration of this road belonging to him. Since logic is about the common road of reasoned out knowledge, the logician would seem to be like the wise man. For through his knowledge of the common road of reasoned out knowledge (defining, dividing and demonstrating), the logician is able to direct in general all pursuit of reasoned out knowledge. Hence, it would seem that the logician more directs the wise man (since wisdom is one form of reasoned out knowledge) than the wise man, the logician. Hence, the sixth attribute of the wise man (he directs others, but is not directed by them) would belong more to the logician than to the wise man.

But we are directed by the natural road in acquiring the common road of reasoned out knowledge and in seeing the reasons for what is studied there.

We acquire what is not natural through what is natural, as artificial tools by our hands and language through our natural tendency to imitate. Hence, too, we acquire the roads made by reason through the natural road. Even the use of the word *road* to name the before and after in our knowledge is a result of naming following the road from the senses into reason. For we name things as we know them.

And a knowledge of the natural road also gives us reasons for the common road. Some examples must suffice here. On the natural road, we sense before we understand. But as Boethius said, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. This is why we give examples of a thing before we define it (as Plato represents so often in the *Dialogues)* and why the way of defining most proportioned to us is that of comparing examples of what is to be defined and separating out what they have in common while leaving aside their

differences. This is also why induction (the argument from many singulars to the universal) comes before syllogism and example (the argument from one singular to another of the same kind) comes before enthymeme. A very important before and after on the natural road is that we know things in a confused way before distinctly, as Aristotle shows in the beginning of the first book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*). But this is the reason why we must define and divide and why we name things before we define them and why the first part of a definition is the genus.

A second reason why the wise man especially considers the natural road is that it is the road *to* wisdom (as distinguished from the road *within* wisdom, the private road of wisdom). The natural road tends toward wisdom. This can be seen from the way one kind of knowledge is before another along this road. The animal that senses seems wise compared to the plant that does not sense or know what is around it. But the animal with memory of what has been sensed seems wiser than those animals with only sensation. My mother would tell the salesman, "I wasn't born yesterday." But we would be no wiser than the infant born today if we had no memory. But the man of one memory seems less wise than the man of experience. (Experience is the result of bringing together many memories of the same.) Art or science arises from experience, but the man of art or science appears wiser than the man of mere experience because he knows why. And likewise the chief artist than the subordinate artist and looking knowledge more than practical knowledge. The most universal knowledge of wisdom presupposes an experience of the particular forms of reasoned out knowledge which come before wisdom along the natural road.

And in general, as we go from experience to art or science, we are moving in the direction of the universal and from the effect to the cause and therefore in the direction of wisdom which is the most universal knowledge and also a knowledge of the first cause.

The third reason why the consideration of the first and natural road in our knowledge belongs most of all to the wise man is that the reasons for this road belong to wisdom. First of all the reason why the proper object of our reason is the what it is of a sensible thing and must be considered in an image is given by the wise man since the consideration of understandings as such belong to him (for the understanding as such does not depend upon matter).[31] Further, since

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[31]Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum De Memoria et Reminiscentia Commentarium* , Lectio II, nn. 316-317: "Non ergo propter hoc solum indiget intellectus possibilis

all knowledge along the road is ordered to wisdom as a last end and the order of things among themselves is on account of their order to the end, the wise man should explain the order of different forms of knowledge along this road. Further, the reason why in going from the effect towards the cause and from the confused toward the distinct along this road, one is going from what is more known to us towards what is more known or knowable by nature, is given by the wise man who most of all knows that something is knowable to the extent it is in act as Aristotle shows in the ninth book which is on act and ability or potency.

The wise man also takes an interest in the natural road insofar as it is followed in the private road of wisdom itself.[32] For the wise man follows this road when he orders the senses of many of the words used in the axioms and to name the subject of wisdom and its parts, causes and properties. And when he considers sensible and material substances before immaterial substances, and act and ability as they are found in motion before act and ability as they can be found even in immaterial things, and goes from the one which is the measure of number to the one which is convertible with being, and reasons from motion to the unmoved mover, he also follows the natural road.

But Aristotle does not have a full consideration of the natural road in the fourteen books of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* or even a consideration that is devoted to the road as such. He considers it partially and so far as necessary to

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humanus phantasmate ut acquirat intelligibiles species, sed etiam ut eas quodam modo in phantasmatibus inspiciat. Et hoc est quod dicitur in tertio *de Anima*. Species igitur in phantasmatibus intellectivum intelligit. Huius autem ratio est, quia operatio proportionatur virtuti et essentiae: intellectivum autem hominis est in sensitivo, sicut dicitur in tertio *de Anima*. Et ideo propria operatio eius est intelligere intelligibilia in phantasmatibus, sicut intellectus substantiae separatae operatio est intelligere res secundum se intellectas; et ideo huius est causa reddenda a metaphysico, ad quem pertinet considerare diversos gradus intellectuum."

[32]Wisdom and natural philosophy follow the natural road much more than mathematics while the latter follows the common road of reasoned out knowledge with more clarity and rigor than the former do. But natural philosophy seems to follow the natural road most of all. Hence, Boethius says in the *De Trinitate* that it proceeds *rationabiliter.* See Thomas' *Exposition* of this there.

manifest something else. Thus, in the Proemium to wisdom in Book One, he shows much of the order of different kinds of knowledge along the natural road. We learn that sensing comes first and is followed by memory of what has been sensed. And then from many memories of the same, we can gather an experience. And by separating out what is common to the many things experienced, we begin to have art or science which is a knowledge of the universal and seeks to know why. We can see a thing is singular when first known and later it is universal, as Boethius said. We can see that sensible things are more known to us than things that cannot be sensed and that effects are usually known before causes. But this consideration of the natural road is for the sake of seeing that wisdom is about causes. But Aristotle could be said to be killing two birds with one stone. He is teaching us much about the natural and first road in our knowledge which is useful to know apart from the reason why it is considered there which is to see that wisdom is about causes.

Another place where Aristotle teaches us about the natural road is in the seventh book of *Wisdom*, the seventh book *After the in Natural Philosophy*. But again he is not attempting a full consideration of the natural road by itself. Rather he touches upon it insofar as it enters into the private road of wisdom. Wisdom is chiefly about substance and Aristotle is explaining why the wise man should consider material and sensible substances before immaterial or separated substances:

> It is agreed that sensible substances exist, so one ought to seek first in these. This is presupposed to going over to the more known. For learning thus comes to be in all through the less known by nature to the more known. And this is necessary, just as in actions to make the whole good, good for each from what is good to each, so too to make from what is more known to each what is more known by nature known to each. For what is first known to each are many times little known and have little or nothing of being. But nevertheless from things known slightly but known to oneself, one ought to try to make known the wholly known, going over, as has been said, through these same.[33]

This road is followed again and again in the fourteen books of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*. Aristotle begins in Books Eleven and Twelve his investigation of the

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[33]1029a 33-1029b 12

first substances which are most known by nature, starting from accidental being and motion which have little being. And in his study of act, he goes from motion, the least actual of acts although most known to us, to the first cause which is pure act and thus most knowable by nature.

The wise man is, of course, specially interested in the private road of wisdom for in every reasoned out knowledge one must consider the road and way of going forward which fits the matter or subject of that reasoned out knowledge. Hence, Aristotle determines in book Six the way of considering the subject of wisdom after he has determined that subject in Book Four. This however is not what characterizes wisdom in distinction from other forms of reasoned out knowledge. For even the particular forms of reasoned out knowledge contain a consideration of their own road.

But the wise man, in the universality of his knowledge and concern for truth, must consider in general how the road to follow in any reasoned out knowledge should or should not be determined, as Aristotle does in the last chapter and *Lectio* of Book Two. There he shows the influence of custom upon how we proceed and expect others to proceed which is how we should *not* determine the road and way of going forward in any reasoned out knowledge. Rather, we must determine the matter or subject of that reasoned out knowledge before we can determine the road and way that fits its matter or subject. We can also see how, in this general consideration, the wise man is to some extent directing every other form of reasoned out knowledge. For we are directed in any reasoned out knowledge by a knowledge of its road and way of proceeding. And the wise man directs us in general as to how these private roads should and should not be determined.

And further since the wise man also has experience of the particular forms of reasoned out knowledge, it also belongs to him to distinguish among the private roads of reasoned out knowledge. And this is what Aristotle does especially among the looking forms in Book Six when he distinguishes the ways of defining in natural philosophy, mathematics and wisdom. Boethius continues to do this in the *De Trinitate* and adds further distinctions as between natural philosophy proceeding *rationabiliter* and mathematics, *disciplinabiliter*, and wisdom, *intellectualiter*.

Does the wise man consider the common road of reasoned out knowledge and the way of going forward therein? This is the concern of the logician. Yet there is considerable likeness between the logician and the wise man. Like the

logician, the wise man sometimes proceeds *per viam praedicationis.* One of the two chief divisions or distinctions of being is according to the figures of predication. And in beginning the consideration of material substance in Book Seven, Aristotle begins from the way a definition and its parts are said of their subject. Likewise, in that book, we see that there are different kinds of definition for substance and accident and why the definition is one and of one thing even though it has parts. In Book Two we see how definitions are limited in an upward direction. Not every genus is a species, nor is every part of every definition known by definition. And the wise man distinguishes the per se from the per accidens in wisdom and gives reasons why no reasoned out knowledge is about the accidental.

Among these secondary matters of wisdom, there is perhaps a third one after the consideration of how man is towards knowing truth and the consideration of the ways of knowing or coming to know truth. Wisdom is also about the distinction of itself from other kinds of knowledge and the distinction of them and the order of learning them.

It is clear in the fourteen books of *Wisdom* that Aristotle is much concerned with distinguishing wisdom from every other kind of knowledge. To some extent, he does this first in the Proemium itself. This is chiefly by the aim or goal of wisdom which is to know the first cause, but also by the kind of knowledge it is. But in the beginning of the fourth book, when he determines the subject of wisdom (being as being and the one), he again distinguishes wisdom from every particular form of reasoned out knowledge. There are two differences seen there. Every other form of reasoned out knowledge has a subject more particular than being. And it does not consider its particular subject *as being*. Finally, in the beginning of Book Six, he distinguishes wisdom once more from every other reasoned out knowledge. And especially he distinguishes it from the other forms of reasoned out knowledge whose end is to know or understand (not to do or make) by the way they define.

We should try to understand that this distinction is a matter for wisdom. And perhaps it is best to begin with an induction to show that such a distinction belongs to wisdom. It can be seen by induction that the distinction between a higher knowledge and a lower (and their order) always belongs to the higher knowledge or the knowledge which has more the character of wisdom.

Reason is higher than the senses and the imagination and it belongs to reason to distinguish between the knowledge of reason and the knowledge of

the senses and between thinking and imagining and between thought and image. Likewise, it belongs to reason to consider the order of sense and imagination to reason. The distinction between knowledge of the singular and knowledge of the universal belongs to knowledge of the universal. For although the singular is not universal, what it is to be a singular is universal.

It belongs to the political philosopher to distinguish between political philosophy and political rhetoric and to consider in what way rhetoric is a tool of the statesman. Likewise, it belongs to the political philosopher to distinguish between political foresight or the political art and the military art and to consider the subordination of the military to the political.

Natural philosophy would be wisdom if there were no immaterial substances.[34] As it is, it is second philosophy in the order of dignity. [35] But in natural philosophy, we distinguish between the natural and the artificial and between the natural and the mathematical, as can be seen in the second book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*). Likewise, it belongs to the natural philosopher to determine the usefulness of mathematics in the study of natural things and to what extent art imitates and is like nature.

Logic, in the strict sense, is ordered to a knowledge which is expressed in words used properly and not figuratively and in statements composed of such words. The distinction between words used properly and words used figuratively is expressed in words used properly. When Aristotle defines metaphor in the book *About the Poetic Art*, his definition is composed of words used properly and not figuratively. One cannot define what a metaphor is, using metaphors. One can only exemplify what a metaphor is by metaphors. Likewise, it is in knowledge expressed in words used properly and statements composed of them that we can distinguish between such knowledge and that expressed in mathematical symbols and equations. One cannot define or say what a mathematical symbol is, using mathematical symbols. Although one can say in

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[34]*Metaphysics*, Book Six, 1026a 27-31

[35]Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Metaphysicorum,* Lectio XI, n. 1526: "In hac enim scientia tentamus determinare de substantiis sensibilibus "huius gratia", idest propter substantias immateriales, quia speculatio circa substantias sensibiles et materiales quodammodo pertinet ad physicam, quae non est prima philosophia, sed secunda, sicut in quarto habitum est."

words what a word is and in a statement what a statement is, one cannot write a mathematical equation saying what a mathematical equation is.

The reason why it belongs to the higher knowledge, or the knowledge which has more the character of wisdom, to distinguish between itself and the lower is that the higher knowledge is the end of the lower and the end is the cause of the order of things among themselves and therefore also of their distinction. Moreover, the higher knowledge is more able to know itself than the lower, if the lower is able to know itself at all. Reason can know itself as well as the senses, but the senses cannot even know themselves. Knowledge of the singular cannot know what the singular is, let alone the difference between it and the universal. And the higher knowledge is more able to know the lower than the lower, the higher. In the description of the wise man or wisdom we see that wisdom is the most universal knowledge whence it is more able to know itself and others. And the sixth attribute of the wise man is that he orders others and one cannot order without distinguishing.

There is a connection between wisdom distinguishing itself from every other knowledge and wisdom ordering the others. As Anaxagoras reasoned that the greater mind must be separated from other things if it is to rule over them, so wisdom must be distinct from all the rest of our knowledge if it is going to rule over it. Heraclitus had seen already that if wisdom was just a heap of knowledge there would be bad art; that is, a lack of order. He saw that wisdom must be apart from all the rest.

> Learning of many things does not teach one to have understanding; else it would have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and also Xenophanes and Heccataeus.[36]
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> Pythagoras, the son of Mnesarchus, practiced enquiry beyond all men; and selecting these writings he called them his own wisdom; which was only a knowledge of many things, and bad art. [37]
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> The wise is one thing. It is to understand the mind [thought] by which all things are steered through all things.[38]

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[36]Heraclitus, DK 40
[37]Heraclitus, DK 129
[38]Heraclitus, DK 41

Moreover, since wisdom is last in the order of learning, the wise man must have an experience of the particular forms of reasoned out knowledge before he acquires wisdom. But one who is expert in some particular form of reasoned out knowledge need not have any understanding of what wisdom is. Hence, the wise man can distinguish and see the order of the forms of reasoned out knowledge. Hence, it is appropriate that Thomas Aquinas give this order in his exposition of the *Liber de Causis:*

> The aim of philosophers was chiefly towards this that, through all they considered in things, they would arrive at a knowledge of the first causes. Whence they ordered in last place a knowledge of the first causes, to whose consideration they reserved the last time of their life.
>
> First, beginning from logic which considers the way of reasoned out knowledge.
>
> Second, proceeding to mathematics of which even boys can be capable.
>
> Third, to natural philosophy which requires time on account of experience.
>
> Fourth, to moral philosophy of which a young person is not a suitable hearer.
>
> And last, they pursued the divine science which considers the first causes of beings.[39]

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[39]Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum de Causis Expositio* , Proemium, nn. 7-8; "Philosophorum intentio ad hoc principaliter erat ut per omnia quae in rebus considerabant, ad cognitionem primarum causarum pervenirerent. Unde scientiam de primis causis ultimo ordinabant, cuius considerationi ultimum tempus suae vitae deputarent. Primo quidem incipientes a Logica quae modum scientiarum tradit. Secundo, procedentes ad Mathematicam cuius etiam pueri possunt esse capaces. Tertio ad Naturalem Philosophiam quae propter experientiam tempore indiget. Quarto, ad Moralem Philosophiam cuius iuvenis esse conveniens auditor non potest. Ultimo Scientiae Divinae insistebant quae considerat primas entium Causas."

It should be noted in this reading that Thomas begins with wisdom as the end of the whole study of the philosopher. If the rest are ordered to wisdom as an end, then it is reasonable that the order among them be determined by wisdom. But the order among them is also determined by the natural road which is, as we have seen above, chiefly considered by the wise man. Thomas touches upon this more in giving the same order of learning in his laying out of the *Nicomachean Ethics* when explaining some words of Aristotle:

> He raises a question about this, to wit, why a boy can become a mathematician, but he cannot become wise, that is, a metaphysician or a natural philosopher.
>
> The Philosopher answers to this that mathematical things are known by abstraction from sensible things of which there is experience; and therefore much time is not required for knowing such. But natural beginnings, which are not separated from sensible things, are considered through experience for which is required much time.
>
> As regards wisdom, he adds that the young do not believe sapiential or metaphysical things; that is, they do not attain them with their mind, although they say them with their mouth. But the what it is of mathematical things is not unclear to them because the definitions of mathematical things are of things that can be imagined, but sapiential things are purely understandable. But they do not reach by their mind to those things which exceed sense and imagination because they do not yet have an understanding exercised in such considerations, both on account of the shortness of time as well as on account of the many changes of nature.
>
> Therefore, it will be a suitable order of learning that first boys be instructed in logical matters because logic teaches the way of the whole of philosophy.
>
> Second, they should be instructed in mathematical things which neither need experience, nor go beyond imagination.
>
> Third, in natural things which, although they do not go beyond sense and imagination, require experience.

> Fourth, in moral matters which require experience and a soul free from passions, as has been said in the first book.
>
> Fifth, in sapiential and divine things which go beyond the imagination and require a strong understanding.[40]

In these words, Thomas gives additional reasons why these five forms of reasoned out knowledge should be learned in the given order. One should consider that experience which comes before reasoned out knowledge along the natural road explains much of the above order. Since mathematics does not depend upon any experience in its development, it can be learned earlier than natural philosophy and moral philosophy which require experience in their development. And moral philosophy requires a more extensive experience than natural philosophy. One could even say that wisdom or metaphysics comes last because it depend upon an experience in another sense. As Msgr. Dionne once

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[40]*In Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis Ad Nicomachum Expositio,* Liber VI, Lectio VII, nn. 1209-1211, Marietti ed.: "Movet circa hoc quaestionem, scilicet quare puer potest fieri mathematicius non autem potest fieri sapiens, idest metaphysicus vel physicus, idest naturalis. Ad hoc respondet Philosophus, quia haec quidem, scilicet mathematicalia, cognoscuntur per abstractionem a sensibilibus quorum est experientia; et ideo ad cognoscendum talia non requiritur temporis multitudo. Sed principia naturalia quae non sunt abstracta a sensibilibus, per experientiam considerantur, ad quam requitur temporis multitudo. Quantum autem ad sapientiam, subiungit quod iuvenes sapientialia quidem metaphysicalia non credunt, idest non attingunt mente, licet dicant ore; sed circa mathematica non est immanifestum eis quod quid est, quia rationes mathematicorum sunt rerum imaginabilium, sapientialia autem sunt pure intelligibilia. Iuvenes autem de facili capere possunt ea quae sub imaginatione cadunt. Sed ad illa quae excedunt sensum et imaginationem non attingunt mente, quia nondum habent intellectum exercitatum ad tales considerationes, tum propter parvitatem temporis, tum propter plurimas mutationes naturae. Erit igitur congruus ordo addiscendi ut primo quidem pueri logicalibus instruantur, quia logica docet modum totius philosophiae. Secundo autem instruendi sunt in mathematicis quae nec experientia indigent, nec imaginationem transcendunt. Tertio autem in naturalibus; quae etsi non excedunt sensum et imaginationem, requirunt tamen experientiam. Quarto in moralibus quae requirunt experientiam et animum a passionibus liberum, ut in primo habitum est. Quinto autem in sapientialibus et divinis quae transcendunt imaginationem et requirunt validum intellectum."

explained, wisdom requires an experience of the particular forms of reasoned out knowledge. This is, of course, using the word *experience* in an extended sense. Experience is from many particulars, but the *particulars* experienced before natural philosophy or moral philosophy are singulars. But the particulars in the experience required for wisdom are forms of reasoned out knowledge less universal than wisdom, but yet universal knowledge. The order of these four can also be understood by going from the easier to the difficult. The cause of difficulty in knowing is either in things or in us and the latter is the greater cause of difficulty. Natural philosophy and moral philosophy are more difficult than mathematics for the first reason and wisdom than all for the second reason. But the reason for logic coming first is not that it is easier, but because it teaches the way of reasoned out knowledge; and we must know the way of reasoned out knowledge before we can acquire it well.

The wise man's consideration of the order of learning could also be considered as a continuation of his study of the natural road, even though reasoned out knowledge would seem to be more a work of reason than of nature. We are following the natural inclination of this road in this proposed order of learning. This is like the moral virtues which we do not have in their perfection by nature, but they are in accord with the natural inclination of our common human nature.

We have thus reasoned along another line from the Proemium to Wisdom to three secondary matters of wisdom. These three are: (1) how man is towards knowing truth; (2) the ways of knowing or coming to know truth (in general and somewhat in particular) in our reasoned out knowledge; and (3) the distinction of wisdom from other kinds of knowledge, especially from other forms of reasoned out knowledge, and the distinction of the latter and the order of learning them and wisdom. Aristotle treats of the first in the beginning of the second book of *Wisdom* and some of the second in the end of the second book and the beginning of the third. He completes the distinction of wisdom from other forms of knowledge in the beginning of the fourth book and the beginning of sixth book.

The order of these three could not be otherwise. In addition to the reasons touched upon above for this order, we could also point out that the consideration of how man is towards knowing truth is more universal than the ways of knowing truth in reasoned out knowledge. Man knows some truth without having to reason it out. And an understanding of the diverse reasons why it is difficult to know truth is presupposed to understanding why there are

diverse forms of reasoned out knowledge with diverse ways of knowing. For reasoned out knowledge is a habit and different habits are necessary to overcome diverse difficulties. And the distinction of roads is necessary to distinguish diverse forms of reasoned out knowledge. Hence, Aristotle distinguishes the three forms of reasoned out knowledge that are not practical by diverse ways of defining. Aristotle often calls reasoned out knowledge a *methodos* which means *over a road*. And sometimes he calls reasoned out knowledge (episteme) a way of having a methodos.[41] Hence, a knowledge of roads is presupposed to seeing fully a distinction of forms of knowledge that are over a road or that follow a road.

Aristotle does not consider all these matters explicitly in the fourteen books of *Wisdom*. He considers fully how man is towards knowing truth, but his consideration as such of the ways of knowing or coming to know truth is limited to what is most necessary to know the road to follow in wisdom. He carefully and fully distinguishes wisdom from every other kind of knowledge, but he is not as explicit in explaining the order of learning the forms of reasoned out knowledge as Thomas is in the texts we saw above.

There seems then to be three second matters of wisdom,[42] just as there were three first matters of wisdom.[43]

PART THREE

We have seen in the first part that wisdom is chiefly about things, about substance and being in general as a subject, and about the first cause as a goal. And in the second part, we have seen the *secondary* matters of wisdom which are (1) how man is towards knowing truth, (2) the way of knowing or coming to

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[41]See the beginning of the *Parts of Animals*.

[42]These are (1) how man is towards knowing truth, (2) the ways of knowing or coming to know truth and (3) the distinction of wisdom and the other forms of reasoned out knowledge of truth and the order of learning them. The last includes also a distinction of their private roads, especially those of the parts of looking philosophy, as we find, for example, in Boethius' *De Trinitate*.

[43]These were (1) the first causes, (2) being and one, and (3) the axioms.

know truth, and (3) the distinction of wisdom and the other forms of reasoned out knowledge and the order of learning them. But are there any other matters for the wise man to consider?

Perhaps we can get a clue to this from the fact that Msgr. Dionne, after considering some of these secondary matters of wisdom, went on to consider the dispositions of will and emotion which are necessary in the life of the philosopher.

We need to consider here two things. Are there dispositions of will and emotion which are necessary for the philosopher? And if so, does it belong to the wise man most of all to consider these dispositions?

Both Plato in the *Theaetetus* and Aristotle in the *Proemium to Wisdom* state that wonder is the beginning of philosophy, that men both in the beginning and now start to philosophize out of wonder. And this wonder is a disposition of will or emotion. And the philosopher is named from the love of wisdom which is a disposition of will. And if a philosopher must learn from others who are wiser than himself in some matter, he also needs that docility which is in the will by which he is disposed to hear or read carefully, frequently and with reverence the words of those wiser than himself. One cannot even begin to philosophize without wonder and how could someone be a philosopher or lover of wisdom without the love of wisdom. And since one man is not sufficient to acquire any reasoned out knowledge, but every reasoned out knowledge is developed through the contribution of many thinkers, is not docility necessary if the philosopher is going to get very far?

But to whom does it belong to consider wonder and the love of wisdom and docility (and perhaps other dispositions of will or emotion closely connected with them)?

Of these three, it is most obvious from the words themselves that the love of wisdom should be considered by the wise man. Since acts and habits are known by their objects, clearly the man who knows best what wisdom is can consider most fully the love of wisdom. But we have seen that among the secondary matters of wisdom is a consideration of the distinction of wisdom from every other knowledge. Therefore, the consideration of the love of wisdom belongs most of all to the wise man.

Next it is not hard to see that the consideration of wonder also belongs to the wise man. For wonder is a beginning of all philosophy and therefore would belong to the consideration of the most universal philosophy. But wisdom is the most universal philosophy. Therefore, the consideration of wonder also belongs to the wise man.

But a stronger reason is that the wonder of the philosopher is a desire to know why, to know the cause. And if the cause has a cause to know that, and so on till the first cause is known. The desire which is wonder is not fully or finally satisfied before one know the first cause. Hence, just as one reason why the natural road is considered by the wise man is that it is the road to wisdom, so too a very good reason why the wise man should consider wonder is that that desire leads him eventually to the first cause (the knowledge of which is the goal of wisdom). And this is what Plato would seem to have in mind in his obscure sentence when teaching us that wonder is the beginning of philosophy. In the dialogue called the *Theaetetus*, Theodorus, the teacher of Theaetetus, has told Socrates that his pupil is something of a philosopher. Later in the dialogue, when Theaetetus undergoes much wonder, Socrates remarks that Theodorus has guessed well in saying that Theaetetus is something of a philosopher for his wonder shows this. And at this point, Socrates states some general truths about philosophy and wonder:

Theaetetus:

> By the gods, Socrates, how greatly I wonder what these things are and sometimes when looking at them, I am really dizzy.

Socrates:

> Theodorus seems to guess not badly about your nature, my friend. For this wonder is very much the undergoing of a philosopher. There is no other beginning of philosophy than this. And the one saying that Iris is the offspring of Thaumas did not make a bad genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so?[44]

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[44]Plato, *Theaetetus*, 155C-D

Socrates or Plato has given us something to wonder about in this text on wonder. (I suppose to see if we are something of a philosopher.) Why does Socrates say that he did not make a bad genealogy who said that Iris is the offspring of Thaumas? The Loeb edition has this note on that line:

> Hes. *Theog.*. 780. Iris is the messenger of heaven and Plato interprets the name of her father as "Wonder".

In Homer, Iris is both the messenger of the gods and the rainbow personified. Hence, Shakespeare in the *Tempest* calls Iris a many colored messenger. There is a reason why Iris should be both of these. The messenger of the gods unites man with God and the rainbow unites heaven (the place associated with God) and the earth (the place of man). Hence, the reason why Socrates praises this genealogy is that wonder unites man and God in some way. Wonder makes one look for the cause and the cause of the cause and so on until one reaches the first cause. But the first cause is God. Hence. wonder unites man with God on the side of his reason. If wonder then is a desire that leads at last to and is satisfied by a knowledge of the first cause, and this is the goal of wisdom, then clearly the consideration of wonder belongs to the wise man.

Does it also belong to the wise man to consider docility (which is in the will) and any other dispositions of will or emotion that are necessary for learning from and investigating with others?

Since the wise man considers how one man is helped by another in the pursuit of truth (which Aristotle considers with how man is towards knowing truth), would it not also belong to him to consider those dispositions of will and emotions which are necessary in particular for learning from and investigating with others? This would seem to be a part of the consideration of the dispositions of the will and emotions necessary for the philosopher and that consideration already seems to belong to the philosopher since he considers wonder and the love of wisdom.

The wonder of the philosopher is the natural desire to know for its own sake the cause. In the text from the *Theaetetus*, it is significant that Theaetetus mentions the question *what* and Socrates the question *why*, because both of these questions are answered by the knowing the cause or causes. Aristotle shows this in his comparison of definition and demonstration in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics.* Hence, we could also define the wonder of the philosopher as the natural desire to know for its own sake what

and why. We define this desire by cause, or by what and why, because the desire of the philosopher must extend that far.

But since it is difficult to know what and why or to know the cause, this desire is not a sufficient beginning of philosophy without the *hope* of overcoming the difficulties in the way of knowing what and why. The wonder of the philosopher includes this hope or is not without it.

And just as there is in man a natural desire to know, so also there is man a natural aversion for error or being mistaken.[45] But this aversion or turning away from error is not enough for the philosopher without the reasonable *fear* of making a mistake. For error or mistake is difficult to avoid. This fear would seem to complete the wonder of the philosopher. Indeed, so much is this so, that Thomas often gives wonder as a species of fear.[46]

Thus, the wise man's consideration of wonder involves a consideration not only of the natural desire in wonder (and the natural aversion for error), but also of the hope and fear without which the desire would be in vain. It is necessary to achieve a balance between the hope of coming to know the truth and the fear of mistake. The former without the latter would make one presumptuous and careless while the latter without the former would lead to despair. Sometimes the teacher must encourage the student and sometimes he must caution him.

The second matter to be considered by the wise man among the dispositions of will and emotion necessary for the philosopher is the love of wisdom.

The true philosopher must love wisdom *for its own sake*, not for the sake of honor or glory or power or anything else. If a man loves a woman for her money, he does not really love her. He should be called a lover of money. If a man loves wisdom for something else, he should be called a lover of his end - a lover of honor or power or whatever it is.

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[45]Thomas Aquinas, *De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas,* Proemium, Opuscula Philosophica, ed. Marietti, n. 173: "Sicut omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant veritatem, ita naturale desiderium inest hominibus fugiendi errores, et eos cum facultas adfuerit confutandi."

[46]See, for example, *Summa Theologiae,* Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 4.

Not only must the philosopher love wisdom for its own sake, he must also love it more than anything else he loves for its own sake. If he loves music, for example, also for its own sake and more than wisdom, he would fittingly be called more a lover of music than a lover of wisdom.

If the true philosopher loves wisdom for its own sake and more than anything else he loves for its own sake, wisdom can rightly be called the end of his life.

The true philosopher then must love wisdom for its own sake, more than anything else, and as the very end or purpose of his life.

But since wisdom is most of all the knowledge of truth, one cannot be a lover of wisdom without being a lover of truth. The philosopher must love truth for its own sake and also as a common good.

And since wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, one cannot be a lover of wisdom without being a lover of reason. But there is, as Augustine said, an "immature and perverse love of reason." The true philosopher needs a mature and ordered love of reason. This is a love which takes into account the limits and the needs of reason.

And since reason is first defined by "looking before and after" and the culminating part of the description of the wise man is that he orders, it is clear that the love of wisdom is inseparable from the love of order.

There is another disposition of will which can be suitably considered along with the love of wisdom. This is humility.

Pythagoras is said to have been the first man to call himself a *philosopher*. The legend goes that his contemporaries had begun to call him *wise* and Pythagoras refused this title saying, "Don't call me wise; God alone is wise." When they asked him then what they should call him, he said a *philosopher*. Thus in the origin of the word, there is humility as well as the love of wisdom. And this is fitting since God alone is wise in the full sense. Without humility, a philosopher would seek to know more than mortal wisdom can attain. Since pride is the chief cause of error on the side of our will, humility is a most necessary virtue for the philosopher. The fear of being mistaken, of coming to

think you know when you do not, helps to keep the philosopher humble. We see this humility in all the great Greek philosophers.

Perhaps also the love of wisdom is not without a certain magnanimity of soul. Just as the desire in wonder must be confirmed by a balance between the hope of coming to know truth and the fear of mistake, so too the love of wisdom is rendered firm by magnanimity and humility.

Since one man by himself is not sufficient to acquire wisdom, it is also necessary for the wise man to consider those dispositions of will or emotion that are necessary in particular to learn from, or to investigate with, others. Foremost among these is the docility or teachableness which is in the will. (There is also a docility in reason.)

Docility is the firm disposition of will to hear or read carefully, frequently, and with reverence the words of those wiser than us in some matter. Since the wiser a man is, the more he says in fewer words, docility must increase in proportion to the wisdom of the teacher.

Laziness can make us indocile. The lazy student will not read carefully and frequently the words of those wiser than himself. Since the careful reading of the words of a wise man often requires us to learn a foreign language, laziness can easily be a major impediment to docility. Hence, docility is not without diligence in pondering the words of the wise.

Docility is also not found without humility. Humility is the moderation of our desire for excellence. It is more excellent to discover something by oneself than to learn it from another. Hence, out of an excessive desire for one's own excellence, one may be unwilling to learn from someone wiser than oneself in some matter. However, there are some things which we may never discover by ourselves. And if we try to discover everything by ourselves, we will not get very far in knowledge. Pride may lead us to scorn those wiser than us rather than reverence them.

Mildness, which is the moderation of anger, is necessary in philosophical conversations with others. We often get angry when a conversation reveals the deficiency in our understanding or when others are slow to recognize the force of our reasoning or the excellence of our thinking. Humility also helps us to be mild.

In the seventh book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics)*, Aristotle reasons that the soul acquires reasoned out knowledge and foresight in quieting down. Thus, in general the tranquillity of all the emotions disposes for the good of reason.

Some kind of friendship would also seem to be necessary between those pursuing together wisdom and truth.

Thus, the consideration of the dispositions of will and emotion necessary in the life of the philosopher can be divided into three parts. The first part is about wonder; the second part centers around the love of wisdom; and the third part is about those dispositions necessary in particular for learning from, or investigating with, others.

Wonder and the love of wisdom are ordered first because they dispose man well towards knowledge and wisdom in themselves while the third group is because of the help which one man receives from another in the pursuit of knowledge and wisdom.

Wonder is considered before the love of wisdom even though the former is not as perfect as the latter because wonder, or at any rate, the desire in it, is more natural than the love of wisdom. Hence, Aristotle begins with the statement that all men by nature desire to know or understand and Plato in the *Theaetetus* calls wonder a *passio* or undergoing.[47] But the love of wisdom is more a chosen love. Hence, Aristotle says in the fourth book of *Wisdom*, that the philosopher differs from the sophist by choice. Since then nature is what is first in anything, it is appropriate to begin with wonder.

Perhaps wonder and the love of wisdom should be distinguished more fully here. Since wonder and the love of wisdom are alike and apt to be confused, it is useful here to distinguish them more fully and see their order. Since wonder is basically a desire and desire is for a good not had yet, the wonder which is the beginning of philosophy[48] diminishes as one acquires philosophy. As Aristotle says in the *Proemium to Wisdom*, the man who wonders thinks himself to be ignorant. But the love of wisdom, unlike a desire, is not diminished by the presence or the acquiring of wisdom. Rather it is increased

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[47]Plato, *Theaetetus*, 155D

[48]*Wonder* is sometimes used not for the desire to know, but for the admiration following upon knowledge of the excellence of something.

since love is increased when the object loved is had.[49] Thomas often makes this point and gives the reason for it:

> Love causes a relation of the concupiscible to the good and hate, to the bad. For love makes the loved connatural with and as it were one with the loving, the contrary of which hate does. And because this relation is perfected by the presence of the object, therefore love in its perfection is of what is had, as Augustine says in his eighth sermon on Psalm 118.[50]

And in another text, he says:

> Love of some thing is not less when it is had but more because a good becomes more connatural to us when it is had...sometimes however the contrary happens by accident, as when we experience something in the loved which is repugnant to love; then it is less loved when it is had.[51]

There is an imperfect love or liking in desire, but when we distinguish the love of wisdom from wonder, we understand a perfect or complete love of wisdom. Thomas speaks of desire and love in this way:

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[49]The philosopher is named from the love of wisdom rather than from wonder because of these reasons. The love of wisdom can be with or without wisdom although it is found more with wisdom. But the wonder which is the beginning of philosophy diminishes as reason comes to know the cause. But one is not less a philosopher when one has acquired some wisdom but more so. Hence, Thomas calls Aristotle *the philosopher* by antonomasia, not because of his desire to know, but because he is wiser than all the rest.

[50]*Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum* , Dist XXVI, Q. I, Art. III, Resp., n. 43: "Amor enim importat habitudinem concupiscibilis ad bonum, odium vero ad malum; quia amor amatum ponit connaturale et quasi unum cum amanti, cujus contrarium odium facit. Et quia haec habitudo perficitur ex praesentia objecti, ideo amor secundum perfectam sui rationem est habiti, ut Augustinus dicit (In Psal. CXVIII, serm. 8; L. 36, 1518)."

[51]*Summa Contra Gentiles* , Liber I, Caput 91: "amor est alicuius rei non minus cum habetur, sed magis, quia bonum aliquod fit nobis affinius cum habetur...quandoque autem contrarium per accidens accidit, utpote quando in amato experimur aliquid quod repugnat amori: tunc enim minus amatur quando habetur..."

> Desire and love differ in this way that love causes a certain agreement and connaturality to the loved, that is perfected when the loved is in some way had; desire however implies a movement towards a lovable not yet had. Whence the motion of the appetite begins in desire and ends in complete love. And therefore desire is a certain commencement of love and as it were an imperfect love.[52]

In the following text (although in a discussion of hope and love in the theological virtues), Thomas does say something which is applicable to the order of the hope in philosophical wonder to the perfect love of wisdom:

> And because the first having of a thing is according as it is within ability - because what is within one's capacity is considered to be had as it were already - therefore what first induces love is the capacity of having what is desired. And therefore love of a distant thing which is not had in act, presupposes hope. But because hope is not of anything except the good, and the first motion of appetite to the good is desire, therefore hope presupposes desire and is between love and desire.
>
> And this happens reasonably. Because the irascible appetite is for the sake of the concupiscible, therefore the act of the irascible begins and ends in the concupiscible. For love and desire are in the concupiscible while hope is in the irascible; and there is a like order of them according as they are in the will. Whence it is clear that...desire...precedes hope, and hope, love.[53]

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[52] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum,* Dist. XXVI, Quaest. II, Art. III, Quaestiuncula II, Solutio II, n. 122: "desiderium et amor in hoc differunt quod amor importat quamdam convenientiam et connaturalitatem ad amatum, quod quidem perficitur dum amatum aliquo modo habetur; desiderium autem importat motum in ipsum amabile nondum habitum. Unde motus appetitus incipit in desiderio et terminatur in amore completo. Et ideo desiderium est quaedam inchoatio amoris et quasi quidam amor imperfectus.

[53] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum,* Dist. XXVI, Quaest. II, Art. III, Quaestiuncula II, Solutio II, nn. 122-124: "Sed quia primum habere rei est secundum quod est in potentia - quia quod est in facultate, quasi jam haberi reputatur - ideo primum quod amorem inducit, est facultas habendi id quod desideratur. Et ideo amor rei distantis quae in actu non habetur, praesupponit

Men are not apt to love fully what they despair of getting. If one has no hope of coming to know causes or, in particular, the first cause, one is apt to cease loving such knowledge altogether.

Aristotle has even less of a separate or full consideration of the dispositions of will and emotion necessary for the philosopher than he did of the secondary matters of wisdom. And this is reasonable in that these matters are third in place. What is most essential to knowledge and wisdom is what is known. Then, how it is known. And then the desire and love of knowing things in that way. Yet all are necessary.

But in the Proemium, he notes that men begin to philosophize out of wonder, that there is an order in which they wonder about things, and that this wonder will diminish and disappear as we come to know.

And in the fourth book, he points out that the philosopher differs from the sophist by choice of life.[54] The sophist would like to appear wise so as to receive honor and even money from this appearance. But the philosopher loves wisdom for its own sake.

Just as the first matters of wisdom and the second matters were each three in number, so too, the third matters of wisdom seem to be three in number.[55]

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spem. Sed quia spes non est nisi boni, et primus motus appetitus in bonum, est desiderium; ideo spes praesupponit desiderium et est media inter amorem et desiderium."

Et hoc rationabiliter accidit. Quia enim irascibilis est propter concupiscibilem, ideo actus irascibilis a concupiscibili incipit et in concupiscibili terminatur. Amor enim et desiderium in concupiscibili sunt, spes autem in irascibili; et similis est eorum ordo secundum quod sunt in voluntate. Unde patet quod...desiderium...praecedit spem, spes autem amorem."

[54]*Metaphysics*, Book 4, 1004b 22-26

[55]These matters center around wonder, the love of wisdom, and docility.

PART FOUR

Most of the order of the *Metaphysics* can be seen from the order in which it is shown what it is first and chiefly about and the order in which these are taken up. The order of the Proemium at the beginning of Book One and Books Four through Fourteen can be seen almost entirely from these two orders. We learn from the Proemium that wisdom is about causes and most of all about the first causes (as its goal). And from this, Aristotle reasons in the beginning of Book Four that wisdom is about being and one (as its subject). And next, he reasons from this that wisdom is about the axioms. He then considers the axioms in the rest of Book Four (and to some extent in Book Five). And in Books Five through Ten he considers being as being and the one and the many. Books Eleven through Fourteen are ordered to a knowledge of the first causes. And in both of these orders, as we have seen, Aristotle proceeds from what is more known to us to what is less known to us.

What is not explained by this is Book One after the Proemium, Books Two and Three, the beginning of Book Six (where wisdom is distinguished from the other forms of reasoned out knowledge) and the beginning of Book Seven (where the way and order of considering substance is determined). Now some of this is explained by the three secondary matters of wisdom: how man is towards knowing truth, the ways of knowing or coming to know truth, and the distinction of wisdom and the other forms of reasoned out knowledge of truth and the order of learning them. The beginning of Book Two is about how man is towards knowing truth. The end of Book Two, the beginning of Book Three and the beginning of Book Seven are about the ways of knowing or coming to know truth. The beginning of Book Six is about the distinction of wisdom from the other forms of reasoned out knowledge and especially from the other parts of looking philosophy. The middle of Book Two gives the reason why it belongs to the wise man to know how man is towards truth and the ways of knowing or coming to know truth. And the order of these by themselves makes sense. For one must see how man is towards knowing truth before one can determine the ways of knowing or coming to know truth. And part of the reason why there are different forms of reasoned out knowledge is because there are different ways of knowing. Hence, Aristotle distinguishes the three looking philosophies (natural philosophy, mathematics and wisdom) by their diverse ways of defining.

The way and order of considering substance can come after the last because it is somewhat more particular than wisdom as a whole.

Book One after the Proemium and Book Three after the discourse on the necessity of doubting well to discover and to be prepared for judging do not bring in other matters. For in Book one after the Proemium, Aristotle considers what his predecessors have said about first causes. And in Book Three, after seeing the need to doubt well, Aristotle doubts well as regards what wisdom is about and he doubts well about the things to be considered in wisdom (especially about substance and the first causes).

The reason for Book One (after the Proemium) is to determine whether one can learn wisdom from one's predecessors. If they have arrived sufficiently at the goal of wisdom, we should learn from them. But if they have not, we must discover the truth ourselves although not without their help. The conclusion from Book One is that none of the earlier philosophers has arrived sufficiently at a knowledge of the first causes. Hence, Aristotle must discover the truth himself. And in the beginning of Book Three, he shows the need to doubt well by dialectic before discovery can be made and before we are ready to judge. Aristotle does something similar to this in other books. The first book *About the Soul* (the *De Anima)* and the second book of the *Politics* are similar in having a whole book devoted to the examination of what earlier thinkers have said. But what is unique to wisdom in comparison to these two is that the discourse to determine whether one can learn from his predecessors and not discover by oneself is separated from the dialectical proceeding from what they said with a view to discovery and eventually to judging. For Book One after the Proemium is ordered to finding whether the earlier philosophers have arrived at a sufficient knowledge of the causes that one can take them as teachers of wisdom while Book Three uses what they said to begin the process of discovery. One of these reasons which Aristotle gives in the *Politics* (which is a wisdom not simply, but in the genus of human things) seems even more applicable to wisdom:

> Since we have chosen to consider which political community is the best for those able to live especially according to desire, it is necessary to examine the constitutions which are used by cities said to be well ruled and some others spoken of by some which seem to be good, in order that one might see what is rightly established and useful, but further that to seek something other besides these will not seem to belong to one wishing to be

> sophistical, but we will seem to have set out upon this knowledge over a road on account of the existing ones not being good.[56]

The second reason given here is even more applicable to one pursuing wisdom (for political philosophy is only wisdom *secundum quid.).* This perhaps explains in part why there is a separate consideration devoted to this in wisdom. The philosopher differs from the sophist by choice. The true philosopher does not disdain to learn from another and *not* have the glory or honor of having discovered something by oneself. The true philosopher loves knowledge and wisdom much more than the honor of having been the first man to discover something. And one can come to know more by learning from others than by discovering everything by oneself. The true philosopher's attitude must be that of Aristotle in the beginning of the thirteenth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy:*

> First one ought to consider the things said by others, so that we will not be bound by what they do not say well, and if some opinion is common to them and us, this will not displease us in private. For it is lovable if someone says some things better and some things no worse.[57]

We find a similar pair of reasons for the consideration of the opinions of earlier thinkers on the soul in the first book *About the Soul*

> It is necessary considering the soul and doubting about those things which in going forward should be discovered, to take together the opinions of earlier thinkers who have said something about it, in order that we might take what is well said and beware of what is not said well.[58]

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[56]*Politics*, Book 2, 1260b 27-37

[57]*Metaphysics,* Book Thirteen (M), 1076a 12-16

[58]*De Anima*, Book One, 403b 20-24 Thomas lays this out thus *In Aristotelis Librum de Anima*, Liber Primus, Lectio II, n. 30: "De qua," scilicet anima, intendentes ad praesens necesse est accipere opiniones antiquorum, quicumque sunt qui aliquid enunciaverunt de ipsa. Et hoc quidem ad duo erit utile. Primo, quia illud quod bene dictum est ab eis, accipiemus in adiutorium nostrum. Secundo quia illud, quod male enunciatum est, cavebimus."

But in the consideration of how man is towards knowing truth and in particular there as to how one is helped by another, Aristotle had pointed out that we must be thankful not only for those from whom we got some part of the truth, but even for those whose mistakes we reasoned against.[59] For reason develops not only by the truth it knows, but also by the refutation of errors opposed to the truth.

Thus there are at least three reasons why it is useful to see the mistakes of earlier thinkers and to reason against them. First, we will see that we cannot just learn the subject from them, but we or someone else must discover it. Second, we will be wary of these mistakes and not be bound by them. And third, we will exercise our reason by arguing against them and perhaps using them dialectically.

Aristotle himself has given fully the reasons for the dialectic of Book Three at the beginning of that book:

> It is necessary, towards the reasoned out knowledge sought, for us to go first through the things about which one ought to doubt first. These are whatever things about which some have taken up opposite positions and whatever else besides these happens to have been overlooked.
>
> To doubt well is useful for those wishing to discover. For the discovery after is an untying of the doubts before. But it is not possible for those ignorant of the knot to untie it. But the doubt of reason shows this about the thing. Insofar as it doubts, it undergoes something like those tied. It is impossible for either to go forward.
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> Hence, it is necessary to have considered all the difficulties before on account of these things and because those seeking without doubting first are like those who do not know where one ought to go and further they do not know whether the sought has been found or not. For the end is not clear to such a one, but it is clear to the one who has doubted before.

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[59] *Metaphysics*, Book Two, 993b 11-14

> Further, one who has heard all the arguments of those disputing, like that of parties in a lawsuit, is necessarily in a better position to judge.[60]

What is clear from this consideration of Book One after the Proemium and Book Three is that they do not introduce other matters for the wise man to consider (unless someone were to say that the opinions of others is a further matter). But perhaps it is better to understand these parts of the books in wisdom in the light of the ways of coming to know truth. In particular, the distinction between coming to know by learning from another who already knows and discovery by oneself and the necessity of deciding which of these to follow explains a main reason for Book One after the Proemium. And when it is clear that Aristotle must discover, he considers what is necessary to discover in the beginning of Book Three and then proceeds accordingly in the rest of the book. But Book Three, in its order to the later books, must also be understood in the light of the second road in our knowledge which is the road from reasonable guesses to reasoned out knowledge. Dialectic which reasons from reasonable guesses, or probable opinions, has a road to the beginnings of all reasoned out knowledge as Aristotle teaches in the *About Places* (*Topics).* [61]

We must now attempt to answer the question asked in Part Two of why Book Two comes between the discourse of Book One after the Proemium which shows that Aristotle cannot simply learn wisdom from the thinkers before but must discover it himself and Book Three which begins with subtle and profound teaching on how we discover and begins that process. Why is seeing the need to discover not followed immediately by a consideration of how to discover by doubting well and the doubting well itself (which occupies the rest of Book Three)? The second surely comes after the first, but why not *immediately* after.

The answer to this question must take into account the three parts of Book Two in their connection with Book One and Book Three. And it should also take into account the connection of Books One through Three with the role of the will and emotions in philosophy.

Thomas Aquinas shows why an understanding of the third part of Book Two is presupposed to an understanding of the division and order of the dialectic of Book Three. We learn in the third part of Book Two that one cannot

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[60] *Metaphysics,* Book B, 995a 24-995b 4
[61] *Topics* Book I, 101b 2-4

at the same time acquire a reasoned out knowledge and the way of that reasoned out knowledge, and that we must know the way of a reasoned out knowledge before we can acquire well that reasoned out knowledge. Further, we learn that we cannot acquire the way of a reasoned out knowledge by following our customary way of thinking, but we must find the way which fits the matter or subject of that reasoned out knowledge. Hence, we must determine what a reasoned out knowledge is about before we can determine its way. This is why the dialectic of Book Three is divided into two parts. The first part concerns what wisdom is about and the second pertains to the things which wisdom is about.

But the first and third parts of the second book are also important to see why one must discover by doubting well. In the first part, we see how there are two causes of difficulty in knowing. One is in things and the other is in us, in the weakness of our reason. And in the third part, we learn that the certitude and the precision of mathematics should not be sought everywhere. Natural philosophy and practical philosophy are more difficult and less certain than mathematics because of the first cause, wisdom or first philosophy is more difficult because of the second cause. Hence, the first part of Book Two gives the beginning for understanding why one cannot have the certitude and precision of mathematics in either natural philosophy or wisdom. The certitude of mathematics is such that one does not need to doubt well before discovery. Even before one sees the rigorous proof that the angles opposite the equal sides of a triangle must be equal, one would suspect this. Men would not be apt to have opposite opinions about this or reasons for opposite opinions about the matter. One would guess that it is so and then seek the rigorous proof that it is so. But in natural philosophy and in metaphysics because of their greater difficulty than mathematics (due to other causes), men are apt to have contrary opinions and reasons for them. Descartes is a witness to this. He sought on the one hand to have the certitude of mathematics everywhere and on the other hand he rejected the need for dialectic in coming to know things. What Aristotle says then about the need to doubt well before discovery and judgment applies to reasoned out knowledge other than mathematics.

The first part of Book Two also provides us with a general understanding that men are apt to see a part of the truth before the whole and that one man is helped by another in the pursuit of truth. And the need for dialectic presupposes this general understanding. Men disagree often because they see only a part of the truth. And in dialectic, one man is helped by another.

In the middle part of Book Two, Aristotle kills two birds with one stone, just as he did in narrating the opinions of his predecessors and their reasons in Book One. In the first part of Book One after the Proemium, he narrated the opinions of his predecessors on the causes and their reasons. This is obviously necessary before discussing the truth of those opinions and the adequacy of those reasons. But in narrating their opinions, Aristotle was also interested in seeing if they touched upon any kind of cause other than the four distinguished in natural philosophy. He finds in their opinions, confirmation that there are only those four kinds of cause. In the middle part of Book Two, he shows that there are first causes in these four kinds of cause. If there were not, wisdom could not be a knowledge of first causes. The proemium in the beginning of Book One has two parts. In the first part, Aristotle shows what is the goal of wisdom; and in the second, he shows the kind of knowledge that is wisdom. But he shows the goal in two steps or stages. First he shows that wisdom is about causes and then he shows that it is about the first causes or cause. Now apart from the rule of going from the general to the particular in determining the goal of wisdom, it is also appropriate that wisdom be said to be about causes in general. For it would seem to belong to wisdom most of all to determine how many kinds of cause there are. Since the first causes are most of all causes, the consideration of causes belongs most of all to the wise man. It is important then that the wise man confirms that there are four kinds of cause in Book One. And that there are first causes is important, not only for wisdom, but for logic and natural philosophy and ethics and the whole of philosophy.[62]

Thus, in the first part of Book One after the Proemium and in the middle part of Book Two, there is a certain advance toward the goal of wisdom. We learn that there are four kinds of cause and that in each of these there is a first cause. Hence, the first cause must be sought in one or more of these kinds.[63] In this respect, Books One and Two are to Book Twelve in their consideration of causes something like Book One of the *Nicomachean Ethics* to Book Ten of that work in their consideration of happiness. One encircles in a confused way what

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[62]Of course, in the line of manuductio, one sees in a many particular ways, in logic and natural philosophy and ethics, that there are first causes.

[63]The first cause turns out to be a cause in two and half of the four kinds of cause. God is the first mover and maker and also the last end of all things. He is also a cause of things in the sense of exemplar, but not of intrinsic form. But he cannot be a cause in the sense of matter for matter is ability or potency and the first cause is pure act.

one seeks to know and then later through the consideration of other things, one is able to know more distinctly what one seeks to know.

But Aristotle's procedure also helps us to balance the fear of being mistaken with the hope of finding the truth and coming to know it. We learn from the proemium that wisdom is difficult and not a human possession. And then, when we meet the diversity of opinions about the causes and the failure of those who have sought a knowledge of the first causes to arrive at them, we are apt to despair of coming to know them. But in meeting the diverse opinions of the earlier thinkers, we are confirmed in there being just four kinds of cause. We know that there are four kinds of cause and that the first cause(s) must be found in one or more of these genera. And in the middle of the second book, we even arrive at the first causes in some way, at least at their existence.[64] Thus Aristotle balances hope and fear. Our fear of mistake is raised by the diversity of opinions and the insufficiency of those who have tried to arrive at the first causes. But our hope of so arriving is strengthened by the confirmation that we can know the kinds of cause and we do have good reasons for thinking that there is a first cause in each kind of cause.

The first part of Book Two also helps to balance hope and fear. For we learn not only how difficult truth is and the causes of this difficulty, but we also learn that in three ways it is easy and how one man (not only the man who has discovered something but also the one who is mistaken) can help another to acquire truth.[65]

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We have distinguished the first and chief matters of wisdom, the second matters and the third matters. We have also tried to give some of the reasons why these are the matters of wisdom. We have considered the orders in which these matters should be considered and some of the reasons for those orders. And we have considered the light which the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, the

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[64]So far does the middle of Book Two take us to knowing the first cause that Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* can use it in establishing the existence of God.

[65]And in the beginning of Book Three, we begin to see how even the contrariety of opinions and the contradictions to which they lead can help us to discover and know that we have found something and even prepare us to judge between truth and falsity

fourteen books of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy,* casts upon these and the light which they cast upon the order of the fourteen books. Are there any other matters of wisdom?[66] We leave this question to the reader.

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[66]Someone might ask whether the influence of custom and fashion upon our thinking is another matter for the wise man to consider. However, Aristotle considered the influence of custom upon how we think in the third part of the Second Book. There is the same knowledge of opposites so he determines there both how we should and should not determine the road to follow in any reasoned out knowledge. Custom can also make something which is not obvious seem obvious, whether it is true, but in need of proof, or even false. Where would the wise man consider this? It seems connected with the consideration of the axioms which are truly obvious or known through themselves. Custom can also kill wonder and fashion disorder wonder. Hence, these pernicious effects of custom and fashion belong to the consideration of wonder.

INTRODUCTORY NOTE FOR THE FOURTEEN BOOKS

We are accustomed to call these fourteen books of Aristotle the *Metaphysics.* But custom can be a tyrant, as Shakespeare teaches us. And if you went into a modern bookstore and looked for some "metaphysical" books, they would probably refer you to the occult and metaphysical section, which, of course, has nothing to do with Aristotle's fourteen books.

In his Proemium to these fourteen books (in the beginning of the first book), Aristotle calls this kind of philosophy *wisdom.* Now how can he call some human knowledge *wisdom* simply and without qualification when he and all the great Greek philosophers think that God alone is wise fully and perfectly? They all think that either God alone is wise; or if man can be called wise in some way, it is only in some very imperfect and qualified way. Thus we might say that Socrates is wise *as a man can be wise* and this limited or imperfect way separates the wisdom of man from that of God. God has wisdom simply and without qualification; He is wise simply and without any qualification.

The answer to this question is that the distinction between what is so simply and without any qualification and what is so only in some imperfect way and with qualification can be applied in the comparison between man's knowledge and the knowledge of God or in the comparison of this kind of philosophy to the other kinds of philosophy.

If we compare man's knowledge to God's knowledge, God is wise simply and without qualification and man can be wise only in some imperfect way and with much qualification.

But if we compare this kind of philosophy to the other kinds of philosophy, we can say that this kind of philosophy is wisdom simply and without qualification while natural philosophy and ethics & political philosophy are wisdom only in some qualified way. Natural philosophy is a wisdom *about all natural things and their causes* and ethics & political philosophy are a wisdom *about human life and the end of human life which is happiness.* Wisdom, as we learn in the Proemium, is about *all* things and the *first* causes or cause. It is not about some things in particular and their first causes. These fourteen books are about all things and their first causes or cause.

Thus we may rightly call these fourteen books, the fourteen books of *Wisdom*.

Aristotle has another name for the knowledge taught in these fourteen books. He calls them *First Philosophy*. Andronicus of Rhodes, the early editor of Aristotle's books, placed these fourteen books *After* (Meta) *the* (Ta) *Books in Natural Philosophy* (phusika) and our word *metaphysics* is a result of running together these three words without any understanding of the original words.

Now there is an apparent contradiction in the words here because how can *first* philosophy be *after anything*. The first is before everything else.

But this apparent contradiction is easily untied by a knowledge of the twelfth chapter of the *Categories.* There Aristotle teaches us that the word *before* is a word equivocal by reason. And he distinguishes in order there the four central senses or meanings of the word. And in so doing, he is also teaching us the central senses of the word *after* for there is the same knowledge of opposites. And because words like *first* and *last* are defined by before and after, he also enables us to distinguish the meanings of *first, last* and any other word (such as *order*) defined by before and after. It is fitting that wisdom be named from two different senses of order, in one of which it is first and in the other last. We are forced to begin thinking about the various senses of order which means a before and after. And *sapientis est ordinare.*

These fourteen books come after the books in natural philosophy in the order of learning. This sense of before and after is led back to the third sense in the *Categories*. But wisdom is called first philosophy by the fourth sense of before which is better and more honorable. As Aristotle says in the Proemium to Wisdom, every other knowledge is more necessary than this, but none is better.

One could also call wisdom first philosophy because the word *philosophy* names a knowledge which a lover of wisdom would pursue and that would be first and most of all the knowledge which has most the character of wisdom.

It could also be called first philosophy because it is about first things, especially the first being and the first causes or cause.

But it is also appropriate that the fourteen books of Wisdom be called the books *After the Books in Natural Philosophy* because for over 200 years, the

Greek philosophers identified wisdom with natural philosophy. Until one knows that there are immaterial substances, one would identify what is with bodies (and what is found in bodies). Thus, it was a common opinion that whatever is must be somewhere; and if it is not somewhere, it does not exist. And it is a property of natural bodies to be in some place. And it is only in the study of natural things that one can reason that there are immaterial things. Thus, this name brings out that wisdom is something other than natural philosophy and something that comes after natural philosophy in the order of learning.

The best way to learn these fourteen books of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* is to read the text of Aristotle with the exposition of Thomas Aquinas.

But there are also other texts of Thomas that cast some light on particular texts in the 14 books. These along with some notes can be divided according to the book and lectio to which they are relevant. Some translations of parts of the text of Aristotle can also be useful. Some texts from other authors besides Thomas will also sometimes be given.

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ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, BOOK ONE, PROEMIUM TO WISDOM

FIRST READING

All men by nature desire to know. A sign is the love of the senses. For apart from their usefulness, they are loved for themselves; and especially among the others, that through the eyes. For we choose to see before all the others, not only in order that we might do something, but also when not aiming to do anything. The cause is that this one among the senses especially makes us know something and shows many differences.

Now animals are born having sensation by nature; from this, memory does not arise in some of them while it does arise in others. And because of this, these are more prudent and more easily taught than those unable to remember; those unable to hear sounds are more prudent without learning, as the bees and whatever other kind of animal is such. Whatever has this sense in addition to memory, is able to learn.

The other animals live by images and memories, but they share little in experience; the race of men however, lives by art and reasonings.

Experience comes to be from memory in men. For many memories of the same thing perfect the power of one experience. And experience seems to be very much like science and art. For science and art come to men through experience. For experience makes art, as Polus says, speaking rightly, but inexperience, chance. Art comes to be whenever one universal understanding about like things comes to be from the many things kept in mind by experience. For to have in mind that this benefited Callias when suffering this disease and Socrates and in each case thus to many, belongs to experience. But that it benefits all such as are marked by one condition and suffer this disease, such as the phlegmatic or choleric suffering the burning fever, belongs to art.

As far as doing is concerned, experience does not seem to differ at all from art, but we see the experienced succeeding more than those having reason without experience. The cause is that experience is knowledge of singulars while art, of universals; but all doings and makings are about singulars. For the doctor does not cure man, except accidentally, but Callias or Socrates or someone of the others so named who happens to be a man. If someone has reason without experience and knows the universal, but does not know the

singular in this, he many times makes a mistake in medical treatment - for it is more the singular that is treated.

Nevertheless, we think that knowing and understanding belong more to art than experience, and we hold that the artists are wiser than the experienced, so that wisdom follows knowledge in all. This is because they know the cause while the others do not. The experienced know that it is so, but do not know why it is so. But these know why it is so and the cause.

Whence also we think that the chief artists about each thing are more honorable and know more and are wiser than the handicraftsman, because they know the causes of the things made. For the latter are like inanimate things: they make, but they do not know what they make, as fire burns. Inanimate things make each of these by a certain nature while the handicraftsmen, through custom. Hence, the chief artists are wiser, not by doing, but by having a reason and knowing the causes.

On the whole, the sign of knowing is the ability to teach, and because of this we think that art is more reasoned out knowledge than experience. For the artists are able to teach while the others are not able.

Further, we think that no one of the senses is wisdom although they are the chief ways of knowing singulars. But they do not say the why it so about anything, such as why fire is hot, but only that it is hot.

It is probable that the first one finding any art beyond the senses common to all was admired by men, not only because some of the things found were useful, but also as wise and distinguished from others. Many arts having been found, some being for necessities and some for passing the time pleasantly, always the finders of the latter were considered wiser because their sciences were not for practical use. Whence all these sciences having been built up, those sciences were found that are neither for pleasure nor for necessities; and first in those places where men had leisure. Hence, the mathematical sciences first began around Egypt for there the priestly class was allowed leisure.

What the difference is between art and science and other things of the same kind has been said in the ethics.

But that for the sake of which we have now made a discourse is this, that all hold what is called wisdom to be about the first causes and beginnings; so that as has been said before, the experienced man seems to be wiser than any of those having sensation; the artist than the experienced, the chief artist than the handicraftsman, the looking sciences more than the making. Thus it is clear that wisdom is about beginnings and causes.

SECOND READING

Since we seek such knowledge, this ought to be considered: about what sort of causes and about what sort of beginnings is wisdom the knowledge? Perhaps it would become clearer if one took the thoughts we have about the wise man.

We think first that the wise man knows all things so far as possible, not having a knowledge of these in particular.

Then we think wise the one who is able to know things difficult and not easy for man to know. To sense is common to all; hence, it is easy and nothing wise.

Further, we think wiser in every science, the man more certain and more able to teach the causes.

And of sciences, the one for itself and for the sake of knowing is more wisdom than that for the sake of its results.

And the one ruling is more wisdom than the one obeying. For the wise man ought not to receive orders, but to give orders; and he ought not to be persuaded by another, but the less wise, by him.

Such and so many are the thoughts we have about wise men and wisdom.

Of these, to know all things necessarily belongs to the man most of all having a knowledge of the universal; for he knows in some way all things placed under the universal.

And perhaps the most universal are the most difficult for men to know - for they are furthest from the senses.

And the most certain of sciences are those most of all about what comes first. Those from fewer things are more certain than those from addition, as arithmetic than geometry.

And the science which considers causes is more fit for teaching. For those teach who give the causes of each thing.

Understanding and knowledge for the sake of themselves especially belong to the knowledge of the most knowable. For the man who desires to know for itself will most desire what is most knowledge; and such is that of the most knowable; and most knowable are the first things and the causes - for other things are known through these and from them, but not these through what comes under them.

And that is the chief science, and more ruling than the subordinate, which knows that for the sake of which each thing ought to be done. This, however, is the good of each; and as a whole, the best in all nature.

From all the foresaid, the name sought falls in the same science. For it is necessary that this looks at the first beginnings and causes. For one of the causes is the good and that for the sake of which.

THIRD READING

That it is not a making science is clear also from those first philosophizing. For men both now and at first began to philosophize through wonder - in the beginning, wondering about the strange things close at hand, then little by little thus going forward raising questions about the greater things, as about the changes of the moon and of the sun and stars, and about the origin of the universe. But the man in doubt and wondering thinks himself to be ignorant. So the philomuthos is in some way a philosopher for the myth is put together from wonders. Hence, if men philosophized to escape ignorance, it is clear that they sought knowledge for the sake of understanding and not for any use.

What happened witnesses this. When almost all necessary things and those for recreation and amusement existed, such knowledge began to be sought. So it is clear that we seek this knowledge through no other need.

But as we call a man free that is for himself and not for another, so this alone is free among the sciences. For this alone is for the sake of itself.

Hence, it might justly be thought that it is not a human possession. For in many ways the nature of man is enslaved.

Thus, according to Simonides, God alone can have this honor; man, however, is not worthy to seek knowledge for itself. If the poets are saying something and the divine is able to envy, it is likely especially to happen about this; and unfortunate are all those who excel in knowledge.

But the divine is not able to be envious and, according to the proverb, poets say many false things.

Nor must any other knowledge be thought to be more honorable. For the most divine is most honorable.

But most divine is only in two ways. For that which God most of all would have is the most divine of sciences; and if it were of divine things. But this alone has both of these. For God seems to all to be among the causes and a beginning, and such knowledge God alone or most of all would have.

All other kinds of knowledge are more necessary than this, but none is better.

It is necessary, however, to place the possession of this in the opposite for us of the searches in the beginning. For all began, as we have said, from wondering if things are thus; as about things that happen wonderfully by chance or about the turnings of the sun or the incommensurability of the diagonal - for it seems wonderful to all who have not seen the cause that something is not measured by the smallest. It is necessary therefore to finish in the contrary and the better, according to the proverb, just as in these when they have learned (for the geometer would wonder at nothing so much as if the diagonal were to become measurable).

What is the nature of the knowledge sought then has been said, and what is the goal that the investigation and the whole knowledge over a road must reach.

NOTE FOR ARISTOTLE'S PROEMIUM TO WISDOM

The fourteen books of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*, the fourteen books *After the Books in Natural Philosophy* (the books *Meta Ta Phusika* or the *Metaphysics*) can and should be divided in two ways. There is the editorial and reference division, and the logical and understandable division.

The editorial and reference division is into fourteen books. And the editorial and reference division of each book has been made into chapters or into lectios (or readings). (An even more particular reference division is made by the Bekker numbers.) We follow the division into Lectios or Readings since for us, not Averroes, but Thomas Aquinas is by antonomasia *The Commentator* and his text divides each book into Lectios or Readings.

But the logical and understandable division is very different. This division is called *logical* because it follows the logical rule of division into two or three For the most part, in this division we divide into two or three. When we divide into more than two or three, it is by combining more than one division into two or three. It is called *understandable* because it is ordered (as logic itself is ordered) to understanding what is divided.

When the logical and understandable division of a work is given, we tend to give where in the editorial and reference division the cuts are made.

The first logical and understandable division of most, if not all, of Aristotle's works is proportional to the logical and understandable division of Shakespeare's *Romeo and Juliet.* The latter is divided into two: the prologue and the play. The prologue is very short compared to the play, but it prepares the audience for the play. Aristotle's works are usually divided logically and understandably into a proemium and the main work sometimes called the *tractatus,* or drawing out, in Latin. Like the prologue to the play, the proemium paves the way for the main work which is drawn out compared to the short proemium.

Aristotle is imitating his master, Plato, in this distinction between the proemium and the main work or drawing out. Plato, of course, wrote mainly Socratic conversations which are not the same kind of work as Aristotle's treatises. But in the *Timaeus* where Socrates listens to the discourse of Timaeus on the universe, Timaeus first gives a proemium (which Socrates praises for its excellence) before his main discourse.

The most essential part of a proemium is to state the aim (*skopos* in Greek) of the work. The desirability of knowing what is aimed at may also be elaborated. Often, in addition to the aim, is something about how to proceed in pursuing that aim. There may be other things to prepare the student for the main work. Thus the way is paved for the student to begin the main work or follow the drawing out of the work in which that aim should be attained.

If the student does not know what the author of the book is aiming at, he can hardly follow understandably what the author is doing in that book. And he may need to know also something about how to proceed.

Among the proemia of Aristotle, two have a most universal importance: the present proemium at the beginning of the fourteen books of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* (the *Metaphysics*) and the proemium at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. For the former is a proemium, not only to wisdom, but to some extent to the whole of looking philosophy; and the latter is a proemium not only to ethics, but in some way to the whole of practical philosophy (Hence, Aristotle calls the knowledge he is aiming at there *political* for ethics contains the elements of political philosophy, the culmination of practical philosophy.) And it is interesting to note that these two proemia of most universal importance, besides being longer than most proemia, have both the unusual feature of an epilogue at their end where Aristotle recalls the two or three things he has done in that proemium, starting with the last and going back to the first.

We do not have a proemium to the whole of logic coming down to us from Aristotle (although there are proemia to different works). But Thomas Aquinas has given us the classical proemium to the whole of logic in the beginning of his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle.

Thus, the first editorial and reference division of this work of wisdom is into fourteen books; but in the first logical and understandable division, the proemium is divided against the rest of Book One and Books Two through Fourteen.

The best way to understand Aristotle's *Proemium to Wisdom* is to read it carefully with Thomas' exposition or commentary where he lays it out. The

remainder of this note, with its somewhat random and ad hoc items, presupposes that careful reading and study.

As Thomas points out in his exposition and Aristotle recalls in his epilogue, the proemium has two parts. (The Proemium at the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* has three parts.) The first part, which occupies the first and second readings in the editorial and reference division, is about the aim of wisdom which is to know causes and at last the first cause or causes. The second part, which is found in the third *lectio* or reading, is about the kind of knowledge wisdom is mainly (and also the limit to be reached).

In the first part, Aristotle shows (in the First Reading) that wisdom is about causes through a consideration of the natural road in our knowledge (the road from the senses into reason) which is going from a knowledge of the singular and that it is so towards a knowledge of the universal and why it so; and then he shows more precisely (in the Second Reading) that it is about the first cause or causes.

Even students, who have the most hazy understanding of what wisdom is, think that wisdom comes at the end of our knowledge, not in the beginning or even in the middle of that knowledge. Hence, Aristotle leads us from the order in our knowledge to see where it is going and what would be at the end. We can see on the natural road that, as we go from sensing, memory (of what has been sensed) and experience (from many memories of the same) towards art and science, we are going from a knowledge of the singular and that it is so towards a knowledge of the universal and why it so. Hence, we might guess that at the end would come the most universal knowledge and the knowledge which goes the furthest in knowing causes which would be a knowledge of the first cause. And this is correct for wisdom is both the most universal reasoned out knowledge and a knowledge of the first cause(s). But Aristotle wants us to go forward slowly to this grand conclusion. Hence, in the Second Reading, he thinks out a six-part description of the wise man or wisdom from which he reasons to this conclusion. But from the first three parts of this description, he reasons to wisdom being the most universal knowledge and from the last three he reasons to wisdom being a knowledge of the first cause or causes.

In the second part of the proemium (which occupies the Third Reading), Aristotle shows the kind of knowledge wisdom is and that it is the most desirable knowledge of all.

The distinction in a philosophical treatise between the proemium and the drawing out or main body of the work is proportional to the distinction found also in speeches and plays and operas where the proemium or prologue or overture is distinct from the main work and prepares the way for it. A passage from the third book of Aristotle's *Rhetoric:*

> The proemium is the beginning of a speech, as the prologue in poetry and the prelude in flute playing. For all these are beginnings and as a paving the way for what follows. The prelude is like the proemium in display speeches; for flute-players begin by playing whatever they have to play well and to this join the keynote, so also one ought to write in display speeches; the speaker should say at once whatever he likes, give the keynote and then join the main subject...It ought to be noted that the proemia of courtroom speeches produce the same effect as the prologues of dramas and the proemia of epics...In dramas and epics there is a sample of the work, so that the hearers may know beforehand what it is about, and that the mind may not be kept in suspense for the undefined leads astray; so then he who puts the beginning, so to say, into the hearer's hand enables him, if he holds fast to it, to follow the story...The most necessary and proper function then of the proemium is to make clear the end for the sake of which is the speech.[1]

Since we have compared the *Proemium to Wisdom* to the Prologue to *Romeo and Juliet*, we give here that prologue:

> Two households, both alike in dignity
> In fair Verona, where we lay our scene,
> From ancient grudge break to new mutiny,
> Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean

[1] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Bk. III, Chapters 14, 1414b 19-24, 1415a 8-10, 12-15, 22-24

> From forth the fatal loins of these two foes
> A pair of star-cross'd lovers take their life;
> Whose misadventur'd piteous overthrows
> Doth with their death bury their parents' strife.
>
> The fearful passage of their death-mark'd love,
> And the continuance of their parents' rage,
> Which, but their children's end, nought could remove,
> Is now the two hours' traffick of our stage.
>
> The which if you with patient ears attend,
> What here shall miss, our toil shall strive to mend.[2]

Notice how Shakespeare mentions pity and fear, the emotions purged by tragedy, as he prepares the audience for a tragedy where pity and fear will be felt by the audience.

Aristotle reasons from wonder being the beginning of philosophy to wisdom being looking or theoretical knowledge. We see this wonder in the first philosophers who are moved by it to seek the first causes of the things around them. Although this wonder is natural and therefore common to all men, it is much stronger in the philosophers. Democritus expresses the strength of this desire in himself when he said:

> I would rather discover one cause than be master of the kingdom of the Persians.[3]

Plato before Aristotle has Socrates insist that this wonder is the beginning of philosophy:

Theaetetus:

> By the gods, Socrates, how greatly I wonder what these things are and sometimes when looking at them, I am really dizzy.

---

[2] Shakespeare, Prologue to *Romeo and Juliet*

[3] Democritus, DK 118

Socrates:

> Theodorus seems to guess not badly about your nature, my friend. For this wonder is very much the undergoing of a philosopher. There is no other beginning of philosophy than this. And the one saying that Iris is the offspring of Thaumas did not make a bad genealogy. But do you begin to understand why these things are so?[4]

Notice the connection of the wonder of the philosopher with the questions what and why in this text. Theaetetus speaks of *what these things are* and Socrates of *why these things are so*. These two questions both ask about the cause as Aristotle teaches us in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*. The wonder of the philosopher is a wonder what and why or a wonder about the unknown cause. Hence, wonder could be taken not only as a sign that philosophy is a looking knowledge, but also that it is a knowledge of causes.

Socrates or Plato puts in these words on wonder a statement that is not immediately clear. Perhaps, it was to see if we would wonder about it. Why was Hesiod making a good genealogy when he said that *Iris is the offspring of Thaumas?*

Thaumas is wonder personified and Iris in Homer is both the messenger of God and the rainbow personified. Iris is both of these because the messenger of God unites man and God and the rainbow unites heaven (the place of God) and earth (the place of man). Wonder insofar as it moves us to seek a knowledge of the cause and of the cause of the cause and eventually the first cause (which is God) unites man and God, at least on the side of his reason.

The connection of the wonder of the philosopher and the wonder of the philomuthos is sweetly touched upon in this passage from Boswell's *Life of Johnson:*

> On Saturday, July 30, Dr. Johnson and I took a sculler at the Temple-stairs, and set out for Greenwich. I asked him if he really thought a knowledge of the Greek and Latin languages an essential

[4] Plato, *Theaetetus*, 155C-D

> requisite to a good education. JOHNSON: “Most certainly, Sir; it is wonderful what a difference learning makes upon most people even in the common intercourse of life, which does not appear to be much connected with it," "And yet, (said I) people go through the world very well, and carry on the business of life to good advantage, without learning." JOHNSON: "Why, Sir, that may be true in cases where learning cannot possibly be of any use; for instance, this boy rows us as well without learning, as if he could sing the song of Orpheus to the Argonauts, who were the first sailors." He then called to the boy, "What would you give, my lad, to know about the Argonauts?" "Sir, (said the boy) I would give what I have." Dr. Johnson then turning to me, "Sir, (said he) a desire of knowledge is the natural feeling of mankind; and every human being, whose mind is not debauched, will be willing to give all that he has to get knowledge."[5]

In the following text, Thomas brings out the significance of one example of wonder given by Aristotle in his Proemium to Wisdom:

> sicut ex verbis Philosophi habetur in principio *Metaphysic*, in proem., admiratio ex duobus causatur, scilicet ex hoc quod alicujus effectus causa occulta est, et ex eo quod aliquid in re videtur per quod aliter esse deberet; unde in hoc quod est diametrum quadrati non posse commensurari lateri, admiratio causatur ex hoc quod hujus causa ignoratur, et ex hoc quod ex parvitate linearum videtur quod una lateri commensurari possit.
>
> Contingit ergo aliquid esse admirabile simpliciter, et aliquid esse admirabile quoad hunc. admirabile huic est omne ilud cujus causa occulta est sibi, et cui videtur secundum suam aestimationem aliquid obviare, quare non ita esse deberet: quamvis in re nihil sit repugnans, nec causa in se sit nimis occulta; et hoc potest dici mirum illi. Admirabile autem in se est id cujus causa simpliciter occulta est, ita etiam quod in re est aliqua virtus secundum rei veritatem per quam aliter debeat contingere. Hujusmodi autem sunt quae immediate a virtute divina causantur, quae est causa

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[5] *BOSWELL’S LIFE OF JOHNSON*, Oxford University Press, 1961, Saturday, 30 July, 1763, pp. 323-324

> occultissima, alio modo quam se habeat ordo causarum naturalium.....
>
> [Ad 1] creatio, proprie loquendo, non est opus miraculosum, quia deficit una conditio miraculi: quamvis enim causam occultam habeat, tamen non est in re unde aliter esse deberet: immo esse rerum naturali quodam ordine a primo ente producitur, quamvis non per necessitatem naturae.[6]

Aristotle says in the Proemium that God cannot be envious. Thomas unfolds the reason for this in the following text:

> Praeterea. Absque errore cognitivae virtutis esse non potest ut illud quod est bonum apprehendatur ut malum. Nec est nisi in particularibus bonis ut alterius malum possit bonum existere alteri, in quibus corruptio unius est generatio alterius: universali autem bono ex nullo particulari bono aliquid deperit, sed per unumquodque repraesentatur. Deus autem est universale bonum, cuius similitudinem participando omnia dicuntur bona. Nullius igitur malum sibi potest esse bonum. Nec potest esse ut id quod est simpliciter bonum et non est sibi malum, apprehendat ut malum: quia sua scientia est absque errore, ut supra ostensum est. Invidiam igitur in Deo impossibile est esse, etiam secundum suae speciei rationem: non solum quia invidia species tristitiae est, sed etiam quia tristatur de bono alterius, et sic accipit bonum alterius tanquam malum sibi.[7]

Aristotle has spoken well of the reason why wisdom is the best knowledge. The Latin word for wisdom, *sapientia*, is sometimes explained etymologically by Thomas as *sapida scientia* or savoury knowledge. One could also speak then of the excellence of wisdom figuratively. To speak metaphorically, wisdom is the sweetest and most savoury knowledge there is. Shakespeare speaks of the foolish as bitter and unsavoury:

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[6] Thomas Aquinas, Two Causes of Wonder, *Scriptum super Lib. II Sententiarum,* Dist. XVIII, Q. I, Art. III, Sol. and Ad 1

[7] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber I, Capitulum LXXXIX

Come bitter conduct, come unsavoury guide![8]

And this leads by us by the hand to see that the opposite is sweet and savoury.

Metaphor is based on likeness and the likeness in the metaphor *sweet* is best explained by Thomas:

> Dulcedo proprie est in corporalibus, metaphorice autem dicitur in spiritualibus. Unde oportet quod in spiritualibus dulcedeo sumatur ad similitudinem corporalis. Habet autem hoc dulcedo corporalis, quod reficit gustum corporalem et quietat et delectat: similiter et spiritualis dulcedo quietat et reficit et delectat spiritualem gustum.[9]

The sweet is pleasant, refreshing and restful. Even an imperfect knowledge of the higher things is more pleasant than a perfect knowledge of the lower things, as Aristotle says in the *Parts of Animals*. Moreover, since all the lower forms of reasoned out knowledge resolve to wisdom, wisdom is most restful. And the first cause is unchanging. And rest is refreshing. And since wisdom perfects our knowledge of that through which all other things are known, it refreshes us in the sense of restoring strength to the mind. As Heraclitus said, those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all. And since this is said of the wise by antonomasia, wisdom must be refreshing, restoring our powers.

Wisdom is also savoury. When we savour something, we dwell on it, not proceeding quickly to something else. The things considered in wisdom most of all need to be savoured because they are so wonderful and/or because so many things depend upon them and/or because they are difficult to understand. We must savour a food or wine to judge it and the wise man most of all judges.

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[8] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act V. Sc. 3, Romeo

[9] Thomas Aquinas, *In Davidem*, Psalmus XXIV

NOTE FOR THE SECOND BOOK OF WISDOM

Sometimes it may be useful to put ourselves in Aristotle's shoes and try to think of what we would do next. Since one man is wiser than another because he sees what is before or after what the other man sees, or because he sees a before and after which the other man does not see, it may be an occasion to learn and admire the wisdom of Aristotle.

Let us put ourselves then in the shoes of Aristotle after the Proemium to Wisdom and the consideration of the opinions of his predecessors about causes in the rest of Book One. In the Proemium, we saw that the goal of wisdom is to know causes and, at last, the first causes. And we also saw in the Proemium that this is the most desirable knowledge. But we also saw in the Proemium that wisdom is about things difficult for man to know. Then we considered our predecessors who had sought this goal of knowing the first causes to see if we could learn wisdom from them. But in each of them we had seen some failure to reach this goal of wisdom. Hence, we must discover wisdom ourselves although perhaps not without the help of our predecessors. And Aristotle will begin the Third Book of Wisdom with some consideration of how discoveries are made by our reason. But before the Third Book comes the Second Book. Why? Once we know that we cannot learn or fully learn wisdom from our predecessors, is not the *next* thing to consider how we may discover what we do not know and then proceed in that way to discover?

Thomas Aquinas has unfolded the division and the order of the questions raised in Book Three and in the dialectical discussion of them there from what we learn in the last part of the Second Book (in the fifth Lectio or Reading). And we can begin to understand why a dialectical consideration of things should come before a reasoned out knowledge of them in natural philosophy and in wisdom (as in the Third Book of Wisdom), but not in geometry, from what we learn in the beginning (and the end) of the Second Book of Wisdom. But these things can begin to be understood only after we have mastered the teaching of the Second Book.

Another question that might occur to us after the Proemium to Wisdom and the consideration of the opinions of our predecessors about causes is how can we get wisdom. This is a pressing question, given the difficulty of getting wisdom and the failure of others to get it. What is the road to follow in wisdom? What is the way of going forward in this reasoned out knowledge? And Aristotle will

eventually take up this question, but he sees something before it to consider in Book Two. There is a more general question that comes before the question what is the road to follow in wisdom, what is the way of knowing in this reasoned out knowledge. This more general question is: how should the road to follow in any reasoned out knowledge be determined? This question comes before, not only the question about the road to follow in wisdom, but also about the particular road to follow in any other form of reasoned out knowledge (such as in natural philosophy or geometry or ethics).

But is there a reason why this general question should be considered in wisdom since it is necessary for every form of reasoned out knowledge?

We learned in the Proemium that the wise man directs all others to some extent. Now in every reasoned out knowledge, one is directed by a knowledge of the road to follow in that reasoned out knowledge. Hence, the man who considers how these private roads of reasoned out knowledge should or should not be determined is, to some extent, directing all others. But this is the office of the wise man as we learned in the Proemium to Wisdom.

Moreover, as Aristotle shows in the middle of the Second Book, the consideration of truth belongs most of all to the wise man. Hence, it is fitting that the wise man considers how the road to truth in any reasoned out knowledge should be determined.

But Aristotle sees that there is an even more universal consideration to be made by the wise man before he considers how the particular road to truth in any reasoned out knowledge should or should not be determined. This is the consideration of how man is towards knowing truth. This is what Aristotle considers in the First Lectio or Reading of the Second Book while it is in the Fifth and Last Reading of the Second Book that he considers how the road to follow in any reasoned out knowledge should be determined. He artfully places in the middle of the book a reason why both of these considerations belong to the wise man for he shows there that the consideration of truth belongs most of all to the wise man.

In the middle of the Book, after he has shown that wisdom is most of all about truth through its being about first causes, he refutes the mistake of thinking there are no first causes. But by showing that in each of the four kinds of cause there are first causes, he also advances us toward the goal of wisdom. Aristotle, in what I call the sub-plot of Books One and Two, has confirmed that there are

four kinds of cause (under one or more than one of which we must look for the first causes) when he considered the opinions of his predecessors in Book One and now in defending the reason why wisdom is chiefly the knowledge of truth that there are first causes in each of these kinds. In this there is a certain likeness in the fourteen books of wisdom to the Nicomachean Ethics. In the latter, Aristotle draws a line around the end of man in Book One, and then after considering the virtues and other things in detail, he is able to come back to the end of man in Book Ten and determine more perfectly what that end is. And here he advances in Books One and Two towards the goal of wisdom by showing that it must be found in one or more than one of four kinds of cause and that in each of these kinds there is a first cause. But then he considers many other things, which enable him in the last Books of Wisdom to determine much more fully what is the first cause or causes.

We see also in this how Aristotle imitates his master, Socrates or Plato who teaches us in the *Phaedo* to strike a balance between the hope of finding the truth and the fear of being mistaken. Seeing the difficulty of wisdom and the failure of those who have tried to reach its goal gives us a healthy fear of mistake. But it is also discouraging so that Aristotle balances the fear with the hope of getting somewhere when we come to know that there are four kinds of cause and that there are excellent reasons for concluding that there are first causes in each of these kinds.

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NOTE FOR SECOND BOOK OF WISDOM, READING ONE

Aristotle does not ask whether man is able to know truth (which perhaps is where a modern philosopher might begin), but he answers the question is it easy or difficult for man to know truth. If man were unable to know truth, he could not know that he is unable to know truth. But it is obvious that man knows many truths. He knows that a whole is more than one of its parts. And how could he not know that statements exist? If you could think that statements do not exist, you would be making a statement.

If you asked a modern professor whether it is easy or difficult to know the truth, he would probably say difficult, if not impossible. But Aristotle says that in one way it is difficult and in another way easy.

He is very brief in showing that truth is difficult for man since this is rarely not seen. But he most of all distinguishes the causes of this difficulty, saying that they can be in the thing or in us. Since ability is knowable through the act for which it is an ability, act is more knowable than ability. Things are knowable to the extent they are in act. Hence, the difficulty we have in knowing matter and motion is in them, that they are not very actual, while the difficulty we have in knowing the separated substances and God who are very much in act must be in us since they are most knowable.

We can apply this distinction to understanding other people. We understand best people who are just like ourselves. But we have difficulty in understanding those who are much less reasonable than we are or those who are much more reasonable than we are. Since a person is understandable to the extent they are reasonable, the difficulty in understanding those less reasonable than us is in them. But the difficulty of understanding those more reasonable than us must be in us

This kind of distinction could be made in other acts, as Thomas teaches us. It is difficult for men to love the ugly or disease and also to love the common good or God. But if something is lovable because it is good, the difficulty in loving the ugly or cancer is in the thing, but the difficulty in loving the common good or God is in the defect of our heart.

But as regards the way it which truth is easy for man, since some might deny that it can be easy for man, Aristotle mainly points out three ways in which it is easy for man. No man can avoid seeing some part of the truth, however small. But the part one man sees may not be the part another man sees. And in some way even much truth is easy for man though the efforts of many. Thus we see the arts and sciences grow by each thinker or worker adding a little bit to the whole. And a third way in which truth is easy for man is that the beginnings are seen to some extent by all. Every man, for example, sees that a whole is more than one of its parts.

The part of the truth which every man sees is the cornerstone of truth for man. To this is added the part that one man sees and another does not see. And through the efforts of many, a large amount is seen in the development of the arts and sciences.

A man is helped by others in the pursuit of truth in two ways. From some, he gets a part of the truth he might not have seen, or seen so quickly, by himself. But he is helped also by those with whom he disagrees. For in reasoning against them, he develops his own mind.

Although Thomas understands the text of Aristotle showing the difficulty in knowing truth by considering both the difficulty in going from the whole to the part and from the parts to the whole, perhaps it would be easier to take the text the way the Greek seems to go: “We have the whole and are unable to see the part.” A text of Thomas fitting this reading is this:

> ...illa sunt priora quae intellectui abstrahenti primo occurunt.
>
> Haec autem sunt quae plura comprehendunt, vel per modum totius universalis, vel per modum totius integralis;
>
> et ideo magis universalia sunt primo nota intellectui,
>
> et composita componentibus, ut definitum partibus definitionis.
>
> Et secundum hoc quaedam imitatio intellectus in sensu est, qui etiam quodammodo abstracta a materia recipit. Etiam apud sensum

> singularia magis communia sunt nota primo, ut hoc corpus quam hoc animal.[1]

It is easy to show by example that men seeing the whole have great difficulty in seeing either kind of part. The reason given by Thomas, for both the reason and the senses, is very interesting.

Thomas solves an objection based on mixing up the two causes of difficulty in knowing by the distinction pointed out by Aristotle in the causes of the difficulty in knowing:

> 4. Praeterea, difficilius est facere aliquid quod est intelligibile in potentia, intelligibile actu, et intelligere illud, quam intelligere illud quod est de se actu intelligibile. Sed intellectus Adae poterat facere species rerum materialium esse intelligibiles in actu, quae de se sunt intelligibiles in potentia, et per hoc intelligere res materiales. Ergo multo fortius poterat intelligere ipsas essentias angelorum, quae de se sunt intelligibiles actu , cum sint a materia immunes.
>
> Ad quartum dicendum, quod difficultas in intelligendo accidit dupliciter; uno modo ex parte cognoscibilis, alio modo ex parte cognoscentis.
>
> Ex parte cognoscibilis difficilius est facere aliquid intelligibile et intelligere ipsum, quam intelligere id quod est in se intelligibile; sed ex parte cognoscentis potest esse difficilius ad cognoscendum id quod est in se intelligibile. Et hoc convenit intellectui humano propter hoc quod non est proportionatus ad intelligendum naturaliter essentias separatas...[2]

In the following text, Thomas shows how the kind of distinction made about the causes of the difficulty in knowing could also be applied to the opposite of difficulty, easiness:

> ...sicut dicitur in *II Meta.*, difficultas potest esse ex nobis et ex rebus, et similiter facilitas. Facilitas ergo quae est ex ratione actuum qui non sunt magni ponderis, diminuit, quantum est in se, rationem meriti; sed facilitas quae est ex promptitudine operantis,

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[1] *In Boetii de Trinitate*, Proemium, Q. I, Art. 3, C

[2] *De Veritate*, Q. 18, Art. 5, 4 & Ad 4

> meritum non diminuit respectu praemii essentialis, sed auget; quia quanto caritate majori facit, tanto facilius tolerat et magis meretur. Et similiter quanto delectabilius operatur propter habitum virtutis, tanto actus ejus est delectabilior et magis meritorius.[3]

Although there is difficulty on the side of the object as well as on the side of the knower, the chief difficulty is on the side of the knower. In accord with this, what is more known to us is the less knowable:

> accidentia et motus et privationes parum aut nihil habent de entitate; et tamen ista sunt magis nota quoad nos quam substantiae rerum, quia sunt viciniora sensui, cum per se cadant sub sensu quasi sensibilia propria vel communia. Formae substantiales per accidens.[4]

Thomas in many places considers that part of the truth which all men see. He points out that this knowledge is had without investigation and that it is a plantation or nursery containing the natural seeds of all the knowledge that follows afterwards. One such text is the following:

> ...in natura humana, in quantum attingit angelicam, oportet esse cognitionem veritatis sine inquisitione et in speculativis et in practicis; et hanc quidem cognitionem oportet esse principium totius cognitionis sequentis sive speculativae sive practicae, cum principia oporteat esse stabiliora et certiora.
>
> Unde et hanc cognitionem oportet homini naturaliter inesse, cum hoc quidem cognoscat quasi quoddam seminarium totius cognitionis sequentis; sicut in omnibus naturis sequentium operationum et effectuum quaedam naturalia semina praeexistunt.
>
> Oportet etiam hanc cognitionem habitualem esse, ut in promptu existat ea uti cum fuerit necesse.[5]

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[3] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXIII, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 4
[4] Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Metaphysicorum*, lectio II, n. 1304
[5] *De Veritate*, q. 16, Art. 1, c

A seed in the mind is (1) a beginning that is (2) natural (3) small in size compared to what comes from it and (4) great in power. These seeds are tools of the agent or acting upon understanding and partake of its light:

> Cum enim omne quod intelligitur, ex vi intellectualis luminis cognoscatur; ipsum cognitum inquantum huiusmodi includit in se intellectuale lumen ut participatum, ex cuius virtute habet intellectum confortare; sicut patet quando magister tradit discipulo aliquod medium alicuius demonstrationis, in quo participatur lumen intellectus agentis ut in instrumento. Prima enim principia sunt quasi instrumenta intellectus agentis, ut dicit Commentator in III de Anima et similiter omnia principia secunda quae continent propria media demonstrationum.[6]

Since man knows things in a confused way before distinctly, the seed like beginning of our knowledge is in a confused knowledge of all things:

> Cognitio autem naturalis humana ad illa potest se extendere quaecumque ductu naturalis rationis cognoscere possumus, Cuius quidem naturalis cognitionis est accipere principium et terminum.
>
> Principium autem eius est in quadam confusa cognitione omnium: prout scilicet homini naturaliter inest cognitio universalium principiorum, in quibus, sicut in quibusdam seminibus, virtute praeexistunt omnia scibilia quae ratione naturali cognosci possunt.
>
> Sed huius cognitionis terminus est quando ea quae in virtute in ipsis principiis sunt, explicantur in actum: sicut cum ex semine animalis, in quo virtute praeexistunt omnia membra animalis, producitur animal habens distincta et perfecta membra, dicitur esse terminus generationis.[7]

Because man sees a part of the truth before the whole, he depends upon others, even in mathematics. But in the other sciences, on account of their difficulty, being above or below our mind, our mind seeing a part of the truth before the whole requires the use of dialectic. Finally, in wisdom which is a universal consideration of truth, not only is dialectic especially important, but

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[6] Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, Q. 9. Art 1, Ad 2

[7] *De Veritate*, Q. 18, Art 4, corpus

there is also a dependence upon the particular sciences whereby we are led by the hand towards the very universal consideration of the wise man.

We should go forward with the help of reasonable thinkers before us. This is possible even when they disagree in three ways. We can find a common basis among them despite their disagreements and become strong in it. We can gather the parts of truth divided among them. Reasonable guess have some part of the truth in them. And since all or most of them are mistaken, at least in part (if they all disagree, all or all but one of them must be mistaken at least in part), we can learn from their mistakes.

Exercise of reason was the first thing for which dialectic was said to be useful in the book *About Places*. But the errors of reason are also useful to exercise the reason. As the Poet says:

> always the dullness of the fool is the whetstone of the wits[8]

Watson came to realize that he was one of these whetstones to Holmes:

> The relations between us in those latter days were peculiar. He was a man of habits, narrow and concentrated habits, and I had become one of them. As an institution I was like the violin, the shag tobacco, the old black pipe, the index books, and others perhaps less excusable. When it was a case of active work and a comrade was needed upon whose nerves he could place some reliance, my role was obvious. But apart from this I had uses. I was a whetstone for his mind. I stimulated him. He liked to think aloud in my presence. His remarks could hardly be said to be made to me - many of them would have been as appropriately addressed to his bedstead - but none the less, having formed the habit, it had become in some way helpful that I should register and interject. If I irritated him by a certain methodical slowness in my mentality, that irritation served only to make his own flame-like intuitions and

[8] Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, Act I, Sc. 2, Celia

> impressions flash up the more vividly and swiftly. Such was my humble role in our alliance.[9]

Watson, by his mistakes, could even be helpful to lead Sherlock Holmes sometimes to the truth:

> “Really, Watson, you excel yourself," said Holmes, pushing back his chair and lighting a cigarette. "I am bound to say that in all the accounts which you have been so good as to give of my own small achievements, you have habitually underrated your own abilities. It may be that you are not yourself luminous, but you are a conductor of light. Some people without possessing genius have a remarkable power of stimulating it. I confess, my dear fellow, that I am very much in your debt."
>
> He had never said as much before, and I must admit that his words gave me keen pleasure, for I had often been piqued by his indifference to my admiration and to the attempts which I had made to give publicity to his methods. I was proud, too, to think that I had so far mastered his system as to apply it in a way which earned his approval. He now took the stick from my hands and examined it for a few minutes with his naked eyes. Then with an expression of interest he laid down his cigarette, and carrying the cane to the window, he looked it over again with a convex lens.
>
> “Interesting, though elementary", said he as he returned to his favourite corner of the settee. "There are certainly one or two indications upon the stick. It gives us the basis for several deductions."
>
> “Has anything escaped me?" I asked with some self-importance. "I trust that there is nothing of consequence which I have overlooked?"

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[9] *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, "The Case book of Sherlock Holmes", 'The Adventure of the Creeping Man', Garden City publishing Co. Inc.; p. 1938, pp. 1261-1262

> "I am afraid, my dear Watson, that most of your conclusions were erroneous. When I said that you stimulated me I meant, to be frank, that in noting your fallacies I was occasionally guided towards the truth."[10]

Although we might see some conclusions from the beginnings of demonstration at once, the further conclusions seen through many steps may require that we led by the hand of a teacher:

> ex principiis demonstrationis statim aliquae conclusiones eliciuntur, quaedam vero non nisi per multa media; et ad haec cognoscenda non potest quilibet per se, sed oportet quod ab alio manuducatur.[11]

One should have the attitude and docility of Alec Macdonald in learning from those wiser than we are:

> Those were the early days at the end of the '80's, when Alec MacDonald was far from having attained the national fame which he has now achieved. He was a young but trusted member of the detective force, who had distinguished himself in several cases which had been intrusted to him...Twice already in his career had Holmes helped him to attain success, his own sole reward being the intellectual joy of the problem. For this reason the affection and respect of the Scotchman for his amateur colleague were profound, and he showed them by the frankness with which he consulted Holmes in every difficulty. Mediocrity knows nothing higher than itself; but talent instantly recognizes genius, and MacDonald had talent enough for his profession to enable him to perceive that there was no humiliation in seeking the assistance of one who already stood alone in Europe, both in his gifts and in his experience.[12]

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[10] *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, "The Hound of the Baskervilles", Chapter I, Gardens City Publishing co. Inc. 1938, p. 784

[11] Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, Q. 8, Art. 4, Ad 12
Is the word *manuductio* here being used in a broader sense than by Dionne so that both things the teacher does could be called manuductio?

[12] *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, "The Valley of Fear", Part One, Chapter I (p. 908 Garden city publishing Co., Inc. , 1938)

The words *Mediocrity knows nothing higher than itself; but talent instantly recognizes genius* can be applied to the division of the middle group in Hesiod's distinction. Among those who can learn from another what they cannot discover by themselves, some know from whom they can learn and others do not.

Is the dependence of the learner upon the teacher something bad? Is the defect of being unable to discover the great truths by oneself something bad?

In considering this question, it should be known that not every defect is something bad. As Thomas explains:

> quia malum privatio est boni, et non negatio pura...non omnis defectus boni est malum, sed defectus boni quod natum est et debet haberi.
>
> Defectus enim visionis non est malum in lapide sed in animali; quia contra rationem lapidis est, quod visum habeat.
>
> Similiter etiam contra rationem creaturae est, quod in esse conservatur a seipsa: quia idem dat esse et conservat. Unde iste defectus non est malum creaturae.[13]

The use of the word *defectus* here should be studied. Does nature or God intend that every man should be able to discover the great truths by himself or even be able to learn them from another? Or does nature and God intend that a few should be able to make the great discoveries and some to learn them from the former and some to be incapable of discovery or learning them from another. Does nature and God intend the equality or the inequality of our minds? An order of minds presupposes an inequality of them and both nature and God love order.

Karl Marx sees man's dependence upon God as something bad, but it is not something bad. For it is against the nature of the creature that it have existence from itself or that it be conserved in existence from itself. It would seem to be by pride that Marx is deceived into thinking that what is not bad is bad.

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[13] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 48, Art 5. Ad 1

Likewise, many moderns see the dependence of the learner upon a teacher as bad. They think that it is bad if the student does not reach his judgments independently of the teacher. They see the support which the reason of the student gets from believing a worthy mind as bad. Pride might also be a cause of this deception.

Duane H. Berquist

NOTE FOR SECOND BOOK OF WISDOM, READINGS 2-4

In showing that the cause is more true than the effect, Aristotle reasons from a beginning stated briefly as *that on account of which more so* (or in Latin *propter quod unumquodque, illud magis*). But perhaps it can be stated more fully in this way: When the same belongs to two things, but to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause. This can be exemplified first in some homely examples. If hot is said of the fire and the air around the fire, but of the air around the fire because of the fire, which is hotter or more hot? Clearly the fire. And if wet is said of the water and the cloth, but of the cloth because of the water, which is more wet? Clearly the water. This beginning or principle is used in every part of philosophy. If known is said of the premisses and the conclusion of a syllogism, but of the conclusion because of the premisses, then the premisses are more known than the conclusion. Indeed, if they were not, we would not use them to prove the conclusion. And if good or desirable is said of the end and of the means, but of the means because of the end, then the end is better or more good than the means. If it were not better, we would not desire the means for the sake of it. Likewise, if true is said of the cause and of the effect, but of the effect because of the cause, then the cause is more true than the effect.

Thomas, in replying to an objection, points out that this beginning must be understood in those things that are of one order:

> Propter quod unumquodque, illud magis, intelligendum est in his quae sunt unius ordinis, ut supra dictum est. Propter Deum autem alia cognoscuntur, non sicut propter primum cognitum, sed sicut propter primam cognoscitivae virtutis causam.[1]

And in another text more fully:

> cum dicitur, *Propter quod unumquodque, illud magis*, veritatem habet, si intelligatur in his quae sunt unius ordinis, puta in uno genere causae: puta si dicatur quod sanitas est propter vitam, sequitur quod vita sit magis desiderabilis.

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[1] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 88, Art. 3, Ad 2

> Si autem accipiantur ea quae sunt diversorum ordinum, non habet veritatem: ut si dicatur quod sanitas est propter medicinam, non ideo sequitur quod medicina sit magis desiderabilis, quia sanitas est in ordine finium, medicina autem in ordine causarum efficientium.
>
> Sic igitur si acipiamus duo, quorum utrumque sit per se in ordine obiectorum cognitionis; illud propter quod aliud cognoscitur, erit magis notum, sicut principia conclusionibus. sed habitus non est de ordine obiectorum, inquantum est habitus; nec propter habitum aliqua cognoscuntur sicut propter obiectum cognitum, sed sicut propter dispositionem vel formam qua cognoscens cognoscit: et ideo ratio non sequitur.[2]

Here is a subtle text of Thomas on the way in which something can be more true:

> obiectum fidei est verum; unde secundum quod contingit esse aliquid magis verum, sic etiam contingit aliquid magis credere.
>
> Cum autem veritas constet in adaequatione intellectus et rei, si consideratur veritas secundum rationem aequalitatis, quae non recipit magis et minus, sic non contingit esse aliquid magis et minus verum;
>
> sed si consideretur ipsum esse rei, quod est ratio veritatis, sicut dicitur in II Metaphys., eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et veritate: unde quae sunt magis entia, sunt magis vera; et propter hoc etiam in scientiis demonstrativis magis creduntur principia quam conclusiones. Et sic etiam contingit in his quae sunt fidei. Unde Apostolus, I ad Corinth., XV, probat resurrectionem mortuorum futuram per resurrectionem Christi.[3]

In the following text, Thomas explains that things have the same order in being and truth, but this does not mean that being and true are entirely the same:

> 5. Praeterea, illa quorum dispositio est eadem, sunt eadem. Sed veri et entis est eadem dispositio. Ergo sunt eadem. Dicitur enim in

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[2] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 87, Art. 2, Ad 3

[3] *De Caritate*, Art. 9, Ad 1

> II *Metaphysic.*: *Dispositio rei in esse est sicut sua dispositio in veritate*. Ergo verum et ens sunt omnino idem.
>
> Ad quintum dicendum, quod dispositio non accipitur ibi secundum quod est in genere qualitatis, sed secundum quod importat quemdam ordinem;
>
> cum enim illa quae sunt causa aliorum essendi sint maxime entia, et illa quae sunt causa veritatis aliorum sint maxime vera; concludit Philosophus, quod idem est ordo rei in esse et veritate; ita, scilicet, quod ubi invenitur quod est maxime ens, invenitur quod est maxime verum.
>
> Nec est hoc ideo, quia ens et verum ratione sunt idem, sed quia ex hoc quod aliquid habet de entitate, secundum hoc natum est aequari intellectui; et sic ratio veri sequitur rationem entis.[4]

In showing that there are first causes in the four kinds of cause, Aristotle considers those kinds of cause in almost the same order as in the First Book of Wisdom. He considers mover and matter, then end and last form.

In showing that there are first causes in each kind of cause, Aristotle gives a reason for the kind of cause called mover that could *mutatis mutandis* be given for all four kinds of cause.

He passes over matter in particular, partly because the Greeks all thought there was a first matter and partly because this kind of cause is least important for wisdom. He shows something else as Thomas explains in the commentary on this Reading.

He is more expansive about the kinds of cause called end and form because these kinds of cause are especially important for wisdom and because there seems a special opposition of them to the endless since both end and form are a limit or end.

Aristotle touches upon the second, third and fourth senses of *limit* when he gives under matter the limits of change, then the end as limit, and then the

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[4] *De Veritate*, Q. I, Art. 1, Obj. 5 & Ad 5

form or definition. Perhaps, we can be led from the first sense through the four, as from the more known to the less known. A cube would not be limited if the squares which contain it were not limited. The squares which contain it would not be limited if the lines which contain the squares were not limited. But the lines are limited by points. And the point is a limit which does not have a limit. One does not go on forever with every limit having a limit. Aristotle reasons in the first book of *Natural Hearing* that the beginnings are limited because they are contraries and contraries are the species furthest apart in a genus and there can only be two such species just as there can only be two points which are *furthest* apart on a line. The point is also a beginning which does not have a beginning while the line and the surface are beginnings that have a beginning. Here again with the point we get back to a beginning that does not have a beginning even though it is not a beginning in the sense of a cause. Just as there is a beginning or limit in the first sense which has a beginning or limit, and a limit or beginning which has no limit or beginning in the first sense, so there is a cause which has a cause and a cause which does not have a cause. By not considering the announced purpose of seeing if there is a first cause in the genus of matter and instead talking about the limits of change, and then going to the end before the form, Aristotle follows the same order as the second, third and fourth senses of *limit* in the Fifth Book of Wisdom.

When Aristotle reasoned to the existence of a first or unmoved mover in natural philosophy, or to a good that is not desired for the sake of anything else in ethics, or to genera that do not have a genus in logic, he was seeing in particular what is being shown universally here in the Second Book of Wisdom.

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ARISTOTLE, BOOK TWO OF WISDOM, READING FIVE

Listenings happen according to customs. For we expect it to be said in the way to which we are accustomed. And what is apart from this does not seem similar, but more unknown and strange through unfamiliarity - for the familiar is known.

The laws, in which the mythical and childish prevail through custom over our knowledge of them, show how much strength the customary has.

Thus some will not accept what is said if one does not speak mathematically; others, if not by example; while others expect a poet to be brought in as witness..

And these, all things precisely [with certitude]: while the precise saddens those either through not being able to join one thing with another or through stinginess. For the precise has something of this sort; so that just as in contracts, so also in discussions, it seems to some to be illiberal.

Hence it is necessary to be brought up to how each should be received because it is absurd to seek at the same time reasoned out knowledge and the way of reasoned out knowledge - and neither is easy to get.

One ought not to demand mathematical precision [or certitude] in all things, but in those not having matter. Whence this way is not that of the knowledge of natural things for probably all nature has matter.

Whence one ought to consider first what is nature. And thus it will become clear what the knowledge of natural things is about and whether it belongs to one or more than one reasoned out knowledge to consider the causes and beginnings.

NOTE FOR SECOND BOOK OF WISDOM, READING FIVE

There is a distinction in all our knowledge between what we know and how we know it. I know the music of Mozart through my ears and the paintings of Titian through my eyes. And I can know the shape of a ball both through my eyes and through my hands. How something is known can also be called the way that it is known.

But in this Reading, Aristotle is thinking about the way of knowing in reasoned out knowledge or reasoned out understanding.

In logic, we consider the way of knowing common to all reasoned out knowledge. But in addition to this is the way of knowing which is private to each form of reasoned out knowledge. To some extent, each form of reasoned out knowledge (such as natural philosophy, geometry, wisdom etc.) has its own way of knowing its subject. Aristotle is considering how these private ways of knowing should or should not be determined. (For there is the same knowledge of opposites.)

He sees the great influence of custom on how we think about something. Custom has a strong influence upon both *what* we think and *how* we think. But here, Aristotle is concerned with the latter, how we think about something. But this is not how we should determine the way of thinking about any subject. We should not take up the way of thinking to which we are accustomed or the way to which we are individually inclined (as Thomas adds). Rather we should find the way of thinking and knowing that fits the matter or subject of each reasoned out knowledge.

In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle compares the distinction of the private or particular ways of knowing in the forms of reasoned out knowledge by their fitting the subject or matter of each reasoned out knowledge to the distinction of the ways of making out of matter in the servile or mechanical arts to the kind of matter out of which one is making. Iron and wood and cloth are not worked in the same way or with the same tools. And the way of knowing different subjects or matters must also fit those matters. In the following text Thomas compares this to the way the moral virtues fit their matter:

> Sicut enim in scientiis modum oportet secundum materiam inquirere, ut dicitur in I Eth., ita et in virtutibus. Materia autem virtutum moralium actiones et passiones humanae sunt. In passionibus autem quaedam sunt in quibus passionem inferens de sui ratione natum est in prosecutionem movere, sicut delectabile quod concupiscibili passionem infert; et in his difficile est retrahi a prosecutione et facili est prosequi. Unde temperantia quae circa principalia delectabilia est, modum habet in retrahendo. Et propter hoc temperatus plus assimilatur insensibili qui superabundat in fuga, quam intemperato qui superabundat in prosecutione talium delectabilium.
>
> In passionibus autem in quibus passionem inferentia nata sunt ad fugam movere, sicut sunt timores et audaciae, difficile est prosequi vel sustinere, facile autem fugere. Unde modus fortitudinis quae circa timores et audacias maximorum terribilium est, modus est in aggrediendo. Et ideo fortis magis similatur audaci qui superabundat in aggrediendo, quam timido qui superabundat in fugiendo.
>
> In actionibus autem non consideratur inclinatio affectus magis ad unum quam ad aliud nisi per accidens, inquantum convincitur passionibus. Et ideo justitiae quae circa actiones est, modus est aequalitas, sicut fortitudinis superextensio, et temperantiae refrenatio et diminutio.[1]

The word *modus* in Latin is connected in meaning with measure. The *modus* of a thing is determined by its measure:

modus a mensura causatur[2]

The *modus operandi* in a servile art is measured by its matter or it must fit its matter. Likewise, the *modus* of a moral virtue must fit its matter. And the *modus* of a reasoned out knowledge must fit its matter or subject. The word *fit* suggests that what must fit another is measured by that other.

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[1] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist XXXIII, Quaest III, Art II, Sol I, nn 306-308

[2] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Q. II, Art I, Sol. III, n. 203

Aristotle's first example of the influence of custom (and individual inclination) is well chosen: those who want to proceed mathematically everywhere. We think of the Pythagoreans and the Platonists in ancient times and the rationalists like Descartes, and Spinoza and Leibniz and the mathematical or symbolic logicians in modern times.

Aristotle's example of those who want to hear a poet quoted in authority reminds one of the custom derived from theology in the Middle Ages. Since the argument from authority is the strongest in theology, those accustomed to theology might look elsewhere for something like the authority of the Bible or the Church Fathers.

But one could change the example and point to those who want to proceed poetically everywhere because they are accustomed to poetical studies. Thus Novalis said:

> Poetry is what is absolutely and genuinely true. That is the kernel of my philosophy, the more poetic the more true.[3]

And Matthew Arnold:

> We should conceive of poetry worthily, and more highly than it has been the custom to conceive it. We should conceive of it as capable of higher uses, and called to higher destinies, than those which in general men have assigned to it hitherto. More and more mankind will discover that we have to turn to poetry to interpret life for us, to console us, to sustain us. Without poetry, our science will appear incomplete; and most of what now passes with us for religion and philosophy will be replaced by poetry.[4]

As Descartes and Spinoza wanted to proceed with the rigor or certitude of geometry everywhere (even where it is not possible), so the existentialists want to proceed poetically (even in matters that admit more rigor or certitude).

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[3] Novalis, Fr. 31, in "Schriften", ed . Jacob Minor (Jena, E. Diederichs, 1907). III, 11

[4] Matthew Arnold, 1822-1888, *The Study of Poetry*

The following text is useful for seeing a connection between the first and fifth readings of the *Second Book of Wisdom:*

> Cum unumquodque quod est ad finem determinetur secundum exigentiam finis, potentiae et habitus qui ordinantur ad actus sicut ad ultimam perfectionem oportet quod secundum actus diversos distinguantur, sicut etiam potentiae materiae distinguuntur per relationem ad diversas formas.
>
> Non autem quaelibet diversitas actuum facit differentiam potentiarum et habituum, sed illa tantum quae est ex diversitate objectorum, a quibus actus specificantur, sicut motus a terminis. Solum autem illa differentia terminorum facit diversam speciem motus quae attenditur secundum illam rationem secundum quam terminat motum. Unde quod descensus terminetur ad aquam vel ad terram, non facit diversam speciem motus localis; quia motus localis non erat ad terram vel aquam inquantum huiusmodi, sed inquantum deorsum sunt. Generationes autem differunt secundum speciem quae terminantur ad formas aquae et terrae.
>
> Et similiter objecta diversa non diversificant actus secundum speciem, nisi sit diversitas secundum illam rationem secundum quam est objectum. Videre enim album et nigrum non sunt diversi actus secundum speciem; quia utrumque est objectum visus secundum unam rationem, inquantum sunt colorata visibilia actu per lucem. Et inde contingit quod quanto aliqui habitus vel potentiae sunt immaterialiores, tanto sunt universaliores et minus distinguuntur, quia attendunt universaliorem rationem objecti; sicut quinque sensibus propriis respondet unus sensus communis et una imaginatio.
>
> Sciendum tamen quod cum plures habitus quandoque sunt in una potentia, aliqua diversitas sufficit ad distinguendum habitus quae non sufficit ad distinguendum potentiam; quia potentia alio modo comparatur ad actum quam habitus; unde et secundum alteram rationem objectum utrique respondet. Potentia enim est principium agendi absolute, sed habitus est principium agendi prompte et faciliter; et ideo objectum secundum illam rationem qua se habet ad

> actum simpliciter respondet potentiae, sed secundum quod se habet ad facilitatem actus respondet habitui. Et ideo diversitas materiae vel objecti in ordine ad ea quae faciunt facilitatem in actu, facit diversitatem habitus et non potentiae
>
> Et inde est quod in speculativis diversitas materiae, secundum quod est determinabilis per diversa media et principia ex quibus est facilitas considerationis, facit diversa scientias, sicut naturalis quae ex effectibus et his quae apparent in sensu demonstrat, a mathematica differt quae circa suam materiam ex eisdem principiis et mediis procedere non potest.[5]

The above words *habitus est principium agendi prompte et faciliter* and *objectum... secundum quod se habet ad facilitatem actus respondet habitui* makes us realize that the distinction of the two kinds of difficulty in knowing pointed out in the First Reading of this book, one of which makes natural philosophy more difficult than geometry and the other, wisdom, makes us understand how different must be these three habits and their ways of knowing.

A knowledge of the road and way of going forward in any reasoned out knowledge is a *foundation* in that reasoned out knowledge. This somewhat metaphorical use of the word *foundation* is based on two likenesses:

> fundamentum dicitur in spiritualibus metaphorice ad similitudinem fundamenti materialis. Potest autem ista similitudo attendi quantum ad duo: scilicet quantum ad ordinem, quia fundamentum praecedit alias partes et etiam quantum ad virtutem fundamenti, quia fundamentum totum aedificium sustentat.[6]

Since reasoned out knowledge is knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road, knowledge of the road to follow is obviously a beginning of that knowledge and a support of it.

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[5] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist XXXIIII, Q. I, Art. I, Sol. I, nn. 117-21

[6] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXIII, Q. II, Art. V, Ad 2

Aristotle sometimes calls this knowledge a *paideia*.

Duane H. Berquist

NOTE ON ONE AS SUBJECT OF WISDOM

To understand the one which is the subject of wisdom (with being), we must see three distinctions.

One is the distinction between being and one

Another is the distinction between the one that is the beginning of number and the one that is convertible with being.

The third is the distinction between the one that is just undivided being and the one that is both undivided being and distinct from all others.

In the following text, Thomas puts one (unum) with thing (res) both following upon being (ens) in itself (in se) and something (aliquid) with good (bonum) and true (verum) as following upon being in order to another (secundum ordinem unius ad alterum):

> Illud autem quod primo intellectus concipit quasi notissimum, et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit, est ens, ut Avicenna dicit in principio suae Metaphysicae. Unde oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus accipiantur ex additione ad ens.
>
> Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur generi, vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens; unde probat etiam Philosophus in III Metaphysicorum, quod ens non potest esse genus, sed secundum hoc aliqua dicuntur addere super ens, in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non exprimitur.
>
> Quod dupliciter contingit:
>
> uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus entis. Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis, secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. Substantia enim non addit super ens aliquam differentiam, quae designet aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens; et ita est in aliis generibus.

> Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis consequens omne ens; et hic modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod consequitur unumquodque ens in se; alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in ordine ad aliud.
>
> Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter quia vel exprimitur in ente aliquid affirmative vel negative.
>
> Non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit accipi in omni ente, nisi essentia eius, secundum quam esse dicitur; et sic imponitur hoc nomen *res*, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaphysicae, quod ens sumitur ab actu essendi, sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam entis.
>
> Negatio autem consequens omne ens absolute, est indivisio; et hanc exprimit hoc nomen *unum:* nihil aliud enim est unum quam ens indivisum.
>
> Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter.
>
> Uno modo secundum divisionem unius ab altero; et hoc exprimit hoc nomen *aliquid:* dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud quid; unde sicut ens dicitur unum, in quantum est indivisum in se, ita dicitur aliquid, in quantum est ab aliis divisum.
>
> Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud; et hoc quidem non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente: hoc autem est anima, quae quodammodo est omnia, ut dicitur in III de Anima. In anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva. Convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen *bonum,* ut in principio Ethicorum dicitur quod *bonum est quod omnia appetunt*. Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen *verum.*[1]

The negation which one adds to being is a being of reason so that one adds nothing real to being. But is this negation to be understood as a pure negation or as a privation or lack? Thomas gives the reason why it should be considered as one kind of privation:

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[1] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, Q. 1 Art. 1, corpus

Nam sicut dictum est, unum est ens non divisum: divisio autem ad multitudinem pertinet, quae uni opponitur. Unde cuius est considerare unum, eius est considerare negationem vel privationem.

Negatio autem est duplex: quaedam simplex per quam absolute dicitur quod hoc non inest illi. Alia est negatio in genere, per quam aliquid non absolute negatur, sed infra metas alicuius generis; sicut caecum dicitur non simpliciter, quod non habet visum, sed infra genus animalis quod natum est habere visum. Et haec adest differentia huic quod dico unum praeter *quod est in negatione*, idest per quam distat a negatione: quia negatio dicit tantum absentiam alicuius, scilicet quod removet, sine hoc quod determinet subiectum. Unde absoluta negatio potest verificari tam de non ente, quod est natum habere affirmationem, quam de ente, quod est natum habere et non habet. Non videns enim potest dici tam Chimaera quam lapis quam etiam homo. Sed in privatione est quaedam natura vel substantia determinata, de qua dicitur privatio: non enim omne non videns potest dici caecum, sed solum quod est natum habere visum. Et sic, cum negatio, quae in ratione unius includitur, sit negatio in subiecto (alias non ens, unum dici posset): patet, quod unum differt a negatione simpliciter, et magis trahit se ad naturam privationis, ut infra decimo huius habetur.

Sciendum est autem quod quamvis unum importet privationem implicitam, non tamen est dicendum quod importet privationem multitudinis: quia cum privatio sit posterior naturaliter eo cuius est privatio, sequeretur quod unum esset posterius naturaliter multitudine. Item quod multitudo poneretur in definitione unius. Nam privatio definiri non potest nisi per suum oppositum, ut quid est caecitas? Privatio visus. Unde cum in definitione multitudinis ponatur unum (nam multitudo est aggregatio unitatum), sequitur quod sit circulus in definitionibus. Et ideo dicendum quod unum importat privationem divisionis, non quidem divisionis quae est secundum quantitatem, nam ista divisio determinatur ad unum particulare genus entis, et non posset cadere in definitione unius. Sed unum quod cum ente convertitur importat privationem divisionis formalis quae fit per opposita, cuius prima radix est oppositio affirmationis et negationis. Nam illa dividuntur adinvicem, quae ita se habent, quod hoc non est illud. Primo igitur intelligitur ipsum ens, et ex consequenti non ens, et per consequens divisio, et per consequens unum quod visionem privat, et per consequens multitudo, in cuius ratione cadit divisio, sicut in ratione unius indivisio; quamvis aliqua divisa modo praedicto rationem multitudinis

> habere non possint nisi prius cuilibet divisorum ratio unius attribuatur.[2]

The following reading helps us to understand better why Thomas seems to say that the one involves a negation or a privation although there is a distinction between a negation and a privation.

> …sicut dicitur in V Metaphysicorum, *privatio* tribus modis dicitur:
>
> Uno modo proprie, quando removetur ab aliquo quod natum est habere, et in quo tempore natum et habere; sicut carere visu est privatio visus in homine.
>
> Alio modo communiter, quando removetur ab aliquo quod ipsum quidem non est natum habere, sed genus eius; sicut si non habere visum dicitur esse privatio visus in talpa.
>
> Tertio modo communissime, quando removetur ab aliquo id quod a quocumque alio natum est haberi, non tamen ab ipso nec ab alio sui generis: sicut si non habere visum, dicatur esse privatio visus in planta.
>
> Et haec privatio medium est inter privationem veram et simplicem negationem, habens commmune aliquid cum utroque; cum privatione quidem vera, in hoc quod est negatio in aliquo subiecto, unde non competit simpliciter non enti; cum negatione vero simplici, in hoc quod non requirit aptitudinem in subiecto.
>
> Per hunc autem modum unum privative dicitur, et potest simili modo praedicari in divinis, sicut et alia quae simili modo praedicantur in divinis, ut invisibilis et immensus et huiusmodi.[3]

The one which is here distinguished from being should not be mixed up or confused with the one which is the beginning of number:

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[2] *In IV Metaphysicorum*, Lectio 3

[3] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia*, Q. 9, Art 7, Ad 11

> De uno autem non videtur esse verum, quod sit idem quod convertitur cum ente, et quod est principium numeri. Nihil enim quod est in determinato genere videtur consequi omnia entia. Unde unum quod determinatur ad speciale genus entis, scilicet ad genus quantitatis discretae, non videtur posse cum ente universali converti. Si enim unum est proprium et per se accidens entis, oportet quod ex principiis causetur entis in quantum ens, sicut quodlibet accidens proprium ex principiis sui subiecti. Ex principiis autem communibus entis inquantum est ens, non intelligitur causari aliquod particulariter ens sufficienter. Unde non potest esse quod ens aliquod determinati generis et speciei sit accidens omnis entis.
>
> Unum igitur quod est principium numeri, aliud est ab eo quod cum ente convertitur. Unum enim quod cum ente convertitur, ipsum ens designat, superaddens indivisionis rationem, quae, cum sit negatio vel privatio, non ponit aliquam naturam enti additam. Et sic in nullo differt ab ente secundum rem, sed solum ratione. Nam negatio vel privatio non est ens naturae, sed rationis, sicut dictum est. Unum vero quod est principium numeri addit supra substantiam, rationem mensurae, quae est propria passio quantitatis, et primo invenitur in unitate. Et dicitur per privationem vel negationem divisionis, quae est secundum quantitatem continuam. Nam numerus ex divisione continui causatur. Et ideo numerus ad scientiam mathematicam pertinet, cuius subiectum extra materiam esse non potest, quamvis sine materia sensibili consideretur. Hoc autem non esset, si unum quod est principium numeri, secundum esse a materia separaretur in rebus immaterialibus existens, quasi cum ente conversum.[4]

This does not mean that one is said of the beginning of number and the one that is convertible with being completely equivocally:

> Sciendum est autem quod esse mensuram est propria ratio unius secundum quod est principium numeri. Hoc autem non est idem cum uno quod convertitur cum ente, ut in quarto dictum est. Ratio enim illius unius in sola indivisione consistit: huiusmodi autem unius in mensuratione.
>
> Sed tamen haec ratio mensurae, licet primo conveniat uni quod est principium numeri, tamen per quamdam similitudinem derivatur ad unum in aliis generibus, ut in decimo huius philosophus ostendet. Et secundum hoc ratio mensurae invenitur in quolibet genere. Haec

[4] Thomas Aquinas, *In IV Metaphysicorum*, Lectio 2

> autem ratio mensurae consequitur rationem indivisionis, sicut habitum est.
>
> Et ideo unum non omnino aequivoce dicitur de eo quod convertitur cum ente, et de eo quod est principium numeri; sed secundum prius et posterius.[5]

But sometimes, Thomas takes one as including both being undivided in itself and also distinct from others:

> ...unumquodque enim, in quantum est unum, est in se indivisum, et ab aliis distinctum.[6]
>
> Sic enim aliquid est ens, sicut et unum; unum autem est quod est in se indivisum et ab aliis divisum: pars autem prout est in toto, non est divisa in actu, sed in potentia tantum: unde non est actu ens neque una, sed in potentia tantum.[7]

Albert the Great also takes one sometimes to include both undivided in itself and distinct from others:

> ...unum est indivisum in se et ab aliis divisum: indivisum autem in se negatio est, ad quam consequitur divisum esse ab aliis[8]

The closeness of these two to being is seen in their having the same cause:

> Quaecumque habentia sui esse causam distinguuntur, habent causam suae distinctionis: unumquodque enim secundum hoc fit ens secundum quod fit unum in se indivisum et ab aliis distinctum.[9]

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[5] Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio 8

[6] *Quaestio Disputata de Anima,* Art. 3, corpus

[7] *In VII Physicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 960

[8] Albert the Great, *Commentaria in libris Elenchorum Sophisticorum Aristotelis*, Liber I, Tractatus IV, Caput VII

And in particular, Thomas notes that there is the same cause of being for a something and its distinction from other things:

> idem autem est causa essendi alicui et distinctionis eius ab aliis[10]

When Thomas is distinguishing the one which is a subject of wisdom from the one which is the beginning of number, he just considers the one as undivided being (before distinguishing the division here from that of the one which fits the beginning of number). However, when we consider the division of the tenth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy,* we see that the consideration of one includes distinction from others, but in that order. Thomas divides the tenth book thus:

> Nunc in hoc decimo intendit determinare de uno…et dividitur in duas partes. In prima determinat de uno secundum se. In secunda per comparationem ad multa.[11]

Since the many are distinct from one another, the consideration of one includes not only undivided in itself, but also distinct from others. Moreover, the special consideration of contrariety shows that one is concerned about the distinction of one thing from another.

This is also clear from the fifth book of *Wisdom* where the four kinds of opposites are distinguished among the secondary parts of one. Since the four kinds of opposites are the basis of formal distinction, the consideration of one includes not only undivided in itself, but also distinct from others. And in the common reasons why wisdom considers the one[12], the importance again of contraries.

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[9] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Caput 40

[10] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Caput 41

[11] *In X Metaphysicorum*, Lectio I

[12] See the fourth book of *Wisdom* or the *Metaphysics*, and in Thomas' *In IV Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IV

INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO THE FIFTH BOOK OF WISDOM

The fifth book of *Wisdom* (the *Metaphysics*) illuminates the beginning and the end of reason's knowledge and, to some extent, the middle.

The words or names, whose meaning are considered in this book, are those used most of all in wisdom (which is the end of reason's knowledge) and are those also found in the axioms which are the statements known through themselves by all men (and therefore are the beginning of reason's knowledge). Since the words used in the axioms are also the words used most of all in wisdom, Aristotle is killing two birds with one stone. By distinguishing the central senses of these words, Aristotle is both helping us to understand the axioms distinctly and to answer sophistical objections against them from mixing up different senses of these words and also helping us to understand the subject of wisdom and its causes and properties that are named by these same words.

Although Thomas in his exposition of the books of *Wisdom* puts the fifth book as the beginning of the books about the subject of *Wisdom* (Books Five through Ten), it could also be seen as useful to conclude the consideration of the axioms (begun in the second part of Book Four).

The reason why the words used most of all in wisdom to discuss its subject (and its causes and properties) are also the words in which the axioms are stated, can be seen after we see why (in Book Four) the subject of wisdom is being and one and why the axioms are about being as being. (This is most clear in the first axioms which are about being as being: something cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same way; and something must be or not be.)

And because these words pertaining to being as being are most universal (as is the subject of wisdom), they are used to some extent everywhere in the middle of our knowledge. And thus, as we said in the beginning of this note, the distinction of these words illuminates not only the beginning and the end of all reason's knowledge, but also to some extent what is in the middle.

Aristotle discovered that these key words are all equivocal by reason. They all have many meanings and not by chance. There is a connection or order among their meanings. Hence, to understand these words fully, one must both distinguish their central senses and also find the order of those senses or meanings.

Aristotle was the first and almost the last philosopher to succeed in thus understanding these words. Although understanding the words one uses does not make one wise, nevertheless *not* understanding the words one uses would seem to exclude one from being wise.

For each word, we will give Thomas' exposition of Aristotle's text in his commentary on the Fifth Book of Wisdom. This will be followed sometimes by a note containing observations on that word and additional texts (mainly from Thomas) casting further light upon that word.

Thomas divides the words or names in Book Five into three parts or groups. Since every reasoned out knowledge has a subject whose properties and causes it considers, the first part of Book Five is about the names of causes, the second part about the names of the subject of wisdom or parts of the subject, and the third part is about the names of the properties of the subject. It is natural to consider the names of the subject before the names of the properties because the properties follow upon the subject. Perhaps he begins with the names of causes because already in Book One and in *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*), he has considered the four kinds of cause.

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NOTE FOR WORD *BEGINNING*

The Greeks had a proverb that the beginning is half of all. And Plato and Aristotle say that it seems to be more than half of all. Hence, if a word is important because it signifies something noteworthy, the word *beginning* is of immense importance.

Moreover, nothing is more necessary in philosophy than to begin well for everything else depends upon the beginning. Hence, *beginning* is a word most necessary for the philosopher to consider and understand.

And if wisdom or first philosophy is about what is first and what is first is a beginning, the wise man must especially consider and understand the word *beginning*. Since wisdom or first philosophy is about first things, one can approach what wisdom is about through the senses of *first* or *beginning.*

Further, the end or goal of wisdom and philosophy is to know the beginning of all things. Hence, to know what the word *beginning* means is a *sine qua non* of the philosophical life.

In addition, we see that the word *beginning* and the words *before* and *after* are intimately connected. For the common thought of *beginning* given by Aristotle at the end of this reading is what is *first* in being or becoming or knowing. And *first* is defined by before and after for the first is not after anything but before all the rest. And in the reading on before and after, Aristotle will distinguish the senses of *before* starting from the common thought of beginning in this reading. For every beginning is the source of some order which is a before and after. (But his ordered distinction of the senses of *before* in the *Categories* could also be used to distinguish senses of *first* or *beginning*.) Since the definition of reason is completed by its looking before and after, we can see how important also is an understanding of the word *beginning* for the whole life of reason. Since every beginning is the source of some order (a before and after), and reason always looks for order, reason also always looks for beginnings.

Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics* states that Plato *well* asked whether we are on the road from the beginning(s) or on the road to the beginning(s). And this

excellent question can be multiplied as we come to understand the different meanings of *beginning.* If we take *beginning* in its sixth sense where every cause is said to be a beginning, the question could mean are we reasoning from causes to their effects or are we reasoning from effects toward their causes. But if we take *beginning* in its fifth sense, the question could be are we proceeding dialectically towards the beginnings of some reasoned out knowledge or are we now proceeding demonstratively from the beginnings of some reasoned out knowledge.

And it is in particular useful for understanding and defending the axioms of beginning: *nothing is a beginning of itself*, but *it is always the origin of something other than itself*. There is always a distinction between a beginning and that of which it is a beginning. But this distinction is not the same for a beginning that is in that of which it is a beginning and a beginning that is outside that of which it is a beginning. When we say that the foundation of a house is the beginning of a house and the carpenter is the beginning of a table, the distinction is not the same. For the foundation is a part of the house, but the carpenter is not a part of the table. The foundation of a house is a beginning of the house of which it is part while the carpenter is altogether outside and in no way a part of the house.

And in the study of the Trinity in theology, it is necessary to see that *beginning* is more universal than *cause*.

It is necessary to distinguish and order the senses of *beginning*. The word or name *beginning* is equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios. The word *before* which is intimately connected with the word *beginning* is also equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios.

Words equivocal by reason of a likeness of ratios have as their first meaning that ratio which is most manifest to the senses or closest to the senses. For we name things as we know them and the first road in our knowledge is from the senses into reason. The other meanings are ordered by their closeness or distance in likeness to this first meaning. Hence, it is not by chance that the meanings of a word are also called its *senses*. All the meanings do not come under the senses, but they are understood by carrying over the word by likeness to ratios that are sensible.

The carrying over of the word is found more in Greek and Latin than in English due to our custom of borrowing Greek and Latin words for the later meanings. Thus we are accustomed to speak of the principles of a science rather than of its beginnings. This gets in the way of the mind being carried over in English. Custom is a tyrant sometimes, as Shakespeare said.

The first three words In Book Five come in the order of more universal to less universal as Thomas notes in his Lectio on *beginning* and elsewhere:

> ...principium enim in plus est quam causa, et causa in plus est quam elementum, sicut dicit Commentator, V *Metaph*. Unde omnis causa est principium, sed non convertitur.[1]

For the same reason cause is considered before element and these three (beginning, cause, element) before nature.

In the following text, Thomas distinguishes two relations between a beginning and what is from a beginning:

> Oportet autem intelligi aliquam relationem inter principium et ea quae a principio sunt,
>
> non solum quidem relationem *originis*, secundum quod principiata oriuntur a principio,
>
> sed etiam relationem *diversitatis;* quia oportet effectum a causa distingui, cum nihil sit causa sui ipsius[2]

The following text of Thomas is interesting on the first of these relations (of origin):

> ...primo coniicere potuimus originem alicuius ab alio, ex motu:

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[1] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXIX, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad 2
[2] *De Potentia*, Q. 7, Art. 8, corpus

> quod enim aliqua res a sua dispositione removeretur per motum, manifestum fuit hoc ab aliqua causa accidere.
>
> Et ideo *actio*, secundum primam nominis impositionem, importat originem motus: sicut enim motus, prout est in mobili ab aliquo, dicitur *passio;* ita origo ipsius motus, secundum quod incipit ab alio et terminatur in id quod movetur, vocatur *actio*.
>
> Remoto igitur motu, actio nihil aliud importat quam ordinem originis, secundum quod a aliqua causa vel principio procedit in id quod est a principio.[3]

The second relation is used by Aristotle in the first book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*) when he points out that those who deny there is a multitude of things also deny there is a beginning. Thomas comments thereon:

> Ad positionem igitur principii sequitur multitudo, quia aliud est principium et aliud id cuius est principium; qui igitur negat multitudinem, tollit principia...[4]

Aristotle puts *first* in the common notion of beginning (what is first in being or becoming or knowing). Since *first* is defined by *before*, there is a problem of how the word *beginning* can be used in the Trinity where there is no before and after. This is the occasion for Thomas to point out some subtle distinctions about *beginning.*

In this text, Thomas points out a fundamental distinction in the consideration of a beginning and how this can be applied to the Trinity:

> ...principium potest dupliciter considerari:
>
> vel id quod est principium, et hoc est prius naturaliter eo cujus est principium;

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[3] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 1, Ad 2
[4] *In I Physicorum*, Lectio II, n. 15

> Vel secundum relationem principii, et sic est simul naturaliter cum principiato.
>
> Si igitur esse aliquis ab eodem habens quod sit aliquis et quod sit ad aliquid; omnino simul esset naturaliter cum eo ad quod diceretur. Et quia in divinis Pater ab eodem habet quod sit aliquis et quod sit Pater; est simul natura cum Filio, non solum inquantum est Pater, sed simpliciter.[5]

Here is another text of Thomas where he uses the above distinction to show that one person of the Trinity is not before another:

> ...principium, secundum relationem principii, non est eo prius cujus est principium aliquo modo; sed id quod est principium, naturaliter est prius.
>
> Si autem ille qui est principium, ipsa relatione sit quis, vel persona distincta, omnis prioritas removetur ab eo respectu illius cujus est principium; et ita, cum Filius, ut supra dictum est, ipsa sua relatione sit persona distincta, nullo modo est prior Spiritu sancto....[6]

In the following text, Thomas explains why the Father can be called a beginning of the Son or Holy Spirit, but not a cause:

> ...Pater, quamvis dicatur principium Filii et Spiritus sancti, tamen non potest dici causa, proprie loquendo: causa enim semper ponit diversitatem naturae, sicut patet in omnibus. Sed principium aliquod a quo aliquid fluit est consubstantiale rei cujus est principium; sicut dicimus, quod punctum est principium lineae, et cor principium animalis, et fundamentum domus; et ideo propter consubstantialitatem Patris dicitur principium, sed non causa.
>
> Praeterea, causatum habet dependentiam ad causam. Sed principium importat originem quamdam, secundum quod dicitur principium, ex quo incipit aliquid.

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[5] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. IX., Quaest. II, Art. 1, Ad 3
[6] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XII., Quaest. I, Art. 1, Ad 1

> Item quamvis dicatur principium, non tamen potest dici primum; quia ibi non est aliquid prius et posterius...[7]

But for the philosopher, who knows nothing about the Trinity and speaks of beginning as it is found in creatures, the beginning is always before that of which it is a beginning. Thomas touches upon this in the following text:

> ...quia nomen principii impositum est secundum quod invenitur in creaturis, ubi principium est prius aliquo modo principiato, ideo a prioritate imponitur; sed tamen imponitur ad significandum illud a quo est aliquid. Unde quamvis quantum ad modum significandi divinis non competat, sicut et alia nomina quae a nobis imposita sunt, tamen quantum ad rem significandam propriiissime ratio principii ibi competit.[8]

The word beginning has a special connection with the word *one* later in Book Five of which it is a property and *before*, a word found among the parts of one.

> ...illud cujus ratio consistit in remotione, optime per negationem certificatur, sicut caecitas et hujusmodi:
>
> et hujusmodi est ratio primi, vel ejus quod non est de principio, quia primum est ante quod nihil.[9]

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[7] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XII., Quaest. I, Art. 2, Ad 1
[8] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXIX, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad 1
[9] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum,* Dist. XXVIII., Quaest. I, Art. 1, Ad 1

NOTE FOR WORD *CAUSE*

The importance of the word *cause* for the philosopher should be obvious for his end is to know the causes of things and, at last, their first cause.

The distinction of matter, form, mover and end is both a distinction of the kinds of cause found in things and a distinction of the senses or meanings of the word *cause.*

In the first part of Book One *after* the proemium, Aristotle enumerates the opinions of his predecessors about causes and the reasons for those opinions. And he states two reasons for this enumeration. One is to prepare for the consideration of the sufficiency of what they have said in the second part of book One *after* the proemium. And the other reason is to see if they have touched upon any kind of cause in addition to the four kinds distinguished in natural philosophy. They have not and have not even understood these four kinds well. Hence, we get a confirmation that there are indeed only four kinds of cause.

But *cause* is not said with the same exact meaning of these four. What is a cause in general? We could say with Thomas:

> causae autem dicuntur ex quibus aliqua dependent secundum suum esse vel fieri...Principium vero importat quendam ordinem alicuius processus[1]

Or we could look at the Greek word for cause (aitia) which has the sense of *responsible.* A cause is what is responsible for the being or becoming of another. But each cause is responsible in a different way. The carpenter and wood are responsible for the becoming of a wooden chair in quite different ways. Further, one kind of cause is a cause of the causality of another for the maker by transforming the wood makes the wood to be the wood of a table and for a new form to be in that wood. But the carpenter acts in making a chair for the sake of sitting. And thus cause is said neither in the same way nor equally of the four kinds unlike a genus which is said equally and in the same way of its species.

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[1] In I Physicorum, Lectio I, n. 5

It is interesting to note then that the distinction of the kinds of causes found in things corresponds exactly to the distinction of the basic senses of the word *cause*. But when a genus is divided into species, the different kinds of it are not different meanings of the word naming the genus. When Euclid divides quadrilateral into square and oblong and rhombus and rhomboid and trapezium, he is dividing quadrilateral into the different kinds of quadrilateral. But these different kinds of quadrilateral are not different senses of the word quadrilateral. For each of the five is a quadrilateral in exactly the same sense – a rectilineal plane figure contained by four straight lines. But the distinction of the kinds of cause is also a distinction of the senses or meanings of cause.

The word *cause* is equivocal by reason of other ratios to the same. For wood, shape, carpenter and sitting are to wooden chair all in different ways.

Perhaps the fundamental reason for considering the four causes in this order is that it is the best one to force reason by truth itself to admit that there are indeed four kinds of cause. This can be best seen in some homely examples. But before taking one of these homely examples, we should also consider that in harmony with forcing reason to admit that there are four kinds of cause, this order also seems to be from what is more known to us to what is the less known to us in causality. We begin with matter and the first philosophers seemed to look only for this kind of cause. And Hesiod before the philosophers had spoken of mother earth. *Materia* in Latin comes from *mater*. And the native English word for cause which is *ground* would also seem to be connected with mother earth. That matter is also most known is clear from the questions and dialectic of Book Three of the Metaphysics, especially the first two questions there about the separated (in the third Lectio): Is there any cause besides matter? And if so, is this other cause separated from matter or only in matter? The dialectic assumes that matter is a cause and disputes about whether there is any cause besides matter. And Thomas explains why Aristotle pauses alone on the fourth cause, the end, to manifest that it is also a cause: this kind of cause is least known.

Let us take here just one homely example to illustrate how this order is the best to force reason by truth itself to admit that there are four kinds

of cause. Consider the written word *cat*. The most obvious dependence here is upon the letters c, a, and t. If I erased these three letters, nothing would remain. This dependence is upon the first kind of cause, matter. But since the word *act* has the same letters, but is not the same word, one is forced to see the dependence of the word *cat* upon the order of its letters. This is a dependence upon the second kind of cause, form. But if the same letters can be in different orders, what is the cause of these diverse orders? It cannot be the letters since they are the same. Hence, we are brought to recognize the need for a mover or maker. But is the ability of the writer limited to one order? Of course not. Hence, there is the need of an end to explain why he put them in this order. What did he intend to signify?

In trying to understand a division or distinction into more than two or three parts and the completeness of that division or distinction, it is usually necessary to follow the rule of two or three. Thomas divides the four causes into two (one and three) in this text to show the necessity of the four:

> Necesse est autem quatuor esse causas.
>
> Quia cum causa sit ad quam sequitur esse alterius, esse eius quod habet causam, potest considerari dupliciter:
>
> uno modo absolute, et sic causa essendi est forma per quam aliquid est in actu;
>
> alio modo secundum quod de potentia ente fit actu ens.
>
> Et quia omne quod est in potentia, reducitur ad actum per id quod est actu ens; ex hoc necesse est esse duas alias causas, scilicet materiam, et agentem, qui reducit materiam de potentia in actum.
>
> Actio autem agentis ad aliquid determinatum tendit, sicut ab aliquo determinato principio procedit: nam omne agens agit quod est sibi conveniens; id autem ad quod tendit actio agentis, dicitur causa finalis.

> Sic igitur necesse est esse causas quatuor.
>
> Sed quia forma est causa essendi absolute, aliae vero tres sunt causae essendi secundum quod aliquid accipit esse; inde est quod in immobilibus non considerantur aliae tres causae, sed solum causa formalis.[2]

But one could also divide the causes into two and two. One way of doing this is to divide the inside causes, matter and form, against the outside causes, mover and end. Then it is not too difficult to see that matter and form exhaust the kinds of inside causes for either one part is as ability and the other as act (as man is body and soul) where the ability is matter and the act is form or all the parts are to the whole as ability to act where parts are like matter and the whole as form. Likewise, it is not difficult to see that mover or maker and end exhaust the outside causes which are either bringing the effect to be or that for the sake of which it comes to be.

Thomas, in explaining the four kinds of cause, often gives a subdivision of the third kind from Avicenna. But in the following text, he gives another somewhat different way of dividing the efficient cause into four kinds:

> ...causa efficiens dupliciter potest dividi.
>
> Uno modo ex parte effectus; scilicet in disponentem quae causat dispositionem ad formam ultimam, et perficientem quae inducit ultimam perfectionem.
>
> Alio modo ex parte ipsius causae in agens principale, et instrumentale. Agens enim principale est primum movens, agens autem instrumentale est movens motum.
>
> Instrumento autem competit duplex actio: una quam habet ex propria natura, alia quam habet prout motum ab primo agente: sicut calor ignis qui est instrumentum virtutis

[2] In II Physicorum, Lectio X, n. 240

> nutritivae, ut dicitur in II de Anima (4165b 25) ex natura propria habet dissolvere et consumere et hujusmodi effectus; sed inquantum est instrumentum animae vegetabilis, generat carnem.
>
> Sed sciendum quod actio instrumenti quandoque pertingit ad ultimam perfectionem quam principale agens inducit, aliquando autem non; semper tamen pertingit ad aliquid ultra id quod competit sibi secundum suam naturam, sive illud sit ultima forma, sive dispositio; alias non ageret ut instrumentum. Sic qualitates activae et passivae elementorum pertingunt instrumentaliter ad formas materiales educendas de materia, non autem ad productionem animae humanae quae est ab extrinseco...omne instrumentum agendo actionem naturalem quae competiit sibi inquantum est res quaedam pertingit ad effectum qui competit sibi inquantum instrumentum: sicut dolabrum dividendo suo acumine pertingit instrumentaliter ad formam scamni...
>
> Ad secundum dicendum quod reducuntur ad genus causae efficientis, non principalis, sed instrumentalis. Deus autem solus est causa gratiae quasi principale agens, sed sacramenta quasi instrumentaliter et dispositive, ut dictum est, agentia sunt.[3]

In the following text, Thomas gives four ways of cooperating with the agent:

> ...cooperari alicui agenti dicitur quatuor modis.
>
> Uno modo sicut adjuvans ei cui auxilium praebet, cooperatur.
>
> Alio modo sicut consilium praebens.
>
> Tertio modo sicut quo mediante agens primum suum

[3] Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula I, Responsio & Ad 2

> effectum inducit, sicut cooperantur instrumenta principali agenti.
>
> Quarto modo sicut disponens materiam ad effectum agentis principalis suscipiendum.
>
> Primis ergo duobus modis in nulla actione aliquid Deo cooperatur propter perfectam ejus potentiam quae auxilio non indiget, et propter perfectam sapientiam quae non indiget consilio...
>
> Sed tertio modo cooperatur aliqua creatura Deo in aliqua actione, non tamen in omnibus. Cum Deus sit primum agens omnium naturalium actionum, quidquid natura agit, hoc efficit quasi instrumentale agens cooperans primo agenti, quod est Deus.
>
> Sed quaedam sunt quae sibi Deus retinuit, immediate ea operans. Et in his creatura Deo non cooperatur hoc tertio modo, sed quarto modo potest ei cooperari: sicut patet in creatione animae rationalis quam immediate Deus producit, sed tamen natura disponit materiam ad animae rationalis receptionem.[4]

It should be noted that this distinction of four takes two from the distinction given by Thomas from Avicenna and two from the previous distinction.

In the following text, Thomas elaborates a bit on the distinction between the principal or chief cause and the instrumental cause or tool:

> Causa autem est duplex, scilicet instrumentalis et principalis.
>
> In principali quidem causa est aliquid secundum similitudinem formae, vel eiusdem speciei, si sit causa univoca; puta, cum

[4] Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio V, Quaest I, Art. II, Responsio

> homo generat hominem, vel ignis ignem; vel secundum aliquam excellentiorem formam, si sit agens non univocum; sicut sol generat hominem.
>
> In causa autem instrumentali est aliquis effectus secundum virtutem quam recipit instrumentum a causa principali, in quantum movetur ab ea:
>
> aliter enim est forma domus in lapidibus et lignis, tamquam in proprio subiecto; et aliter in anima artificis, tamquam in causa principali; et aliter in serra et securi tamquam in causa instrumentali.[5]

The famous statement that an agent acts insofar as it is in act involves a distinction when applied to the chief cause and the instrument:

> ...aliquod agens est in actu multipliciter.
>
> Uno modo secundum propriam formam quae vel continet formam effectus secundum similitudinem speciei, sicut ignis generat ignem; vel secundum virtutem tantum, sicut sol generat ignem.
>
> Alio modo, secundum motum ab alio; et hoc modo instrumentum agit ut ens actu: et sic etiam semen est actu, in quantum est in eo motus et intentio animae generantis, secundum Philosophum in lib. de gener. Animalium [II, cap. vii]; et ex hoc habet virtutem causandi et humanam naturam et originale peccatum.[6]

Hence, the power of acting is also different in the principal or chief cause and the instrument or tool:

> ...virtus agendi proportionatur agenti. Unde alio modo oportet ponere virtutem agendi in agente principali; alio modo in agente instrumentali.

---

[5] Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, Q. 4, Art. 1, Ad 16

[6] Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo, Q. 4, Art. 3, corpus

> Agens enim principale agit secundum exigentiam suae formae. Et ideo virtus activa in ipso est aliqua forma vel qualitas habens completum esse in natura.
>
> Instrumentum autem agit ut motum ab alio. Et ideo competit sibi virtus proportionata motui; motus autem non est ens completum sed est via in ens quasi medium quid inter potentiam puram et actum purum, ut dicitur in III Physicorum.
>
> Et ideo virtus instrumenti inquantum hujusmodi, secundum quod agit ad effectum ultra id quod competit sibi secundum suam naturam, non est ens completum habens esse fixum in naturam, sed quoddam ens incompletum: sicut est virtus immutandi visum in aere, inquantum est instrumentum motum ab exteriori visibili.
>
> Et hujusmodi entia consueverunt *intentiones* nominari et habent aliquid simile cum ente quod est in anima quod est ens diminutum, ut dicitur in VI Meta...
>
> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ens incompletum quod est in anima, dividitur contra ens distinctum per decem genera, ut patet in VI Metaphysicorum (1026a 35). Et ideo talia entia incompleta, per se loquendo, non sunt in aliquo genere nisi per reductionem: sicut motus quantum ad suam substantiam reducitur ad illud genus in quo sunt termini motus, sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, quamvis ponatur in praedicamento passionis secundum quod importat ordinationem moventis ad motum, ut dicit Commentator in III Physicorum.[7]

Likewise, this involves a distinction in regard to the statement that the agent makes what is like itself:

> ...agens per se et agens instrumentale in hoc differunt quod agens instrumentale non inducit in effectu similitudinem suam, sed similitudinem principalis agentis. Principale autem

[7] Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula II, Responsio & Ad 1

> agens inducit similitudinem suam.
>
> Et ideo ex hoc aliquid constituitur principale agens quod habet aliquam formam quam in alterum transfundere potest. Non autem ex hoc constituitur agens instrumentale, sed ex hoc quod est applicatum a principali agente ad effectum aliquem inducendum.
>
> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod sicut inter instrumentum et effectum non exigitur similitudo secundum convenientiam in forma, sed secundum proportionem instrumenti ad effectum; ita etiam nec inter instrumentum et principale agens....[8]

The distinction of a univocal cause and a non-univocal or equivocal cause is primarily a distinction of the chief or principal cause:

> Ad quartum dicendum quod causa univoca vel non univoca, proprie loquendo et simpliciter sunt divisiones illius causae cujus est similitudinem habere cum effectu; hoc autem est principalis agentis et non instrumentalis, ut dicit Alexander, secundum quod narrat Commentator in XI [II] Meta.
>
> Et ideo proprie loquendo, neque instrumentum est causa univoca, neque aequivoca. Posset tamen reduci ad utrumlibet, secundum quod principale agens, in cujus virtute instrumentum agit, est causa univoca vel non univoca.[9]

The instrumental cause is sometimes divided into the animate and inanimate:

> ...duplex est instrumentum, scilicet animatum, ut servus, et inanimatum ut securis, ut dicitur in VIII Eth. (1161b 4; lectio II, n. 1699)

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[8] Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio XIX, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad primam quaestionem & Ad 1

[9] Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula I, Ad 4

In instrumento igitur inanimato non requiritur intentio propria, quia ipsa inclinatio instrumenti ad effectum per motum principalis
agentis, locum intentionis supplet.

Sed in instrumento animato quod non tantum agitur, sed aliquo modo agit, utpote per imperium agens et non per impulsum motus, requiritur intentio exequendi ministerium ad quod applicatum est.[10]

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[10] Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio VI, Quaest I, Art. II, Quaestiuncula I, Ad 1

NOTE FOR WORD NATURE

The word *nature* is extremely important for philosophy. Every part of philosophy requires an understanding of this word.

Heraclitus, the central thinker in human history, said that *wisdom is to speak the truth and to act in accord with nature giving ear thereto*. What is meant by nature in this royal fragment? But *nature loves to hide.* Why?

Natural philosophy is about things that are by nature. What is meant by nature here?

Is there a natural law? In what sense of *nature* is some law natural?

What is the distinction between reason as a nature and reason as reason? What is the distinction between will as a nature and will as will?

Definition is speech signifying or making known the nature of a thing. What is meant by *nature* here?

Why is the nature of a thing what is first in it?

How do *nature* and *substance* have some meanings in common?

The word *nature* does not seem to be carried over in one way. It is carried over to the second meaning by its ratio to the first. It is carried over from the second to the third by dropping its particular meaning so to be more general. It is said of the fourth and fifth by other ratios to the same. And it is carried over to the last meanings by a likeness of ratios to earlier meanings.

In the following text from the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Thomas recounts most of the senses of nature:

> Amplius. Nomen *naturae* primo impositum est ad significandum ipsam generationem nascentium.

> Et exinde translatum est ad significandum principium generationis huiusmodi.
>
> Et inde ad significandum principium motus intrinsecum mobili.
>
> Et quia huiusmodi principium est materia vel forma, ulterius natura dicitur forma vel materia rei naturalis habentis in se principium motus.
>
> Et quia forma et materia constituunt essentiam rei naturalis, extensum est nomen *naturae* ad significandum essentiam cuiuscumque rei in natura existentis: ut sic natura alicuius rei dicatur *essentia, quam significat definitio*. [II Physics., I, 10; 193a] [1]

How do the senses Thomas reports from Boethius in this text fit into those in the fifth book of *Wisdom?:*

> ...nomen naturae multipliciter dicitur, ut Boetius, I lib. *De duabus naturis et una persona Christi*, cap. 1, col. 1341, t. II, dicit.
>
> Primo enim modo dicitur natura, secundum quod communiter ad omnia entia se habet, prout natura definitur omne id quod intellectu quoquo modo capi potest.
>
> Secundo modo prout tantum substantiis convenit: et sic natura dicitur esse quod agere vel pati potest.
>
> Tertio modo dicitur natura quod est principium motus vel quietis in eis in quibus per se est, et non secundum accidens.
>
> Quarto modo unumquodque informans specifica differentia dicitur natura.
>
> Secundo igitur et tertio modo peccata natura dici non possunt: quia in genere substantiae non sunt...Sed primo modo et quarto quodammodo potest dici natura peccatum, et quodammodo non.[2]

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[1] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Capitulum XXXV

[2] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXVII, Quaest I, Art. I, Solutio

Since the wise man and philosopher most of all seek order, they take a great interest in nature. Aristotle says in the eighth book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*):

> But none of the things by nature and according to nature is disordered. For nature is a cause of order in all.[3]

Thomas unfolds this in commenting on Aristotle's text:

> Manifestum est enim quod cum ponitur aliquid esse quasi principium, oportet accipere quod hoc sit secundum rei naturam; hoc est, ut natura rei sit talis quod hoc ei conveniat. Sic enim accipimus quasi principium, quod omne totum maius est sua parte, quia hoc est de ratione et natura totius, quod excedat partis quantitatem....
>
> Sed manifestum est quod nulla res naturalis, nec aliquid eorum quae naturaliter rebus conveniunt, potest esse absque ordine; quia natura est causa ordinationis. Videmus enim natura in suis operibus ordinate de uno in aliud procedere: quod ergo non habet aliquem ordinem, non est secundum naturam, nec potest accipi ut principium.[4]

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[3] 252a 11-12

[4] *In VIII Physicorum*, Lectio III, n. 993

NOTE ON WORD *NECESSARY*

Thomas gives as a reason for considering the word *necessary* with the names of causes that a "Causa enim est ad quam de necessitate sequitur aliud." In the following text, he says that *proprie* a cause is that to which something follows necessarily:

> ...diabolus, quamvis ordine naturae sit supra animam humanam, non tamen ex necessitate potest voluntatem eius movere; et sic non est proprie causa peccati. Nam proprie causa dicitur ad quam ex necessitate sequitur aliquid.[1]

But in the following text, after pointing out that all causes do not produce their effects with necessity, he teaches us that the statement that a cause is that to which something follows necessarily should be understood of a cause that is complete and unimpeded:

> ...ex causa sequitur effectus secundum conditionem causae et effectus: quia in quibusdam necessario, et in quibusdam non, sed ut in pluribus, sicut est in rebus naturalibus, quia causa naturalis impediri potest. Similiter etiam in moralibus multo minus oportet quod ex causa de necessitate effectus sequatur: quia in his nihil est causa completa, nisi adjuncto voluntatis actu, et subtracto omni impedimento;
>
> et quod dicitur quod ad causam de necessitate sequitur effectus, intelligitur de causa completa non impedita.[2]

Thomas followed the rule of two or three when dividing the fourth sense of *necessary* against the first three, saying that it was necessary *absolute* and the first three *secundum quid*. In the following text, he begins from this

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[1] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, Q. 3, Art. 3, Ad 3

[2] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXVI, Quaest I, Art. I, Ad 2

distinction, but calling them necessary *absolute* and necessary *ex conditione:*

> ...secundum Philosophum, V Metaph., text. 6, necessarium dicitur multipliciter. Est enim necessarium absolute, et necessarium ex conditione;
>
> et hoc est duplex: scilicet ex conditione finis vel ex conditione agentis.
>
> Necessarium ex conditione agentis, est necessarium per violentiam: non enim qui violenter currit, necesse est currere, nisi sub hac conditione, si aliquis eum cogit.
>
> Necessarium ex conditione finis est illud sine quo non potest consequi aliquis finis, vel non ita faciliter. Finis autem est duplex: vel ad esse, et hoc modo cibus vel nutrimentum dicuntur esse necessaria, quia sine eis non potest esse homo; vel pertinens ad bene esse, et sic dicitur esse navis necessarium eunti ultra mare; quia sine ea exercere non potest actionem suam.
>
> Necessarium autem absolute dicitur quod est necessarium per id quod in essentia sua est; sive illud sit ipsa essentia, sicut in simplicibus; sive sicut in compositis, illud principium sit materia, sicut dicimus hominem mori est necessarium; sive forma, sicut dicimus, hominem esse rationalem est necessarium.
>
> Hoc autem absolute necessarium est duplex. Quoddam enim est quod habet necessitatem et esse ab alio, sicut in omnibus quae causam habent: quoddam est cujus necessitas non dependet ab alio, sed ipsum est causa necessitatis in omnibus necessariis, sicut Deus.[3]

In the following text, he also follows the rule of two or three when dividing and sub-dividing the same senses in a slightly different way, starting with the distinction of whether it comes from an intrinsic beginning and cause or an extrinsic one:

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[3] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum,* Distinctio VI, Quaest I, Art. I, Solutio

...necessitas dicitur multipliciter.

Necesse est enim quod non potest non esse. Quod quidem convenit alicui,

uno modo ex principio intrinseco:

sive materiali, sicut cum dicimus quod omne compositum ex contrariis necesse est corrumpi;

sive formali, sicut cum dicimus quod necesse est triangulum habere tres angulos aequales duobus rectis.

Et haec est *necessitas naturalis et absoluta*.

Alio modo convenit alicui quod non possit non esse, ex aliquo extrinseco, vel fine vel agente.

Fine quidem, sicut cum aliquis non potest sine hoc consequi, aut bene consequi finem aliquem: ut cibus dicitur necessarius ad vitam, et equus ad iter. Et haec vocatur *necessitas finis;* quae interdum etiam utilitas dicitur.

Ex agente autem hoc alicui convenit, sicut cum aliquis cogitur ab aliquo agente, ita quod non possit contrarium agere. Et haec vocatur *necessitas coactionis*.[4]

In the following text, Thomas calls the necessary *secundum quid* or *ex conditione* necessary *per aliud:*

...necessarium dicitur aliquid per se et per aliud

per aliud quidem dupliciter

uno modo, sicut per causam agentem et cogentem: et sic necessarium dicitur quod est violentum

[4] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 82, Art. 1, corpus

> Alio modo, sicut per causam finalem: sicut dicitur aliquid esse necessarium in his quae sunt ad finem, inquantum sine hoc non potest esse finis, vel bene esse
>
> Et neutro istorum modorum divina generatio est necessaria: quia Deus non est propter finem, neque coactio cadit in ipsum.
>
> Per se autem dicitur aliquid necessarium, quod non potest non esse.
>
> Et sic Deum esse est necessarium.
>
> Et hoc modo Patrem generare Filium est necessarium.[5]

In the following text, Thomas makes an interesting application of the senses of *necessary* in considering the voluntariness and merit of our acts:

> Videntur autem huiusmodi homines necessitatis rationem ignorare. Est enim duplex necessitas.
>
> Quaedam coactionis. Et haec laudem virtuosorum actuum diminuit, quia voluntario contrariatur: coactum enim est quod est voluntati contrarium.
>
> Est autem quaedam necessitas ex interiori inclinatione proveniens. Et haec laudem virtuosi actus non minuit, sed auget: facit enim voluntatem magis intense tendere in actum virtutis. Patet enim quod habitus virtutis, quanto fuerit perfectior, tanto vehementius voluntatem facit tendere in bonum virtutis, et minus ab eo deficere. Quod si ad finem perfectionis devenerit, quandam necessitatem infert ad bene agendum, sicut est in beatis, qui peccare non possunt, ut infra patebit: nec tamen propter hoc aut libertati voluntatis aliquid deperit, aut actus bonitati.

---

[5] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 41, Art. 2, Ad 5

Est autem et alia necessitas ex fine: sicut cum dicitur alicui necesse esse habere navem ut transeat mare. Patet autem quod nec haec necessitas libertatem voluntatis diminuit, nec actuum bonitatem. Quin potius quod quis agit quasi necessarium ad finem, ex hoc ipso laudabile est: et tanto laudabilius, quanto finis fuerit melior.[6]

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[6] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber III, Capitulum CXXXVIII

NOTE FOR WORD *ONE*

The words signifying the universal subject of wisdom (being and one) or its chief subject (substance) are put before the words signifying the parts of the subject. But Aristotle considers the word *one* before the word *being* although when he determined the subject of wisdom in the beginning of Book Four, he showed that it is about being before it is about one. And when he considers the subject of wisdom in book 6-10, the books on being (Bks. 6-9) come before the book on one and many (Bk. 10). Why then does he consider the word *one* before the word *being?*

He needs to consider *substance* after and next to *being* since substance is part of the distinction or division of being according to the figures of predication. If he considered *one* after substance, he would descend to something less universal. And, more important, the distinction of the senses of *one* is much more like the distinction of the senses of *being* than of substance. Hence, they should be considered next to each other. But it would make no sense to insert the reading on one between that of being and substance. Moreover, he began from the word *beginning* in Book Five and it is a property of one to be a beginning.

It is necessary to understand the word *one* because the subject of wisdom is being and one and both words are equivocal by reason. Further, among words equivocal by reason, these two words have perhaps the most senses and therefore are especially in need of being considered at length.

Since it is a property of the one to be a beginning, the necessity of understanding one shares in the necessity of understanding beginning. And since the one is a beginning of the many, one cannot understand the many without knowing the one

And since something must be one before it can be understood, all understanding is connected with the meaning of one.

The distinction between the one which is the beginning of number and the one which is convertible with being is very important and very difficult to see.

And it is necessary to understand the senses of one to reason against the position and arguments of Parmenides and Melissus that being is one and in no way many.

And the distinction of the senses of one is before understanding in what sense God is one.

Thomas and Aristotle often give just three senses of one per se:

> Dicitur enim unum tripliciter: vel sicut continuum est unum, ut linea et corpus; vel sicut indivisibile est unum, ut punctum; vel sicut unum dicuntur illa quorum ratio est una, seu definitio, sicut vappa et vinum dicuntur unum.[1]

But note the difference in this text:

> ...per se unum simpliciter et quod est numero unum, tribus modis dicitur.
>
> Uno modo sicut indivisibile est unum, ut punctum et unitas, quod neque est multa actu neque potentia.
>
> Alio modo quod est unum continuitate, quod tamen est multa potentia, sicut linea.
>
> Tertio modo quod est unum perfectione: sicut dicitur calceamentum unum, quia habet omnes partes quae requiruntur ad calceamentum. Et haec unitas dicitur in omnibus illis ad quorum integritatem aliqua exiguntur, sicut unus homo, una domus.[2]

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[1] Thomas Aquinas, *In I Physicorum,* Lectio III, n. 122

[2] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio VIII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad secundam quaestionem

Thomas notes how even Avicenna was deceived by the equivocation of one: *In X Metaphysicorum,* Lectio III, n. 1981

> Avicennna...Deceptus enim fuit ex aequivocatione unius. Quod quidem secundum quod est principium numeri habens rationem mensurae in genere quantitatis, significat quamdam naturam additam his de quibus dicitur, cum sit in genere accidentis. Sed unum quod convertitur cum ente circuit omnia entia. Unde non significat aliquam naturam determinatam ad aliquod genus.[3]

One of many texts where Thomas distinguishes between the one that is the beginning of number and the one which is convertible with being and with it the subject of wisdom:

> duplex est unum;
>
> quoddam scilicet quod convertitur cum ente, quod nihil addit supra ens nisi indivisionem;
>
> et hoc unum privat multitudinem, in quantum multitudo ex divisione causatur; non quidem multitudinem extrinsecam quam unum constituit sicut pars; sed multitudinem intrinsecam quae unitati opponitur. Non enim ex hoc quod aliquid dicitur esse unum, negatur quin aliquid sit extra ipsum quod cum eo constituat multitudinem; sed negatur divisio ipsius in multa.
>
> Aliud vero unum est quod est principium numeri, quod supra rationem entis addit mensurationem;
>
> et huius unius multitudo est privatio, quia numerus fit per divisionem continui.
>
> Nec tamen multitudo privat unitatem totaliter, cum diviso toto adhuc remaneat pars indivisa; sed removet unitatem totius.[4]

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[3] *In X Metaphysicorum,* Lectio III, n. 1981

[4] *De Potentia,* Q. 3, Art. 16, Ad 3

And this distinction is important for understanding in what sense God is said to be one:

> ...unum dicitur dupliciter. Est enim unum quod convertitur cum ente, et est unum quod est principium numeri.
>
> Loquendo de uno quod convertitur cum ente, non est determinatum ad genus quantitatis, immo invenitur in omnibus entibus: et sicut Deus est ens non aliquo esse quod non sit ipse, ita etiam est unus non aliqua unitate quae non sit ipse, sed per essentiam suam; et ideo maxime unum est.
>
> Loquendo autem de uno quod est principium numeri, non potest transumi in divinam praedicationem quantum ad genus suum quod est quantitas, sed quantum ad differentiam suam quae ad perfectionem pertinet, sicut indivisibilitas et prima ratio mensurandi vel aliquid hujusmodi.[5]

Here is a text where Thomas shows how one is naturally before and a beginning of the many:

> Illud a quo non convertitur consequentia essendi, est naturaliter prius et quodammodo principium.
>
> Sed unum est huiusmodi quia *sine uno non* invenitur aliqua *multitudo*, sed invenitur aliquod *unum* absque omni *multitudine*.
>
> Unum igitur est prius omni multitudine et principium eius.
>
> Cuius signum apparet in numeris, quia *unitas* est *ante omnem numerum*, qualitercumque multiplicetur.[6]

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[5] *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXIV, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad 1

[6] *In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio*, Caput XIII, Lectio II, n. 977

Duane H. Berquist

TEXTS FOR NAME BEING

It is very necessary for a philosopher to understand the word or name *being,* its senses and their order.

It is necessary for understanding and defending the axioms about being and non-being which are by nature the beginning of all the axioms (which are first beginnings of all reasoned out knowledge). It is impossible to be and not be (at the same time and in the same way) and it is necessary to either be or not be (at the same time and in the same way).

It is necessary for knowing why there can be one reasoned out knowledge of being as being even though that word is equivocal.

It is necessary for knowing the parts of the consideration of being as being as can be seen in Books Six through Nine of *Wisdom.*

It is necessary for understanding the universality of the first sophistical places outside speech

It is necessary for reasoning against the position and arguments of Parmenides and Melissus that being is one and in no way many.

It is necessary for understanding in what way lack and bad are said to be.

It is necessary for understanding in what sense God is being

The word *being* is perhaps the most difficult word of all to understand because of the plethora of its meanings which cannot be put in one order. Aristotle will eventually distinguish four groups of meanings which will be taken up in Books Six through Nine of *Wisdom* (accidental being and being as true briefly in Book Six; being according to the figures of predication, but mainly substance in Books Seven and Eight; and being as act and ability or potency in Book Nine). Plato in the dialogues or Socratic conversations puzzles over the meanings of *being*.

Only Aristotle, it seems, could have thought out in an ordered way the senses or meanings of *being*.

In distinguishing the senses of *being*, Aristotle seems to have followed the rule of two or three for the most part. For he first distinguishes between being by happening or through happening and being through itself or as such, a distinction into two. And he distinguishes being through itself or as such into three groups: being according to the figures of predication, being as true, and being as act and ability.

He divides accidental being into three.

And although Aristotle usually divides being according to the figures of predication into ten (as in the *Categories*), when Thomas unfolds this distinction, both in this Reading and in the commentary on the third book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*), he always divides and subdivides into two or three to get eventually ten.

The beings of reason that are beings only in reason also seem to be two in kind as will be seen later.

And the division of being into act and ability is, of course, into two.

The division of being according to the figures of predication is placed between the division of accidental being which, although something other than the accidents that are distinguished against substance (in the division of being according to the figures of predication), presupposes the distinction of substance and accident in its explanation (for one kind of accidental being is when two accidents happen to the same subject or when an accident is said of its subject or vice-versa); and beings of reason which in the Fourth Book could be considered after substance, accident, motion, as Thomas gives four main senses there of *being* based on substance first.

But there is also an ascent from the less universal to the more universal when one goes from the division of being according to the figures of predication to being in reason to act and ability. And this characterizes wisdom, as we see elsewhere. Thus in the ninth book, Aristotle ascends from ability and act as found in motion to a completely universal consideration of act and ability and in

the consideration of one, we ascend from the one which is the beginning of number to the one which is convertible with being.

Since reason seeks to know the distinction and order of things, we can summarize here the distinction and order of being in general. But before doing so, it might be good to consider the distinction and order of distinction and order so we know what we are doing.

Things are distinct when one is not the other. Order in the strict or narrow sense is a before and after. Since nothing is before or after itself, there must be some distinction before there can be order and reason must see some distinction between things before it can see that one is before the other. Distinction is before order, both in being and in the discourse of reason. Things can be distinct even though they have no order, but they cannot have some order if they are not distinct. And reason can know the distinction of two things without knowing their order (if they have some order), but it cannot know their order without seeing their distinction. But order would seem to be better than distinction or before distinction in goodness.

The first distinction of being pointed out by Aristotle in this reading is between being as such or through itself and being by happening or through happening. Being as such is before being by happening in being. One can be a geometer or white without being a white geometer, but one cannot be a white geometer without being white and without being a geometer. But accidental being may be better than being as such. It is better to be a courageous geometer than to be just a geometer or just courageous. Thomas points this out in the following text:

> Ad perfectionem autem rerum requiritur quod non solum sint in rebus entia per se, sed etiam entia per accidens: res enim quae non habent in sua substantia ultimam perfectionem, oportet quod perfectionem aliquam consequantur per accidentia; et tanto per plura, quanto magis distant a simplicitate Dei.
>
> Ex hoc autem quod aliquod subiectum habet multa accidentia, sequitur quod sit aliquod ens per accidens: nam subiectum et

> accidens, et etiam duo accidentia unius subiecti, sunt unum et ens per accidens; sicut homo albus, et musicum album.[1]

After the distinction of being according to the figures of predication, there is more order to be seen. For substance is before accidents in being and in definition. But there is also an order among the accidents as Thomas teaches us:

> Inter accidentia vero quidam ordo considerandus est.
>
> Nam inter omnia accidentia propinquius inhaeret substantiae quantitas dimensiva.
>
> Deinde qualitates in substantia recipiuntur quantitate mediante, sicut color mediante superficie: unde et per divisionem quantitatis, per accidens dividuntur.
>
> Ulterius autem qualitates sunt actionum et passionum principia; et relationum quarundam, ut sunt pater et filius, dominus et servus, et alia huiusmodi. Quaedam vero relationes immediate ad quantitates consequuntur: ut maius et minus, duplum et dimidium, et similia.[2]

Substance and accidents are also in definition before those beings of reason that are lacks or negations.

After distinguishing act and ability in the Ninth Book of *Wisdom*, Aristotle will go on to show that act is before ability in definition and perfection and in time *simpliciter loquendo.*

Which is better, substance or accidents? Someone might think that accidents are better because they are a perfection of substance. But consider this text of Thomas:

> Praeterea. In comparatione rerum ad finem talis ordo apparet quod accidentia sunt propter substantias, ut per ea perficiantur; in substantiis vero materia est propter formam; per hanc enim

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[1] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber III, Capitulum LXXIV

[2] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Capitulum LXIII

> participat divinam bonitatem, propter quam omnia facta sunt, ut supra ostensum est.[3]

By geometry, the man understands.

There are many texts where Thomas distinguishes being according to the figures of predication and being as true. We should look at some of these. In the following text, Thomas points out that what is being according to the figures of predication can also being as true, but not every being as true can be found in things outside the mind:

> Philosophus in V *Metaphys*., text. 14, ostendit quod ens multipliciter dicitur.
>
> Uno enim modo dicitur ens quod per decem genera dividitur: et sic ens significat aliquid in natura existens, sive sit substantia, ut homo, sive accidens, ut color.
>
> Alio modo dicitur ens, quod significat veritatem propositionis; prout dicitur quod affirmatio est vera, quando significat esse de eo quod est; et negatio, quando significat non esse de eo quod non est; et hoc ens compositionem significat, quam intellectus componens et dividens adinvenit.
>
> Quaecumque ergo dicuntur entia quantum ad primum modum, sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum: quia omne quod habet naturale esse in rebus potest significari per propositionem affirmativam esse, ut cum dicitur: color est vel homo est.
>
> Non autem omnia quae sunt entia quantum ad secundum modum, sunt entia quantum ad primum: quia de privatione, ut de caecitate, formatur una affirmata propositio, cum dicitur: *caecitas est;* nec tamen caecitas aliquid est in rerum natura, sed est magis alicujus entis remotio; et ideo etiam privationes et negationes dicuntur esse entia quantum ad secundum modum, sed non quantum ad primum.

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[3] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber III, Capitulum LXXV

> Ens autem secundum utrumque istorum modorum diversimode praedicatur: quia secundum primum modum acceptum est praedicatum substantiale, et pertinet ad quaestionem quid est, sed quantum ad secundum modum, est praedicatum accidentale, ut Commentator ibidem dicit, et pertinet ad quaestionem an est. Sic ergo accipiendo ens secundo modo dictum, prout quaestio quaerebat, simpliciter dicimus mala esse in universo.[4]

Another text where this distinction is shown:

> ...ens dicitur dupliciter.
>
> Uno modo quod significat essentiam rei extra animam existentis, et hoc modo non potest dici ens deformitas peccati, quae privatio quaedam est; privationes enim essentiam non habent in rerum natura.
>
> Alio modo secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis, et sic deformitas dicitur esse, non propter hoc quod in re esse habeat, sed quia intellectus componit privationem cum subjecto, sicut formam quamdam. Unde sicut ex compositione formae ad subjectum vel ad materiam, relinquitur quoddam esse substantiale vel accidentale, ita etiam intellectus compositionem privationis cum subjecto per quoddam esse significat. Sed hoc esse non est nisi esse rationis, cum in re potius sit non esse.[5]

And a third text where this disitnction is made:

> ...secundum Philosophum, V *Meta*. (D 7. 1017a31035; L. 9, nn. 895-896) *esse* duobus modis dicitur.
>
> Uno modo, secundum quod significat veritatem propositionis, secundum quod est copula; et sic, ut Commentator ibidem dicit (text 6) dicit, *ens* est *praedicatum accidentale*. Et hoc esse non est

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[4] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum* , Distinctio XXXIV, Quaest I, Art. 1, Utrum malum sit, Solutio

[5] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXVII, Quaest I, Art. II, Ad 3

> in re, sed in mente quae conjungit subjectum cum praedicato, ut dicit Philosophus in VI *Metaphysicorum*.
>
> Alio modo (1017a, 22-27; L. 9, nn. 889-895) dicitur esse quod pertinet ad naturam rei, secundum quod dividitur secundum decem genera. Et hoc quidem esse in re est, et est actus resultans ex principiis rei, sicut lucere est actus lucentis.
>
> Aliquando tamen *esse* sumitur pro essentia, secundum quam res est; quia per actus consueverunt significari eorum principia, ut potentiae vel habitus.[6]

In the following passage from Shakespeare, the false is said to be that which is not:

Cleopatra to Caesar	This is my treasurer; let him speak, my lord, Upon his peril, that I have reserv'd To myself nothing. Speak the truth, Seleucus.
Seleucus:	Madam, I had rather seal my lips Than to my peril speak that which is not.
Cleopatra:	What have I kept back?
Seleucus:	Enough to purchase what you have made known.[7]

Likewise, in this passage from Shakespeare:

> Mistrust of good success hath done this deed.
> O hateful error, melancholy's child,
> Why dost thou show to the apt thoughts of men
> The things that are not? O error, soon conceiv'd
> Thou never com'st unto a happy birth,
> But kill'st the mother that engender'd thee.[8]

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[6] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio VI, Quaest II, Art. II, Responsio

[7] *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act V, Sc. 2

[8] *Julius Caesar*, Act V, Sc. 1, about Cassius' suicide

What is the division of the beings of reason that are only in reason? Thomas touches upon the division of what is in reason only in this text: when explaining how one, true and good add only something of reason to being, a negation or a relation:

> Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex. Omnis enim positio absoluta aliquid in rerum natura existens significat.
>
> Sic ergo supra ens, quod est prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, scilicet negationem: dicitur enim unum quasi ens indivisum.
>
> Sed verum et bonum positive dicuntur; unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum.[9]

A being of reason or ens rationis may be either a negation or privation (which is distinguished from a *positio)* or a relation (which is divided against *absoluta)*. We find both of these beings of reason in what is convertible with being.

All privations or lacks would seem to be only beings of reason:

> ...privatio non dicitur ens naturae, sed solummodo ens rationis[10]

Thus blindess is a being of reason only:

> Caecum enim aliquid addit supra hominem, scilicet caecitatem, quae non est aliquod ens in natura, sed rationis tantum, secundum quod ens est comprehendens privationes....[11]

Likewise, negations are beings of reason:

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[9] *De Veritate*, Q 21, Art. 1, corpus
[10] *De Veritate*, Q. 21, Art. 2, Ad 7
[11] Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, Q. 21, Art. 1, corpus

> Et ideo hoc ipsum quod est non posse recipere additionem...distinguit primam bonitatem, quae est bonitas prima, ab aliis bonitatibus.
>
> Hoc autem quod non est recipere additionem, cum sit negatio, est ens rationis,
>
> et tamen fundatur super simplicitatem bonitatis primae.[12]

Thus, in general, negations and privations or lacks are only beings of reason:

> illa communitas qua aliquid praedicatur communiter de ente et non ente, est rationis tantum, quia negationes et privationes non sunt nisi entia rationis.[13]

Some relations are real, but some are in reason only. We can speak of these when we take up toward something or relation.

The following text suggests that there is a sense of *being* common to substance and accident just as there is a sense of *nature* common to matter and form. When we say that there is a reasoned out knowledge of being as being, we would seem to be using *being* in this common sense before we say that it is chiefly about substance.

> Dicit ergo primo quod Parmenides assumit propositiones falsas, quia accipit quod est, idest ens, dici simpliciter, idest uno modo, cum tamen dicatur multipliciter.
>
> Dicitur enim ens uno modo substantia, alio modo accidens; et hoc multipliciter secundum diversa genera:
>
> potest etiam accipi ens prout est commune substantiae et accidenti.
>
> Patet autem quod propositiones ab eo sumptae in uno sensu sunt verae, et in alio sensu sunt falsae. Nam cum dicitur: *quidquid est praeter ens est non ens*, verum est si *ens* sumatur prout est

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[12] *De Veritate*, Q. 21, Art. 4, Ad 8

[13] Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, Q. 3, Art. 4, Ad 3

> commune substantiae et accidenti: si autem sumatur pro accidente tantum, vel pro substantia tantum, falsum est, ut infra ostendetur.[14]

Are there other divisions of being per se besides those given here by Aristotle? The following text suggests another division of being per se which is not given in Book Five:

> Adhuc. Ad divinam providentiam pertinet ut gradus entium qui possibiles sunt adimpleantur, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ens autem dividitur per contingens et necessarium: et est per se divisio entis. Si igitur divina providentia excluderet omnem contingentiam, non omnes gradus entium conservarentur.[15]

Is it because contingent and necessary are defined by ability? This is perhaps after the distinction of being into act and ability. The contingent is able to be and able not to be while the necessary is not able not to be (and the impossible is not able to be). The before and after of these is very important in arriving at the existence of God. (The word *possible* is used in that proof.)

The distinction between good and bad is also after the distinction of being into act and ability. For the bad is the lack of an act one is able to have and should have while act is the end and good of ability

In the following text, Thomas speaks of universal and singular as differentiae or per se passiones of being:

> Amplius. Natura generis perfecte non potest cognosci nisi eius differentiae primae et passiones propriae cognoscantur: non enim perfecte sciretur natura numeri si par et impar ignorarentur. Sed universale et singulare sunt differentiae, vel per se passiones entis. Si igitur Deus, cognoscendo essentiam suam, perfecte cognoscit naturam communem entis, oportet quod perfecte cognoscat universale et singulare. Sicut autem non perfecte cognosceret

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[14] *In I Physicorum*, Lectio VI, n. 39

[15] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber III, Caput LXXII, 2nd argument

universale si cognosceret intentionem universalitatis et non cognosceret rem universalem, ut hominem aut animal; ita non perfecte cognosceret singulare si cognosceret rationem singularitatis et non cognosceret hoc vel illud singulare. Oportet igitur quod Deus res singulares cognoscat.[16]

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[16] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber III, Capitulum LXV, 3rd argument

NOTE ON AND TEXTS ON WHOLE AND PART

The most universal distinction of whole and part that I have learned from Thomas is a distinction of three. This distinction is a distinction both of the kinds of whole and part there are and a distinction of the senses of the words *whole* and *part* or the meanings of *whole* and *part.* This is the distinction between the integral or composed whole, the universal whole, and the potential whole (which Thomas often speaks of as inbetween the other two kinds). Aristotle in the reading on part in the fifth book of *Wisdom* seems to distinguish only between the composed whole and the universal whole, leaving out the one inbetween, although he talks about it elsewhere (as in the books *About the Soul*).

De Spiritualibus Creaturis, Art. 11, Ad 2:

> ...sciendum est triplex esse totum.
>
> Unum universale, quod adest cuilibet parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem; unde proprie praedicatur de suis partibus, ut cum dicitur: Homo est animal.
>
> Aliud vero est totum integrale, quod non adest alicui suae parti neque secundum totam essentiam neque secundum totam suam virtutem; et ideo nullo modo praedicatur de parte, ut dicatur: Paries est domus.
>
> Tertium est totum potentiale, quod est medium inter haec duo: adest secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam suam virtutem. Unde medio modo se habet in praedicando: praedicatur quandoque de partibus, sed non proprie. Et hoc modo quandoque dicitur, quod anima est suae potentiae, vel e converso.

Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum, Dist. 3, Q. 4, Art. 2, Ad 1:

> Totum enim potentiale, quasi medium est inter integrale et universale.

> Universale enim adest cuilibet parti subjectivae secundum esse et perfectam virtutem, et ideo proprie praedicatur de parte sua. Sed totum integrale non adest cuilibet parti, neque secundum esse, neque secundum virtutem. Non enim totum esse domus est in pariete, neque tota virtus; et ideo nullo modo praedicatur de parte.
>
> Totum autem potentiale adest cuilibet parti secundum se, et secundum aliquid virtutis, sed non secundum perfectam; immo secundum perfectam virtutem adest tantum supremae potentiae; et ideo praedicatur quidem, sed non adeo proprie sicut totum universale.

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 77, Art. 1, Ad 1:

> ...haec locutio verificatur secundum modum quo totum postestativum praedicatur de suis partibus, quod medium est inter totum universale et totum integrale.
>
> Totum enim universale adest cuilibet parti secundum totam suam essentiam et virtutem, ut animal homini et equo: et ideo proprie de singulis partibus praedicatur.
>
> Totum vero integrale non est in qualibet parte, neque secundum totam essentiam, neque secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo nullo modo de singulis partibus praedicatur; sed aliquo modo, licet improprie, praedicatur de omnibus simul, ut si dicamus quod paries, tectum et fundamentum sunt domus.
>
> Totum vero potentiale adest singulis partibus secundum totam suam essentiam, sed non secundum totam virtutem. Et ideo quodammodo potest praedicari de qualibet parte, sed non ita proprie sicut totum universale. Et per hunc modum Augustinus dicit quod memoria, intelligentia et voluntas sunt una animae essentia.

In the following text, in addition to an interesting distinction of two ways of speaking of the soul, Thomas points out why there is less *abusio* in saying the potential whole of its parts than in saying the integral whole of its parts.

Quodlibet Decimum, Q. 3, Art. 1, corpus:

> ...de anima dupliciter loqui possumus.
>
> Uno modo secundum quod est quaedam substantia; et sic impossibile est quod anima sit suae potentiae...
>
> Alio modo possumus loqui de anima secundum quod est quoddam totum potentiale; et sic diversae potentiae sunt diversae partes eius: et ita anima praedicatur de potentiis, vel e converso, abusiva praedicatione, sicut totum integrale de suis partibus, vel e converso; quamvis minor sit abusio in toto potentiali quam integrali, quia totum potentiale secundum suam substantiam adest cuilibet parti, non autem integrale.

Thomas uses this distinction of the three kinds of whole in his consideration of the virtues, especially according to the four cardinal virtues. See the following text:

Summa Theologiae, II-II, Q. 143, Art. Un, corpus:

> ...alicuius virtutis cardinalis triplices partes esse possunt: scilicet integrales, subiectivae et potentiales.
>
> Et dicuntur partes integrales alicuius virtutis conditiones quas necesse est concurrere ad virtutem...
>
> Partes autem subiectivae alicuius virtutis dicuntur species eius. Oportet autem diversificare species virtutum secundum diversitatem materiae vel obiecti...
>
> Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis principalis dicuntur virtutes secundariae, quae modum quem principalis virtus observat circa aliquam principalem materiam, eundem observant in quibusdam aliis materiis, in quibus non est ita difficile.

Another text on the same:

Summa Theologiae, II-II, q. 48, Art. Un., corpus:

> ...triplex est pars: scilicet integralis, ut paries, tectum et fundamentum sunt partes domus; subiectiva, sicut bos et leo sunt partes animalis; et potentialis, sicut nutritivum et sensitivum sunt partes animae.
>
> Tribus ergo modis possunt assignari partes alicui virtuti.
>
> Uno modo, ad similitudinem partium integralium: ut scilicet illa dicantur esse partes virtutis alicuius quae necesse est concurrere ad perfectum actum virtutis illius...
>
> Partes autem subiectivae virtutis dicuntur species eius diversae.
>
> Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis dicuntur virtutes adiunctae quae ordinantur ad aliquos secundarios actus vel materias, quasi non habentes totam potentiam principalis virtutis.

And in the writing on the *Sentences:*

Scriptum super Lib. III Sententiarum, Dist. XXXIII, Q. 3, Art. 1, Sol. 1:

> ...omne totum ad tria genera reducitur, scilicet universale, integrale et potentiale.
>
> Et similiter pars triplex invenitur dictis tribus respondens.
>
> Integralis enim pars intrat in constitutionem totius, sicut partes domus.
>
> Universalis vero totius pars suscipit praedicationem totius, sicut homo animalis.
>
> Potentialis vero pars neque praedicationem totius recipit, neque in constitutionem ipsius oportet quod veniat, sed aliquid de potentia totius participat, sicut patet in anima. Rationalis enim anima tota anima dicitur, eo quod in ipsa omnes animae potentiae congregantur. Sensitivum vero in brutis et in plantis vegetabilis dicuntur partes animae, quia aliquid de potentia animae habent, sed

non totum. Unde dicitur in lib. I *De Plantis,* quod non habent animam, sed partes animae.

Et secundum hunc modum tripliciter assignantur partes prudentiae et aliis virtutibus.

Uno enim modo assignantur et partes quasi integrales, cum scilicet partes virtutis alicujus ponuntur aliqua quae exiguntur ad virtutem, in quibus perfectio virtutis consistit. Et hae partes, proprie loquendo non nominant per se virtutes, sed conditiones unius virtutis integrantes ipsam.

Alio modo, per modum partium subjectivarum. Et sic partes illae nominant quidem virtutes et ad invicem distinctas, sed non quidem a toto cujus partes assignantur, quia illud de eis praedicatur.

Tertio modo, per modum totius potentialis, inquantum aliquae virtutes participant aliquid de modo qui principaliter et perfecte invenitur in aliqua virtute.

And in regard to prudence or foresight in particular:

Summa Theologiae, Prima Secundae, Q. 57, Art. 6, Ad 4:

...memoria, intelligentia et providentia, similiter etiam cautio et docilitas, et alia huiusmodi, non sunt virtutes diversae a prudentia: sed quodammodo comparantur ad ipsam sicut partes integrales, inquantum omnia ista requiruntur ad perfectionem prudentiae.

Sunt etiam et quaedam partes subiectivae, seu species prudentiae: sicut oeconomica, regnativa, et huiusmodi.

Sed praedicta tria [eubulia, synesis et gonome] sunt quasi partes potentiales prudentiae: quia ordinantur sicut secundarium ad principale.

But when Thomas considers fortitude or courage, he does not try to distinguish all three kinds of parts:

Summa Theologiae, II-II, Q. 128, Art. Un.:

> ...sicut supra dictum est, alicuius virtutis possunt esse triplices partes, scilicet subiectivae, integrales et potentiales.
>
> Fortitudini autem, secundum quod est specialis virtus, non possunt assignari partes subiectivae: eo quod non dividitur in multas virtues specie differentes, quia est circa materiam valde specialem Assignantur autem ei partes quasi integrales et potentiales: integrales quidem secundum ea quae oportet concurrere ad actum fortitudinis; potentiales autem secundum quod ea quae observat fortitudo circa difficillima, scilicet circa pericula mortis, aliquae aliae virtues observant circa quasdam alias materias minus difficiles; quae quidem virtutes adiunguntur fortitudini sicut secundariae principali.

Integral or composing parts (and therefore integral or composed wholes) can be distinguished into quantitative parts and essential parts, parts of the quantity and parts of the nature or essence.

In the following reading, Thomas distinguishes between the parts of a quantity and the parts of an essence or nature, two kinds of composing parts. And he also distinguishes between two kinds of quantitative parts.

Scriptum super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio XVI, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad tertiam quaestionem:

> ...partes integrales sunt duplices.
>
> Quaedam sunt partes quantitatis:
>
> quae sunt quandoque unius rationis, ut in totis homogeneis;
>
> quandoque vero diversarum rationum, ut in totis heterogeneis.
>
> Quaedam vero sunt partes essentiae, sicut materia et forma, non quantitatis. Et hae semper sunt diversarum rationum, et habent ordinem naturae ad invicem, et quandoque etiam ordinem temporis in his quorum esse non est simul.

Is the following text on the order of the parts of a quantitative whole?

Summa Theologiae, Tertia Pars, Q. 90, Art. 3, Ad 3:

> ...omnes partes integrales habent ordinem quendam ad invicem.
>
> Sed quaedam habent ordinem tantum in situ: sive consequenter se habeant, sicut partes exercitus; sive se tangant, sicut partes acervi; sive etiam colligentur, sicut partes domus; sive etiam continuentur, sicut partes lineae.
>
> Quaedam vero habent insuper ordinem virtutis: sicut partes animalis, quarum prima virtute est cor, et aliae quodam ordine virtutis dependent ab invicem.
>
> Tertio modo ordinantur ordine temporis: sicut partes temporis et motus.

In the following text, Thomas again distinguishes the same two kinds of composing parts (quantitative parts and essential parts). And here in addition, he distinguishes two kinds of essential parts: one which is in things and the other in reason. The one in reason has a remote foundation in the first which is in things. (This text suggests that the sense in which matter and form are said *to be in* that which is composed of matter and form should be led back to the third central sense of *being in* rather than the second even though it is in things.)

Summa Theologiae, Tertia Pars, Q. 90, Art. 2, corpus:

> ...duplex est pars, ut dicitur in V Metaphysicorum: scilicet pars essentiae, et pars quantitatis.
>
> Partes quidem essentiae sunt, naturaliter quidem, forma et materia: logice, autem, genus et differentia.

But in the following text, Thomas puts together quantitative parts and the parts called matter and form as the two ways in which one nature can be constituted from many remaining.

Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber IV, Capitulum XXXV:

> Amplius. Nunquam invenitur ex duabus naturis manentibus fieri unam: eo quod quaelibet natura est quoddam totum, ea vero ex quibus aliquid constituitur, cadunt in rationem partis; unde, cum ex anima et corpore fiat unum, neque corpus neque anima natura dici potest, sicut nunc loquimur de natura, quia neutrum habet speciem completam, sed utrumque est pars unius naturae. Cum igitur natura humana sit quaedam natura completa, et similiter natura divina, impossibile est quod concurrant in unam naturam, nisi vel utraque vel altera corrumpatur. Quod esse non potest: cum ex supra dictis pateat unum Christum et verum Deum et verum hominem esse. Impossibile est igitur in Christo unam esse tantum naturam.
>
> Item. Ex duobus manentibus una natura constituitur vel sicut ex partibus corporalibus, sicut ex membris constituitur animal: quod hic dici non potest, cum divina natura non sit aliquid corporeum. Vel sicut ex materia et forma constituitur aliquid unum, sicut ex anima et corpore animal. Quod etiam non potest in proposito dici: ostensum est enim in primo libro quod Deus neque materia est, neque alicuius forma esse potest. Si igitur Christus est verus Deus et verus homo, ut ostensum est, impossibile est quod in eo sit una natura tantum.

In the following text, Thomas again distinguishes between the two kinds of integral or composing parts, the quantitative part and the essential part. And in addition, he distinguishes the two kinds of essential part. He then uses these distinctions in replying to a particular question.

Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars., Q. 8, Art. 2, Ad 3:

> Ad tertium dicendum quod totum dicitur respectu partium. Est autem duplex pars, scilicet pars essentiae, ut forma et materia dicuntur partes compositi, et genus et differentia partes speciei; et etiam pars quantitatis, in quam scilicet dividitur aliqua quantitas.

> Quod ergo est totum in aliquo loco totalitate quantitatis, non potest esse extra locum illum, quia quantitas locati commensuratur quantitati loci, unde non est totalitas quantitatis, si non sit totalitas loci. Sed totalitas essentiae non commensuratur totalitati loci. Unde non oportet quod illud quod est totum totalitate essentiae in aliquo, nullo modo sit extra illud. Sicut apparet etiam in formis accidentalibus, quae secundum accidens quantitatem habent, albedo enim est tota in qualibet parte superficiei, si accipiatur totalitas essentiae, quia secundum perfectam rationem suae speciei invenitur in qualibet parte superficiei. Si autem accipiatur totalitas secundum quantitatem, quam habet per accidens, sic non est tota in qualibet parte superficiei. In substantiis autem incorporeis non est totalitas, nec per se nec per accidens, nisi secundum perfectam rationem essentiae. Et ideo, sicut anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis, ita Deus totus est in omnibus et singulis.

In the following text, Thomas limits himself in his discussion of the totality of forms to the distinction of composing parts *secundum quantitatem* and *secundum divisionem essentiae.*

Summa Contra Gentiles, Liber II, Capitulum LXXII:

> Cum enim totum dicatur per relationem ad partes, oportet totum diversimode accipi sicut diversimode accipiuntur partes.
>
> Dicitur autem pars dupliciter: uno quidem modo, inquantum dividitur aliquid secundum quantitatem, sicut bicubitum est pars tricubiti; alio modo, inquantum dividitur aliquid secundum divisionem essentiae, sicut forma et materia dicuntur partes compositi. Dicitur ergo totum et secundum quantitatem, et secundum essentiae perfectionem.
>
> Totum autem et pars secundum quantitatem dicta formis non conveniunt nisi per accidens, scilicet inquantum dividuntur divisione subiecti quantitatem habentis. Totum autem vel pars secundum perfectionem essentiae invenitur in formis per se. De hac igitur totalitate loquendo, quae per se formis competit, in qualibet forma apparet quod est tota in toto et tota in qualibet parte eius: nam albedo, sicut secundum totam rationem albedinis est in toto

corpore, ita et in qualibet parte eius. Secus autem est de totalitate quae per accidens attribuitur formis: sic enim non possumus dicere quod tota albedo sit in qualibet parte.

Si igitur est aliqua forma quae non dividatur divisione subiecti, sicut sunt animae animalium perfectorum, non erit opus distinctione, cum eis non competat nisi una totalitas: sed absolute dicendum est eam totam esse in qualibet parte corporis.

Nec est hoc difficile apprehendere ei qui intelligit animam non sic esse indivisibilem ut punctum; neque sic incorporeum corporeo coniungi sicut corpora ad invicem coniunguntur; ut supra expositum est.

In the following text, Thomas after distinguishing the three kinds of whole other than the universal whole, speaks of *partes rationis et essentiae*. Does *partes rationis* mean more *partes definitionis* and matter and form more *partes essentiae?*

Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, Q. 76, Art. 8, corpus:

...cum totum sit quod quod dividitur in partes, secundum triplicem divisionem est triplex totalitas.

Est enim quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes quantitativas, sicut tota linea vel totum corpus.

Est etiam quoddam totum quod dividitur in partes rationis et essentiae; sicut definitum in partes definitionis, et compositum resolvitur in materiam et formam.

Tertium autem totum est potentiale, quod dividitur in partes virtutis.

Prima autem totalitatis modus non convenit formis, nisi forte per accidens; et illis solis formis quae habent indifferentem habitudinem ad totum quantitativum et partes eius...

> Sed totalitas secunda, quae attenditur secundum rationis et essentiae perfectionem, proprie et per se convenit formis.
>
> Similiter autem et totalitas virtutis, quia forma est operationis principium.

In the following text, Thomas, in distinguishing totality acccording to the three kinds of whole other than the universal whole, speaks of the *partes essentiae* and divides these *physice* into matter and form and *logice* into genus and difference.

De Spiritualibus Creaturis, Art. 4, corpus:

> ...triplex totalitas invenitur.
>
> Prima quidem est manifestior secundum quantitatem, prout totum quantum dicitur quod natum est dividi in partes quantitatis: et haec totalitas non potest attribui formis nisi per accidens, in quantum scilicet per accidens dividuntur divisione quantitatis, sicut albedo divisione superficiei. Sed hoc est illarum tantum formarum quae coextenduntur quantitati; quod ex hoc competit aliquibus formis, quia habent materiam similem aut fere similem et in toto et in parte. Unde formae quae requiruntur magnam dissimilitudinem in partibus, non habent huiusmodi extensionem et totalitatem, sicut animae, praecipue animalium perfectorum.
>
> Secunda autem totalitas attenditur secundum perfectionem essentiae, cui totalitati etiam respondent partes essentiae, physice quidem in compositis materia et forma. Logice vero genus et differentia; quae quidem perfectio in formis accidentalibus recipit magis et minus, non autem in substantialibus.
>
> Tertia autem totalitas est secundum virtutem.

In the following text, Thomas, using the distinction of three kinds of whole other than the universal whole, calls one of them the essential parts of the species and distinguishes these into the parts of the composite, matter and form, and the parts of the species, genus and difference.

Quaestio disputata de Anima, Art. 10, corpus:

> Potest autem attribui totalitas alicui formae tripliciter, secundum quod tribus modis convenit aliquid habere partes.
>
> Uno enim modo aliquid habet partes secundum divisionem quantitatis, prout scilicet dividitur numerus aut magnitudo.
>
> Uni autem formae non competit totalitas numeri nec magnitudinis, nisi forte per accidens, puta in formis quae per accidens dividuntur divisione continui, sicut albedo per divisionem superficiei.
>
> Alio modo dicitur aliquid totum per comparationem ad partes essentiales speciei; sicut materia et forma dicuntur partes compositi; genus et differentia partes quodammodo speciei.
>
> Et hic modus totalitatis attribuitur etiam essentiis simplicibus ratione suae perfectionis; eo quod sicut composita habent perfectam speciem ex coniunctione principiorum essentialium, ita substantiae et formae simplices habent perfectam speciem per seipsas.
>
> Tertio modo dicitur totum per comparationem ad partes virtutis seu potestatis; quae quidem partes accipiuntur secundum divisionem operationum.

In the following text, Thomas again recalls the three kinds of whole and gives a distinction of the universal whole and subject part. (This suggests that the sense in which there are many senses under a word can sometimes be led back to the fourth sense of *being in*.)

Summa Theologiae, Secunda Secundae,, Q. 120, Art 2:

> ...virtus aliqua habet triplicem partem: scilicet partem subiectivam, integralem et quasi potentialem.

> Pars autem subiectiva est de qua essentialiter praedicatur totum, et est in minus. Quid quidem contingit dupliciter: quandoque enim aliquid praedicatur de pluribus secundum unam rationem, sicut *animal* de equo et bove; quandoque autem praedicatur secundum prius et posterius, sicut *ens* praedicatur de substantia et accidente.

In the following text, Thomas shows that potestative whole can spoken of in many distinct substances. He also explains how the whole power can be found in only one, the highest.

Scriptum super Lib. II Sententiarum, Dist 9, Q. 1, Art. 3, Ad 1:

> ...divisio hierarchiae in ordines est totius potestativi in partes potentiales, sicut anima dividitur in suas potentias: et hoc totum est quasi medium inter totum universale et integrale.
>
> Universale enim est secundum essentiam et completam virtutem in qualibet sua parte, unde de omnibus aequaliter praedicatur; sed integrale nec est secundum essentiam nec secundum virtutem totam in unaquaque suarum partium, et ideo nullo modo de parte praedicatur; sed totum potentiale adest quidem secundum essentiam cuilibet parti, sed secundum completam virtutem est in parte suprema, quia semper superior potentia habet in se completius ea quae sunt inferioris: et ista est comparatio hierarchiae ad ordines.

Thomas considers the division or distinction of the three virtues of looking reason as more a division of a potential whole than one of a genus into species in the strictest sense:

Summa Theologiae, Prima secundae, Q. 57, Art 2, ad 2:

> Ad secundum dicendum quod quando ratio obiecti sub uno actu refertur ad potentiam vel habitum, tunc non distinguuntur habitus vel potentiae penes rationem obiecti et obiectum materiale, sicut ad eandem potentiam visivam pertinet videre colorem, et lumen, quod est ratio videndi colorem et simul cum ipso videtur. Principia

> vero demonstrationis possunt seorsum considerari, absque hoc quod considerentur conclusiones. Possunt etiam considerari simul cum conclusionibus, prout principia in conclusiones deducuntur. Considerare ergo hoc secundo modo principia, pertinet ad scientiam, quae considerat etiam conclusiones, sed considerare principia secundum seipsa, pertinet ad intellectum.
>
> Unde, si quis recte consideret, istae tres virtutes non ex aequo distinguuntur ab invicem, sed ordine quodam; sicut accidit in totis potentialibus, quorum una pars est perfectior altera, sicut anima rationalis est perfectior quam sensibilis, et sensibilis quam vegetabilis. Hoc enim modo, scientia dependet ab intellectu sicut a principaliori. Et utrumque dependet a sapientia sicut a principalissimo, quae sub se continet et intellectum et scientiam, ut de conclusionibus scientiarum diiudicans, et de principiis earundem.

An unusual application of the teaching on potestative or potential whole:

Scriptum super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio XV, Quaest. II, Art. II, Ad secundam quaestionem:

> ...efficacia satisfactionis invenitur in tribus satisfactionis partibus, sicut virtus totius potentialis in partibus ejus, quae quidem complete in una invenitur, et in aliis diminute.
>
> Sicut tota virtus animae invenitur in rationali, sed in sensibili anima invenitur diminute, et adhuc magis diminute in vegetabili, quia anima sensibilis includit in se virtutem animae vegetabilis, et non convertitur.
>
> Eleemosyna enim includit in se virtutem orationis et jejunii duplici ratione.
>
> > Primo, quia eleemosyna eum cui datur constituit debitorem ad orandum et jejunandum, et alia bona quae potest faciendum pro eo qui dedit.

> Secundo, quia eleemosyna propter Deum data, est quasi quaedam oblatio Deo facta. Unde Philosophus etiam dicit in IV *Eth.* (1123a 5) quod *dona habent aliquid simile Deo sacratis*; oblatio autem ipsa Deo facta vim orationis habet.
>
> Et similiter inquantum bona exteriora ad corporis conservationem ordinantur, subtractio exteriorum bonorum per eleemosynam quasi virtute continet jejunium, quo maceratur corpus.
>
> Similiter etiam oratio virtute continet jejunium, quia extensio intellectus ad Deum debilitatem corporis parit, ut dictum est.
>
> Unde eleemosyna completius habet vim satisfactionis quam oratio, et oratio quam jejunium.

In the following text, we see Thomas giving a reason why some parts are integral parts rather than potential parts. In potential wholes, one part must have the whole power it seems. He also gives the distinction we have seen of integral parts into *partes quantitatis* and *partes essentiae* and points out that the former may or may not be of the same *ratio*, but the latter are always of different *ratios* or *rationes*.

Scriptum super Lib. IV Sententiarum, Distinctio XVI, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad tertiam quaestionem:

> ...in partibus potentialibus totum adest secundum essentiae suae rationem cuilibet parti completae, sicut essentia animae cuilibet potentiae; sed tota ratio poenitentiae secundum speciem non est in quolibet horum.
>
> Praeterea. Unum eorum non includit in se vim omnium aliorum: quod requiritur in partibus potentialibus; sed unumquodque ad suum officium servit.
>
> Ideo dicendum est cum aliis, quod sunt partes integrales.
>
> Sed sciendum quod partes integrales sunt duplices.

> Quaedam sunt partes quantitatis: quae sunt unius rationis, ut in totis homogeneis; quandoque vero diversarum rationum, ut in totis heterogeneis.
>
> Quaedam vero sunt partes essentiae, sicut materia et forma, non quantitatis. Et hae semper sunt diversarum rationum, et habent ordinem naturae ad invicem, et quandoque etiam ordinem temporis in his quorum esse non est simul.

In summary, we can distinguish the kinds of whole and part seen above first into three: the composed whole, the universal whole, and the potential whole.

The composed whole can be the quantitative whole or the essential whole.

> The quantitative whole either has homogenous parts or heterogeneous parts.
>
> The essential whole speaking naturally are matter and form, but speaking logically genus and species.

the universal whole is either said of it parts equally with the same meaning or unequally, before and after.

> Following Andronicus of Rhodes, the former can be divided into the division of a genus into species or accidental division (the latter is divided into subject by its accidents or accident by its subjects or accident by accidents

I do not know of a distinction of kinds of potential whole

Thus ten wholes and parts are ultimately distinguished (four kinds of composed whole and composing parts, five kinds of universal whole and subject parts, and the potential whole), but by always dividing into two or three.

Aristotle and Euclid sometimes distinguish the homogenous quantitative part into the part which measures the whole and the part that does not measure the whole. Thus two is in one sense a part of three; and in another, only a part of

four and six and whatever else it measures by a number and in this sense not a part, but *parts* of three.

NOTE FOR SIXTH BOOK OF WISDOM

In the first reading of the *Sixth Book of Wisdom*, Aristotle distinguishes wisdom from all other forms of reasoned out understanding or reasoned out knowledge. At the same time, he shows how wisdom differs from natural philosophy and mathematics in the way it defines. We see that wisdom differs both in its subject from those of natural philosophy and mathematics and in how it considers its subject.

And after recalling in the beginning of the second reading the senses of *being* distinguished in the Fifth Book of Wisdom, he considers two of them (being by happening and being as true) briefly in the rest of the readings in this book (readings two through four) and shows why they are not the main kinds of being to be considered in wisdom (which main kinds are being according to the figures of predication and being as act and ability). The main kinds of being will be considered in Book Seven and Eight (which are chiefly about substance) and Book Nine (which is about ability and act).

In readings two and three of this book, he considers being by happening, and in the fourth and last reading, he considers being as true.

We can see, then, that Aristotle is determining the subject of wisdom and how that subject should be considered before beginning the consideration of being as being. This is in accord with what was taught in the fifth reading of the Second Book. We should know the road to follow and the way of going forward in any reasoned out knowledge before we set out into that reasoned out knowledge.

Following Thomas's exposition or laying out of the first reading in Book Six, we have placed part of his exposition of Boethius's *de Trinitate* where Boethius, following Aristotle, has distinguished the forms or kinds of looking reasoned out understanding and their ways of going forward. Although Thomas has explained much of this in laying out the text of Aristotle, he has given us his most complete consideration of these matters in this exposition of the text of Boethius and the questions he has developed for them.

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NOTE FOR SIXTH BOOK OF WISDOM, READING ONE

Aristotle distinguishes wisdom in this reading from all other forms of reasoned out understanding (or reasoned out knowledge) in general and in particular from the other forms of theoretical or looking reasoned out understanding.

In the second book of *Natural Hearing* (customarily called the *Physics*), he had distinguished between natural philosophy and mathematics and between nature and art.

Underlying these distinctions being where they are is an important principle or beginning which can be stated thus: it belongs to the higher knowledge and that which is more like wisdom and which more knows itself to distinguish between itself and the lower knowledge and to show any order there is between them.

Since wisdom is the highest or greatest perfection of reason, and it belongs to reason to distinguish and order things, this must belong to wisdom most of all and to other forms of knowledge as they are more like wisdom.

And inductively this can be seen.

The distinction between sensing and understanding must be made or seen by reason which alone can understand this distinction. This distinction also includes the distinction between a knowledge of the singular and a knowledge of the universal (what is common to many and said of many). The distinction between a knowledge of the singular and a knowledge of the universal is found only in our universal knowledge. And wisdom is more a knowledge of the universal than a knowledge of the singular. And reason can know itself, but the senses and the imagination do not even ask what they are.

Likewise the distinction between imagining and thinking or understanding is made or seen only by reason which can think out and understand this important distinction.

And the order of sensing and imagining to thinking and understanding is known only by reason which can think out and understand this order.

The distinction between the looking knowledge of reason and the practical knowledge of reason is made or seen in our looking knowledge. And looking knowledge is more like wisdom than practical knowledge as was seen in the Proemium to Wisdom. Thus, Aristotle in natural philosophy (in the second book of *Natural Hearing*), when determining the subject of natural philosophy, distinguishes between nature and art. And here, he distinguishes between nature and both art and choice.

And the distinction between knowledge expressed in proper words and statements and knowledge expressed in metaphors and other figures of speech and knowledge expressed in symbols and equations can only be found in the first (that is, knowledge expressed in proper words and statements). One can state in words what a statement or a word is and also what is a metaphor or a symbol or an equation. But one cannot say in metaphors what a metaphor is or write an equation or symbols that will tell us what an equation is or what a symbol is. Wisdom is expressed in proper words and statements rather than in figurative speech or in symbols and equations.

In the second book of *Natural Hearing,* Aristotle distinguishes between natural philosophy and mathematics for natural philosophy is more like wisdom than mathematics. But it is only in the sixth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy,* the sixth book *After the Books in Natural Philosophy*, that he distinguishes between wisdom and both natural philosophy and mathematics.

Perhaps the first distinction between our looking knowledge and our practical knowledge is by their ends. And hence, already in the second book of *Wisdom* (and to some extent also in the *Proemium to Wisdom*), we saw Aristotle so distinguishing them. But since every reasoned out understanding is a knowledge of the causes of something, Aristotle here distinguishes the kinds of reasoned out understanding by the causes they know or by the cause of their subject.

But although there are three forms of looking reasoned out understanding, each with its own causes, he distinguishes in general looking reasoned out understanding from making or doing reasoned out understanding by separating just the cause *nature* from the causes *art* and *choice*. Why can he separate in general looking reasoned out understanding from making or doing reasoned out

understanding by separating the cause only in natural philosophy from art and choice.

The reason for this is the proximity of natural things to the things by art or by choice. All three seem to involve motion or doing of some kind so, if natural things are other than artificial things and human acts, even more so will be mathematical things (which are defined without motion and matter) and wisdom (which is about things that do not depend upon matter or motion for their existence).

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NOTE FOR SIXTH BOOK OF WISDOM, READINGS 2-3

Thomas often comes back to the teaching of Aristotle in this *Sixth Book of Wisdom* when showing that not everything comes to be by necessity:

> Nec tamen verum est quod ea quae directe causantur a corporibus caelestibus, ex necessitate ab eis proveniant;
>
> ut enim Philosophus dicit in VI *Metaphy*., si omnis effectus ex aliqua causa procederet, et omnis causa ex necessitate produceret suum effectum, sequeretur quod omnia essent necessaria.
>
> Sed utrumque istorum est falsa:
>
> quia aliquae causae, etiam cum sint sufficientes, non ex necessitate producunt suos effectus, quia possunt impediri, sicut patet in omnibus causis naturalibus.
>
> Nec iterum verum est quod omne quod fit, habet causam naturalem; ea enim quae fiunt per accidens, non fiunt ab aliqua causa activa naturali; quia quod est per accidens, non est ens et unum.
>
> Sic ergo occursus impedientis, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in corpus caeleste sicut in causam: agit enim corpus caeleste per modum agentis naturalis.[1]

In the following texts, Thomas replies in particular to various ways in which thinkers have laid down that all things happen by necessity:

> Ad decimum quartum dicendum, quod quatuor viis processerunt aliqui ponentes omnia ex necessitate evenire.
>
> Quarum una fuit via Stoicorum, qui imponebant necessitatem futuris eventibus ex certa serie causarum ad invicem connexarum, quam fatum dicebant; et ad hoc tendit haec ratio.

---

[1] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, Q. VI, Ad 21

Sed Aristoteles solvit eam in VI *Metaphys.*, dicens, quod si duo supponantur, quod scilicet omne quod evenit habet causam, et quod posita causa necesse est effectum poni, sequitur omnia ex necessitate contingere; erit enim quemlibet effectum futurum reducere in aliquam causam praesentem vel praeteritam, quam ex quo est vel fuit, necesse est eam esse vel fuisse; puta, quod iste occidetur, si de nocte exibit domo; exibit autem, si volet bibere; quod volet, si sitiet; et hoc erit, si comedet salsa; et forte iam comederat, vel comedit: unde sequitur quod necessarium erit eum occidi.

Sed utraque praedictarum suppositionum falsa est.

Falsum enim est quod causa posita, etiamsi de se sit sufficiens, necesse est effectum poni, quia potest impediri, puta ignis a combustione lignorum per inectionem aquae.

Similiter etiam non est verum quod omne quod evenit, habet causam. Quaedam enim eveniunt per accidens; quod autem est per accidens non habet causam, quia proprie non est ens, ut Plato dixit. Unde quod iste fodiat sepulcrum, causam habet; et iterum quod in aliquo loco conditus est thesaurus, causam habet; sed iste concursus qui est per accidens, scilicet hunc volentem sepulcrum fodere in loco ubi est thesaurus reconditus; non habet causam, quia est per accidens.

Ad decimumquintum dicendum, quod quidam voluerunt imponere necessitatem futuris eventibus ex providentia divina, in qua fatum constituebant; et ad hoc videtur haec ratio tendere. Ideo autem Augustinus dici [lib. LXXXIII *Quaestionum*, quaest. 24] nihil in mundo temere fieri, quia omnia sunt providentiae divinae subiecta.

Sed hoc non tollit contingentiam futurorum eventuum, neque propter certitudinem divinae cognitionis, neque propter efficaciam divinae voluntatis.

Et hoc quidem quantum ad scientiam patet ex his quae supra dicta sunt. Sicut autem se habet divina scientia ad futura contingentia, sic se habet oculus noster ad contingentia quae in praesenti sunt, ut dictum est. Unde sicut certissime videmus Socratem sedere cum

sedet, nec tamen propter hoc sequitur quod sit simpliciter necessarium; ita etiam ex hoc quod Deus videt omnia quae eveniunt, in seipsis, non tollitur contingentia rerum.

Ex parte autem voluntatis considerandum est, quod voluntas divina est universaliter causa entis, et universaliter omnium quae consequuntur modum necessitatis et contingentiae. Ipsa autem est supra ordinem necessarii et contingentis, sicut est supra totum esse creatum.

Et ideo necessitas et contingentia in rebus distinguuntur non per habitudinem ad voluntatem divinam, quae est causa communis, sed per comparationem ad causas creatas, quas proportionaliter divina voluntas ad effectus ordinavit; ut scilicet necessariorum effectuum, sint causae intransmutabiles, contingentium autem transmutabiles.

Ad decimum sextum dicendum, quod quidam etiam conati sunt futuris eventibus necessitatem imponere ex virtute caelestium corporum, in qua fatum constituebant; et secundum hoc procedit haec ratio.

Quae quidem deficit primo in hoc quod non omnia principia futurorum eventuum sunt subiecta virtuti caelestium corporum; intellectus enim, et per consequens voluntas quae in ratione est, non sunt vires alicuius organi corporalis; et ideo non subduntur directe actioni alicuius corporalis virtutis.

Deficit etiam quantum ad effectus pure corporales: virtus enim corporis caelestis est virtus naturalis; natura autem semper tendit ad unum; id autem quod est per accidens non est vere unum, ut dicitur in V *Metaphy*.

Unde id quod est per accidens, potest quidem quandoque reduci in aliquam causam intellectualem, quae potet accipere ut unum id quod est per accidens; non autem in causam naturalem.

Manifestum est autem, in effectibus pure corporalibus multa evenire per accidens: puta quod fulgur cadat in loco nemoroso, ubi sunt multae arbores sitae, quae accenduntur, et comburunt totam silvam. Unde non omnes effectus pure corporales reduci possunt

> sicut in causa in virtutem caelestis corporis; et propter hoc non omnes corporales effectus caelestium corporum ex necessitate eveniunt, quia possunt per accidens impediri, sicut dicitur in lib. *de divinat. per somnium*, cap. II, quod multa in commotionibus aëris non eveniunt quorum signa praecesserunt in caelesibus corporibus.
>
> Ad decimumoctavum dicendum, quod ratio illa tangit quartam viam ex qua aliqui necessitatem actibus humanis imponere voluerunt.
>
> Sed ad hoc repellendum, considerandum est, quod movetur voluntas a bono, sicut intellectus a vero. Intellectus autem ex necessitate assentit primis principiis, quae sunt secundum se nota; et omnibus illis quae ex his considerat ex necessitate concludi, quia sine his principia vera esse non possunt.
>
> Et similiter voluntas ex necessitate appetit ultimum finem, qui est propter se appetendus (Omnes ex necessitate volunt esse beati.); similiter ea quae considerat ut sine quibus beatitudo esse non possit. Alia vero eligibilia quae possunt considerari vel sicut ad beatitudinem pertinentia secundum aliquam rationem boni, vel sicut impeditiva, ita tamem ut sine his beatitudo possit haberi, voluntas non ex necessitate affectat; sicut nec intellectus opinabilibus assentit de necessitate, in quibus considerat quod eis remotis nihilominus stare possunt principia per se nota.[2]

There is a possibility that some determinists are making the fallacy of the accidental. In the following text, Thomas developes the role of the per accidens or through happening or by happening in showing why not all things happen by necessity:

> Sed quia huiusmodi causae non deficiunt in minori parte, nisi propter aliquam causam impedientem, videtur adhuc praedictum inconveniens non vitari: quia et ipsum impedimentum talis causae ex necessitate contingit.
>
> Et ideo, secundo, oportet dicere quod omne quod est per se, habet causam: quod autem est per accidens, non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, cum non sit vere unum. Album enim causam habet, et

[2] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, Q. XVI, Art. 7, Ad 14, 15, 16 & 18

> similiter musicum; sed album musicum non habet causam, quia non est vere ens, neque vere unum.
>
> Manifestum est autem quod causa impediens actionem alicuius causae ordinatae ad suum effectum ut in pluribus, concurrit ei interdum per accidens: unde talis concursus non habet causam, inquantum est per accidens.
>
> Ad tertium dicendum quod licet causa impediens effectum alterius causae, reducatur in aliquod caeleste corpus sicut in causam; tamen concursus duarum causarum, cum sit per accidens, non reducitur in causam caelestem, ut dictum est.[3]

In many texts, Thomas points out that reason can take as one the accidental which nature cannot and that therefore the accidental can more be reduced to an understanding cause than to nature:

> natura autem semper tendit ad unum; id autem quod est per accidens, non est vere unum, ut dicitur in V Metaphys. Unde id quod est per accidens, potest quidem quandoque reduci in aliquam causam intellectualem, quae potest accipere ut unum id quod est per accidens; non autem in causam naturalem.[4]

And a fuller text from Thomas on the same:

> Quamvis autem secundum praedictum inclinationis modum, corpora caelestia disponant ad aliquos actus humanos necessitatem non imponendo, non tamen ad omnes eventus humanos talis inclinatio se potest extendere. Corpora enim caelestia naturaliter agunt. Est autem hoc naturae proprium ut ad unum aliquid tendat, sicut etiam actio rei naturalis ab uno procedit principio, scilicet a propria forma rei, quae est naturalis actionis principium. Intellectus vero agit per formas mente conceptas, quae in eodem possunt multiplicari: et ideo potestates rationales non determinantur ad unum, sed se habent ad multa.
>
> Ea vero quae in humanis eventibus casualiter accidunt, per accidens sunt, puta quod homo fodiens sepulcrum, inveniat thesaurum. Quod

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[3] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 115, Art. 6, C, Ad 3

[4] *De Malo,* Q. 16, Art. 7, Ad 16

> vero per accidens est, non est unum. Unde nullum agens naturale inclinare potest ad id quod per accidens evenit. Posset igitur esse in homine aliqua inclinatio naturalis ut sepulcrum foderet, quia hic hoc aliquid unum est, et similiter ad hoc quod thesaurum quaereret; sed hoc quod fodienti sepulcrum thesaurus occurrat, non potest causam naturalem habere. Non igitur per modum inclinationis ad omnes eventus humanos secundum praedictum opinionem sortium inquisitio efficax esse potest.
>
> Sed intellectus potest accipere ut unum quod evenit per accidens, ex multis unam compositionem formando: et ideo nihil prohibet aliqua quae per accidens evenire videntur, ab aliquo intellectu esse praeordinata; puta si aliquis lapidem in via ponat, ad quem qui ab eo mittitur, impingens cadat; casus quidem euntis est per accidens, non eveniens secundum eius propositum; est autem dispositum per intellectum alterius eum mittentis.[5]

We should take into account this ability of reason to take as one what is by happening:

> nihil prohibet id quod est per accidens, accipi ut unum ab aliquo intellectu: alioquin intellectus formare non posset hanc propositionem, Fodiens sepulcrum invenit thesaurum.[6]

But we should not confuse the way things are with the way we understand or know them.

Duane H. Berquist

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[5] *De Sortibus Ad Dominum Iacobum De Burgo*, Caput 4, n. 661

[6] Thomas Aquinas,*Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 116, Art 1, c

NOTE FOR SIXTH BOOK OF WISDOM, READING 4

Aristotle is very brief in this reading when touching upon a distinction between good and true. And we would probably miss it without the exposition of Thomas. The good is chiefly in things, but truth is chiefly in the mind or reason. Thomas often teaches and uses this distinction. Thus in the *Summa Theologiae*, he considers the goodness of God under his substance, but that God is truth under the operations of God after he has considered the understanding of God. In this text, he points out that knowledge takes place as the known is in the knower while love or desire is completed by the lover being inclined to the thing in itself:

> ...sicut bonum nominat id in quod tendit appetitus, ita verum nominat id in quod tendit intellectus. Hoc autem distat inter appetitum et intellectum, sive quamcumque cognitionem, quia cognitio est secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente: appetitus autem est secundum quod appetens inclinatur in ipsam rem appetitivam. Et sic terminus appetitus quod est bonum, est in re appetibili: sed terminus cognitionis, quod est verum, est in ipso intellectu.[1]

And this is why in common speech, reason is said *to grasp* its object for what is grasped by the hand is contained in the hand. Or when reason wants to define something, it *takes* the genus and then *taking* the differences it adds them to the genus. But loving is more a *giving* of the heart to its object. Thus the song says "I left my heart *in* San Francisco" and Christ said that "*Where* your treasure is, *there* also shall your heart be." And because truth is chiefly in the mind, there is the same knowledge of opposites, as the medical art is both a knowledge of health and of sickness and ethics, a knowledge of virtue and of vice. But there is not the same love of opposites for in things one opposite excludes the other and love tends to things in themselves. Thus if I know what virtue is, this helps me to know what vice is and knowing normal blood pressure helps me to know abnormal blood pressure. But the love of virtue excludes the love of vice and the love of health prevents one from loving sickness. Hence, the act of grasping something by reason is by a motion

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[1] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 16, Art. 1, c.

from things to the soul while the act of the heart is by the motion from the soul to things:

> ...actus apprehensionis in nobis, qui scientiam a rebus accipimus, est secundum motum a rebus ad animam.
>
> Viciniores autem sunt rebus sensibilibus sensus quam intellectus; et ideo sequitur quod sicut sensus recipit a rebus sensibilibus, ita intellectus a sensibus.
>
> Actus autem appetitivae virtutis est secundum motum ab anima ad res;
>
> et ideo e converso naturaliter ab appetitu superiori procedit motus ad appetitum inferiorem, ut dicitur in III *De Anima*.[2]

In the following text, Thomas explains why the truth about something bad can be good:

> Veritas est de his quorum ratio completur per operationem animae et fundamentum habent in re.
>
> Non est autem inconveniens quod de re mala sit operatio animae bona; sicut etiam non ens in re dicitur ens in anima ratiocinante, ut negationes et privationes, sicut patet ex IV *Metaph.,* text. 2, secundum Commentatorem.
>
> Unde si procedatur a bonitate veritatis secundum quod completur in operatione animae ad bonitatem ejus quod est in re, erit fallacia accidenti; hoc enim quod est mala esse, accidit huic quod est intelligible vel significabile sicut est in re, in quo consistit ratio veri, ut scilicet significetur vel intelligatur aliquid sicut est in re. Unde nihil prohibet dicere quod mala esse est verum; sed haec veritas qua vere dicitur vel significatur mala esse, est bonum quamvis mala esse sit malum.[3]

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[2] Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, Q. 2, Art. 3, Ad 7

[3] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist XLVI, Q. I, Art. 2, Ad 1

Although knowledge of the bad can be good, love of the bad cannot be good. This is connected with the good and the bad being in things and love tending toward, or being an inclination to, the thing in itself. But the bad is known by being in reason according to the way of reason and not to the way it is in things. Sickness as it is in things; that is, in the body, is always a bad thing as such. But sickness as it is in reason in the form say of a definition does not make reason bad. Rather it enables or perfects reason in knowing what sickness is. Since there is the same knowledge of opposites, and therefore of good and the bad opposed to it, all knowledge would be bad if it were bad to know the bad. As it is, all knowledge *as such* is good as the Philosopher says in the beginning of the first book *About the Soul*.

Note also that in this text it is said that truth has a foundation in things. A distinction about that foundation will be considered later in this note where we will read Thomas distinguishing between what has a proximate foundation in things, what has a remote foundation in things, and what has no foundation in things.

In the Fifth Book of Wisdom, Thomas saw that the words *substance being* and *one* are names of the subject of wisdom or first philosophy, but the word *perfect* is the first name pertaining to the properties of being and one. The words *true* and *good* name more the perfections of being and one. Thomas often discusses how perfection pertains diversely to true and good as in this text:

> duplex est perfectio; scilicet prima et secunda: prima perfectio est forma uniuscuiusque, per quam habet esse; unde ab ea nulla res destituitur dum manet; secunda perfectio est operatio, quae est finis rei, vel id propter quod ad finem devenitur et hac perfectione interdum res destituitur. Ex prima autem perfectione resultat ratio veri in rebus; ex hoc enim quod res formam habet, artem divini intellectus imitatur, et sui notitiam in anima gignit. Sed ex parte secundae consequitur in ipsa ratio bonitatis, quae consurgit ex fine; et ideo malum simpliciter invenitur in rebus, non autem falsum.[4]

[4] *De Veritate,* Q, I, Art. 10, Ad 3 in second group

Another text where Thomas developes this connection between true & good and form & end:

> Si autem consideremus obiecta voluntatis et intellectus, inveniemus quod obiectum intellectus est primum principium in genere causae formalis, est enim eius obiectum ens et verum;
>
> sed obiectum voluntatis est primum principium in genere causae finalis, nam eius obiectum est bonum, sub quo comprehenduntur omnes fines, sicut sub vero comprehenduntur omnes formae apprehensae.
>
> Unde et ipsum bonum, in quantum est quaedam forma apprehensibilis, continetur sub vero quasi quoddam verum; et ipsum verum, in quantum est finis intellectualis operationis, continetur sub bono ut quoddam particulare bonum.[5]

Note that Thomas says in the above text that the object of reason is being and the true ("est enim eius obiectum ens et verum"). One interesting distinction where we see that true is closer to being than good is the distinction between necessary and contingent. Consider the following two texts of Thomas, one of which is about the true and the other about being:

> objectum intellectus est verum, cujus differentiae sunt necessarium et contingens; non autem sunt differentiae boni inquantum huiusmodi, quod est objectum appetitus. Et ideo necessarium et contingens magis possunt diversificari intellectum quam voluntatem.[6]
>
> Adhuc. Ad divinam providentiam pertinet ut gradus entium qui possibiles sunt adimpleantur, ut ex supra dictis patet. Ens autem dividitur per contingens et necessarium: et est per se

[5] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, Q. VI, corpus
[6] *Scriptum super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XVII, Art. I, Sol. III, Ad 3

> divisio entis. Si igitur divina providentia excluderet omnem contingentiam, non omnes gradus entium conservarentur.[7]

Necessary and contingent are differences of being and true, but not of the good as such. And in the Second Book of Wisdom, Aristotle spoke of the disposition or order of things in being and in truth as the same. This is something of a paradox in that good and bad are in things while truth is primarily in the reason or understanding.

And in this text, Thomas says that the true is *magis motivum in ratione obiecti* and the good is *magis motivum secundum rationem finis:*

> ...ex hoc ipso quod quod verum est intentio quaedam quasi in mente existens, habet quod sit magis formale quam bonum, et magis motivum in ratione obiecti; sed bonum est magis motivum secundum rationem finis[8]

Many modern thinkers seem to prefer the will to reason or to put the will above reason. One reason for this could be democratic customs which make them love liberty above all other goods. Another reason could be because they understand no higher cause than the mover and the will is a mover and the mover is better than the moved. In the following text, Thomas distinguishes between reason and the will in reference to liberty and also points out that the superiority of the will as mover is not to be better simply. (So the moderns may be deceived by confusing what is so in some way with what is so simply):

> Praeterea, illud quod est liberum sui, est nobilius eo quod non est liberum, Sed intellectus non est liber sui, cum possit cogi; voluntas autem est libera, cum cogi non possit. Ergo voluntas est nobilior intellectu.
>
> ...libertas voluntatis non ostendit eam ese nobiliorem simpliciter, sed nobiliorem in movendo: quod ex sequentibus patebit.[9]

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[7] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber III, Caput LXXII, 2nd argument
[8] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Malo*, Q. VI, Ad 12
[9] *De Veritate,* Q. 22, Art. 11, Sed Contra 2 and Ad 2

In the following text, Thomas explains why reason can be said to be coerced, but not the will:

> intellectus aliquid naturaliter intelligit, sicut et voluntas aliquid naturaliter vult; sed coactio non est contraria intellectui secundum suam rationem, sicut et voluntati.
>
> Intellectus enim si habeat inclinationem in aliquid, non tamen nominat ipsam inclinationem hominis, sed voluntas ipsam inclinationem hominis nominat. Unde quidquid fit secundum voluntatis inclinationem, fit secundum hominis inclinationem, et per hoc non potest esse violentum.
>
> Sed operatio intellectus potest esse contra inclinationem hominis, quae est voluntas; ut cum alicui placet aliqua opinio, sed propter efficaciam rationum deducitur ad assentiendum contrarium per intellectum.[10]

Thomas elaborates upon the will as a mover in this text:

> Sed movere per modum causae agentis est voluntatis, et non intellectus: eo quod voluntas comparatur ad res secundum quod in seipsis sunt; intellectus autem comparatur ad res secundum quod sunt per modum spiritualem in anima. Agere autem et moveri convenit rebus secundum esse proprium quo in seipsis subsistunt, et non secundum quod sunt in anima per modum intentionis; calor enim in anima non calefacit, sed in igne. Et sic comparatio voluntatis ad res est secundum quod competit eis motus, non autem comparatio intellectus; et praeterea actus voluntatis est quadam inclinatio in aliquid, non autem actus intellectus. Inclinatio autem est dispositio moventis secundum quod efficiens movet. Unde patet quod voluntas habet movere per modum causae agentis, et non intellectus...
>
> Cum autem aliqua potentia super aliam fertur, comparatur ad eam secundum suam proprietatem...unde et ipsa voluntas, cum fertur super potentias animae, fertur in eas ut in res quasdam quibus convenit motus et operatio, et inclinat

[10] *De Veritate*, Q. 22, Art 5, Ad 3

> unamquamque in proprium operationem. Et sic non solum res exteriores movet voluntas per modum causae agentis, sed etiam ipsas animae partes.
>
> Ad quintum dicendum, quod quaelibet potentia preeminet alteri in hoc quod est proprium sibi: sicut tactus perfectius comparatur ad calorem, quem sentit per se, quam visus, qui sentit ipsum per accidens; et similiter intellectus completius comparatur ad verum quam voluntas; et voluntas perfectius comparatur ad bonum quod est in rebus, quam intellectus. Unde quamvis intellectus simpliciter sit nobilior voluntate, ad minus respectu aliquarum rerum; tamen secundum rationem movendi, quae competit voluntati ex ratione propria obiecti, voluntas nobilior invenitur.[11]

The question of whether the reason or the will is superior is involved. Here is one text leading us into the consideration of that question:

> in rebus omnibus duplex perfectio invenitur: una qua in se subsistit, alia qua ad res alias ordinatur. et utraque perfectio in rebus materialibus finita et terminata est; quia et formam unam determinatam habet per quam in una tantum specie est; et etiam per determinatam virtutem ad res quasdam sibi proportionatas habet inclinationem et ordinem, sicut grave ad centrum.
>
> Ex utraque autem parte res immateriales infinitatem habent quodammodo, quia sunt quodammodo omnia: sive inquantum essentia rei immaterialis est exemplar et similitudo omnium sicut in Deo accidit; sive quia habet similitudinem omnium vel actu vel potentia, sicut in angelis et animabus accidit; et ex hac parte accidit eis cognitio.
>
> Similiter etiam ad omnes res inclinationem et ordinem habent, ex qua parte accidit eis voluntas, secundum quam omnia placent vel displicent vel actu vel potentia.

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[11] *De Veritate,* Q. 22, Art. 12 in C and Ad 5

Et secundum quod aliquam immaterialitatem participant, secundum hoc cognitionis et voluntatis participativa fiunt. Unde et animalia cognoscunt, inquantum species sensibilium immaterialiter in organis sensuum recipiuntur et secundum intentiones spiritualiter ex rebus perceptas per appetitum sensibilem ad diversa inclinantur.

Patet ergo quod cognitio pertinet ad perfectionem cognoscentis qua in seipso perfectum est; voluntas autem pertinet ad perfectionem rei secundum ordinem ad alias res; et ideo objectum cognoscitivae virtutis est verum quod est in anima, ut dicit Philosophus in VI Meta., objectum autem appetitivae bonum quod est in rebus, ut ibidem dicitur.

Potest ergo comparari potentia cognoscitiva ad appetitivam tripliciter.

Primo secundum ordinem; et sic cognitiva potentia naturaliter prior est, quia prius est perfectio rei in seipsa quam secundum ordinem ad aliam.

Secundo, quantum ad capacitatem; et sic sunt aequales, quia sicut cognoscitiva est respectu omnium, ita et appetitiva; unde etiam mutuo se includunt, quia intellectus et voluntatem cognoscit et voluntas ea quae ad intellectum pertinent appetit vel amat.

Tertio possunt comparari secundum eminentiam vel dignitatem; et sic se habent ut excedentia et excessa, quia si consideretur intellectus et voluntas et quae ad ipsa pertinent, ut quaedam proprietates et accidentia ejus in quo sunt, sic intellectus est praestantior, et quae ad ipsum pertinent. Si sutem considerentur ut potentiae, id est secundum ordinem ad actus et objecta, sic voluntas et quae ad ipsam pertinent excedit.

Si autem quaeratur quid harum simpliciter dignius sit, dicendum quod res quaedam sunt anima superiores et quaedam inferiores. Unde cum per voluntatem et amorem homo in ipsas res volitas et amatas quodammodo trahatur,

> per cognitionem autem e converso res cognitae in cognoscente efficiantur per sui similitudines; earum quae sunt supra animam, est nobilior et altior amor quam cognitio; illarum vero quae sunt infra animam, est cognitio potior. Unde etiam multarum rerum quarum est malus amor, est bona cognitio.[12]

There is also an imperfection in reason's way of doing that is not found in the will's way of doing. This imperfection is in taking from images or from sensible things in order to understand. The will does not have this kind of imperfection as Thomas explains in the following two texts:

> Ad primum igitur dicendum quod dona possunt dici *virtutes*, inquantum perficiunt ad bene operandum, et *humanae* secundum quod operationes quae ex donis eliciuntur non sunt communes hominibus et brutis; sed sunt supra virtutes, inquantum *ultra humanum modum* perficiunt.
>
> Ad quintum dicendum quod voluntas non habet aliquam imperfectionem de ratione sua in nobis quantum ad modum suae operationis, sicut intellectus qui cognoscit accipiendo a phantasmatibus. Unde in statu viae Deum per essentiam amamus, non autem videmus.
>
> Et ideo non potest accipi supra illam virtutem quae est in voluntate, aliquod donum perficiens ad agendum nobiliori modo quam sit modus virtutis.
>
> Et ideo cum donum non sit supra virtutem nisi de ratione modi, non erit inconveniens quod virtus perficiens voluntatem quantum ad sui supremum, dignior sit quolibet dono.[13]
>
> 1. Dona enim perficiunt ad modum altiorem quam virtus. Ergo singulis virtutibus debent respondere singula dona. Sed inter theologicas virtutes soli fidei videntur dona aliqua respondere

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[12] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist XXVIII, Q. I, Art IV, Resp.
[13] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXIV, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad 1 & Ad 5

> sicut intellectus et sapientia. Ergo videtur quod debeant esse alia dona quae respondent spei et caritati.
>
> Ad primum igitur dicendum quod fides est in intellectu, spes autem et caritas in voluntate, ut prius dictum est.
>
> Intellectus autem humanus ex sua natura habet imperfectionem in modo intelligendi, quia spiritualia non potest percipere nisi deveniens in ea ex sensibilibus; sed voluntas non habet ex sui natura aliquem modum imperfectionis, ut dictum est.
>
> Et ideo caritati et spei non respondet aliquod donum quod perfectiori modo operatur: imperfectio enim quae est in actu spei, non est ex modo operandi, sed magis ex distantia objecti.[14]

In the following text, Thomas has an extremely interesting before and after. Truth is after the being of things, he says, but before knowledge:

> Convenientiam vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen *verum*. Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitam, ita quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis: sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur per speciem coloris, cognoscit colorem. Prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens intellectui correspondeat: quae quidem correspondentia adaequatio rei et intellectus dicitur; et in hoc formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit verum supra ens, scilicet conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus; ad quam conformitatem, ut dictum est, sequitur cognitio rei.
>
> Sic ergo entitas rei praecedat rationem veritatis, sed cognitio est quidem veritatis effectus.[15]

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[14] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Distinctio XXXIV, Quaest. I, Art. II, Obj. 1 & Ad I

[15] *De Veritate*, Q. 1, Art. 1, c.

Thomas here says that knowledge is an effect of truth. Thus, although truth is primarily in the mind and not in things, yet this does not mean that truth is an effect of our knowledge. Rather our knowledge is an effect of truth. We could not know the conformity of our mind and things if they were not conformed.

The following text makes a distinction which in part might seem to contradict the previous text insofar as it speaks of truth as *following* the act of reason or the understanding, but perhaps it clarifies the previous text:

> ...veritas est in intellectu...sicut consequens actum intellectus, et sicut cognita per intellectum.
>
> Consequitur namque intellectus operationem, secundum quod iudicium intellectus est de re secundum quod est.
>
> Cognoscitur autem ab intellectu secundum quod intellectus reflectitur supra actum suum, non solum secundum quod cognoscit actum suum, sed secundum quod cognoscit proportionem eius ad rem: quod quidem cognosci non potest nisi cognita natura ipsius actus; quae cognosci non potest nisi cognoscatur natura principii activi, quod est ipse intellectus, in cuius natura est ut rebus conformetur; unde secundum hoc cognoscat veritatem intellectus quod supra seipsum reflectitur.[16]

When reason judges things to be as they are, it is true. But when reason reflects upon this and knows the conformity of itself to things, then it knows truth. And in this way, knowledge of the truth is an effect of truth. This also helps us to understand why it is possible not to know that you know for it is difficult to know yourself.

In the following text, Thomas explains why reason knows truth only in its second act and points out that the perfection of reason is the true as known:

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[16] *De Veritate,* Q. I, Art. 9, corpus

> ...verum...secundum sui primam rationem est in intellectu. Cum autem omnis res sit vera secundum quod habet propriam formam naturae suae, necesse est quod intellectus, inquantum est cognoscens, sit verus inquantum habet similitudinem rei cognitae, quae est forma eius inquantum est cognoscens.
>
> Et propter hoc per conformitatem intellectus et rei veritas definitur.
>
> Unde conformitatem istam cognoscere, est cognoscere veritatem.
>
> Hanc autem nullo modo sensus cognoscit...
>
> Intellectus autem conformitatem suam ad rem intelligibilem cognoscere potest: sed tamen non apprehendit eam secundum quod cognoscit de aliquo quid est; sed quando iudicat rem ita se habere sicut est forma quam de re apprehendit, tunc primo cognoscit et dicit verum. Et hoc facit componendo et dividendo...
>
> Veritas quidem igitur potest esse in sensu, vel in intellectu cognoscente quod quid est, ut in quadam re vera: non autem ut cognitum in cognoscente, quod importat nomen *veri.* Perfectio enim intellectus est verum ut cognitum.[17]

Although many truths are hard for us to know, that there is truth is known through itself:

> veritatem autem esse, est per se notum.[18]

Indeed, if someone said that *truth does not exist*, he would be hard put to say whether his statement is true or false.

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[17] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 16, Art. 2, corpus

[18] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. III, Art. II, C.

In the following text, Thomas indicates that truth is an equality of the mind with things and that the mind is false when it says more or less than things:

> bonum virtutum intellectualium consistit in hoc quod verum dicatur. Veritas autem consistit in quadam adaequatione intellectus et vocis ad rem. Et quia aequalitas est medium inter majus et minus, ideo oportet quod bonum virtutis intellectualis in medio consistat, ut scilicet dicatur de re hoc quod est. Si autem excedat vel in plus vel in minus, erit falsum quod se habet ad virtutes intellectuales, sicut vitium ad morales; et hoc inquantum intellectus absolute aliquid considerat; inquantum vero de uno in aliud discurrit, accipitur medium non solum secundum commensurationem ad rem, sed secundum commensurationem conclusionum ad principia, vel eorum quae sunt ad finem in operativis.
>
> sicut dicit Philosophus in X Meta. (1053a 321-33, l. 2 nn 1956-1960) mensura intellectus nostri est res. Et ideo secundum quod adaequatur rei, est rectum ipsius. Nihilominus et principia sunt regula conclusionum, et intelligens est quodammodo regula principiorum.[19]

Shakespeare also speaks of truth as a mean between two extremes, one of which is more and the other less than the truth.

King Lear, Act IV, Sc. 7, Kent:

> All my reports go with the modest truth,
> Nor more nor clipp'd, but so.

King Henry IV, Part One, Act II, Sc. 4, Falstaff:

> Let them speak.
> If they speak more or less than truth,
> they are villains and the sons of darkness.

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[19] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXXIII, q. I, Art. III, Sol. III & Ad 1

Othello, Act II, Sc. 3, Montano to Iago:

> If partially affin'd, or leagu'd in office,
> Thou dost deliver more or less than truth,
> Thou art no soldier.

But what does it mean to say more or less than the truth? When reason says that what-is (in things) is and what-is-not (in things) is not, it is speaking truly. But when it says what-is is not or what-is-not is, it is speaking falsely. To say *what-is is not* is to subtract from the truth or to say less than the truth. To say that *what-is-not is* is to add to the truth or to say more than the truth. The courtroom oath "to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth. " in its second and third phrases is not just emphasizing that one should tell the truth, but they are excluding the two ways of speaking false. Swearing to tell the whole truth excludes saying *what-is is not.* And swearing to tell nothing but the truth excludes saying what-is-not is.

Returning to the closeness of being and true, one should note in the following text of Thomas how being does not express fully the definition of true:

> ista definitio, verum est id quod est, non perfecte exprimit rationem veritatis, sed quasi materialiter tantum, nisi secundum quod esse significat affirmationem propositionis, scilicet ut dicatur id esse verum quod sic esse dicitur vel intelligitur ut in re est; et sic etiam falsum dicatur quod non est, id est quod non est ut dicitur vel intelligitur; et hoc in rebus inveniri potest.[20]

However, as Thomas points out, one sense of the word *being* can mean true. And this also is a sign of true being closer to being than good.

In the following text, Thomas speaks of *true* being said of the thing insofar as it is the cause of truth:

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[20] *De Veritate*, Q. I, Art 10, Ad 1 in first group

> Verum per prius dicitur de veritate intellectus, et de enuntiatione dicitur inquantum est signum illius veritatis; de re autem dicitur, inquantum est causa.
>
> Unde res dicitur vera quae nata est de se facere veram apprehensionem quantum ad ea quae apparent exterius in ipsa; et similiter dicitur falsa res quae nata est facere, quantum ad id quod apparet exterius de ipsa, falsam apprehensionem, sicut aurichalcum dicitur aurum falsum.
>
> Et inde est etiam quod homo dicitur falsus, qui dictis vel factis ostendit de se aliud quam sit; et per oppositum intelligitur veritas quae est virtus in dictis et factis consistens, ut dicit Philosophus,V Metaph., text.34[21]

In the following text, Thomas brings out a distinction of what is outside the soul in comparison to the truth which is in the soul:

> extra animam duo invenimus, scilicet rem ipsam, et privationes et negationes rei; quae quidem duo non eodem modo se habent ad veritatem, quia non eodem modo se habent ad intellectum.
>
> Res enim ipsa ex specie quam habet divino intellectui adaequatur, sicut artificialis arti; et ex virtute eiusdem speciei nata est sibi intellectum nostrum adaequare, in quantum, per similitudinem sui receptam in anima, cognitionem de se facit.
>
> Sed non ens extra animam consideratum, neque habet aliquid unde intellectui divino aequetur, neque unde cognitionem sui faciat in intellectu nostro. Unde quod intellectui cuicumque aequetur, non est ex seipso non ente, sed ex seipso intellectu, qui rationem non entis accipit in seipso. Res autem quae est aliquid positivum extra animam, habet aliquid in se unde vera dici possit.
>
> Non autem ita est de non esse rei, sed quidquid ei attribuitur est ex parte intellectus. Cum dicit ergo: Veritatem non esse,

[21] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. XIX, Q. V, Art. I, c.

> est verum; cum veritas quae hic significatur, sit de non ente, nihil habet nisi in intellectu. Unde ad destructionem veritatis quae est in re, non sequitur nisi esse veritatis quae est in intellectu.
>
> Et ita patet quod ex hoc non potest concludi nisi veritas quae sit in intellectu, quae est aeterna; et oportet utique quod sit in intellectu aeterno; et haec est veritas aeterna.[22]

Non-being does not make the truth of negative statements as an efficient cause of that truth:

> non esse non est causa veritatis negativarum propositionum quasi faciens eas in intellectu; sed anima ipsa hoc facit conformans seipsam non enti quod est extra animam; unde non esse extra animam existens, non est causa efficiens veritatis, sed quasi exemplaris. Obiectio autem procedebat de causa exemplari efficiente.[23]

A good summary of these points is given by Thomas in the following text:

> Res autem existens extra animam, per formam suam imitatur artem divini intellectus, et per eamdem nata est facere de se veram apprehensionem in intellectu humano, per quam etiam formam unaquaeque res esse habet; unde veritas rerum existentium includit in sui ratione entitatem earum, et superaddit habitudinem adaequationis ad intellectum humanum vel divinum.
>
> Sed negationes vel privationes existentes extra animam non habent aliquam formam, per quam vel imitentur exemplar divinae artis, vel ingerant sui notitiam in intellectu humano; sed quod adaequentur intellectui, est ex parte intellectus, qui earum rationes apprehendit.
>
> Sic ergo patet quod cum dicitur lapis verus et caecitas vera, non eodem modo veritas se habet ad utrumque: veritas enim

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[22] *De Veritate,* Q. 1, Art 5, Ad 2
[23] Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate,* Q 1, Art 8, Ad 7

> de lapide dicta claudit in sui ratione entitatem lapidis, et superaddit habitudinem ad intellectum, quae causatur etiam ex parte ipsius rei, cum habeat aliquid secundum quod referri posssit; sed veritas dicta de caecitate non includit in seipsa privationem quae est caecitas, sed solummodo habitudinem caecitatis ad intellectum; quae etiam non habet aliquid ex parte ipsius caecitatis in quo sustentetur, cum caecitas non adaequetur intellectui ex parte alicuius quod in se habet.[24]

We said before that truth has a foundation in things. In the following text, Thomas distinguishes the two ways that a thought of our reason can have a foundatin in things from the way in which it could have no foundation in things:

> ipsa conceptio intellectus tripliciter se habet ad rem quae est extra animam.
>
> Aliquando enim hoc quod intellectus concipit, est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sicut hoc quod concipitur de hoc nomine "homo" et talis conceptio intellectus habet fundamentum in re immediate, inquantum res ipsa, ex sua conformitate ad intellectum, facit quod intellectus sit verus, et quod nomen significans illum intellectum proprie de re dicatur.
>
> Aliquando autem hoc quod significat nomen non est similitudo rei existentis extra animam, sed est aliquid quod consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem quae est extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt intentiones quas intellectus noster adinvenit, sicut significatum hujus nominis "genus" non est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam existentis; sed ex hoc quod intellectus intelligit animal ut in pluribus speciebus, attribuit ei intentionem generis; et hujusmodi intentionis licet proximum fundamentum non sit in re, sed in intellectu, tamen remotum fundamentum est res ipsa. Unde intellectus non est falsus, qui has intentiones adinvenit. Et simile est de omnibus

[24] *De Veritate,* Q I, Art 8, C

> aliis qui consequuntur ex modo intelligendi, sicut est abstractio mathematicorum et hujusmodi.
>
> Aliquando vero id quod significatur per nomen, non habet fundamentum in re, neque proximum, neque remotum, sicut conceptio chimerae: quia neque est similitudo alicujus rei extra animam, neque consequitur ex modo intelligendi rem aliquam vere: et ideo ista conceptio est falsa.
>
> Unde patet secundum, scilicet quod ratio dicitur esse in re, inquantum significatum nominis, cui accidit esse rationem, est in re: et hoc contingit proprie quando conceptio intellectus est similitudo rei.[25]

And here is another text of Thomas giving the same distinction:

> ratio in intellectu rerum tripliciter se habet.
>
> Quandoque enim apprehendit aliquid quod est in re secundum quod apprehenditur, ut quando apprehenditur forma lapidis.
>
> Quandoque vero apprehendit aliquid quod nullo modo in re est, ut quando quis imaginatur chimaeram vel aliquid hujus modi.
>
> Alquando apprehendit aliquid cui subest in re natura quaedam, non tamen secundum rationem qua apprehenditur; sicut patet quando apprehendit intentionem generis substantiae, quae in re est natura quaedam, non determinata secundum se ad hanc vel illam speciem; et huic naturae apprehensae, secundum modum quo est in intellectu apprehendente, qui ex omnibus accipit unum quid commune in quibus invenitur natura illa, attribuit rationem generis, quae quidem ratio non est in re.
>
> Ita etiam est in hujusmodi relationibus, quas intellectus noster attribuit Deo. Invenit enim in ipso virtutem, et essentiam, et operationem, qua creatura producitur in ipsum

[25] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist II, Q. 1, Art. III, Solutio

> relationem habens; et ideo essentiae illi vel operationi habitudinem attribuit, et secundum quod intelligit, nomina relativa imponit.
>
> Unde patet responsio ad primum: quia intellectus noster neque cassus neque vanus est, quia habet aliquid respondens in re, quamvis non secundum modum quo est in ratione;
>
> sicut etiam intellectus mathematicorum non est falsus neque vanus est, quamvis nulla linea sit abstracta a materia in re, sicut ipsi considerant.
>
> Unde dicit Philosophus, II Physic., text. 18: "Abstrahentium non est mendacium."[26]

In the following text, Thomas again touches upon this threefold distinction, but gives examples that considerably broaden our understanding of this distinction and its importance, Notice where truth comes in this distinction:

> eorum quae significantur nominibus, invenitur triplex diversitas.
>
> Quaedam enim sunt quae secundum esse totum completum sunt extra animam; et hujusmodi sunt entia completa, sicut homo et lapis.
>
> Quaedam autem sunt quae nihil habent extra animam, sicut somnia et imaginatio chimerae.
>
> Quaedam autem sunt quae habent fundamentum in re extra animam, sed complementum rationis eorum quantum ad id quod est formale, est per operationem animae, ut patet in universali. Humanitas enim est aliquid in re, non tamen ibi habet rationem universalis, cum non sit extra animam aliqua humanitas multis communis; sed secundum quod accipitur in

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[26] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist XXX, Q. 1, Art. III, Solutio and Ad 1

> intellectu, adjungitur ei per operationem intellectus intentio secundum quam dicitur species:
>
> et similiter est de tempore, quod habet fundamentum in motu, scilicet prius et posterius ipsius motus; sed quantum ad id quod est formale in tempore, scilicet numeratio, completur per operationem intellectus numerantis.
>
> Similiter dico de veritate, quod habet fundamentum in re sed ratio ejus completur per actionem intellectus, quando scilicet apprehenditur eo modo quo est. Unde dicit Philosophus VI *Metaph.,* text. 8, quod verum et falsum sunt in anima; sed bonum et malum in rebus.
>
> Cum autem in re sit quidditas ejus et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur; et in ipsa operatione intellectus accipentis esse rei sicut est per quamdam similationem ad ipsum, completur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis. Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum quod est in cognitione intellectus. Sed tamen ratio veritatis per prius invenitiur in intellectu quam in re.
>
> Ad 5: semper veritati respondet aliquod esse; nec oportet quod semper respondeat sibi esse in re extra animam, cum ratio veritatis compleatur in ratione animae.[27]

Since what is found in things outside the understanding soul can also be found in an immaterial way in the reason of the soul and there are also in the understanding soul what is not found in things outside it, being as true would seem to be of greater extent than being divided according to the ten figures of predication. *Ens rationis* is said of what is in reason but not in things or beings outside the understanding soul. What is the distinction of *ens rationis?* Thomas touches upon it in this text:

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[27] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist XIX, Q. V, Art. I, Solutio and Ad 5

> Id autem quod est rationis tantum, non potest esse nisi duplex. Omnis enim positio absoluta aliquid in rerum natura existens significat.[28]

A being of reason or *ens rationis* may be either a negation or privation (lack) which is distinguished from a *positio* or placing something in things or a relation which is divided against *absoluta* in this text. We find both of these beings of reason in what is convertible with being.

Thomas often points out that privation or lack is not a being of nature (*ens naturae*), but only a being of reason (ens rationis):

> ...privatio non dicitur ens naturae, sed solummodo ens rationis[29]

> Caecum enim aliquid addit supra hominem, scilicet caecitatem, quae non est aliquod ens in natura, sed rationis tantum, secundum quod ens est comprehendens privationes....[30]

Likewise, negations are beings of reason:

> Et ideo hoc ipsum quod est non posse recipere additionem...distinguit primam bonitatem, quae est bonitas prima, ab aliis bonitatibus.
>
> Hoc autem quod non est recipere additionem, cum sit negatio, est ens rationis,
>
> et tamen fundatur super simplicitatem bonitatis primae.[31]

Indeeed all privations and negations would seem to be beings of reason:

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[28] *De Veritate*, Q 21, Art. 1
[29] *De Veritate*, Q. 21, Art. 2, Ad 7
[30] *De Veritate*, Q. 21, Art. 1, corpus
[31] Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, Q. 21, Art. 4, Ad 8

> illa communitas qua aliquid praedicatur communiter de ente et non ente, est rationis tantum, quia negationes et privationes non sunt nisi entia rationis.[32]

Hence, when Thomas is showing how transcendentals convertible with being add nothing real to being, he must discover whether the being of reason they add is a negation or relation of reason. In the case of one, it is a negation. But since true and good are said positively, they must add to being only a relation of reason:

> Sic ergo supra ens, quod et prima conceptio intellectus, unum addit id quod est rationis tantum, scilicet negationem: dicitur enim unum quasi ens indivisum.
>
> Sed verum et bonum positive dicuntur; unde non possunt addere nisi relationem quae sit rationis tantum.[33]

Aristotle sets aside from the main consideration of the wise man these beings of reason only. In some places Thomas assimilates in their imperfect being some other things to these beings of reason, using the word *intentional* to name both:

> ...virtus agendi proportionatur agenti. Unde alio modo oportet ponere virtutem agendi in agente principali; alio modo in agente instrumentali.
>
> Agens enim principale agit secundum exigentiam suae formae. Et ideo virtus activa in ipso est aliqua forma vel qualitas habens completum esse in natura.
>
> Instrumentum autem agit ut motum ab alio. Et ideo competit sibi virtus proportionata motui; motus autem non est ens completum sed est via in ens quasi medium quid inter potentiam puram et actum purum, ut dicitur in II *Phys.*
>
> Et ideo virtus instrumenti inquantum hujusmodi, secundum quod agit ad effectum ultra id quod competit sibi secundum

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[32] Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, Q. 3, Art. 4, Ad 3
[33] Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, Q. 21, Art. 1, corpus

> suam naturam, non est ens completum habens esse fixum in naturam, sed quoddam ens incompletum: sicut est virtus immutandi visum in aere, inquantum est instrumentum motum ab exteriori visibili.
>
> Et hujusmodi entia consueverunt intentiones nominari et habent aliquid simile cum ente quod est in anima quod est ens diminutum, ut dicitur in VI *Meta*.
>
> Et quia sacramenta non faciunt effectum spiritualem nisi inquantum sunt instrumenta; ideo virtus spiritualis est in eis non quasi ens fixum, sed sicut ens incompletum.
>
> Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ens incompletum quod est in anima, dividitur contra ens distinctum per decem genera, ut patet in VI *Meta*. (1026a 35). Et ideo talia entia incompleta, per se loquendo, non sunt in aliquo genere nisi per reductionem: sicut motus quantum ad suam substantiam reducitur ad illud genus in quo sunt termini motus, sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, quamvis ponatur in praedicamento passionis secundum quod importat ordinationem moventis ad motum, ut dicit Commentator in III *Phys*.
>
> Unde et virtus haec quae est in sacramentis reducitur ad idem genus in quo est virtus completa principalis agentis quae est qualitas, vel in qua esset, si in genere esset; quia virtus increata non est in aliquo genere.[34]

And some other texts where he teaches the same:

> Ad quartum dicendum quod in re corporali non potest esse virtus spiritualis secundum esse completum; potest tamen ibi esse per modum intentionis: sicut in instrumentis motis ab artifice est virtus artis, et sermo audibilis existens causa disciplinae, ut dicitur in lib. de *Sensu et Sensato* (437a 12) continet intentiones animae; quodammodo etiam in motu est

[34] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula II, Responsio & Ad 1

virtus substantiae separatae moventis, secundum Philosophos, et semen agit in virtute animae, ut dicitur in XVI *De animal*.[35]

...quia omne agens agit sibi simile, ideo effectus agentis oportet quod aliquo modo sit in agente.

In quibusdam enim est idem secundum speciem; et ista dicuntur agentia univoca, sicut calor est in igne calefaciente. In quibusdam vero enim est idem secundum proportionem sive analogiam, sicut cum sol calefacit. Est enim in sole aliquid quod ita facit eum calefacientem sicut calor facit ignem calidum et secundum hoc calor dicitur esse in sole aequivoce, ut dicitur in libro de *Substantia orbis* (cap. 2) Ex quo patet quod illud quod est in effectu ut forma dans esse, est in agente, inquantum hujusmodi, ut virtus activa. Et ideo sicut se habet agens ad virtutem activam, ita se habet ad continendam formam effectus.

Et quia agens instrumentale non habet virtutem agendi ut aliquod ens completum, sed per modum intentionis, ut dictum est; et forma introducta continetur in eo per modum intentionis: sicut sunt species colorum in aere, a quibus aer non denominatur coloratus.

Et hoc modo gratia est in sacramentis sicut in instrumento, non complete, sed incomplete quantum ad quatuor.

Primo, quia in instrumento non est forma effectus secundum completam rationem speciei, sicut est in effectu jam completo et in causa univoca.

Secundo, quia est in eo per modum intentionis, et non secundum completum esse in natura: sicut forma effectus est in causa principali non univoca secundum perfectum esse in natura, quamvis non secundum completam rationem illius

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[35] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula II, Ad 4

speciei sive formae quam inducit in effectu, ut calor est in sole.

Tertio, quia non est in eo per modum intentionis quiescentis, sicut sunt intentiones rerum in anima, sed per modum intentionis fluentis duplici fluxu: quorum unus est de potentia in actum: sicut etiam in mobili est forma quae est terminus motus, dum movetur ut fluens de potentia in actum; et inter haec cadit medium motus cujus virtute instrumentum agit; alius de agente in patiens, inter quae cadit medium instrumentum, prout unum est movens et alterum motum.

Quarto, quia sacramentum etiam instrumentaliter non attingit directe ad ipsam gratiam, ut dictum est, sed dispositive.[36]

Duane H. Berquist

[36] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio I, Quaest I, Art. IV. Quaestiuncula IV, Responsio

ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, BOOK EIGHT

READING ONE

One should syllogize from what has been said, and bringing things to a head, complete the consideration.

It has been said that the causes and the beginnings and the elements of substances are sought.

And some substances are agreed upon by all, but some have spoken privately about some. Those agreed upon are the natural ones, such as fire, earth, water, air, and the other simple bodies; then plants and their parts, and animals and the parts of animals; and last, the heavens and the parts of the heavens; but others say privately that the Forms and mathematical things are substances.

But in another way it follows from thoughts that the what was to be and the underlying subject are substances. Again, in another way the genus more than the species, and the universal, than the singulars. And with the universal and the genus the Forms are connected. For by the same argument, they seem to be substances.

Since the what was to be is substance, and the definition is a speech about this, because of this it has been determined about definition and about the through itself. Since the definition is a speech, and a speech has parts, it was necessary to consider about the parts, what are parts of the substance and what are not, and if they were the same of the definition. Further, too, neither the universal nor the genus is a substance. But we must inquire later about the Forms and mathematical things; for some say these are substances as well as the sensible substances. But let us now go through the substances which are agreed upon. These are the sensible substances.

All sensible substances have matter. The underlying subject is substance: for in one way the matter is substance (I call matter what is not this something in act, but is this something in ability); and in another way the thought of what it is and the form which being a this something is separated in thought; and thirdly what is from these of which alone there is generation and corruption, and is, without qualification, separated. For of substances according to the thought of what it is, some are separable, and some are not.

But it is clear that matter is substance. For in all changes between opposites there is something underlying the changes, such as in respect of place that which is now here and again elsewhere, and in respect of growth that which is now of one size and again less or more, and in respect of alteration that which is now healthy and again sick. And likewise according to substance, what is now being generated and again being destroyed, and now underlies as a this something and again underlies according to a lack.

And the other changes follow upon this one. But this does not follow upon one or two of the others. For it is not necessary, if a thing has matter for change of place, that it should also have matter for generation and destruction. What is the difference between becoming simply and not simply has been said in our natural books.

READING TWO

Since the substance as underlying and as matter is agreed upon, and this is the one in ability, it remains to say what is the substance as act of sensible things.

Democritus then seems to think there are three differences. The underlying body, the matter, is one and the same. But they differ either in rhythm, which is shape, or in turning, which is position, or in disposition, which is order.

But there seems to be many differences; such as, some things are said by the mode of composition of their matter, as whatever are by mixture, such as honey-water; and others by being bound together, such as a bundle; and others by being glued together, such as a book; and others by being nailed together, such as a wooden box; and some in many of these ways; and others by position, such as threshold and lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way); and others by time, such as dinner and breakfast; and others by place, such as the winds. And others by undergoing the sensible: such as hardness and softness, density and rareness, dryness and wetness; and some by some of these while others by them all, and in general some by excess and some by defect.

So it is clear that the [what] it is will be said in so many ways. It is a threshold because it is placed thus, and the being of threshold means its being placed thus while being for ice means having been solidified thus. And

the being of some things will be defined by all these, because some parts of them are mixed, others are blended, others are bound together, others are solidified, and others use other differences as the hand or the foot.

The genera of differences should be taken (for these will be the beginnings of being), such as those by the more and less, or by the dense and the rare, and by other such as these; for all these are excess and defect. If something is by shape or by smoothness and roughness, all will be by straight and curved. And for other things, their being will be to be mixed, and their not being will mean the opposite.

It is clear, then, from these that, if substance is the cause of each thing's being, one ought to seek in these what is the cause of the being of each of these things. Now none of these is substance, even when joined [with matter], yet it is the proportional in each. And as in substances that which is said of the matter is the act itself, and especially in the other definitions. For example, if threshold should be defined, we should say wood or stone placed thus, and a house we should define as bricks and boards placed thus, (and further in some that for the sake of which). If ice, water frozen or solidified in such a way. And if harmony, such a mix of high and low. And likewise in others.

From these things, it is clear that the act, and thought of what it is, is other when the matter is other. For of some, it is the composition; of some, the mixture; and of some, another of those said.

Whence of those defining, those saying what a house is, that it is stones, bricks, and boards, are speaking of the house in ability - for these are the matter; but those proposing a covering protecting possessions and bodies, or something of the sort, speak of the act. But those who put together both of these speak of the third and the substance from these. For the account through the differences seems to be of the form or act while that through what exists within is more of the matter. And it is likewise in the definitions which Archytas would accept; they are of both together. For example, what is a calm? Rest in much air. Air is the matter, and rest is the act and substance. What is calm-sea? Smoothness of sea. The sea is the underlying as matter while the evenness is the act and the form.

It is clear, then, from what has been said, what sensible substance is, and how it is. For this is as matter; this as form and act; and the third, what is from these.

READING THREE

One should not ignore that sometimes it is hidden whether a name signifies the composed substance, or the act and the form; for example, whether *house* is a sign of the common, that is, a covering consisting of bricks and stones laid thus, or of the act and the form, that is a covering; and whether a line is two in length or two; and whether an animal is soul in a body or a soul (for this is the substance and act of some body).

Animal might even be said of both, not by one definition, but as towards one. This makes a difference towards something else, but nothing towards the investigation of sensible substance. For what was to be belongs to the form and to the act. For soul and what it is to be soul are the same, but what it is to be man and man are not the same, unless even the soul is to be called man. And thus in some and not in some.

To those examining, the syllable does not seem to be from the elements and composition, nor is the house bricks and composition. And this is right. For neither the composition, nor the mixture is from those things of which it is the composition or mixture. Likewise, in none of the others. For example, if the threshold is by position, the position is not from the threshold, but rather the latter is from the former. Nor is man animal and twofooted, but there must be something which is besides these, if these are matter, neither an element nor from a element, but which taking away, they state the matter. If, then, this is the cause of the being and substance, they will be saying this is the substance itself.

This, then, must either be eternal or it must be corrupted without ever being corrupted, and must have come to be without ever coming to be. But it has been proved and shown elsewhere that no one makes or begets the form, but it is the individual that is made and what is from these that is generated.

Whether the substances of destructible things are separated, is not yet at all clear. But that it is not possible for some is clear : whatever are such as not to be apart from some things, such as house or utensil.

Perhaps, indeed, neither these things themselves, nor any of the other things which are not formed by nature, are substances at all. For one would lay down only nature as substance in corruptible things.

Therefore the difficulty which the followers of Antisthenes, and others without paideia, raised has a certain timeliness, that the what it is cannot be

defined (for the definition is a long speech). But how it is what it is can be taught, as silver, not what it is, but that it is like tin. Thus, there is able to be a definition and account of substance that is composed whether it be sensible or understandable. But that from which first it is cannot since defining speech says something of something and it is necessary that one part of the definition be as matter and the other as form.

It is also clear why, if substances are in some way numbers, they are so thus and not, as some say, as of units. For a definition is a number in a qualified way. For it is divisible and into indivisibles (for definitions are not unlimited), and number is also such.

And as, when something is taken from or added that from which is a number, it is no longer the same number, but another, even if the least has been taken away or added, so neither the definition nor the what was to be will be when anything has been taken away or added.

And it is necessary that a number be one by something which these thinkers cannot state by what it is one, if it is one. For either it is not one but as a heap: or if it is, it should be said what is making it one from many. And the definition is one, but likewise they cannot say how. And this happens reasonably; for there is the same reason why the substance is thus one, and not, as some say, by being some unit or point; but each is an act and some nature.

And as number does not have the more and the less, neither does substance according to the form; but if any does, it is the one with matter.

About the generation and corruption then of the foresaid substances, how it can happen and how impossible, and about the reduction of things to number, let it be determined as far as these.

READING FOUR

It should not remain hidden about the material substance that even if all things come from the same first cause or the same first causes and the same matter is as beginning for the things coming to be, yet there is its own for each; for example, of phlegm the sweet or the fat, and of bile the bitter, or something else (though perhaps these come from the same).

And there come to be many matters of the same thing, when one is matter of the other; for example, phlegm comes from fat and sweet, if the fat is from the sweet. But it comes from bile when bile is broken down into the first matter. For this comes from that in two ways: either because it will be further along the way, or because it is taken apart into its beginning.

It is possible for other things to be generated when the matter is one because of the moving cause, as chest and bed from wood. But necessarily the matter of some different things is other; such as a saw could not come to be from wood, nor is this in the ability of the moving cause. For it could not make a saw of wool or of wood. But if the same thing can be made from a different matter, it is clear that the art and the beginning as mover is the same. For if both the matter and the mover were different, so also what comes to be would be different.

When one seeks the cause, one should state all the causes that happen to be, since the causes are said in many ways. For example: what is the cause of man as matter? Is it the menstrual fluid? What then as mover? Is it not the seed? What as the form? The what was to be. What as that for the sake of which? The end. But perhaps both of these are the same.

It is necessary to say the proximate causes. What is the matter? Not fire or earth, but the thing's own matter.

About natural and generable substances, it is necessary to search thus if one is going to search rightly if the causes are such and so many and it is necessary to know the causes.

But there is another account of natural and eternal substances. For perhaps some have no matter, or not such, but only the movable according to place.

Nor does matter belong to those things which exist by nature but are not substances; their subject is the substance. For example, what is the cause of eclipse, what is its matter? There is none; but the moon is what undergoes. What is the cause as mover and corrupting the light? The earth. Probably there is no that for the sake of which. The definition is as form, but this is obscure if the account were not with the cause. For example, what is an eclipse? A lack of light But if is added by the earth's coming in between, this is the definition with the cause. It is not clear what first undergoes sleep. But that it is animal? Yes, but this according to what and what first? The heart or some other part. Then, by what? Next, what is the undergoing

of that, not of the whole? That it is such an immobility? Yes, but what in the first subject undergoing what?

Since some things are and are not, without coming to be and ceasing to be, such as points, if they can be said to be, and in general forms. For the white does not come to be, but the white wood, if everything that comes to be comes from something and comes to be something. Not all contraries can come from one another, but it is in other ways that a white man comes to be from a black man, and white from black. Nor is there a matter of everything, but of those there is coming to be and change into each other. Whatever things are or are not without changing have no matter.

There is difficulty about how the matter of each is toward the contraries. For example if the body is healthy in ability, and disease is contrary to health, is it therefore both in ability? And is water wine and vinegar in ability? Or is it the matter of one by having and by form, and of the other by lack and the corruption besides its nature.

Further, there is a doubt why wine is not the matter of vinegar, nor vinegar in ability, even though vinegar come to be from it, and why the living is not in ability dead. Or is it not so, but the corruptions are accidental, and it is the matter of the animal that is the ability to be dead and its matter and it is water that is the matter of vinegar. They come from these as night from day. For the dead body comes from the animal, and vinegar from wine, as night from day. And all the things which change thus into one another must go back to their matter; for example, if from a corpse is produced an animal, the corpse first goes back to their matter, and only then becomes an animal. For example, if the living body from the dead body, first it goes into matter and from this animal. And vinegar first goes back to water, and only then becomes wine.

READING FIVE

In regard to the foresaid difficulty about definitions and about numbers, what is the cause of their being one? All things which have many parts and in which the whole is not, as it were, a heap, but the whole is something beside the parts, there is some cause. For even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some, and in others stickiness or some such other undergoing. And a definition is one speech, not by being bound together, like the *Iliad*, but by being of one thing. Why, then, is it one and not many; for example, animal and two-footed?

Further, if there are, as some say, an animal itself and a twofooted itself, why is not man these, so that men would be by participation not of man, nor of one, but of two, animal and twofooted. And in general man would be not one but many, animal and twofooted.

It is clear, then, that if people proceed thus as they are accustomed to define and speak, it will not be possible to answer and untie the difficulty. But if, as we say, this is matter and that is form, and this is in ability and that in act, what is sought would no longer seem a difficulty.

For this difficulty is the same as would arise if spherical bronze were the definition of cloak. For this word would be a sign of the definition so that what is sought is the cause of sphere and bronze being one. The difficulty no longer appears, because the one is matter, the other form. What is the cause of this, of what was a sphere in ability being actually a sphere besides the maker in those things of which there is coming to be. For there is no other cause of the sphere in ability becoming a sphere in act, but this was the what was to be for each..

Of matter some is understandable and some sensible. And always in a definition, this is matter and that, act. For example, the circle is a plane figure.

But whatever things have no matter, either understandable or sensible, are right away each something one, just as being itself [is right away] individual substance, how, how much (whence neither being nor one is in definitions). And their what was to be is right away something one just as some being. Whence there is no other cause of being one for any of these, nor of their being a being in act. For right away each one is some being and something one; but not in being or one as a genus, nor as separated from singulars.

Because of this difficulty, some speak of participation and ask what is the cause of participation and what is it to participate. And others speak of being together, as Lycophron says knowledge is of knowing and the soul. And yet others say that living is the putting together or binding together of the soul with the body

Yet the same account would apply to all. For being healthy, too, will be either the being together or the binding together or the putting together of the soul and health; and the bronze to be a triangle will be the putting

together of bronze and triangle; and to be white will be a putting together of surface and whiteness.

The cause is that they seek a reason making one and a difference of ability and act. But, as has been said, the last matter and the form are the same and one, the one in ability and the other in act, so that it is like seeking the cause of something one and of its being one. For each thing is something one, and what is in ability and what is in act are in some way one, so that the cause is nothing other besides what is moving it from ability to act. And whatever things have no matter are all simply something one.

ARISTOTLE, METAPHYSICS, BOOK NINE

READING ONE

We have spoken, then, about the first being to which all the other categories of being are brought back; that is, about substance, for the other beings (how much and how and the others thus said) are said according to the thought of substance. For all have the thought of substance as we said in the first discourses. And since *being* is said in one way as what or how or how much, and in another way by ability and act and by doing, we will now determine about ability and act; and first about the ability which is said most properly, although not the most useful towards what we want now. For ability and act are in more than those said only according to motion. But having spoken about this, we shall in our determinations of act show the other kinds of ability.

It has been determined by us elsewhere that *ability* and *to be able* are said in many ways. Let us leave aside whichever of these are called abilities equivocally. For some are said by a certain likeness, as in geometry we call something possible or impossible for being or not being in some way. But whichever are said toward the same form are all beginnings and are said towards one that is first which is the beginning of change in another as other. Another is the ability to undergo, a beginning in the one undergoing of being changed when acted upon by another as other. And another is the firm disposition not to undergo change toward the worse and corruption by being acted upon by another as other. The thought of the first ability is in all these definitions. Again, these abilities are said to be of only acting upon or undergoing, or of doing so well, so that also in these definitions exist in some way the definitions of the above abilities.

It is clear, then, that in a way there is one ability of acting upon and undergoing for it is able in one having the ability to undergo and the other in another by itself. But in another way it is other. For the one is in the thing undergoing. Because it has a beginning and the matter is a beginning, the thing acted upon undergoes, and another by another. For that which is oily can be burnt, and that which yields thus can be crushed; and likewise in the others. But the other is in the maker; for example, heat and the art of building are present, one in the heater and the other in the builder. And so, in so far as a thing has grown into one, it undergoes nothing from itself; for it is one and not other.

And inability (and unable) is the lack which is contrary to such an ability, so that every ability is opposed to an inability of the same and according to the same. Lack is said in many ways: the not having and what is apt to have if it does not, either wholly or when it is apt and either wholly or in some other way. And in some, if it is naturally apt to have, but does not have it by force, it is said to be lacking.

READING TWO

Since some such beginnings are present in soulless things, and others in those having soul, and in soul, and in the part of the soul having reason, it is clear that some abilities will be without reason and some with reason. Wherefore all the arts and making sciences are abilities. For they are beginnings able to produce change in another as other.

And all those with reason are the same of contraries, but those without reason are one of one; for example, heat is only of heating, but the medical art is both of disease and health.

The cause is that knowledge of reason is thought, and the same thought shows the thing and its lack, except not in the same way. In some way, it is of both and in another way it is more of what belongs. Therefore, such knowledge of reason must be of contraries, but of one as such and of the other not as such. For the thought is of one as such, but of the other in a way by accident. For it shows the contrary by negation and by taking away. For lack is the first contrary and is itself the taking away of the other.

Now since contraries do not come to be in the same thing, but the knowledge of reason is an ability in having thought and the soul has a beginning of motion, therefore, while the wholesome makes only health and the heater only heat and the chilling only coldness, the one with the knowledge of reason can make both. For the thought is for both, though not in the same way, and it is in a soul which has a beginning of motion. Thus the soul will move both from the same beginning joining them to the same. Whence it makes the possible by reason contrary to what is possible without reason. For they are contained in one beginning which is thought.

It is clear also that the ability of only acting upon or undergoing follows the ability of doing so well, but the latter does not always follow the former.

For it is necessary that the one making well also make, but he who just makes something does not necessarily make well.

READING THREE

There are some who say, as the Megarians do, that a thing is able to act only when it is acting, and when it is not acting it is not able; for example, that he who is not building is not able to build, but only the one building, when he is building, and likewise in others.

It is not hard to see the absurd things that follow upon such opinions. For it is clear that a man will not be a builder unless he is building; for to be a builder is to be able to build. And likewise in the other arts. If, then, it is impossible to have such arts if one has not at some time learnt and acquired them and not to have them if one has not sometime lost them, either by forgetfulness or by some undergoing or by time (for it cannot be by the thing being destroyed for it always is); when a man pauses, he will not have the art. And how will he get it right away when he builds again?

And likewise with regard to soulless things. For nothing will be either cold or hot or sweet or sensible at all when no one is sensing. So they will have to assert the position of Protagoras.

But, indeed, neither will anything have sense if it is not sensing or active. If, then, that is blind which has not sight though it would naturally have it, when it would naturally have it and when it still exists, the same will be blind many times in the day, and deaf too.

Again, if that which lacks ability is impossible, that which has not come to be will not be able to come to be. But the one saying that what is impossible to come to be, either is or will be, is speaking falsely. For the impossible means this. Therefore these thoughts take away both motion and becoming. For the standing will always stand, and the sitting will always sit. For it will not stand up if it is sitting because to stand up is impossible for what is unable to stand up.

If then such things cannot be said, it is clear that ability and act are other. But these thoughts make ability and act the same. Whence, it is no small thing they are seeking to take away. Thus, something is able to be when it is not and able not to be when it is. And likewise in the other

predicates: being able to walk and not walk, and being able not to walk and walk.

And that is possible in which, if the act of which it is said to have the ability exists, nothing will be impossible. I say, for example, if a thing is able to sit and it happens to sit, there will be nothing impossible in sitting belonging to it. And likewise if it is moved or moves or stands or stops or is or comes to be or is not or does not come to be.

The word *act*, which is placed upon perfection and upon other things, has come most of all from motions. For act seems to be especially motion. Hence, we do not attribute motion to what does not exist, but other predicates; for example, non-beings are understood and desired, but not moved. And this is because non-beings in act would be in act. For some non-beings are in ability, but they do not exist because they are not in act.

If the able is that which has been said, to which something follows, it is clear that it cannot be true to say that the able is this, but will not be, so that the things unable to be would escape. I say, for example, if someone (who does not think that there is the unable to be) should say the diagonal is able to be measured, but will not be measured because nothing prevents a thing able to be or come to be, neither to be nor come to be. But from the laid down, it is necessary that, if we suppose that which is not, but is able to be, to be or to have come to be, there will be nothing impossible. But it will happen: for to be measured is impossible. For the false and the impossible are not the same. It is false that you stand now, but not impossible.

At the same time it is clear that, if A being, it is necessary for B to be, then when A is possible, B also must be possible. For if it need not be possible, there is nothing to prevent its not being possible. Now let A be possible. Then, when A was able to be, if A is laid down to be, nothing impossible to be would happen. Therefore, B necessarily is. But it was impossible. Let it be impossible then. If then B is impossible A must also be. But the first was supposed impossible; therefore also the second. If, then, A is possible, B also will be possible - if they are such that, A being, B necessarily must be. If, then, A and B being thus, B was notpossible [able to be], neither would A and B be as has been laid down. And if A being possible, necessarily B is possible [able to be] And if when A is possible, B must be possible; then if A is, necessarily also B is. For to say that B must be possible, if A is possible, means this, that if A was, both when and how it was able to be, B also must then and in that way be.

FOURTH READING

All abilities are either inborn, such as the senses, or by use [custom], such as that of playing the flute, or by learning, such as that of the arts. Whichever are by use or learning we must acquire by doing something before, but this is not necessary with those not such and those for undergoing.

Since that which is able has an ability for something and at some time and in some way and whatever other things are necessarily added in the definition; and since some things can move by reason and their abilities are with reason and some are without reason and the abilities without reason; those abilities must be in a thing with soul while the latter can be in both.

As regards abilities of the latter kind, when the one that acts upon and the one that undergoes meet as they are able, the one must act and the other be acted on. But with the former ability, this is not necessary.

For all these are something one productive of one, but those are of contraries, so that it would make contraries at the same time. But this is impossible.

Necessarily therefore there is something other which determines. I say this is desire or choice. For whichever of two things is chiefly desired, it will make, when it is present as it is able, and near the undergoing. Therefore everything which has an ability with reason, when it desires that for which it has an ability and as it has it, necessarily makes this. And it has the ability in question when the undergoing is present and it is thus. If not, it will not be able to make.

To add *nothing outside preventing* is no longer necessary. For it has the ability as it is the ability to make. This is not in every way, but things being thus, in which is taken away outside things preventing. For these would take away some things included in the definition.

And so even if one has a wish, or a desire, to do two things or contrary things at the same time, one will not do them. For one does not thus have an ability for them, nor is it an ability for making both at the same time, since it will make that for which it is thus an ability.

READING FIVE

Since the ability said according to motion has been considered, let us determine about act, what it is and how it is. And the able at the same time will become clear to those dividing, that we call able not only what is apt to move another or to be moved by another, either simply or in some way, but also otherwise for which we have gone through the others in our investigation.

Act, then, is the existence of a thing not in the way in which we say in ability. We say in ability as Hermes is in the wood and the half in the whole because it might be taken from, and knowing the man not considering if he was able to consider. But the other in act.

What we wish to say is clear in the particulars by induction. And one should not seek a definition of everything, but see together in the proportion: as the one housebuilding is to the housebuilder, and the awake to the sleeping, and the seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and that which has been formed out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been worked up to the unworked. Let one part of the difference be distinguished as the act and the other as the able.

But all things are not said to be in act in the same way, but in proportion, as this in that or towards that, so another in another or towards another. For some are as motion to ability and others as substance to matter.

But also the unlimited and the empty, and whatever is such, are said to be in ability and in act otherwise than many other things, such as the seeing or the walking or the seen. For at some time, these can be said simply to be true: the seen that it is seen while at another time it is able to be seen But the unlimited is not thus in ability so that it will be separated in act, but in knowledge. For the division never ending ensures that this act is in ability, but not that it is separated.

Since of the acts [actions] which have a limit, none is an end, but are about the end; for example, the parts themselves when one is making them thin are in movement in this way, not existing that for the sake of which is the movement, this is not an act or not a perfect act, for it is not an end; but act is that in which the end is; for example, at the same time we are judging and have judged, are understanding and have understood, while one is not learning and has learned, or is becoming healthy and is healthy. At the

same time we are living well and have lived well, and are happy and have been happy. If not, it would have to cease as when one becomes healthy, but now it is not so, but one lives and has lived Of these then, some should be called motions, but the others acts. For every movement is incomplete: thinning, learning, walking, housebuilding. These are movements, and imperfect. For it is not true that at the same time a thing is walking and has walked, or is building and has built, or is coming to be and has come to be, or is being moved and has been moved, but other. But the same has seen and is seeing, and understands and has understood. The latter I call an *act* and the former, a *movement*.

Let it be clear then from these things, and such as them, what and how it is to be in act.

READING SIX

It should be determined when each thing is in ability and when not. For it is not at just any time. For example, is earth in ability a man? Or not, but more when it has already become seed, and perhaps not even then.

Thus, not everything can be healed by the medical art or by luck, but there is something which is able, and this is healthy in ability. And the determination of that which comes to be in act by reason from being in ability is having willed it to come to be and nothing outside preventing and there being nothing in the healed which prevents it. Likewise, the house is in ability, if there is nothing in this matter which prevents it from becoming a house, and there is nothing which ought to come before, or be taken away, or be changed. This is a house in ability. And likewise in others of which the beginning is outside. And in those having the beginning in themselves, nothing outside preventing, it will be through itself. For example, the seed is not yet. For it must be in another and change. But when through its own beginning it is such, already it is this in ability. But that has need of another beginning, just as earth is not yet a statue in ability - but changing it will be copper.

It seems that when we call a thing not this, but made of that material (for example, the box not wood, but wooden; and wood is not earth but earthen; and again the earth if it is not another, but made of another material) that other thing is always in ability simply what is after. For example, a box is not earthen nor earth, but wooden, for this is a box in ability and this is the matter of a box, wood in general of a box in general, and this wood of this box. And if something is first which no longer by

another is said to be made of a material, this is the first matter. For example, if earth is airy and air is not fire but fiery, fire is the first matter not being a this something. For the said of or subject differ by this, by being a this something or not being. For example, the subject of undergoings is a man, and body and soul, but the passion, the musical and white. For when the musical has come to be, the subject is called, when the art of music comes to be present in it, not music but musical, and the man is not whiteness but white, and not the act of waking or motion, but walking or moving, which is like made of that material.

Whatever are thus, the last is substance. But whatever are not thus, but the predicate is some form and this something, the last is matter and material substance. And it happens rightly to be said derivatively what is made of a material and the undergoings. For both are undetermined. When a thing then should be said to be in ability, and when not, has been said.

READING SEVEN

Since it has been determined in how many ways *before* is said, it is clear that act is before ability. And I mean by ability, not only that definite kind which is said to be a beginning of change in another as other, but in general every beginning of movement or of rest. For nature is in the same genus as ability; for it is a beginning of motion, but not in another, but in the same as the same. Act is before all such both in definition and in substance. And in time it is in this way, but not in that.

It is clear that it is before in definition. For what is first able is able in that it can act. For example, I say the builder is able to build and he who has sight is able to see and the visible is able to be seen. And the same can be said in others, so that necessarily the definition of one exists before the definition of the other and the knowledge of one before the knowledge of the other.

In time it is before in this way: the same in kind acts before, but not in number. I mean this: that the matter and the seed and the visible which are in ability the man and the grain and the seeing, but not in act, are before in time this man and this grain and this seeing now existing in act, but before in time to these are other beings in act, from which these come to be. For always from what is in ability comes to be what is in act by what is in act, as man from man and the knower from knower, there being always a first mover - for the mover is already in act. It has been said in the discourses

about substance that everything which comes to be, comes to be from something and by something. And this is the same in kind.

Whence it seem impossible to be a housebuilder without having built anything, or a harpist never having played the harp. For the one learning to play the harp learns to play the harp by playing it. And likewise the others.

Whence the sophistical refutation arises that one not having the knowledge will do that of which it is the knowledge. For the one learning does not have it.

But since, of that which is coming to be, something has come to be, and generally, the moving has moved somewhat (this is clear in the books about motion), so he who is learning must, it seems, have something of knowledge. Here too, then, it is clear that act is thus before ability in generation and in time.

READING EIGHT

But it is also [before] in substance. First, because what are after in becoming are before in form and substance, as man is before boy and human being before seed. For the one already has the form and the other does not.

And because everything that comes to be goes toward a beginning and end (because that for the sake of which is a beginning, and the becoming is for the sake of the end), but the act is the end and the ability is taken for the sake of this.

For animals do not see in order that they may have sight, but they have sight so they may see.

And likewise, men have the art of building so that they may build, and looking knowledge so they may look. But they do not look so they may have looking knowledge, except those learning. And these do not look except imperfectly or because they look not out of any need.

Further, matter is in ability so that it may come to form. And when it is in act, then it is in form. And likewise in the others, and those whose end is motion. Hence, as teachers showing [their pupils] acting, think they have achieved the end, so nature likewise.

For if it does not come to be thus, Pauson will be the Hermes. For it will not be clear whether the knowledge is within or without, as in that. For the doing is the end, and the act is the doing. Whence also the word *act* is said by doing and is extended to perfection [the form].

But in some, the use is last; for example, seeing of sight, and nothing other comes to be from the operation. But from some [acts] something comes to be, as from the art of housebuilding a house besides the housebuilding. Yet none the less here the act is the end while there it is more the end than the ability. For the act of building is in the thing that is being built, and at the same time it comes to be and is as the house. In those things where there is something other which comes to be besides the use, the act of these is in the thing that is being made; for example, the act of building is in the thing that is being built and that of weaving in the thing that is being woven, and likewise in all others, and in general the motion is in the moved. But where there is no product apart from the act, the act is in these; for example, seeing is in the one who sees and looking is in the looker and life is in the soul (whence also happiness, for it is a certain life)

Thus, it is clear that the substance and the form is act. By this argument, it is clear that act is before ability in substance. And as we have said, one act always precedes another in time right back to the eternal first mover.

READING NINE

But also more masterly. For eternal things are before corruptible things in substance, but no eternal thing is in ability.

The reason is this: every ability is of a contradiction at the same time. For what is not able to belong will never belong to anything, but everything which is able may not act. Therefore what is able to be, may both be and not be. The same therefore is able to be and not be. But what is able not to be may not be And what may not be is corruptible, either simply, or in that same way in which it is said that it can not be, according to place or according to how much or how. But simply, according to substance.

Nothing incorruptible simply, then, is in ability simply. But nothing prevents it from being so in some way, as how or where. All therefore are in act.

Nor are any of the necessary beings. And these are the first [things]. For if these were not, nothing would be.

Nor, if something is eternally moved, it is not moved according to ability except hither thither. For nothing prevents matter of this kind belonging to it.

And so the sun and the stars and the whole heaven are ever active, and there is no fear that they may sometime stand still, which those [thinking] about nature fear. Nor do they tire doing this. For motion is not for them about the ability of contradiction as it is for corruptible things. so that the continuity of the movement should be laborious. For the cause of this is substance as matter and ability, not act.

And the things which are in change, such as earth and fire, imitate incorruptibles. For these also always act. For they have motion through themselves and in themselves.

But of the other abilities, those with reason, from what has been determined, are all of contradiction. For what is able to move thus is also able, not thus. But those without reason will be the same of contradiction by their presence or absence.

If, then, there are natures or substances such as those in arguments call the Forms, there must be something much more knowing than knowledge itself and something more moved than motion [itself]. For these are more acts, but those, the abilities for them. It is clear, then, that act is before ability and every beginning of change.

READING TEN

That the act is also better and more honorable than the good ability is clear from these things. Whatever is said according to ability is capable of contraries; for example, it is the same which is able to be healthy and at the same time [able] to be sick. For there is the same ability for being healthy and sick, for being at rest and in motion, for building and knocking down, for being built and falling down. The ability for contraries, then, exists at the same time; but contraries cannot exist at the same time, and the acts also cannot exist at the same time; for example, to be healthy and to be sick. Therefore, while the good must be one of them, the ability is both alike, or neither. The act, therefore, is better.

It is necessary also that in bad things, the end and the act is worse than the ability. For it is the same that is able to be both contraries.

It is clear, therefore, that the bad does not exist apart from things. For the bad is after ability by nature.

And therefore in the things which are from the beginning and the eternal things, there is nothing bad, neither failure nor the corrupted (for corruption is bad).

And the geometrical figures are found by act. For we find by dividing. If they were already divided, they would have been clear. But now they exist in ability. Why are the angles of the triangle equal to two right angles? Because the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If, then, the line parallel to the side had been already drawn, it would have been clear right away to any one seeing it. Why is every angle in a semicircle a right angle? If three lines are equal, the two which are the base, and the straight line from the center, it is clear to the one seeing who knows that [a former theorem] Thus, it is clear that it is found by what are in ability being led into act. The cause is that understanding is an act so that the ability is [known] from act and therefore in making they know. For the individual act is after in generation.

READING ELEVEN

Since *being* and *nonbeing* are said according to the figures of predicates, but also by ability or act of these or contraries, this being is chiefly true or false.

This is in things to be put together or divided. So he thinks truly who thinks the divided to be divided and the put together to be put together, but he think falsely who is in the contrary or the things. When is or is not what is called true or false? What we say should be investigated. It is not because we think truly that you are white, that you are white, but because you are white, we who say this speak truly.

If, then, some things are always put together and unable to be divided, and others are always divided and unable to be put together while others can be contraries for being is to be put together and be one while non-being is

not to be put together, but to be many. The same opinion and the same thought about contingent things becomes false and true, and happens to be sometimes true and sometimes false. But about things unable to be otherwise, it does not become sometimes true and at other times false, but the same are always true or false.

But about things not put together, what is it to be or not to be and the true and the false? For it is not put together so as to be when it is put together, but not to be when it is divided, like the wood is white or the diameter incommensurable. Nor will true and false belong still in the same way as in those. Or just as true is not the same in these, so neither is to be.

But true or false is as follows: to grasp [or understand] and say is true (affirmation and saying are not the same), and not to grasp is ignorance. For it is not possible to be deceived about the what it is except by accident. Likewise, it is not possible to be deceived about the substances not put together.

And all exist in act, not in ability. For otherwise they would have come to be and ceased to be; but now being itself does not come to be, nor is it corrupted, for it would have come to be from something. Whatever things, then, are a what itself and in act, about these it is not possible to be deceived, but either one understands or not. But the what it is is sought about them, if they are such or not.

As regards being as true and non-being as false, one is thus: if it is put together, it is true, and if it is not put together, it is false; in the other one, if it is a being, it is thus. If it is not thus, it is not; but the true is to understand these. The false is not, nor is there deception, but ignorance. And not as blindness. For blindness is as if one was wholly lacking the ability to understand.

It is clear also that there is no deception about unchangeable things according to when, if someone takes them to be unchangeable. For example, if we think the triangle does not change, it would not be thought that sometimes it has [angles equal to] two right angles and sometimes not. For it would change [But it can be thought] that one has and another does not. For example, we may think that no even number is prime, or that some are and some are not. But about one number not even this. For no longer is it thought that one is and another is not. But one thinks truly or falsely that it is always thus.

PROEMIUM TO WISDOM AND REASON

Wisdom in human knowledge is the highest or greatest perfection of reason. It is also acquired by a most difficult use of reason. And in these two ways, wisdom and reason are connected.

Aristotle's *Proemium to Wisdom* and Shakespeare's *Exhortation to Use Reason* (which also contains a definition of reason as reason) illuminate and confirm each other because of the above connection of wisdom and reason. Thomas Aquinas in his *Proemium to the Nicomachean Ethics* has pointed out one important connection between wisdom and reason. We learn, he says, in Aristotle's *Proemium to Wisdom* that it belongs to the wise to order. (*Sapientis est ordinare.*) And the reason for this, as Thomas there explains, is that wisdom is the highest perfection of reason to which is private looking for and knowing order. Shakespeare's definition of reason is completed by reference to its *looking before and after* and order is a before and after. That it belongs most all to the wise to order and direct others is very much in harmony, then, with wisdom being the highest perfection of reason.

In the second book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*, the second book After (*Meta*) the (*ta*) Books in Natural Philosophy (*phusika*), we learn from Aristotle that the consideration of truth belongs most of all to the wise man. This is also in harmony with wisdom being the highest perfection of reason for it is private to reason to seek and know what is true.

And since Aristotle shows in other ways than by wisdom being the highest perfection of reason that the wise most of all order and consider truth, wisdom is also a witness to its being proper or private to reason to know order and consider what is true.

Because of the connection of these four, the love of wisdom and the love of reason and the love of order and the love of truth are inseparable. How could one love wisdom and not love the reason which it perfects? Or how could one love reason and not love it highest perfection? It would be like loving the body and not loving health, or loving health but not loving the body. And one could not love wisdom, which is most of all a knowledge of truth, without loving truth. And one could not love truth without loving reason whereby we are able to know truth. And one could not love reason without loving order which reason strives to know and make.

Order and truth are not the only things that connect wisdom and reason. But a more complete consideration of their connection and mutual illumination comes after a careful study of Aristotle's *Proemium to Wisdom* and Shakespeare's *Exhortation to Use Reason*.

To whom belongs the Exhortation to use Reason? Who should make such an exhortation or urging? Does it belong to the practical philosopher or the looking philosopher or the logician?

There is reason to think that it is appropriate to all three. The practical philosopher is writing for those who want to live in accord with reason. If someone does not want to live in accord with reason, he is not someone to hear lectures in ethics and the rest of practical philosophy. Therefore, it much belongs to the practical philosopher to urge us to use our reason.

But logic is the art whereby reason is directed in its acts. Logic is the art that teaches us how to use our reason. Hence, it would seem to belong to the logician to urge us to use our reason. If we are not intent upon using our reason, why study logic?

But the looking philosopher aims at the perfection of our reason which is acquired by the use of our reason. Hence, it is relevant to him to urge us to use our reason, especially since it requires a long and difficult use of our reason to perfect it.

Although it is not out of place for the practical philosopher or the logician to urge us to use our reason, we have placed the readings pertaining to the exhortation to use reason under wisdom. For wisdom is the highest perfection of reason and it belongs to the wise man to direct all others.

The consideration of reason belongs both to the study of the soul and to wisdom. Since reason is a part or power or ability of a soul, the consideration of reason is found in the third book *About the Soul* (in Latin, the *De anima*). But since reason is an understanding and immaterial power, it is also considered in wisdom which is about immaterial things. Consider this text from Thomas:

> Non ergo propter hoc solum indiget intellectus possibilis humanus phantasmate ut acquirat intelligibiles species, sed etiam ut eas quodam modo in phantasmatibus inspiciat. Et hoc est quod dicitur in tertio *de Anima.* Species igitur in phantasmatibus intellectivum intelligit. Huius autem ratio est, quia operatio proportionatur virtuti et essentiae: intellectivum autem hominis est in sensitivo, sicut dicitur in tertio *de Anima*. Et ideo propria operatio eius est intelligere intelligibilia in phantasmatibus, sicut intellectus substantiae separatae operatio est intelligere res secundum se intellectas; et ideo huius est causa reddenda a metaphysico, ad quem pertinet considerare diversos gradus intellectuum.[1]

But we shall also place under this heading of wisdom and reason the papers concerning the definition of reason. For they are connected with, or a part of, the exhortation to use reason.

Duane H. Berquist

[1] *In librum De Memoria et Reminiscentia Commentarium*, Lectio II, nn. 316-317

ARISTOTLE: PROEMIUM TO WISDOM

FIRST READING

All men by nature desire to know. A sign is the love of the senses. For apart from their usefulness, they are loved for themselves; and especially among the others, that through the eyes. For we choose to see before all the others, not only in order that we might do something, but also when not aiming to do anything. The cause is that this one among the senses especially makes us know something and shows many differences.

Now animals are born having sensation by nature; from this, memory does not arise in some of them while it does arise in others. And because of this, these are more prudent and more easily taught than those unable to remember; those unable to hear sounds are more prudent without learning, as the bees and whatever other kind of animal is such. Whatever has this sense in addition to memory, is able to learn.

The other animals live by images and memories, but they share little in experience; the race of men however, lives by art and reasonings.

Experience comes to be from memory in men. For many memories of the same thing perfect the power of one experience. And experience seems to be very much like science and art. For science and art come to men through experience. For experience makes art, as Polus says, speaking rightly, but inexperience, chance. Art comes to be whenever one universal understanding about like things comes to be from the many things kept in mind by experience. For to have in mind that this benefited Callias when suffering this disease and Socrates and in each case thus to many, belongs to experience. But that it benefits all such as are marked by one condition and suffer this disease, such as the phlegmatic or choleric suffering the burning fever, belongs to art.

As far as doing is concerned, experience does not seem to differ at all from art, but we see the experienced succeeding more than those having reason without experience. The cause is that experience is knowledge of singulars while art, of universals; but all doings and makings are about singulars. For the doctor does not cure man, except accidentally, but Callias or Socrates or someone of the others so named who happens to be a man. If someone has

reason without experience and knows the universal, but does not know the singular in this, he many times makes a mistake in medical treatment - for it is more the singular that is treated.

Nevertheless, we think that knowing and understanding belong more to art than experience, and we hold that the artists are wiser than the experienced, so that wisdom follows knowledge in all. This is because they know the cause while the others do not. The experienced know that it is so, but do not know why it is so. But these know why it is so and the cause.

Whence also we think that the chief artists about each thing are more honorable and know more and are wiser than the handicraftsman, because they know the causes of the things made. For the latter are like inanimate things: they make, but they do not know what they make, as fire burns. Inanimate things make each of these by a certain nature while the handicraftsmen, through custom. Hence, the chief artists are wiser, not by doing, but by having a reason and knowing the causes.

On the whole, the sign of knowing is the ability to teach, and because of this we think that art is more reasoned out knowledge than experience. For the artists are able to teach while the others are not able.

Further, we think that no one of the senses is wisdom although they are the chief ways of knowing singulars. But they do not say the why it so about anything, such as why fire is hot, but only that it is hot.

It is probable that the first one finding any art beyond the senses common to all was admired by men, not only because some of the things found were useful, but also as wise and distinguished from others. Many arts having been found, some being for necessities and some for passing the time pleasantly, always the finders of the latter were considered wiser because their sciences were not for practical use. Whence all these sciences having been built up, those sciences were found that are neither for pleasure nor for necessities; and first in those places where men had leisure. Hence, the mathematical sciences first began around Egypt for there the priestly class was allowed leisure.

What the difference is between art and science and other things of the same kind has been said in the ethics.

But that for the sake of which we have now made a discourse is this, that all hold what is called wisdom to be about the first causes and beginnings; so that as has been said before, the experienced man seems to be wiser than any of those having sensation; the artist than the experienced, the chief artist than the handicraftsman, the looking sciences more than the making. Thus it is clear that wisdom is about beginnings and causes.

SECOND READING

Since we seek such knowledge, this ought to be considered: about what sort of causes and about what sort of beginnings is wisdom the knowledge? Perhaps it would become clearer if one took the thoughts we have about the wise man.

We think first that the wise man knows all things so far as possible, not having a knowledge of these in particular.

Then we think wise the one who is able to know things difficult and not easy for man to know. To sense is common to all; hence, it is easy and nothing wise.

Further, we think wiser in every science, the man more certain and more able to teach the causes.

And of sciences, the one for itself and for the sake of knowing is more wisdom than that for the sake of its results.

And the one ruling is more wisdom than the one obeying. For the wise man ought not to receive orders, but to give orders; and he ought not to be persuaded by another, but the less wise, by him.

Such and so many are the thoughts we have about wise men and wisdom.

Of these, to know all things necessarily belongs to the man most of all having a knowledge of the universal; for he knows in some way all things placed under the universal.

And perhaps the most universal are the most difficult for men to know - for they are furthest from the senses.

And the most certain of sciences are those most of all about what comes first. Those from fewer things are more certain than those from addition, as arithmetic than geometry.

And the science which considers causes is more fit for teaching. For those teach who give the causes of each thing.

Understanding and knowledge for the sake of themselves especially belong to the knowledge of the most knowable. For the man who desires to know for itself will most desire what is most knowledge; and such is that of the most knowable; and most knowable are the first things and the causes - for other things are known through these and from them, but not these through what comes under them.

And that is the chief science, and more ruling than the subordinate, which knows that for the sake of which each thing ought to be done. This, however, is the good of each; and as a whole, the best in all nature.

From all the foresaid, the name sought falls in the same science. For it is necessary that this looks at the first beginnings and causes. For one of the causes is the good and that for the sake of which.

THIRD READING

That it is not a making science is clear also from those first philosophizing. For men both now and at first began to philosophize through wonder - in the beginning, wondering about the strange things close at hand, then little by little thus going forward raising questions about the greater things, as about the changes of the moon and of the sun and stars, and about the origin of the universe. But the man in doubt and wondering thinks himself to be ignorant. So the philomuthos is in some way a philosopher for the myth is put together from wonders. Hence, if men philosophized to escape ignorance, it is clear that they sought knowledge for the sake of understanding and not for any use.

What happened witnesses this. When almost all necessary things and those for recreation and amusement existed, such knowledge began to be sought. So it is clear that we seek this knowledge through no other need.

But as we call a man free that is for himself and not for another, so this alone is free among the sciences. For this alone is for the sake of itself.

Hence, it might justly be thought that it is not a human possession. For in many ways the nature of man is enslaved.

Thus, according to Simonides, God alone can have this honor; man, however, is not worthy to seek knowledge for itself. If the poets are saying something and the divine is able to envy, it is likely especially to happen about this; and unfortunate are all those who excel in knowledge.

But the divine is not able to be envious and, according to the proverb, poets say many false things.

Nor must any other knowledge be thought to be more honorable. For the most divine is most honorable.

But most divine is only in two ways. For that which God most of all would have is the most divine of sciences; and if it were of divine things. But this alone has both of these. For God seems to all to be among the causes and a beginning, and such knowledge God alone or most of all would have.

All other kinds of knowledge are more necessary than this, but none is better.

It is necessary, however, to place the possession of this in the opposite for us of the searches in the beginning. For all began, as we have said, from wondering if things are thus; as about things that happen wonderfully by chance or about the turnings of the sun or the incommensurability of the diagonal - for it seems wonderful to all who have not seen the cause that something is not measured by the smallest. It is necessary therefore to finish in the contrary and the better, according to the proverb, just as in these when they have learned (for the geometer would wonder at nothing so much as if the diagonal were to become measurable).

What is the nature of the knowledge sought then has been said, and what is the goal that the investigation and the whole knowledge over a road must reach.

SHAKESPEARE'S EXHORTATION TO USE REASON

.....What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed: a beast, no more.
Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and god-like reason
To fust in us un'used.

APPENDIX

Hamlet, Act I, Sc. 3:

THIS ABOVE ALL: TO THINE OWN SELF BE TRUE,
AND IT MUST FOLLOW, AS THE NIGHT THE DAY,
THOU CANST NOT THEN BE FALSE TO ANY MAN.

A PROEMIUM TO THE EXHORTATION

Shakespeare has written the best short exhortation to use reason that we have. In less than fifty words (forty-nine to be exact), he teaches us so many things that are most necessary and useful to know. Shakespeare's *Exhortation to Use Reason* is thus a supreme example of what he teaches us elsewhere in *Hamlet:* "brevity is the soul of wit". (*wit* here means wisdom). Shortness is the soul of wisdom because the wise man says more than others in fewer words (while "the fool multiplieth his words"). The words of the wise man are like seeds, which are small in size, but great in their power, in what they extend to and illuminate. As loquacity kills thought, so seeds are the beginning of life. Shakespeare gives us more to think about and to understand in these forty-nine words than most authors do in a book.

They enable us to understand what is order and the parts of order, to understand the act of reason and what it is to use reason, to understand what reason is, to understand what man is, to understand what a beast is, and to define each of these five things.

They also help us to see the necessary connections between good and end and between the chief good of man and what man is and between the chief good of man and the use of reason, and to begin to define the chief good and end of man.

They also help us to understand that the natures of things are like numbers and to begin to understand something about God by the likeness and opposition of reason to God.

Last, but not least, they touch upon five most powerful reasons why we should use our reason or use it more than we do.

* * *

Shakespeare's *Exhortation* is found on seven lines of blank verse (unrhymed iambic pentameter) in Act IV, Sc. 4 of *Hamlet*. Since the thought of the *Exhortation* begins on the seventh syllable of the first line and ends on the sixth syllable of the seventh line, the length of the whole *Exhortation* amounts to six lines of blank verse.

The *Exhortation* naturally falls into two parts, the first three lines and the last four lines. The first three lines are in the form of a question (What is a man?) based on a hypothesis (if his chief good is no more than that of the beast) and the answer that would follow (that man is no more than a beast) which is false and absurd. The second part of the exhortation confirms the absurdity of the answer to the question with that hypothesis and brings out what many things are.

Both the question and the answer in the first part are based on a wonderful proportion: man is to beast as the chief good of man is to the chief good of a beast ("to sleep and feed"). One can reason about the chief good of man in more than one way from this proportion. Indeed, this proportion is the beginning of most rigorous reasoning about what is the chief good of man. Shakespeare also suggests in the first part the necessary connection between the chief good of man and the end of man and between the chief good of man and what man is. We can also begin to see they're how the natures of things (or what they are) are like numbers.

From the second part, we can understand what is order and what is the act of reason and what it is to use reason and what reason is. We can also begin to think about God by the likeness and opposition of reason to God.

By bringing together the first and second parts, we can understand what man is and what a beast is. And we can see the necessary connection between the chief good of man and the use of reason and begin to understand what is the chief good of man.

From the second part, we can also see two most powerful reasons (in comparison to what is above man) why man should use his reason or use it more than he does. From the first part, we can see a powerful reason from what is below man why man should use his reason or use it more than he does.

And from bringing together the first and second parts, we can see two other most powerful reasons (in comparison to man himself) why man should use his reason or use it more than he does.

* * *

Shakespeare's *Exhortation* is difficult because he says so much in so few words. Furness, who was familiar with what had been written up to his time on the words of Hamlet, wrote in a celebrated passage that only the words of the Bible and especially those of Christ had been pondered more. William J. Rolfe, in the Preface to his 1894 edition of *Hamlet,* has given us this passage of Furness and said that it is not an exaggeration:

> No one of mortal mould (save Him "whose blessed feet were nailed for our advantage to the bitter cross") ever trod this earth, commanding such absorbing interest as this Hamlet, this mere creation of a poet's brain. No syllable that he whispers, no word let fall by anyone near him, but is caught and pondered as no words ever have been, except of holy Writ. Upon no throne built by mortal hands has ever "beat so fierce a light" as upon that airy fabric reared at Elsinore.

Without judging the before and after here, this passage encourages us to read the words of the exhortation (spoken by Hamlet) "carefully, frequently and with reverence."

The words *before and after* are equivocal by reason. Hence, to understand more fully Shakespeare's definition, it is necessary to understand the central senses of *before* as thought out by Aristotle in the following text.

ARISTOTLE, *CATEGORIES*, CHAPTER 12

One thing is said to be *before* another in four ways. First and most strictly according to time, by which one thing is older and more ancient than another. For something is said to be older or more ancient in that its time has been longer.

Second, that whose existence does not follow reversibly, as one is before two. If two exists, it follows right away that one exists; but if one exists, it is not necessary that two exist; so that the existence of the other does not follow reversibly from the one. Thus the *before* is such that from it, existence does not follow reversibly.

In a third way, *before* is said according to a certain order, as in the sciences and speeches. The order of before and after belongs to the demonstrative sciences: the elements are in order before the diagrams; and in grammar, the letters are before the syllables. Likewise, in speeches, the proemium comes in order before the narration.

Further, besides the aforesaid, the better and more honorable seems to be before by nature. For even the many say that those honored or loved by them come *before* with them. But this is perhaps the strangest of the ways.

Before would seem to be said in that many ways.

There would seem to be another way *before* is said in addition to the above. Of those things whose existence follows reversibly, the cause in whatever manner of existence to the other would reasonably be said to be before by nature. That there are such things is clear. The existence of a man follows reversibly in existence to the true statement about him. For if a man exists, the statement by which we say the man exists is true. But the true statement is in no way a cause of the thing being, but the thing being would seem to be a cause in some way of the

> statement being true. For the statement is said to be true or false as the thing is or is not. Thus, one thing is said to be *before* another in five ways.

QUESTIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING SHAKESPEARE'S EXHORTATION

What words in the exhortation define *order?*
How do these same words define *beginning, middle and end?*
How do these same words define *first, second, third* (and so on) and *last?*
What are the central and chief senses of *before?*
In what sense of *before* does one meaning of a word come before another?
In what sense of *before* does one sense of *before* come before another sense of *before*?
Why do *order; beginning, middle & end; first, second & last* have many meanings?

What is *a definition of a thing?*
What word is the genus and first part of the definition of reason?
What words complete the definition of reason?
Why in general are these used to complete the definition?
How does Shakespeare define reason?

What is the origin of the word *discourse?*
What is the *discourse* of reason?
Why is discourse the act of reason most known to us?
Distinguish the discourses of reason.

What is meant by *large* in the phrase *large discourse?*
Why does Shakespeare define reason by *large* rather than *small* discourse?

How is *looking* defined by seeing?
What is meant by *seeing* and hence by *looking* in the definition?

In which of the central and chief senses of *before* does reason look before and after?

Which sense perfects the others in reason's looking?
Why does the ability to look before and after include, or presuppose, the ability to distinguish things?
Does *looking before and after* also pertain to what is most known to us about reason?
How does the definition of reason bring out what it is to use reason?

Why is *large discourse* put before *looking before and after* in the definition?
Why is it necessary to add *looking before and after* to *large discourse?*

In what way is reason *god-like?*
Why is reason *god-like?*
In what way is reason not like God?

What do man and the beast have in common?
What does man have in addition to what the beast has?
What difference separates man and beast?
What is a man?
What is a beast?
Why is a man without reason said to be *no more* than a beast?

What is the *chief good* of a thing?
What is meant by the phrase *market of his time?*
Why is the chief good of man and the market of his time the same?
What is the connection between the chief good of man (or market of his time) and what a man is?
What proportion does Shakespeare see between man and beast and their chief goods?
How does Shakespeare reason (like a mathematician) to some understanding of the chief good of man from this proportion?
What does the chief good of man involve or include that the chief good of the beast does not have?

What reasons does Shakespeare touch upon why man should use his reason or use it more than he does:

In comparison to what is below man?
in comparison to what is above man?
in comparison to man himself?

Why is the philosopher (in the original sense of the word) above all others interested in an exhortation to use reason?
How does the definition of reason give us a beginning for dividing the knowledge of reason?

What can be learned about wisdom (the highest or greatest perfection of reason) from Shakespeare's Exhortation?

In the following text, Thomas points out that before and after define order in the strict sense and that distinction is presupposed to order because nothing is before or after itself. The latter is the reason why in both logic and in wisdom, Aristotle considers the basis of formal distinction, which is opposition, before the word *before*.

Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Lib. I Sent*, Dist. XX, Q. I, Art. III, Sol. I:

> Order in its definition includes...the notion of before and after. Hence there can be said to be an order of things in all those ways in which something is said to be *before* another, according to place and according to time and according to all things of this sort. It also includes distinction because there is not an order of things unless they are distinct. But the name *order* more presupposes this than signifies it

In the following text, Thomas brings out that it is proper to reason to consider and know order, and, hence, that reasoned out knowledge can be distinguished by the order it considers.

THOMAS AQUINAS: PROEMIUM TO THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

> As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, it belongs to the wise to order. The reason for this is that wisdom is the greatest perfection of reason whose property it is to know order. For, although the sense powers know some things absolutely, to know the order of one thing to another belongs only to understanding or reason.
>
> But a twofold order is found in things. One is of the parts of some whole or some multitude to each other, as the parts of a house are ordered to each other. The other is the order of things to their end. And this order is more the chief one than the first. For, as the Philosopher says in book XII of the *Metaphysics*, the

order of the parts of an army to each other is because of the order of the whole army to its leader.

Order however is compared to reason in four ways:

There is an order which reason does not make, but only considers, as is the order of natural things.

There is also an order which reason by considering makes in its own act, as when it orders its thoughts to each other, and the signs of thoughts which are signifying vocal sounds.

There is moreover a third order which reason by considering makes in the acts of the will.

And there is a fourth order which reason by considering makes in exterior things of which it is the cause, such as a box or a house.

And because the consideration of reason is perfected by the firm disposition of knowledge, there are diverse forms of knowledge according to the diverse orders which reason properly considers.

For the consideration of the order of things which human reason considers but does not make belongs to natural philosophy; thus that with natural philosophy, we also include metaphysics.

The order however which reason by considering makes in its own act belongs to rational philosophy which considers the order of the parts of a speech to each other and the order of beginnings to conclusions.

But the order of voluntary acts belongs to the consideration of moral philosophy

And the order which reason by considering makes in exterior things constructed by human reason belongs to the mechanical arts.

Thus therefore it belongs to moral philosophy, about which turns the present intention, to consider human acts as they are

ordered to each other and to the end. I call acts *human* which proceed from the will of man according to the order of reason. For if there are some acts in man which are not subject to the will and reason, they are not properly called human, but natural, just as is clear about the acts of the plant soul which in no way come under the consideration of moral philosophy. Therefore just as the subject of natural philosophy is motion or a movable thing, so also the subject of moral philosophy is human act ordered to an end, or also man insofar as he is voluntarily acting for an end.

It should be known however that, because man is naturally a social animal, since he needs many things for his life which he cannot himself alone prepare for himself, it follows that man is naturally a part of some multitude through which he is given help to live well. This help he needs for two things.

First for those things necessary for life without which the present life is not able to be gone through. And the domestic household, of which he is a part, aids man in this. For every man has from his parents generation and nourishment and discipline and likewise also the individuals who are parts of the domestic family aid each other in the necessities of life.

In another way man is aided by the multitude of which he is a part for a complete sufficiency of life, so that man not only lives, but lives well, having all the things which suffice for his life. And thus the civil multitude, of which he is a part, helps him not only as far as bodily things (as regards many artificial things for which one household is not sufficient), but also as regards moral things insofar as insolent youth, whom paternal admonition is not able to correct, are forced through public power by the threat of punishment.

It should de known however that this whole which is a multitude of citizens or the domestic family has only a unity of order by which something is not simply one. And therefore a part of this whole can have an act which is not an act of the whole, as the soldier in the army has an act which is not that of the whole army.

Nevertheless the whole itself has some act which is not private to some part, but of the whole, as the striking together of the whole army. And the drawing of the ship is an act of the

multitude drawing the ship. There is however another whole, which has a unity not only in order, but in composition or binding together, or even in continuity by which unity something is one simply; and therefore there is no act of the part which is not of the whole. For there is the same motion of the whole and the part in continuous things. And likewise in things composed or bound together, the act of the part is chiefly of the whole. And therefore it is necessary that the consideration of such a whole and its part belong to the same knowledge. However it does not belong to the same knowledge to consider the whole which has only a unity of order and its parts. And hence it is that moral philosophy [we call this practical philosophy, the philosophy of doing] is divided into three parts.

The first of these considers the acts of one man ordered to an end and is called *monastic*. [We call this part *ethics.*]

The second however considers the acts of the domestic multitude and is called *domestics.*

But the third considers the acts of the civil multitude and is called *politics.*

Duane H. Berquist

AN EXPOSITION OF HAMLET'S EXHORTATION TO USE REASON

Proemium

In an age as unreasonable as our own, the twentieth century, where mad men and fools have so often misled nations (it is the plague of the times, says Shakespeare, when "mad men lead the blind") and where individuals prefer to follow their own fantasies and feelings rather than reason, and where even scientists are willing to admit contradictions in things and where the irrational followers of Nietzsche and others run amuck, we surely have need of an exhortation to use reason.

And the philosopher has a special concern with such an exhortation. For the true philosopher is a lover of wisdom and wisdom is the chief and greatest perfection of reason. Therefore, the philosopher most of all should love reason and the use of it. Hence, it belongs most of all to the philosopher to exhort or urge men to use reason.

And like the saying "physician heal thyself", the philosopher also needs an exhortation to use reason, especially one that tells us what reason is and what it is to use reason. It is laughable to pursue wisdom which requires a long and most difficult use of reason without seeing first what it is to use reason and why we should use reason.

The Best Short Exhortation to Use Reason

Perhaps the best short exhortation to use reason is that found in just forty-nine words of Hamlet written on seven lines of blank verse in Act IV, Sc. 4 of *Hamlet:*

> .....What is a man,
> If his chief good and market of his time
> Be but to sleep and feed: a beast, no more.
> Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
> Looking before and after, gave us not

That capability and god-like reason
To fust in us un'used.

Hamlet's Exhortation is useful for understanding and defining what is order, and what it is to be first or second (etc.) or last and what is a beginning or a middle or an end.

The words of the Exhortation are also useful for understanding and defining what is the act and use of reason and what is reason (the ability).

Further, they are useful for understanding what is the difference between a man and a beast, why man is more than a beast, what a man is and what a beast is.

In addition, they are useful for understanding the connection between good and end, the necessary connection between what man is and his chief good and the end of his life, that the chief good of man is better than the chief good of the beast and why the chief good of man is more than the chief good of a beast, what the chief good of man has above that of the beast, and what the chief good of man or the end of his life is.

The words of the Exhortation are also useful for seeing the order among these definitions.

At last, they are useful for understanding why man should use his reason or use it more fully than he does. Hamlet touches upon five most excellent and powerful general reasons why man should use his reason or use it more than he does.

The Exhortation is Written in Blank Verse

We should first consider the exterior form of Hamlet's words, their verse form, and then the infinitely more important meaning of those words.

Hamlet's exhortation is written in what is called *blank verse*. Blank verse, for those not versed in these matters, is unrhymed iambic pentameter. An *iamb*

in English verse is two syllables with the accent falling upon the second syllable. *Pentameter* means that there are five such feet in a line or ten syllables with the accent falling upon the even numbered syllables. (To avoid monotony, the number of syllables or the place of the accent is sometimes varied.) Since the thought of the exhortation begins with the seventh syllable of the first line and ends on the sixth syllable of the seventh line, the exhortation amounts in quantity to six lines of blank verse. But for the purpose of referring to specific words in Hamlet's Exhortation, we will number seven lines (the first having only four syllables and the last six syllables)

Why is the exhortation written in verse?

First, verse is more pleasant than prose. The use of verse occasionally is not below the dignity of the philosopher. Boethius wrote verse alternating with prose in each part of his great work *The Consolation of Philosophy*. Hamlet, however, has chosen the meter closest to daily speech.

But a second and far more important reason is that verse is more easily memorized and remembered. It is necessary to always remember this exhortation since it is a permanent and universal beginning of the whole use of our reason. And one must think of these words carefully and frequently before one begins to understand them fully. One should not be altogether surprised by the attention given to the words of Hamlet's exhortation in what follows and the length of the consideration of their meaning and significance. Indeed, many words in the play *Hamlet* have for a long time engaged the minds of many authors. And one cannot think often of these words if one cannot remember them. William J. Rolfe has preserved a general observation on the attention which has been given to the words of Hamlet in his edition of the play:

> The play is one of the longest...and the amount that has been written about it far exceeds that on any other of Shakespeare's works. Furness does not exaggerate when he says: "No one of mortal mould (save Him 'whose blessed feet were nailed for our advantage to the bitter cross') ever trod this earth, commanding such absorbing interest as this Hamlet, this mere creation of a poet's brain. No syllable that he whispers, no word let fall by anyone near him, but is caught and pondered as no words ever have been, except of holy Writ. Upon no throne built by mortal

> hands has ever'beat so fierce a light' as upon that airy fabric reared at Elsinore."[1]

In the more recent edition of the play Harold Jenkins has written:

> ...such is the fascination of this play, the most discussed in the world, that hardly a line of dialogue has failed to attract comment and an article or two in the journals.[2]

A third reason why the exhortation is written in verse or meter is to call our attention to the likeness between what is said in the exhortation and numbers and what is found in numbers. Shakespeare often calls what is written in verse *numbers*. And Hamlet himself in his letter to Ophelia, after some verses addressed to her, calls them *numbers*:

> O dear Ophelia, I am ill at these numbers. I have not art to reckon my groans.[3]

Numbers and what is found in them are like what is in the exhortation first as regards definitions. There are many definitions in the exhortation and Aristotle notes the likeness of definitions to numbers.[4] Hence, Hamlet speaks of man without reason or the use of reason as being *no more* than a beast.

Proportion, or the likeness of ratios, is first seen in numbers and the exhortation rests upon many proportions as can be seen especially in the first part (the first three lines).

Moreover, although thoughts are like numbers rather than continuous quantities,[5] nevertheless as ratios of numbers are said to be in continuous proportion by a certain likeness to the continuous, so too, definitions and syllogisms can be said to be continuous by the same likeness. In Hamlet's Exhortation, for example, the definitions of order, of the act of reason, of reason, and of man are continuous and it is necessary to see this. Hamlet syllogizes and syllogizing is like reckoning with numbers and especially when one syllogizes from a proportion like one does in mathematics.

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[1] *The Tragedy of Hamlet*, Preface, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1894, p. 5
[2] The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, edited by Harold Jenkins, Preface, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1982, p. viii
[3] *Hamlet* , Act II, Sc. 2
[4] *Metaphysics*, Book Eight, 1043b 32-1044a 14
[5] Aristotle, *About the Soul* (*De Anima*), Book One, 407a 7-10

There is also the symbolism of the numbers to exercise the minds of the Pythagoreans and Platonists and Straussians amongst us who will, of course, note that Hamlet writes his *wise* exhortation on seven lines beginning on the seventh syllable of the first line. Seven is an old symbol of wisdom and seven is also the age of reason. Further, there are exactly forty-nine words in the exhortation and forty-nine is the square of seven and the age in which Aristotle said reason is best. Further, Hamlet *completes* the exhortation using the equivalent of six lines of blank verse by ending on the sixth syllable of the last line. Six is the first perfect number with parts perfectly ordered. And this signifies then the perfection and order of his exhortation. There can also be seen deep significance in his writing ten syllable lines of iambic pentameter. Ten, the number of syllables on a line of iambic pentameter, is a symbol of the law which is something of reason. And the five and two in iambic pentameter is also deeply significant. Five is the number of the virtues of reason in Book Six of the Nicomachean Ethics which perfects the two parts of reason - looking and practical. Two is also a symbol of reasoned out knowledge for Plato, as we learn in the first book *On the Soul*. But perhaps this way madness lies.

The Division of Hamlet's Exhortation

Hamlet's exhortation has two parts.

In the first part (the first three lines), Hamlet asks a question and answers it on the basis of a proportion between man and beast and the chief goods of each. The question is: "What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed?" and the answer is: "a beast, no more".

In the second part (lines four through seven), Hamlet brings out what man has, or what God has given him, in addition to what the beast has and also what is found in man's chief good that is not found in the chief good of the beast. In this second part, Hamlet also defines order, the act and use of reason, and reason (the ability) itself and (with the help of the first part) enables us to complete the first definitions of man and beast.

In the two parts together, Hamlet touches upon at least five general reasons why we should use reason, or use it more than we do. We can see these five reasons after we have examined the two parts in some detail.

The difficulty of fully understanding Hamlet's Exhortation comes from its brevity and universality. But as Polonius says (while exemplifying the opposite), "brevity is the soul of wit" (*Wit* here means wisdom). Considerable laying out of Hamlet's words, then, and much leading by the hand from less universal statements, examples, likenesses and opposites are necessary before we can hope to rise to the level of Hamlet's thought. This is especially true when we consider Hamlet's definition of reason. Other words of *Hamlet* help us here, but we must also go to the words of many other thinkers and our own experience.

The First Part of the Exhortation

The proportion and implicit syllogism of the first part

When we examine more carefully the first part of Hamlet's exhortation, we can see that the question and answer in it are based on a proportion or likeness of ratios among four things. And that this proportion involves implicitly if-then statements from which if-then syllogisms arise. Each of these should be unfolded.

The four things in the proportion are man and his chief good and the beast and his chief good. Aiming at clarity and avoiding the pedantry of teaching, Hamlet speaks *exemplariter* of the beast's chief good as "to sleep and feed". This fits our cat Tabitha who purrs when she's fed and when she sleeps.

The proportion could be first stated thus: the chief good of man is to man as the chief good of the beast is to the beast. Then, alternating the proportion, as the chief good of man is to the chief good of the beast, so is man to the beast.

From this proportion, we could form if-then statements something like what the mathematician does. If the mathematician sees that A is to B as X is to Y, he can form any of three if-then statements. If X is more than Y, then A is more than B; If equal, equal; if less, less. Hamlet's question and answer differ only in form from this if-then statement: if man's chief good is no more than the good of the beast, then man is no more than a beast.

And this if-then statement is the beginning of a powerful hypothetical or if-then syllogism which can be stated thus: If man's chief good is no more than the chief good of a beast, then man is no more than a beast. But man is surely more than a beast. Hence, it cannot be true that man's chief good is no more than the chief good of the beast.

No man wants us to treat him as if he were no more than a beast. We would all think it wrong, if faced with the choice between saving the life of a man or a beast, we were to save the life of the beast. But despite thinking themselves better than a beast, many men pursue the goods we have in common with the beast as if they were our greatest good. But this statement upon which their life seems to be based, that is, that our chief good is eating and sleeping and sexual pleasure is refuted by the rejection of its consequence, that man is no more than a beast.

One could also, of course, reason from the statement that if man is more than a beast, then the chief good of man is more than the chief good of the beast. Affirming the antecedent "man is more than a beast" and we are forced to admit the consequent, the chief good of man is more than the chief good of the beast.

These syllogisms have something of the power and certitude of the mathematician's syllogisms based on proportions. It is as if the mathematician had seen this proportion: Half of six is to three and as half of four is to two. And then said: What is a three if it be half of four? A two, no more.

The Connection between What a thing is and its End or Chief Good

But what is seen explicitly in the first part of the exhortation is the necessary connection between what man is and what is his chief good. Just as there is a necessary connection between three and half of six, and between two and half of four, so likewise, there is a necessary connection between what man is and his chief good and between what a beast is and his chief good. Plato and Aristotle have taught us why there is a necessary connection between what a thing is and its end and good. The middle terms are *a thing's own act* and *a thing's own perfection*. A thing's own act done well is its end or purpose and a thing's own act (what it alone can do or do better) is determined by what it is.

Likewise, a thing's own perfection is its end and the perfection of things different in kind is different. The perfection of the eye is not the same as the perfection of the ear because *what an eye is* is not the same as *what an ear is*.

Hence, when we see in the second part what is necessary to complete the definition of man, that is, what he has in addition to the beast, we are prepared again to reason more perfectly to what man's chief good is.

* * *

Before turning to the second part of Hamlet's Exhortation, there are some words to look at more closely in the first part.

The words *chief good*

The word *chief* added to good signifies both that it is the greatest good and also the good under which all other goods are placed. Antony says about Cleopatra

> Whose bosom was my crownet, my chief end.[6]

Why Hamlet use the metonym *time* for our life

The word *time* here is a metonym for the life of man. The name of the measure is used for the measured. Man's life is measured by time for it begins and ends in time. But it is especially appropriate to use this metonym for the life of man rather than the life of a beast or a plant. Man lives in time more than the other animals. Hence, in the third book *About the Soul*, Aristotle calls man the animal with the sense of time:

> Desires come to be contrary to each other. This happens when reason and concupiscence are contrary. This comes about in those having the sense of time: for the mind urges us to hold back on account of the future while concupiscence on account of the

[6]Shakespeare, *Antony & Cleopatra*, Act IV, Sc. 8. The Yale Shakespeare says there that "'Crown' was used in the sense of fulfillment, the last final achievement."

> present - for what is pleasant now seems to be simply pleasant and simply good on account of not seeing the future.[7]

Thomas Aquinas comments on these words:

> In man there are contrary desires, one of which the continent follow and others resist. He says therefore that desires are able to become contrary to each other and this happens "in those having the sense of time"; that is, those who not only know what is in the present, but who consider the past and the future - because the understanding sometimes commands one to draw back from something concupiscible on account of the consideration of the future, as when to one with a fever, it seems from the judgment of the understanding, that he ought to abstain from wine lest the fever become warm.[8]

Man begins to differ from the beast in his acts when he considers not just the here and now, but takes into account the past and the future before he acts. And as we will see in the second part, man is the animal with reason and reason is the ability to look before and after and the first meaning of *before* and *after* is that of time. Indeed, as Aristotle shows in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing*,[9] time would not fully be without the numbering soul.

The word *market*

The word *market* can be explained in two ways. It can mean more or less the same as *mark* which means the end or goal aimed at. Or it can be taken for what man spends his time or life on or trades them for. But since that for the sake of which is the definition of end, the second explanation does not differ in substance from the first. Thus York says:

> For that's the golden mark I seek to hit[10]

Why Hamlet couples *his chief good* and *market of his time*

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[7]*De Anima*, Book III, Chapter 10, 433b 5-10
[8]Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Book III of About the Soul*. Lectio 15, n. 829
[9]*Physics*, Book IV, 223a 21-29
[10]Shakespeare, *Henry VI, Part II*, Act I, Sc. 2

By this coupling, Hamlet points out two things. One is that the *good* and the *end* are the same. And the second is that the good or end of *man* is the same as the end or good of *human life*.

Why Hamlet says *no more*

The definitions of things are like numbers. When Hamlet says that man would be "a beast, no more" if his chief good were no more than that of the beast, he also insinuates by the words *no more* that man does have something in common with the beast (which is to be an animal) and that the difference between man and the beast is like that of numbers, as Aristotle, following Plato, teaches us in the eighth book of the *Metaphysics* [11] where the addition or subtraction of a unit gives a different species. Hence, we can begin to understand better the likeness of the implicit syllogisms in Hamlet's question and answer to the reasoning of the mathematician. To say it again, it is as if the mathematician were to ask: What is a three if it be half of four? And the answer would be: a two, no more.

Hence also when, in the second part, we consider what man has in addition to the beast, namely reason, we can complete the first definition of man as an animal with reason.

The Second Part of the Exhortation

In the second part, Hamlet tells us what man has in addition to the beast and what therefore will be found in his chief good (but not in the chief good of the beast).

But if we examine more closely the second part, we can see that Hamlet has given us implicitly five continuous definitions. Definitions are said to be continuous when one definition, or what is defined by it, enters into another. In geometry, for example, the definitions of rectilineal plane figure, of quadrilateral and of square are continuous. In logic, the definitions of sign, name, predicable

[11] 1043b 32-1044a 14

and genus are continuous. In the philosophy of nature, the definition of motion is continuous with both the definition of nature and that of time. (Something like this is also found in syllogisms. When the conclusion of one syllogism is the premiss of another, the two syllogisms can be called *continuous*. Even elementary theorems in Euclid are based on continuous syllogisms.)

In the second part of Hamlet's Exhortation, the definitions of order, of the act or use of reason, of reason, (and with some help from the first part) of man and of beast are continuous. The definition of order is found in the definition of the act of reason and reason is defined by its act and man is defined by reason and the beast by negating something in the definition of man.

Order is defined as a before and after. Hamlet uses the definition of order (before and after) in his definition of the act of reason which is a discourse in which there is looking before and after. And reason is defined as the *capability*, or (I shorten this to) the *ability, for large discourse, looking before and after.* (Reason, like every ability, must be defined by what it is an ability for.) Man can then be defined as the animal with reason. And the beast as an animal without reason.

Hamlet gives us the act (large discourse, looking before and after) for which reason is the ability in lines four and five before he speaks in line six of reason as a capability or ability.

Since we know that we have an ability for some act only through the presence of that act in us (as we know, for example, that we have the ability to see by seeing and the ability to hear by hearing), it is reasonable that Hamlet mentions the act of reason before speaking of our having the ability called *reason*.

Further, we must know the act of reason before we can define reason. For every ability is known and defined by the act for which it is an ability.

Hence, in lines four, five and six, Hamlet gives us the elements of a definition of reason. Reason is the *ability for large discourse, looking before and after*.

The definition of man is also a beginning for knowing man's own act. Since man is an animal with reason, the act with reason must be man's own act. And since a thing's own act done well is its end, we can be led into ethics from

Hamlet's exhortation since ethics is based on a knowledge of the end of man. Likewise the definition of man enables us to know what is the natural road in human knowledge. Since man is an animal with reason, the natural road in human knowledge must be the road from the senses into reason. But let us return to the exhortation itself.

We should now examine some key words in the definition of reason and of order. Hamlet tells us that reason is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after and order is a before and after. Four words should be examined here: *discourse, large, looking* and *before*. Each of these words has more than one meaning and not by chance. We cannot attempt here a complete exposition of any one of them. But we can indicate some of the main senses and their order so as to better understand Hamlet's definition of reason and order.

The Word *Discourse*

The words *discourse* and the shorter *course* come from the Latin word for *running*. Both the Latin and the English words name first, of course, the well-known act of our legs. Close to this meaning of *course* is the place where we run, as when we speak of a *race-course*.

Then the word *course* or *running* is carried over and applied to all other outwards motions and changes and actions. A river is said to run. Or a man is said to be run down. And since motion is measured by time, we also use the word *running* in talking about time; as when we say that "time is running out". Likewise, we speak of a *course of action*. The famous American *Declaration of Independence* begins with these familiar words:

> When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another...

And in *King John*, when Prince Henry at the death of his father sees the course of human life and how it ends. Prince Henry on death of father:

> Even so must I run on, and even so stop.[12]

[12]Shakespeare, *King John*, Act V, Sc. 7

In one famous line, Shakespeare manages to use both the Latin derived word and the English word:

> The course of true love never did run smooth.[13]

Then the word is applied to the movement of the eyes as when our eyes run down a column of figures or a list of names.

And at last, the word is placed upon an inward act of reason that is like running or motion, an inward running or going from this to that and upon the speech in which that movement is expressed.

The discourse of reason is like even the definition of motion:

> scientia quae in nobis invenitur, habet aliquid perfectionis et aliquid imperfectionis. Ad perfectionem eius pertinet certitudo ipsius, quia quod scitur, certitudinaliter cognoscitur; sed ad imperfectionem pertinet discursus intellectus a principiis in conclusiones, quarum est scientia; hic enim discursus non contingit nisi secundum quod intellectus cognoscens principia cognoscit in potentia tantum conclusiones; si enim actu cognoseret, non esset ibi discursus; cum motus non sit nisi exitus de potentia ad actum.[14]

Thus we find *discourse* used in *Othello* both for the inward movement of reason and the speech in which that movement is expressed. When Desdemona protests her innocence, she uses *discourse* (as a noun) for the inward movement of the mind:

> If e'er my will did trespass 'gainst his love,
> Either in discourse of thought or actual deed...[15]

But when Cassio speaks of his drunkenness, he uses the word *discourse* (as a verb) meaning to speak:

> Drunk! and speak parrot! and squabble, swagger, swear, and discourse fustian with one's own shadow![16]

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[13]*A Midsummer Night's Dream,* Act I, Sc. 1
[14]Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, Q. 2, Art. 1, Ad 4
[15]*Othello*, Act IV, Sc. 2
[16]*Othello,* Act II, Sc. 3

In *Hamlet*, we also find these same two meanings. Hamlet speaks of the inward movement of our reason in these words:

> And how his audit stands who knows save heaven?
> But in our circumstance and course of thought
> 'Tis heavy with him.[17]

The phrase *course of thought* is also found in this subtle passage on how uncustomary novelty disturbs the course of our thoughts:

> In this the antique and well noted face
> Of plain old form is much disfigured;
> And, like a shifted wind unto a sail,
> It makes the course of thoughts to fetch about,
> Startles and frights consideration,
> Makes sound opinion sick and truth suspected,
> For putting on so new a fashion'd robe.[18]

But when Guildenstern says to Hamlet (feigning madness) in the same play:

> Good my lord, put your discourse into some frame, and start not so wildly from my affair.[19]

he seems to be thinking of Hamlet's wild words, a sign of the disorder in his mind.

And in *Henry VI, Part Three*, when York speaks to Clifford, he uses the native English word of *running*:

> O Clifford! but bethink thee once again,
> And in thy thought o'er-run my former time[20]

In one play, Shakespeare speaks of a course of argument as a *chase*:

> Celia: Is it possible, on such a sudden, you should fall into so strong a liking with old Sir Rowland's youngest son?
>
> Rosalind: The Duke my father lov'd his father dearly.

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[17]*Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 4
[18]Shakespeare*, King John,* Act IV, Sc. 2
[19]*Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2
[20]*Henry VI, Part Three*, Act I, Sc. 4

> Celia: Doth it therefore ensue that you should love his son dearly? By this kind of chase, I should hate him, for my father hated his father dearly; yet I hate not Orlando.[21]

And Henry says:

> For now we have no thought in us but France,
> Save those to God, that run before our business.[22]

The meaning of discourse in the definition of reason is, of course, the inward motion of reason. For it is this that most of all and first separates us from the beast, as pointed out in Hamlet's exhortation to use reason. When Hamlet complains of his mother's hasty marriage in his soliloquy, he says:

> O God! a beast that wants discourse of reason,
> Would have mourn'd longer.....[23]

Here the beast is said *to want,* that is, *to lack* the discourse of reason.

There are perhaps some reasons why the movement of reason is named from, among outward or sensible motions, that of the legs and from running rather than walking. The reason here is, of course, in general one of likeness.

Reason goes forward step by step as do the legs. The movement of reason is not continuous like that of a falling stone or the rolling of a bowling ball. Thoughts are like numbers rather than like the continuous. The continuous is divisible forever and between any two continuous quantities, there is an infinity of possible quantities. But between the two premisses of a syllogism and the conclusion, there is no other possible thought. There is no statement closer to the conclusion than the premisses. In this way, statements resemble numbers. There is no number closer to four than three as we ascend from one. As there is a next number, so there is a next thought or statement. Further one cannot divide premisses forever. One comes to statements known through themselves. Likewise between the genus and the differences on the one hand and the species on the other hand, there are no other thoughts. The speech composed of the genus and the differences, the convertible speech, is next to

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[21] *As You Like It*, Act I, Sc. 3
[22] Shakespeare, *Henry V,* Act I, Sc. 2
[23] Shakespeare, *Hamlet,* Act I, Sc. 2

the species. Likewise, definitions are not divisible forever. Hence, the motion of reason is like the step by step motion of the legs.

Reason goes forward step by step as do the higher animals. But why does the swiftest of these motions, running, give its name to the movement of reason? The reason seems to be that the movement of reason is very swift in comparison to the movement of bodies. Hence, the movement of reason is named from the swiftest of the movements of the legs.

Indeed the proverbial speed of thought (compared to the body) makes the word *running* in some ways more suitable for naming the movement of reason than *walking*. Hence the complaint of the old, fat Falstaff:

> Lancaster: Now, Falstaff, where have you been all this while?
> When everything is ended, then you come.
> These tardy tricks of yours will, on my life,
> One time or other break some gallows' back.
>
> Falstaff: ....do you think me a swallow, an arrow, or a bullet? have I, in my poor and old motion, the expedition of thought? I have speeded hither with the very extremest inch of possibility.[24]

Rosalind speaks as if her thoughts outrun her actions or go before them:

> Rosalind: I might ask you for your commission.
> But I do take thee, Orlando, for my husband.
> There's a girl goes before the priest, and
> certainly a woman's thought runs before her actions.
>
> Orlando: So do all thoughts; they are wing'd.[25]

And King John urges Richard to go swiftly to the nobles and back in these words:

> Be Mercury, set feathers to thy heels,
> And fly like thought from them to me again.[26]

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[24]Shakespeare, *Henry IV, Part Two*, Act IV, Sc. 3

[25]Shakespeare, *As You Like It* , Act IV, Sc. 1. Yale Shake speare note 32. **chase** pursuit of an argument

[26]Shakespeare, *King John*, Act IV, Sc. 2

Indeed, thought is sometimes said to have wings because of its swiftness:

> Heave him away upon your winged thoughts
> Athwart the sea[27]

And in a Prologue to announce the swift change of scene, it is said:

> Thus with imagin'd wing our swift scene flies
> In motion of no less celerity
> Than that of thought.....[28]

In this passage, we also see how the movement of the imagination, like that of reason, is swift in comparison to the movement of bodies. Perhaps the likeness of reason to wings and of thinking to flying touched upon in several passages above is more metaphorical than the word *running*. The movement of the imagination is more like flying than is the movement of reason. The movement of reason is or should be grounded in things while the flight of the imagination can be without a foundation in things. Perhaps there is this deep significance in the swift motion of reason being named from a motion on the ground than from the motion of flying. Air seems to be insubstantial or nothing. Shakespeare points to the "poet's eye" or imagination as "in a fine frenzy rolling" (rather than proceeding step by step) and as giving to "airy nothing a local habitation and a name":

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> The lunatic, the lover and the poet
> Are of imagination all compact.....
> The poet's eye, in a fine frenzy rolling,
> Doth glance from heaven to earth, from earth to heaven;
> And, as imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
> A local habitation and a name.
> Such tricks hath strong imagination,
> That, if it would but apprehend some joy,
> It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
> Or, in the night, imagining some fear,
> How easy is a bush suppos'd a bear.[29]

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[27]Shakespeare, *Henry V,* Act V, Prologue
[28]Shakespeare, Prologue to Act III of *Henry the Fifth*
[29]*A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Sc. 1

From the foregoing, then, four things can be known about the act for which reason is an ability. This act is a movement or like a movement from this to that. It is, in general, a movement much faster than that of bodies. It is a movement which is not continuous, but step-like. Reason goes forward step by step. And unlike the movement or the flight of the imagination, the movement of reason is, or should be, grounded in things.

Although the movement of reason is swift in comparison to that of the body (Newton's mind went from the earth to the moon and back again much faster than the astronauts did), nevertheless it not true that the swifter the mind goes, the better will be its thinking. It does not mean that the movement of reason is always easy or that the faster reason goes, the better it will be. We can apply to the running of reason, the words of Friar Lawrence to Romeo:

> Romeo: O let us hence! I stand on sudden haste.
> Friar: Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast.[30]

The words of Friar Laurence can be said of *running* in the sense of the act of the legs, in the sense of action, and in the sense of the act of reason. Although Friar Laurence is giving Romeo advice about *running* in the sense of action (Romeo is apt to act in too great a haste), his advice clearly looks back to, and is applicable to, the original sense where a person stumbles who runs too fast with his legs, and it is also most applicable to the movement of reason: those who do not go forward wisely and slowly in the discourse of reason, will stumble or fall into mistakes. Reason makes mistakes when it moves too quickly to a conclusion. Hence, we sometimes tell people not to *jump* to conclusions because this is the way they stumble or make mistakes. It is interesting to note how the same advice (in words) could be applied to all these meanings of *running*. People stumble or make mistakes when they run too fast or act in haste (hence the proverbs "Act in haste, repent in leisure", "Haste makes waste") or jump to conclusions.

And Malcolm says well to Macduff:

> modest wisdom plucks me from over-credulous haste.[31]

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[30]Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 2
[31]Shakespeare, *Macbeth,* Act IV, Sc. 3

It is not by chance that the greatest mind of the Middle Ages was nicknamed at one time by his fellow students, *The Dumb Ox*. Gamow pointed out that the great Niels Bohr seemed to be the last man to get a new idea presented by some visiting physicist at his Institute in Copenhagen, but he was the first man to get the idea correctly. Reason makes mistakes when it jumps to conclusions. Thus although the movement of reason is swift in comparison to that of the body, it does not mean that the faster a mind comes to conclusions the better is that mind. It is especially in the beginning that a great mind proceeds slowly, as Poe pointed out in *The Purloined Letter*.

Just as the word *running* is carried over, so also is the word *foot:*

> There is a play tonight before the king;
> One scene of it comes near the circumstance
> Which I have told thee of my father's death:
> I prithee, when thou seest that act afoot,
> Even with the very comment of thy soul
> Observe mine uncle; if his occulted guilt
> Do not itself unkennel in one speech,
> It is a damned ghost that we have seen,
> And my imaginations are as foul
> As Vulcan's stithy. Give him heedful note;
> For I mine eyes will rivet to his face,
> And after we will both our judgments join
> In censure of his seeming.[32]

Notice the word *afoot* in line four. In like manner, we speak of *foot* or *feet* in meter. Here not only *running* is carried over, but also that by which we run - the *foot*. In like manner, Shakespeare speaks of the plot as going forward. *Foot*, however, is more metaphorical than analogous (just as the word eye applied to reason as in the "eye of the soul" is more metaphorical than the word *see*.)

We have now proceeded perhaps as far as an analysis of the likeness underlying the carrying over of the word *running* or *discourse* can take us. But we can now seek a deeper knowledge of the discourse of reason by distinguishing the discourses of reason.

Every discourse of reason is a going from this to that, but there are four ways in which these discourses of reason can be distinguished. We can

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[32]Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2

distinguish them first by how reason goes from this to that. And then we can distinguish them by the differences of the this and that between which reason runs. Third, they can be distinguished by their ends or that for the sake of which reason runs. And fourth, they can be distinguished by what the discourse is about.

In the following text, Thomas distinguishes the discourse of reason by how reason goes from this to that:

> In scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus.
>
> Unus secundum successionem tantum: sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud.
>
> Alius discursus est secundum causalitatem: sicut cum per principia pervenimus in cognitionem conclusionum...
>
> secundus discursus praesupponit primum: procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque considerant
>
> ...discursus talis est procedentis de noto ad ignotum...quando cognoscitur primum, adhuc ignoratur secundum. Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo, sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas: tunc cessat discursus.[33]

This can be translated thus:

> In our reasoned-out knowledge, there is a twofold discourse.
>
> One by succession only: as when, after we understand something in act, we turn to understanding another thing.
>
> The other discourse is by causality: as when through beginnings we arrive at a conclusion...
>
> The second discourse presupposes the first; for those proceeding from beginnings to conclusions, do not consider both at once.
>
> ...Such a discourse belongs to one proceeding from the known to the unknown...when the first is known the second is still unknown. And thus the second is not known in the first, but from the first. The end of the discourse however is when the second is seen in

[33] *Summa Theologiae,* Prima Pars, Q. 14, Art. 7, c.

> the first, the effects having been untied in the causes: and then the discourse stops.

In the light of this text, the question arises about the word *discourse* in the definition of reason. Should we understand the first or the second discourse?

Although both could be understood by the word *discourse* in Hamlet's definition, it seems nevertheless that one should have chiefly in mind the second discourse. Three reasons can be given for this.

The first reason is based on the truth that we should define an ability by its utmost.[34] For example, we define a person's weight-lifting ability by the greatest weight they can lift, not by any lesser weight they can also lift. Now, as Thomas points out, the second discourse presupposes and includes the first, but the reverse is not true. Whoever is capable of the second discourse must also be capable of the first, but not vice-versa. Hence, we should define reason by the second discourse which is the utmost to which its ability (for discourse) extends.

The second reason is that the second discourse seems to be properly of reason, the discourse that is appropriate or proper to reason. The eyes can run down a column of figures or names. But they do not see one thing through seeing another or by seeing another. Reason not only goes from one thing to another (as in a course in which many different things are taken up, one after the other), but it also reasons from one thing to another. A sign that the second discourse is proper to reason is that *discursus* became for the Latin logicians often a synonym for *reasoning*. And, of course, the fact that the second discourse is called *reasoning*, but not the first; and that *reasoning* is named from reason, as if its own act, is a sign that the second discourse is the one to define reason by what is proper to it. In this discourse, reason not only goes from one thing to another, but knowing or accepting the former is the *cause* of one's coming to know or accept the latter. When reason is defined as the ability for discourse, it is especially or mainly this discourse which is had in mind. Indeed, the eyes and the imagination go from one thing to another in this common way. When one walks through a picture gallery, one's eyes see one painting after another. But seeing one painting does not cause one to see another. One does not come to see one painting through seeing another. Hence, Thomas speaks as if *discurrere* properly names this second discourse:

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[34]See Aristotle, *De Caelo*, 281a7-25

> discurrere proprie est ex uno in cognitionem alterius devenire....tunc dicitur aliquid *ex* aliquo cognosci, quando non est idem motus in utrumque; sed primo movetur intellectus in unum, et ex hoc movetur in aliud; unde hic est quidam discursus, sicut patet in demonstrationibus. Primo enim intellectus fertur in principia tantum, secundario fertur per principia in conclusiones.[35]

The author of *La Division Des Ordres de Thomas D'Aquin* makes the same point:

> Tout cela revient a dire qu'on ne trouve pas transpose sur le plan sensible le discours au sens propre dont j'ai parle precedemment, c'est-a-dire le discours *secundum causalitatem*. Notre connaissance sensible est cependant discursive *secundum successionem*, en tant qu'on y retrouve une certaine succession d'actes distincts.[36]

Another passage where Thomas identifies *discursus* with the movement of reason from what is known before to what is unknown before, but afterwards known as a result of the discourse is the following:

> *discursus* quendam motum nominat. Omnis autem motus est de uno priori in aliud posterius. Unde discursiva cognitio attenditur secundum quod ex aliquo prius noto devenitur in cognitionem alterius posterius noti, quod prius erat ignotum.[37]

We have spoken of how the Latin logicians would use *discursus* as a synonym for *reasoning*. Since reasoning is coming to know or guess a statement from other statements and because of them, reasoning is clearly a discourse *secundum causalitatem*.

One edition of *Hamlet* gives the following explanation of *discourse* from Samuel Johnson:

> 36. *discourse*] power of reasoning. 'The act of the understanding, by which it passes from premisses to consequences' (Johnson, *Dict.*). Cf. I.ii 150 and LN[38]

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[35]*De Veritate,* Q. 8, Art. 15, c.
[36]pp. 112-113
[37]*Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 58, Art. 3, Ad 1
[38]The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, edited by Harold Jenkins, Footnotes on Act IV, Sc. 4, line 36, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1982, p. 345

There are other discourses or movements of reason whereby reason comes to know something before unknown through something already known. Foremost among these is defining. Reason comes to a definition by a movement. Such a way of coming to know what a thing is pertains to a mind that discourses, as Thomas explains in the following passage:

> In operatione autem intellectus qua apprehendit *quod quid est*, non accidit falsum nisi per accidens, secundum quod in hac etiam operatione permiscetur aliquid de operatione intellectus componentis et dividentis.
>
> Quod autem contingit inquantum intellectus noster non statim, sed cum quodam inquisitionis ordine ad cognoscendam quidditatem alicuius rei pertingit: sicut cum primo apprehendimus *animal*, et dividentes per oppositas differentias, altera relicta, unam generi apponimus, quousque perveniamus ad definitionem speciei. In quo quidem processu potest falsitas accidere, si accipiatur ut differentia generis quod non est generis differentia.
>
> Sic autem procedere ad cognoscendum de aliquo quid est, est intellectus ratiocinando discurrentis de uno in aliud.[39]

In this passage, Thomas uses the word *ratiocinando*. Thomas even goes so far as to say that reason comes to know the universal (from the senses or experience) by a discourse when contrasting man's reason with the angelic understanding in this passage:

> intellectus et ratio differunt quantum ad modum cognoscendi: quia scilicet intellectus cognoscit simplici intuitu, ratio vero discurrendo de uno in aliud. Sed tamen ratio per discursum pervenit ad cognoscendum illud quod intellectus sine discursu cognoscit, scilicet universale.[40]

Thomas even uses the word *ratiocinatio* when describing the process whereby the universal comes to be in our reason from experience and in regard to experience itself:

> Sed tamen experimentum indiget aliqua ratiocinatione circa particularia per quam confertur unum ad aliud, quod est proprium rationis. Puta cum aliquis recordatur quod talis herba multoties

[39] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber III, Caput 108
[40] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 59, Art. 1, Ad 1

> sanavit multos a febre, dicitur esse experimentum quod talis est sanativa febris.
>
> Ratio autem non sistit in experimento particularium, sed ex multis particularibus in quibus expertus est, accipit unum commune, quod firmatur in anima, et considerat illud absque consideratione alicuius singularium; et hoc commune accipit ut principium artis et scientiae.[41]

The third reason is that we can see much better in the second discourse the difference between the movement of reason and the movements in the sensible world. When my body goes from being in Boston to being in New York, my being in Boston is not a cause of my coming to be in New York. Likewise, if my body goes from being healthy to being sick, my being healthy is not the cause of my becoming sick. But when reason goes from knowing the premisses to knowing the conclusion, knowing the premisses is a cause of coming to know the conclusion. And in the further discourse of reason, we come to know the conclusion not only from the premisses, but *in* the premisses. But how could we be in New York by being in Boston?

Defining and demonstrating and counting and calculating are main forms of discourse *secundum causalitatem*. In all of these, reason comes to know or understand by a movement rather than all at once.

Thomas also distinguishes the discourses of reason by the *this* and *that* between which reason runs when explaining why natural science is said to proceed *rationabiliter* or reasonably:

> cum sit rationis de uno in aliud discurrere, hoc magis in scientia naturali servatur. ubi ex cognitione unius in cognitionem alterius devenitur, sicut ex cognitione effectus in cognitionem causae.
>
> Et non proceditur solum ab uno in aliud secundum rationem, quod non est aliud secundum rem, sicut si ab animali proceditur ad hominem.
>
> In scientiis enim mathematicis proceditur per ea tantum, quae sunt de essentia rei, cum demonstrent solum per causam formalem; et ideo non demonstratur in eis aliquid de una re per aliam rem, sed per propriam definitionem illius rei. Etsi enim dentur aliquae demonstrationes de circulo ex triangulo, vel e converso, hoc non est nisi inquantum in circulo est potentia triangulus, et e converso.

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[41] *In II Posteriorum Analyticorum,* Lectio XX, n. 592

> Sed in scientia naturali, in qua fit demonstratio per causas extrinsecas, probatur aliquid de una re per aliam omnino extrinsecam. Et ita modus rationalis in scientia naturali maxime observatur, et ideo scientia naturalis inter alias est intellectui hominis magis conformis. Attribuitur igitur rationabiliter procedere scientiae naturali, non quia ei soli conveniat, sed quia ei praecipue competit.[42]
>
> Since it belongs to reason to run from one thing to another, this is more observed in natural science where, from the knowledge of one thing, reason comes to knowledge of another, as from the knowledge of the effect to a knowledge of the cause.
>
> And it does not only go forward from one to another in reason that is not other in things, as when it goes forward from animal to man.
>
> In the mathematical sciences, one goes forward only through what belongs to the essence of the thing, since they demonstrate only through the formal cause; and therefore in them, something is not demonstrated of one thing by another thing. For although some demonstrations are made about the circle from the triangle, or the reverse, this is not except insofar as the triangle is in the circle in ability and vice-versa.
>
> But in natural science, in which there is demonstration through extrinsic causes, something is proven about one thing by another thing altogether outside of it. And thus the way of reason is most of all observed in natural science; and therefore natural science among the others is more in conformity with the understanding of man. To proceed then by way of reason is attributed to natural science, not because it belongs only to it, but because it especially belongs to it.

Sometimes reason runs from a *this* to a *that* when these are not other things. But the utmost of reason's ability to discourse is when it runs from one *thing* to another *thing*.

The first of these discourses is found when reason goes from the sensible singulars to the universal or from the image of a thing to the thought of it and when reason goes from one thought to another thought of the same thing. Thomas points out that reason knows the universal by a discourse:

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[42] *In Boetii de Trinitate,* Lectio II, Q. II, Art. 1, Ad primam quaestionem

> aliter ratio transcendit sensum, et aliter intellectus, rationem. Ratio enim transcendit sensum, secundum diversitatem cognitorum: nam sensus est particularium, ratio vero universalium...Sed intellectus et ratio differunt quantum ad modum cognoscendi: quia scilicet intellectus cognoscit simplici intuitu, ratio vero discurrendo de uno in aliud. Sed tamen ratio per discursum pervenit ad cognoscendum illud, quod intellectus sine discursu cognoscit, scilicet universale.[43]

The first discourse of reason is from the sensible to the understandable. Thomas speaks of this thus: :

> Ex hoc enim quod anima corporis forma et actus est, procedunt ab essentia ejus quaedam potentiae organis affixae, ut sensus et huiusmodi, ex quibus cognitionem intellectualem accipit,
>
> propter hoc quod rationalis est habens cognitionem decurrentem ab uno in aliud; et sic a sensibilibus in intelligibilia venit,
>
> et per hoc ab angelo differt, qui non a sensibilibus discurrendo ad intelligibilia, cognitionem accipit.[44]
>
> From the fact that the soul is the form and act of a body, certain powers fastened to organs proceed from its nature, as the senses and others of this sort, from which it takes the knowledge of understanding
>
> because of this it is reasonable, having knowledge running from one thing to another; and thus it comes to the understandable from the sensible,
>
> and by this it differs from the angel who gets knowledge without running from the sensible to the understandable.

And in another text, Thomas sees reason as knowing the *what it is* by a discourse:

> intellectus secundum suum nomen importat cognitionem pertingentem ad intima rei. Unde cum sensus et imaginatio circa accidentia occupentur quae quasi circumstant essentiam rei, intellectus ad essentiam ipsam pertingit. Unde secundum Philosophum in III De Anima, objectum intellectus est quid.

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[43] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 59, Art. I, Ad 1
[44] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sent.,* Dist. III, Q. I, Art VI, Solutio

> Sed in apprehensione hujus essentiae est differentia.
>
> Aliquando enim apprehenditur ipsa essentia per seipsam, non quod ad eam ingrediatur intellectus ex ipsis quae quasi circumvoluntur ipsi essentiae; et hic est modus apprehendendi a substantiis separatis, unde intelligentiae dicuntur.
>
> Aliquando vero ad intima non pervenitur nisi per circumposita quasi per quaedam ostia; et hic est modus apprehendendi in hominibus, qui ex effectibus et proprietatibus procedunt ad cognitionem essentiae rei.
>
> Et quia in hoc oportet esse quemdam discursum, ideo hominis apprehensio ratio dicitur, quamvis ad intellectum terminetur in hoc quod inquisitio ad essentiam rei perducit.[45]

From the above texts and others below, it can be seen how the explanation of *rationabiliter* from what characterizes reason (taking from the senses and discoursing) does not prevent us from using discourse in a broader sense to include even this taking from the senses. In that discourse, *large* would mean that from many memories collected in experience, we come to the universal.

The use of *signs* which is so distinctive of man is also tied up with the discursive nature of his reason:

> signum proprie loquendo, non potest dici nisi aliquid ex quo deveniatur in cognitionem alterius quasi discurrendo; et secundum hoc, signum in angelis non est, cum eorum scientia non sit discursiva...
>
> Et propter hoc etiam in nobis signa sunt sensibilia, quia nostra cognitio, quae discursiva est, a sensibilibus oritur.
>
> Sed communiter possumus signum dicere quodcumque notum in quo aliquid cognoscatur; et secundum hoc forma intelligibilis potest dici signum rei quae per ipsum cognoscitur.[46]

Although one might be said to reason to a definition and even to reason to the universal, these reasonings or discourses are not the utmost of reason's ability to discourse. For the universal is ordered to definition and definition to reasoning by syllogism to conclusions. Hence, the discourse in the definition of

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[45] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sent.,* Dist XXXV, Q. II, Art. II, Sol. I. Resp.
[46] Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, Q. 9, Art. 4, Ad 4

reason is more the last (just as the Latins took *discursus* as a synonym of the third act of reason). This does not mean to eliminate the others for they are included in the ability to reason to conclusions and they all indicate how discourse in general and in the second sense is so characteristic of reason.

The discursive character of reason is seen not only in the above acts, but also in calculating and counting. From two numbers already known, reason comes to know another number unknown before by adding, subtracting, multiplying or dividing. But since one must know some numbers before on can begin to add or subtract or multiply or divide, there must be another way of coming to know the first numbers we know. Counting is also a way of coming to know by a step-like movement rather than all at once or in a continuous way.

The discursive nature of reason is also seen in practical reason as it moves from the end to means in counsel.

When reason runs or goes from the sensible to the understandable, it is not going from one thing to another thing. It is the same thing that is singular when sensed and universal when understood. When we go from experience to the universal, the universal is also contained in some way in the singular. Thomas explains this:

> ...singulare sentitur proprie et per se, sed tamen sensus est quodammodo etiam ipsius universalis. Cognoscit enim Calliam non solum inquantum est Callias, sed etiam in quantum est hic homo, et similiter Socrates in quantum est hic homo.
>
> Et exinde est quod tali acceptione sensus praeexistente, anima intellectiva potest considerare hominem in utroque. Si autem ita esset quod sensus apprehenderet solum id quod est particularitatis, et nullo modo cum hoc apprehenderet universalem naturam in particulari, non esset possibile quod ex apprehensione sensus causaretur in nobis cognitio universalis.[47]
>
> The singular is sensed properly and as such, but nevertheless sense is in some way also of the universal itself. For it knows Callias not only insofar as he is Callias, but also insofar as he is this man, and likewise Socrates insofar as he is this man.
>
> And hence it is that, such taking by the senses coming before, the understanding soul is able to consider man in both. If however it were the case that sense grasped only that which is of the

[47] *In II Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Lectio XX, n. 595

> particular, and in no way with this grasped the universal nature in the particular, it would not be possible that universal knowledge is us could be caused from the grasping of sense.

Reason also goes from one thought to another thought of the same thing. We have seen Thomas use the example of going from the genus to the species. When we go from animal to man, or from quadrilateral to square, we are not going from one thing to another thing. Likewise, in mathematics, as Thomas explains in the above text from his Exposition of Boethius' work *On the Trinity*, we do not go from one thing to another thing outside of it.

The discourse *ab uno in aliud secundum rem* is the high point of reason's ability. Not only is reason's discourse not confined within the limits of one thing, but it enables reason to know things it has not experienced. Thomas touches upon these things and also gives us a division of this kind of discourse in this key text:

> scientia rerum acquiri potest non solum per experientiam ipsarum, sed etiam per experientiam quarandam aliarum rerum: cum ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis possit homo procedere ad intelligendum effectus per causas, et causas per effectus, et similia per similia, et contraria per contraria.
>
> A knowledge of things is not only able to be acquired by an experience of those things, but also by an experience of certain other things: since by the power of the active understanding's light man is able to go forward to understanding effects through causes and causes through effects, and like things through like things, and contraries through contraries.[48]

There are four main runs that reason makes between things.

Sometimes reason runs from a cause to its effect, as is done most in mathematics.

But more often, reason runs from an effect to its cause, as is usually done in natural and human things. For example, when we hear a sound, our reason runs from the sound to its cause.

Reason also runs from like to like as when we try to foresee future events from like past ones or when we reason from one ratio to another like one in a

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[48] *Summa Theologiae*, Tertia Pars, Q. 12, Art. 1, Ad. 1

proportion. Reason could not understand the word *running* without running in this way from the first meaning through the middle to the last meaning

And reason also runs from one opposite to its opposite, as from the good to the bad and vice-versa. Perhaps the discourse from opposite to opposite can be divided according to the four kinds of opposition.

When Aristotle, following Plato, speaks of the first two discourses, he compares reason to the runners in a race:

> It should not remain hidden to us that arguments from the beginnings and those to the beginnings differ. For it was well that Plato asked about this and investigated whether the road was from the beginnings or to the beginnings; just as in the race-course from the judges to the end or the reverse.[49]

In the Greek race-course, the runners sometimes would run from the starting-point to some post down the field and then from that post back to the starting-point. Likewise, our reason sometimes runs from a cause towards its effect, but more often in the contrary direction, from an effect towards its cause. (It depends upon which is known, or more known, to us.)

Hamlet adds the word *looking* immediately after *discourse* because in its discourse, reason is trying to see or understand. This brings out that our understanding is by way of a motion. Thomas makes this point while distinguishing again the four discourse from one *thing* to another *thing:*

> Ipsum autem intelligere animae humanae est per modum motus;
>
> intelligit enim anima discurrendo de effectibus in causas, et de causis in effectus, et de similibus in similia, et de oppositis in opposita.[50]
>
> However the understanding itself of the human soul is by way of motion.
>
> For the soul understands by running from effects to causes, and from causes to effects, and from like to like, and from opposites to opposites.

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[49]*Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 1095a 30 - 1095b 1

[50]*Quaestiones Disputatae de Spiritualibus Creaturis,* Art. 10, c.

We should note here that Thomas uses the words *per modum motus* and *discurrendo* as equivalent. Hamlet's phrase that reason in its *discourse* is *looking* indicates that reason tries to understand by way of motion or discourse.

Reason then is the ability for all the discourses we have touched upon, but especially the discourse whereby it understands one thing from another thing. For this shows the utmost of its ability.

In the two passages where Thomas touches upon this last discourse, it is significant that he gives the same four ways that understanding one thing can help us to understand another thing. The question can be asked whether Thomas has divided completely the kinds of discourse in which reason comes to know one thing from another. Either one thing depends upon the other (hence the first two discourses) or one is like the other or one is the opposite of the other. (It is possible that two things have more than one of these.) This is perhaps an example of three is enough. It is difficult, or impossible, to think of any other way in which understanding one thing could help us to understand another. If there is no dependence of one thing upon another and no likeness or opposition of one to the other, how could understanding one help us to understand the other?

We can also distinguish the discourse of reason in a third way by its end. The end is either knowing (alone) or doing. If the end of the discourse is knowing alone, we have the discourse of looking reason. We can consider under this, the discourse of the dialectician, the discourse of the demonstrator and the discourse of the wise man. If the end of the discourse is some doing, we have the discourse of practical reason. The discourse of practical reason can be divided into the discourse of foresight and the discourse of art. A discourse is necessary both for doing and making. The discourse of art is more certain than that of foresight for the means of making are determined while those in doing are variable.

The discourse of reason can also be distinguished by what it is about.

Even when we enjoy the beatific vision (in which there is not discourse), Thomas still maintains that our nature or the nature of our reason will lead us to discourse:

> ...beati conformantur angelis quantum ad dona gratiarum: manet tamen differentia quae est secundum naturam.

> Et ideo uti collatione et discursu est connaturale animabus beatorum, non autem angelis.[51]

St. Thomas speaks of *collatio* before *discursus* because the latter presupposes the former. For example, in reasoning we bring together the premisses before we can go from the premisses to the conclusion. And we must bring together the singulars before we can go from the singular to the universal. *Discursus* presupposes *collatio* as order presupposes distinction.

The Word *Large*

Hamlet adds that reason is the ability for *large* discourse. The word *large* brings out many things about the discourse of which reason is capable.

The discourse of reason can be called *large* because it is about the large or because its limit is large or because the discourse is itself large or long. We find similar distinctions elsewhere. Knowledge can be called *natural* because the knowledge itself is natural as is our first understanding of axioms, such as the whole is larger than one of its parts; or because it is about the natural, as is the reasoned-out knowledge of natural things. Likewise, a knowledge can be called *human* because it is had by humans or because it about human things. Ethics is human in both senses while natural science is human only in the first sense. Wisdom is also called *divine* because God especially has it or because it is about God.

The discourse of reason can be about the large in two senses, one more quantitative and the other more qualitative

First, the discourse of reason can be about the large or cover a large area in that reason can discourse about the universal. Hence, Locke in the *Essay on Understanding* speaks of the *enlargement* of our ideas by the general. A thing is singular when sensed or imagined (for example, the triangle we sense or imagine); but when we understand by reason what it is (for example, what a triangle is), it is universal. Thus, unlike the senses and the imagination which know only the singular. Reason knows the universal. But the universal covers many things or even an infinity of things insofar as it is said of many or even an

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[51] *Summa Theologiae*, Tertia Pars, Q. 11, Art. 3, Ad 3

infinity of particulars. When reason thinks about the difference between a man and a beast, its discourse extends in general to all human beings and beasts. And when reason discourses about odd and even number, its discourse covers an infinity of numbers. When the Greeks said that something cannot come to be out of nothing, their discourse was touching upon all things - for everything is something. Likewise, when they discoursed about the statement that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time and in the same way, their discourse was about all things.

Second, the discourse of reason can be about the *large* in the sense of great. *Large* in this sense is opposed to *small* as in *small talk*. The latter is talk about small or unimportant things. As the word *great* can be taken, not only in a quantitative sense, but also in a more qualitative sense, so too the word *large* can be taken in the second sense of *great*. Shakespeare touches upon this sense of large in *The Winter's Tale* when Perdita says:

> O Doricles! Your praises are too large [too great][52]

And also in *Julius Caesar*, Brutus speaks of *large honours:*

> .....What! shall one of us,
> That struck the foremost man of all this world
> But for supporting robbers, shall we now
> Contaminate our fingers with base bribes,
> And seal the mighty space of our large honours
> For so much trash as may be grasped thus?[53]

Mark Twain uses this sense in his work on Joan of Arc:

> The minister lifted his brows in amused surprise, and said, with a touch of sarcasm. "I am the King's chief minister, and yet you had the impression that matters connected with my department are not matters of state? Pray how is that?" Joan replied, indifferently: "Because there is no state." "No state!" "No, sir, there is no state, and no use for a minister. France is shrunk to a

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[52]Act IV, Sc. 4

[53]Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, Act IV, Sc 3. The Yale Shakespeare here has this note: "The infinite spiritual extent of true honor is contrasted with the petty material extent of a handful of money."

> couple of acres of ground; a sheriff's constable could take care of it; its affairs are not matters of state. The term is too large."[54]

The discourse of reason can be about great things, such as the purpose of man, the immortality of the human soul, the order of the universe and even about the existence and nature of God. We do not understand fully the ability which is reason if we do not see that it is capable of discourse about great things as well as little things.

The discourse of the philosopher is larger than that of other men in both of these senses. And the discourse of the wise man is the largest in both senses.

The discourse of reason itself can be called large insofar as its limit is large. The limit of a discourse is its beginning or its end. Insofar as the discourse of reason is from many things or to many things, it is large in its limit. It begins or ends in many things

Reason, as Boethius and Thomas teach us, gathers one simple truth from many things. This is first seen when reason separates out the common from experience by induction. If we understand the discourse of reason from the sensible to the understandable or from experience to the universal, *large* refers to the *many* singulars collected in experience. Washington Irving places before his paper "The Bermudas" a passage from a work contemporary with Shakespeare:

> Who did not think, till within these foure yeares, but that these islands had been rather a habitation for Divells, than fit for men to dwell in? Who did not hate the name, when hee was on land, and shun the place when he was on the seas? But behold the misprision and conceits of the world! For true and large experience hath now told us, it is one of the sweetest paradises that be upon earth.[55]

Experience is here called *large* because it involves many things.

And again from one simple truth that is a beginning, reason deduces many things and makes many applications. From a beginning well considered,

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[54]*Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc,* Nelson Doubleday Inc., N. Y., Chapter 23, p. 197
[55]*A Plaine Descript. of the Barmudas*, 1613

reason is able to come to see many conclusions or applications of the one beginning. And thus the discourse of reason is large in its end.

The discourse of reason can also be called *large* because it is long. Perhaps in Shakespeare's time, *large* could be used more readily in the sense of *long*. In the following passages, *large* seems to refer to length of the discourse (usually with the discourse in speech in mind)

Northhumberland says to Bolingbroke:

> The manner of their taking may appear
> At large discoursed in this paper here.[56]

And Harcourt says to the King:

> The manner and true order of the fight
> This packet, please it you, contains at large[57]

And the Abbess says to the Duke:

> Renowned duke, vouchsafe to take the pains
> To go with us into the abbey here
> And hear at large discoursed all our fortunes[58]

And in *A Midsummer Night's Dream:*

> Let Lion, Moonshine, Wall, and lovers twain
> At large discourse, while here they do remain[59]

And in *Richard II,* Act III, Sc. 1:

> A gentleman of mine I have dispatch'd
> With letters of your love to her at large.[60]

And in *Much Ado about Nothing:*

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[56]Shakespeare, *Richard II,* Act V, Sc. 6
[57]Shakespeare, *Henry IV, Part Two,* Act IV, Sc. 4
[58]Shakespeare, *The Comedy of Errors*, Act V, Sc. 1
[59]Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Sc. 1
[60]Shakespeare, *Richard II,* Act III, Sc. 1. The Yale Shakespeare explains in a note: " at large at great length"

I'll tell you largely of fair Hero's death.[61]

And in the following passage, *large* modifies *lengths* :

> Th 'advantage of his absence took the king
> And in the mean time sojourn'd at my father's;
> Where how he did prevail, I shame to speak.
> But truth is truth, large lengths of seas and shores
> Between my father and my mother lay,
> As I have heard my father speak himself
> When this same lusty gentleman was got.[62]

The discourse of reason is long insofar as it goes through many steps or insofar as it is goes between things greatly distant. In the first way, the discourse of reason can be long even in geometry or arithmetic. A mathematical discourse can be long in the sense of going through many steps. But it is not long in the second sense of going from one thing to another thing outside the first.

Those who have studied *Euclid's Elements* and seen the many steps in one theorem and how the conclusion in one is a premiss in the next and so on, are aware of reason's capability for long discourse through many steps.

But in the second way, the discourse of reason is long in the philosophy of nature and especially in wisdom. The discourse of the natural philosopher is long in the sense of going from one thing to another thing outside of the first. Eventually one goes all the way from motion to an unmoved mover, a very long discourse in the sense that it goes between things very far apart. The discourse of reason in natural philosophy may go from an effect to a cause outside that effect. And since a cause may itself have a cause, this movement of reason can be very long, going from an effect all the way to its first cause. Reason goes from motion to moved movers and at last to an unmoved over, a very long discourse.

Likewise, the discourse of reason between things that are alike may not only be between particulars of the same kind (as in the argument called *example*), but also between things that are only proportionally alike. Hence, Aristotle says about the fourth tool of dialectic that reason is more exercised in

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[61]Shakespeare, *Much Ado about Nothing*, Act V, Sc. 4
[62]Shakespeare, *King John* , Act I, Sc. 1

seeing the likeness of ratios which is a likeness between things far apart than it is in seeing the likeness of species in the same genus or of individuals in the same species.

Reason is, of course, capable of *small* discourse in all the senses opposed to *large* discourse. But Hamlet rightly defines the ability of reason by *large* discourse. For as has been said, an ability is always to be defined by its utmost. (If someone can lift two hundred pounds but no more, we define his ability by two hundred pounds, not by one hundred.) If reason is capable of large discourse, it is also capable of small discourse. But the reverse is not true. We do not fully understand the ability that is reason if we do not see that it is capable of large discourse.

Of course, most discourses of reason may be short and about small things. Most men may discourse no more than does Roger in Anthony Trollope's novel *The Way We Live Now*:

> To a man not accustomed to thinking there is nothing in the world so difficult as to think. After some loose fashion we turn over things in our mind and ultimately reach some decision, guided probably by our feelings at the last moment rather than by any process of ratiocination; - and then we think we have thought. But to follow out one argument to an end, and then to found on the base so reached the commencement of another, is not common to us. Such a process was hardly within the compass of Roger's mind...[63]

And if someone were to say that *large* means not only long, but *many* long, he would also be saying the truth even more fully about reason's capacity. For reason is capable of *many long* discourses.

The word *looking*

Hamlet completes the definition of reason with the words *looking before and after.* What do these words mean and how are they ordered with the word *discourse* and why was it necessary to add them to complete this definition of reason?

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[63]Vol. II, Chapter XCIII, Worlds Classics, Oxford Univ. Press, 1975, p. 406

The word *looking* here means *trying to see*, just as the word *listening* means *trying to hear*. But the word *to see* or *seeing* is also a word with many senses by reason or in an order.

Its first meaning is, of course, the well-known act of the eye.

Then the word is carried over and placed upon imagining. This is not by chance. Imagining is like the act of the eye. A sign of this is found in dreams when we think we are seeing with our eyes and instead we are only imagining. Likeness is the cause of deception. Hamlet uses the word *seeing* in this second sense, but his friends, who have seen with their eyes the ghost of Hamlet's father, think he is speaking in the first meaning:

Hamlet:	My father - methinks I see my father.
Horatio:	O, where, my lord?
Hamlet:	In my mind's eye, Horatio[64]

Notice how the imagination is here called metaphorically the "mind's eye"

Then the word *seeing* is carried over from imagining and placed upon the understanding of reason. (Hence, too, the reason is sometimes called metaphorically the *eye of the soul* as when Gregory says that "anger disturbs the eye of the soul.") Understanding is clearly further from seeing with the eyes than is imagining. Even in dreams, we do not confuse understanding with seeing with the eyes. But imagining is closer to understanding than is the act of the eye. Thinking which leads to understanding is sometimes confused with imagining and a thought with an image. Hence, in English, we sometimes call both an image and a thought an *idea* without clearly distinguishing between them. And when we are not sure, we say interchangeably "I think that is so" and " I imagine that is so." Imagining is like thinking in many ways. In imagining something, we form an image of it; and in thinking about something, we form a thought of it.

Since Hamlet is defining reason, he is using the word *looking* as defined by the third sense of *seeing*. Reason is trying to understand by its discourse. Reason seeks to understand by its discourse. We don't understand the

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[64]Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act I, Sc. 2

discourse of reason if we don't know that reason is trying to understand by its motion. Motion is not for the sake of motion.

We saw that *discourse* names an act that is like motion. But motion is not for the sake of motion. Motion is not the purpose of motion. The movement of reason, thinking and reasoning, is for the sake of understanding. If reason was always thinking and reasoning but never coming to understand anything, its movement would be in vain or without purpose. Hence, Hamlet could not define reason by its motion and make sense of that motion (and hence, of reason) without bringing in the end or purpose of that motion which is understanding. He had to say what reason was trying to accomplish by its movement or discourse.

Further, having begun to define reason as an ability for discourse, Hamlet rightly says *looking* rather than *seeing*. For when in motion, reason is more looking than seeing. When reason sees, its motion has come to an end. When we are thinking and reasoning, our reason is in motion. When we have thought out or reasoned-out something, we understand it and our reason has come to rest.

We have seen that *discourse* names the movement of reason, its thinking and especially its reasoning. Now the discourse of reason, its thinking and reasoning, are to understanding as motion is to rest. (We have seen how *discourse* is taken from the Latin word for running and *understanding* is taken from *standing*) So long as we are thinking about something or reasoning, but have not thought it out yet, or reasoned it out yet, our reason does not yet understand. But when we have thought it out or reasoned it out, our reason comes to a rest and this rest is understanding. Since Hamlet then is defining reason by the looking in the discourse of reason, clearly he is using the word *looking* in the sense of *trying to see* (rather than a prolonged seeing). Otherwise, the movement would be over.

We can also see from the above why it was necessary for Hamlet to define reason not by *discourse* alone, but adding *looking*. Motion is never itself the end, but always for the sake of something further. The discourse of reason is for the sake of understanding. It was necessary for Hamlet to bring out what was the end or rest for which the discourse of reason exists.

But perhaps the word *understanding* is itself in need of being understood. The etymology of the word is a key to understanding the kind of knowing that

is understanding. Shakespeare likes to pun on the meaning and etymology of the word *understanding*. Three places where he does this are as follows.

In the *Comedy of Errors:*

Adriana:	Say, is your tardy master now at hand?
Dromio:	Nay, he's at two hands with me, and that my two ears can witness.
Adriana:	Say, didst thou speak with him? Know'st thou his mind?
Dromio:	Ay, ay, he told his mind upon mine ear. Beshrew his hand, I scarce could understand it.
Luciana:	Spake he so doubtfully, thou couldst not feel his meaning?
Dromio:	Nay, he struck so plainly, I could too well feel his blows; and withal so doubtfully, that I could scarce understand them.[65]

And in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*:

Speed:	What an ass art thou! I understand thee not.
Launce:	What a block art thou, that thou canst not! My staff understands me.
Speed:	What thou sayest?
Launce:	Ay, and what I do too. Look thee, I'll but lean, and my staff understands me.
Speed:	It stands under thee, indeed.
Launce:	Why, stand-under and under-stand is all one.[66]

And in *Twelfth Night:*

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[65]Act II, Sc. 1
[66]Act II, Sc. 5

Toby: Taste your legs, Sir; put them to motion.

Viola: My legs do better understand me, Sir, than I understand what you mean by bidding me to taste my legs.[67]

If there is a connection between its etymology and meaning, the word understanding would properly mean to know what is said to stand under something or to know something by what is said to stand under it. To understand a word or name means to know the thing(s) or meaning(s) that are said to stand under that name. We are said to place a name *upon* a thing. In Latin, Thomas speaks of the *impositio nominis*. In *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, Master Ford fears standing under the name *cuckold*:

> Who says this is improvident jealousy? my wife hath sent to him, the hour is fixed, the match is made. Would any man have thought this? See the hell of having a false woman! My bed shall be abused, my coffers ransacked, my reputation gnawed at; and I shall not only receive this villainous wrong, but stand under the adoption of abominable terms, and by him that does me this wrong. Terms! names! Amaimon sounds well; Lucifer, well; Barbason, well; yet they are devils' additions, the names of fiends; but Cuckold! Wittol! - Cuckold! the devil himself hath not such a name.[68]

Reason is sometimes called the understanding. And indeed this does separate reason from the ear and the eye which hear or see the word, but do not know what stands under that word as such. (I say *as such* because even if the eye or the ear knew in some case what stands under the word, they would not know it as standing under that word.)

The distinction between reason or the understanding and the senses is even more strict when we consider that the senses know only what are called accidents while substance is known only by reason. In *The Tempest*, Prospero calls the vision he has conjured up both baseless and insubstantial:

> Our revels now are ended... these our actors -

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[67]Act II, Sc. 1

[68]Shakespeare, *The Merry Wives of Windsor,* Act II, Sc. 2

> As I foretold you - were all spirits and
> Are melted into air, into thin air;
> And like the baseless fabric of this vision
> The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces,
> The solemn temples, the great globe itself,
> Yea, all which it inherit, shall dissolve
> And like this insubstantial pageant faded
> Leave not a rack behind: we are such stuff
> As dreams are made on, and our little life
> Is rounded with a sleep.[69]

And indeed the etymology of *substance* in Latin is the same as that of *understanding* in English. The first object of reason or the understanding is substance. This is, of course, tied to its object being the what it is. One meaning of substance is what it is. Hence, Aristotle calls definition the *logos of the ousia* (*ratio substantiae* in Latin) in the *Categories* and, in distinguishing the genus substance from the genera of accidents, he calls substance what it is. But substance is said to stand under accidents as their subject.

But perhaps all the connections between the etymology and meaning of the word *understanding* can be reduced to the meaning of knowing the cause of something or knowing something by its cause. For we speak of the *underlying* cause. The cause is said to stand under its effect, as it were supporting its effect. Here we can see how the English word for cause *ground* and the word *understanding* fit together. Shakespeare puns upon the two meanings of *ground* in these lines:

> Pitiful sight! here lies the County slain,
> And Juliet bleeding, warm and newly dead,
> Who here hath lain this two days buried.
> Go tell the Prince, run to the Capulets,
> Raise up the Montagues, some others search.
> We see the ground whereon these woes do lie,
> But the true ground of all these piteous woes
> We cannot without circumstance descry.[70]

The "true ground" or cause of all those bodies lying on the ground is not yet clear. In that most conservative profession of the law, we still speak of "grounds for divorce" or cause for divorce. There are other places where

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[69]Shakespeare, *TheTempest*, Act IV, Sc. 1
[70]*Romeo and Juliet*, Act V, Sc. 3

Shakespeare touches upon the use of *ground* for cause. In *Twelfth Night,* Olivia says to Malvolio:

> This practice hath most shrewdly pass'd upon thee;
> But when we know the grounds and authors of it,
> Thou shalt be both the plaintiff and the judge
> Of thine own cause.[71]

Even without the word *ground*, it is common to use the word *upon* in speaking of the cause. For example, Blunt says:

> But to my charge. The king hath sent to know
> The nature of your griefs; and whereupon
> You conjure from the breast of civil peace
> Such bold hostility, teaching his duteous land
> Audacious cruelty.[72]

It is striking that we speak of *cause* or *reason* almost interchangeably. Indeed the best reason we can give for something is the reason why it must be so. This is a reason that brings out the cause. Reason seeks a reason for things and, if the best reason contains the cause, reason is seeking understanding, that is, to know a thing by the cause that is said to stand under it.

Before and after

But Hamlet says not only that reason is *looking* in its discourse, but that it is looking *before and after*. Why must reason look before and after when it tries to understand?

Since reason knows or understands most of all when it comes to know the cause, and a cause is said to be before its effect, clearly reason cannot come to understand without looking before.

Moreover, since we name things as we know them, a thing and our knowledge of it come before naming it. Hence, trying to understand a word is

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[71]Act V, Sc. 1

[72]*Henry IV, Part I*, Act IV, Sc. 1. Kittredge's note on *whereupon:* "whereupon: for what reason. On or upon was common in a causal sense. This use survives in on compulsion, on purpose"

also looking before. And when a word is equivocal by reason, as are all the common words, and there is a before and after in the meanings of such words, clearly these key words cannot be understood without looking before and after. It is impossible to understand these words without seeing the order (the before and after) in their meanings.

We cannot understand a course of action or someone's reasoning if we cannot follow it. And we cannot follow it without seeing the before and after in it.

Hence, Hamlet speaks well of reason's trying to understand by, or in its discourse, as looking before and after.

But it should not remain hidden to us that the word *before* is equivocal by reason (and, hence, also the word *after* and therefore also the word *order* and all other words defined by before and after such as *first* and *last*, *beginning, middle,* and *end* and so on).

Like other words in the definition, the word *before* has many meanings in an order. Aristotle has distinguished in order the central and chief senses of the word:

> One thing is said to be *before* another in four ways.
>
> First and most strictly according to time, by which one thing is older and more ancient than another. For something is said to be older or more ancient in that its time has been longer.
>
> Second, that whose existence does not follow reversibly, as one is before two. If two exists, it follows right away that one exists; but if one exists, it is not necessary that two exist; so that the existence of the other does not follow reversibly from the one. Thus the *before* is such that from it, existence does not follow reversibly.
>
> In a third way, *before* is said according to a certain order, as in the sciences and speeches. The order of before and after belongs to the demonstrative sciences: the elements are in order before the diagrams; and in grammar, the letters are before the syllables. Likewise, in speeches, the proemium comes in order before the narration.
>
> Further, besides the aforesaid, the better and more honorable seems to be before by nature. For even the many say that those honored or loved by them come before with them. But this is perhaps the strangest of the ways.

> *Before* would seem to be said in that many ways.
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> There would seem to be another way *before* is said in addition to the above. Of those things whose existence follows reversibly, the cause in whatever manner of existence to the other would reasonably be said to be before by nature. That there are such things is clear. The existence of a man follows reversibly in existence to the true statement about him. For if a man exists, the statement by which we say the man exists is true. But the true statement is in no way a cause of the thing being, but the thing being would seem to be a cause in some way of the statement being true. For the statement is said to be true or false as the thing is or is not.
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> Thus, one thing is said to be *before* another in five ways.[73]

And, of course, the word *after* has as many meanings in like order, corresponding one to one, to the meanings of *before*.

It is necessary to study the text of Aristotle on *before* most carefully at length, but here we can only briefly touch upon it.

The first meaning of *before* is *in time*, as the American Revolution was before the French Revolution To this sense is also reduced the sense of before in motion or in place.

The second sense is *in being*, as one is before two. One can be without two, but two cannot be without one.

The third sense in the discourse of reason, as the prologue comes before the play in *Romeo and Juliet* and premisses before the conclusion. To this sense is reduced any before and after in our knowledge.

The fourth and last sense is in goodness. *Before* in this sense means *better*. The end is before the means in this sense even though the means may be before the end in time or being.

Aristotle gives a most important additional sense of *before* after he has distinguished in order the above four. This is the sense in which the cause is said to before the effect even if they are simultaneous, as a man's sitting and the truth of the statement that he is sitting. The former is before the latter, as a cause is before its effect, for the man's sitting is a cause of the truth of the

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[73] *Categories*, Chapter 12

statement, even though his sitting and the truth of the statement are simultaneous. This additional sense is very important, especially to reason that wants to know why, but it escapes many because of its subtlety and distance from the first two senses. It is difficult to see how of two things that exist at the same time and neither of which can be without the other, one is before the other.

In what sense does reason look before and after? Clearly, in all five of the above senses. Hamlet is thus saying much in few words when he says that reason looks before and after.

The ability to look before and after includes or presupposes the ability to see the distinction of things. Since nothing is before or after itself, one could never see that this is before that without distinguishing this from that. But one could distinguish this from that without seeing that this is before that. Hence, Hamlet rightly defines reason as the ability to look before and after since, as has been said, an ability must always be defined by the utmost of which it is capable

But we must also consider how the words *looking before and after* are ordered with the word *discourse* and why was it necessary to add them to complete this definition of reason.

We cannot here enter into an exposition of this magnificent text of Aristotle and show that he has perfectly ordered the central senses of the word *before*. But even a cursory examination of this text will begin to reveal how much lies under the words of Hamlet. Reason looks before and after in all five senses given here, as well as in the senses attached to them.

Reason looks before and after *in time*. We recall the past and try to foresee the future. We put past events in chronological order, before and after the birth of Christ. We plan our future, putting things we intend to do in a temporal order.

Reason also looks before and after *in being*. What can be without another, but not vice-versa, is said to be before the latter in being. One is before two in being. Bricks are before a brick wall or patio in being. Water also seems to be before animals and plants in being.

Reason also looks before and after *in its own discourse* (and, in general, in our knowing). The prologue comes before the play in *Romeo and Juliet*. And the premisses of an argument come before the conclusion. And plane geometry comes before solid geometry. And we sense before we understand.

Finally, reason looks before and after *in goodness*. What is *better* is said to be before in this sense. Shakespeare is before Chaucer in this sense (although Chaucer is before Shakespeare in time.) The end is before the means in this sense even thought the means might be before in time or being.

Besides the above four ordered central sense of *before*, there is another sense sufficiently different from the above and yet extremely important for reason. This is the sense in which a cause is before its effect. Although this resembles the second sense because of the dependence of the effect upon the cause, one cannot have a cause (in act) without an effect (in act). When we ask *why*, we are looking before in this sense. If *looking* means here *trying to understand*, we can see why looking before in this sense perfects reason. For we fully understand a thing only when we know its underlying cause.

It can be seen that nothing prevents what is before in one of the above senses from being after in another sense. Thus in things the cause is before the effect, but in our knowledge the effect is usually before the cause. And what is after in time or being may be better or before in goodness.

The word *before* has many meanings, not by chance, but by reason. Hence, there is an order among them. The first meaning of before is in time. That is before in the past which is further from the present. Thales is before Socrates. That is before in the future which is closer to the present now.

Since time arises by numbering the before and after in some motion (like that of the sun), to this sense is reduced that of the before and after in motion. And since motion is over some distance, we can also reduce to this sense the before and after in a road or path.

This sense of *before* comes first because it involves the before and after in motion. Since we name things as we know them and our knowledge begins with the senses and "things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs", the before and after in motion is first named by us.

Before in place and before in motion are reduced to the first sense of *before* (just as to the first sense of beginning in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* are attached beginning in motion and in time) In Sonnet 60, we see the connection:

> Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
> So do our minutes hasten to their end;
> Each changing place with that which goes before,
> In sequent toil all forwards do contend.[74]

The reason why of their close connection is given in Book Six of Aristotle's *Natural Hearing* (the so-called *Physics*).

Although reason looks before and after in the sense of time, it often fails to foresee the future. Hastings does not foresee his own downfall and death due to the treachery of Lancaster in *King Henry IV, Part II*, Act IV, Sc. 2:

Hastings:	And though we here fall down, We have supplies to second our attempt: If they miscarry, theirs shall second them; And so success of mischief shall be born, And heir from heir shall hold this quarrel up Whiles England shall have generation.
Lancaster:	You are too shallow, Hastings, much too shallow, To sound the bottom of the after-times.

Likewise, in *Henry the Fourth, Part One*, Act III, Sc. 2, K. Henry speaks to the Prince of Wales:

> The hope and expectation of thy time
> Is ruin'd, and the soul of every man
> Prophetically do forethink thy fall.

But all were deceived in their expectations.

Ecclesiastes, Chapter Four, v. 13:

> Better is a child that is poor and wise, than a king that is old and foolish, who knoweth not to forsee for hereafter.

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[74]Shakespeare, Sopnnet 60, lines 1-4

The second sense of *before* is in being. What can be without another when that other cannot be without it, is said to be before in being. In this sense, the letters A, C, and T are before the word CAT. What is before in being is never after in time. But sometimes it is not before in time. If one has a stamp or printer which produces the word CAT with all its letters at once, the letters are not before the word in time (but still in being).

The third sense of before is in the discourse of reason and, in general, in our knowledge. This resembles the first two senses, but it comes after them being inward in our knowledge and not outward to our senses as the first two senses. Discourse is like a motion and just as one thing can be without another (but not vice-versa) so likewise one thing can be known without another but not vice-versa. But many times what is after in time or in being is known before.

The fourth sense of *before* is in goodness. Before in this senses means *better*. This sense is the furthest from the first sense. Things that grow and develop in time become better later in time. One of the ways that Aristotle shows in the in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* that act is before ability in perfection (and therefore goodness) is that what is later in generation is more complete and perfect than what is before and what is after in generation is to what is before as act to ability. Fourth sense of before is used in these lines spoken by Iachimo (*Cymbeline* Act V, Sc. 2):

> If that thy gentry, Britain, go before
> This lout, as he exceeds our lords, the odds
> Is that we scarce are men and you are gods.

The sense which Aristotle brings in after he has distinguished the four central senses in order is not, I think, fifth in order. Rather, it is a distant relative of the second sense. It is like the second sense in that what is after in being depends upon what is before in being and an effect depends upon its cause. But it is mentioned among other senses that attach in some way, or are reduced, to one of the four central senses because it is the crowning sense for our knowledge (to which, of course logic is ordered) and because it perfects all the other senses. Our knowledge that *this is before that* is perfected when we see *why* this is before that.

Shakespeare is, of course, well aware that *before* has many meanings. In accord with his custom, he puns upon a meaning attached to the first and the fourth meaning of *before* in the words of Helena's confession to the Countess of her love in *All's Well That Ends Well* (Act I, Sc. 3):

> .....Then I confess,
> Here on my knee, before high heaven and you,
> That before you, and next unto high heaven,
> I love your son.

Puns, of course, take the most distant meaning as a way of being clear. (Hence, the punning saying "I see said the blind man; but he couldn't see at all" punning on the first and last sense of *seeing*.)

Hamlet himself touches upon the first and fourth senses of *before* in his soliloquy complaining of his mother's hasty marriage to a man so inferior to his father:

> .....That it should come to this!
> But two months dead! nay, not so much, not two.
> So excellent a king, that was, to this
> Hyperion to a satyr.....
> O God! a beast, that wants discourse of reason,
> Would have mourn'd longer - married with my uncle,
> My father's brother, but no more like my father
> Than I to Hercules. Within a month.....[75]

Hamlet's reason goes back and forth, looking before and after in the fourth sense (how much better was his father than his uncle) and in the first sense (how soon after his father death, she married his uncle).

Hamlet not only indicates that reason is trying to understand in its discourse (its thinking or reasoning), but also what and how it comes to understand. Reason is trying to see the before and after in things. One cannot see the order in things before one has seen their distinction or difference. But Hamlet defines reason as trying to see order, or a before and after, because we define ability by its utmost. Now the last thing reason's ability extends to is not seeing the differences among things, but seeing the order among those things

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[75] *Hamlet*, Act I, Sc. 2

whose differences it has already seen. (We might add that reason also seems to have gone further when it see the differences among things than when it sees their likenesses. For the one who sees the likeness of things but not their difference would seem to have a confused or indistinct and hence imperfect knowledge of them.)

But Hamlet's words not only indicate *what* reason is trying to see or understand, but also *how* it comes to understand. For it is by looking before and after that reason comes to see the before and after.

capability

Henry IV, Part Two, Act I, Sc. 1, Morton to Northhumberland about the death of Hotspur:

> You knew he walk'd o'er perils, on an edge,
> More likely to fall in than to get o'er;
> You were advis'd his flesh was capable
> Of wound and scars and that his forward spirit
> Would lift where most trade of danger rang'd

Here the word *capable* is said of the ability to undergo. Understanding is also in a way an undergoing.

Godlike

Since God understands all things at once by understanding Himself and there is no discourse or movement in Him, it seems simply false to say that reason or the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, is *god-like*.

Reason is god-like insofar as it is able to understand and to the extent that it understands in act. But Hamlet has told us that reason understands by a discourse in which it looks before and after. The greatest virtue of practical reason is called *foresight* which word itself points to before and after. And the Latin word for this virtue (*prudentia*) is also derived from the Latin word for foresight (*providentia*) When Thomas explains the word *Deus*, he does so by *providentia.*

> hoc nomen *Deus*...imponitur...ab universali rerum providentia: omnes enim loquentes de Deo, hoc intendunt nominare Deum, quod habet providentiam universalem de rebus. Unde dicit Dionysius, 12 cap. *de Div. Nom.* quod *deitas est quae omnia videt providentia et bonitate perfecta*. Ex hac autem operatione hoc nomen Deus assumptum, impositum est ad significandum divinam naturam.[76]
>
> This name *God* (*Deus*) is imposed from the universal providence of things: for all speaking of God intend to name that which has universal providence over things. Whence Dionysius says, in the twelfth chapter *About the Divine Names,* that "Godhood is what sees all things by providence and perfect goodness." The name *God*, taken from this operation, is laid down to signify the divine nature.

Just as reason looks before and after, and before and after is the definition of order, so order is seen as the proper effect of providence whence God is named:

> Convenientia ordinis perfectionem providentiae demonstrat: cum ordo sit proprius providentiae effectus.
>
> The suitableness of order shows the perfection of providence: since order is the proper effect of providence.[77]

And in general Thomas will often quote St. Paul in his Latin text:

> Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.
>
> The things which are from God, are ordered.[78]

And in the Latin text of *Iudith:*

> Tu fecisti priora, et illa post illa cogitasti, et hoc factum est quod ipse voluisti.[79]

One man is wiser than another and more like God by his reason when he sees what is before or after what the other man sees or, in general, when he sees a before and after which the other man does not see. It is not the discourse of reason or its coming to know what it did not know that is Godlike (for God is

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[76]*Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 13, Art. 8, c.
[77]*Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber III, Caput LXXVII
[78]*Rom.*, XIII, v. 1. Quoted for example in *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber III, Caput LXXVI
[79]Chapter IX, v. 4

never ignorant or in need of a discourse), but rather the knowing itself or the end of the discourse, as the King tells Biron:

> Biron: What is the end of study? let us know.
>
> King: Why, that to know, which else we should not know.
>
> Biron: Things hid and barr'd, you mean, from common sense?
>
> King: Ay, that is study's god-like recompense[80]

Hence, Hamlet speaks of man as *like a god* in his apprehension, not in his need of discourse or reasoning:

> What a piece of work is man! how noble in reason! how infinite in faculty! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world! the paragon of animals![81]

Only what pertains to perfection can be properly carried over to God. Thus, the certitude of our science, but not the need of discourse can be carried over:

> illud quod in Deo est absque omni imperfectione, in creaturis cum aliquo defectu invenitur; propter hoc oportet, ut si aliquid in creaturis inventum Deo attribuitur, separemus totum quod ad imperfectionem pertinet, ut solum maneat hoc quod perfectionis est, quia secundum hoc tantum creatura Deum imitatur.
>
> Dico igitur, quod scientia quae in nobis invenitur, habet aliquid perfectionis, et aliquid imperfectionis.
>
> Ad perfectionem eius pertinet certitudo ipsius, quia quod scitur, certitudinaliter cognoscitur; sed ad imperfectionem pertinet discursus intellectus a principiis in conclusiones, quarum est scientia; hic enim discursus non contingit nisi secundum quod intellectus cognoscens principia, cognoscit in potentia tantum conclusiones; si enim actu cognoseret, non esset ibi discursus; cum motus non sit nisi exitus de potentia ad actum.
>
> dicitur ergo in Deo scientia ratione certitudinis, non autem ratione discursus praedicti, qui nec etiam in angelis invenitur, ut Dionysius dicit.[82]

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[80]Shakespeare, *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act I, Sc. 1
[81]*Hamlet*, Act II, Sc. 2
[82]*De Veritate*, Q. 2, Art 1, Ad 4

Thus as Shakespeare teaches us elsewhere, it is never the course in any sense that is the end and the perfect:

> All's well that ends well: still the fine's the crown;
> Whate'er the course, the end is the renown.[83]

What is the end of the course of reason? Understanding and ultimately understanding God. Reason is godlike insofar as its end is to know God who in knowing himself knows everything, but chiefly himself.

fust

The word *fust* means *to be become musty*.[84]

Five General Reasons Why We Should Use Reason

Hamlet touches upon at least five general reasons why we should use reason (or use it more than we do).

One reason is in comparison to what is below man; two reasons are in comparison to what is above man; and two reasons are in comparison to man himself.

The beast is below man. If man does not use his reason, he falls to the level of the beast.

God is above man. If man uses his reason, he obeys God who has given us reason so that we might use it. "Sure he that made us with such large

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[83]*All's Well That Ends Well,* Act IV, Sc. 4

[84]The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, edited by Harold Jenkins, Footnote on Act IV, Sc. 4, lines 9, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1982, p. 345: 39. *fust*] become musty

discourse, Looking before and after, gave us not That capability and god-like reason To fust in us un’used."

And in using reason, man becomes like God who is above him.

Having looked above and below man, we can now look at man himself. Since man is an animal with reason, man cannot be true to himself if he does not use his reason. And as Polonius says elsewhere in the play: "This above all: to thine own self be true"

And since the chief good or end of man involves the use of reason, man cannot achieve his chief good or end without the use of reason.

Anyone of these five reasons by itself is a powerful motive for using reason. Taken together, they are overwhelming.

Duane H. Berquist

HAMLET'S EXHORTATION TO USE REASON

Proemium

In an age as unreasonable as our own, the twentieth century, where mad men and fools have so often misled nations (it is the plague of the times, says Shakespeare, when "mad men lead the blind") and where individuals prefer to follow their own fantasies and feelings rather than reason, and where even scientists are willing to admit contradictions in things and where the irrational followers of Nietzsche and others run amuck, we surely have need of an exhortation to use reason.

And the philosopher has a special concern with such an exhortation. For the true philosopher is a lover of wisdom and wisdom is the chief and greatest perfection of reason. Therefore, the philosopher most of all should love reason and the use of it. Hence, it belongs most of all to the philosopher to exhort or urge men to use reason.

And like the saying "physician heal thyself", the philosopher also needs an exhortation to use reason, especially one that tells us what reason is and what it is to use reason. It is laughable to pursue wisdom which requires a long and most difficult use of reason without seeing first what it is to use reason and why we should use reason.

The Best Short Exhortation to Use Reason

Perhaps the best short exhortation to use reason is that found in just forty-nine words of Hamlet written on seven lines of blank verse in Act IV, Sc. 4 of *Hamlet:*

> .....What is a man,
> If his chief good and market of his time
> Be but to sleep and feed: a beast, no more.
> Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
> Looking before and after, gave us not

That capability and god-like reason
To fust in us un'used.

The Exhortation is Written in Blank Verse

Blank verse, for those not versed in these matters, is unrhymed iambic pentameter. Since the thought of the exhortation begins with the seventh syllable of the first line and ends on the sixth syllable of the seventh line, the exhortation amounts in quantity to six lines of blank verse.

Why is the exhortation written in verse?

First, verse is more pleasant than prose. The use of verse occasionally is not below the dignity of the philosopher. Boethius wrote verse alternating with prose in each part of his great work *The Consolation of Philosophy*. Hamlet, however, has chosen the meter closest to daily speech.

But a second and far more important reason is that verse is more easily memorized and remembered. It is necessary to always remember this exhortation since it is a permanent and universal beginning of the whole use of our reason. And one must think of these words carefully and frequently before one begins to understand them fully. And one cannot think often of these words if one cannot remember them. William J. Rolfe has preserved a general observation on the attention which has been given to the words of Hamlet in his edition of *Hamlet:*

> The play is one of the longest...and the amount that has been written about it far exceeds that on any other of Shakespeare's works. Furness does not exaggerate when he says:
>
> "No one of mortal mould (save Him 'whose blessed feet were nailed for our advantage to the bitter cross') ever trod this earth, commanding such absorbing interest as this Hamlet, this mere creation of a poet's brain.

> No syllable that he whispers, no word let fall by anyone near him, but is caught and pondered as no words ever have been, except of Holy Writ.
>
> Upon no throne built by mortal hands has ever "beat so fierce a light" as upon that airy fabric reared at Elsinore."[1]

A third reason why the exhortation is written in verse or meter is to call our attention to the likeness between what is said in the exhortation and numbers and what is found in numbers. Shakespeare often calls what is written in verse "numbers." And Hamlet himself in his letter to Ophelia, after some verses addressed to her, calls them *numbers:*

> O dear Ophelia, I am ill at these numbers. I have not art to reckon my groans.[2]

Numbers and what is found in them are like what is in the exhortation first as regards definitions. There are many definitions in the exhortation and Aristotle notes the likeness of definitions to numbers in the eighth book of the *Metaphysics*.[3] Hence, Hamlet speaks of man without reason or the use of reason as being "no more" than a beast.

Proportion, or the likeness of ratios, is first seen in numbers and the exhortation rests upon many proportions as can be seen especially in the first part (the first three lines).

Moreover, although thoughts are like numbers rather than continuous quantities (as we learn in the first book *About The Soul*), nevertheless as ratios of numbers are said to be in continuous proportion by a certain likeness to the continuous, so too, definitions and syllogisms can be said to be continuous by the same likeness. In Hamlet's Exhortation, for example, the definitions of order, of the act of reason, of reason, and of man are continuous and it is necessary to see this. Hamlet syllogizes and syllogizing is like reckoning (see Greek) and especially when one syllogizes from a proportion like one does in mathematics.

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[1] *The Tragedy of Hamlet*, Preface, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1894, p. 5
[2] *Hamlet* , Act II, Sc. 2
[3] 1043b 32-1044a 14

There is also the symbolism of the numbers to exercise the minds of the Pythagoreans and Platonists and Straussians amongst us who will, of course, note that Hamlet writes his *wise* exhortation on seven lines beginning on the seventh syllable of the first line. Seven is an old symbol of wisdom and seven is also the age of reason. Further, there are exactly forty-nine words in the exhortation and forty-nine is the square of seven and the age in which Aristotle said reason is best. Further, Hamlet *completes* the exhortation using the equivalent of six lines of blank verse by ending on the sixth syllable of the last line. Six is the first perfect number with parts perfectly ordered. And this signifies then the perfection and order of his exhortation. There can also be seen deep significance in his writing ten syllable lines of iambic pentameter. Ten, the number of syllables on a line of iambic pentameter, is a symbol of the law which is something of reason. And the five and two in iambic pentameter is also deeply significant. Five is the number of the virtues of reason in Book Six of the Nicomachean Ethics which perfects the two parts of reason - looking and practical. Two is also a symbol of reasoned out knowledge for Plato, as we learn in the first book *About the Soul*. But perhaps this way madness lies.

The Division of Hamlet's Exhortation

Hamlet's exhortation has two parts.

In the first part (the first three lines), Hamlet asks a question and answers it on the basis of a proportion between man and beast and the chief goods of each. The question is: "What is a man if his chief good and market of his time be but to sleep and feed?" and the answer is: "a beast, no more".

In the second part (lines four through seven), Hamlet brings out what man has, or what God has given him, in addition to what the beast has and also what is found in man's chief good that is not found in the chief good of the beast. In this second part, Hamlet also defines order, the act and use of reason, and reason (the ability) itself and (with the help of the first part) enables us to complete the first definitions of man and beast.

In the two parts together, Hamlet touches upon at least five general reasons why we should use reason, or use it more than we do. We can see these five reasons after we have examined the two parts in some detail.

The First Part of the Exhortation

The proportion and implicit syllogism of the first part

When we examine more carefully the first part of Hamlet's exhortation, we can see that the question and answer in it are based on a proportion or likeness of ratios among four things. And that this proportion involves implicitly if-then statements from which if-then syllogisms arise. Each of these should be unfolded.

The four things in the proportion are man and his chief good and the beast and his chief good. Aiming at clarity and avoiding the pedantry of teaching, Hamlet speaks *exemplariter* of the beast's chief good as "to sleep and feed". This fits our cat Tabitha who purrs when she's fed and when she sleeps.

The proportion could be first stated thus: the chief good of man is to man as the chief good of the beast is to the beast. Then, alternating the proportion, as the chief good of man is to the chief good of the beast, so is man to the beast.

From this proportion, we could form if-then statements something like what the mathematician does. If the mathematician sees that A is to B as X is to Y, he can form any of three if-then statements. If X is more than y, then A is more than B; If equal, equal; if less, less. Hamlet's question and answer differ only in form from this if-then statement: if man's chief good is no more than the good of the beast, then man is no more than a beast.

And this if-then statement is the beginning of a powerful hypothetical or if-then syllogism which can be stated thus: If man's chief good is no more than the chief good of a beast, then man is no more than a beast. But man is surely more than a beast. Hence, it cannot be true that man's chief good is no more than the chief good of the beast.

No man wants us to treat him as if he were no more than a beast. We would all think it wrong, if faced with the choice between saving the life of a man or a beast, we were to save the life of the beast. But despite thinking

themselves better than a beast, many men pursue the goods we have in common with the beast as if they were our greatest good. But this statement upon which their life seems to be based, that is, that our chief good is eating and sleeping and sexual pleasure is refuted by the rejection of its consequence, that man is no more than a beast.

One could also, of course, reason from the statement that if man is more than a beast, then the chief good of man is more than the chief good of the beast. Affirming the antecedent "man is more than a beast" and we are forced to admit the consequent, the chief good of man is more than the chief good of the beast.

These syllogisms have something of the power and certitude of the mathematician's syllogisms based on proportions. It is as if the mathematician had seen this proportion: Half of six is to three and as half of four is to two. And then said: What is a three if it be half of four? A two, no more.

The Connection between What a thing is and its End or Chief Good

But what is seen explicitly in the first part of the exhortation is the necessary connection between what man is and what his chief good is. Just as there is a necessary connection between three and half of six, and between two and half of four, so likewise, there is a necessary connection between what man is and his chief good and between what a beast is and his chief good. Plato and Aristotle have taught us why there is a necessary connection between what a thing is and its end and good. The middle terms are *a thing's own act* and *a thing's own perfection* . A thing's own act done well is its end or purpose and a thing's own act (what it alone can do or does better) is determined by what it is. LIkewise, a thing's own perfection is its end and the perfection of things different in kind is different. The perfection of the eye is not the same as the perfection of the ear because *what an eye is* is not the same as *what an ear is*.

Hence, when we see in the second part what is necessary to complete the definition of man, that is, what he has in addition to the beast, we are prepared again to reason more perfectly to what man's chief good is.

* * *

Before turning to the second part of Hamlet's Exhortation, there are some words to look at more closely in the first part.

The words *chief good*

The word *chief* added to good signifies both that it is the greatest good and also the good under which all other goods are placed

Why Hamlet use the metonym *time* for our life

The word *time* here is a metonym for the life of man. The name of the measure is used for the measured. Man's life is measured by time for it begins and ends in time. But it is especially appropriate to use this metonym for the life of man rather than the life of a beast or a plant. Man lives in time more than the other animals. Hence, in the third book *About the Soul*, Aristotle calls man the animal with the sense of time:

> Desires come to be contrary to each other. This happens when reason and concupiscence are contrary. This comes about in those having the sense of time: for the mind urges us to hold back on account of the future while concupiscence on account of the present - for what is pleasant now seems to be simply pleasant and simply good on account of not seeing the future.[4]

Thomas Aquinas comments on this:

> In man there are contrary desires, one of which the continent follow and others resist. He says therefore that desires are able to become contrary to each other and this happens "in those having the sense of time"; that is, those who not only know what is in the

[4]Book III, Chapter 10, 433b 5-10

> present, but who consider the past and the future - because the understanding sometimes commands one to draw back from something concupiscible on account of the consideration of the future, as when to one with a fever, it seems from the judgment of the understanding, that he ought to abstain from wine lest the fever become warm.[5]

Man begins to differ from the beast in his acts when he considers not just the here and now, but takes into account the past and the future before he acts. And as we will see in the second part, man is the animal with reason and reason is the ability to look before and after and the first meaning of *before* and *after* is that of time. Indeed, as Aristotle teaches us in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing*, miscalled the *Physics* (223a 21-29), time would not fully be without the numbering soul.

The word *market*

The word *market* can be explained in two ways. It can mean more or less the same as *mark* which means the end or goal aimed at. Or it can be taken for what man spends his time or life on or trades them for. But since that for the sake of which is the definition of end, the second explanation does not differ in substance from the first.

Why Hamlet couples *his chief good* and *market of his time*

By this coupling, Hamlet points out two things. One is that the *good* and the *end* are the same. And the second is that the good or end of *man* is the same as the end or good of *human life*.

Why Hamlet says *no more*

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[5] *Commentary on Book III of On the Soul*, Lectio 15, n. 829

The definitions of things are like numbers. When Hamlet says that man would be "a beast, no more" if his chief good were no more than that of the beast, he also insinuates by the words *no more* that man does have something in common with the beast (which is to be an animal) and that the difference between man and the beast is like that of numbers, as Aristotle, following Plato, teaches us in the eighth book of the *Metaphysics* [6] where the addition or subtraction of a unit gives a different species. Hence, we can begin to understand better the likeness of the implicit syllogisms in Hamlet's question and answer to the reasoning of the mathematician. To say it again, it is as if the mathematician were to ask: What is a three if it be half of four? And the answer would be: a two, no more.

Hence also when, in the second part, we consider what man has in addition to the beast, namely reason, we can complete the first definition of man as an animal with reason.

The Second Part of the Exhortation

In the second part, Hamlet tells us what man has in addition to the beast and what therefore will be found in his chief good (but not in the chief good of the beast).

But if we examine more closely the second part, we can see that Hamlet has given us implicitly five continuous definitions. Definitions are said to be continuous when one definition, or what is defined by it, enters into another. In geometry, for example, the definitions of rectilineal plane figure, of quadrilateral and of square are continuous. In logic, the definitions of sign, name, predicable and genus are continuous. In the philosophy of nature, the definition of motion is continuous with both the definition of nature and that of time. (Something like this is also found in syllogisms. When the conclusion of one syllogism is the premiss of another, the two syllogisms can be called *continuous*. Even elementary theorems in Euclid are based on continuous syllogisms)

In the second part of Hamlet's Exhortation, the definitions of order, of the act or use of reason, of reason, (and with some help from the first part) of man and of beast are continuous. The definition of order is found in the definition of

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[6] 1043b 32-1044a 14

the act of reason and reason is defined by its act and man is defined by reason and the beast by negating something in the definition of man.

Order is defined as a before and after. Hamlet uses the definition of order (before and after) in his definition of the act of reason which is a discourse in which there is looking before and after. And reason is defined as the capability, or (I shorten this to) the ability, for large discourse, looking before and after. Man can then be defined as the animal with reason. And the beast as an animal without reason.

The definition of man is also a beginning for knowing man's own act. Since man is an animal with reason, the act with reason must be man's own act. And since a thing's own act done well is its end, we can be led into ethics from Hamlet's exhortation since ethics is based on a knowledge of the end of man. Likewise the definition of man enables us to know what is the natural road in human knowledge. Since man is an animal with reason, the natural road in human knowledge must be the road from the senses into reason. But let us return to the exhortation itself.

We should now examine some key words in the definition of reason and of order. Hamlet tells us that reason is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after and order is a before and after. Four words should be examined here: *discourse, large, looking* and *before*. Each of these words has more than one meaning and not by chance. We cannot attempt here a complete exposition of any one of them. But we can indicate some of the main senses and their order so as to better understand Hamlet's definition of reason and order.

The Word *Discourse*

The word *discourse* comes from the Latin word for *running* which first names the well known act of our legs.

It is then carried over to other outwards actions of man. In this famous line from *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Shakespeare manages to use both the Latin derived word and the English word:

The course of true love never did run smooth.[7]

Then the word is applied to the movement of the eyes as when our eyes run down a column of figures or a list of names.

And at last, the word is placed upon an inward act of reason that is like running or motion, a going from this to that.

Perhaps the best way to understand this last sense of *discourse* is to distinguish the discourses of reason.

Every discourse of reason is a going from this to that, but there are four ways in which these discourses of reason can be distinguished. We can distinguish them first by how reason goes from this to that. And then we can distinguish them by the differences of the this and that between which reason runs. Third, they can be distinguished by their ends or that for the sake of which reason runs. And fourth, they can be distinguished by what the discourse is about.

Thomas distinguishes the discourse of reason by how reason goes from this to that:

> In scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus.
>
> Unus secundum successionem tantum: sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud.
>
> Alius discursus est secundum causalitatem: sicut cum per principia pervenimus in cognitionem conclusionum...
>
> secundus discursus praesupponit primum: procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque considerant
>
> ...discursus talis est procedentis de noto ad ignotum...quando cognoscitur primum, adhuc ignoratur secundum.Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo, sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas: tunc cessat discursus.[8]

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[7] *A Midsummer Night's Dream,* Act I, Sc. 1

[8] *Summa Theologiae,* Prima Pars, Q. 14, Art. 7, c.

This can be translated thus:

> In our reasoned-out knowledge, there is a twofold discourse.
>
> One by succession only: as when, after we understand something in act, we turn to understanding another thing.
>
> The other discourse is by causality: as when through beginnings we arrive at a conclusion...
>
> The second discourse presupposes the first; for those proceeding from beginnings to conclusions, do not consider both at once.
>
> ...Such a discourse belongs to one proceeding from the known to the unknown...when the first is known the second is still unknown. And thus the second is not known in the first, but from the first. The end of the discourse however is when the second is seen in the first, the effects having been untied in the causes: and then the discourse stops.

In the light of this text, the question arises about the word *discourse* in the definition of reason. Should we understand the first or the second discourse?

Although both could be understood by the word *discourse* in Hamlet's definition, it seems nevertheless that one should have chiefly in mind the second discourse. Three reasons can be given for this.

The first reason is based on the truth that we should define ability by its utmost.[9] For example, we define a person's weight-lifting ability by the greatest weight they can lift, not by any lesser weight they can also lift. Now, as Thomas points out, the second discourse presupposes and includes the first, but the reverse is not true. Whoever is capable of the second discourse must also be capable of the first, but not vice-versa. Hence, we should define reason by the second discourse which is the utmost to which its ability (for discourse) extends.

The second reason is that the second discourse seems to be properly of reason, the discourse that is appropriate or proper to reason. The eyes can run down a column of figures or names. But they do not see one thing through seeing another or by seeing another.

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[9]See Aristotle, *De Caelo,* 281a7-25

A sign that the second discourse is proper to reason is that *discursus* became for the Latin logicians often a synonym for *reasoning*. And, of course, the fact that the second discourse is called *reasoning*, but not the first; and that *reasoning* is named from reason, as if its own act, is a sign that the second discourse is the one to define reason by what is proper to it.

The third reason is that we can see much better in the second discourse the difference between the movement of reason and the movements in the sensible world. When my body goes from being in Boston to being in New York, my being in Boston is not a cause of my coming to be in New York. Likewise, if my body goes from being healthy to being sick, my being healthy is not the cause of my becoming sick. But when reason goes from knowing the premisses to knowing the conclusion, knowing the premisses is a cause of coming to know the conclusion. And in the further discourse of reason, we come to know the conclusion not only from the premisses, but <u>in</u> the premisses. But how could we be in New York by being in Boston?

Defining and demonstrating and counting and calculating are main forms of discourse *secundum causalitatem*. In all of these, reason comes to know or understand by a movement rather than all at once.

Thomas distinguishes the discourses of reason by the *this* and *that* between which reason runs when explaining why natural science is said to proceed *rationabiliter* or reasonably:

> cum sit rationis de uno in aliud discurrere, hoc magis in scientia naturali servatur. ubi ex cognitione unius in cognitionem alterius devenitur, sicut ex cognitione effectus in cognitionem causae.
>
> Et non proceditur solum ab uno in aliud secundum rationem, quod non est aliud secundum rem, sicut si ab animali proceditur ad hominem.
>
> In scientiis enim mathematicis proceditur per ea tantum, quae sunt de essentia rei, cum demonstrent solum per causam formalem; et ideo non demonstratur in eis aliquid de una re per aliam rem, sed per propriam definitionem illius rei. Etsi enim dentur aliquae demonstrationes de circulo ex triangulo, vel e converso, hoc non est nisi inquantum in circulo est potentia triangulus, et e converso.

> Sed in scientia naturali, in qua fit demonstratio per causas extrinsecas, probatur aliquid de una re per aliam omnino extrinsecam. Et ita modus rationalis in scientia naturali maxime observatur, et ideo scientia naturalis inter alias est intellectui hominis magis conformis. Attribuitur igitur rationabiliter procedere scientiae naturali, non quia ei soli conveniat, sed quia ei praecipue competit.[10]
>
> Since it belongs to reason to run from one thing to another, this is more observed in natural science where, from the knowledge of one thing, reason comes to knowledge of another, as from the knowledge of the effect to a knowledge of the cause.
>
> And it does not only go forward from one to another in reason that is not other in things, as when it goes forward from animal to man.
>
> In the mathematical sciences, one goes forward only through what belongs to the essence of the thing, since they demonstrate only through the formal cause; and therefore in them, something is not demonstrated of one thing by another thing. For although some demonstrations are made about the circle from the triangle, or the reverse, this is not except insofar as the triangle is in the circle in ability and vice-versa.
>
> But in natural science, in which there is demonstration through extrinsic causes, something is proven about one thing by another thing altogether outside of it. And thus the way of reason is most of all observed in natural science; and therefore natural science among the others is more in conformity with the understanding of man. To proceed then by way of reason is attributed to natural science, not because it belongs only to it, but because it especially belongs to it.

Sometimes reason runs from a *this* to a *that* when these are not other things. But the utmost of reason's ability to discourse is when it runs from one *thing* to another *thing*.

The first of these discourses is found when reason goes from the sensible singulars to the universal or from the image of a thing to the thought of it and when reason goes from one thought to another thought of the same thing.

The first discourse of reason is from the sensible to the understandable. Thomas speaks of this:

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[10]*In Boetii de Trinitate,* Lectio II, Q. II, Art. 1, Ad primam quaestionem

> Ex hoc enim quod anima corporis forma et actus est, procedunt ab essentia ejus quaedam potentiae organis affixae, ut sensus et huiusmodi, ex quibus cognitionem intellectualem accipit,
>
> propter hoc quod rationalis est habens cognitionem decurrentem ab uno in aliud; et sic a sensibilibus in intelligibilia venit,
>
> et per hoc ab angelo differt, qui non a sensibilibus discurrendo ad intelligibilia, cognitionem accipit.[11]
>
> From the fact that the soul is the form and act of a body, certain powers fastened to organs proceed from its nature, as the senses and others of this sort, from which it takes the knowledge of understanding
>
> because of this it is reasonable, having knowledge running from one thing to another; and thus it comes to the understandable from the sensible,

and by this it differs from the angel who gets knowledge without running from the sensible to the understandable.

When reason runs or goes from the sensible to the understandable, it is not going from one thing to another thing. It is the same thing that is singular when sensed and universal when understood. When we go from experience to the universal, the universal is also contained in some way in the singular. Thomas explains this:

> ...singulare sentitur proprie et per se, sed tamen sensus est quodammodo etiam ipsius universalis. Cognoscit enim Calliam non solum inquantum est Callias, sed etiam in quantum est hic homo, et similiter Socrates in quantum est hic homo.
>
> Et exinde est quod tali acceptione sensus praeexistente, anima intellectiva potest considerare hominem in utroque. Si autem ita esset quod sensus apprehenderet solum id quod est particularitatis, et nullo modo cum hoc apprehenderet universalem naturam in particulari, non esset possibile quod ex apprehensione sensus causaretur in nobis cognitio universalis.[12]
>
> the singular is sensed properly and as such, but nevertheless sense is in some way also of the universal itself. For it knows

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[11] *In II Sent.,* Dist. III, Q. I, Art VI, Solutio

[12] *In II Posteriorum Analyticorum,* Lectio XX, n. 595

> Callias not only insofar as he is Callias, but also insofar as he is this man, and likewise Socrates insofar as he is this man.
>
> And hence it is that, such taking by the senses coming before, the understanding soul is able to consider man in both. If however it were the case that sense grasped only that which is of the particular, and in no way with this grasped the universal nature in the particular, it would not be possible that universal knowledge is us could be caused from the grasping of sense.

Reason also goes from one thought to another thought of the same thing. We have seen Thomas use the example of going from the genus to the species. When we go from animal to man, or from quadrilateral to square, we are not going from one thing to another thing. Likewise, in mathematics, as Thomas explains in the above text from his Exposition of Boethius' work *On the Trinity*, we do not go from one thing to another thing outside of it.

The discourse *ab uno in aliud secundum rem* is the high point of reason's ability. Not only is reason's discourse not confined within the limits of one thing, but it enables reason to know things it has not experienced. Thomas touches upon these things and also gives us a division of this kind of discourse in this key text:

> scientia rerum acquiri potest non solum per experientiam ipsarum, sed etiam per experientiam quarandam aliarum rerum: cum ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis possit homo procedere ad intelligendum effectus per causas, et causas per effectus, et similia per similia, et contraria per contraria.[13]
>
> a knowledge of things is not only able to be acquired by an experience of those things, but also by an experience of certain other things: since by the power of the active understanding's light man is able to go forward to understanding effects through causes and causes through effects, and like things through like things, and contraries through contraries.

When Aristotle, following Plato, speaks of the first two discourses, he compares reason to the runners in a race:

> It should not remain hidden to us that arguments from the beginnings and those to the beginnings differ. For it was well that

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[13] *Summa Theologiae,* Tertia Pars, Q. 12, Art. 1, Ad. 1

> Plato asked about this and investigated whether the road was from the beginnings or to the beginnings; just as in the race-course from the judges to the end or the reverse.[14]

In the Greek race-course, the runners sometimes would run from the starting-point to some post down the field and then from that post back to the starting-point. Likewise, our reason sometimes runs from a cause towards its effect, but more often in the contrary direction, from an effect towards its cause. (It depends upon which is known, or more known, to us.)

Hamlet adds the word *looking* immediately after *discourse* because in its discourse, reason is trying to see or understand. Thomas in this text uses the words *per modum motus* and *discurrendo* as equivalent:

> Ipsum autem intelligere animae humanae est per modum motus;
>
> intelligit enim anima discurrendo de effectibus in causas, et de causis in effectus, et de similibus in similia, et de oppositis in opposita.[15]
>
> However the understanding itself of the human soul is by way of motion.
>
> For the soul understands by running from effects to causes, and from causes to effects, and from like to like, and from opposites to opposites.

Hamlet's phrase that reason in its *discourse* is *looking* indicates that reason tries to understand by way of motion or discourse.

Reason then is the ability for all the discourses we have touched upon, but especially the discourse whereby it understands one thing from another thing. For this shows the utmost of its ability.

In the two passages where Thomas touches upon this last discourse, it is significant that he gives the same four ways that understanding one thing can help us to understand another thing. It is difficult, or impossible, to think of any other way in which understanding one thing could help us to understand

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[14] *Nicomachean Ethics,* Book One, 1095a 30 - 1095b 1

[15] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Spiritualibus Creaturis,* Art. 10, c.

another. If there is no dependence of one thing upon another and no likeness or opposition of one to the other, how could understanding one help us to understand the other?

We can also distinguish the discourse of reason in a third way by its end. The end is either knowing (alone) or doing. If the end of the discourse is knowing alone, we have the discourse of looking reason. We can consider under this, the discourse of the dialectician, the discourse of the demonstrator and the discourse of the wise man. If the end of the discourse is some doing, we have the discourse of practical reason. The discourse of practical reason can be divided into the discourse of foresight and the discourse of art. A discourse is necessary both for doing and making. The discourse of art is more certain than that of foresight for the means of making are determined while those in doing are variable.

The discourse of reason can also be distinguished by what it is about.

The Word *Large*

The discourse of reason can be called *large* because it is about the large or because the discourse is itself large.

The discourse of reason can be about the large in two senses.

First, the discourse of reason can be about the universal while the senses know only the singular. A discourse about the universal can be called large because the universal covers a large area insofar as it is said of many, if not an infinity, of things.

Second, the discourse of reason can be about the *large* in the sense of great. *Large* in this sense is opposed to *small* as in *small talk*. The latter is talk about small or unimportant things.

The discourse of the philosopher is larger than that of other men in both of these senses. And the discourse of the wise man is the largest in both senses.

The discourse of reason itself can be called large insofar as it begins or ends in many things, or insofar as it is long.

Reason, as Boethius and Thomas teach us, gathers one simple truth from many things. This is first seen when reason separates out the common from experience by induction. And again from one simple truth that is a beginning, reason deduces many things and makes many applications.

The discourse of reason is long insofar as it goes through many steps or insofar as it is goes between things greatly distant. In the first way, the discourse of reason can be long even in geometry or arithmetic. But in the second way, the discourse of reason is long in the philosophy of nature and especially in wisdom. For reason goes from motion to the unmoved mover.

Reason is, of course, capable of *small* discourse in all the senses opposed to *large* discourse. But Hamlet defines reason by large discourse because we define any ability by its utmost. If one is capable of large discourse, one is also capable of a small discourse. But the reverse is not true.

The word *looking*

The word *looking* here means trying to see. And *to see* is used not in the first sense of the act of the eyes or the second sense of imagining, but in its third sense of understanding. We don't understand the discourse of reason if we don't know that reason is trying to understand by its motion. Motion is not for the sake of motion.

The Words *Before and After*

But it should not remain hidden to us that the word *before* is equivocal by reason (and hence also the word *after* and therefore also the word *order* and all other words defined by before and after such as *first* and *last*, *beginning, middle,* and *end* and so on)

Hamlet does not distinguish here the senses of *before*, but Aristotle has distinguished the central and chief senses:

> One thing is said to be *before* another in four ways.
>
> First and most strictly according to time, by which one thing is older and more ancient than another. For something is said to be older or more ancient in that its time has been longer.
>
> Second, that whose existence does not follow reversibly, as one is before two. If two exists, it follows right away that one exists; but if one exists, it is not necessary that two exist; so that the existence of the other does not follow reversibly from the one. Thus the *before* is such that from it, existence does not follow reversibly.
>
> In a third way, *before* is said according to a certain order, as in the sciences and speeches. The order of before and after belongs to the demonstrative sciences: the elements are in order before the diagrams; and in grammar, the letters are before the syllables. Likewise, in speeches, the proemium comes in order before the narration.
>
> Further, besides the aforesaid, the better and more honorable seems to be before by nature. For even the many say that those honored or loved by them come before with them. But this is perhaps the strangest of the ways.
>
> *Before* would seem to be said in that many ways.
>
> There would seem to be another way *before* is said in addition to the above. Of those things whose existence follows reversibly, the cause in whatever manner of existence to the other would reasonably be said to be before by nature. That there are such things is clear. The existence of a man follows reversibly in existence to the true statement about him. For if a man exists, the statement by which we say the man exists is true. But the true statement is in no way a cause of the thing being, but the thing being would seem to be a cause in some way of the statement being true. For the statement is said to be true or false as the thing is or is not.
>
> Thus, one thing is said to be *before* another in five ways.[16]

We cannot here enter into an exposition of this magnificent text of Aristotle and show that he has perfectly ordered the central senses of the word *before*. But even a cursory examination of this text will begin to reveal how much lies under the words of Hamlet. Reason looks before and after in all five senses given here, as well as in the senses attached to them.

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[16] *Categories*, Chapter 12

Godlike

Since God understands all things at once by understanding Himself and there is no discourse or movement in Him, it seems simply false to say that reason or the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, is *god-like*.

Reason is god-like insofar as it is able to understand and to the extent that it understands in act. But Hamlet has told us that reason understands by a discourse in which it looks before and after. The greatest virtue of practical reason is called *foresight* which word itself points to before and after. And the Latin word for this virtue (*prudentia*) is also derived from the Latin word for foresight (*providentia*) When Thomas explains the word *Deus,* he does so by *providentia:*

> hoc nomen *Deus*...imponitur...ab universali rerum providentia: omnes enim loquentes de Deo, hoc intendunt nominare Deum, quod habet providentiam universalem de rebus. Unde dicit Dionysius, 12 cap. *de Div. Nom.* quod *deitas est quae omnia videt providentia et bonitate perfecta*. Ex hac autem operatione hoc nomen Deus assumptum, impositum est ad significandum divinam naturam.[17]
>
> This name *God* (*Deus*) is imposed from the universal providence of things: for all speaking of God intend to name that which has universal providence over things. Whence Dionysius says, in the twelfth chapter *About the Divine Names*, that "Godhood is what sees all things by providence and perfect goodness." The name *God*, taken from this operation, is laid down to signify the divine nature.

Thomas also sees order as the proper effect of divine providence:

> Convenientia ordinis perfectionem providentiae demonstrat: cum ordo sit proprius providentiae effectus.[18]

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[17] *Summa Theologiae,* Prima Pars, Q. 13, Art. 8, c.
[18] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber III, Caput LXXVII

> The suitableness of order shows the perfection of providence: since order is the proper effect of providence

And Thomas often quotes St. Paul in the Latin text:

> Quae a Deo sunt, ordinata sunt.[19]
>
> The things which are from God, are ordered

And the Latin text of *Iudith:*

> Tu fecisti priora, et illa post illa cogitasti, et hoc factum est quod ipse voluisti.[20]

One man is wiser than another and more like God by his reason when he sees what is before or after what the other man sees or, in general, when he sees a before and after which the other man does not see.

Five General Reasons Why We Should Use Reason

Hamlet touches upon at least five general reasons why we should use reason (or use it more than we do).

One reason is in comparison to what is below man; two reasons are in comparison to what is above man; and two reasons are in comparison to man himself.

The beast is below man. If man does not use his reason, he falls to the level of the beast.

God is above man. If man uses his reason, he obeys God who has given us reason so that we might use it. "Sure he that made us with such large discourse, Looking before and after, gave us not That capability and god-like reason To fust in us un'used."

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[19]*Rom.*, XIII, v. 1: Quoted in *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber III, Caput LXXVI
[20]*Iudith*, IX, v. 4

And in using reason, man becomes like God who is above him.

Having looked above and below man, we can now look at man himself. Since man is an animal with reason, man cannot be true to himself if he does not use his reason. And as Polonius says elsewhere in the play: "This above all: to thine own self be true"

And since the chief good or end of man involves the use of reason, man cannot achieve his chief good or end without the use of reason.

Anyone of these five reasons by itself is a powerful motive for using reason. Taken together, they are overwhelming.

Duane H. Berquist

THE FIRST DEFINITION OF REASON

The first definition of reason should be three things. First, it must be speech making known what reason is. Otherwise, it would not be a definition. Every definition of a thing is speech convertible with the thing defined and making known, however imperfectly, what that thing is. Second, it must make known what reason is by what is most known to us about it. It could not be the *first* definition of reason if it did not do this. For the order of learning proceeds from what is more known to us to what is less known to us. And third, it should be a beginning and seed of the whole use and growth of reason. For a beginning is what is first. Hence, the first definition of reason, although short, is great in its power.

Speech that fulfills the above three requirements is a most beautiful first definition of reason.

One should not expect the first definition of reason to give us a complete knowledge of what reason is although it should be useful in the search for such knowledge. Further, one should not think that the first definition is the only beginning of the whole use and development of reason.

Shakespeare has given us the elements of a first definition of reason in his exhortation to use reason:

> .....What is a man,
> If his chief good and market of his time
> Be but to sleep and feed: a beast, no more.
> Sure he that made us with such large discourse,
> Looking before and after, gave us not
> That capability and god-like reason
> To fust in us unus'd.[1]

Shortening one of his words, one could state Shakespeare's definition thus: reason is the *ability for large discourse, looking before and after*. Reason is

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[1] *Hamlet*, Act IV, Sc. 4

the ability for a large discourse which is, or in which there is, a looking before and after.

We must first understand Shakespeare's definition and then we can see that it makes known what reason is by what is most known to us about it. And last, we can see that it is a beginning of the whole use of reason.

UNDERSTANDING SHAKESPEARE'S DEFINITION

Shakespeare is defining reason in the sense in which we say that man is an animal with reason, not in the sense in which a reason is given for a statement. The former reason is an ability or capacity for some act while the latter is a thought of why the statement is so or why we think that it is true. There is, of course, a connection between these two senses of the word *reason*. For reason in the first sense is able to give a reason in the second sense. Moreover, Shakespeare is defining reason strictly and properly as it belongs to the animal called man.[2]

We need not spend time on the word *ability* since the interested reader can find a full consideration of the senses of *ability* in the fifth and ninth books of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle. Likewise, it is well known to the reader of those books and the *De Anima* that an ability must be known and defined by the act for which it is an ability. The ability of matter is an ability for form while the ability of form is an ability to do something. Reason is an ability to do something. Hence, what we must chiefly understand here is the act for which reason is an ability.

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[2]Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib.I Sententiarum* , Distinctio XXV, Quaest I, Art. I, Ad 4: "rationale dicitur dupliciter. Quandoque enim sumitur stricte et proprie, secundum quod ratio dicit quamdam obumbrationem intellectualis naturae, ut dicit Isaac, quod ratio oritur in umbra intelligentiae. Quod patet ex hoc quod statim non offertur sibi veritas, sed per inquisitionem discurrendo invenit; et sic rationale est differentia animalis, et Deo non convenit nec angelis. Quandoque sumitur pro qualibet cognitione virtutis non impressae in materia, et sic convenit Deo, angelis et hominibus..."

Carrying-over the word *discourse* or *running* to reason

The word *discourse* names an act of reason from the Latin word for running (or running to and fro).

The word *discourse* or *course* or *running* is first placed upon the well known act of the legs. It is then carried over and placed upon any outward action of men. In this sense, the American Declaration of Independence speaks of the *course of human events*. Or in Patrick Henry's famous words: "I know not what course other men may take, but as for me, give me liberty or give me death!" The native English word is used by Prince Henry upon the death of his father when he foresees the course of his own mortality:

> Even so must I run on, and even so stop.[3]

And Shakespeare manages to use both the Latin derived word and the native English word in this famous line:

> The course of true love never did run smooth.[4]

It is then carried over to an inward act of man. The eye can run over a number of things and the imagination can run from one thing to another. And reason itself runs from one thing to another. When Fr. Laurence says to the hasty Romeo: *Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast*, he is thinking of *running* in the sense of doing or acting, but his words look back to the act of the legs and also could be applied to the running of our reason. (In a similar carry over of a word, we also say that reason makes mistakes when it *jumps* to conclusions.) [5]

But the discourse which defines reason is not just a running or going from this to that, but one in which the latter is made known in some way

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[3]Shakespeare, *King John*, Act V, Sc. 7

[4]*A Midsummer Night's Dream,* Act I, Sc. 1

[5]Sometimes also the word *discourse* is used, not for an act of reason, but for the words or speech in which the discourse of reason is signified.

by the former. Thomas distinguishes two discourses of reason by how it goes from this to that:

> In our reasoned-out knowledge, there is a twofold discourse. One by succession only: as when, after we understand something in act, we turn to understanding another thing. The other discourse is by causality, as when through beginnings we arrive at a conclusion...The second discourse presupposes the first; for those proceeding from beginnings to conclusions, do not consider both at once.... Such a discourse belongs to one proceeding from the known to the unknown...when the first is known the second is still unknown. And thus the second is not known in the first, but from the first. The end of the discourse however is when the second is seen in the first, the effects having been untied in the causes: and then the discourse stops.[6]

In the light of this text, the question arises about the word *discourse* in the definition of reason. Should we understand the first or the second discourse? Although both could be understood by the word *discourse* in Hamlet's definition, it seems nevertheless that one should have chiefly in mind the second discourse. Two reasons can be given for this. The first is based on the truth that we should define an ability by its utmost.[7] We define, for example, a person's weight-lifting ability by the greatest weight

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[6] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 14, Art. 7, c: "In scientia enim nostra duplex est discursus. Unus secundum successionem tantum: sicut cum, postquam intelligimus aliquid in actu, convertimus nos ad intelligendum aliud. Alius discursus est secundum causalitatem: sicut cum per principia pervenimus in cognitionem conclusionum...secundus discursus praesupponit primum: procedentes enim a principiis ad conclusiones, non simul utrumque considerant...discursus talis est procedentis de noto ad ignotum...quando cognoscitur primum, adhuc ignoratur secundum.Et sic secundum non cognoscitur in primo, sed ex primo. Terminus vero discursus est, quando secundum videtur in primo, resolutis effectibus in causas: tunc cessat discursus."

[7] Aristotle, About the Universe, 281a 11-12

they can lift, not by any lesser weight they can also lift. Now, as Thomas points out, the second discourse presupposes and includes the first, but the reverse is not true. Whoever is capable of the second discourse must also be capable of the first, but not vice-versa. Hence, we should define reason by the second discourse which is the utmost to which its ability (for discourse) extends.

The second reason is that the second discourse seems to be properly of reason, the discourse that fits reason alone. The eyes can run down a column of figures or names. But they do not see one thing through seeing another or by seeing another. Indeed, the eyes and the imagination go from one thing to another in this common way. When one walks through a picture gallery, one's eyes see one painting after another. But seeing one painting does not cause one to see another. One does not come to see one painting through seeing another. Reason not only goes from one thing to another (as in a course in which many different things are taken up, one after the other), but it also reasons from one thing to another. A sign of this is that *discursus* became for the Latin logicians often a synonym for *reasoning* which is the second discourse and *reasoning* is named from *reason*, as if its own or most characteristic act. Hence, Thomas says that discourse is properly to know one thing from another:

> To discourse is properly to go from one thing to knowledge of another...then something is said to be known from something when there is not the same motion in both; but the understanding is first moved to one and from this it is moved to another; whence there is some discourse here, as is clear in demonstrations. For the understanding is first carried to the beginnings only and, secondly, it is carried to the conclusions through the beginnings.[8]

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[8] *De Veritate* , Q. 8, Art. 15, c: " discurrere proprie est ex uno in cognitionem alterius devenire....tunc dicitur aliquid *ex* aliquo cognosci, quando non est idem motus in utrumque; sed primo movetur intellectus in unum, et ex hoc movetur in aliud; unde hic est quidam discursus, sicut patet in demonstrationibus. Primo enim intellectus fertur in principia tantum, secundario fertur per principia in conclusiones." See also Sylvester De Ferrara, *Commentary on the Summa Contra Gentiles* Liber I, Caput 57, on the first argument, Leonine Edition, Tomus Decimus

Although reason, like the eye, may merely look at one thing after another, the discourse which defines reason is more than this. Thomas points out this difference between the eye and reason:

> There is this difference between understanding and bodily sight: to bodily sight all its objects are equally near to being known; for sense is not a power that brings together so that from one of its objects it necessarily has to arrive at another. But to the understanding, all understandables are not equally near to being known; but some it is able to look upon at once while others it does not see except from other beginnings which it has seen.[9]

Tertius: "Advertendum ex doctrina Sancti Thomae Prima q. lviii, art. 3 et *Verit*., q. viii, art 15, quod ad rationem discursus duo requiruntur: primo, ut distinctis cognitionibus cognoscantur plura; secundo, quod cognitio unius sit causa cognitionis alterius.Unde discurrere est ex uno prius cognito in cognitionem alterius posterius noti devenire, quod prius erat ignotum. Propter defectum primi, videns plura in speculo non dicitur discurrere: quia omnia unica visione cognoscit. Propter defectum secundi, cognoscens primo hominem et secundo lapidem, non dicitur discurrere: quia una cognitio non est causa alterius."

[9]*De Veritate*, Q. 11, Art. 3, c: "inter intellectum et corporalem visum haec est differentia: quod visui corporali omnia sua obiecta aequaliter sunt propinqua ad cognoscenda; sensus enim non est vis collativa, ut ex uno obiectorum suorum necesse habeat pervenire in aliud. Sed intellectui non omnia intelligibilia aequaliter vicina sunt ad cognoscendum; sed quaedam statim conspicere potest, quaedam vero non conspicit nisi ex aliis principiis inspectis." See also *De Veritate*, Q. 11, Art. 1, Ad 12: "non est simile de intellectu et visu corporali. Visus enim corporalis non est vis collativa, ut ex quibusdam suorum obiectorum in alia perveniat; sed omnia sua obiecta sunt ei visibilia, quam cito ad illa convertitur: unde habens potentiam visivam se habet hoc modo ad omnia visibilia intuenda, sicut habens habitum ad ea quae habitualiter scit consideranda; et ideo videns non indiget ab alio excitari ad videndum, nisi quatenus per alium eius visus dirigitur in aliquod visibile, ut digito, vel aliquo huiusmodi. Sed potentia intellectiva, cum sit collativa, ex quibusdam in alia devenit; unde non se habet aliqualiter ad omnia

Distinguishing the discourses of reason

We can distinguish a number of discourses of reason. Reason first runs from the sensible to the understandable. Thomas speaks of this first discourse:

> For from this that the soul is the form and act of a body, there proceed from its essence certain powers fixed to organs, as the senses and the like from which it gets intellectual knowledge, on account of this that it is reasonable, having knowledge running from one thing to another; and thus it comes from sensibles to understandables, and by this it differs from an angel who gets knowledge not by running from sensibles to understandables. [10]

Second, there is also a discourse of reason in trying to understand what a thing is and again the soul is also distinct here from the angel who does not need such a discourse:

> The understanding, according to its name, implies a knowledge arriving at what is within a thing. Whence the senses and the imagination are concerned with accidents which stand as it were around the nature of a thing, but the understanding

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intelligibilia consideranda; sed statim quaedam videt, ut quae sunt per se nota, in quibus implicite continentur quaedam alia quae intelligere non potest nisi per officium rationis ea quae in principiis implicite continentur, explicando."

[10]Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum* , Dist. III, Quest. I, Art. VI, Solutio: "ex hoc enim quod anima corporis forma et actus est, procedunt ab essentia ejus quaedam potentiae organis affixae, ut sensus, et hujusmodi, ex quibus cognitionem intellectualem accipit, propter hoc quod rationalis est habens cognitionem decurrentem ab uno in aliud; et sic a sensibilibus in intelligibilia venit, et per hoc ab angelo differt, qui non a sensibilibus discurrendo ad intelligibilia, cognitionem accipit."

> arrives at the nature itself. Whence according to the Philosopher in the third book *About the Soul*, the object of the understanding is the *what it is.* But there is a difference in the grasping of this nature. Sometimes the nature is grasped by itself, so that the understanding does not enter into it from those things which are rolled around the nature; and this is the way of grasping in the separated substances - whence they are called *intelligences*. But sometimes it does not come to what is within except through what is placed around it, as it were through certain doors or entrances; and this is the way of grasping in men who from effects and properties go forward to a knowledge of the nature of a thing. And because it is necessary for there to be a certain discourse in this, therefore the grasping of man is called *reason,* although it ends in understanding in that the investigation leads to the nature of the thing.[11]

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[11] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum,* Distinctio XXXV, Quaest II, Art. II, Solutio I:"...intellectus secundum suum nomen importat cognitionem pertingentem ad intima rei. Unde cum sensus et imaginatio circa accidentia occupentur quae quasi circumstant essentiam rei, intellectus ad essentiam ipsam pertingit. Unde secundum Philosophum in III *De Anima* (430b 28; lectio 11, n;. 762) objectum intellectus est *quid*. Sed in apprehensione hujus essentiae est differentia. Aliquando enim apprehenditur ipsa essentia per seipsam, non quod ad eam ingrediatur intellectus ex ipsis quae quasi circumvolvuntur ipsi essentiae; et hic est modus apprehendendi a substantiis separatis, unde *intelligentiae* dicuntur. Aliquando vero ad intima non pervenitur nisi per circumposita quasi per quaedam ostia; et hic est modus apprehendendi in hominibus, qui ex effectibus et proprietatibus procedunt ad cognitionem essentiae rei. Et quia in hoc oportet esse quemdam discursum, ideo hominis apprehensio *ratio* dicitur, quamvis ad intellectum terminetur in hoc quod inquisitio ad essentiam rei perducit."

Thomas also speaks of discourse and reasoning when we come to define by dividing a genus.[12]

Third, reason runs from premises to conclusions. This is what is usually understood by the word *discourse.* In the Latin logicians. *Discursus* is often a synonym for *reasoning*. But this discourse may not go from one thing to another thing, as in geometry where, when one reasons from one figure to another, one figure is not really outside another, but contained in it potentially.[13]

But the culmination of reason's discourse is when it reasons from knowing one thing to knowing another thing outside of it in reality. It is this discourse which Thomas distinguishes into four: running from cause to effect, running from effect to cause, running from like to like, and running

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[12] *Summa Contra Gentiles* , Liber III, Caput 108:"intellectus noster non statim, sed cum quodam inquisitionis ordine ad cognoscendam quidditatem alicuius rei pertingit: sicut cum primo apprehendimus *animal,* et dividentes per oppositas differentias, altera relicta, unam generi apponimus, quousque perveniamus ad definitionem speciei. ...Sic autem procedere ad cognoscendum de aliquo quid est, est intellectus ratiocinando discurrentis de uno in aliud."

[13] Thomas Aquinas, *In Boetii de Trinitate* , Lectio II, Q. II, Art. 1, Ad primam quaestionem: "In scientiis enim mathematicis proceditur per ea tantum, quae sunt de essentia rei, cum demonstrent solum per causam formalem; et ideo non demonstratur in eis aliquid de una re per aliam rem, sed per propriam definitionem illius rei. Etsi enim dentur aliquae demonstrationes de circulo ex triangulo, vel e converso, hoc non est nisi inquantum in circulo est potentia triangulus, et e converso. Sed in scientia naturali, in qua fit demonstratio per causas extrinsecas, probatur aliquid de una re per aliam omnino extrinsecam. Et ita modus rationalis in scientia naturali maxime observatur, et ideo scientia naturalis inter alias est intellectui hominis magis conformis. Attribuitur igitur rationabiliter procedere scientiae naturali, non quia ei soli conveniat, sed quia ei praecipue competit."

from one opposite to the other. In these four ways, it seems that knowing one thing is a cause of knowing, or knowing better, another thing.

The discourse *ab uno in aliud secundum rem* is the high point of reason's ability. Not only is reason's discourse not confined within the limits of one thing, but it enables reason to know things it has not experienced. Thomas touches upon these things and also gives us a division of this kind of discourse in this key text:

> ...a knowledge of things is not only able to be acquired by an experience of those things, but also by an experience of certain other things: since by the power of the active understanding's light man is able to go forward to understanding effects through causes and causes through effects, and like things through like things, and contraries through contraries.[14]

Reason runs from one thing to another when knowing one thing makes or helps us to know another thing. This happens when one thing depends upon another or when one thing is like another or when one thing is the opposite of the other. When one thing depends upon another, sometimes the cause is known and from this one comes to know, or know better, the effect. But more often, reason runs from the known effect towards an unknown cause. If neither of two things depended upon the other, nor was one like the other, nor was one the opposite of the other, it does not appear how knowing one thing could help one to know the other in particular. There are, then, four discourses of reason from one thing to another where knowing or accepting one thing is the cause of knowing, or knowing better, another thing. Reason sometimes runs from the cause to the effect, but more often from the effect to the cause. And then reason runs from like to like and from one opposite to the other.[15]

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[14] *Summa Theologiae*, Tertia Pars, Q. 12, Art. 1, Ad. 1: "...scientia rerum acquiri potest non solum per experientiam ipsarum, sed etiam per experientiam quarandam aliarum rerum: cum ex virtute luminis intellectus agentis possit homo procedere ad intelligendum effectus per causas, et causas per effectus, et similia per similia, et contraria per contraria."

[15] We seem to have left out two common discourses of reason: counting and calculating. But counting is like the second above and calculating like

When Aristotle, following Plato, asks in the *Nicomachean Ethics* whether we are on the way *from* the beginnings or causes, or on the way *to* the beginnings or causes, he compares these two movements of reason to those of a runner who sometimes runs from the starting-line down to a post, and sometimes in the reverse way, from the post back to the starting point.[16] So likewise, reason sometimes runs from the cause towards the effect (as in geometry) or in the reverse direction, from the effect towards the cause (as is usual in moral matter and in natural things).

Many of these four discourses may be found in thinking about the same thing. For example, we reason about God from his effects and their likeness to him and by way of negation of their defects.

The word *large*

The discourse of reason can be called *large* because it is (1) about the large as an object, or (2) its limit is large, or (3) the discourse is itself large or long.[17]

There are two senses in which the discourse of reason could be said to be *about the large*. The senses know only the singular, but the discourse of reason can be about *the universal* which is said of many things or even an

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the third. One has a confused knowledge of the quantity of a material multitude until one counts it. And in calculating one comes to know a number from two already known, just as in reasoning one comes to know a statement from two already known.

[16]*Nicomachean Ethics*, Book One, 1095a 30-1095b 1

[17]When Holmes says to Watson: "What seems strange to you is only so because you do not follow my train of thought or observe the small facts upon which large inferences may depend." (*The Sign of Four*, Chapter I, The Science of Deduction, *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, Garden City Publishing Co. Inc., 1938, pp. 95-96), it is possible to understand *large* in more than one of these ways

infinity of things. In this sense, the discourse of reason covers a large area. In another sense, the discourse of reason can be called *large* because it is *about great things*. This sense of *large* is opposed to *small* as in *small talk*, that is, talk about unimportant things. In this sense, a discourse of reason about the purpose of life or about the universe or about God, is a *large* discourse. The discourse of the wise man is the largest in both of these ways for he discourses about being and one which are said of all things and about the first cause which is God.

The discourse of reason can also be called large *from its limit*. The limit of a discourse is its beginning or its end. In his Exposition of Boethius' *De Trinitate*, Thomas states that "It is a property of reason to be spread about many things and to gather one simple knowledge from them."[18]

This is first seen in the discourse of reason from experience. Thus, the marvelous character Mr. Jaggers, the great lawyer, says to Pip when they first meet at Miss Havisham's house:

> "Well! Behave yourself. I have a pretty large experience of boys, and you're a bad set of fellows. Now mind!" said he, biting the side of his great forefinger as he frowned at me, "you behave yourself!"[19]

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[18] *In Boetii De Trinitate*, Lectio II, Q. II, Art 1, Ad Tertiam quaestionem: "Est enim rationis proprium circa multa diffundi et ex eis unam simplicem cognitionem colligere."

[19] Charles Dickens, *Great Expectations*, Chapter 11, The Franklin Library Edition, 1979, p. 90. Pip also uses the phrase when speaking of how Pumblechook seems *everywhere* to get (undeservedly) credit for giving him his start in life. Chapter 28, p. 251: "I entertain a conviction, based upon large experience, that if in the days of my prosperity I had gone to the North Pole, I should have met somebody there, wandering Esquimaux or civilised man, who would have told me that Pumblechook was my earliest patron and the founder of my fortunes."

From his "large experience" of them, Jaggers has arrived at one simple universal truth that boys are "a bad set of fellows." This distinguishes reason in knowing the universal from the understanding of an angel.[20]

The discourse of reason is also called *large* from its beginning when there is a *manuductio* from many less universal statements to a more universal one.[21]

But understanding, as contrasted with reason, is characterized by the opposite condition of seeing many things in something one. As Thomas continues in the above text of his Exposition of Boethius' *De Trinitate:*

> The understanding conversely first considers one simple truth and, in that, it grasps a knowledge of a whole multitude of

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[20]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars *,* Q. 59, Art. 1, Ad 1: "intellectus et ratio differunt quantum ad modum cognoscendi: quia scilicet intellectus cognoscit simplici intuitu, ratio vero discurrendo de uno in aliud. Sed tamen ratio per discursum pervenit ad cognoscendum illud quod intellectus sine discursu cognoscit, scilicet universale."

[21]The classic text on the necessity of *manuductio* is in the *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 117, Art. 1, Corpus: "Ducit autem magister discipulum ex praecognitis in cognitionem ignotorum, dupliciter. Primo quidem, proponendo ei aliqua auxilia vel instrumenta, quibus intellectus eius utatur ad scientiam acquirendam: puta cum proponit ei aliquas propositiones minus universales, quas tamen ex praecognitis discipulus diiudicare potest; vel cum proponit ei aliqua sensibilia exempla, vel similia vel opposita, vel aliqua huiusmodi ex quibus intellectus addiscentis manuducitur in cognitionem veritatis ignotae. Alio modo cum...proponit discipulo ordinem principiorum ad conclusiones." Philosophers are deeply indebted to Msgr. Maurice Dionne for bringing out the necessity of *manuductio* and for showing the manuductio necessary in those most difficult forms of reasoned out knowledge, logic and wisdom.

> things, as God by understanding his nature, understands all things.[22]

But reason can imitate this when, from understanding one simple truth (which it has gathered from many things), it proceeds to consider many things. And in this way, the discourse of reason is large from its end.

Thus the discourse of reason is large from its beginning when it ends in understanding one simple truth from many things and large from its end when it begins with one simple truth that is great in its power.[23] (To see at the same time many truths in one universal truth is, of course, not a discourse, but the perfection of understanding.)

The discourse of reason can also be called *large* because it is itself large or long.[24] Again, there are two ways in which this could be said. The

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[22] *In Boetii De Trinitate* , Lectio II, Q. II, Art 1, Ad Tertiam quaestionem: "Intellectus autem e converso per prius unam et simplicem veritatem considerat, et in illa totius multitudinis cognitionem capit, sicut Deus intelligendo suam essentiam omnia cognoscit."

[23] And thus understanding is a limit of the discourse of reason in the reverse way of the large or many as Thomas explains in the same text *In Boetii De Trinitate*, Lectio II, Q. II, Art 1, Ad Tertiam Quaestionem: "Sic igitur patet quod rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem terminatur secundum viam resolutionis, inquantum ratio ex multis colligit unam et simplicem veritatem. Et rursum, intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis secundum viam compositionis vel inventionis inquantum intellectus in uno multa comprehendit."

[24] It may seem a misuse of the word *large* to call a length *large*, but Shakespeare does, for example, in this passsage from *King John* , Act I, Sc. 1 where *large* modifies *lengths* :

> Th 'advantage of his absence took the king
> And in the mean time sojourn'd at my father's;
> Where how he did prevail, I shame to speak.
> But truth is truth, large lengths of seas and shores
> Between my father and my mother lay,
> As I have heard my father speak himself
> When this same lusty gentleman was got.

discourse itself of reason can be called large or long because it goes through many steps by continuous definitions or syllogisms to understand what one thing is, or to see one conclusion, as we see in geometry; or because it goes between things that are far apart, as in the fourth tool of dialectic and, even infinitely apart, as in reasoning from motion to God. The largest discourse in this latter sense is that in Books Eleven & Twelve of the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle's discourse goes from accidental being and motion to the first cause who is pure act.

Shakespeare defines reason by the ability for *large* discourse even though it is also capable (or even more capable) of a *small* or short discourse. The reason for this is that an ability must be defined by its utmost. The ability to do less is included in the ability to do more, but the reverse is not true. Hence, one does not fully define the ability of reason for discourse without saying that it is an ability for *large* discourse. Reason is capable of a large discourse in all six senses distinguished above.

Shakespeare has told us much about reason in saying that it is the ability for large discourse. But to complete the definition, he adds *looking before and after.*

What does the word *looking* mean here? And what does the word *before* mean here? (The meanings of *after* will correspond to those of *before.*) And why does he couple *looking* with *before and after*. And how do these words complete our understanding of that discourse for which reason is the ability?

The word look

The word *look* means *try to see*. Since we name things as we know them, and our knowledge begins with our senses, the word *see* is first placed upon the well known act of the eye. Then, we place the word *see* upon the act of the imagination which is like the act of the eye. A sign of their close likeness is that imagining is confused with the act of the eye in our dreams. Third, we place the word *see* upon the act of reason called

understanding. This is further from the act of the eye, but we do sometimes confuse thinking with imagining. In the exhortation *look before and after,* it is this third sense of *see* which we have in mind in using the word *look*.

By adding the word *looking*, Shakespeare brings out the end of the discourse of reason. In its discourse, reason is trying to understand. Discourse is reason's way of coming to understand. The separated substances understand without any need of discourse. Hence, they are more strictly said to have an understanding or intellect and man, a reason.

The word before

The word *before* is also equivocal by reason. And since reason looks before and after, there is also an order among the senses of *before;* that is, one sense comes before or after another. Thus we cannot understand the word *before* (and the word *after*) without looking before and after.

Aristotle seems to have been the first to see clearly the order of these senses of *before*. In the twelfth chapter of the *Categories*, he distinguishes in order four central senses of the word *before*. Later, in the same chapter, he brings out another sense which is the crowning one, especially for the philosopher.[25] We can learn the ordered senses of *before* by reading carefully this chapter of the *Categories.*

Aristotle begins Chapter 12 with these words:

> One thing is said to be *before* another in four ways.[26]

When Aristotle distinguishes the senses of a word equivocal by reason, he does not give all the senses of the word. Rather, he distinguishes in order the main or chief central senses. To each of these main senses can be attached other meanings very closely related. Thus

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[25]I do not think that this "fifth" sense is fifth in order, but I will try to explain how it is related to the four ordered senses that he first distinguishes when we look at the text of Aristotle.

[26]*Categories*, Chapter 12, 14a 26

when he distinguishes the senses of *in* in the fourth book of the *Physics*, he does not give the sense of *in time*. But as Thomas rightly notes there, this sense is reduced to the first sense whereby something is said to be in place (for place and time are both extrinsic measures).[27] Likewise, when he distinguishes the senses of *beginning* in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, he does not distinguish the senses of the beginning in time and the beginning in motion although he had distinguished them in the first book of the *Physics*. They are distinct meanings as can be seen from Aristotle's critique of Melissus in Book One of the *Physics*.[28] These meanings are reduced to the first one in place since, as is shown in the sixth book of the *Physics*, before and after and beginning in motion and time follow that in place.

Next, Aristotle gives the first sense of *before:*

> First and most strictly according to time, by which one thing is older and more ancient than another. For something is said to be older or more ancient in that its time has been longer.[29]

Since we name things as we know them, the order in naming follows the order in knowing. And since the first road or order in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason, it can be seen why the first meaning comes most under the senses and that later meanings are ordered by their likeness and distance from the first meaning.

Why the first meaning of *before* is that in time and motion can be seen from two things. Time measures the before and after in motion. Aristotle points out the connection of time and before and after in Book IV of the *Physics:*

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[27] Thomas Aquinas, *In I Sent.*, Dist. XIX, Q. III, Art. II, Ad 1: "stricte accipiendo, non omnes modi quibus aliquid est in aliquo, continentur in illis octo, nisi per quamdam similitudinis reductionem, sicut esse in tempore reducitur ad illum modum quo aliquid dicitur esse in loco, quia utrumque est sicut mensuratum in mensura."

[28] *Physics*, Book I, 186a 10-16

[29] *Categories*, Chapter 12, 14a 26-29

> But we know time when we divide the motion, separating the before and after. And then we say time has been when we have sensation of the before and after in time.[30]

Since time is the number of motion according to the before and after in motion, it is not hard to see why this should be first. For we name things as we know them so that the order in naming follows the order in knowing. But our knowledge begins with our senses and as Ulysses observes in *Troilus and Cressida:*

> things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs[31]

It is a sign of the natural genius of Shakespeare that he introduces his greatest comic character, Falstaff, by a reference to time. Falstaff is represented as having his chief good no more than that of the beast, as if he were living without reason that looks before and after. But the first sense of before and after is in time. This is the conversation that first introduces Falstaff to the world:

> Falstaff: Now, Hal, what time of day is it, lad?
>
> Prince: Thou art so fat-witted, with drinking of old sack and unbuttoning thee after supper and sleeping upon benches after noon, that thou hast forgotten to demand that truly which thou wouldst truly know. What a devil hast thou to do with the time of day? Unless hours were cups of sack, and minutes capons, and clocks the tongues of bawds, and dials the signs of leaping-houses, and the blessed sun himself a fair hot wench in flame-coloured taffeta, I see no reason why thou shouldst be so superfluous to demand the time of day.[32]

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[30] *Physics,* Book IV, Chapter 11, 219a 22-25

[31] Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida,* Act III, Sc. 3

[32] *Henry IV, Part I,* Act I, Sc. 2

To this first central sense of *before* in time can be reduced *before in motion* and *before in place*. The close correspondence of these three and the reason for it can be seen from a study of the sixth book of the *Physics*. Since time arises by numbering the before and after in some motion (like that of the sun), to this sense is reduced that of the before and after in motion. And since motion is over some distance, we can also reduce to this sense the before and after in a road or path. The closeness of these three can be seen by one who reads carefully the first quatrain of Shakespeare's *Sonnet 60* (lines 1-4):

> Like as the waves make towards the pebbled shore,
> So do our minutes hasten to their end;
> Each changing place with that which goes before,
> In sequent toil all forwards do contend.

Just as to the first of sense of *beginning* in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* are attached beginning in motion and beginning in time, so to the first sense of before in time are attached before in motion and in place. But in the *Metaphysics*, beginning in place (or in the magnitude over which is the motion) is given as the central sense while here before *in time* is given as the central sense. The reason for the latter would seem to be that *before and after* are explicitly in the definition of time, but not in that of place or motion, as can be seen from the definitions in the third and fourth books of the *Physics*.

The second sense of *before* given by Aristotle can also be exemplified in outward sensible things, but Aristotle gives a mathematical example:

> Second, that whose existence does not follow reversibly, as one is before two. If two exists, it follows right away that one exists; but if one exists, it is not necessary that two exist; so that the existence of the other does not follow reversibly from the one. Thus the *before* is such that from it, existence does not follow reversibly.[33]

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[33] *Categories,* Chapter 12, 14a 29-35

The second sense of before is in being. What can be without another, but that other cannot be without it, is before that other. It is significant that Aristotle uses a mathematical example here since there is no motion or time in mathematics.

What is before in the second sense may also be before in the first sense, but it is not necessary. One is always before two in the second sense, but not always in the first sense. When one slices a loaf of bread with a knife, one has one slice before two in time. But a slicing machine in the bakery goes at once from no slices to thirteen or fourteen. Most people have one child before two in time, but not those who have twins or triplets. If the stamp prints two A's at once, one is not before two in time. Yet it is before it in being. The letter *C* is before the written word *CAT* in being, but if the press prints the whole word at once, *C* is not before *CAT* in time. But, if one prints by hand the word *CAT*, the letter C is before it both in time and in being. One can be a man (a male human being) without being a brother, but one cannot be a brother without being a man. Thus being a man is always before being a brother in the second sense of *before*. But sometimes one is also in time a man before being a brother and sometimes not. The older brother is a man in time before he is a brother. But the younger brother is not in time a man before he is a brother. And the same can be seen with woman and sister. But sometimes one thing is always before another in both the first and second senses of *before*. Thus man is before father always in both senses and likewise woman is before mother.

The point is that, although what is before in being is often also before in time, it is not always so. And hence it is clear that before *in being* is a distinct sense of *before* from that *in time*.

The third sense of *before* is given by Aristotle in these words:

> In a third way, *before* is said according to a certain order, as in the sciences and speeches. The order of before and after belongs to the demonstrative sciences: the elements are in order before the diagrams; and in grammar, the letters are

> before the syllables. Likewise, in speeches, the proemium comes in order before the narration.[34]

The words "according to a certain order" do not tell us what distinguishes this third sense from the other senses. For order consists in a before and after, and hence there is an order corresponding to every sense of *before*. But the examples given by Aristotle help us to recognize that he is talking about before *in the discourse or knowledge of reason*. This sense comes after the first two which are found in outward or sensible things. For a similar reason, the sense of *beginning* in our knowledge comes after the more outward senses of *beginning* in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics.* To this third sense of *before* can be reduced every before in our knowledge.

The words in the *Tempest*[35] "What's past is prologue" touch upon a likeness of this third sense of *before* to the first. As the past is before the future, so the prologue is before the play.

A special likeness to the second sense of *before* is found in our knowledge when one thing can be known without another, but the reverse is impossible. Just as a square can be without a cube, but the reverse is impossible; so too we can know what a square is without knowing what a cube is, but one cannot know what a cube is without knowing what a square is.

But what is before in our knowledge may not be before in time or before in being. I may know you before your parents even though your parents are before you in time. The natural philosopher may know water before hydrogen even though hydrogen is before water in being. Clearly, then, this is another sense of *before* from the first two senses of in time and in being.

The fourth sense of *before* is still in common use, but is stranger than the others:

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[34]*Categories,* Chapter 12, 14a 35-14b 3

[35]William Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, Act II, Sc. 1

> Further, besides the aforesaid, the better and more honorable seems to be before by nature. For even the many say that those honored or loved by them come *before* with them. But this is perhaps the strangest of the ways.[36]

The fourth sense of *before* is *in goodness* in which what is *better* or *more loved* is said to be or come before. This sense seems to be the farthest from the first sense of *before*. If what is after in time and generation is more perfect or better, there seems to be a great distance between what is before in time and what is before in the sense of better. Yet there is enough likeness that in the introduction of many people we often hear the phrase "And last, but not least" so that one will not think that the last person in time to be introduced is the last in excellence. And for a similar reason, Antony says "Though last, not least in love" when shaking the hands of the conspirators:

> First, Marcus Brutus, will I shake with you;
> Next, Caius Cassius, do I take your hand;
> Now, Decius Brutus, yours; now yours, Metellus;
> Yours, Cinna; and my valiant Casca, yours,
> Though last, not least in love, yours, good Trebonius.[37]

The likeness is enough between the first and fourth senses that we use words drawn from motion in talking about the fourth sense. Iachimo uses the words *go before* when talking about the fourth sense of before:

> If that thy gentry, Britain, go before
> This lout as he exceeds our lords, the odds
> Is that we scarce are men and you are gods.[38]

Before in motion is reduced to the first sense of *before* and *go before* seems to look back to this first meaning. And in the age of

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[36]*Categories*, Chapter 12, 14b 3-8

[37]Shakespeare, *Julius Caesar*, Act III, Sc. 1)

[38]Shakespeare, *Cymbeline,* Act V, Sc. 2

primogeniture, the brother who comes first in time is more honored than the younger brother. Hence, Orlando says to his older brother:

> The courtesy of nations allows you my better, in that you are the first born, but the same tradition takes not away my blood, were there twenty brothers betwixt us. I have as much of my father in me as you. Albeit I confess your coming before me is nearer to his reverence.[39]

But so great is the distance that one would have no difficulty in thinking of the first sense before this fourth sense. Notice how *before* and *better* are used with no confusion for the listener. We tend to fall back on the first sense of a word equivocal by reason when it is used with synonyms for later senses. [Likewise, although *first* has as many meanings as *before* (*first* in general means before all the rest), we find it natural to speak of first and best, knowing that everyone will understand by *first* what is first *in time*. Thus, Irving uses *first* and *best* with no confusion in this passage from *The History of New York:*

> I have been the more anxious to delineate fully the person and habits of Wouter Van Twiller, from the consideration that he was not only the first, but also the best governor that ever presided over this ancient and respectable province.[40]

Everyone would understand the words "not only the first, but also the best". Likewise, if someone said that "Washington was not only the first, but also the best President." In such a context, the first meaning of *first* appropriates the word and *best* is used for the last sense of *first*.

Aristotle then states

> So many then are the ways *before* is said[41]

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[39]Shakespeare, *As You Like It,* Act I, Sc. 1

[40]Book Three, Chapter One

[41]*Categories*, Chapter 12, 14b 9-10

Shakespeare is, of course, well aware that *before* has many meanings. In accord with his custom, he puns upon a meaning attached to the first and the fourth meaning of *before* in the words of Helena's confession to the Countess of her love:

> .....Then I confess,
> Here on my knee, before high heaven and you,
> That before you, and next unto high heaven,
> I love your son.[42]

Puns, of course, take the most distant meanings as a way of being clear. Hence, the saying "I see said the blind man; but he couldn't see at all" puns on the first and last sense of *seeing* distinguished earlier.

Thomas Aquinas would seem to have these four ordered meanings in mind when he shows that God the Father is in no way before God the Son. Thus when considering this in the Commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, he says:

> The Father is in no way before the Son, neither in duration, nor by nature, nor in understanding, nor in dignity.[43]

And in the *Contra Errores Graecorum*, Thomas again eliminates four senses of *before* from the Father and the Son:

> There is no way of being before in which the Father can be said to be before the Son. For the Father is neither before in time since the Son is eternal; nor before by nature since there is one nature of the Father and the Son; nor in dignity since the Father and the Son are equal; nor in understanding since they are not distinguished except by relations and relatives are

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[42] *All's Well That Ends Well* , Act I, Sc. 3

[43] *Commentum in Lib. I Sententiarum,* Dist. IX, Quaestio II, Art. 1, Solutio: "Pater nullo modo est prior Filio neque duratione, neque natura, neque intellectu, neque dignitate"

> together in understanding since one is of the understanding of the other.[44]

Reason looks before and after in all of the senses of those words.

The words which are defined by before and after have also as many meanings or senses. Thus the words *order, first, second* and *last, beginning, middle* and *end* all have ordered meanings corresponding to those of *before* and *after*. Hence, whenever we look for order or for what is first or second or last or for the beginning or end or what is in the middle of something, we are looking before and after.

But after distinguishing four senses in order of *before* and saying so many are the senses, Aristotle then brings in another sense:

> There would seem to be another way *before* is said in addition to the above. Of those things whose existence follows reversibly, the cause in whatever manner of existence to the other would reasonably be said to be before by nature. That there are such things is clear. The existence of a man follows reversibly in existence to the true statement about him. For if a man exists, the statement by which we say the man exists is true. But the true statement is in no way a cause of the thing being, but the thing being would seem to be a cause in some way of the statement being true. For the statement is said to be true or false as the thing is or is not.[45]

This sense is sufficiently different from the above four and so important for reason and the philosopher that it needs to be made explicit. This

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[44] *Contra Errores Graecorum* , Pars Prior, Caput 2, n. 1034: "Nullus enim modus prioritatis est, secundum quem Pater prior Filio dici possit. Neque enim prior est Pater tempore, cum Filius sit aeternus; neque prior natura, cum Patris et Filii sit una natura; neque dignitate, cum Pater et Filius sint aequales; neque etiam intellectu, cum non distinguuntur nisi relationibus, relativa autem sunt simul secundum intellectum, cum unum sit de intellectu alterius."

[45] *Categories*, Chapter 12, 14b 10-22

"fifth" sense is the crowning sense of *before,* especially for the philosopher whose end is to know why. If *looking* means here *trying to understand*, we can see why looking before in this sense perfects reason. For we fully understand a thing only when we know its underlying cause.

Although Aristotle speaks of this sense after the other four because it is not as familiar and is harder to see, I do not think that it is necessarily fifth by its distance from the first sense of *before.* It seems to resemble in some ways the second sense. In the second sense, what is after *depends on* what is before for its existence even though what is before is not necessarily followed by what is after. And we think that the effect depends upon the cause for its existence.

What is after in time need not depend at all upon what is before in time. And reason, for the most part, knows the effect before the cause so that what is before and after in the discourse of reason seems contrary to the fifth sense.

Perhaps there is also a sign of the closeness of the second and "fifth" senses of *before* from the senses of *hama* (at the same time, together; *simul* in Latin) in Chapter 13 of the *Categories* which are opposed to before and after. Things that are together are neither before nor after one another. The first sense Aristotle gives there is opposed to before and after in time.[46] Aristotle then gives two senses of together by nature. The first of these is opposed to both the second and the "fifth" sense of before and after. Things like *double and half* which are convertible in being and one of which is not the cause of the other are together in this sense.[47] The second sense of together by nature (and hence, the third sense of together in Chapter 13) is that of things divided against each other by the same division of a genus.[48] The immediate species of the same genus are together in this sense. To what sense of *before and after* are these opposed? Aristotle contrasts this sense of together with the

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[46]*Categories*, Chapter 13, 14b 24-26

[47]*Categories*, Chapter 13, 14b 27-32

[48]*Categories*, Chapter 13, 14b 32-15a 4

genus always being before the species. He speaks of this *before* immediately afterwards.[49] Although the genus seems to be before the species in the second sense of *before* (for if dog is, then animal must be; but if animal is, dog need not be), nevertheless the genus might seem even more properly to be before the species *in the discourse of reason* or *in our knowledge* more than in things. Hence, the third sense of *together* seems to be opposed to the third sense of *before*. Aristotle then close the chapter by recalling the three senses he has distinguished.[50] (The Greek Commentators ask why Aristotle does not give a sense of *together* opposed to the fourth sense of *before and after*. We need not here go into that question.) If then the first sense *together* is opposed to the first sense of *before* and the third sense of *together* somewhat to the third sense of *before* and the second sense of *together* is opposed to both the second and the "fifth" senses of *before*, we should perhaps be careful of thinking that it is more like the third and fourth senses of *before* than like the second. (Three kinds of cause, however, are better than their effects.[51])

It is, of course, possible that what is *before* in the sense of a cause could be together, neither before nor after, in the sense of time.[52]

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[49]*Categories*, Chapter 13, 15a 4-7

[50]*Categories*, Chapter 13, 15a 7-12

[51]Thomas Aquinas, *De Veritate*, Q. 7, Art. 7, Ad 1: "quaedam causae sunt nobiliores his quorum sunt causae, scilicet efficiens, formalis et finalis; et ideo quod est in talibus causis, nobilius est in eis quam in his quorum sunt causae. Sed materia est imperfectior eo cuius est causa; et ideo aliquid est in materia minus nobiliter quam sit in materiato; in materia enim est incomplete et in potentia, et in materiato est actu. Omnis autem dispositio, quae praeparat subiectum ad aliquam formam vel perfectionem recipendam, reducitur ad causam materialem; et hoc modo gratia est causa gloriae; et ideo vita non est nobilius in gratia quam in gloria."

[52]*De Veritate*, Q. 18, Art 6, 8 & Ad 8: "8. Praeterea, dum homo primo peccato peccavit, in actu ipso nondum erat in statu culpae; quia cum status culpae causetur ex peccato, ante primum peccatum fuisset aliud

Sometimes Thomas is careful to distinguish these two senses[53] as if they are apt to be confused (which would be due to their likeness) and at other times, he seems to identify them.[54] Both of these are a sign of the likeness of the second and "fifth" senses of *before*.[55]

Moreover, in the disjunctive syllogism (we saw above in the *Commentum in Lib. I Sententiarum* and the *Contra Errores Graecorum*) that there is no before and after in the Trinity, Thomas has only four parts. For the second and fifth senses are eliminated by the three Persons having the same nature. That this eliminates the fifth sense as well is seen in Thomas'

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peccatum. Sed in actu quo primo homo peccavit, deceptus fuit. Ergo ante statum culpae homo decipi potuit...Ad octavum dicendum, quod actus momentanei simul dum esse incipiunt suum effectum habent, sicut in eodem instanti quo aer illuminatur, oculus videt. Unde cum motus voluntatis, in quo primo consistit peccatum, sit in instanti: in eodem instanti quo peccavit, fuit a statu innocentiae destitutus; et sic decipi potuit in illo instanti."

[53]*De Veritate,* Q. 6, Art. 2, Ad 13: "licet illud a quo non convertitur consequentia, sit aliquo modo prius, tamen non sequitur quod sit eo modo prius quo causa prius dicitur, sic enim coloratum esset causa hominis; et propter hoc non sequitur quod praescientia sit causa praedestinationis."

[54]*In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus Expositio* , Caput XIII, Lectio II, n. 977: "illud a quo non convertitur consequentia essendi, est naturaliter prius et quodammodo principium. Sed unum est huiusmodi quia *sine uno non* invenitur aliqua *multitudo*, sed invenitur aliquod *unum* absque omni *multitudine*. Unum igitur est prius omni multitudine et principium eius. Cuius signum apparet in numeris, quia *unitas* est *ante omnem numerum*, qualitercumque multiplicetur."

[55]The sense in which the cause is before the effect has some likeness to *better* for the cause (except for matter) is better or more honorable than the effect. It is especially the end, the cause of causes, which is better than what is for the sake of the end. And the agent seems better than the patient. But *in our knowledge*, the effect is usually before the cause.

reason why the Holy Spirit does not proceed from the Father more than from the Son.[56]

In the last sentence of Chapter 12, Aristotle sums up, saying:

> Thus, one thing is said to be *before* another in five ways.[57]

As *forenoon*, *forecast, foretell, foretaste, forestall, forethought. forefather, afternoon, afterwards* and *hindsight is easier than foresight* refer to the first sense of *before* (and *after*), so foreword, *afterword* and *therefore* indicate a before and after in the discourse of reason and *foremost* and *foreman* refer to the fourth sense, what is before in goodness or dignity.[58] *Wherefore* looks for what is before in the sense of

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[56] *Commentum in Lib. I Sententiarum* , Dist. XII, Quaestio I, Art. 2(?): "Videtur quod Spiritus Sanctus magis procedit a Patre quam a Filio. Sicut enim dicit Philosophus in lib. *De Causis*, omnis causa primaria plus est influens in suum causatum quam causa secundaria. Sed Filius est quasi secunda causa. Pater autem quasi primum principium qui non est de alio. Ergo Spiritus Sanctus magis procedit a Patre quam a Filio."..."Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Pater quamvis dicatur principium Filii et Spiritus Sancti, tamen non potest dici causa, proprie loquendo: causa enim semper ponit diversitatem essentiae, sicut patet in omnibus. Sed principium aliquod a quo aliquid fluit est consubstantiale rei cujus est principium sicut dicimus quod punctus est principium lineae, et cor principium animalis, et fundamentum domus et ideo propter consubstantialitatem Pater dicitur principium sed non causa. Praeterea, causatum habet dependentiam ad causam. Sed principium importat originem quamdam secundum quod dicitur principium ex quo incipit aliquid. Item quamvis dicatur principium, non tamen potest dici primum; quia ibi non est aliquid prius et posterius, ut dictum est."

[57] *Categories*, Chapter 12, 14b 22-23

[58] But in English we also have many words derived from Latin prefixes signifying before or after such as *prologue, preface, premiss, proposition, proposal,* and *postscript*. *Prior* and *posterior* are synonyms for *before* and *after*. One's "priorities" may be in the first and second or fourth senses of *before*.

cause. Thus Cleopatra asks, "Wherefore is this?" to the angry Antony and Juliet wonders "O Romeo, Romeo, wherefore art thou Romeo?"[59]

Since *before* is said in many ways, it is possible that something be before another in more than one way. Thus bricks are before a brick wall both in time and in being. In time the bricks are made before the wall is made. And the bricks can be without the brick wall, but the reverse is not true. Hence, the bricks are sometimes sold after the demolition of a brick wall.

Further, since *before* is said in many ways, it is possible that two things be before each other. If the bricks are for the sake of the brick wall and letters for the sake of words, then the brick wall is before the bricks in the fourth sense of before (better) and in the same way, words are before letters. But in being, the bricks are before the brick wall and the letters before words. Chaucer comes before Shakespeare (in time), but the critics put Shakespeare before Chaucer (in the sense of better). The end is before the means in goodness even though the means might be before in time or being. And what is before in being or as the cause is before the effect, is often after in our knowledge. Hydrogen may be before water in being, but water is before hydrogen in our knowledge. (Hence, hydrogen was named from water and we name things as we know them.) In things, the cause is before the effect. But in our knowledge, the effect is usually before the cause. Hence, we ask why.

Hence, looking before and after is, not only trying to see if this is before that, but also in what way this is before that. This may be before that in more than one way. And it is also possible that this is after that in some other sense of before and after. John the Baptist must have looked before and after to have said about the Lamb of God: "This is he of whom I said: 'After me there comes a man who was made before me because he was before me'"[60]

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[59]Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra* , Act III, Sc. 11 and *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 1

[60]*The Gospel According to St. John*, Chapter 1, v. 30: Thomas coments *In I Super Evangelium S. Ioannis,* Lectio XIV, nn. 26o--262: **Hic**, scilicet agnus, digito eum demonstrans, **est ille de quo dixi**, scilicet in eius absentia, **Post me venit vir**, ad praedicandum et baptizandum, qui

Here we could ask the tongue-twister question: In what sense of *before* is one sense of *before* before another sense of *before*?

Since we name things as we know them, the order in naming follows the order in knowing. Hence, one sense of *before* comes before another in the third sense of *before* (or one reduced to the third).

There are other ways of distinguishing one before and after from another besides distinguishing the senses of the words *before* and *after*.[61]

Why a *before and after* is the object of reason's looking

We have seen the meaning of *look* in Shakespeare's exhortation and the meanings of *before (*and consequently *after*). We should now ask why these go together. *Before and after* are the object of looking in this exhortation. And since *looking* here means trying to understand, we should try to see why the understandable is a before and after. Answering this

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post me venit nascendo. Secundo quantum ad ordinem dignitatis, cum dicit **Qui ante me factus est.**. Quasi dicat: Licet post me venerit ad praedicandum, tamen **ante m e** idest praelatus mihi factus est dignitate...Tertio quantum ad ordinem durationis, cum dicit **Quia prior me erat.** Quasi dicat: Non mirum si praefertur dignitate, quia etsi posterior sit tempore, est tamen prior aeternitate. **Quia prior me erat**."

[61]There are perhaps four ways in which one before and after or order can be distinguished from another. These ways correspond roughly to the four kinds of cause. In his proemium to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Thomas distinguishes between the order made by nature and that made by reason. He then subdivides the second by *that in which* the order is made (the acts of reason or the acts of the will or exterior matter) These two ways of distinguishing correspond to the maker and matter among the causes. Thomas also speaks there of the order of things among themselves as being on account of their order to an end. We might also then distinguish orders on the basis of their ends. When we distinguish the senses of *before*, we are distinguishing kinds or forms of order.

question will at the same time help us to understand in general why the philosopher must look before and after. Since philosophy is a reasoned out understanding, the philosopher naturally seeks the understandable. If the understandable is a before and after, then the philosopher must look before and after. Indeed, if one does not look before and after, one is not using one's reason.

Speaking with the brevity of wisdom, we can say that the connection between the *understandable* and *before and after* is *one*. The understandable is one and before *and after* follow upon one. This in a nutshell is the reason why *looking* goes together with *before and after* and why it is so important for the philosopher to look before and after. Let us examine the steps in this reasoning.

The connection of the *understandable* with *one* can be seen by looking at the before and after of *true* and *one*. In the following text, Thomas helps us to see the before and after of *one*, *true* and *good:*

> In considering therefore true and good by themselves, true is before good in reason since it is perfective of another by reason of the species. The good however is perfective, not only by reason of the species, but by the being which it has in reality. And thus the definition of good includes in itself more things than the definition of true, and has itself in a way by addition to that, and thus good presupposes true.
>
> True however presupposes one since the definition of true is perfected from the grasping of the understanding and each thing is understandable insofar as it is one. For the one who does not understand something one, understands nothing, as the Philosopher says in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*.[62]

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[62] *De Veritate* , Q. 21, Art. 3, c: "Considerando ergo verum et bonum secundum se, sic verum est prius bono secundum rationem, cum sit perfectivum alterius secundum rationem speciei; bonum autem non solum secundum rationem speciei, sed secundum esse quod habet in re. Et ita plura includit in se ratio boni quam ratio veri, et se habet quodammodo per additionem ad illa; et sic bonum praesuppponit verum, verum autem praesupponit unum. Cum veri ratio ex apprehensione

Another text of Thomas also enlightens us on the connection of the understandable or knowable and one. Thomas is explaining an importance text of Aristotle in the *Metaphysics:*

> He lays down a certain property following upon one; and he says that the account [ratio] of one is in this that it is a beginning of some number. And this is clear from the fact that one is the first measure of number, by which every number is measured. A measure however is considered to be a beginning. For things measured are known by their measure and things are known by their own beginnings. And from this it is clear that one is the beginning of the known or knowable about each thing, and it is in all the beginning of knowing.
>
> The one however which is the beginning of knowing is not the same in all genera...In all however this is common, that what is the first measure is indivisible according to quantity or according to form.
>
> It should be known however that to be a measure is the proper account of the one which is the beginning of number. But this is not the same as the one which is convertible with being, as has been said in the fourth book. For the account of this one consists only in being undivided, but of that one in measurement.
>
> Nevertheless, although it belongs first to the one which is a beginning of number to be considered a measure, it is derived by a certain likeness to the one in other genera, as the Philosopher shows in the tenth book. And in this way measure can be considered to be in every genus. And this account of measure follows that of being undivided, as has been said.

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intellectus perficiatur; unumquodque autem intelligible est inquantum est unum; qui enim non intelligit unum, nihil intelligit, ut dicit Philosophus in IV Metaph."

> And therefore *one* is not said wholly equivocally of that which is convertible with being and of that which is the beginning of number, but rather before and after.[63]

That *before and after* are a part of one or rather follow upon one is clear from the study of the division and order of names in Book Five of the *Metaphysics*. Thomas divides the part of the text which is about the names of the parts of one thus:

> ...he distinguishes the names which signify the parts of one...It is divided into two. In the first part, the names which signify the parts of one. In the second part, names which signify something following the account of one which are *before* and *after*. For to be one is to be a beginning, as has been said above. The first part is divided into two. In the first part he

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[63] *In V Metaphysicorum* , Lectio VIII, n. 872-875: "Ponit quamdam proprietatem consequentem unum; et dicit, quod ratio unius est in hoc, quod sit principium alicuius numeri. Quod ex hoc patet, quia unum est prima mensura numeri, quo omnis numerus mensuratur: mensura autem habet rationem principii, quia per mensuram res mensuratae cognoscuntur, res autem cognoscuntur per sua propria principia. Et ex hoc patet, quod unum est principium noti vel cognoscibilis circa quodlibet, et est in omnibus principium cognoscendi. Hoc autem unum, quod est principium cognoscendi, non est idem in omnibus generibus.....In omnibus tamen istis hoc est commune, quod illud, quod est prima mensura, est indivisibile secundum quantitatem, vel secundum speciem.... Sciendum est autem quod esse mensuram est propria ratio unius secundum quod est principium numeri. Hoc autem non non est idem cum uno quod convertitur cum ente, ut in quarto dictum est. Ratio enim illius unius in sola indivisione consistit: huiusmodi autem unius in mensuratione. Sed tamen haec ratio mensurae, licit primo conveniat uni quod est principium numeri, tamen per quamdam similitudinem derivatur ad unum in aliis generibus, ut in decimo huius Philosophus ostendit. Et secundum hoc ratio mensurae invenitur in quolibet genere. Haec autem ratio mensurae consequitur rationem indivisionis, sicut habitum est. Et ideo unum non omnino aequivoce dicitur de eo quod convertitur cum ente, et de eo quod est principium numeri, sed secundum prius et posterius."

> distinguishes the names which signify the first parts of one and its opposite, multitude. In the second, he distinguishes the names which signify certain secondary parts....[64]

The secondary parts are the opposites, the basis for distinction, which is presupposed to order. Thus in the *Metaphysics*, as in the *Categories*,[65] a consideration of the four kinds of opposite immediately precedes that of before and after. Since the one is a beginning and before and after are said in comparison to some beginning, before and after are said to follow upon one.[66] Moreover, order, which consists in a before and after, seems itself to be some kind of unity for we speak of the unity of order.

Order, or before and after, presupposes distinction, as has been said. But distinction based on opposites also pertains to the understandable as one. In the following text, Thomas notes the connection between these four (understandable, one, distinction and opposites:

> According to the Philosopher in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*, whoever does not understand something one, understands nothing. Something is one however through this that it is undivided and distinct from others. Whence anyone who knows something, must know its distinction from others. But distinction is first considered in affirmation and negation.

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[64]*In V Metaphysicorum,* Lectio XI, nn, 906-907: "...distinguit nomina quae significant partes unius...dividitur in duas. In prima distinguit nomina quae significant partes unius. In secunda, nomina, quae significant aliquod consequens ad rationem unius, scilicet prius et posterius. Nam unum esse, est principium esse, ut supra dictum est...Prima dividitur in duas. In prima distinguit nomina que significant primas partes unius et eius oppositi, scilicet multitudinis. In secunda, distinguit nomina, quae significant quasdam secundarias partes..."

[65]Chapters 10 and 11 are about the four kinds of opposites and Chapter 12, as we saw above, is about the senses of *before*.

[66]*In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XIII, n. 936: "significatio prioris dependet a significatione principii. Nam principium in unoquoque genere est id quod est primum in genere. Prius autem dicitur quod est propinquius alicui determinato principio."

> And therefore whoever knows an affirmation, must know the negation.[67]

The connection of order and the understandable is seen everywhere. Heisenberg speaks thus in his Gifford Lectures:

> For our senses, the world consists of an infinite variety of things and events, colors and sounds. But in order to understand it we have to introduce some kind of order, and order means to recognize what is equal, it means some sort of unity[68]

The fact that Thomas can distinguish the parts of philosophy by the comparison of order to reason is a sign of how central is the consideration of order to the philosopher. In his Proemium to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Thomas proceeds thus:

> As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, ordering belongs to the wise. The reason for this is that wisdom is the greatest perfection of reason whose property is to know order. For, although the sense powers know some things absolutely, nevertheless to know the order of one thing to another belongs only to the understanding or reason.
>
> There is found, however, a two-fold order in things. One is of the parts of some whole or multitude toward each other; as the parts of a house are ordered to each other. The other is the order of things to an end. And this order is more the chief

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[67] *De Veritate* , Q. 2, Art. 15, c: "secundum Philosophum in III [IV] Metaphysicorum, quicumque non intelligit aliquod unum, nihil intelligit. Per hoc autem est aliquid unum, quod est in se indivisum, et ab aliis distinctum; unde quicumque cognoscit aliquid oportet quod sciat distinctionem eius ab aliis. Prima autem distinctionis ratio est in affirmatione et negatione: et ideo oportet quod quicumque scit affirmationem, cognoscat negationem."

[68] *Physics and Philosophy*, Harper, & Brothers, New York, 1958, pp. 62-63. Heisenberg, as a physicist, thinks of order as introduced by our reason through equations.

> one because it is first. For as the Philosopher says in the eleventh [twelfth] book of the *Metaphysics*, the order of the parts of an army to each other is on account of the order of the whole army to the leader.
>
> Order, however, is compared to reason in four ways. There is an order which reason does not make, but only considers, as is the order of natural things. There is also an order which reason by considering makes in its own act, as when it orders its thoughts to each other, and the signs of thoughts which are signifying vocal sounds. There is, moreover, a third order which reason by considering makes in the acts of the will. And further, there is a fourth order which reason by considering makes in exterior things of which it is itself the cause, as in a box or house.
>
> And because the consideration of reason is perfected by habit, there is a diverse knowledge corresponding to each of these diverse orders which reason properly considers. For it belongs to natural philosophy to consider the order of things which human reason considers but does not make; thus that under natural philosophy, we also include metaphysics. The order however which reason by considering makes in its own act belongs to rational philosophy which considers the order of the parts of speech to each other and the order of principles to each other and to conclusions. The order of voluntary actions however belongs to the consideration of moral philosophy. The order however which reason by considering makes in exterior things put together by human reason belongs to the mechanical arts.[69]

Someone might object that something is understandable to the extent it is in act, as the Philosopher shows in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*. However, as Aristotle shows there and we have seen in our consideration of why the first sense of *before* is in time, motion is the act most known to us and from this we come to know other acts. But there is

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[69] *Expositio in Decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis Ad Nicomachum* , Liber Primus, Lectio I, nn. 1-2

a connection between motion and the one and the many and between motion and the opposites which are the basis of formal distinction and between motion and order. Thomas points out that the sensing of the common sensibles, motion and rest, is to sense in a way the one and the many.[70] And motion or change is between opposites and motion is one of two ways of distinguishing opposites.[71] And order is first said in change of place.[72]

Thus there is a harmony between saying that something is understandable insofar as it is one and something is understandable insofar as it is in act.

Understanding further the meaning of looking before and after

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[70] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 78, Art. 3, Ad 2: "....magnitudo et figura et huiusmodi, quae dicuntur communia sensibilia, sunt media inter sensibilia per accidens et sensibilia propria, quae sunt obiecta sensuum. Nam sensibilia propria primo et per se immutant sensum; cum sint qualitates alterantes. Sensibilia vero communia omnia reducuntur ad quantitatem. Et de magnitudine quidem et numero, patet quod sunt species quantitatis. Figura autem est qualitas circa quantitatem, cum consistat ratio figurae in terminatione magnitudinis. Motus autem et quies sentiuntur, secundum quod subiectum uno modo vel pluribus modis se habet secundum magnitudinem subiecti vel localis distantiae, quantum ad motum augmenti et motum localem; vel etiam secundum sensibiles qualitates, ut in motu alterationis: et sic sentire motum et quietem est quodammodo sentire unum et multa.."

[71] Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XII, n. 923: "Ponit duos modos, secundum quos potest cognosci quod aliqua sunt opposita: quorum primus est per comparationen ad motum. Nam in quolibet motu vel mutatione, terminus a quo, opponitur termino ad quem. Et ideo ex quibus est motus, et in quae est motus, sunt opposita..."

[72] Thomas Aquinas, *In V Metaphysicorum*, n. 751: "Ordo autem prioris et posterioris invenitur in diversis; sed secundum id quod primo est nobis notum, est ordo inventus in motu locali, eo quod ille motus est sensui manfestior."

It should not remain hidden from us that reason sometimes knows two things without seeing that one is before the other or which one is before the other. Reason could know, for example, two plays of Shakespeare without knowing which was written before the other. Or, one could know two things without seeing that one was better than the other. In this case, when reason looks before and after, it is trying to see which of two things it knows already is before the other (in time or in goodness or in some other sense of *before*). But sometimes reason does not know at all what is before or after what it does know. Thus, for example, if one thought that water was the beginning of material things, and there is something before water (such as hydrogen) whose existence one does not even suspect, one is in double ignorance. One is ignorant both of what is before water and one is ignorant that it is before water. In this case, then, it is necessary to look before and after, not only to see that this is before that, but also to know what it is that is before or after the other. In this case of double ignorance, one must look before and after both to know what is before or after and to know that it is before or after.

Everyone who is ignorant of what is before or after something is also ignorant that it is before or after. But not everyone who is ignorant that this is before or after that, is ignorant of this or that.

Thus one man is wiser than another because he sees what is before or after what the other man sees or because, at least, he sees a before and after which the other man does not see. But in both cases, he is wiser because he has looked before and after more or better than the other man.

Wisdom also consists in seeing that nothing is before or after something. The wisdom of the theologian, for example, consists not only in seeing the ways that God is before all other things, but also in seeing that one Person in the Trinity is *not* before or after another. And it belongs to wisdom to know that no knowledge is better than wisdom.

What comes for reason before seeing a before and after

Having seen the before and after in the senses or meanings of the word *before*, we should now look before *before and after*. Or to avoid the tongue twisting here, we can ask whether anything is before order since order is nothing other than a before and after.[73] Order means before and after. Hence, when Baptista says in *The Taming of the Shrew* that he will not give his youngest daughter in marriage *before* his older daughter has a husband, [74] Hortensio can rightly speak of this as an *order* which he has established.[75]

It is impossible that anything be before or after itself. Nothing is before or after itself (in any sense of *before*). Hence, before every order, there is some distinction.[76] Distinction is before order in the second sense of *before*. Distinction can be without order, but order cannot be without distinction. One reason for this is that order requires not only the distinction of things, but also their coming together in some way.[77]

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[73]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Secunda Secundae, q. 26, art. 1, c: "Ordo autem includit in se aliquem modum prioris et posterioris."

[74]Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act I, Sc. 1:

> Gentlemen, importune me no farther,
> For how I firmly am resolv'd you know;
> That is, not to bestow my youngest daughter
> Before I have a husband for the elder.

[75]Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act I, Sc. 2:

> Therefore this order hath Baptista tane.
> That none shall have access unto Bianca
> Till Katherine the curst have got a husband.

[76]Thomas Aquinas, *Commentum in Liber I Sententiarum* , Dist. XX, Quaest. I, Art. III, Solutio I: "ordo in ratione sua includit...rationem prioris et posterioris; unde secundum omnes illos modos potest dici esse ordo aliquorum secundum quos aliquis altero prius dicitur et secundum locum et secundum tempus et secundum omnia huiusmodi. Includit etiam distinctionem quia non est ordo aliquorum nisi distinctorum. Sed hoc magis praesupponit nomen ordinis quam significet."

[77]Thomas Aquinas, *In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus,* Caput IV, Lectio I, n. 283: "...ubi non est distinctio, ordo locum non habet; si

Another reason for this is that there can be a distinction of relatives, as we saw in the second sense of *hama* above, but one is not before the other.[78]

This casts some light on why both in the *Categories* and in the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle considers the four kinds of opposition immediately before the word *before*. For every distinction is either material by the division of quantity or formal by opposites.[79] The philosopher is, of course, more interested in formal distinction than material distinction since his object is something universal or immaterial.

We cannot see that one thing is before another if we cannot see their distinction. If we could not distinguish between one and two, we could not see that one is before two. We must distinguish between act and ability before we can see the many ways in which act is before ability (and the one way in which ability is, in a qualified way, before act). But we could see some distinction between things without seeing how one is before the other. For example: we could distinguish between two men without seeing which one is older or which one is better.

Seeing a distinction always comes before seeing a before and after. But something else comes before seeing a before and after. It may also come before seeing a distinction, but it is more apt to come before seeing a *before and after*. For the most part, if not always, a *discourse* of reason

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autem quae distinguuntur in nullo convenirent, unius ordinis non essent." See also Thomas' *Responsio as Ioannem Vercellensem de art. cviii,* quaestio 50: "Ordo enim non est nisi aliquorum distinctorum convenientium in aliquo: quae enim in nullo conveniunt, nullum habent ordinem ad invicem."

[78]For a Christian, the most interesting example of distinction without a before and after is in the Trinity.

[79]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles* , Liber II, Caput 44: "Omnis distinctio est aut secundum divisionem quantitatis...aut secundum divisionem formalem." *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Caput 24: "in rebus enim, remota materiali distinctione... non inveniuntur aliqua distingui nisi per aliquam oppositionem. Quae enim nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem, simul esse possunt in eodem, unde per ea distinctio causari non potest: album enim et triangulare, licet diversa sunt, quia tamen non opponuntur, in eodem esse contingit."

is necessary before reason can see clearly a before and after. In his immortal exhortation to use reason, Shakespeare teaches us that reason is the ability for "large discourse, looking before and after". The wisdom of Shakespeare is seen in his placing the word *discourse* before *looking before and after. The* discourse of reason is a looking before and after. Or reason, in its discourse, looks before and after. *Looking* means *trying to see*. In saying then that the discourse of reason is a looking before and after, or that reason looks before and after in its discourse, Shakespeare is teaching us that a discourse of reason is necessary to see a before and after or to see it well. And this, as Thomas teaches us, is a major difference between the seeing of reason and the seeing of the eyes:

> There is this difference between understanding and bodily sight. To bodily sight, all objects are equally near to being known. For sense is not a power of bringing together so that from one of its objects it needs to come to another. But for the understanding, all understandables are not equally near to being known. But some things it is able to look upon at once and some things it does not see except from having seen other beginnings.[80]

In other passages where Thomas talks about this difference between seeing in the first and last senses, he compares bodily sight to a reason formed by the habits of science and art. The man who possesses the habit of geometry, for example, can think at once about anything he want to that comes under that habit. But reason is not in this condition in the beginning when it sees some things at once and must come to know others things through the former.[81] The name for this motion of reason

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[80] *De Veritate,* Q. 11, Art. 3, c: "inter intellectum et corporalem visum haec est differentia: quod visui corporali omnia sua obiecta aequaliter sunt propinqua ad cognoscenda; sensus enim non est vis collativa, ut ex uno obiectorum suorum necesse habeat pervenire in aliud. Sed intellectui non omnia intelligibilia aequaliter vicina sunt ad cognoscendum; sed quaedam statim conspicere potest, quaedam vero non conspicit nisi ex aliis principiis inspectis."

[81] *De Veritate*, Q. 11, Art. 1, Ad 12: "non est simile de int ellectu et visu corporali. Visus enim corporalis non est vis collativa, ut ex quibusdam

going from what it knows already to knowing something unknown before is called *discourse* from the Latin word for running.[82]

It is striking that there is a before and after in the discourse of reason since that discourse is like a motion and every motion is from something before to something after.[83] For as we have seen, motion is what first gets the attention of our senses and is the act most known to our reason. Hence, there is a before and after both in what reason first knows and in the discourse of reason which is necessary to see a before and after. Reason must take into account the before and after in what it knows and the before and after in the discourse by which it comes to see the former before and after.

The words *looking before and after* bring out the end or goal of reason's discourse which is to understand by seeing a before and after. And this is especially true of the crowning sense of *before*, the sense in

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suorum obiectorum in alia perveniat; sed omnia sua obiecta sunt ei visibilia, quam cito ad illa convertitur: unde habens potentiam visivam se habet hoc modo ad omnia visibilia intuenda, sicut habens habitum ad ea quae habitualiter scit consideranda; et ideo videns non indiget ab alio excitari ad videndum, nisi quatenus per alium eius visus dirigitur in aliquod visibile, ut digito, vel aliquo huiusmodi. Sed potentia intellectiva, cum sit collativa, ex quibusdam in alia devenit; unde non se habet aliqualiter ad omnia intelligibilia consideranda; sed statim quaedam videt, ut quae sunt per se nota, in quibus implicite continentur quaedam alia quae intelligere non potest nisi per officium rationis ea quae in principiis implicite continentur, explicando."

[82]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 58, Art. 3, Ad 1: "discursus quendam motum nominat. Omnis autem motus est de uno priori in aliud posterius. Unde discursiva cognitio attenditur secundum quod ex aliquo prius noto devenitur in cognitionem alterius posterius noti, quod prius erat ignotum."

[83]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* Prima Pars, Q. 58, Art. 3, Ad 1: "discursus quendam motum nominat. Omnis autem motus est de uno priori in aliud posterius. Unde discursiva cognitio attenditur secundum quod ex aliquo prius noto devenitur in cognitionem alterius posterius noti, quod prius erat ignotum."

which the cause is before the effect. For understanding means especially knowing the underlying cause which is said to stand under its effect.

There is always a before and after in the discourse itself of reason,[84] but in that discourse, reason is also trying to see a before and after in whatever the discourse is about. Reason looks before and after in things and in its discourse about those things. Seeing the before and after in things is more the end or goal of reason, but in order to reach that end, reason needs to look at the before and after in its own discourse about those things.

SHAKESPEARE'S DEFINITION AND THE PROEMIUM TO WISDOM

When Aristotle in his Proemium to Wisdom[85] goes from sensing, memory and experience towards art or science, he is going from the senses (the inward as well as the outward) towards reason. The first difference which he sees between art or science and experience is that art or science is a knowledge of the universal while experience is still a knowledge of the singular or singulars. The second difference which he sees is that art or science knows the cause while experience as such knows only that it is so.

The first difference corresponds to the first sense of *large* said of discourse. We have seen that the discourse of reason can be called *large* because it is about the universal. The second difference corresponds, of course, to looking before and after since the crowning sense of *before* is the sense in which the cause is before the effect.

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[84]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 58, Art. 3, Ad 1: "*discursus* quendam motum nominat. Omnis autem motus est de uno priori in aliud posterius. Unde discursiva cognitio attenditur secundum quod ex aliquo prius noto devenitur in cognitionem alterius posterius noti, quod prius erat ignotum."

[85]Aristotle usually begins his books with a *proemium* (which is a Greek word meaning *paving the way*). The Proemium to Wisdom is found in the beginning of the first book of the *Metaphysics*, 980a 22 - 983a 24.

This is also a sign that Shakespeare's definition is from what is most known to us about reason for when we first see what is proper to reason, we touch upon large discourse and looking before and after. And when Aristotle points out how art or science arise from experience, he also touches upon the large discourse of reason from its beginning (large experience).

Later, Aristotle thinks out a six-part description of the wise man or wisdom. And from the first three parts of this description, he reasons to wisdom being a knowledge of the most universal. And from the second three parts, he reasons to wisdom being a knowledge of the first cause. These again correspond in a superlative degree to large discourse and looking before and after. Since wisdom is the highest or greatest perfection of reason, there is great harmony between what we learn there about wisdom and what Shakespeare's definition tells us about reason. It is interesting to note also how the first and last or sixth part of the description of the wise man or wisdom again correspond to the definition of reason. The first part is that the wise man knows all things in some way and this corresponds to one sense of *large* discourse. The sixth and crowning part of the description, the wise man orders (*sapientis est ordinare*), corresponds to looking before and after.

What we learn about wisdom later on in the Proemium is also in perfect harmony with the definition of reason. Wisdom is about the best or most honorable thing and hence, its discourse is the largest in the sense of being about the best. Its discourse in books eleven and twelve is also the largest or longest in one sense, going from accidental being and motion to what most is, the unmoved mover. And the discourse of the wise man is also largest in its limits. Hence, Boethius teaches us that it proceeds *intellectualiter*. And the wise man most of all *understands* in the sense of that word connected with its etymology.[86]

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[86]Causes are said to underlie effects and the wise man considers the first cause. The wise man especially considers substance and the etymology of *substance* is the same as that of *understanding*, And the wise man most of all knows the axioms which stand under all other statements. And the wise man distinguishes the roads that underlie all our knowledge.

Thus, the perfect harmony between what reason is and what wisdom is, confirms the truth of what is said of each. For with the truth all things harmonize. When Thomas in his Proemium to the *Nicomachean Ethics* wants to show the suitability of distinguishing reason's knowledge by the relation of order to reason,[87] he also recalls the harmony between the sixth attribute of the wise man (*sapientis est ordinare*) and the property of reason, in distinction from the senses, which is to know order. Since wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, there must be harmony between what is characteristic of reason and of wisdom.

WHY NOT DEFINE REASON AS THE ABILITY TO UNDERSTAND

Someone might object here that we should define reason as the ability to understand. Since we define an ability by its utmost and the ability of reason extends not only to thinking and reasoning, but to thinking out and reasoning out which result in understanding, we should define reason by this its ultimate end. Although this is reasonable, there seems to be at least two reasons why it is better to define reason as Shakespeare does.

To simply define reason as *the ability to understand* would be to confuse reason with the understanding of an angel or God who understand without need of discourse. Hence, Thomas says that "the name *intellectus* is taken from the intimate penetration of truth but the name of *reason* from inquiry and discourse".[88] *Understanding* or *intellectus* is sometimes divided into understanding and reason, the second being given a new name (*reason)* because it partakes only imperfectly of understanding. Man is placed above the other animals by his reason, but below those who

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[87] *In N. Ethicorum,* Lectio I, n. 1: "Sicut dicit Philosophus in principio*Metaphysicae*, sapientis est ordinare. Cuius ratio est, quia sapientia est potissima perfectio rationis, cuius proprium est cognoscere ordinem."

[88] *Summa Theologiae* , Secunda Secundae, Q. 49, Art. 5, Ad 3: "nomen enim *intellectus* sumitur ab intima penetratione veritatis; nomen *rationis* ab inquisitione et discursu."

understand since man partakes only imperfectly of understanding. This is why man is properly defined as the animal with reason rather than understanding.[89]

A second reason is that Shakespeare's definition brings out what is proper to reason's understanding as distinguished from that of an angel or God. Human understanding is by way of motion (*per modum motus)*. Thomas puts it this way:

> The understanding itself of the human soul is by way of motion; for the soul understands by running from effects to causes and from causes to effects and from like to like and from opposite to opposite.[90]

When Shakespeare defines reason as the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, he brings out that our understanding is *per modum*

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[89] *Scriptum Super Lib. II Sententiarum* , Dist IX, Q. I, Art. IV, Sol.:"Ad hoc enim quod aliquod nomen nominet proprie aliquam rem, duo requiruntur: scilicet quod hoc quod significatur per nomen, habeatur perfecte secundum completum actum, et ut sit ultima perfectio eius...Verbi gratia, in homine est quaedam participatio intellectus: et quia non habet plenum actum intellectus, ut sine inquisitione et imaginatione intelligere possit, ideo in ordine intellectualium non ponitur. Similiter etiam quamvis sensum habeat secundum completissimam operationem respectu omnium animalium: quia tamen sentire non est secundum ultimam perfectionem eius; non ponitur in ordine sensitivorum, sed in ordine rationalium: quia rationis actus plene habet, et est actus eius inquantum est homo."

[90] *Quaestiones Disputatae de Spiritualibus Creaturis* , Art. 10, c.: " Ipsum autem intelligere animae humanae est per modum motus; intelligit enim anima discurrendo de effectibus in causas, et de causis in effectus, et de similibus in similia, et de oppositis in opposita."

motus. We do not simply understand like an angel or God, but we come to understand by way of a motion.[91]

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After this partial explanation of the meaning of Shakespeare's immensely powerful definition of reason, we must now turn to showing that it is the *first* definition of reason, or that it is by what is most known to us.

DEFINING REASON BY WHAT IS MOST KNOWN TO US

We must now consider whether the ability called *reason* is most known to us by the word *discourse* and then by the word *large, which* modifies discourse and the phrase *looking before and after* which completes our understanding of the discourse of reason. But we should not expect *large* and *looking before and after* to be as well known as *discourse* since they give us a more distinct knowledge of the discourse of reason and the distinct is necessarily less known to us.[92]

Moreover, since the word *discourse* or *running is* a word equivocal by reason, we should not expect its later senses to be more known than its first sense. It is unreasonable or preposterous not to look before and after

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[91]This does not mean that *understanding* itself is a motion, but that it is a result of a motion. Hence, the Greek word for a reasoned out understanding, *episteme* is taken from *coming to a halt or stop*

[92]The classic text on the confused being more known and more certain to us than the distinct is in the opening chapter of the first book of Aristotle's *Physics*. Descartes made one of the greatest mistakes in the history of human thought when he identified certitude with clarity and distinction. Descartes'mistake is so destructive of philosophy. It was Charles de Koninck who most fully exposed and refuted the error of Descartes; and in so doing, he defended the very possiblity of philosophy and brought about a quantum leap in our understanding of the first chapter of Aristotle's *Physics*. We can never be sufficiently grateful to him for this.

at the senses of a word equivocal by reason. And since we name things, as we know them, the order in the meanings of a word follows the order in our knowing. And since the first order in our knowledge is from the senses into reason, it is not strange that this order is often seen in words equivocal by reason such as *discourse* or *running*.

And in considering the word *discourse*, we should not be led astray by the modern confusion resulting from our bad custom of not carrying over enough our native words from what can be sensed to what cannot be sensed and substituting foreign words in their later senses while all too often forgetting or ignoring their first sense. There is no good reason why we should not carry over the English word *running* instead of taking over the Latin word *discursus* in its later senses. And we do sometimes carry over the English word *running* to the act of reason. When York speaks to Clifford, he uses the native English word of *running:*

> O Clifford! but bethink thee once again,
> And in thy thought o'er-run my former time[93]

And King Henry says:

> For now we have no thought in us but France,
> Save those to God, that run before our business.[94]

And Rosalind says:

> I might ask you for your commission; but I do take thee, Orlando, for my husband: there's a girl goes before the priest; and, certainly, a woman's thought runs before her actions.[95]

Since our knowledge starts with our senses, motion, or things in motion, would seem to be most known to us. As Shakespeare says:

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[93]Shakespeare, *Henry VI, Part Three*, Act I, Sc. 4

[94]Shakespeare, *Henry V*, Act I, Sc. 2

[95]Shakespeare, *As You Like It* , Act IV, Sc. 1. Note how the thoughts run faster than the actions.

things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs[96]

If things in motion sooner catch the eye of the imagination also (as Aristotle notes in praise of Homer), and things like revolution, the attention of the historian, it is not strange that reason in motion should be most known to us.

We should recall that *discourse* names an act of reason which is like a motion. Since we name things as we know them, we should consider whether motion is the act most known to us. Since our knowledge begins with our senses, and "things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs", it is reasonable to conclude that motion is the act most known to us.

Further, Aristotle in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* (the book dedicated to a consideration of act and ability) states that the word *act* has been carried over from motion to other acts.[97] If motion then is the act most known to us, it is not strange that the act of reason which is like a motion is most known to us. And in carrying over a word that first names a sensible motion (running) and placing it upon a different but similar act of reason, Shakespeare leads us from what is simply most known (the sensible motion) to what is most known in our reason's acts.

Moreover, since the discourse of reason is an act of a living thing or indeed part of the life (meaning by *life* here, not the existence of a living thing, but its operations) of a living thing, we can also consider whether there is a connection between what is most known about life and discourse. What we seem to first mean when we say that something is *alive* is that it moves itself. Self-motion seems to be the common notion of life. Life then (or a living act) is first recognized in some motion. When Aristotle follows the investigation of the soul or cause of life in his predecessors (in the first book *About the Soul*), he first does so through motion (before through sensation) Hence, it also is reasonable that the life

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[96] *Troilus and Cressida*, Act III, Sc. 3

[97] *Metaphysics,* Bk. 9, 1047a 30-33

of reason in particular is first recognized in its act which is like a motion; namely, *discourse.*

We can also reason from part to part. The desiring ability is named in Greek and Latin from the act which is like motion. *Appetitus* in Latin comes from the verb meaning desire or wanting. Originally *appeto* means to reach to, to grasp at and then is carried over to the desire within. (It comes from *peto* meaning to *reach out.*) When we distinguish love, desire and pleasure, love seems to be a conformity or agreement of the desiring ability with its object and pleasure a resting in that object had, but desire seems to be like a seeking of that object, a reaching out for it. In Greek, this part or ability of the soul is also named from desire. We can see in ourselves and in the other animals that they have a desiring ability best from their hunger and thirst and anger (which is a desire for revenge). So, as the desiring ability is first named from the act in it which is most like motion, so too reason is first known from its act which is most like motion (*discourse*).[98]

Since *discourse* especially names reasoning from a sensible motion, the word *reasoning* can also witness to the motion of reason being the act of it which is most known to us. Since *reasoning* is named from *reason*, it is a sign that it is the act most seen to be characteristic of reason. *Discourse* is almost a synonym for *reasoning* (although it can cover other movements of reason that are not reasoning), but it also names it from a sensible motion and it is the sensible motion that is first known by us. There is also a connection between the act called *reasoning* and the other sense of the word *reason*, not as the ability, but pertaining to the object. The man who reasons gives a reason for what he thinks. *Reason* in this last sentence does not mean the *ability* to reason. When Aristotle first distinguishes reason (the ability) from the imagination, he does so by our freedom to imagine what we want to and our need to have a reason for what we think. Thus in Chapter 3 of Book Three *About the Soul*, he distinguishes reason from the imagination by the third act of reason which is like a motion and it not until Chapter 8 that he distinguishes them by the second and the first

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[98]Kittredge in his note on the words "The motions of his spirit are dull as night" (said of "The man that hath no music in himself") in *The Merchant of Venice*, Act V, Sc. 1, Note on line 86, Ginn & Company, 1945, p. 143: "**motions of his spirit**. *Motions* is a common word for the operations of the mind and heart."

acts of reason which are more an understanding (as Thomas explains in the Proemium to logic in the beginning of his commentary on the *Posterior Analytics*). The second reason is also in terms of an effect that is even more so a motion (the passions).

Thomas unfolds the text where Aristotle first distinguishes reason from imagination in the third book *About the Soul*[99] (where he seems to do so from the act which is more a discourse than an understanding) thus:

> He proves that opinion and imagination are not the same...The passion of imagination is in us when we will, because it is in our power to form something appearing as it were before our eyes, as gold mountains or whatever we want...But to have an opinion is not in our power; because it is necessary that the one having an opinion have a reason by which he thinks something is true or false; therefore opinion is not the same as imagination.[100]

I am free to *imagine* terrorists in the next room or my winning the lottery, but I cannot *think* that there are terrorists in the next room or that I have won the lottery without having some reason to think so. Only much later[101] does Aristotle distinguish reason or the understanding from imagination by what is more an act of understanding (the first two acts of reason as we call them in logic) and first and more clearly from the act in which there is the true and the false. Thomas's commentary follows the order of Aristotle' text:

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[99]*De Anima*, Book III, Chapter 3, 427b 16-26

[100]Thomas Aquinas, *In III De Anima,* Lectio IV, n. 633: "Probat quod non sit idem opinio et phantasia..Passio phantasiae est in nobis cum volumus, quia in potestate nostra est formare aliquid, quasi apparens ante oculos nostros, ut montes aureos, vel quicquid volumus... Sed opinari non est in potestate nostra; quia necesse est, quod opinans habeat rationem, per quam opinetur, vel verum vel falsum; ergo opinio non est idem quod phantasia."

[101]*De Anima,* Book III, Chapter 8,

> Then...he shows the difference between imagination and understanding. And first as regards the common operation of the understanding which is composition and division; saying that imagination is different from the affirmation and negation of the understanding because in the intertwining of understandables there is already the true or the false which is not in imagination. For to know the true and the false is only of the understanding. Second...he investigates how the first understandings, that is the understanding of indivisibles, differ since they are not images. And he answers that they are not without images, but they are not images, because images are likenesses of singulars, but understandables are universals separated from individuating conditions: whence images are understandable in ability and not in act.[102]

When we come to this last difference, we touch upon the first meaning of *large* when said of the discourse of reason; and this follows the order from the more known (to us) to the less known (to us).

When Aristotle distinguishes the genera of powers in the second book *About the Soul,*[103] the word he uses to name reason or our

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[102]Thomas Aquinas, *In III De Anima* , Lectio XIII, nn. 793-794: "Deinde...Ostendit differentiam inter phantasiam et intellectum. Et primo quantum ad operationem communem intellectus, quae est compositio et divisio; dicens quod phantasia est alterum ab affirmatione vel negatione intellectus; quia in complexione intelligibilium iam est verum vel falsum: quod non est in phantasia. Nam cognoscere verum et falsum est solius intellectus. Secundo...Inquirit in quo differant primi intellectus, idest intelligentiae indivisibilium, cum non sint phantasmata. Et respondet, quod non sunt sine phantasmatibus, sed tamen non sunt phantasmata, quia phantasmata sunt similitudines particularium, intellecta autem sunt universalia ab individuantibus conditionibus abstracta: unde phantasmata sunt intellecta in potentia, et non in actu."

[103]Aristotle, *About the Soul* B, 414a 31-33 And a little after B, 414b 17-19b

understanding seems close to thinking or discourse. This is the word *dianoetikon* which is the word used in the beginning of the *Posterior Analytics*[104] when Aristotle is inducing that we teach and learn from pre-existent knowledge. Thus Aristotle uses a word that seems to signify the discourse which is proper to reason in which it not only goes from this to that, but in which knowing this is a cause of its coming to know that. Plato also seems to use the word for this discursive knowledge.[105]

When Thomas first distinguishes between the human understanding or reason and the angelic understanding, he distinguishes between the *intellectus deiformis* and the *intellectus discursivus.*[106]

When Augustine and Descartes are trying to come up with something that even the skeptic has a hard time denying (and therefore something more known to us), they point to the doubt of the mind and hence to the doubter's existence as undeniable. But when the mind is doubting it is in motion, not at rest. This then is another sign that the act of reason which is like motion is more known to us than the act which is like rest. This sign also recalls Aristotle's observation in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics* that non-existent things are said to be thought of or wished for, but not to be in motion.

Since *thinking* and *reasoning* also name the movement of reason, is it better to define reason by the word *discourse* than by the words *thinking* and *reasoning?* Although the latter words are more familiar in English than the former, nevertheless *discourse* names the movement of reason from a

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[104]71a 1-2

[105] *Republic*, Book VI, 511D-E

[106]An imperfect echo of this teaching even found its way into *Paradise Lost. See* Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, edited by Harold Jenkins, Longer Note on Act I, Sc. 2, line 150, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1982, pp. 438-439: "The 'discursive reason' which was a property of man was distinguished form the higher 'intuitive reason' of angelic beings. In *Par. Lost* (V.469ff.) Raphael tells Adam that 'Reason is [the Soul's] being, Discursive or intuitive: discourse Is oftest yours, the latter most is ours'."

more known motion of our legs. *Thinking* and *reasoning* seem to start with the less known act of reason. But the words *thinking* and especially *reasoning* seem to name the movement of reason which stops when something has been thought out or reasoned out. And this corresponds to the discourse which is looking, or in which there is a looking, in the definition of Shakespeare. For when we are thinking about something, we do not yet understand it. But when we have thought it out, we understand it. The same is true in reasoning. Reasoning tries to reason out something. And this, by the way, is what philosophy is: a reasoned out understanding. Hence, Aristotle often calls philosophy in its perfection an *episteme* for it is a rest or understanding after a movement of reason thinking out, or reasoning out, something.

We should also recall the proportion of Boethius: reasoning is to understanding, as motion is to rest. We reasoned above that motion is the act most known to us and that things in motion are more known to us than things at rest. Hence, reason is more known to us in its discourse than in its understanding.

Moreover, since rest in its first sense is a lack of motion in that which is able to move and when it is able to move, an act which is like rest in the proportion of Boethius seems at first to be no act at all.

Some editions of *Hamlet* have relevant notes on the *discourse of reason* showing that these words were well known as distinguishing man from the beast.[107]

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[107]See, for example, in The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, edited by Harold Jenkins, Longer Note on Act I, Sc. 2, line 150, Methuen & Co. Ltd., London, 1982, pp. 438-439: "I.ii.150. *wants discourse of reason*] The faculty of reason was traditionally recognized as the crucial difference between man and beast, for the classical statement of which see Cicero, *De Officiis*, I.iv.11. This lends further significance to the Hyperion-satyr comparison above (l. 140). It was through his reason that man could perceive the relation of cause and effect and thus connect past with future, whereas the beast, precisely because it lacks reason, must live largely in the present moment. Hence, the axiom that its mourning would be brief. Cf. IV.iv.33-9; and for Gertrude's failure to be guided by reason, III.iv.88. *Discourse*

Since *discursus* or *running* is not only the name of a sensible motion but of one particular kind, someone might ask that whether there is any suitability in naming the motion of reason from this one in particular.

Since thoughts are more like numbers than continuous quantity,[108] it is appropriate that we name the movement of reason from a step-like motion, such as walking or running, than from one that seems purely continuous, like the falling of a rock. And the proverbial swiftness of thought compared to that of the body makes it suitable to name the movement of reason from running rather than walking. Shakespeare often touches upon the swiftness of thought in this way. When Lancaster upbraids Falstaff for the latter's coming slowly to the scene of battle:

> Now, Falstaff, where have you been all this while?
> When everything is ended, then you come.
> These tardy tricks of yours will, on my life,
> One time or other break some gallows' back.

Falstaff replies:

> .... do you think me a swallow, an arrow, or a bullet? have I, in my poor and old motion, the expedition of thought? I have speeded hither with the very extremest inch of possibility.[109]

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of reason was a regular term, occurring also in *Troil*. II.ii.116, as well as in, e.g., Bright's *Treatise of Melancholy* (dedication), Holland's Plutarch (*Moral Virtue*), Florio's Montaigne, the translation of La Primaudaye's *The French Academy* (pp. 269, 270). For other instances, see Boswell, and OED discourse *sb*. 2b. While sometimes apparently used as a cliché for 'reason', it properly denotes the faculty or process of reasoning from premises to conclusions. *Discourse* alone is also used in the same sense (see IV.iv.36.)."

[108]See Aristotle's argument in the first book *About the soul* (*De Anima*), 407a 8-9seq.

[109]Henry IV, Part Two, Act IV, Sc. 3

And King John says to the Bastard when haste is in need:

> Be Mercury, set feathers to thy heels,
> And fly like thought from them to me again[110]

But even in the fastest thinking there are steps however little we may be aware of them. Thus Holmes says that he quickly came to the conclusion that Watson had come from Afghanistan when they first met, but that his mind did go through a number of steps.[111]

The word *large* is necessary, as we have seen above, to bring out the utmost of reason's ability for discourse. But it also pertains to what is more known to us about reason as distinct from the senses. Art and science, which are in reason, are first distinguished from experience which is in the inward senses and close to them, by the former being a knowledge of the universal and experience, of singulars. Anaxagoras' great fragment on the mind (DK 12) begins by saying that the mind is unlimited (in its object and not in magnitude) and that is rather large. It is important also to note that the word *large* is taken from quantity, which is involved, in all the common sensibles. Heraclitus had also seen this infinity of the mind.

Reason is most known by its looking before and after

We can first note that there is a connection between *motion* being most known and *before and after* being also well known. Thomas teaches us that:

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[110] *King John*, Act IV, Sc. 2

[111] *A Study in Scarlet* , Part I, Chapter II, *The Complete Sherlock Holmes* , Garden City Publishing Co. Inc.,1938, p. 14: "I *knew* you came from Afghanistan. From long habit the train of thoughts ran so swiftly though my mind that I arrived at the conclusion without being conscious of intermediate steps. There were such steps, however. The train of reasoning ran...[and then he gives the steps]"

> It is impossible for something to be now when before it was not unless it is changed or something into it; nor is this able to come about by a miracle, just as neither that it be a mortal rational animal and not be a man; for to have itself otherwise now and before is the same as to be moved or changed.[112]

And in replying to an objection there, Thomas even more strongly identifies *other now than before* with motion:

> ...to this position there follows a more grave absurdity; to wit, that contradictories are true at the same time; because it lays down the definition, to wit, *otherwise now than before*, and it is not able to lay down the defined, to wit, motion...[113]

If otherwise *now than before* is almost a definition of motion, then it seems one cannot know motion without looking before and after.[114] And since motion is the act most known to us, before and after pertain to what is most known to us.

But one should also consider by itself how well it is known that reason looks before and after.

Pope Paul VI began his General Audience on Jan. 10, 1973, with this Exhortation:

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[112] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XI, Quaest. I, Art. 1, Ad Primam Quaestionem: "impossibile est aliquid esse nunc cum prius non fuerit nisi ipso mutato vel aliquo in ipso; nec posset etiam per miraculum fieri, sicut quod nec esset animal rationale mortale, et non esset homo; aliter enim se habere nunc et prius est idem quod moveri vel transmutari."

[113] *Scriptum Super Lib. IV Sententiarum*, Distinctio XI, Quaest. I, Art. 1, Ad Primam Quaestionem, Ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod ad hanc positionem sequitur gravius inconveniens, scilicet quod contradictoria sint simul vera; quia ponit definitionem, scilicet aliter nunc quam prius, et non potest ponere definitum, scilicet motum..."

[114] In the ability to look before and after is included the ability to distinguish since nothing is before or after itself.

Let just one word kindle our thought, the word "after".

This is in harmony with Shakespeare's exhortation to look before and after which is also an urging to use reason. But it is also a sign that looking before and after is well known to characterize reason.

There are many ways of showing that *looking before and after* pertain to what is most known (*after* discourse) about reason. The first or most known sense of *before and after* is that in time. And it is when men look before and after in time that we see the beginning of the use of reason in what they do. So long as they pursue only what is pleasant here and now and avoid what is painful here and now, they do not seem any different from the animals without reason. Reason gives us a sense of time and the continent listen to reason while the incontinent, overcome with passion, seem to pursue merely what is pleasant here and now, which is what the animal does. The incontinent wrongly judge that something is good simply because they remain in the ignorant present, not having a sense of time. Aristotle speaks of this in the third book *About The Soul:*

> Desires come to be contrary to each other. This happens when reason and concupiscence are contrary. This comes about in those having the sense of time: for the mind urges us to hold back on account of the future while concupiscence on account of the present - for what is pleasant now seems to be simply pleasant and simply good on account of not seeing the future.[115]

Thomas Aquinas comments on this passage:

> in man there are contrary desires, one of which the continent follow and others resist. He says therefore that desires are able to become contrary to each other and this happens when reason is contrary to concupiscence. And this "comes about", that is, it happens "in those having the sense of time"; that is, those who do not only know what is in the present, but who

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[115]Chapter 10, 433b 5-10

> consider the past and the future - because the understanding sometimes commands one to draw back from something concupiscible on account of the consideration of the future, as when to one with a fever, it seems from the judgment of the understanding, that he ought to abstain from wine lest the fever become warm.[116]

Men, and not beasts, have these contrary desires because men have the sense of time by their reason. Something may seem good to us here and now, as to the beast, if we do not have the sense of time, if we do not look before and after in the first sense of these words. Man's actions first reveal the work of reason in him when he shows that he has the sense of time and avoids something pleasant here and now, or undergoes something painful here and now, because of his ability to consider the past and the future.[117] Reason gives man "a sense of time". This is why Shakespeare's metonym[118] for man's life in the *Exhortation to Use Reason* is appropriate. Shakespeare calls the end or goal of man's life the "market of his time". Man lives in time in a way that the beasts do not. When a man becomes incontinent, he comes to resemble a boy who is apt to follow his present pleasure rather than looking before and after on the basis of experience. Caesar thus compares Antony in his infatuation with Cleopatra to a boy:

> .....But to confound such time
> That drums him from his sport, and speaks us loud
> As his own state and ours, 'tis to be chid
> As we rate boys who, being mature in knowledge,
> Pawn their experience to their present pleasure

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[116] *In III De Anima*, Lectio 15, n. 829

[117] Since our knowledge begins with ours senses, it is natural for man to pursue first what is agreeable to his senses and avoid what is disagreeable to them. And many men, and even thinkers such as Mill, still keep pleasure and pain as their basic criterion of good and bad. But where we first begin to see the use of reason in them is not in seeing a higher criterion of good and bad, but in their trying to maximize their pleasures and minimize their pains by looking before and after.

[118] When the name of the measure is given to the measured, we have metonymy.

And so rebel to judgment.[119]

Dr. Samuel Johnson made this statement on looking before and after in time and our being rational creatures:

> Whatever withdraws us from the power of the senses, whatever makes the past, the distant, or the future predominate over the present, advances us in the dignity of thinking beings.[120]

For our present purpose, we should look at what the great poets, or makers of fiction, have said about reason more than the words of philosophers and scientists. For the latter go a long way into reason and its use while the poets, or makers of fiction, speak of what is more known to all men. And our present purpose is not to go into reason and its use in detail, but to make clear the beginning which is most known to us. The poets and makers of fiction speak of what is more known to all men; for they represent men in all their more manifest differences. What is most known to us, or most obvious, thus stands out in the representation of men and their actions. But among these differences is that some men excel in the use of reason while others because of youth and inexperience or passion or defective character are unable or fail to use reason.

The first poet to be called in as a witness is, of course, Homer whom the Greeks, the fathers of our fiction, regarded as their greatest poet and whom Aristotle calls *The Poet*.

Rolfe, in his edition of *Hamlet*, has preserved for us a remark of Theobald of great philosophic interest:

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[119]Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act I, Sc. 4

[120]Quoted in *Gray Days and Gold* by William Winter, Macmillan, N.Y. 1893, p. 13

> Theobald remarks that *looking before and after* is "an expression purely Homeric" and refers to *Iliad*, III, 109 and XVIII, 250.[121]

Although Homer's expression or phrase is not exactly the same as Shakespeare's,[122] it has for a long time impressed me as being like enough to allow us to speak of a harmony between the two greatest poets on what is most known to us about reason. Theobald's remark has strengthened my conviction. At the crucial moments when men fail to use their reason, Homer always speak of a failure or inability to look before and behind them. Agamemnon is guilty of this when he offends Achilles and drives him from active fighting to the detriment of the Achaean army. Likewise, when Hector will not listen to Poulydamas about getting back into the city before Achilles returns to action, Homer speaks of Poulydamas as alone looking before and behind himself while Zeus had taken away from Hector and the rest their mind or reason or wits. This harmony of the two greatest poets moves us to accept *looking before and after* as pertaining to what is most known, or what most stands out, about reason.

Sherlock Holmes is very much represented as using his reason and, as Watson sometimes thinks, not listening to his emotions enough.

To what extent does Sherlock Holmes see the last part of Hamlet's definition (looking before and after) as the function of reason? Consider Holmes' words on the ideal reasoner in the story of *The Five Orange Pips:*

> Sherlock Holmes closed his eyes and placed his elbows upon the arms of his chair, with his finger-tips together. "The ideal reasoner," he remarked, "would, when he had once been shown a single fact in all its bearings, deduce from it not only all the chain of events which led up to it but also all the results that would follow from it. As Cuvier could correctly describe a

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[121]Harper and Brothers, 1894, p. 246

[122]Homer speaks more of looking before and behind oneself while Shakespeare, although sometimes using a similar phrase, defines reason by *looking before and after*. The latter phrase is more able to be clearly extended to the whole use of reason as can be seen from the senses of *before* in the *Categories*, Ch. 12.

> whole animal by the contemplation of a single bone, so the observer who has thoroughly understood one link in a series of incidents should be able to accurately state all the other ones, both before and after. We have not yet grasped the results which the reason alone can attain to. Problems may be solved in the study which have baffled all those who have sought a solution by the aid of their senses."[123]

The ideal reasoner has, of course, the perfection of the reasoner and seeing the before and after is the perfection of the ability to look before and after. If then the perfect reasoner succeeds in seeing the before and after, reason is indeed characterized by looking before and after. And notice how Holmes sees this as enabling one to solve something that is beyond the senses.

In a burst of enthusiasm, Holmes says to Inspector MacDonald in *The Valley of Fear:*

> ...the quick inference, the subtle trap, the clever forecast of coming events, the triumphant vindication of bold theories - are these not the pride and justification of our life's work?[124]

In this passage, Holmes touches first upon the discourse of reason ("the quick inference") and then upon looking before and after ("the clever forecast of coming events, the triumphant vindication of bold theories").

In the following passage from "The Man with the Twisted Lip", there is again reference to discourse and looking before and after in the same order:

> Holmes drove in silence, with his head sunk upon his breast, and the air of a man who is lost in thought, while I sat beside

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[123]From *The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes* in *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, Garden City Publishing Co. Inc., 1938, p. 253

[124]Chapter VII - The Solution, *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, Garden City Publishing Co. Inc., 1938, p. 951

> him, curious to learn what this new quest might be which seemed to tax his powers so sorely, and yet afraid to break in upon the current of his thoughts. We had driven several miles, and were beginning to get to the fringe of the belt of suburban villas, when he shook himself, shrugged his shoulders, and lit up his pipe with the air of a man who has satisfied himself that he is acting for the best..."I shall just have time to tell you the facts of the case before we get to Lee. It seems absurdly simple, and yet, somehow, I can get nothing to go upon. There's plenty of thread, no doubt, but I can't get the end of it into my hand. Now, I'll state the case clearly and concisely to you, Watson, and maybe you can see a spark where all is dark to me."[125]

Watson is afraid to break in upon the *current* of Holmes' thoughts. *Current*, of course, has the same root as *discourse*. But what is Holmes trying to do in this discourse or current of thoughts? He is trying to find the *end* of a thread which will be the beginning of an understanding of the case. Holmes is clearly looking before and after in the current of his thoughts. When our reason is puzzled in daily life as to what we should do, we often remark that we don't know where to begin.

There is another phrase from daily speech often used in Sherlock Holmes stories for reason unable to understand something. Holmes says to Inspector Stanley Hopkins:

> Which means, I suppose, that you were not quite clear about your case?

And Hopkins replies:

> It means that I can make neither head nor tail of it. So far as I can see, it is just as tangled a business as ever I handled, and

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[125] *The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes* in *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, Garden City Publishing Co. Inc., 1938, pp. 262-263

> yet at first it seemed so simple that one couldn't go wrong. There's no motive, Mr. Holmes.[126]

And in discussing another case, Watson is in the same position as Hopkins, but Holmes as usual is ahead in the use of reason. Holmes begins the conversation:

> Our little problem draws to a close...No doubt you have outlined the solution in your own mind."

And Watson replies:

> I can make neither head nor tail of it.

And to this, Homes replies:

> The head is surely clear enough and the tail we should see tomorrow. Did you notice nothing curious about the advertisement?[127]

Head and *tail* are metaphors for *beginning* and *end*. Beginning and end are, of course, defined by before and after. Clearly then, anyone trying to use his reason, or to make head or tail out of something, is looking before and after. If reason cannot make head or tail out of something, it cannot understand it.

But we can also see that reason is well known to look before and after by those who are unable or fail to use their reason. This may be because of youth and inexperience or passion (such as love) or defect of character (as in the thoughtless).

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[126]"The Adventure of the Golden Pince-Nez" in *The Return of Sherlock Holmes* in *The Complete Sherlock Holmes,* Garden City Publishing Co. Inc., 1938, p. 711

[127]"The Adventure of the Three Garridebs" in *The Case Book of Sherlock Holmes* in *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, Garden City Publishing Co. Inc., 1938, p. 1238

Shakespeare has Bottom remark that reason and love keep little company nowadays and that it is a pity that no one will make them more acquainted:

> reason and love keep little company together now-a-days; the more the pity that some honest neighbors will not make them friends[128]

The reasons for this are touched upon in the second stanza of an exquisite song in *Twelfth Night:*

> What is love? 'Tis not hereafter;
> Present mirth hath present laughter;
> What's to come is still unsure:
> In delay there lies no plenty;
> Then come kiss me, sweet and twenty!
> Youth's a stuff will not endure.

Because they are in love and because they are young, they do not use their reason. For the lover is absorbed in the delight of the present and hence does not look before and after. And youth lacks experience and hence is not so able to look before and after. The first four lines indicate why the lover remains in the present and does not look before and after and the sixth line touches upon the second reason. And there is a fitting together of love and youth. In this way, the young lover resembles the incontinent who pursue what is pleasant here and now against what is known to be reasonable by looking before and after. This is why Antony in his infatuation[129] for Cleopatra was compared to "boys who, being mature in knowledge, Pawn their experience to their present pleasure And so rebel to judgment." Because they are absorbed in the present pleasure, they exchange their experience (which would enable them to look before and after) for that pleasure and hence rebel to the judgment of reason.

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[128]Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 1

[129]*Infatuation,* like *fond,* originally means *foolish* and therefore opposed to wise and reason.

The young do not use their reason or are not able to look before and after. Youth hardly knows there is a tomorrow. In *The Winter's Tale*, Polixenes describes his youth with Leontes:

> We were, fair queen,
> Two lads that thought no more behind
> But such a day to-morrow as to-day,
> And to be boy eternal.[130]

In his greatest novel, Dickens represents the very young David and Emily as living in the now:

> We used to walk about that dim old flat at Yarmouth in a loving manner, hours and hours. The days sported by us, as if Time had not grown up himself yet, but were a child too, and always at play. I told Em'ly I adored her, and that unless she confessed she adored me I should be reduced to the necessity of killing myself with a sword. She said she did, and I have no doubt she did. As to any sense of inequality, or youthfulness, or other difficulty in our way, little Em'ly and I had no such trouble, because we had no future. We made no more provision for growing older, than we did for growing younger.[131]

At the end of the hilarious, mad scene, where David and Dora become engaged, Dickens speaks as if they didn't look before and after and remained in the *ignorant present* when they became secretly engaged:

> Well, well! Dora and I were sitting on the sofa by-and-by, quiet enough, and Jip was lying in her lap, winking peacefully at me. It was off my mind. I was in a state of perfect rapture. Dora and I were engaged. I suppose we had some notion that this was to end in marriage. We must have had some, because Dora stipulated that we were never to be married without her papa's consent. But, in our youthful ecstasy, I don't think that

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[130]Shakespeare, *The Winter's Tale,* Act I, Sc. 2

[131]*David Copperfield*, Chapter III, Random House, Mod. Lib. Ed., 1950, pp. 39-40

> we really looked before or behind us, or had any aspiration beyond the ignorant present.[132]

In their "youthful ecstasy" (*ecstasy* can mean *madness* and is an effect of love), they remained in the ignorant present, unable or failing to look before and after. The phrase "ignorant present" may have been suggested to Dickens from *Macbeth* where Lady Macbeth learns of the predictions of the witches:

> Great Glamis! worthy Cawdor!
> Greater than both by the all-hail hereafter!
> Thy letters have transported me beyond
> This ignorant present, and I feel now
> The future in the instants.[133]

Since foresight or prudence requires experience and this comes with age, Homer rightly speaks of the older as more looking before and behind than the young. In the *Iliad*, we find the distinction between the young and the old:

> Always it is, that the hearts in the younger men are frivolous,
> but when an elder man is among them, he looks behind him
> and in front,
> so that all comes out far better for both sides.[134]

Washington Irving touches upon this difference between the young and the older in his account of *A Tour on the Prairies:*

> There was an abundant supply of meat in the camp; for besides other game, three elk had been killed. The wary and

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[132]*David Copperfield*, Chapter XXXIII, Random House, Mod. Lib. Ed., 1950, p. 513

[133]Shakespeare *Macbeth,* Act I, Sc. 3. Notice t he word *hereafter* in the second line while the question "What is love?" was answered in the song from Twelfth night by the words "'Tis not hereafter."

[134]*Iliad*, Book III, Lattimore Translation, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962, p. 103

> veteran woodmen were all busy jerking meat, against a time of scarcity; the less experienced reveled in present abundance, leaving the morrow to provide for itself.[135]

The experienced men foresee that a time of abundance on the prairie is likely to be followed by a time of scarcity, but the young and inexperienced rest in the ignorant present and its abundance. Because of experience, the older can recall the past and foresee the future which the young are not able to do. Later in his account, Irving notes what happened to the "young, heedless, and inexperienced":

> Most of the rangers were young, heedless, and inexperienced, and could not be prevailed upon, while provisions abounded, to provide for the future, by jerking meat, or carrying away any on their horses. On leaving an encampment, they would leave quantities of meat lying about, trusting to Providence and their rifles for a future supply. The consequence was, that any temporary scarcity of game, or ill luck in hunting, produced almost a famine in the camp. In the present instance, they had left loads of buffalo meat at the camp on the great prairie; and, having ever since been on a forced march, leaving no time for hunting, they were now destitute of supplies, and pinched with hunger. Some had not eaten anything since the morning of the preceding day. Nothing would have persuaded them, when reveling in the abundance of the buffalo encampment, that they would so soon be in such famishing plight..[136]

Lacking the large discourse which is from experience, they were not apt to look before and after. Something of the same improvidence could be seen in their handling of the horses.[137]

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[135] *A Tour on the Prairies*, Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1962, pp. 98-99

[136] *A Tour on the Prairies*, Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1962, pp. 203-204

[137] *A Tour on the Prairies* , Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1962, p. 194: "Our men, too, had acted with little forethought; galloping off whenever they had a chance, after the game that we encountered on the march. In this way they had strained and wearied their horses, instead of husbanding their strength and spirits. On a tour of the kind, horses should as seldom

Since memory or experience of the past is an integral part of prudence or foresight (*Prudentia* in Latin is a contraction of *providentia*.), the young are not so able to have this virtue as the older. Practical reason is more known to us than looking reason. And practical reason is perfected by two virtues: prudence and art (as we learn in the sixth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*). Hence, this virtue is called in English *foresight*. As its name indicates, foresight is named from seeing before. Thus this virtue is named from before and after. Fabian alludes to the fact that prudence looks before and behind when he comments on the deception of Malvolio:

> Ay, an you had any eye behind you, you might see more detraction at your heels than fortunes before you.[138]

Kittredge, in his note on this line, points out that there is an allusion here to the symbolic figure of Prudence which has three eyes - one in the back of the head.[139] This way of speaking is like that of Homer above.[140]

But of course it is not only boys who seem to live in the present moment. The character of some men is such as not to live with a sense of time. Comedy represents men inferior to us and Shakespeare's greatest comic character, Falstaff, is represented as pursuing the goods of the beast as his chief good. Hence, it is very significant that Shakespeare introduces his most famous comic character for the first time by a joke on his having no concern with time in his intemperance. The conversation in

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as possible be put off of a quiet walk; and the average day's journey should not exceed ten miles."

[138]Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act II, Sc. 5

[139]*Twelfth Night*, edited by George Lyman Kittredge, Ginn and Company, Boston, 1941, p. 130: "149. *any eye behind you* Fabian alludes (with a phantom pun) to the symbolic figure of *Prudence*, which has three eyes - one in the back of the head. Cf. Chaucer, *Troilus*, V, lines 744-749."

[140]Art also is characterized by looking before and after. For art, speaking generally, is nothing other than an *ordering* by reason of how something can be made through definite steps. Thus both art and foresight, the virtues of practical reason, clearly involve looking before and after. And practical reasonis more known to us than theoretical or looking reason.

which Falstaff is first introduced to the world begins with a question of Falstaff:

> Now, Hal, what time of day is it, lad?

and Prince Hal replies:

> Thou art so fat-witted, with drinking of old sack and unbuttoning thee after supper and sleeping upon benches after noon, that thou hast forgotten to demand that truly which thou wouldst truly know. What a devil hast thou to do with the time of the day? Unless hours were cups of sack, and minutes capons, and clocks the tongues of bawds, and dials the signs of leaping-houses, and the blessed sun himself a fair hot wench in flame-coloured taffeta, I see no reason why thou shouldst be so superfluous to demand the time of the day.[141]

The prisoner Barnardine does not use his reason, even when under the sentence of death, as seen in this description of him by the Provost:

> A man that apprehends death no more dreadfully but as a drunken sleep: careless, reckless, and fearless of what's past, present, or to come; insensible of mortality, and desperately mortal.[142]

Jane Austen says of Crawford in *Mansfield Park* that "thoughtless and selfish from prosperity and bad example, he would not look beyond the present moment".[143] It is significant that she couples *thoughtless* with not looking before and after.

Thomas Hardy in like manner speaks of Lucetta's "thoughtless want of foresight":

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[141] *King Henry IV, Part One*, Act I, Sc. 2

[142] Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, Act IV, Sc. 2

[143] Chapter XII, J.M. Dent & Sons, London, 1963, pp 87-88

> Moreover, that thoughtless want of foresight which had led to all her trouble remained with poor Lucetta still.[144]

Sergeant Troy is also represented by Hardy as one whose reason and desires had parted company and who seemed to live almost only in and for the present:

> Sergeant Troy ...was a man to whom memories were an encumbrance, and anticipations a superfluity. Simply feeling, considering, and caring for what was before his eyes, he was vulnerable only in the present. His outlook upon time was as a transient flash of the eye now and then: that projection of consciousness into days gone by and to come, which makes the past a synonym for the pathetic and the future a word for circumspection, was foreign to Troy. With him the past was yesterday; the future, to-morrow; never the day after... Sergeant Troy, being entirely innocent of the practice of expectation, was never disappointed. To set against this negative gain there may be some positive losses from a certain narrowing of the higher tastes and sensations which it entailed... His reason and his propensities had seldom any reciprocating influence, having separated by mutual consent long ago.[145]

Anthony Trollope compares Bertie to a beast in his lack of foresight:

> As to Bertie, one would have imagined from the sound of his voice and the gleam of his eye that he had not a sorrow nor a care in the world. Nor had he. He was incapable of anticipating to-morrow's griefs. The prospect of future want no more disturbed his appetite than does that of the butcher's knife disturb the appetite of the sheep.[146]

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[144] *The Mayor of Casterbridge* , Macmillan & Company, 1966, Greenwood Ed., Chapter XXXV, p. 289

[145] *Far From The Madding Crowd,* Chapter XXV, “The New Acquaintance Described”, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1968, pp. 156-157

[146] *Barchester Towers*, Mod. Lib. Ed., p. 383

We have looked at the poets and makers of fiction for witnesses to what is more known to us about reason. But the scientists would also give witness to looking before and after as giving rise to science. The scientist is always looking for *laws* and law and order are almost synonymous. When the scientist stands back, he sees this clearly. Sir Arthur Eddington, for example, writes thus:

> Knowledge of the relatedness of sensory perceptions e.g., the sound of thunder following the flash of lightning, is the beginning of science.[147]

In his more sober moments, Darwin referred to "the extreme difficulty or rather impossibility of conceiving this immense and wonderful universe, including man with his capacity for looking far backwards and far into futurity, as the result of blind chance or necessity."[148]

The words we use to signify what is opposed to reason are also very revealing. We might begin with a letter of George Washington:

> Virginia, in the very last session of her legislature, was about to have passed some of the most extravagant and preposterous edicts on the subject of trade, that ever stained the leaves of a legislative code.[149]

What is opposed to reason is here called *extravagant* and *preposterous*. The first is opposed to the first part of the definition of reason and the second is opposed to the second part of the definition. When something wanders from the true or straight course of reason, it is

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[147] *The Philosophy of Physical Science*, p.114

[148] Quoted in Ernst Mayr's *Towards a New Philosophy of Biology* , Harvard University Press, 1988, p.241:

[149] Letter to the Marquis de Lafayette, Mount Vernon, 28 April, 1788

extravagant. And when it puts the cart before the horse, it is *preposterous*.[150]

Our two common words for a defect in our thinking, *error* and *mistake*, correspond somewhat in their etymology to these two and to discourse and looking before and after. *Error* comes from the Latin word for wandering. And wandering is a disordered movement and hence indicates a defect in the discourse of reason. *Mistake* comes, according to Partridge,[151] from taking the *minus* or lesser or bad (not from missing in taking) and thus is named from a defect of looking before and after (in the fourth sense distinguished in the *Categories*).

Daniel Defoe, in *The Adventures of Captain John Gow*, narrating the foolish actions of some pirates, speaks of them as "void of any forecast or reasonable actings" and speaks also of their "preposterous way of proceeding"[152] Here, there are two references to the lack of looking before and after as indicative of their failure to use or follow reason.

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[150]There are also words taken from the beginning and last end of reason's discourse which are used to name what is opposed to the judgment of reason. Since judgment is the separation of the true from the false by some beginning in our knowledge and the first beginning of our knowledge is in the senses, reason in its discourse returns to the senses to judge. Hence we also call what is opposed to reason by such names as *nonsense* and *absurd.*

[151]Eric Partridge, *Origins*, A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1996, p. 829

[152]*The Works of Daniel Defoe* , Vol. 16, Fred DeFau & Company, N.Y., 1903, Univ. Press Cambridge Mass, p. 334: "..for the going away with the long-boat, and ten men in her, confounded all their measures, and made them jealous and afraid of one another, and made them act afterwards as if they were under a general infatuation or possession, always irresolute and unsettled, void of any forecast or reasonable actings; but having the plunder of Mr. Fea's house in their view, when they should chiefly have regarded their own safety and making their escape, they pushed at the least significant though most difficult part, and which was their ruin in the undertaking, when they should at first have secured their lives, which, at least to them, was the thing of most value, though the easiest at that time to secure. By this preposterous

Something obviously or very much against reason is said to be *preposterous*. As the etymology of the names indicates, this is putting the before, after and the after, before. As the Fool says to Lear:

> May not an ass know when the cart draws the horse?[153]

Since disorder is a main source of the laughable (as when someone paints himself into a corner), the preposterous is an object that pleases Puck. In *A Midsummer Night's Dream,* Act III, Sc. 2 Puck is amused with the foolish, laughable lovers:

> Shall we their fond pageant see?
> Lord, what fools these mortals be...
> Then will two at once woo one;
> That must needs be sport alone;
> And those things do best please me
> That befall preposterously.

Fond originally meant *foolish*. To say that a man was *fond* of a girl meant that he was acting foolishly about her. If the foolish is preposterous, then the wise is ordered. Hence, the sixth attribute of the wise man is that he orders: *sapientis est ordinare*. For wisdom is the greatest perfection of reason which looks before and after.

Iago points out in his conversation with Roderigo (who wants to drown himself over his loss of Desdemona to Othello) that, without reason, our emotions would lead us to what he calls *preposterous* results:

> If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us to most preposterous conclusions.[154]

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way of proceeding they drew themselves into the labyrinth and were destroyed, without any possibility of recovery"

[153]Shakespeare, *King Lear*, Act I, Sc. 4

[154]Shakespeare, *Othello*, Act I, Sc 3

The fourth sense of *before* in Chapter Twelve of the *Categories* is *better*. But the Poet speaks in this quatrain that passion could not be so strong as to lead him to a "most preposterous conclusion" or action:

> Never believe, though in my nature reign'd
> All frailties that besiege all kinds of blood,
> That it could so preposterously be stain'd
> To leave for nothing all thy sum of good.[155]

Why not define reason as the ability to count and calculate

Some trace the etymology of *reason* to the Latin for counting and then thinking. Partridge gives the following origin of the word reason:

> reason....rests upon L. *ratus,* pp (*s rat-)* of *reri*, to count, calculate, reckon, hence to think[156]

Would not then the most known definition of reason be the ability to count and calculate? But this is perhaps too narrow an account of reason's ability. One would define reason too narrowly if one defined it as the ability to count or calculate. Counting and calculating are forms of discourse in which one comes to know by a movement and in the case of calculating, at least, one thing from other things. But not every discourse of reason is counting or calculating. But at any rate, both counting and thinking name an act of reason which is like a motion. And *discourse* names this act by carrying over the name of a sensible motion. And counting is involved in the first sense of *looking before* and *after* (in time) for time is the number of the before and after in motion.

If the etymology of the word *reason* is a clue to what is more known about reason, it would seem that reason is first known as the ability to

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[155]Shakespeare, Sonnet 109, lines 9-12

[156]Eric Partridge, *Origins*, A Short Etymological Dictionary of Modern English, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1996, p. 553

count and then to calculate. Since definitions are like numbers, as Plato pointed out, then defining is like counting. and to syllogize, the most perfect kind of reasoning with statements, comes from the Greek word for to calculate.

However, to define reason as the ability to count or even as the ability to count and calculate might seem too particular and not to bring out the full ability of reason. If *discourse* can cover all movements of reason (counting and calculating as well as reasoning) it might be better as a definition (and more known to us insofar as motion is most known to us).

Moreover, some recognition of the movement of counting as most known among the movements of reason might be seen in the first two meanings of *before*. Time is the number of the before and after in motion. And Aristotle exemplifies the second meaning of *before* by using the example of one being before two.

CONCLUSION

Reason is, of course, the ability for large discourse. And it would be preposterous to deny that reason looks before and after.

Further, it would be difficult to deny that *the ability for large discourse, looking before and after* is speech convertible with reason and making known, to some extent at least, what it is.

And if anyone should try to show that some other definition of reason is the *first* one, they would be forced to make a large discourse and look before and after. For a discourse about reason must be *large* in several of the senses distinguished before. And anyone who looks for the *first* definition of reason must look before and after. For it is impossible to define without looking before and after. And *first* is also defined by before and after. So if there is a definition *before* that of Shakespeare, one would have to look before Shakespeare's definition to find it. And it would take a large discourse to show that such a definition is the first one. If someone asserts that Shakespeare has not made the *first* definition of reason, they must show that some other definition of reason comes *before* this one.

Thus, anyone who uses reason to find the first definition of reason, or to find one before Shakespeare's definition, is forced to use reason as indicated in that definition. This is perhaps a sign that Shakespeare has indeed given us the first definition of reason.

Shakespeare's definition is, *of course*, the first definition of reason. To put any other definition before it would be *preposterous*.

TOWARD THE THIRD PART OF THIS PAPER

We said in the beginning that a first definition of reason should not only tell us what reason is and from what is most known to us about reason, but that it should also be a beginning and seed of the whole use and growth of reason.

Since reason is defined by its act and its act is its use, clearly the exhortation to use reason is chiefly urging us to look before and after. If one does not look before and after, one is hardly using one's reason. Hence in what follows, we need to show how looking before and after is a beginning and seed of the whole use and growth of reason.

THE PHILOSOPHER MUST LOOK BEFORE AND AFTER

The importance and necessity of looking before and after for the philosopher must be considered in particular before it can be understood.[157] There are many ways in which one could divide to begin a particular consideration. One could, for example, consider in particular according to each of the five chief senses of *before*. One could also divide

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[157]The consideration of a universal truth in less universal statements is a part of the *manuductio* necessary in teaching. See *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 117, Art. 1, corpus. It was Msgr. Maurice Dionne who most illuminated the philosophical world on the necessity of *manuductio* and, in particular, on the *manuductio* necessary for the most difficult sciences of logic and metaphysics. Both as students and teachers, we are forever indebted to this Master.

by *that in which* a before and after must be considered by the philosopher. There is a before and after *in things* which we want to know, and there is a before and after *in our knowledge* of them, and there is a before and after *in our desire* for that knowledge. We should not confuse these before and afters and it is important to see each of them. Seeing the before and after *in the things* we want to know is a part of knowing them and perhaps the crowning or chief part of knowing them. Seeing the before and after *in our knowledge* is a help to acquiring that knowledge and indeed is necessary to acquire that knowledge. Seeing the before and after which should be *in our desire* to know can direct us in acquiring the dispositions of will and feeling necessary for coming to know.

But to us, it seems especially appropriate to consider in particular the necessity for the philosopher of looking before and after by the distinction of the beginning, middle and end of philosophy.

Since nothing is more necessary in philosophy than to begin well (as Plato and Aristotle and Thomas have taught us), we should first consider the necessity of looking before and after to begin well. Second, since all's well that ends well, we must consider the necessity of the philosopher looking before and after to reach his end which is to know the first cause and first being which is God. And third, we can consider in the middle the need to look before and after.

LOOK BEFORE AND AFTER TO BEGIN WELL

Nothing is more necessary in philosophy than to begin well. The reason why the beginning is so important in philosophy is that everything else depends upon it. But no one can begin well without looking before and after. The reasons for this can brought out step by step.

First, no one can know what a beginning is without looking before and after. *First* is in the common account of beginning which Aristotle brings out after distinguishing in order the central senses of *beginning* in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*.[158] And since *first* is defined by before

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[158]*Metaphysics*, Book Five, 1013a 17-19

and after, we cannot know what a beginning is without looking before and after. And sometimes we define *beginning* immediately by before and after as Aristotle does in the *Poetics*.[159] Since a beginning is before everything else (in that of which it is a beginning) and is not after anything else (in that of which it is a beginning), clearly no one knows what a beginning is without looking before and after.

Second, no one can find a beginning without looking before and after. For to find a beginning, one must look for what comes before all the rest and not after anything. Every beginning is found by looking before and after. For a beginning is before everything of which it is the beginning.

Since dialectic has a road to the beginnings of all reasoned-out knowledge,[160] it is interesting to note that a concern with before and after (and opposites) is seen to be characteristic of the dialectician. The eighth question raised in the third book of the *Metaphysics* witnesses to this:

> And in addition to these, about the same and other and like and unlike and contrariety, and about the before and after and all other such things about which the dialecticians try to consider, making their investigation from probable statements only, to whom does it belong to consider all these? [161]

Since it by looking before and after that every beginning is seen to be a beginning, there is an obvious connection between the dialectician's interest in before and after and his having a road to the beginnings of all reasoned out knowledge.

Third, since nothing is a beginning of itself, but always of something other that comes *after* it, reason cannot see a beginning *as a beginning* or recognize it *as a beginning* without looking before and after. Even if the

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[159]*Poetics*, 1450b 27-28

[160]Aristotle, *Topics*, 101b 3-4

[161]*Metaphysics*, 995b 20-25

beginning had been found, it could not be known to be the beginning without looking before and after.

Further, since a beginning in general is what is *first* either in being or becoming or knowing (see V *Metaphysics*), and *first* is defined by before and after (the first is before all the rest and after nothing, either simply or in some genus), no one can know that something is a beginning without looking before and after.

And every beginning is known to be a beginning or as a beginning by looking before and after. For we know a beginning as a beginning by seeing that something comes after it or follows upon it.

Fourth, one cannot know the importance of a beginning without looking before and after. For the power of a beginning is not seen in its size, but by what comes *after* it or follows upon it. And the power of every beginning is known or measured by looking before and after. For the power of a beginning is not judged by its size, but by that of which it is the beginning, and all of this comes after it.

Fifth, it is only by looking before and after that one can see the need to consider carefully each beginning. When someone has seen how many other things become clear *after* a beginning has been well considered that were not clear *before*, he sees the importance or need to consider each beginning very carefully.

Sixth, it is only by looking before and after that one can see the danger of even a little mistake in the beginning. A little mistake in the beginning is multiplied in what comes after. And since even a small mistake in the beginning is a great one in the end (as those who take the wrong turn at a fork in the road get further and further from where they should be), only the man who looks before and after can properly appreciate the importance of avoiding even the smallest mistake in the beginning.

Seventh, it is only by looking before and after that reason can see the order of beginnings. For knowing the order of beginnings is to see how one is before or after another. It is necessary to see the order of beginnings since the beginning which comes after depends upon the beginning which comes before.

Since the whole growth of philosophy depends upon its beginnings, as Plato and Aristotle so well understood, it is not hard to see in general the immense importance of looking before and after for the whole growth of reason.

However, we must consider this more in particular. There are three genera, or three kinds, of beginning in philosophy.

The first genus of beginnings in philosophy is in desire; that is, in the will (and to a lesser extent in the emotions.) In this genus is included, for example, the *wonder* which is said to be the beginning of philosophy and the *love of wisdom* whence the philosopher is named.

The second genus of beginnings in philosophy is a knowledge of the road to follow in philosophy. Since philosophy is knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road, knowledge of that road is a beginning of philosophy. In this genus, for example, is found *logic* which is a knowledge of the common road of philosophy. Since philosophy is in the end a reasoned out knowledge of things, logic is in part about the common road of reasoned out knowledge. But since the philosopher makes reasonable guesses before he reaches reasoned out knowledge, logic is also in part about the road to follow in making reasonable guesses.

But there is a third genus of beginnings in philosophy which is a knowledge of the beginnings about things. Since philosophy is a reasoned out knowledge *of things*, the philosopher must reason from beginnings about things. Otherwise, his conclusions would not be about things. Some of these beginnings are common to all things, such as the axioms, and others are private to one reasoned out knowledge. Thus, for example, the axiom about contradiction, *the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same way*, is a beginning about all things. Likewise, the axiom that *a whole is larger than one of its parts* is a beginning about things studied in every reasoned out knowledge. But the definition of right angle and the statement that *all right angles are equal* are beginnings private to one reasoned out knowledge, geometry.

Looking before and after has a special importance in recognizing the *first* beginnings in each genus and not only because *first* is defined by before and after. One of the greatest results of looking before and after is the recognition that the *nature* of a thing (in the sense of what it is) is

what is *first* in that thing.[162] It is obviously impossible for a thing to be something else *before* it is what it is. How could a thing be anything else *before* it is what it is? It could not even *be* before it is what it is. And having seen by looking before and after that the nature of a thing is what is first in it, it is not hard to see that the *natural* beginnings of philosophy or reasoned out knowledge must be the *first* beginnings of such knowledge. Hence, the first beginning of philosophy in the will is wonder, which is natural. For all men *by nature* desire to know. And among statements about things, those *naturally* known by all men, the *axioms* (not in the modern sense of the word, but in that of Euclid and Aristotle), are *first* beginnings about things. And before the roads made by reason and studied in logic, there must be also a natural road in our knowledge. This natural road will be the first road to be followed in philosophy. Since man is by nature an animal with reason, the natural road in our knowledge must be the road from the senses into reason. For animal is defined by having senses. But man has reason in addition. And what is generic comes before (in time and generation) what is specific.

But does looking before and after help us to know and acquire the beginnings in each of these genera? This question should be considered in particular in each of the three genera of the beginnings of philosophy.

Looking before and after and the beginnings of philosophy in our will

The first genus of the beginnings of philosophy is in our will and emotions. Are these beginnings before or after *looking before and after*? We had best reply to this question by considering one by one the main beginnings of philosophy in our will.

Plato in the *Theaetetus* and Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* both noted that men begin to philosophize out of wonder. Does wonder arise from looking before and after or is it a desire to look before and after? There is

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[162]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* , Prima Pars, Q. 82, Art. 1, c: "Oportet enim quod illud quod naturaliter alicui convenit et immobiliter, sit fundamentum et principium omnium aliorum: quia natura rei est primum in unoquoque, et omnis motus procedit ab aliquo immobili."

perhaps something of both. The wonder of the philosopher is most of all a desire to know the unknown cause of a known effect, especially when this effect is contrary to what we would expect.[163] Unless one had looked before and after in the past, one would not be struck by an effect being contrary to what is expected. And the desire to know why, to know the cause of this strange effect, is of course a desire to look before in the "fifth" and crowning sense of the *Categories*. Thus wonder, the beginning of philosophy, presupposes that one has looked before and after and is itself a desire to look before. Perhaps it is correct to say that wonder is more *before* looking before and after than *after* it. However, the fact that wonder, the beginning of philosophy,[164] is most of all a desire to look before in the fifth and crowning sense of Chapter 12 of the *Categories* is a sign that looking before and after is the activity of a philosopher. Nevertheless, this desire to know the cause is especially strong when the effect is contrary to what we expect; and this presupposes looking before and after.

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[163]Thomas Aquinas, *In II Sent.,* Dist. XVIII, Q. I, Art. III, Sol. and Ad 1: "sicut ex verbis Philosophi habetur in principio *Metaphysic.* in proem., admiratio ex duobus causatur, scilicet ex hoc quod alicujus effectus causa occulta est, et ex eo quod aliquid in re videtur per quod aliter esse deberet; unde in hoc quod est diametrum quadrati non posse commensurari lateri, admiratio causatur ex hoc quod hujus causa ignoratur, et ex hoc quod ex parvitate linearum videtur quod una lateri commensurari possit." Also, *De Potentia*, Q. 6, Art. 2, Corpus: "Ad admirationem autem duo concurrunt, ut potest accipi ex verbis Philosophi in principio *Metaphysicorum*: quorum unum est, quod causa illius quod admiramur, sit occulta; secundum est quod in eo quod miramur, appareat aliquid per quod videatur contrarium eius debere esse quod miramur, sicut aliquis posset mirari si videret ferrum ascendere ad calamitam, ignorans calamitae virtutem, cum videatur quod ferrum naturali motu debeat tendere deorsum." Einstein uses a similar example to that in the *De Potentia* when writing of his own early experience of wonder. See Albert Einstein, “Autobiographical Notes”, in *Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist*, Harper Torchbooks, Vol. I, p. 9

[164]Are Plato and Aristotle speaking by antonomasia when they say that wonder is the beginning of philosophy? When they emphasize the necessity of beginning well, it is usually in the context of the beginnings in reason about things.

Moreover, much of the philosopher's desire to know comes only after one has looked before and after in other ways. Men do not wonder or desire to know unless they think that they are ignorant. As Aristotle said in the *Metaphysics*, men begin to philosophize out of wonder and hence to escape their ignorance. Socrates discovered that most men do not know that they do not know. After he shows the slave-boy of Meno that he is ignorant of how to double a square, he turns to Meno and says that now the slave-boy will want to know while before, when he thought he knew how to double a square (by doubling the side), he did not so desire. It is, of course, by looking before and after in the third sense that Socrates found that men did not know what they thought they knew. What came after some of the statements they admitted (*after* as a conclusion comes after the premisses) contradicted something else they admitted before. Men do not directly contradict themselves in conversation with Socrates, but they admit three statements and from two of them follows the contradictory of the third. It is often dangerous to admit three statements to Socrates. Three may be enough to get one into a contradiction.

And the deepest and strongest desires to look before and after (which lead one to investigate the greatest questions and to the greatest discoveries) come after one has already seen a before and after, especially a continuous one. Thus when the logician sees that the genus is before the species and that the same thing can be a genus and a species in comparison to different things, he wonders and asks whether every genus has a genus before it or is there a *first* genus. This eventually led to the discovery or recognition of the ten categories or highest genera, the genera that are not species. Likewise, after reason sees how the premisses are before the conclusion in a syllogism and that the conclusion of one syllogism can be the premiss of another, he wonders whether every premiss is a conclusion. This eventually leads to the discovery or recognition of statements known through themselves, the foundation of all other statements. And after the natural philosopher sees the before and after in time, he wonders whether time has a beginning or an end. And after he sees that nothing moves itself (first and through itself) and that the movers around him are themselves moved or have a mover before them, he wonders whether there is another mover before every mover or there is a first mover. This leads us eventually to the unmoved mover, God. And the moral philosopher sees that the end is desired before the means, but some ends are desired for the sake of other ends which are desired

before them. Is there some end which is *first* desired and everything else is desired *after* it? This leads us to consider happiness, the end which is desired in life for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, but everything else for the sake of it. In all of these, a profound and intense desire to look before comes only after one has seen a number of before and afters. Thus the wonder, or desire to know, of the philosopher is both a desire to look before and after and a result of having looked before and after.

Although wonder is the beginning of philosophy, the philosopher is named, not from wonder, but from the *love of wisdom*. Wonder is not sufficient to make one a philosopher. But a true philosopher must love wisdom for its own sake (not for honor or for wealth, like the sophist) and indeed more than anything else that he might love for its own sake, so that wisdom is the very end or goal of his life. But one could not come to love wisdom thus unless one saw that wisdom is better than any other knowledge. Nay more, one would have to see that wisdom is better than anything else in life before one could love wisdom as one's end in life. Better however is the fourth sense of *before* as we have seen in the *Categories*. Hence, it is impossible to love wisdom as a philosopher must without looking before and after.

Moreover, the lover of wisdom pursues not only wisdom, which is the best knowledge, but also among other kinds of knowledge, that which is better. Hence, he must know which knowledge is better, not only to know which is best (for best is defined by better - the best is better than all the rest), but to pursue the better among other kinds of knowledge.

Aristotle answers the question of which knowledge is better in the Proemium to his three books *About the Soul*. One knowledge (as knowledge) is better than another in two ways. In every knowledge, we can distinguish between what we know and how we know it. Hence, one knowledge can be better than another because the thing known is better or the way it is known is better. Either what is known is better or it is known better (with more certitude or clarity etc.) Aristotle praises the study of the soul for both reasons.[165] But it is possible that a lesser thing

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[165]Charles De Koninck pointed out that the certitude in the study of the soul is in regard to its existence rather than what it is.

be known better than a greater thing. We know better what a triangle is than what God is. Hence, the philosopher must also look to see which is better (before in the fourth sense) when one knowledge excels in certitude and another in the nobility of its object. There is no doubt in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas that the nobility of the object is the greater criterion.[166]

We can see from the above how necessary it is for the philosopher to look before and after to know which knowledge he should pursue before another knowledge. But the pursuit of one knowledge before another in time depends, not only upon which thing is better to be known, but also upon which must be known before another. For example: the knowledge of God is better than the knowledge of motion and time and the knowledge of the soul. But should a philosopher pursue a knowledge of God before a knowledge of motion and time and the soul? It is better to know God than to know motion. But if we know God through motion as a cause is known through its effect and by the negation of motion, then it seems we must study motion before God. If it is better to know the eternity of God than to know time, but we know eternity by the negation of time, then we must study time before we study eternity.[167] It is better to know God than the soul, but if we know God in part by the likeness of our soul to God, we should pursue a knowledge of the soul before a knowledge of God. A knowledge of the soul is a beginning for the study of any other understanding substance.[168] It is through knowing our own understanding

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[166]Thomas Aquinas, *In I De Anima,* Lectio I, n. 5: "Nihilominus tamen illa est melior quae de rebus melioribus et honorabilioribus est. Cuius ratio est, sicut dicit Philosophus in lib. *undecimo de Animalibus*, magis concupiscimus scire modicum de rebus honorabilibus et altissimis, etiam si topice et probabiliter illud sciamus, quam scire multum, et per certitudinem de rebus minus nobilibus. Hoc enim habet nobilitatem ex se et ex sua substantia, illud vero ex modo et ex qualitate."

[167]When Thomas Aquinas explains Boethius' great definition of eternity in the *Summa Theologiae*, he show how it involves many negations of what is found in time as Aristotle defines it in the *Physics*.

[168]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 88, Art. 1, Ad 1: "apud philosophos dicatur quod scientia de anima est principium quoddam ad cognoscendum substantias separatas. Per hoc enim quod anima nostra cognoscit seipsum, pertingit ad cognitionem aliquam

and will that we must by likeness (and negation of defects) come to know, however imperfectly, the understanding and will of what is above us. Thus we can see that it is not always better to try to know before what is better to know. But this consideration takes us into the second genus of beginnings which is a knowledge of the order within our knowledge.

The third beginning of philosophy in the will (after wonder and the love of wisdom) is humility. Humility in knowing comes after seeing that one mind is better than another. First one must see that the divine mind is better than the human mind. And second, one must see the before and after in human minds which Hesiod pointed out

> He is best of all who by himself understands all things.
> Good also he who believes the one speaking well.
> But who neither himself understands, nor hearing another
> Throws into his mind - this one is a useless man.[169]

Looking before and after and knowledge of the roads of philosophy

Philosophy is knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road. Hence, Aristotle often gives *methodos* as the genus of philosophy for philosophy is knowledge *meta* (after or over) *odos* (a road). Philosophy is knowledge that follows a road.

After one has seen this before and after in the genus of philosophy, it is not hard to see that a knowledge of the road to follow is before knowledge over that road or that follows that road. Hence, Aristotle and

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habendam de substantiis incorporeis, qualem eam contingit habere; non quod simpliciter et perfecte eas cognoscit."

[169]Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 293 ff.

Boethius and Thomas Aquinas insist in many places[170] that one must have knowledge of the road to follow *before* one can acquire well the knowledge which is over that road. Aristotle, in his proemium to this or that kind of philosophy, often considers the road to follow in that kind of philosophy.[171]

But the road made by nature in our knowledge, the road from the senses into reason, is *before* the roads made by reason in our knowledge. And it is necessary to see that the road made by nature is before the roads made by reason in perhaps all five senses of *before* distinguished in the *Categories*. It is especially important to see that the natural road can be without the roads made by reason, but they cannot be without it, and that the natural road is the reason or cause of much that is basic in the roads made by reason. We acquire what is not natural through what is natural and it is not even possible to understand why we use the word *road* in our knowledge without following the road from the senses into reason.

Moreover, it is necessary to see that the common road of reasoned out knowledge (which is studied in logic) is *before* the private road of this or that reasoned out knowledge (which should be studied in the beginning of each reasoned out knowledge).

Not only is it necessary for the philosopher to look before and after to see that a knowledge of the road is before knowledge that follows a road and to see that one road is before another, but also to understand each road. For a road in our knowledge is nothing other than a before and after, or a continuous before and after therein. Hence, it is obvious that no one can know any road to follow in philosophy without looking before and after.

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[170]Some of the classical texts for this are: Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book 2, Chapter 3 and *Parts of Animals*, Book 1, Chapter 1; Boethius, *De Trinitate*, II and Thomas' Commentary thereon; Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book One, Chapters 3-9

[171]See, for example, the proemia to the *Physics*, the *De Anima*, and the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

But it should not remain hidden from us that there is more than one before and after to be seen in each road. Let us exemplify this in the first and last roads of philosophy.

The *first* road in our knowledge must be the natural road in our knowledge as anyone can reasonably guess who know that what is natural comes before what is not natural. The natural road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason. Since man is an animal with reason, the natural road in our knowledge must be the road from the senses into reason. For animal is defined by sense and what is generic comes before what is specific in time and generation. There are many before and afters which must be seen before this road is fully understood. We can distinguish some of them here.

First, it can be seen that one knowledge is before or after another along this road. Sensation is before memory and memory before experience and experience before a knowledge of the universal as Aristotle shows in the beginning of the *Metaphysics* and elsewhere.

Second, it can be seen how one thing is known before another along this road. Sensible things, of course, are known *before* things that cannot be sensed along this road. And since material things are to some extent sensible and immaterial things are not, material things are known before immaterial things along this road. And since effects are more sensible than causes, effects are usually known before causes along this road. And composed things are known before simple things along this road. And this is so, not only because immaterial things are simpler than material things and causes than effects, but also even in imaginable things we know the point by the negation of parts or by the negation of length, breadth and depth.

Third, the *same* thing is known along this road in one way before it is known in another way. Thus, as the great Boethius said, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. And a thing is known in an outward before it is known in an inward way for the senses know things in an outward way and reason seeks insight. And the same thing is known in a confused way before it is known distinctly. And this is so, not only because reason is apt to distinguish things that the senses do not, but also because both the senses and reason go from ability to act in their knowing and to know a thing in a confused way is between ability and act.

And fourth, there is another before and after most profound and difficult to see which penetrates and gives reason for many of the above. And this is that the road is from what is more known *to us* to what is more known *by nature* or *simply*. And this enters, for example, into our knowing effects before causes (for the most part - mathematics is the great exception to this rule) and into our knowing things in a confused way before distinctly.

There are many other before and afters to be seen in this road, but the above is sufficient to indicate how much it is necessary to look before and after before we can know sufficiently a road.

The same need to see more than one before and after can be considered in the last road of philosophy, the private road of this or that reasoned out knowledge. For example: even in the private road of geometry, which is easier to know than that of most other forms of reasoned out knowledge, there is more than one before and after to be seen. In Euclid's *Elements*, for example, there is more than one before and after to be seen. The simple comes before the composed for the most part. This is seen, not only in plane geometry coming before solid geometry, but also within plane geometry. And the equal comes before the unequal for the most part, not only in the theorems, but also in the definitions and the axioms. And the cause is before the effect, contrary to what is found for the most part along the natural road.

We could also exemplify that there is more than one before and after to be seen in the middle road. The middle road of the philosopher is the common road of philosophy, studied in logic. But since this is the *middle* road, after one road and before another, it may be appropriate to use this road to exemplify the necessity of seeing how one road is before another. (At the same time, however, we will see that there is more than one before and after to be seen along this road.) For the road which is before enters into our understanding of the road which comes after

The middle road is especially the common road of reasoned out knowledge. Defining and dividing and reasoning are along this road. But why is it necessary to define and divide in our reasoned out knowledge? This presupposes a before and after in the natural and first road. We know things in a confused way before distinctly. And definition and division are

two of the chief ways for reason of going from a confused knowledge of things to a distinct knowledge of them. But *after* we have seen definition as the beginning of reasoned out knowledge, we can see the necessity of considering the way of defining in the private road of each particular reasoned out knowledge. As Aristotle taught in the *Physics* and Metaphysics, the way of defining is different in each of the looking philosophies. There are many other ways in which a knowledge of the natural and first road enters into that of the road studied in logic. Aristotle teaches us in logic, for example, that induction comes before syllogism. This again goes back to the natural and first road. Our knowledge starts with the senses and singulars, as does induction while the syllogism begins with something universal.

Whence Socrates in the *Phaedo*, when considering the arguments for and against the immortality of the soul, sees the need for an art about arguments[172] before we can evaluate properly those particular arguments. Socrates warns against our becoming haters of argument through our ignorance of this art.

Although philosophy is in the end a reasoned out knowledge, it begins with reasonable guesses.[173] Hence, one could say that the common road of philosophy is from reasonable guesses to reasoned out knowledge. There is also a reason in the natural road why we guess the truth before we know it.

From these and similar things, it is not hard to see that this genus of the beginnings of philosophy is entirely dominated by the need to look before and after. No road can be known without looking before and after, nor can the order of the roads be known without so doing, nor the need to consider the road of a reasoned out knowledge before trying to acquire fully that knowledge, nor the need to know the common road before the private roads nor the need to know the natural road before all the roads made by reason.

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[172] *Phaedo*, ... This is to my knowledge the first time a philosopher saw this before and after: Logic is before the perfect learning of the other parts of philosophy.

[173] We define philosophy as a *reasoned out knowledge* because each thing is defined by its utmost.

Looking before and after and the knowledge of the beginnings about things

As regards the third genus of the beginnings of philosophy, which is a knowledge of the beginnings about things, the necessity of looking before and after to know them can also be shown. Such beginnings arise from experience which is after memory and sensation. Now it is difficult to see how there can be memory or experience without looking before and after. But we should consider the necessity of looking before and after in order to know the beginnings about things which are in reason. This again can be considered in particular after the division of such beginnings.

Some beginnings in our knowledge about things are common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge. Foremost among these are the statements which are axioms (in the sense of Aristotle and Euclid). For example: the axiom about contradiction and the axiom about whole and part. The axiom about contradiction (*the same thing cannot both be and not be at the same time and in the same way*) is followed in all reasoned out knowledge. Likewise, the axiom about whole and part (*the whole is greater than one of its parts*) is used in every reasoned out knowledge

Some beginnings about things in our knowledge are private to this or that reasoned out knowledge. The first beginnings about things private to this or that reasoned out knowledge are definitions of the things which are considered in that reasoned out knowledge. And second are the statements which are understood by these definitions. Thus the definitions of circle and diameter and the definition of right angle are private to geometry. Likewise, the statements which can be known after these definitions are known. For example: the statement that *the diameter bisects the circle* and the statement that *all right angles are equal*.

The common beginnings of reasoned out knowledge, as the axioms, are before the private beginnings of this or that reasoned out knowledge. Thomas tells us that an ordered asking goes forward from the common beginnings which are known through themselves towards the private things and that reasoned out knowledge is caused in the soul of the learner

through such a going forward.[174] This reminds one of Socrates' teaching by asking questions in an ordered way (and then denying that he is teaching although his *ordered* questioning is what leads the one replying to see something new.)

But not only is it important to see the order *from* the axioms which is to see a before and after of which the axioms are the beginning, but also in knowing the axioms well it is necessary to look before and after. For there is a before and after among the axioms and a before and after in understanding each axiom.

Among the axioms, the axiom about contradiction is before the others. For it is the natural beginning of all the other axioms. And the words in every axiom are equivocal by reason which means that there is a before and after in the many senses or meanings of those words (as we saw in the senses of the word *before*). Such words, then, cannot be understood fully without looking before and after. And since the words must be understood before the statements can be understood, it is clear that a perfect knowledge of the axioms or statements about things underlying all reasoned out knowledge of things is had only by looking before and after. Growth in understanding the words used everywhere and avoiding the frequent mistakes due to the equivocation of these words require one to look for the before and after in their meanings.

It is also necessary to look before and after to know the beginnings about things *private* to this or that reasoned out knowledge. The first private beginnings about things are definitions of the things studied in that reasoned out knowledge. But it is impossible to define without looking before and after. We define a thing by its cause(s) or effect.[175] Since the cause is before in the "fifth" or crowning sense and the effect is after in the corresponding sense, it is clear that no one can define by either a

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[174] *Summa Theologiae* , Prima Pars, Q. 84, Art. 3, Ad 3: "ordinata interrogatio procedit ex principiis communibus per se notis, ad propria. Per talem autem processum scientia causatur in anima addiscentis."

[175] The definition by cause is a perfect definition, but we often define imperfectly by effect, especially since the effect is more known to us. We define the good at first by its effect which is desire. The good is what all desire.

cause or effect without looking before or after. If we define things by either their causes or their effects, then it is by looking before and after the thing (in the "fifth" sense) that we come to define.

We are also said to define a species either by genus and differences or by property.[176] And in either case, we must look before and after. For the genus and the species-making differences are before the species[177] and the property is after the species. The genus is before the species in the second and third senses of before and the difference is also before the species in these two senses. Quadrilateral, for example, can be without square, but the reverse is impossible. Likewise, equilateral and right-angled can be without square, but the reverse is impossible. One adds differences to the genus until the resulting speech is no longer before the species, but is convertible as *equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral* is convertible with *square*. Neither is before or after the other in the second sense of before (in the sequence of being. A property in the strict sense (what belongs to only one species, to every member of it and always) is also convertible with the species, but after it as an effect is after a cause.

Thus, it is impossible to define without looking before and after. And in the definition, it is important to know which part comes before and which after.[178]

And by these definitions, we know the statements which are also beginnings private to each reasoned out knowledge. As, for example, the statement that *all right angles are equal* is known after the definition of right angle.

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[176]This distinction of definition is almost the same as the first one since the property is an effect of the nature of the species. The definition by property is also an imperfect definition, but often the property is known first.. Thus the child first knows virtue as a praiseworthy quality.

[177]The genus and difference can be without the species, but not vice-versa. Likewise, they are before in our knowledge for we know the general before the particular

[178]Thomas Aquinas, *In II Posteriorum Analyticorum* , Lectio XIV, n. 540:"Dicit ergo primum quod multum differt quid prius et quid posterius praedicetur inter ea quae ponuntur in definitione."

There is, of course, a special way in which looking before and after is necessary to define. And this is when before and after are in the definition itself, or something defined by before and after is in the definition, or the thing being defined is essentially before one thing and after another, or the thing defined consists essentially in an order of parts. We will see this in particular when we come to examine the necessity of looking before and after in the middle of philosophy.

LOOK BEFORE AND AFTER TO END WELL

The end of the philosopher is know the first cause, as Aristotle shows in his *Proemium to Wisdom* in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*. That it is necessary to look before and after to reach this end is obvious. For the crowning sense of *before* is the sense in which the cause is said to be before the effect. And *first* is defined by before and after. But this should be unfolded.

There can be more than one kind of cause before an effect. And the philosopher needs to see the kinds of cause which can be before an effect. In the first book of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle goes through the thinking of his predecessors on causes. He does this, not only to prepare the way for a discussion of the truth or falsity of their positions on causes, but also to see whether they touched upon any other kind of cause besides the four distinguished in the *Physics*. We see here the care which Aristotle takes not to overlook any kind of cause which could be before an effect. Some of the philosophers before him saw only one kind of cause before effects and some more than one kind. The very first philosophers saw only one kind of cause before effects while those who came after saw two or three kinds. But it is not until Aristotle that anyone saw fully and clearly that there are as many as four kinds of cause before an effect.[179] Most thinkers even to

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[179]The first philosophers saw only matter before effects while the later ones saw also that a mover is before them. Pythagoras and the Platonists saw form before effects. Empedocles saw three kinds of cause before effects like flesh and bone. Aristotle saw that natural things can have four kinds of cause before them. In the first book of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle considers the opinions and arguments of his predecessors about causes, not only to prepare for seeing whether they

this day do not see, or do not see clearly, all the kinds of cause that can be before effects.

But Aristotle was perhaps the first to see clearly that there can be as many as four kinds of cause before an effect. (In mathematics, there is only one of these four kinds of cause before an effect. But in natural things, there can be as many as four kinds of cause before an effect.) We can begin to see here and also in the *Phaedo* of Plato how much one must look before effects to see all the kinds of cause in general that can be before an effect.

But in the second book of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle looks before and after within each of these four kinds of cause. Within each kind of cause, there is a before and after to be seen. One matter may be made out of another matter. The sentence is made out of words and the words are made out of letters. And something may move other things insofar as it is itself moved, as one wagon pulls another insofar as it is pulled itself. And the end for the sake of which something is, or is done, may be a means to a further end. I go to the well for the sake of getting water and I get water for the sake of drinking it.

And after seeing that there are causes before and after each other within one kind of cause, Aristotle wonders whether there is a cause before every cause within each kind of cause. And by a wonderful discourse, he comes to see that there is a first cause within each kind of cause. Thus looking before and after has helped the philosopher arrive to some extent at the first cause or causes.

But it is necessary not to overlook another before and after among causes before one can see the first cause. Not only is there a before and after *within* each of the four kinds of cause, but there is also a before and after to see among the four kinds of cause. The matter is formed by a maker for some end or good. Hence, the maker seems to be responsible for the matter and form being causes. And the end seems to be responsible for the maker acting. Thus, the end seems to be the cause of the causality of all the other causes. But does this mean that the first

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have arrived at the first cause, but also to see if they saw any kind of cause before things in addition to the four (matter, form, mover, end). They did not.

cause is a cause only in the genus of end? Is the first mover or maker something other than the first end (the end which is not desired for the sake of any further end)? Or could the first mover or maker act for the sake of itself (not to make or acquire itself, but to communicate itself and lead all other things in some way to itself)? Could the first mover or maker be also the end for which all things are? This requires one to look at being.

Here we can begin to see the necessity of looking before and after in beings and not only in causes. The first cause is also the first being. Since the first being is before all other beings, one must see the before and after of beings before one can find the first being.

Before the philosopher can see a before and after in beings, he must see a distinction in beings. For nothing is before or after itself.

The first distinction of beings in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* is between being as such and accidental being. And it is not hard to see that being as such is before accidental being.

And in being as such, we soon see that substance is before accidents in more than one sense of *before*. (Descartes and perhaps the Pythagoreans and Platonists did not see anything before quantity or extension. Here we have an example of double ignorance and the need to look before and after more than once.)

But the most important before and after to look for in being is that which can be seen after the distinction of act and ability. Thus in the ninth book of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle distinguishes abilities in comparison to the act most known to us which is motion. Then, he distinguishes acts in general and, consequently the abilities for them. And then he shows the many ways in which act is before ability (and the one qualified way in which an ability can be before act, but not simply so). We see that act is before ability in definition and, more generally, in knowability. We come to see also that act is simply before ability (although what goes from ability to act is in ability before it is in act) because nothing goes from ability to act

except by reason of something already in act.[180] And we come to see that act is before ability in perfection and goodness. And after seeing all these ways in which act is before ability, we can come to see that the first being is pure act and most knowable and most perfect and good.[181]

Seeing the before and after of act and ability will help us to see that the first cause cannot be in the genus of matter for such a cause is in ability.[182] But it is possible for the first cause to be both in the genus of maker and end for both of these are based on actuality as can be seen respectively from the second and the third senses in which act is before ability.

The above outline of some of the before and afters which must be seen before the philosopher can come to know the first cause is a sufficient manifestation of the necessity of looking before for the philosopher if he is going to end well.

The philosopher most of all wants to know the first cause for this is the best thing there is to know. But after this comes a knowledge of the order of the universe. And he cannot know this without looking before and after for the order of the universe consists most of all in the fourth and fifth senses of *before*.[183]

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[180]If something were to give itself the act which it does not have, it would have to have the act before having it - a manifest contradiction. One cannot give what one does not have.

[181]We can show that the first cause is simple, perfect, unchanging, infinite and therefore one through its being pure act, as is done in the two *Summas* of Thomas.

[182]Those who think that matter is the first cause have seen only what is before in some respect or qualified way and not what is before simply and without qualification. And in not seeing both before and afters, they fall into the mistake of simply and in some respect about the first cause. They have not looked before and after enough.

[183]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* Prima Pars, q. 103, Art. 4, Ad 1: ordo universi includit in se et conservationem rerum diversarum a Deo institutarum, et motionem earum: quia secundum haec duo invenitur

LOOKING BEFORE AND AFTER IN THE MIDDLE

We have seen some of the necessity of the philosopher looking before and after both to begin well and to end well. We should now consider this necessity in the middle. It is convenient to divide this consideration according to the particular parts of philosophy which come before wisdom or first philosophy. But here we must be even more sketchy than in the other parts.

Looking before and after in logic

Logic is about defining and dividing and reasoning. Hence, definition, division, and syllogism (and the other forms of argument) are considered in logic. The father of logic, Aristotle, uses the word *tool*[184] within logic almost exclusively for the four tools of dialectic. But the chief purpose of these tools, as Aristotle explains in the *Topics*,[185] is to reason and define and divide.

As we have seen before, it is impossible to define without looking before and after what is to be defined. But there is more than one before and after to be seen here. The logician should see that we name things before we define them. And he needs to see that the first name in a definition is the genus and that the second names are differences. But is there also a before and after among the differences? When Aristotle divides the imitative arts in the *Poetics* and defines tragedy, he uses the same kinds of difference. But the order is not the same. He distinguishes the imitative arts first by *that in which* they imitate, then by *what* they imitate, and last by *how* they imitate. But when he defines tragedy he uses

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ordo in rebus, secundum scilicet quod una est melior alia, et secundum quod una ab alia movetur.

[184]In Greek *organon*

[185]See *Topics*, I, Chapters 18. The tool of likeness, for example, is useful for definitions, inductions and hypothetical syllogisms.

the difference from *what* it imitates first, and second, the difference from *that in which* it imitates and last the difference by *how* it imitates. The reason why the order of the first two is the reverse would seem to be that the beginning or the genus is different. If the genus is the imitative art and art is a way of making in some matter, then it seems natural to first divide the imitative arts by *that in which* they imitate. For the way of making and the tools of making and the skill are different for different matters. Hence, the carpenter also makes both bookcases and chairs out of wood and the metalworker, both out of metal. It is not one art that makes bookcases and another art that makes chairs. Likewise, it is not one art that makes sad stories and sad music, but one art that makes sad and joyful music. But in the case of the products of the imitative arts, the genus is imitation or likeness. And a likeness seems to be first *of* something, just as a relation. Hence, *what* is imitated seems closer to the genus than *that in which* it is imitated. For a similar reason, Euclid divides *trilateral* into equilateral, isosceles and scalene triangles before he divides it into right-angled, obtuse-angled and acute-angled triangles. Hence, the significance of the use of the word *trilateral* for the genus rather than *triangle*. (This is not arbitrary. For rectilineal plane figure is naturally divided into trilateral, quadrilateral etc.)

Again, the logician needs to know whether we should define before we divide or divide before we define. For logic, as Thomas teaches us, is the art which helps reason to proceed orderly, easily and without error. And order is a before and after. Therefore the logician must try to see whether defining is before dividing or the reverse.

If a highest genus is known without definition and only a species can be defined, then we divide before we define. We divide a genus into its species before we define the species. But if the species is itself a genus (of what is below it), then we define it before we divide it into species. Thus Euclid defines triangle before dividing it into its species. And indeed if he had not defined it before, one could not see clearly the basis for the division into species.

But when definition is compared with the other main kind of division, the division of a composed whole into its parts, the logician must again try to see which is before so he can direct us in our thinking. If the species to be defined is a composed whole, do we divide it as a composed whole before or after we define it?

Knowing the composing parts of a whole would seem to be a help to defining it or knowing what it is. We take apart something (if it is composed of parts) when we try to know what it is. Aristotle considers noun and verb before statement and premiss before syllogism.

However, if there is definition of a thing by its end and a definition of a thing by its matter or parts, and the definition by end is the middle term for uniting the definition by parts to the thing defined, then in this way a definition by end is before a consideration of the parts of which the defined is composed. Hence, someone might define definition as *speech making known what a thing is* before it is shown that definition is *speech composed of a genus and differences*. The former definition is the reason why of the second definition.

Yet even here, it would seem that we know *what a genus is* and *what a difference is* before we know *speech composed of a genus and differences*. Of course, it is not the same thing to know what a genus is and to know that it is the first part of a definition. Likewise, it is not the same thing to know what a difference is and to know that it is the second part of a definition. And we know something in a confused way before we know that this and that are parts of it. However, to know something in a confused way is not to know it by definition.

We cannot enter further here into the before and after of definition and division. But the above is sufficient to see how much the logician must look before and after if he is going to be able to direct us in our defining and dividing And indeed, this comes under the general purpose of logic which is to help us proceed orderly in our thinking.

It is also impossible to reason without looking before and after for the premisses (as the prefix in their name indicates) are before the conclusion. The premisses of a syllogism are before the conclusion of that syllogism, as a cause is before the effect. Hence, we say in the definition of the syllogism that something else follows necessarily because of what has been laid down. But the statements (which become premisses) are also before in the sense that they can be known without the conclusion, but the reverse is not possible. The logician must see how the premisses are before the conclusion and how some statements are before other statements. This, of course, requires him to look before and after.

There is also a before and after in the premisses which he must see. The major premiss is before the minor premiss of a syllogism. The minor premiss contracts the power of the major in a way proportional to the difference contracting the ability of the genus to, or towards, the species.

But reasoning by the very common if-then syllogism even more clearly requires reason to look before and after. The if-then statement by itself is understood by looking before and after. Hence, we call the simple statements in it the *antecedent* and *consequent*. Sometimes one can make both a true and a false if-then statement out of the same two simple statements.[186] And the second premiss either affirms the antecedent or denies the consequent. If one wants to establish a simple statement by this kind of syllogism, one looks *before* that simple statement. One is looking for a simple statement which is true and which can be the antecedent in a true if-then statement whose consequence is the statement to be established. One looks for a statement which is true and which the statement to be established follows upon necessarily. If one wants to syllogize to the negation of some simple statement, one looks *after* that simple statement. One looks for a simple statement that is false, but which can be the consequent in a true if-then statement whose antecedent is the statement to be overthrown. One looks for a statement that is false, but necessarily following upon the statement to be overthrown.[187]

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[186] *If this number is four, then this number is even* is true. *If this number is even, then this number is four* is false.

[187] In letters, statement B can be established by looking for a statement (A) before it or which it follows upon. If the statement before (A) is known or thought to be so, one can syllogize thus: If A is so, then B is so. But A is so. Therefore, B is so. In overthrowing or reasoning against a statement B by the hypothetical syllogism, one looks after it for a statement C that is known or thought not to be so. We then syllogize thus: If B is so, then C is so. But C is not so. Therefore, B is not so. When Socrates reasons dialectically in the *Meno* for and against the statement that *virtue can be taught,* he use these two forms.

Not only must the logician see the before and after in a definition or syllogism, but he must further see the before and after of *continuous*[188] definitions and syllogisms. Since there are *continuous* syllogisms and arguments and *continuous* definitions in every part of philosophy, it is necessary to look before and after many times. If one of these steps is left out, one ceases to know for a chain is no stronger than its weakest link.[189] The logician must see that reasoned out knowledge involves continuous definitions, divisions and syllogisms. (And since the syllogism begins with something universal, induction comes before syllogism. The logician must also see this before and after.)

And the logician must see that, although there are continuous definitions and syllogisms, yet there is not a definition before every definition or a syllogism before every syllogism. If we know one thing through another when we reason or define or calculate, does this go on forever? If this were so, would we be able to know anything? But if some things are known, but not through other things, what are these things? And why are some things known through other things and some things known, but not through other things? Looking before and after in these

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[188]I call syllogisms *continuous* in which the conclusion of one is the premiss in the other. Likewise, two definitions are continuous when what is defined by one is used in the definition of the other. In this use of the word *continuous*, I imitate Euclid when he calls a proportion such as four is to six as six is to nine *continuous*, but not a proportion such as two is to three as four is to six. The likeness of course is to the definition of continuous in logic, not to that proper to natural philosophy. Likewise, what is defined by one definition becomes part of another definition

[189]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* Prima Pars, Q. 108, Art. 7, Ad 2:"Inveniuntur autem in nobis multae intelligibiles actiones quae sunt ordinatae secundum ordinem causae et causati; sicut cum per multa media gradatim in unam conclusionem devenimus. Manifestum est autem quod cognitio conclusionis dependet ex omnibus mediis praecedentibus, non solum quantum ad novam acquisitionem scientiae, sed etiam quantum ad scientiae conservationem. Cuius signum est quod, si quis oblivisceretur aliquod praecedentium mediorum, opinionem quidem vel fidem de conclusione posset habere, sed non scientiam, ordine causarum ignorato."

ways leads to the knowledge of the highest genera and the distinction between statements known through themselves and statements known through other statements.

The logician must also see how one two things are before each other in different senses of *before*. For example, we name a thing before (in time and in our knowledge) we define it, but defining gives us a better knowledge of a thing than naming it. And we guess by the dialectical syllogism before (in time and in the discourse of reason) we know by a demonstration, but a demonstration is better (before in the fourth sense) than a dialectical syllogism.

The above is enough to show some of the importance of looking before and after for the logician.

Looking before and after in mathematics

After we recall here the first two senses of *before* in the *Categories*, it is interesting to consider these words of Thomas Aquinas:

> Order follows the account both of time and of number because one species of number is naturally before another and time is also the number of motions according to their before and after.[190]

We have seen that the first sense of *before* is in time and the second sense was exemplified by one being before two in being. (One can be without two, but two cannot be without one.) One number is also before another number in this same sense of *before*. One number is naturally before another number.[191]

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[190] *In Librum Beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus* , Caput IV, Lectio lll, n. 310: "Rationem autem tam temporis quam numeri sequitur ordo, quia una species numeri naturaliter est alia prior et tempus est etiam numerus motuum secundum prius et posterius."

[191] Aristotle in Book V of the *Metaphysics* (1019a 2-4) calls this sense of *before* katà fúsin.

Not only is one number naturally before another in the second sense of *before*, but even in one number there seems to be order. Thomas indicates that an order of parts pertains to the account of quantity in general:

> Since an order of parts is in the account of quantity, and infinite follows upon quantity, to know the infinite by way of the infinite is to know by numbering part after part.[192]

But the most interesting before and afters are seen after the discourses of the arithmetician. Before all other numbers in the same ratio or which are proportional, there are numbers prime to each other. And these numbers prime to one another are not only before in the second sense, but also as a measure is before the measured. They measure all the other numbers respectively.

It is not difficult to see that after every square number, there is another square number. But Plato himself, it is said, saw that, after every square number and before the next square number, there is one number which is a mean proportional between the two square numbers. And after every cube number and before the next cube number, there are two mean proportionals.

But perhaps it is not necessary to illustrate further the importance of looking before and after for the mathematician.

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[192] *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. XIV, Art. 12, Ad 1: "cum de ratione quantitatis sit ordo partium, et infinitum sequatur quantitatem, cognoscere infinitum per modum infiniti est cognoscere ipsum numerando partem post partem." Sylvester of Ferrara on *S. C. Gentiles*, Liber I, Caput LXIX after quoting above says: "Et ideo inquit Sanctus Thomas hic quod haec est propria ratio quantitatis, ut scilicet per numerationem suarum partium cognoscatur. Et quia nunquam compleri posset numeratio infiniti, ideo infinitum, inquantum infinitum, est ignotum."

Looking before and after in natural philosophy

It is not hard to see that the natural philosopher must look before and after. Beginning and first are in the definition of nature and, as we have seen, beginning and first are defined by before and after. Nature is a cause and the natural philosopher looks for the causes of natural things which is, of course, to look before in the "fifth" and crowning sense.

The natural philosopher considers motion (indeed nature is a cause of motion) and motion takes time and the mobile is in place or moves from one place to another. There is a before and after in all of these which is the first meaning of before and after or attached to the first chief sense. This is most explicit in the case of time. Before and after are in the definition of time.

Eventually we wonder whether every time has a time before it and after it. Does time have a beginning or an end? Thomas Aquinas has written a work devoted to examining the discourses of thinkers looking before and after in this way. Some think it impossible for time to have a beginning. Unable to transcend their imagination or unable to move the word *before* from its first meaning, they think that if anything were before time, then time would be before it was - a manifest contradiction. If nothing was before the beginning of time, how could it begin? Nothing cannot give rise to anything. One is forced by such questions to distinguish the senses of *before*. Christian revelation teaches that time had a beginning. Was there anything before this beginning? Surely not before in the first chief sense of before. But if there was nothing before time existed, how could time come into existence? When Christ said "Before Abraham was, I am", what does *before* mean? One must speak of the eternity of God by the negation of before and after (and of other aspects of time). Looking before and after leads sometimes to the negation of before and/or after. We see that nothing is before or after itself. And we see that there is no before and after in God's existence or life.

Both motion and time have such an imperfect existence that they do not exist in a full way without reason looking before and after. Thomas explains this difficult teaching of Aristotle and we can enter only a little into it here. But it is important to touch upon this for manifesting the

necessity of looking before and after for the natural philosopher whose subject could be said to be motion (and time follows upon motion). In the commentary on the fourth book of the *Physics*, Thomas writes:

> If therefore motion had fixed being in things, as a stone or horse does, it could be said absolutely that, just as there is a number of stones even without the soul existing, so also there would be the number of motion which is time even without the soul existing. But motion does not have fixed being in time, nor is anything of motion found in act in things, except the indivisible of motion which is the division of motion. But the wholeness of motion is taken by the consideration of the soul comparing the disposition of the mobile before to that after. Thus also time does not have being outside the soul except by its own indivisible. But the wholeness of time is taken by the ordering of the soul numbering the before and after in motion, as has been said above. And therefore the Philosopher says significantly that time without the soul existing is *barely* a being, that is imperfectly; just as if it was said that motion can be without the soul imperfectly.[193]

Earlier in the commentary on the third book of the *Physics*, Thomas had already spoken of this necessity of looking before and after to complete an account of motion as distinct from the term or limit of motion:

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[193] *In IV Physicorum* , Lectio XXIII, n. 629: "Si ergo motus haberet esse fixum in rebus, sicut lapis vel equus, posset absolute dici quod sicut etiam anima non existente est numerus lapidum, ita etiam anima non existente esset numerus motus, qui est tempus. Sed motus non habet esse fixum in rebus, nec aliquid in actu invenitur in rebus de motu, nisi quoddam indivisibile motus, quod est motus divisio: sed totalitas motus accipitur per considerationem animae, comparantis priorem dispositionem mobilis ad posteriorem. Sic igitur et tempus non habet esse extra animam, nisi secundum suum indivisibile: ipsa autem totalitas temporis accipitur per ordinationem animae numerantis prius et posterius in motu, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo signanter dicit Philosophus quod tempus, non existente anima, est *utcumque* ens, idest imperfecte; sicut et si dicatur quod motum contingit esse sine anima imperfecte."

> For the account of motion is completed not only through what there is of motion in things, but also by what reason apprehends. For there is nothing more of motion in things than an imperfect act which is a beginning of perfect act in that which is moved; just as in that which is becoming white, there begins to be already something of whiteness. But that this imperfect [beginning] be accounted motion, there is required further that we understand it as a middle between two things: of which the one going before is compared to it as ability to act, whence motion is said to be an act; and the one following is compared to it as the perfect to the imperfect or as act to ability, on account of which motion is said to be the act of what exists in ability, as has been said above. Whence whatever imperfect thing is taken as not tending to something other that is perfect, is said to be the limit of motion and will not be motion by which something is moved, as if something begins to become white, and the alteration is at once interrupted.[194]

When we divide motion in natural philosophy, there are other before and afters to be seen. After we divide motion or change into kinds, we need to see the many ways in which change of place is before the other

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[194] *In III Physicorum* , Lectio V, n. 324-325: "Nam ratio motus completur non solum per id quod est de motu in rerum natura, sed etiam per id quod ratio apprehendit. De motu enim in rerum natura nihil aliud est quam actus imperfectus, qui est inchoatio quaedam actus perfecti in eo quod movetur: sicut in eo quod dealbatur, iam incipit esse aliquid albedinis. Sed ad hoc quod illud imperfectum habeat rationem motus, requiritur ulterius quod intelligamus ipsum quasi medium inter duo; quorum praecedens comparatur ad ipsum sicut potentia ad actum, unde motus dicitur actus; consequens vero comparatur ad ipsum sicut perfectum ad imperfectum vel actus ad potentiam, propter quod dicitur actus existentis in potentia, ut supra dictum est. Unde quodcumque imperfectum accipiatur ut non in aliud perfectum tendens, dicitur terminus motus et non erit motus secundum quem aliquid moveatur; utpote si aliquid incipiat dealbari, et statim alteratio interrumpatur."

kinds. And after we divide motion into its quantitative parts, there is many a before and after to be seen.

The quantitative division of motion is part of a larger philosophy of the continuous (its infinite divisibility, its not being composed of indivisibles, and so on) which includes time and place or distance. This larger philosophy is the subject of the sixth book of the *Physics* of Aristotle. Motion down a continuous road will be itself continuous. And likewise the time it takes. But what is most striking in the consideration of the before and after in the continuous is the negation sometimes of a first or a last. In the change from one contradictory to the other, such as from not being a sphere to being a sphere, there is no last instant in which one is in the term from which (in the example, there would be no *last* instant in which something is not a sphere) but there is a *first* instant in which it is in the term to which (in the example, there would be a first instant in which something is a sphere) This is a profound witness to Aristotle's looking before and after. And it solves one of the most difficult apparent contradictions in change which has plagued theologians and modern philosophers down through the ages.[195]

Looking before to see if there is a first distance covered in motion or a first part of motion completed and so on (in the sixth book of the *Physics*) leads to a negative conclusion. And this conclusion is the beginning for seeing in book seven that nothing moves itself and that *before* what is in motion, there is a mover.[196] And later in the *Physics* of

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[195]We have touched here upon part of the before and after to be seen in book six of the *Physics* of Aristotle. But to understand it, one would have to follow the discourse of Aristotle there with the help of the commentary of Thomas Aquinas. Charles de Koninck, in his article *Une paradoxe du devenir par contradiction* (*Laval Theologique et Philosophique*, Vol. XII, Numéro 1, 1956, p. 9-51*)* has shown the great difficulty theologians and philosophers have had down through the ages in seeing this before and after and the errors into which they fall because of this.

[196]Thomas Aquinas, *In VII Physicorum* , Lectio I, n. 889: "aliquid movere seipsum nihil aliud est, quam esse sibi causa motus. Quod autem est sibi causa alicuius, oportet quod *primo* ei conveniat; quia quod est primum in quolibet genere, est causa eorum quae sunt post. Unde ignis, qui sibi et

course, Aristotle will look *before* moved movers and find an unmoved mover.

When Aristotle begins to consider place, he wonders if place is the first of all things. Place seems to be before all other things in that it can be without them, but they cannot be without it. The common thought is that whatever is must be somewhere; and if it is not somewhere, it does not exist. Without place, then, nothing else can exist. If all things are bodies or in bodies, and bodies must be somewhere, and where one body is now another can have been or will be, place seems to be the first of all things in the second sense of first. Such wonder leads one to investigate whether place is before all other things.

The above is sufficient to begin to see how necessary looking before and after is for the philosopher in the first part of natural philosophy.

Socrates (or Plato) gave a great impetus to the study of the soul when he asked whether the soul existed before or after the body. There are four possible positions on this question. Three are false and one is true. All the false positions are touched upon in the *Phaedo* and defended to some extent, but Aristotle found the true one. But in investigating this question and all other questions about the soul and its powers or abilities, one must see as Aristotle did, the before and after in our knowledge of these things. We must know objects before we can know acts, and we must know acts before we can now abilities and we must know abilities before we can know souls. And there is also a before and after to be seen in souls or their parts.

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aliis est causa caloris, est primum calidum. Ostendit autem Aristoteles in sexto, quod in motu non invenitur primum, neque ex parte temporis, neque ex parte magnitudinis, neque etiam ex parte mobilis, propter horum divisibilitatem. Non ergo potest inveniri primum, cuius motus non dependeat ab aliquo priori: motus enim totius dependet a motibus partium, et dividitur in eos, ut in sexto probatum est. Sic ergo ostendit Aristoteles causam quare nullum mobile movet seipsum; quia non potest esse primum mobile, cuius motus non dependeat a partibus: sicut si ostenderem quod nullum divisibile potest esse primum ens, quia esse cuiuslibet divisibilis dependet a partibus: ut sic haec conditionalis sit vera: *si pars non movetur, totum non movetur*, sicut haec conditionalis est vera: *si pars non est, totum non est.*"

The Moral and Political Philosopher must look Before and After

The practical philosopher must understand good *before* everything else in ethics and politics. The practical philosopher must see that good must be understood *before* better and best. For good is in the definition of better and better is in the definition of best.

And it is Socrates in the *Euthyphro* who teaches us how to look before and after in the *first* definition of good which is *what all desire*. When Euthyphro defines piety as what all the gods approve, Socrates teaches us how to begin looking before and after. Is it pious because the gods approve of it, or do the gods approve of it because it is pious? This is a question of before and after in the "5th" sense. Is the approval of the gods, the cause or the effect of the pious?

And we can ask a similar question about good. Is it good because we desire it or do we desire it because it is good? This is a question of before and after in the sense of cause and effect. Is desire the cause or the effect of the good? Are we defining by cause or by effect?

It makes no little difference, but rather all the difference, in the thinking of the moral and political philosopher whether he has seen that good is before desire as a cause is before its effect even though in another sense of *before* desire comes before. He must see that, although desire is before good in the discourse of reason (or in definition or in our knowledge since we know causes at first by their effects), nevertheless the good is the cause of desire. If the good is the cause of desire, then good is in things; and there can be knowledge of good and bad.

We cannot enter here into the reasoning by which the practical philosopher can come to see that good is the cause of desire and answer

objections to this fundamental truth.[197] This is a before and after that can be seen well only after some reasoning.

If something is not good because we want it, then something is not better because we want it more. The before and after in the consequent is seen from the before and after in the antecedent. Hence, too, there is a basis in things for saying that one thing is better than another. One can reason out first that the end is always better than what is for the sake of it. This is perhaps the first before and after which must be seen in goods.

And in the *Apology,* Socrates says that the chief thing he tried to convince the Athenians of in his conversations with them was that the goods of the soul are better than the goods of the body and outside goods. The distinction between goods of the soul, goods of the body and outside goods must be seen before we can see that the inside goods are better than the outside ones and the goods of the soul better than those of the body.[198] But reasoning is necessary after the distinction before we can see well what is before in this 4th sense of the *Categories*. Most men think like the Athenians all their life and maybe all men before they think things out. Socrates is wiser than the Athenians because he sees this before and after. That the goods of the body and outside goods are before the goods of the soul in the third sense of the *Categories* (before in knowledge or more known to us) must be seen before we can see why the Athenians or most men and all children think this way.

After we have seen clearly why the goods of the soul are better than those of the body and outside goods, we are prepared to see the paradoxical positions of Socrates that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit injustice and that, if one commits injustice, it is better to get caught and punished than to escape without punishment.

Once the philosopher sees that the goods of the soul are better than those of the body and outside goods, he should have a greater desire to

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[197]The author presented some of this reasoning at a conference of the Society for Aristotelian Studies in the summer of 1994 at St. Anselm's College.

[198]Aristotle speaks most explicitly of this before and after in the seventh book of the *Politics*.

study the former than the latter. And since the end is always better than what is for the sake of it, it is very clear to the practical philosopher that the end of man or the end of human life must be found in the goods of the soul. Hence, Aristotle considers at length the goods of the soul before his final determination of the end of man and human life in the 10th book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. And in this long consideration of the goods of the soul, he must eventually determine which goods are better.

Happiness, or the end of man and human life, is before everything else in human things both in the fourth and fifth senses. The moral philosopher must see these befores. For the end is the cause of causes and the end is better than what is for the sake of it.

But unless one sees that the common good is better than the private good, as the good of the whole is better than the good of the part, one will never become a political philosopher.

The political philosopher looks for the best government and how one government is better than another. He should see the best government (simply), the best government for most men, and the best government for a given people.[199]

And after this, the political philosopher must see what comes before a revolution. Knowing how to prevent or encourage a revolution depends upon such knowledge.

In general, practical philosophy is ordered to the virtue of practical reason called *foresight*.[200] And the very name *foresight* indicates the importance of looking before and after for that virtue.[201] Hence, the practical philosopher must look before and after if he is going to be any help to foresight.

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[199]Some political thinkers now hold that liberal democracy is the best government for us with our customs in the modern world. It surely is better than a communist or any other totalitarian government.

[200]Ethics is ordered to the foresight of the individual; domestics, to the foresight of the father; and political philosophy, to the foresight of the statesman.

[201]The latin word *prudentia* is a contraction of *providentia*.

Conclusion

It should be clear now that it is most necessary for the philosopher to look before and after. If reason is the ability for large discourse which is a looking before and after;[202] clearly all use of reason requires one to look before and after.[203] But since wisdom is the highest perfection of reason, the philosopher must *most of all* look before and after.

Shakespeare has given us the first definition of reason as reason.

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[202]Shakespeare defines reason thus in his great exhortation to use reason. There is much reason for thinking that this is the first definition of reason.

[203]Practical reason, as well as looking reason, looks before and after. One of its virtues is named from this: *prudence,* we have noted, is a contraction of *providentia* or *foresight*. But art also is always an *ordering* of how human acts can arrive at a suitable end through determined means. Hence, practical reason is also dominated by the need to look before and after.

NECESSITY AND DIFFICULTY OF BEGINNING WELL IN PHILOSOPHY

Statement of the necessity

Nothing is more necessary in philosophy than to begin well. If philosophy can be in some way without beginning well, it cannot be good philosophy.

Reason for the necessity

The reason for this is that everything else depends upon the beginning. The beginning, although small in size, is great in its power or in that to which its power extends. Hence, it is often compared to a seed which is small in comparison to what comes from it. From a small acorn comes a great oak-tree.

Three corollaries of the reason

There are, at least, three corollaries or statements that follow from the above reason.

The first corollary is that one will be helped through the whole of philosophy by beginning well. Hence, the Greek proverb said that *the beginning is half of all.* And Plato and Aristotle said it seems to be even more than half. Heisenberg has pointed out that even a beginning in the sense of asking the right question is often to go more than halfway to a knowledge of the truth.

The second corollary is that one will be harmed or impeded through the whole of philosophy if one has not begun well.

The third corollary is that even a small mistake in the beginning, or about the beginning, is a great one in the end. This is because that mistake will be multiplied through all that to which the power of the beginning extends. Hence,

a mistake in the beginning is likened to taking the wrong road at a fork in the road. The further one goes, the further one is from where one should be.

Statement of the difficulty

Nothing is more difficult in philosophy than to begin well.

Reasons for the difficulty of beginning well

The first reason why it is difficult to begin well is that a beginning is small in size and therefore it is hard to be seen.

The second reason is that, even if a beginning is somewhat seen, it is difficult to see it *as a beginning*. For one cannot know a beginning as a beginning without seeing of what it is the beginning. And one cannot begin to see of what it is the beginning before one has followed it well for a long time. Thus, it is difficult to comprehend the power of a beginning. And if one does not begin to comprehend its power, one will not consider it seriously, or sufficiently, enough.

The third reason why it is difficult to begin well is that even a small mistake or defect in the beginning is very serious. And such a mistake or defect is hard to avoid given the smallness of the beginning itself.

Since there are many beginnings of philosophy (some in desire and some in our knowledge) and the first (both in our desire and in our knowledge) are natural, one should not perhaps speak without distinction of the difficulty of beginning well. Someone might with reason say that the natural beginnings are not as difficult as those which must be acquired by custom or by the use of reason. (Aristotle would seem to be speaking in the book *About Sophistical Refutations* of one kind of beginning in our knowledge when emphasizing the difficulty of the beginning in reasoned out knowledge.) While granting the justness of this distinction, it is important to understand that to begin well in philosophy requires that *all* beginnings be good. For the bad comes from any defect. Hence, the distinction of the beginnings of philosophy increases our appreciation of the difficulty of beginning well. Moreover, although some

beginnings seem to be more or less assured by nature, even there we can see difficulties, as for example, in the axioms about being and non-being.

Four corollaries or consequences from seeing the difficulty

The first corollary is that one must be very careful to distinguish the beginnings from each other and from what is not a beginning.

The second corollary is that one must consider how each beginning is to be acquired and determined in us.

The third corollary is that we must follow the advice of Friar Laurence to Romeo most of all when considering or acquiring the beginnings. That advice is: *Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast*. Hence, as Edgar Allen Poe well said, great minds are always most hesitant in the beginning. Thus, it is not so surprising after all that the greatest mind of the middle ages, if not of all time, Thomas Aquinas, should have been called in his student days, *The Dumb Ox.* Likewise, Gamow writes of how Bohr was always the last man to get a new idea in the seminars at Copenhagen, but the first one to get it right.

The fourth corollary is that one should always return from time to time to a consideration of the beginnings. One should never assume that one has acquired the beginnings well enough for all one's subsequent thinking in philosophy.

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TEXTS ON NECESSITY AND DIFFICULTY OF BEGINNING WELL

COMMON FOREWORD

The following is a first collection of key texts on the necessity (or importance) and difficulty of beginning well. These texts, to which others may be added, are a *common* good for all who want to philosophize well. They are offered to all philosophers as a permanent resource for thinking and writing about the beginnings and will serve as a common foundation for discussing the necessity and difficulty of beginning well.

Among the Greek philosophers of the golden age of Greek philosophy (from Thales to Aristotle), we find a full statement of the need to begin well in the books of Plato and Aristotle. But there is also some recognition of this to be seen in some of the fragments of the first philosophers before them. Parmenides, the first philosopher to speak explicitly of the statement about contradiction (it is impossible for the same thing to be and not be) as a beginning of his thinking, says about this common beginning that he will come back again to it.

Parmenides, DK 5

It is common to me where I begin for there I shall come back again.

Parmenides also speaks of this axiom about contradiction as the beginning of a road that reason should follow and the denial of this axiom as the beginning of a road reason should not follow.

Parmenides, Dk 2

> Come, I will tell, and you pay attention to my word when you have heard it, the only road that can be thought of: the one that it is and that it is impossible for it not to be is the road of belief for it follows truth; the other that it is not and that it must not be - this I

> tell you is a wholly unbelievable road. For you could neither know what is not, for this is impossible, nor say it.

Parmenides, DK 7

> For this, what-is-not to be, will never conquer. But you hold back thought from this road of investigation and do not let custom force you along the much-experienced road where sightless sight and ringing ears and tongue rule, but judge by reason the much-fought refutation spoken by me.

Later thinkers, as we shall see, use this likeness in discussing the danger of even a small mistake in the beginning. It is like taking the wrong road where two roads meet. Although one does not seem to be far apart in the beginning, the further one goes, the further one is from where one should be.

Heraclitus also spoke of the beginning as common and in the following fragment he see such a beginning as *feeding* its consequences. He compares it to the divine or natural law which nourishes many human laws. (How many laws of the city, for example, come from the divine law not to take innocent life?)

Heraclitus, DK 114

> Those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all, as much as a city is strong in its law, and even more so. For all human laws are fed by one divine law which governs as far as it wishes and is more than sufficient for all.

And when Empedocles is teaching the beginnings, he touches upon the usefulness of considering well these beginnings. Many other things will be gotten from the beginning being considered well or being firmly implanted in the learner.

Empedocles, DK 110

> If you press these things deep into your firm mind with a friendly disposition and a watchful attention that is pure, certainly all these things will remain with you throughout your life; and you will gain many other things from them; for the former things cause these things to grow into their own character according to the nature of each....

Hence, one could apply to the beginning the words of Empedocles in the following fragment:

Empedocles, DK 25

It is good to say twice what ought to be said.

Hence, also, the beginning is compared to a seed which must be planted deeply in the soul. And when this is done, much else will grow from it. Thus in a fragment from Antiphon:

Antiphon, DK 60

> The first thing, I believe, for mankind is education. For whenever someone has made a beginning correctly in anything, it is likely that the end will also come about correctly. And as is the seed one has sown in the ground, so also are the things one ought to expect will come forth. And when one sows a noble education in a young body, this lives and grows through the whole of life, and neither rain nor drought destroys it.

Even Protagoras touches upon this:

Protagoras, DK 11

> Education does not take root in the soul unless one goes deep.

But let us turn now to Plato and Aristotle.

Plato, *Laws*, Book VI, 753E

> For the beginning is called half of the whole work in the proverbs, and all praise beginning well on each occasion.
>
> But it seems to me that it is more than the half and no one has ever praised it enough when it has come to be well.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

Plato first notes the *common* thinking reflected in the Greek proverb (proverbs are a sign of some *common* understanding) that *the beginning is half of all* and in the praise *commonly* bestowed upon beginning well. As a student of Heraclitus (through Cratylus), Plato knows the importance of the *common:* "Those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all."

But then Plato states that the proverb about the beginning and the praise commonly bestowed on beginning well do not do justice to the importance of the beginning and the excellence of beginning well. For it seems to him that the beginning is *even more* than half and that one cannot praise *enough* the man who begins well. The latter statement also hints at the difficulty of beginning well for such praise is appropriate when something is most difficult.

It is also very significant that Plato should return to a consideration of the importance of the beginning and of beginning well in the *Laws*, which is commonly considered to be his last work. We should learn from Plato's example here that we should never presume to have understood enough, or acquired sufficiently, the beginning. If Plato returns to this topic even in his last work, how much more must we who are not his equal.

Aristotle says in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that Plato was right to ask whether we are on the road from the beginnings or on the road to the beginnings. This has more than one meaning. But sometimes we assume that

we are just on the road from the beginnings, going forward, when we may need to go toward the beginnings and acquire them better. The later on we can go forward better.

* * *

Plato, *Republic*, Book II, 377A-B

> Do you not know then that the beginning is the greatest part of every work, and especially for the young and soft? For especially then it is molded and takes on the form which one wishes to press upon it.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

When Plato states that the beginning is what is *greatest* in any work, he is not only indicating what has been said in the previous text (that the beginning is more than half of the whole). But he also regards the beginning as the *greatest* in that it is the most difficult part of the whole. Finding or recognizing and laying down the beginning is the greatest accomplishment.

Plato then points out that this has special importance for the young upon whom a good beginning has the most influence.

* * *

Plato, *Cratylus*, 436C-D

> If the one laying down the first erred and forced the other things towards this and compelled them to harmonize with the same, it is nothing strange, just as sometimes in geometrical figures when there has come to be a first small and hidden falsehood, all the rest following are made to agree with each other.

> It is necessary then for every man to have much thought and much consideration about the beginning of every thing, whether it has been laid down rightly or not. For that having been considered well, the rest following it will be seen.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

Here Plato emphasizes that even a small mistake in the beginning becomes ever greater as one proceeds from it. And he gives the reason for this: everything else is conformed to and judged by this beginning.

From this he concludes that one must think very carefully about the beginning and whether it has been laid down well or not. And he gives a reason why it is so important to have begun well which is that everything else can be seen as following from it. He has already given a reason why it is so harmful to have made even a small mistake in the beginning.

* * *

Plato, *Timaeus*, 29B

The greatest of all is to begin at the natural beginning.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

In this text, Plato teaches us that the greatest or best thing is to begin at the *natural* beginning. Plato's greatest student, Aristotle, sometimes notes explicitly that he is doing this. In the beginning of his book *About the Poetic Art* (1447a 8-16), for example, he states in the proemium:

> About the poetic art and its forms, what power each has, and how the plots should be put together if the fiction is to be good, further from how many and what kind of parts, likewise about whatever

> else belongs to this knowledge over a road, let us speak beginning first by nature from those that are first.
>
> Epic and the fiction of tragedy, further comedy and dithyrambic poems and most of flute and harp playing, all seem to be imitations {or likenesses) as a whole. But they differ in three ways...

Aristotle is going to begin from the natural beginning for a consideration of these things. Likewise, in the proemium to his book *About Sophistical Refutations* (164a 20-26):

> About sophistical refutations and apparent refutations, being paralogisms but not refutations, let us speak beginning by nature from what is first
>
> It is clear that some are syllogisms and some appear to be when they are not. This comes about, just as in other things through some likeness, so likewise in arguments.

In both of these texts, Aristotle begins with something more general than what he is going to consider, but which is close to the latter. This is the natural place to begin from for the reasons we learn in the beginning of his first book *About Natural Hearing* (whose title is customarily and misleadingly translated the *Physics).*

However, we must consider further what Plato and Aristotle mean by *natural* here. For *natural* can mean assured by nature and also what is not assured by nature, but is in accord with nature. There may be some beginnings which are assured in some way by nature and others which are not.

* * *

Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1098a 33 - 1098b 8

> Nor should the cause be sought in like manner in all things, but it is enough in some to show well that it is so, as about the beginnings. For that it is so is first and a beginning.

> Some of the beginnings are considered by induction, some by sensation, some by some custom, and others in other ways.
>
> One should try to go over each in the way natural to it and earnestly seek how they are determined well. For they have great influence upon what follows, For the beginning seems to be more than half of the whole, and many things sought become clear through it.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

In the first part of this text, Aristotle explains that what is a beginning and first in any reasoned out knowledge should not be made known in the same way as what is demonstrated therein. The beginning and what is known from the beginning are not known in the same way.

In the second part of the text, Aristotle points out that the beginnings private to each reasoned out knowledge are also not made known in the same way.

In the third part, he draws the conclusions that we must try to go over the beginnings in the way they are naturally apt to be known and hence that we must carefully consider how they can be determined. And then he gives the reason for doing all this which is that the beginning seems to be more than half of the whole and that from it many things we seek to know become clear.

Thomas Aquinas unfolds this in his exposition which we give in Latin and in a carryover or translation:

* * *

Thomas Aquinas, *In I Ethicorum*, Lectio XI, nn. 137-138

Aliam autem diversitatem tangit...quae attenditur secundum differentiam principiorum et eorum quae sunt ex principiis. Et dicit quod non est in omnibus eodem modo causa inquirenda. Alioquin procederetur in infinitum in demonstrationibus. Sed in quibusdam sufficit quod bene demonstretur, idest manifestetur quod hoc ita est; sicut in his quae accipiuntur in aliqua scientia, ut principia: quia principium oportet esse primum. Unde non potest resolvi in aliquid prius.

Ipsa autem principia non eodem modo manifestantur. Sed quaedam considerantur inductione, quae est ex particularibus imaginariis, utputa quod omnis numerus est par aut impar; quaedam vero accipiuntur sensu, sicut in naturalibus; puta quod omne quod vivit indiget nutrimento. Quaedam vero consuetudine, sicut in moralibus, utpote quod concupiscentiae diminuuntur, si eis non obediamus. Et alia principia aliter manifestantur; sicut in artibus operativis accipiuntur principia per experientiam quamdam.

Deinde...determinat modum quantum ad id quod est communiter observandum in omnibus. Et dicit quod homo debet insistere ad hoc, quod singula principia pertranseat, scilicet eorum notitiam accipiendo et eis utendo, secundum quod nata sunt cognosci et studendum qualiter determinentur in hominis cognitione, ut scilicet sciat distinguere principia ab invicem et ab aliis. Cognitio enim principiorum multum adiuvat ad sequentia cognoscenda. Principium enim videtur plus esse quam dimidium totius. Quia scilicet omnia alia quae restant continentur in principiis. Et hoc est quod subdit, quod per unum principium bene intellectum et consideratum, multa fiunt manifesta eorum, quae quaeruntur in scientia.

Translation of Thomas Aquinas, *In I Ethicorum*, Lectio XI, nn. 137-138

He touches upon another diversity which is seen in the difference of beginnings and those things which are from the beginnings.

And he says that a cause should not be sought in all things in the same way. Otherwise one would proceed in demonstrations without end. But in some it is enough that it be well shown, that is, made

clear, that it is thus; as in those things which are taken in some reasoned-out knowledge as beginnings: because a beginning must be first. Whence it cannot be resolved into something before.

The beginnings themselves, however, are not made known in the same way. But some are considered by induction which is from particular imaginings, as that every number is even or odd; some indeed are taken by sense, as in natural things, as that every thing which lives needs food. Some by custom, as in moral matters, as that concupiscible desires are weakened if we do not obey them. And other beginnings are made known in other ways; as the beginnings in the active arts are gotten by some experience.

Then he determines the way as regards what should be observed generally in all. And he says that a man ought to insist on this that one go over the individual beginnings, by getting knowledge of them and using them, as they are naturally known and one should seek out how they are determined in man's knowledge, so that he knows how to distinguish the beginnings from each other and from other things.

For the knowledge of the beginnings helps much in knowing what follows. A beginning truly seems to be more than half of the whole because all the rest is contained in the beginnings. And this is what he adds, that many of those things sought in reasoned-out knowledge become clear through one beginning, well understood and considered.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

In his commentary on the words before of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics,* Thomas explains in which reasoned out knowledge is used each of those ways of making known beginnings distinguished by Aristotle.

He also makes more explicit that a good determination of the beginnings involves distinguishing them from each other and from what is not a beginning. A student of the first book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics)* can recall how carefully Aristotle distinguishes matter, form and lack of form from each other

He also states more fully the reasons for knowing the beginnings differently than what is from the beginnings and for considering carefully the beginnings and how they are known.

* * *

Aristotle, *About the Universe (De Caelo et Mundo),* Book One, 271b 4-18

> To be thus or otherwise is not something small, but wholly different, and everything towards the consideration of truth. For this has been and will be the source of almost all the disagreements of those saying something about nature as a whole
>
> if indeed to depart a little from the truth becomes further along ten thousand times greater to those going astray.
>
> as if someone says that there is a smallest magnitude. For the one bringing in the smallest would destroy the greatest things in mathematics.
>
> The cause of this is that the beginning is greater in power than in size. Wherefore what is small in the beginning becomes very great in the end.
>
> But the unlimited has the greatest power, both of a beginning and of quantity, so that it nothing strange nor unreasonable for there to be a wonderful difference from holding that some body is unlimited. Hence, one ought to speak about it, taking it up from the beginning.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

This is the classical text where Aristotle warns us (as Plato has already done) that even a small error in the beginning is a great one in the end. Thomas Aquinas refers to this text in the beginning of his little work *de Ente et Essentia.* where he is also considering beginnings and the necessity of avoiding even little errors in them.

Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia,* Proemium, n. 1:

> Quia parvus error in principio magnum est in fine, secundum Philosophum, primo *Caeli et Mundi,* ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in primo libro suae *Metaphysicae;* ideo, ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum difficultatem aperiendam, dicendum est, quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur, et quomodo in diversis inveniantur, et quomodo se habeant ad intentiones logicas, scilicet genus, speciem et differentiam.
>
> Because a small error in the beginning is a great one in the end according to the Philosopher in the first book *de Caelo et Mundo;* and being and essence are what are first conceived by the understanding, as Avicenna says in the first book of his *Metaphysics;* therefore, lest from ignorance of them one happens to err, it should said, toward opening the difficulty of these, what is meant by the name of essence and being, and in what way they are found in diverse things, and how they are to logical intentions such as genus, species and difference.

But it is an especially clear example because it is taken from a most striking beginning in natural philosophy.

Aristotle also give clearly the reason for this which is that the beginning is great in power or ability rather than in size. The text is also remarkable for its example of a like great mistake in geometry which would be to think there is a least magnitude, such as a shortest line. Anaxagoras had already seen that "there is no smallest of the small." A similar mistake in logic would be to think of the universal as a class. Since the universal is the first thing to be considered in logic, as Albert the Great has pointed out, a mistake about the universal is multiplied through the whole of logic. The whole of logic is corrupted by such a

"little" mistake in the beginning. These things are unfolded more by Thomas in his commentary on Aristotle's work

* * *

Thomas Aquinas, *In I De Caelo et Mundo*, Lectio IX, nn. 96-97

Deinde..assignat rationem suae intentionis, ex diversitate quae accidit propter praedictam positionem. Et primo ponit hanc diversitatem consequentem.

Et dicit quod non modicum differt in comparationem ad speculationem veritatis in naturali philosophia, utrum hoc aut illo modo se habeat, scilicet quod sit aliquod corpus infinitum secundum magnitudinem vel non: sed magis inducit differentiam circa *totum*, idest circa totum universum, et circa omnem considerationem naturalem.

Hoc enim quod dictum est, fere fuit in praeterito, et erit in futuro principium omnium contradictionum inter eos qui aliquid enuntiaverunt de tota natura rerum. Illi enim qui posuerunt unum infinitum principium, posuerunt alia fieri quasi per separationem ab illo principio; et sic, propter infinitatem illius principii, dixerunt generationem rerum non deficere; sicut si aliquis diceret quod ex infinita massa possunt fieri panes in infinitum. Illi vero qui posuerunt principia finita, dixerunt fieri res in infinitum per reciprocam congregationem et separationem elementorum.

Deinde...assignat causam quare tanta diversitas ex hoc sequatur: quia scilicet qui modicum transgreditur a veritate circa principium, procedens in ulteriora fit magis longe a veritate decies millies.

Et hoc ideo, quia omnia subsequentia dependent ex suis principiis.

Et hoc maxime apparet in errore viarum: quia qui parum elongatur a recta via, postmodum procedens fit multum longe.

Et ponit exemplum de eo quod dictum est, in his qui posuerunt aliquam minimam magnitudinem, sicut Democritus posuit corpora indivisibilia: sic autem introducens aliquid minimum in quantitate, destruit maximas propositiones mathematicorum puta quod lineam datam contingit secari in duo media.

Et huius causa est, quia principium, etsi sit modicum in magnitudine, est tamen magnum virtute, sicut ex modico semine producitur magna arbor: et inde est quod illud quod est modicum in principio,in fine multiplicatur, quia pertingit ad totum id ad quod se extendit virtus principii, sive hoc sit verum vel falsum.

Infinitum autem habet rationem principii (omnes enim quicumque sunt locuti de infinito, posuerunt infinitum esse principium, ut dictum est in III *Physic*; et cum hoc habet maximam virtutem quantum ad quantitatem, quia excedit omnem quantitatem datam. Si igitur principium quod est minimum quantitate, facit magnam differentiam in sequentibus, multo magis infinitum, quod non solum excedit in virtute principii, sed etiam in quantitate. Et ideo neque inconveniens neque irrationabile est, si mirabilis differentia sequatur in scientia naturali ex eo quod sumitur aliquod corpus esse infinitum. Et ideo de hoc dicendum est, resumendo considerationem nostram a principio quod supra accepimus, de differentia simplicium corporum et compositorum.

Translation of Thomas Aquinas, *In I De Caelo et Mundo*, Lect. IX, nn. 96-97

Then he assigns the reason for his intention from the diversity which happens because of the foresaid position. And first he lays down the diversity that follows.

And he says that it makes no little difference towards the consideration of truth in natural philosophy, whether it is in this or that way; that is, whether there is some body infinite in size or not; but it rather leads into a difference about the whole, that is about the whole universe and about every natural consideration.

For this which has been said was perhaps in the past and will be in the future the source of all the contradictions among those who stated something about the whole nature of things. For those who laid down one unlimited beginning, laid down that other things came to be as though through separation from that beginning; and thus, on account of the unlimitedness of that beginning, they said that the coming to be of things will not cease; just as if someone said that breads can come to be without end from an unlimited mass. But those who laid down limited beginnings said that things come to be without end through the alternating congregation and separation of the elements.

Then he assigns the cause why so great a diversity follows from this: for he who departs a little from the truth about the beginning, going further becomes ten thousand times much farther from the truth.

And this is because all the things that follow depend upon their beginnings.

And this most of all appears in mistaking the road: because the one who turns a little from the right road, going further, becomes a long way off.

And he lays down an example about what has been said, in those who posited some smallest magnitude, as Democritus laid down indivisible bodies: someone thus introducing something smallest in quantity destroys the greatest statements of mathematics, such as that a given line can be divided into two equal parts.

And the cause of this is that the beginning, although it be small in size, is nevertheless great in power, just as from a small seed is produced a great tree; and thus it is that what is small in the beginning, is multiplied in the end, because it stretches out to all that to which the power of the beginning extends, whether this is true or false.

The unlimited however has the character of a beginning (for all who spoke about the unlimited, laid down the unlimited to be a beginning, as has been said in the third book of the *Physics*); and

with this it has the greatest power as far as quantity, because it excels every given quantity. If therefore a beginning which is small in size makes a great difference in what follows, much more the unlimited, which not only excels in the power of a beginning, but also in size. And therefore it is not strange nor unreasonable if a wonderful difference follows in natural science from taking some body to be unlimited. And therefore one should speak of this, resuming our consideration from the beginning that we took above about the difference of simple and composed bodies.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

Among the many wonderful things to be noted in Thomas' commentary on the text from Aristotle, not the least is the wonderful *manuductio* from the seed and from the fork in the road. The seed is the paradigm beginning for our reason which is nourished by the senses. The seed is small in size, but great in its power as seen from what it produces. And the *little* difference in taking the wrong direction at a fork in the road can easily be seen to lead one further and further from where one should be, the further one proceeds. Such *manuductio* is, of course, the first way that a teacher leads us from the known to the unknown, as Thomas explains in the article on the teacher in the *Summa Theologiae*.

* * *

Aristotle, *About Sophistical Refutations*, Chapter XXXIV, 183b 16-28

What has happened about this study should not remain hidden to us. Of all that is found, some is from those coming after developing what has been taken from others worked out before in part. But those found from the beginning usually take a small first advance, but are more useful by far than the later growth after from these

> For the beginning is probably the greatest of all, as has been said. And hence the most difficult. For as much as it is greatest in power, so much being smallest in size, is it most difficult to be seen.
>
> But this having been found it is easier to add and to increase the rest. And this very thing happened about rhetorical speeches and in nearly all other arts.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

This is a very important text on the importance and difficulty of the beginning. Aristotle speaks of the beginning in any art, such as logic, as being small with respect to what comes after, but as more useful and powerful than the rest. It is also most difficult to see because it is smallest in size, but greatest in power. What comes after is, comparatively, much easier. Many can add and cause the art to grow, once the beginning has been discovered or seen. But few could make the original discovery of the beginning. He says this can be seen in almost all arts and makes special mention of the art of persuasion or rhetoric which he, following in the footsteps of Plato, had studied so often.

Like Plato in the *Republic* and with the same word, Aristotle see the beginning as the greatest part in any knowledge over a road.

* * *

Albert the Great expands on the significance of the beginning in paraphrasing Aristotle's books *On Sophistical Refutations:*

Albert the Great, *Commentaria in Libris Elenchorum Sophisticorum Aristotelis*, Liber II, Tractatus V, Caput III, Doyon ed., pp. 254-255

> Oportet autem nos non latere quod accidit circam sophisticum et totum logicum negotium, quantum ad modum inveniendi ipsum et et ordinandi ipsum in artem perfectam et scientiam.

Nam eorum quae inveniuntur in omnibus aliis scientiis, sive inventa sunt, quae quidem sumpta sunt ab aliis, a quibus prius elaborata sunt, a posteris particulariter augentur, qui sua prioribus inventis adjungentes sic particulariter auxerunt, et sic prima inventa ab eis successoribus priorum, qui scilicet successores postea post primos accipiunt a priorbus inventa, et addunt sua ad artis et scientiae incrementum.

Quae autem in primis ex principio dictionis inveniuntur, parum valde in primis inventoribus augmentum sumere solent: quia non sunt nisi quaedam communissima, in quibus scilicet parum scitur de arte. Utilius autem est plurimo illo invento quod scitur postea additum et inventum a posteris: quia hoc coarctatum est et appropriatum conclusionibus artis: et ex hoc fit artis et scientiae augmentum usque ad perfectionem scientiae et arti debitam.

Maximum enim omnium fortasse principium est.

Et dico *fortasse*, non quia dubium sit, sed quia non est maximum quantitate, cum sit unum ex duobus simplicissimis principiis et incomplexis, subjecto scilicet et praedicato: et ideo quantitate substantiae minimum est, maximum autem est potestate, quia super omnes conclusiones influunt principia :

et hoc quidem dicitur ab omnibus Philosophis.

Propter quod et principium maxime primum ad inveniendum, non ad cognoscendum, est difficilimum, et praecipue quod in ratione principii, et non tantum in ratione veri cujusdam inveniatur: quanto enim optimum sive potissimum est potestate influendi super plures conclusiones, tanto parvissimum est magnitudine substantiae: quia ex duobus minimis est et simplicissimis praedicato et subjecto: et propter hoc difficillimum est videri quoad inventionem secundum quod influentiam habet super omnes conclusiones scientiae.

Hoc principio invento facile est addere sequentia, quae jam potestate sunt in ipso principio: et ideo notitia principii influit et illuminat ad sequentium inventionem et additionem. Unde facile est sic invento principio augere reliqua ad scientiam et artem pertinentia. Et hoc probatur per hoc quod talis inventio et talis

> additio etiam circa rhetoricas accidit orationes. Et pene circa omnes etiam accidit iste modus augendi circa omnes alias artes et scientias.

Translation of Albert the Great's *Commentaria in Libris Elenchorum Sophisticorum Aristotelis*, Liber II, Tractatus V, Caput III, Doyon ed., pp. 254-255

> It is necessary however for us not to hide what happens about sophistic and the whole logical enterprise as far as the way of finding it and ordering it into a complete art or science.
>
> For of those things which are found in all the other sciences, or have been found, some to be sure are taken from others, by whom first they have been worked out, while others have been made to grow in particular by those coming later, who, adding their own discoveries to those found before, have made the science grow in particular ways. Thus the first things having been found by the first thinkers, their successors take the things found by the first and add their own to the growth of an art or science.
>
> The things which are first found by those who begin to speak of a subject have little growth in these first thinkers because they are very general in which little is known of the art. But they are more useful than all that is found and known and added later by those who come after; because these are confined and made proper to the conclusions of the art. And from this, a science or art grows up to the perfection due to art and science.
>
> For the beginning is perhaps the greatest of all.
>
> And I say *perhaps*, not because it is doubtful, but because it is not greatest in size since it is something one from two most simple and incomplex beginnings, a subject and a predicate. And therefore it is least in the quantity of its substance, but greatest in power, because the beginnings flow into all conclusions.
>
> And this is said by all philosophers.

> And on account of this the beginning is most difficult to find and know, and especially to find and know as a beginning and not just as something true. For just as it is best or most powerful in its ability to flow into many conclusions, so it is most small in the size of its substance because it is from two most small and simple things, a predicate and a subject: and on account of this it is most difficult to be see it in the influence it has over all the conclusions of the science
>
> But when this beginning has been found, it is easy to add the things that follow for they are already contained in the power of the beginning itself. And therefore the knowledge of the beginning flows over and lights the way to the finding and addition of what follows. Whence, it is easy, the beginning having been found, to add the remaining things pertaining to the science or art. And this is proved by this that such discovery and such addition also happens about rhetorical speeches. And this way of growing happens in almost all arts and sciences.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

Albert does not divide and give the order of Aristotle's text as Thomas does. Rather he gives a paraphrase of the text and sometimes goes into questions it raises. The paraphrase does not need any commentary on it, but note that Albert says about its teaching: "And this is said by all philosophers." Perhaps this could be said of all the philosophers who are in the great tradition going back to Plato and Aristotle whom Thomas calls the "chief philosophers".

* * *

We can now turn to one of the greatest physicists of the twentieth century:

Werner Heisenberg, “The History of Quantum Theory” in *Physics and Philosophy*, Harper, N.Y., p. 35:

> Bohr’s theory had opened up a new line of research. The great amount of experimental material collected by spectroscopy through

> several decades was now available for information about the strange quantum laws governing the motions of the electrons in the atom. The many experiments of chemistry could be used for the same purpose.
>
> It was from this time on that the physicists learned to ask the right questions; and asking the right question is frequently more than halfway to the solution of the problem.
>
> What were these questions? Practically all of them had to do with the strange apparent contradictions between the results of different experiments...Again and again one found that the attempt to describe atomic events in the traditional terms of physics led to contradictions.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

This text from Heisenberg's Gifford Lectures is very interesting for a number of reasons. We have included it here because Heisenberg applies to a beginning that is a question the thought of Plato and Aristotle that the beginning is more than half. The beginning about which Plato and Aristotle said this was something known rather than a question. But Heisenberg is pointing out from his experience that asking the right question is often to go more than halfway. If we represent by a straight line the time and effort it takes to go from ignorance to knowledge, asking the right question is often more than half the distance from ignorance to knowledge. This has also been my experience. Socrates denies that he is teaching the slave-boy in the *Meno* how to double a square since he uses only what the slave-boy has answered out of his knowledge to come to know this. But in asking him the right questions, Socrates is doing much more than the slave-boy.

The text is also important in bringing out the connection between seeing a contradiction and asking the right question.

* * *

Werner Heisenberg, *The Physicist's Conception of Nature*, Scientific Book Guild, London, p. 53:

> ...what always distinguished Greek thought from that of all other peoples was its ability to change the questions it asked into questions of principle and thus to arrive at new points of view, bringing order into the colourful kaleidoscope of experience and making it accessible to human thought...
>
> Whoever delves into the philosophy of the Greeks will encounter at every step this ability to pose questions of principle, and thus by reading the Greeks he can become practised in the use of the strongest mental tool produced by Western thought.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

Heisenberg praises the Greek philosophers for their ability to ask questions of principle. These are questions which are about a beginning. Since such questions help us to see a beginning, and the beginning, although small in size, is great in its power, such questions are "the strongest mental tool produced by Western thought." Heisenberg urges us to read the Greek philosophers so as to acquire something of this ability.

* * *

Werner Heisenberg, *The Physicist's Conception of Nature*, Scientific Book Guild, London, p. 63:

> Those, however, who...wish to get to the root of things in their chosen vocation...are bound sooner or later to encounter the sources of antiquity, and their own work can only benefit if they have learned from the Greeks how to discipline their thoughts and how to pose questions of principle.
>
> I believe that in the work of Max Planck, for instance, we can clearly see that his thought was influenced and made fruitful by his classic schooling.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

Heisenberg in this passage again speaks of the importance for thinkers of reading the Greeks so that they can learn "how to discipline their thoughts and how to pose questions of principle." These two go together because discipline or order is based on some principle or beginning.

Since order is based on some beginning, a defect of a beginning in a philosopher results in disorder in his thinking.

The example of Max Planck is very significant because he began the physics of the twentieth century. When Planck was a student, it was thought by many that physics was complete in its principles. But he discovered a beginning, the quantum, which led to the greatest change in physics since Galileo, Kepler and Newton.

* * *

Descartes, Letter to the Translator of his *Principles of Philosophy*, Dover edition of Descartes' philosophical works., Vol. I. p. 208:

> ...just as in traveling while we turn our backs on the place to which we desire to go, the longer and the quicker we walk the further we recede from the place we are making for.... so when our principles are bad, the more we cultivate them and the more carefully we apply ourselves to derive from them various consequences, thinking that we are philosophizing very well, the further we are moving from the knowledge of the truth and from wisdom.

Descartes, in the fourth of his *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*, Dover edition of Descartes' philosophical works. Vol. I. p. 49:

> it were better never to think of investigating the truth at all, than to do so without a method. For it is very certain that unregulated

> inquiries and confused reflections...only confound the natural light and blind our mental powers.

Foreword to the Study of the above Texts

In the first text, Descartes is agreeing with Plato and Aristotle that a mistake in the beginning becomes greater the further we proceed from it. However, his road image does not illustrate this as well as the fork in the road image used above by Thomas.

In the second text, he considers in particular the importance of that beginning which is sometimes called *method*. Method here seems to mean a knowledge of the road to follow and how to proceed in our thinking. Descartes is very strong here on the effect of the disordered thinking which results from ignorance of that road and way of proceeding. We become blind, as it were, and unable to see (that is, understand).

* * *

George Washington, Philadelphia, 31 May, 1776, *Letter to John Augustine Washington*:

> To form a new government requires infinite care and unbounded attention; for if the foundation is badly laid, the superstructure must be bad.
>
> Too much time, therefore, cannot be bestowed in weighing and digesting matters well.
>
> We have, no doubt, some good parts in our present constitution; many bad ones we know we have. Wherefore, no time can misspent that is employed in separating the wheat from the tares.
>
> My fear is, that you well all get tired and homesick; the consequence of which will be, that you will patch up some kind of a constitution as defective as the present. This should be avoided.

> Every man should consider, that he is lending his aid to frame a constitution, which is to render millions happy or miserable, and that a matter of such moment cannot be the work of a day.

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

This text from the Father of his country is about a very different beginning than those discussed above in philosophy. However, it is can serve as an excellent *manuductio* by likeness.

Washington here compares the beginning to the foundation of a house. If that is not well laid, everything built on it will suffer. He see how necessary it is to lay this foundation well since the happiness or misery of millions of citizens will depend upon how it has been laid.

Likewise, the beginnings of philosophy (especially in our knowledge) can be compared to the foundation of the house. And since a godlike happiness is found in knowledge for its own sake and error is a great part of misery, we cannot be too careful that the beginnings are well laid.

The great Washington could hardly emphasize more the great care which must be taken about a beginning. It requires, he says, "infinite care and unbounded attention." He points out the time it will take: "a matter of such moment cannot be the work of a day." And even more strongly: "Too much time, therefore, cannot be bestowed in weighing and digesting matters well."

Likewise, much time must be spent on the beginnings of philosophy to insure that they are well laid.

George Washington, "Queries on a Line of Conduct,", May 10, 1789, *The Writings of George Washington,* Washington, D. C., United States Government Printing Office: 30: 321:

> Many things which appear of little importance in themselves and at the beginning, may have great and durable consequences from their

> having been established at the commencement of a new general government.

Because the beginning, although it appears small, is great in its power or consequences, as Washington notes here, it requires a statesman to see the danger in even a little mistake there. Hence, the following statement of Aristotle.

Aristotle, *Politics*, Book V, 1308a 33-35:

> To know what is bad in the beginning does not belong to just anyone, but to the statesman (the political man).

* * *

Shakespeare is also touching upon the beginning in these famous words:

Shakespeare, *Hamlet,* Act II, Sc. 2: "brevity is the soul of wit"

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

As Kittredge and others have explained, *wit* is here taken in the older sense of wisdom. Shakespeare is saying that brevity is the soul of wisdom.

Shakespeare puts these profound words in the mouth of a man who does not exemplify them anymore. For Polonius is, as Hamlet says (in Act II, Sc. 2, line 220), one of "These tedious old fools". Why does he do this? Perhaps both a poetic and a philosophic reason can be given. Since it is humorous when a man is the opposite of what he says, putting these words in the mouth of Polonius pleases the audience and also avoids the appearance of the playwright lecturing us. But at the same time, since opposites are more clear when laid along side each other, it serves as a manuductio *per oppositа*.

The fool multiplieth his words. His words are like those of Gratiano as described by Bassanio (*The Merchant of Venice*, Act I, Sc. 1):

> Gratiano speaks an infinite deal of nothing, more than any man in all Venice. His reasons are as two grains of wheat hid in two bushels of chaff: you shall seek all day ere you find them, and, when you have them, they are not worth the search.

But the wise man says more than others in fewer words. His words are more powerful. In this respect, they are like the words of those in power. In Shakespeare's *Timon of Athens*, the First Senator says to Alcibiades (Act III, Sc. 5):

> Do you dare our anger?
> 'Tis in few words, but spacious in effect,
> We banish thee for ever.

In like manner, the king's words in Shakespeare's *King Richard II* (Act I, Sc. 3):

King Richard:

> Uncle even in the glasses of thine eyes
> I see thy grieved heart: thy sad aspect
> Hath from the number of his banish'd years
> Pluck'd four away [to Bolingbroke] Six frozen winters spent,
> Return with welcome home from banishment

Bolingbroke:

> How long a time lies in one little word!
> Four lagging winters and four wanton springs
> End in a word: such is the breath of kings.

But the brief words of the wise man are not powerful in the same way as those of the king. They are brief like the lightning in their power to illuminate, but are often forgotten by fools. Shakespeare speaks well of this brevity of lightning in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (Act I, Sc. 1):

> Brief as the lightning in the collied night,
> That, in a spleen, unfolds both heaven and earth.
> And ere a man hath power to say, "Behold!"
> The jaws of darkness do devour it up:

So quick bright things come to confusion.

But a fuller and deeper understanding of Shakespeare's words that brevity is the soul of wit or wisdom can be seen from Thomas' commentary on the words of Aristotle in *Metaphysics*, Book VII (1041a 19-20):

But this is common to all and short

The Greek word for short here (*suntomon*) is translated in Thomas' Latin, by *breve* which is connected with Shakespeare's English word *brevity.* (Shakespeare, it has often been noted, stays close to the Latin etymologies of his words.) Thomas explains the words of Aristotle (*In VII Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XVII, n. 1654):

> Sed etiam dato quod haec esset alia ratio a praedicta, tamen hoc etiam est commune omnibus, quia unumquodque est indivisibile ad seipsum. "Et est quod breve", idest se habet ad modum principii, quod est parvum quantitate et maximum virtute.
>
> But even given that this was another reason from the foresaid, nevertheless this also is common to all because each thing is indivisible from itself. "and it is short", that is it has itself in the way of a beginning that is small in size but great in power.

If we understand by *brevity* in the quote from Shakespeare a reference to the beginning that is short or small in size, but great in power, we can see that such brevity is indeed the soul of wisdom. For such beginnings give rise to the whole of wisdom. The common to all could also be understood in the light of a beginning which extends in its power to other things without limit as in the fragment of Heraclitus (DK 114):

> Those who speak with understanding must be strong in what is common to all, as much as a city is strong in its law, and even more so. For all human laws are fed by one divine law which governs as far as it wishes and is more than sufficient for all.

Wisdom is called *first philosophy* among other reasons because it is about first things; that is, about beginnings. As Boethius teaches us, it proceeds understandably. What gives life to this understanding are the brief beginnings which are the beginning and the end of the wise man's thinking.

* * *

Edgar Allan Poe, as Charles DeKoninck noted, also saw some of these points about the beginning

Edgar Allan Poe, "The Gold-Bug", *Complete Short Stories of Edgar Allan Poe,* Doubleday & Company, 1966, pp. 95-96:

> "I suppose," said I, "you missed the spot, in the first attempt at digging, through Jupiter's stupidity in letting the bug fall through the right instead of through the left eye of the skull."
>
> "Precisely. The mistake made a difference of about two inches and a half in the 'shot' - that is to say, in the position of the peg nearest the tree; and had the treasure been *beneath* the "shot,' the error would have been of little moment; but 'the shot,' together with the nearest point of the tree, was merely two points for the establishment of a line of direction; of course, the error, however trivial in the beginning, increased as we proceeded with the line, and by the time we had gone fifty feet, threw us quite off the scent."

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

In the words "of course, the error, however trivial in the beginning, increased as we proceeded with the line", Poe has given us another manuductio for the danger of even a "little" error in the beginning which becomes greater the further we proceed. It is similar in reason to Thomas' one from taking the wrong turn at a fork in the road.

* * *

Edgar Allan Poe, "The Purloined Letter", *Complete Short Stories of Edgar Allan Poe*, Doubleday & Company, 1966, p. 135:

> "The material world," continued Dupin, "abounds with very strict analogies to the immaterial; and thus some color of truth has been given to the rhetorical dogma, that metaphor, or simile, may be made to strengthen an argument, as well as to embellish a description. The principle of the *vis inertiae*, for example, seems to be identical in physics and metaphysics. It is not more true in the former, that a large body is with more difficulty set in motion than a smaller one, and that its subsequent *momentum* is commensurate with this difficulty, than it is, in the latter, that intellects of the vaster capacity, while more forcible, more constant, and more eventful in their movements than those of inferior grade, are yet the less readily moved, and more embarrassed and full of hesitation in the first few steps of their progress."

Foreword to the Study of the above Text

In this beautiful passage, Poe has touched upon the greater mind's care in the beginning. The reason for this is that the beginning is that upon which everything else depends so that the better one considers the beginning, the better one will be in everything that comes after. And the other reason is that even a "little" mistake in the beginning is a great one in the end. Hence, it behooves us to be especially careful in the beginning. This is why Thomas could have been called The Dumb Ox.

* * *

Deo gratias who is the beginning and the end of all things.

Duane H. Berquist

DISTINCTION OF THE BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy is a reasoned out understanding of things or a reasoned out knowledge of them.[1] It is not that natural understanding of things which all men come to have that is confused and very general (although it may depend upon it).

Since philosophy is a reasoned out knowledge of things, it is *both* a *perfection* of reason in regard to things and acquired by the *use of reason*.

Because it is a perfection of reason to know things, philosophy must have beginnings about things. For as King Lear said, nothing will get you nothing. One cannot think out and reason out a knowledge of things from nothing. And unless these beginnings were about *things*, they would not give rise to a reasoned out knowledge of *things*.

Because it is acquired by the use of reason, philosophy also has beginnings about the right use of reason or beginnings of the good use of reason. For it is also possible to misuse reason.

Since the good use of reason depends both upon a knowledge of the roads to follow in our thinking (or a knowledge of the ways of going forward in our thinking) and upon our will (and to some extent even our emotions), philosophy has two kinds of beginnings of the good use of our reason.

One is the knowledge of the roads to follow in our thinking[2] or a knowledge of the ways of going forward in our thinking.

The other is the dispositions of will (and emotion) necessary to use our reason well.[3] For we may be willing to think about something or not willing to

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[1] This is why Plato and Aristotle often call philosophy an *episteme* whose etymology from *coming to a halt or stop* suggests we can carry over this word into English by *reasoned out understanding* or *reasoned out knowledge*

[2] Hence, Aristotle usually calls philosophy a *methodos* which comes from the Greek words for *over a road*. Philosophy is knowledge over a road or knowledge that follows a road.

[3] Philosophy is itself named from one of these key dispositions of will, the *love of wisdom* . *Philosophy* however is used by Aristotle and Plato not so much to name the love of wisdom, but the *knowledge* which a lover of wisdom seeks. (And therefore most of all to name wisdom.)

think about it. Or we may be willing to think about something slowly and carefully or hastily. Or we may be willing to listen to or read those wiser than ourselves or unwilling. And everyone knows, for example, how anger interferes with the good use of our reason.

Thus philosophy has three kinds of beginnings: (1) the beginnings about things, (2) the beginnings which are a knowledge of the roads to follow and (3) the beginnings which are dispositions of the will (and emotions) which help us to use our reason well or remove impediments to using it well.

Since the good is *ex integra causa,* all these beginnings are necessary to go forward well in philosophy. But we need to consider each of them in particular.[4] However, one of them cannot be good without the others.

Duane H. Berquist

[4] It was the great Msgr. Dionne (Requiescat in pace.) who taught us the importance and necessity of considering all these beginnings. We dimwits are merely following in his footsteps.

BEGINNINGS OF PHILOSOPHY IN WILL (AND EMOTIONS)

WONDER

The first disposition of will to be considered a beginning of philosophy is wonder. Plato and Aristotle seem to say by antonomasia that wonder is the beginning of philosophy. For it is out of wonder that men first began to philosophize.

But not every wonder is the beginning of philosophy. If I wonder who will win the game or how the story will turn out, this wonder does not give rise to philosophy although it may keep me watching the game or make me finish reading the story. If I wonder about a famous man like George Washington, what sort of man he was or what was the course of his life, this wonder might lead me to read a biography of Washington or even write one. But such wonder does not lead me to philosophize. If I wonder what it was like to live in Elizabethan England or imperial Rome, I might read some history or even do some historical research. But this is not to philosophize. If I wonder about some new gadget or invention of man, I am not becoming a philosopher. What then is the wonder which gives rise to philosophy?

The wonder that gives rise to philosophy is a wonder (1) about the universal, not the singular, (2) a wonder chiefly about what something is or why something is so and hence (3) a wonder about the cause or causes responsible for what something is or why something is so.

But perhaps we should add that it is chiefly a wonder about natural things. The wonder we have in reading Euclid's *Elements* is more the wonder or admiration of the simplicity and beauty of the theorems and proofs.

Now if it were easy to know the truth and avoid mistakes, the desire to know and the aversion for mistakes would be enough. But since truth is often difficult to know and error hard to avoid, the wonder of the philosopher must include or have with it the hope of overcoming the difficulties in coming to know the truth (for if one despairs of this, he will give up the pursuit of truth) and the fear of making a mistake (lest he become bold and careless in his

search for the truth). The philosophical life requires a balance of hope and fear, the hope of coming to know what you do not know and the fear of making a mistake on the way. If you have hope, but not enough fear, you will become presumptuous and easily fall into error. If you have fear, but not enough hope, you may easily despair and give up. We see Socrates in the *Phaedo* trying to balance hope and fear in his friends as they investigate whether the soul is immortal.

Logic is the tool of the man who wonders in this way. Since wonder is the desire to know what and why, the man who wonders finds the second book of the *Posterior Analytics* the heart of logic for him. For there we learn the connection of what and why with cause and each other, and with definition and demonstration. We can hope to know the unknown through the known for in logic, as Albert the Great most of all emphasizes, we are taught how to investigate and know the unknown through the known. But logic also teaches us how we err or make mistakes in our thinking. So the fear of making mistakes leads us to learn logic whereby we can avoid them. But in seeing how we err and how easily we do so, the logician also gives us that reasonable fear of mistake that is found in Socrates and other great philosophers.

THE LOVE OF WISDOM

The love of wisdom is a chosen love, a love in the will. And it cannot be chosen before one knows what wisdom is. The senses cannot sense what wisdom is or know its excellence. So the love of wisdom cannot be an emotion or feeling. It must be an act of the will. Aristotle says in the fourth book of *Wisdom* that the philosopher and the sophist differ by their choice.

But how must a man love wisdom to be considered a true philosopher? He must love it *for its own sake*. If he loves it for the sake of glory or honor or wealth or anything else, he is more to be called a lover of those things than of wisdom. If a man loves a woman for her money, we would call him more a lover of money than of that woman.

And if he loves something else for its own sake and more than wisdom, he should be named a lover of that. If I love the music of Mozart more than

wisdom, it would make sense to call me a lover of the music of Mozart more than a lover of wisdom. Thus a philosopher or lover of wisdom in the fullest sense is one who not only loves wisdom for its own sake, but loves it *more than anything else which he may love for its own sake.*

And if he loves wisdom for its own sake and more than anything else he may love for its own sake, he must love wisdom as the end of his life, the very purpose of it.

But since the knowledge of truth belongs most of all to the wise man (as Aristotle shows in the second book of *Wisdom,* the *Metaphysics*) and truth is the common good of man, the philosopher must also love wisdom as the common good of man and of reason.

Such love of wisdom is very rare and so the true philosopher must be very rare.

LIKENESS, DIFFERENCE AND NEED FOR BOTH WONDER AND THE LOVE OF WISDOM

Wonder is like the love of wisdom and some have even gone so far as to say that it is, at least, an imperfect love of wisdom. But the wonder that is the beginning of philosophy is about something unknown to the one who wonders. The one who wonders, as Aristotle said, wants to escape from his ignorance. But the love of wisdom is possible both in the absence and in the presence of wisdom. And the love of wisdom is greater and more stable or confirmed in the presence of wisdom. Hence, the love of the beautiful (which Socrates speaks about in the *Symposium*) is more akin to the love of wisdom. For the beautiful is that which pleases when seen. And thus it is found more in the one who knows than the one who does not know. And also wisdom is itself a most beautiful thing.

Wonder is also more particular in its object than the love of wisdom. For one wonders about something in particular, such as what is time or what is the soul. But the love of wisdom is a love of the common good of reason for

wisdom is the end of the whole activity of reason. Hence, the love of wisdom is necessary to insure the common good of reason which wonder does not insure.

Moreover, the love of wisdom is very much the love of order, not only because it belongs to the wise man to order or direct all others, but also because wisdom is the highest perfection of reason which, as Shakespeare teaches us, looks before and after. The lover of wisdom, therefore, loves not only the order he sees in things, but also the order in our knowledge. And since every reasoned out knowledge is perfected by order in itself and by the knowledge of some order or orders in the things it considers, every reasoned out knowledge (and not only the reasoned out knowledge that is wisdom) is stimulated to perfection by this love of wisdom. And since order is the first of the three chief forms of the beautiful, we again see the likeness of the love of wisdom and the love of the beautiful.

But the universality and perfection of the love of wisdom is not possible in the beginning for man who does not even know then what is wisdom. We wonder about something more particular which leads bit by bit to particular kinds of knowledge that are a kind of experience necessary to begin the universal considerations of the wise man.

TEACHABLENESS (IN THE WILL), MILDNESS, AND FRIENDSHIP

Man is by nature a social animal and he comes to know with the help of others. He can learn from others who already know something and he can investigate the unknown with those who are also ignorant of something.

In order to learn from others, he need that teachableness which is a disposition of the will to listen to or read carefully, frequently and with reverence the words of those wiser than ourselves.

And when he investigates the unknown with others, he needs that mildness which moderates anger and resentment toward those who think otherwise and are slow to see his thinking.

And both in learning from others and in investigating with others, he is also helped by the friendship that is appropriate. Homer, in the *Iliad* and the

Odyssey, and Aristotle, in the eighth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* have taught us the difference between friendship among equals and friendship among unequals. The friendship of the teacher and the student is between unequals, like that of father and son. But the friendship among those ignorant of the same can be a friendship among equals.

Envy is sadness over the good fortune or success of another. And flattery is undeserved praise of another. Both envy and flattery are opposed to true friendship although envy is much more opposed. If we envy those wiser than us or those who have discovered something before us, this will impede us from learning from them and may even lead us to slander them and their accomplishments. If envy harms the life of the mind in the one who envies, flattery can harm the life of the mind in the one who is flattered. For he may not correct his mistakes or perfect his thinking when he is flattered for what he has done. We need then true friendship in the life of the mind.

HUMILITY

Humility moderates the desire for excellence in accord with right reason and, therefore, it supports all the dispositions above.

If out of pride or arrogance one thinks he knows more than he does or knows what he does not, how will he wonder about what he does not know? But such wonder is the beginning of philosophy.

There is a proverb *Ubi humilitas, ibi sapientia.* Where there is humility, there is wisdom. Humility places us under God and godlike men in reference to God. And since wisdom is the knowledge of God in both senses, we can begin to see the wisdom of the proverb.

Teachableness also requires the humility to submit our reason to learn from those wiser than us (and to recognize them as wiser).

And since envy and anger especially arise from pride or haughtiness, humility helps to remove these impediments to learning from others and

investigating with them and greatly contributes to true friendship among philosophers.

Duane H. Berquist

DISTINCTION OF THE ROADS IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

We seek the distinction of the roads in our *looking* knowledge here, not in our art or foresight. By *looking* knowledge, we mean knowledge for the sake of seeing or understanding, not knowledge for the sake of making or doing. A *road* in our knowledge is nothing other than the order, the before and after, in our knowledge and in things as known by us.

Since nature and reason are responsible for order in our experience, is the road in our knowledge made by nature or by reason?

The first road in our knowledge is made by nature, but the other roads are made by reason.

The first road in our knowledge is the natural road in our knowledge. And the natural road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason. Therefore, the first road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason.

Since the *nature* of a thing (or what it is) is what is *first* in it (for a thing must be what it is before it can be anything else), the first road in our knowledge must, of course, be the natural road in our knowledge.

And since man is by nature an animal with reason, the natural road in human knowledge is, of course, the road from the senses into reason. For *animal* is defined by having senses. But man is not *just* an animal, but also an animal *that has reason*. And what pertains to the genus (in this case *animal*) always comes before what is specific by the difference (which in this case is *has reason*) in time and generation. Hence, the natural road must be from the senses into reason.

The second road in our looking knowledge is the road of reason as reason. This road includes the common road of reasoned out knowledge. Since reason is the ability for discourse; and this means not only the ability to know one thing

after another, but also to know one thing from knowing another, we would expect a road for which reason is responsible.

This road is based on the before and after in the acts of looking reason. A complete understanding of this road involves seeing three before and afters in the acts of reason.

Reason understands what something is before putting together or separating such things in a statement and it forms statements before reasoning. Logic as a whole is divided by this distinction of three acts.

Reason guesses (or believes) before it knows. This is why reason is often mistaken and spends more time being mistaken than in knowing. And here we see the importance of reasonable guesses: “Let us not guess at random about the greatest things.” Reasonable guesses are more apt to lead to knowledge; and if we do not get to knowledge, a reasonable guess is better than a wild one. Let us guess, then, by reason and by art (there is an art of guessing contained in Aristotle’s eight books *About Places* (the *Topics*). Reason goes from guessing to knowing by finding the natural beginnings of reasoned out knowledge. In geometry, men tend to guess the same, but elsewhere they tend to guess opposites. Hence, the order and reasons for that order given in the beginning of the third book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy.* Like guessing before knowing, reason also often believes on the word of another before knowing.

Reason thinks about something before understanding it. Reason goes from thinking about something to understanding it by thinking it out. And there are as many senses of thinking out as there are of *in* or more.

The third road (or roads) in our looking knowledge is the private road of each reasoned out knowledge. This is based on the matter of that reasoned out knowledge. The private road of each reasoned out knowledge should fit its matter and how our reason is towards knowing that matter.

THE ORDER OF THESE ROADS

The natural road is before the roads made by reason and the roads made by reason are acquired by the natural road which enters into them.

The *private* road of each reasoned out knowledge presupposes and is based in part on the *common* road of reasoned out knowledge, which is part of the second road.

WHERE THESE ROADS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED

We begin to consider the natural road in natural philosophy. But the full consideration of this road belongs to wisdom. For this road directs us in all our knowledge and this is the office of the wise man.

The *first* and *natural* road, the road from the senses into reason, is proposed to the beginner in philosophy since it will underlie all his thinking. But the defense and understanding of this road belong officially to the wise man that directs everyone else.

The second road is considered in logic. For logic is about the acts of reason as reason. In logic, we learn both how to make reasonable guesses and the common road of reasoned out knowledge.

The private road of each reasoned out knowledge should be learned in the beginning of that particular knowledge after we know its matter and the end for which that matter is studied and can see how our reason is to knowing that matter for that end. For the private road of each reasoned out knowledge should be measured by its matter and also fit how our reason is to knowing that matter. Thus the private road of geometry should be studied in the beginning of geometry and the private road of ethics in the beginning of ethics.

Duane H. Berquist

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FIRST ROAD IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

WHAT IS A ROAD IN OUR KNOWLEDGE?

The first philosophers carried over the word *road* by likeness from the road we walk or drive upon to the order we follow in our knowledge. Since order is defined by before and after, a road in our knowledge is nothing other than the before and after therein. Hence, understanding a road in our knowledge consists in seeing the before and after in that road.

All our knowledge is along a road or over a road and, most of all, our reasoned out knowledge. For reason knows one thing through another and therefore one thing before another. Hence, Aristotle often calls our reasoned out knowledge a *methodos* from the Greek words for *over a road*.

Knowledge of the road to follow is before knowledge over that road or knowledge which follows that road.

WHAT IS THE FIRST ROAD IN OUR KNOWLEDGE?

The first road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason. We can see this in the baby and the developing child. We naturally think first of what we can sense or imagine. Even those who question the reliability of the senses are forced to follow this road in attacking them.

Since we sense things before we understand them by our reason, and our knowledge begins with our senses, the first road in our knowledge would seem to be from the senses into reason.

By first, we mean not only in time (the road we follow as babies and children), but also first in being (that is, the road which can be without other roads, but not the reverse). Such a road may also be first in our knowledge in that we cannot understand the other roads except through this one. The first

road may also be before the other roads as a cause is before its effects in that the reason why of much that is found in the other roads may be seen in the first road. Indeed this road may also be first in the sense of best. But whether there is one road that is first in all these senses is something that can be seen only after we have found the first road.

If there is a road which is first in all or many of the above senses, it is not difficult to see the importance of knowing it. If all human knowledge is along or over a road, a knowledge of the roads to follow will help us go forward in an ordered way, more easily, and with fewer mistakes. And a knowledge of the road that is first (in all or many of the above senses) will be the cornerstone or foundation of that knowledge of roads.

WHY IS THE FIRST ROAD FROM THE SENSES INTO REASON?

The reason why the first road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason can be given in a syllogism whose middle term is the reason why. The syllogism is as follows.

The first road is the natural road in our knowledge. And the natural road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason

The minor premiss is clear because the nature of a thing (or what it is) is what is first in that thing. A thing must be what it is before it can be anything else. Hence, what is natural in a thing is first in it.

Since order (or before and after) is made by nature and by our reason, and the order made by nature is before the order made by reason, clearly any order made in our knowledge by nature is before any order made by reason. If then there is a natural road in our knowledge, this road will clearly be the first road in our knowledge.

The major premiss is clear because man is by nature an animal with reason. Animal is defined by having senses. But man is not just an animal, but an animal with reason. And what is general in a thing develops before what is particular. What is general in a thing is before in time and generation what is

particular in it. Hence, the natural road in our knowledge must be the road from the senses into reason.

It is not hard to see that this same middle term could be given as the reason why the road from the senses into reason is the first road in our knowledge.

The middle term in a syllogism for an affirmative conclusion should have a connection with both the minor term and the major term. There is a connection between *first* and *nature* and between the *nature of man* and the *road from the senses into reason* which is based on that nature.

The road from the senses into reason is in us by nature. It is in us first by the nature of man as an animal with reason, but also by the nature of his senses and the nature of his reason. The nature of the senses and the nature of reason also enter into the natural road. For example, it belongs to the nature of the senses and reason to be in ability to their objects and to go from ability to act in knowing. This is why they know in a confused way before distinctly as we shall see.

But the knowledge of the natural road is a work of reason as reason. This means that our knowledge of the natural road is a result of the discourse of reason, looking before and after. The connection between knowledge of a road and looking before and after is especially clear since a road in our knowledge is nothing other than a before and after in our knowledge and in things as known by us.

WHAT IS NECESSARY TO UNDERSTAND FULLY THE FIRST ROAD?

Since a road in our knowledge is nothing other than the before and after in our knowledge, we understand a road fully when we know all the before and afters in it. Hence, we will understand fully the road from the senses into reason when we see all the before and afters along this road and why this is before or after that.

To understand fully the before and after in this road, it is necessary to distinguish between the before and after in the *kinds of knowing* along this road and the before and after in *things as known* along this road. There is a before

and after both in the *kinds of knowing* along this road and in *things as known* along this road. Although these two correspond to some extent, there is need to consider both separately. And in both of these, there are many before and afters to be distinguished.

And in the order of things as known, there is a distinction between the order in which *different* things are known along this road and the order in which the *same* thing is known following this road. One thing is known before another along this road, and even the same thing is known in one way before another in following this road.

Hence, we shall consider first the order in which different kinds of knowing come along this road; second, the order in which different things are known in following it; and third, the order in which the same thing is known along this road.

THE ORDER OF DIFFERENT KINDS OF KNOWING ALONG THIS ROAD

The kind of knowledge that comes first along the road from the senses into reason is, of course, sensing (touching, tasting, smelling, hearing and seeing). And from sensing, there comes to be memory of what has been sensed (not only in man, but also in all the higher animals). And from many memories of the same, we gather an experience. For experience (in this meaning) is nothing other than a collection of many memories of the same. And from experience, without thinking about it, we begin to separate out what is common to the many and this enables us to begin understanding the universal (or what is common to many). This natural understanding (in some confused way) of the universal is followed by a reasoned-out understanding of universal things. (Clearly, our first understanding cannot be a reasoned-out one. If we understood nothing, we would have nothing to reason from.) Natural understanding and many forms of reasoned-out understanding are followed by wisdom which is the head of both natural and reasoned-out understanding.

In brief, then this is the before and after in the kinds of knowledge that come along the road from the senses into reason: sensation, memory, experience, natural understanding of the universal, reasoned-out understanding, and wisdom. There are many kinds of reasoned-out knowledge or

understanding, but this is perhaps not the place to enter into their distinction and order.

The before and after in different kinds of knowing along this road can be seen largely in Aristotle's proemium to wisdom at the beginning of the *Metaphysics.* Sensing, of course, comes first. And then memory of what has been sensed. And from many memories of the same, we gather one experience. And from experience, we separate out the universal which can be understood. Aristotle passes over the natural understanding of the most common things in the proemium and goes to the reasoned out understanding (or reasoned out knowledge) found after this natural understanding. After natural understanding and many forms of reasoned out understanding (among whom also there is an order such as mathematics is before natural philosophy), there comes wisdom at the end of the road. This wisdom is a perfection of both natural and reasoned-out understanding and the greatest perfection of reason.

ORDER IN WHICH DIFFERENT THINGS KNOWN ON THIS ROAD

As regards the before and after in which things are known along this road, it should not remain hidden to us that there is a distinction between the order in which *different* things are known along this road and the order in which the *same* thing is known. We should consider first the order in which different things are known along this road for this is easier to see.

There is a general obvious order in which different things are known along this road: sensible things are known before things that cannot be sensed. And with this, it is also clear that *more* sensible things are known before *less* sensible things.

But under this most general before and after, we can distinguish three orders ascending from the particular to the general.

First, material and changing things are known before immaterial and unchanging things for the former can be sensed in some way, but not the latter. Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs, as the Poet says. We know immaterial things from material things as causes are known from their effects.

Second, more generally we can see that effects are *usually* more known than causes, not only in going from material things to their immaterial causes, but even within the material and sensible world. Effects are usually more evident to our senses than causes. The frequency of the question *why* is a sign that the effect is more known than the cause. For we ask why when see the effect, but do not see its cause. It is mainly in mathematics that the cause seems more known to us than the effect. But in this way, mathematics is not characteristic of our mind.

Third, composed things are known before simple things. This is even more general than effects before causes and material things before immaterial things. Not only are material things more composed than their causes which are immaterial things, and more generally, causes are simpler than their effects, but this is true even of simple things that are not causes, such as the point. Even in mathematics, the simple is defined by the composed as if less known (for example, the point is defined as having no parts). The point is not a cause, but it is known by negation of extension or as the beginning of a line. Indeed as we go from body to surface to line to point, we know the increasingly simple by more negations of the composed. The senses know composed things.

ORDER IN WHICH THE SAME THING IS KNOWN ON THIS ROAD

As regards the order in which the same thing is known, we can also distinguish going from the particular to the general.

First, as Boethius says on the *Prologue of Porphyry's Isagoge* , a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. (*Super prologum Porphyrii in Praedicabilia:* "Singulare est dum sentitur, universale dum intelligitur.") When we see a dog with our eyes, the dog is a singular or individual dog. But when we come to understand what it is, we are understanding a universal. For what a dog is, is common to all dogs. Hence, what we sense is singular when sensed and becomes universal when understood.

Second, a thing is known in an outward way before inwardly. This is true not only because the senses know things in an outward way (in English *outward* is almost a synonym for sensible) while reason tries to gain *insight* or see into

them; but also because reason, in starting from the senses, in its own knowledge knows things in an outward way first. Hence, we are said to think *about* something before we think it *out* and understand it. Thus virtue is known outwardly as a praiseworthy quality before its inward nature is brought out. Hence, Heraclitus said that nature loves to hide because nature is a cause within.

A third and most important before and after in which the same thing is known is this: we know a thing in a confused or indistinct way before we know it distinctly. This is true, not only because reason is apt to distinguish things which are joined in our sense-experience, but also because the senses and reason are able to know a thing before knowing it actually. Hence, when the senses and reason go from ability to act, they first know a thing in a confused way before knowing it distinctly - for to know something in a confused way is in-between not knowing it at all and knowing it fully and in act. Hence, both the senses and reason know the confused before the distinct. They know a composed whole or a universal whole in a confused way before they distinguish their parts. Hence, both the senses and reason know the confused before the distinct.

SUMMARY

A distinct or complete knowledge of a road in our knowledge requires us to see the before and after in that road. For a road in our knowledge is nothing other than a before and after therein.

There are three before and afters to be seen in the natural road, as we have seen. One kind of knowledge comes before or after another kind along this road. And one thing is known before or after another along this road. And there is a before and after in our knowledge of the same thing along this road because we know the same thing in one way along this road before we know it in another way. No one can come to a complete knowledge of this road without seeing all three before and afters.

There is a difficult but profound order which is common to the order in which different things are known along this road and the order in which the same thing is known. Aristotle has pointed this out in speaking of the confused being more known to us than the distinct and the effect (usually), than the

cause. This most universal order in which things are known by us along the natural road will conclude our consideration of that order.

WHAT IS COMMON TO TWO ORDERS IN WHICH THINGS ARE KNOWN

There is a before and after in our knowledge which is common to the order in which *different* things are known along the first or natural road and the order in which the *same* thing is known along this road. Aristotle, with some help from Plato, was the first to bring this out.

The crowning order on the natural road is the two-sided coin that what is more known to us is before what is less known to us, but what is more known to us is less known by nature (or less known simply) and what is less known to us is more known by nature (or more known simply). We thus go forward from what is more known to us towards what is more known by nature (or more known simply)

The more known to us is before the more perfectly known. The more known to us is the imperfectly known and the perfectly known is less known to us. For imperfect knowledge is before perfect knowledge for us. And the imperfectly known corresponds to imperfect knowledge as does the perfectly known to perfect knowledge.

A sign that the imperfectly known is more known to us is that we are more sure of it than the perfectly known. We are more sure we are drinking a dry red wine than Pinot Noir. We are more sure of the effect than the cause.

Since our reason goes from ability to act, imperfect knowledge is before perfect knowledge for us. Hence, what is more known to us is the imperfectly known (for this corresponds to imperfect knowledge) and what is less known to us is the perfectly known (for this corresponds to perfect knowledge.

This is difficult to understand, but we can be led to understand it from or by the more particular orders in which things are known along the first road.

We can see the truth of this order from the orders in which *different* things are known along the natural road.

Material things are more known to us than immaterial things, but immaterial things are more known by nature (for things are understandable to the extent they are separated from matter and to the extent they are in act). After we learn that something is understandable to the extent that it is separated from matter, we can also see that material things are less known than immaterial things, but not to us.

Effects are usually more known to us than causes, but causes are by nature more known for the cause explains why the effect is so. We know effects by themselves more than in the light of their causes. We are often sure that the effect has taken place, but uncertain of its cause. But an effect is perfectly or fully known only in the light of its cause. For the cause explains why the effect is so.

And composed things are known perfectly only through the simple things which compose them or which are their causes. But we know more the composed thing by itself. Hence, what is more known to us is the imperfectly known.

We can also see that the road goes from what is more known to us towards what is perfectly known by considering the three particular orders in which the same thing is known by us along the natural road.

We know things more in an outward way than inwardly. But a thing is known fully when *what it is* is known and this is within it. Hence, the less known is more known to us and the fully known is less known to us.

And as Aristotle brings out in the proemium to the eight books of *Natural Hearing* (misleadingly called the *Physics* by translators), the confused is more known to us than the distinct. But a thing is more fully known when it is known distinctly.

And after we learn that something is understandable to the extent that it is separated from matter, we will also see that the material singular is less understandable than the universal. But the sensible singular comes before in our knowledge

This order may seem strange at first, but there is something proportional to it in every other kind of education.

In the education or development of the body, we begin with exercises *productive of lesser strength*, but *more productive of strength for us*.

The same is true in the education of taste.

The child likes the sweet taste of soda before that of a dry wine, but there is more to taste in the latter.

And the child's eye takes in, or comprehends more, the little drawing in his book than the great painting in the museum.

And the ear hears more the march although there is more to be heard in the Mozart symphony.

And the child can more imagine what takes place in the fairy tale than in Shakespeare's play. But there is more for the imagination in Shakespeare's play than in the fairy tale.

And in the education of the heart or of love, what is more lovable by us is in the beginning is the less lovable. Something is lovable because it is good. Hence, the common good is more lovable than the private good and the understandable good (like wisdom or justice) is more lovable than the sensible good (like sense pleasure). But the private good is more loved by us in the beginning than the common good (for the senses know only the private good) and the sensible good, more than the understandable good.

The reason why the orders in every education are thus proportional is that every education is the development of something from the imperfect towards the perfect. Hence, in every education, the imperfect comes before the perfect *for us*.

CONSEQUENCES OF BEFORE AND AFTER IN THE FIRST ROAD

CONSEQUENCES OF EXPERIENCE BEFORE KNOWLEDGE OF UNIVERSAL

Mathematics is before natural philosophy and political philosophy in the order of learning because of the extensive experience required for the latter.

And political philosophy after natural philosophy because of the more extensive experience required for the former. Hence, it is said that the young man is not a good judge of political matter although he can be a very good mathematician.

And wisdom comes last in the order of learning since it requires an experience of the particular forms of reasoned out understanding.

CONSEQUENCES OF SENSIBLE THINGS BEFORE THINGS NOT SENSIBLE

Since we name things as we know them, we name things that cannot be sensed from things that can be sensed. We place names upon sensible things that can be pointed out and then we carry over these names and place them (with a new meaning) upon things that cannot be sensed through the connection of the latter with the former (especially a connection of likeness or causality). Often there is a continuous before and after in this carrying-over of a name. (The word *in*, for example, is carried over seven times.) If one cannot follow the carrying-over, one is lost, not even knowing clearly the meanings of the words one uses everyday and even falling into the mistake that comes so often from mixing up the diverse meanings of a words. Because of this dependence upon the senses, we often call the meanings of a word its *senses*. When the senses of a word equivocal by reason are alike, the first sense is the one most sensible or closest to the senses.

Another consequence of knowing sensible things before those that cannot be sensed is that we must reason from the former to the existence and nature of the latter if we are to know them at all. Thus the Greek philosopher Anaxagoras reasoned from the order sensed in natural things to a greater mind that is responsible for that order. There are three ways in which things which cannot be sensed are known in some way through sensible things: (1) as a cause is known through its effect, (2) by likeness and (3) by negation.

Natural philosophy (which is about sensible things) is before wisdom (which is about things that cannot be sensed) in the order of learning. Hence,

wisdom was also called *metaphysics*, a contraction of three Greek words: *meta* (or after) *ta* (the) *phusika* (books in natural philosophy).

CONSEQUENCES OF MATERIAL THINGS KNOWN BEFORE IMMATERIAL THINGS

We can also consider here four most important consequences of our knowing material and changing things before immaterial and unchanging things.

First, mathematics (although it defines without sensible matter) and natural philosophy are about material things and therefore in the order of learning before wisdom which is about immaterial things. Natural philosophy which is a reasoned out knowledge of material and changing things comes in the order of learning before wisdom which is a reasoned out knowledge of immaterial things and of those common things which do not depend upon matter for their existence. This also casts light upon why wisdom comes last among the kinds of knowledge found along the road from the senses into reason.

Second, within wisdom, the common things which do not depend upon matter for their existence (although they can be in matter) are considered before the things which cannot be in matter. We consider substance, act and ability before the immaterial substances.

Third, we reason from material and changing things to immaterial and unchanging things. We reason from motion and moving things to the unmoved mover.

Fourth, we define the immaterial and unchanging things by the negation of the material and changing. Thus we first know God as the unmoved mover.

SOME CONSEQUENCES OF EFFECT USUALLY KNOWN BEFORE CAUSE

We wonder and ask what and why.

Although we can define by cause or by effect. We usually define by effect before by cause.

Likewise, we reason more from effect to cause than the reverse.

Wisdom, or the knowledge of the first cause, is last in the order of learning. If wisdom is a knowledge of the first cause, it naturally comes last among the kinds of knowledge on the road from the senses into reason. Even within wisdom, there is a consideration of effects before causes, the common things before their first cause.

CONSEQUENCES OF COMPOSED THINGS BEFORE SIMPLE THINGS

Immaterial things are known after material things and God last.

Simple things are known by negation of composed things. We define the simple by the negation of the composed. Even in mathematics, we define the point by the negation of parts. And as we go from body, to surface, to line, we add negations. (The surface has length and width but no depth; the line has length, but no width or depth.)

CONSEQUENCES OF A THING BEING SINGULAR BEFORE UNIVERSAL

First, there is the need of examples to illustrate the universal and in general of manuductio through sensible examples and less universal statements. This is also why an experience of the particular forms of reasoned out knowledge are necessary to dispose the reason for the universal considerations of the wise man. And in general, those forms of reasoned out knowledge which require less experience come before those that require more. Hence, the mathematical sciences which require little or no experience come before natural philosophy and natural philosophy before political philosophy which requires such an extensive experience.

A second very importance consequence, much represented in the *Dialogues of Plato*, is that we give examples of a thing before we define it. And indeed the first way we come to definitions is by comparing examples of the

thing to be defined and separating out what they have in common while leaving aside their differences).

A third important consequence in regard to arguments is that those which begin with the singular are more known to us and come before those starting with something general or universal. Example (an argument from one singular to another of the same kind) is before enthymeme and induction (an argument from many like singulars to the universal) before syllogism. Thus, Socrates in the *Dialogues* induces universal statements and then syllogizes from them. (The syllogism is based on universality.)

Wisdom, being the most universal knowledge, is last in the order of learning.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE OUTWARD BEFORE THE INWARD

We think about a thing before we understand it. We need to think out things to come to understand them.

We usually encircle or draw a line around a thing before we are able to define it fully.

Nature loves to hide because nature is a cause within.

Superficial philosophy or plane geometry comes before natural philosophy and substantial philosophy or wisdom in the order of learning.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFUSED BEFORE THE DISTINCT

The confused is more certain or sure than the distinct.

Reason needs to define, divide and distinguish. We know a whole, whether composed or universal, in a confused way before we distinguish its parts. And indeed we know a part distinctly before we know the whole distinctly. Hence, we proceed part by part, in coming to know a whole distinctly. And this seems close to the important truth that we see a part of the truth before the whole

truth. Hence the need to define and divide in every form of reasoned out knowledge.

We name a thing usually before we define it.

The beginning of a definition is a genus to which are added later differences. When we begin to define, we begin with the genus and then add differences, again going from the confused to the distinct.

We know the general before the particular.

And we know a word in a confused way before we can distinguish its meanings (and order if it has many meanings by reason).

It is not as clear that *we see a part of the truth before the whole truth* comes under the *confused is before the distinct*. But I tend to put it there since we see a whole in a confused way first and only gradually do we distinguish its parts, one by one. And this seems close to the important truth that we see a part of the truth before the whole truth.

IGNORANCE IN THE RATIONALISTS & EMPIRICISTS OF THE FIRST ROAD

Descartes seems to have thought that the distinct is more certain than the confused and hence that it replaces it, as light does darkness. From this arises the possibility of two great errors. One can think that he knows something clearly and distinctly because he is very sure about it. And one can think that something is certain because it is so distinct. Descartes falls often into both of these errors. This confusion (now in the sense of error or mistake) leads to the illusion that experimental science replaces the general philosophy of nature. Some of the great physicists of the twentieth century have come back from Descartes to Aristotle in this matter.

Spinoza, influenced by the custom of mathematics, thinks that the cause should be known before the effect in our knowledge as a whole. Hegel following

Spinoza think that what is before in our knowledge is before in things. Hence he tries to derive everything from the most general and confused thought of man.

Locke and Berkeley cannot understand the universal whole and are stuck on the composed whole. Hence, they cannot understand how the general is before the particular. Triangle in general for them is either a contradiction in terms or the smashing together of the particular kinds of triangle. Either triangle in general cannot be understood or it is "understood" after the particular kinds as a mishmash of them.

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SECOND ROAD IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

The second road in our knowledge is the road of reason as reason. This road is based on the before and after in the acts of reason. Perhaps there are three most important before and afters in the acts of reason as reason.

One is that reason understands what something is before it understands statements about it and reason understands statements before reasoning from some of them to another one. Reason understands to some extent what a man is and what an animal is and what a stone is before it understands that man is an animal or man is not a stone. And after reason knows some statements, it puts them together to get to some conclusion. Thomas divides the logical works of Aristotle as they pertain to these three acts. Every student of the first book of Euclid's *Elements* can see the order of these three acts clearly in the text. This is the clearest example of the common road of reasoned out knowledge. Reason understands what a thing is (however imperfectly) before it understands statements about that thing. And it understands statements about that thing before it reasons about that thing.

A second before and after is that reason guesses (or believes) before it knows. Since reason knows things in an outward way before inwardly, it guesses what it does not know. Likewise, because it knows the singular before the universal, it guesses about the universal from the singulars it knows. Reason is often mistaken because it guesses before it knows.

Some have held that reason should not guess and thus, in this way, it could avoid being mistaken. Others have urged us not to guess at random, but to make reasonable guesses. One could defend this second answer if reasonable guesses are as far as we can get (in many matters, at least) or if there is a road from reasonable guesses toward reasoned out knowledge or both of these are true.

A reasonable guess is apt to have some part of the truth and thus by reasonable guesses we may be able to approach a knowledge of the truth bit by

bit. And this fits our reason in knowing a part of the truth before it knows the whole. Thus, there is a road from reasonable guesses toward reasoned out knowledge

And unless we guess that something is true, we would not look for the reason why it must be so. Even in geometry, where it is easiest for us to find a reason why something must be so, we guess that something is so before we look for the reason why it must be so.

And when reasonable guesses lead to contradictory conclusions, the untying of these contradictions is the discovery of a difficult to see truth. Aristotle begins the third book of *Wisdom* (*Metaphysics*) which is dialectical with this reason. And Thomas sees the original cause of our having a way to opposite conclusions in our knowledge starting from the senses and signs:

> in hominis ratione contingit, quae, quia ex sensibilibus et per signa quaedam colligit veritatem, viam habet ad utrumque oppositorum.[1]

Thus, in untying these contradictions, we start to see the beginnings of reasoned out knowledge.

And in giving the reasons for dialectic in the first book *About Places* (the *Topics*), Aristotle states that dialectic has a road to the beginnings of all reasoned out knowledge. And hence we can speak of a road from reasonable guesses towards reasoned out knowledge.

A third before and after in the acts of reason, somewhat like the second but not exactly the same, is that reason thinks about something before understanding it. Reason goes from thinking about something to understanding it by thinking it out. But it should not remain hidden from us that *thinking out* has many senses or meanings and one kind of thinking out is presupposed to another.

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[1] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Capitulum LV

One way to begin thinking out the senses or meanings of *thinking out* is to think out the meanings of *in* or *to be in* which Aristotle has done for us in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing* (the so-called *Physics*). Thomas in his commentary on this book of Aristotle has further thought out the order of the senses of *in* or *to be in* since this word is equivocal by reason and in the work of reason there is always order. We can give here briefly those senses in order.

The first sense of *in* refers to place. We are in this room

The second sense is that of a part being in its whole as the tooth is in the mouth. This is very close to the first sense. If I loosened your tooth so I could take it out of your mouth, it would be in your mouth as in a place.

The third sense is that of the genus being in the species or part of a definition being in the definition. Like the first two senses, what is in something in this way is also actually in it.

The fourth sense is that of the species being in the genus. Here we have an extended sense of whole and part for the universal is sometimes called a whole for it is said of many particulars. But unlike the second and third senses, the parts of a universal whole are in it only in ability.

The fifth sense is that in which form is said to be in matter. For form is also in the ability of matter just as the species is in the ability of the genus.

The sixth sense is that in which the whole is said to be in its parts and this is like the fifth sense since the whole is to parts something like form is to matter.

The seventh sense is that of the effect being in the power of the agent. *I have you in my power* or the opposite *it is out of my hands*.

The eighth sense is that of the heart being in the good it loves: “I left my heart in San Francisco.” Or “My heart’s not in it”

We can begin to distinguish senses of *thinking out* from the above.

We can think out the parts of some whole. We could think out that the parts of a plot are its beginning, middle and end or the parts of a statement are noun and verb.

Then we can think out the definition of some thing. We might think out the definitions of beginning, middle and end or the definitions of noun and verb and statement.

Then we can think out the particular kinds of something. We might think out the distinction between a tragic and a comic plot or we might think out the species of statement which are affirmation and negation.

We can think out the order of things as Thomas did the order of the eight central sense of *in.* Aristotle thought out the order of the powers of the soul.

After we have thought out the definitions of even number and odd number, we could think out the statement of which these are parts: no even number is odd. Or after we have thought out the species of statement, affirmation and negation, we might think out the statement that every statement has an opposite statement – every affirmative statement has an opposite negative statement and vice-versa. This sense of thinking out corresponds to the sixth sense of *being in*.

And after we have thought out some statements that are obvious from their parts, we can begin to think out conclusions. The conclusion of a syllogism is in its premisses in the seventh sense of *being in*. Hence, this sense of thinking out corresponds to the seventh sense above.

We can begin to see then from this brief consideration of the senses of *being in* that there are many senses of *thinking out* corresponding to them. And even the order of these kinds of thinking out somewhat corresponds to the order of the senses of *being in*.

But there are more senses of thinking out than those corresponding to the central senses of *being in*.

All reasoned out knowledge begins from thinking out definitions, divisions, distinctions and proportions.

Aristotle gives two different ways of thinking out a definition in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*.

The man who defines also divides in one way for he separates the parts of the definition. But not everyone who divides defines. We can think out the parts that a thing has outside reason. And here there are at least two ways corresponding to the two kinds of parts that a thing can have in itself outside of reason. We can think out the quantitative parts of the thing as when we think out the parts of an animal's body. Or we can think out the essential parts of the thing which are its matter and form. Going back into reason, we can also think out the particular kinds of a more general kind of thing, as when we divide a genus into its species.

Just as every division is not a definition, so every distinction is not a division in the strict or narrow sense. A division in the strict sense is the distinction of the parts of some whole. But there are many kinds of distinction that are very common in philosophy which are not division in the strict sense. We must think out the senses or meanings of a word in every part of philosophy (and sometimes of a speech). We must think out the distinction of the through itself and the through happening or the as such and the by happening. Likewise, we must think out the distinction between the through itself and the through another in every part of philosophy. Again, we are always called upon in every part of philosophy to think out the distinction between what is so simply and what is so not simply, but in some qualified or imperfect way.

Thus there are many kinds of thinking out corresponding to the various kinds of distinction and division. And there is more than one way of thinking out a definition.

Besides thinking out distinctions, divisions and definitions, the thinking out of proportions is fundamental in every part of philosophy. We are using the word *proportion* here to mean a likeness of ratios (a ratio being the order or relation of one thing to another). To think out a proportion means to come to see distinctly in what way the two ratios are alike. We often misunderstand a proportion, thinking the ratios are alike in ways they are not. Thus to think out a proportion is to come to see exactly in what way the two ratios are and are not alike.

To think out in one way may presuppose many other thinking outs. In the second book *About the Soul,* Aristotle thinks out six distinctions and divisions before trying to think out the definition of the soul.

The thinking out of some statements is possible after some distinctions or divisions or definitions or proportions have been thought out. Thus, after Euclid has defined circle and diameter, he thinks out that the diameter bisects the circle into two equal parts. And after he has defined right angle, he thinks out that all right angles are equal.

And after some statements have been thought out in the aforesaid way, we can begin to think out conclusions by syllogism.

The thinking out of order (which has many senses corresponding to the many senses of *before*) always presupposes the thinking out of some distinction. Aristotle thinks out the order of ability and act after he has though out their distinction in the ninth book of *Wisdom*. But thinking out an order may also require much reasoning.

We often think about something a long time before we think it out. And sometimes we do not succeed in thinking it out. Plato often represents this in the *Dialogues.* In the first book *About the Soul*, Aristotle recounts his predecessors' thinking about the soul, but it not until the second book that he is able to think out what the soul is.

We have seen what are perhaps the three main before and afters in the second road in our knowledge, in the road of reason as reason. This includes the common road of reasoned out knowledge. But for a complete knowledge of this road, the student must learn logic.

Duane H. Berquist

THE BEFORE AND AFTER IN THE ACTS OF (LOOKING) REASON

The second road in our knowledge is the road of reason as reason. The before and after in this road corresponds to the before and after in the acts of looking reason considered in logic.

A complete and fully distinct knowledge of the before and after in the acts of looking reason requires us to see the distinction and order of those acts in more than one way. Following the rule of two or three, one can see the distinction of those acts into three by Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas or into two by Plato and Albert the Great. (Aristotle and Thomas also touch upon this distinction into two.)

Although these two ways of distinguishing the acts of looking reason and seeing their order somewhat overlap and correspond, a complete and fully distinct knowledge of their order requires one to consider both. Even though the same things somewhat are spoken of in somewhat different words, this richness of consideration gives us a more distinct knowledge of the before and after in this road. Moreover, other before and afters that can be seen in the acts of reason as reason can be considered in connection with these fundamental distinctions by Aristotle and Thomas and by Plato and Albert the Great.

In his major proemium to logic (at the beginning of his laying out of the *Posterior Analytics* of Aristotle), Thomas Aquinas distinguishes three acts of our reason and indicates an order among them so as to explain the distinction and order of the books in logic of the father of logic, Aristotle.

The first of these acts is grasping what something is or understanding what something is. The second act is understanding the true or the false by putting together things understood by the first act in an affirmative statement or dividing them in a negative statement. The third act is reasoning from statements known to another statement.

The *Categories* of Aristotle is ordered to the first act of understanding what something is. The *Per Hermeneias* is about the statement and hence corresponds to the second act. The remaining books of Aristotle's *Organon* are ordered to the third act of reasoning.

Since reason is an ability and an ability is defined by the act for which it is an ability, the above distinction of the acts of reason enables us to define reason as *the ability to understand and reason.*

Some understanding is before reasoning. For if reason understood nothing before reasoning, it would have nothing to reason from. But is there not also an understanding *after* reasoning, after perfect reasoning, a reasoned out understanding? Boethius points out that reasoning is to understanding, as motion is to rest. But there can be rest before motion and after motion. The Greek word for science in the sense of necessary knowledge, *episteme*, comes from the Greek word for coming to a halt or stop. And therefore it seems to name an understanding after reasoning. We can come back to this after we have seen another before and after in the acts of reason that can be considered in connection with this before and after in the acts of reason pointed out by Thomas in his major proemium to logic.

Reason is somewhat capable of coming to know what it does not know through what it knows already. Hence, Shakespeare begins the definition of reason as reason by saying that it is *the ability for discourse* where the word *discourse* names the act of coming to know the unknown through the known.

Reason comes to know the unknown through the known by defining and reasoning and also by counting and calculating. Hence, the Greeks named both the art of defining and reasoning and the art of counting and calculating from the word for reason. Our words *logic* and *logistic* are derived from these Greek words although in English *logic* more names the art of defining and reasoning than *logistic*, the art of counting and calculating.

There does not seem to be one art of these four acts. One does not know how many men there are through knowing what a man is (even though you must know in some way what a man is before you can count men) and counting men will not tell you what a man is.

We shall be concerned with reason's defining and reasoning rather than its counting and calculating since the former are more universal and basic and are the matter of logic.

Reason must recall things that it knows already and bring them together before it can come to know something else through them. This is true of both defining and reasoning (as well as of counting and calculating).

Socrates or Plato in the *Meno* and Albert the Great in his logical works distinguished between the simple unknown which is made known especially by defining and the complex unknown which is made known by reasoning. The simple unknown is what this or that is and the complex unknown is whether or why this is that. The simple unknown must be known in some way before the complex unknown can be known. As Socrates points out in the *Meno,* we must know what virtue is before we can know fully whether virtue can be taught or not.

But reason cannot know every complex unknown, or statement, through other statements and it cannot know the simple unknown, or what something is, by always knowing something else. If this were so, it could never come to know anything. For there would be an infinity of comings to know before any coming to know. And it could not even begin to know anything for knowing anything would presuppose knowing something else. Reason must come to know what it does not know at last through what it knows naturally and through the senses. The *through another* always presupposes the *through itself*. Reason must know what it knows through another at last by what it knows through itself. And this is what it knows naturally and through the senses. Thomas explains this before and after thus (and in so doing, he had in mind a distinction of the acts of reason into two: coming to know the simple unknown and coming to know the complex unknown):

> Nam intellectus humanus natus est rerum quidditatem comprehendere; in quibus cognoscendis naturaliter procedit sicut in cognoscendis conclusionibus complexis.
>
> Insunt enim nobis naturaliter quaedam principia prima complexa omnibus nota, ex quibus ratio procedit ad cognoscendum in actu conclusiones quae in praedictis principiis potentialiter continentur, sive per inventionem propriam, sive per doctrinam alienam, sive per revelationem divinam; in quibus omnibus modis cognoscendis homo iuvatur ex principiis naturaliter cognitis: vel ita quod ipsa principia cognita ad cognitionem acquirendam sufficiant adminiculantibus sensu et imaginatione, sicut cum aliquam cognitionem acquirimus

> per inventionem vel doctrinam; vel ita quod principia praedicta ad cognitionem acquirendam non sufficiant: nihilominus tamen in huiusmodi cognoscendis principia dirigunt, in quantum inveniuntur non repugnare principiis naturaliter cognitis: quod si esset, intellectus nullo modo eis assentiret, sicut non potest dissentire principiis.
>
> Et similiter in intellectu insunt nobis etiam naturaliter quaedam conceptiones omnibus notae, ut entis, unius, boni, et huiusmodi, a quibus eodem modo procedit intellectus ad cognoscendum quidditatem uniuscuiusque rei, per quem procedit a principiis per se notis ad cognoscendas conclusiones; et hoc vel per ea quae quis sensu percipit, sicut cum per sensibiles proprietates alicuius rei concipio illius rei quidditatem; vel per ea quae ab aliis quis audit, ut cum laicus qui nescit quid sit musica, cum audit aliquam artem esse per quam discit canere vel psallere, concipit quidditatem musicae, cum ipse praesciat quid sit ars, et quid sit canere; aut etiam per ea quae ex revelatione habentur, ut est in his quae fidei sunt.[1]

What reason knows naturally and through the senses is the beginning of all its knowledge. We acquire what is not natural through what is natural as we acquire artifacts and artificial tools through our hands which we have by nature and language, by imitation which is natural to man.

There are other before and afters in the acts of reason which can be considered either with the distinction of the three acts by Thomas or with the distinctions of the two kinds of discourse, coming to know the unknown through the known

With the three acts of reason, we can consider the following before and after: Reason thinks about something before understanding it. And reason goes from thinking about something to understanding it by thinking it out. Hence, there is

[1] *Quodlibetum Octavum*, Quaestio II, Art. 2, Corpus

another threesome to be considered here: thinking about something, thinking it out, understanding it.

But it should not escape us that these three are said in many ways. This is perhaps most easily seen in *thinking out*. *Thinking out* is said in many ways. The senses of thinking out can be distinguished by the senses of *in* and *out* in the Fourth Book of *Natural Hearing* (which the rude multitude call the *Physics*), and, at least, in the second through the seventh senses (in the order of the central senses thought out by Thomas Aquinas). If the reader is not familiar with the eight ordered central senses of *being in*, we suggest that he think out the eight central senses and then think out their order. Or if he is unable to do this, he might learn them and their order from Aristotle and Thomas in the fourth book of *Natural Hearing*.[2]

When reason tries to understand what something is, it may need to think out its definition. And this corresponds to the third sense of in and out. And to some extent, the whole of dialectic is about thinking out definitions, as Aristotle explains in distinguishing the dialectical *places.* And whether it defines or not, reason will also find it useful to think out the parts of a thing which corresponds somewhat to the second sense of in and out (at least, when thinking out quantitative parts). And in trying to understand what a particular kind of thing is, reason will need to think out the division of a general kind of thing into its particular kinds. And this corresponds to the fourth sense of in and out. And in general, reason must think out many distinctions and think out the order of the distinct in trying to understand what something is. And these senses of *thinking out* correspond to the fourth and fifth senses of in and out

Some statements can be thought out of their parts. If I understand what an odd number is and what an even number is, it is not difficult to think out that *no odd number is even*. And if I understand what a whole and what a part is, it is not difficult to think out that *a whole is more than one of its parts*. And this corresponds to the sixth sense of in and out.

But most statements need to be thought out of other statements. This is *thinking out a conclusion* which can also be called *reasoning out a conclusion*. By thinking out in this way, one may be able to reach a reasoned out understanding. This corresponds to the seventh sense of in and out

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[2] *In IV Physicorum*, Lectio IV

Thinking out parts like matter and form is perhaps attached to the third sense for the genus is to difference as matter to form. Likewise, distinguishing the senses of a word is attached to the fourth sense, but is quite different from it.

And the order of thinking out somewhat corresponds to the order of the senses of *in* and *out* and to the order of the three acts of reason. (Senses two through five to the first act, the sixth sense to the second act and, of course, the seventh sense to the third act of reasoning.

But there is another before and after in the acts of reason that can be considered more with reason's coming to know the unknown through the known. Reason guesses before it knows. And this is true both in trying to know the simple unknown and in trying to know the complex unknown. About the simple unknown, Thomas writes:

> Nos autem quidditates rerum ex accidentibus et effectibus coniectamus.[3]

And even the geometer, who is most able to come to know the complex unknown, guesses before he looks for the reason why it must be so. And in the more difficult parts of philosophy (whether more difficult than geometry because they are about the less knowable or because of the weakness of our reason), reason often guesses opposites with some probability. And often reason gets no further that a guess. Now logic is not necessary to make a wild guess, but it is useful for making reasonable guesses. This pertains to the part of logic which could be called the art of dialectical reasoning. And since reasonable guesses are more apt to lead to knowledge than wild guesses, dialectic prepares the way for knowledge.

Hence, dialectical reasoning comes before demonstrative reasoning for dialectical reasoning enables us to make a reasonable guess. And when we reason dialectically to opposite conclusions and even to contradictory conclusions, we often can do so because we are bringing out different parts of the truth. And this fits our seeing a part of the truth before we see the whole

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[3] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber III, Capitulum XCI

truth about something. A reasonable guess has some probability to it. And the probable is apt to contain some part of the truth. Further it is natural for man to see a part of the truth before he sees the whole truth.

Reason often sees a contradiction or what seems to be a contradiction before major discoveries. The untying of the contradiction is the major discovery.

Since we have seen how dialectical reasoning comes before demonstrative reasoning, we can also see some other befores and after from the third and fourth tools of dialectic.

Reason sees a likeness before it defines, or induces a general statement or reasons from one ratio to another like it.

Reason also sees a difference before it defines.

In the definition of reason by Shakespeare (the ability for large discourse, looking before and after) which is connected with Plato's and Albert's emphasis on discourse (or coming to know the unknown through the known), we can see some other before and afters in the acts of reason.

Since discourse is coming to know the unknown through the known, reason must recall some things it knows already *before* it can come to know something else through them. In that sense, learning by reason, or by discourse, is recalling or involves recalling. But one does not recall what one learns because one is coming to know it for the first time in one's life.

And reason sees a distinction before it sees a before and after. This can be seen from the axiom of before and after: nothing is before or after itself. Reason cannot see that this is before that if it cannot see some distinction between this and that. (But one can see a distinction between two things without seeing that one is before the other. Reason discourses, as Shakespeare teaches us, before it sees a before and after (and even perhaps sometimes before it sees a distinction).

Hence, reason's not seeing a distinction or misunderstanding it seems to be a beginning of trouble for reason.

And there is a distinction in knowing between grasping and judging. Reason grasps before it judges. Judging is the perfection of knowing, but grasping is the beginning. Hence, those authors, who cannot or will not express themselves clearly, are a long way from leading us to any knowledge.

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THE THIRD ROAD(S) IN OUR KNOWLEDGE

The third road in our knowledge is the private road of each reasoned out knowledge. Since the matter of each reasoned out knowledge is different, and the road and way of going forward in any reasoned out knowledge must fit the matter of that reasoned out knowledge, there is a road private to each reasoned out knowledge.

Since reasoned out knowledge is an effect of demonstration and definition is the beginning of demonstration, the way of defining and the way of demonstrating will be fundamental elements to be considered in the private road of any reasoned out knowledge. Besides these, there is also the order of determination or the order of considering things in that reasoned out knowledge.

Along with the way of defining, we may consider in general the way of making known its private beginnings in each reasoned out knowledge. And since judgment is the separation of the true from the false by some beginning in our knowledge, we may consider here the limit of judgment in that reasoned out knowledge

Under the way of demonstrating, we can consider whether they demonstrate more from cause to effect or from effect to cause. And second, by what causes they demonstrate. And third how rigorous are these demonstrations.

Besides these six elements of the private road of a particular reasoned out knowledge, we must also, as has been said, know its order of consideration of things.

We can exemplify these elements of the private road of a reasoned out knowledge and how they differ by taking our examples from natural philosophy and mathematics.

In the second book of *Natural Hearing* (the *Physics*), Aristotle distinguishes between the way of defining in natural philosophy and in

mathematics. The natural philosopher defines with sensible matter and motion; the mathematician defines without these. Likewise, the natural philosopher makes known his beginnings by sense experience while the mathematician uses the imagination. And thus the limit of judging in natural philosophy is the senses while in mathematics it is the imagination.

Likewise, we learn that the natural philosopher often goes from effect towards cause while the geometer always proceeds from the cause to the effect. Likewise, in the second book of *Natural Hearing,* we learn that the natural philosopher must use all four kinds of cause in his demonstrations while the mathematician uses only the formal cause. But the demonstrations of the mathematician are more rigorous while the natural philosopher must often be content with what is so for the most part.

The order of consideration or determination is also different in these two forms of reasoned out knowledge. The geometer considers the simple before the composed and the equal before the unequal for the most part, as is clear to the student of Euclid's *Elements*. But natural philosophy proceeds from the general to the particular and goes toward matter as Aristotle shows in the beginning of the first book of *Natural Hearing*.

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DISTINCTION OF THE BEGINNINGS ABOUT THINGS

A distinction of the beginnings about things is brought out by Aristotle in the *Posterior Analytics* when he distinguishes between the common beginnings of reasoned out knowledge and the private beginnings of one reasoned out knowledge. The former beginnings are common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge while the latter are limited to one form of reasoned out knowledge.

Foremost among the beginnings common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge are the statements about being and non-being: it is impossible to be and not be (at the same time and in the same way) and it is necessary to be or not to be (in the same way of being in the same time). Other examples can be given about beginning and about whole and part: nothing is a beginning of itself (and nothing is before or after itself) and the whole is more than one of its parts. These are beginnings of every reasoned out knowledge. Every reasoned out knowledge goes forward from such beginnings.

The parts of the above statements (such as being and non-being, whole and part, before and after etc.) can also be said to be beginnings of all reasoned out knowledge.

But these beginnings are not enough for any reasoned out knowledge. Each reasoned out knowledge needs beginnings which are private to it. Thus the geometer needs to know, for example, what is a right angle and that all right angles are equal. In the first book of Euclid's *Elements*, the definitions and postulates are beginnings private to geometry and the axioms are beginnings common to it and other forms of reasoned out knowledge.

Boethius divides these beginnings in comparison to us. The statements which are beginnings are statements known through themselves. For statements known through other statements are conclusions, not beginnings. Boethius then points out the distinction between statements known through themselves *by all men* and statements known through themselves *by the wise* (that is, those learned in some reasoned out knowledge). Every man knows what a whole is and what a part is. And hence every man sees that a whole is more than one of its parts. But not every man knows what a right angle is and hence only to those who have some learning in geometry is the statement *all right angles are equal* known through itself.

It is not too hard to see that Boethius and Aristotle have distinguished the beginnings into the same two groups, but in comparison to different things: to reasoned out knowledge and to us. For the beginnings common to all reasoned out knowledge, or which are beginnings of all reasoned out knowledge, are the same as the beginnings which are known through themselves by all men. And the beginnings private to one form of reasoned out knowledge are the beginnings known through themselves by the wise.

Aristotle calls the statements common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge a*xioms*. (This word is, of course, used in quite different meanings by many moderns so we should be on our guard to not be deceived by equivocation.) In the fourth book of *Wisdom or First Philosophy* (the fourth book *After the Books in Natural Philosophy*), Aristotle that the axiom(s) about being and non-being, the beginning(s) about contradiction, is the natural beginning of all the axioms. But he does not explicitly order for us the other axioms after this first one.

But since one is almost the same as being, as Aristotle shows in the fourth book of *Wisdom*, and hence the subject of wisdom is both being and one, the axioms about one are also very fundamental. One such axiom is that nothing is separated from itself. And since it is a property of one to be a beginning and a beginning is the source of some before and after, the axioms about beginning and about before and after are very fundamental. We stated two similar axioms of beginning and before and after above: nothing is a beginning of itself and nothing is before or after itself.

Since reason is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, the axiom about before and after is a very universal and important beginning for reason. Reason always sees some distinction before it sees a before and after. Since nothing is before or after itself, reason must see some distinction between what is before and what is after before it sees that one is before or after the other.

But that reason sees a distinction before it sees a before and after shows again how fundamental is the axiom of being and non-being, the axiom about contradiction. For the distinction of being and non-being, the opposition of

contradiction, is the beginning and cause of all distinction and opposition. Thomas is very clear about this:

> omnis distinctio, sive rei sive rationis, fundatur in affirmatione et negatione.[1]

And in another text, Thomas teaches us:

> Ubicumque enim est aliqua distinctio, oportet inveniri negationis et affirmationis oppositionem.
>
> Quae enim secundum nullam affirmationem et negationem differunt, penitus indistincta sunt: oportet enim quod quantum ad omnia unum esset quod et alterum, et sic essent penitus idem, et nullo modo distincta.[2]

Hence, the one who says that it is possible to affirm and deny the same of the same (in the same way and at the same time) is excluding all distinction or determination as Thomas explains when commenting on Aristotle's discussion of those who deny the axiom about contradiction:

> Item prohibet ne mente aliquid possimus definire vel determinare.
>
> Prima enim ratio distinctionis consideratur in affirmatione et negatione.
>
> Unde qui affirmationem et negationem unum esse dicit, omnem determinationem sive distinctionem excludit.[3]

Since distinction is before order (or before and after), the axiom about being and non-being or the axiom about contradiction (the opposition of affirmation and negation) is more fundamental than the axiom about before and after.

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[1] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist XXXIV, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 2

[2] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Caput 14

[3] *In IV Metaphysicorum,* Lectio IX, n. 660

After the axiom of before and after would come any axioms about what is before and after. But are there any axioms about what is before and after?

There are many statements of what is before and what is after involving words common to all reasoned out knowledge or words pertaining to being as being. Substance is before accident in many ways. Likewise, act is before ability in many ways. The through itself is before the through happening and the through itself is before the through another. Whole and part may be before each other in different ways.

The distinction of the beginnings private to each reasoned out knowledge must be left to the beginning of each reasoned out knowledge.

Duane H. Berquist

CONTRADICTION AND THE GROWTH OF REASON

The opposition of contradiction and the statement about contradiction are necessary for the growth of reason and its knowledge. Indeed, it could be said that the whole growth of reason depends upon these two seeds. To show that this is so and why it is so is the goal of this paper. This goal is a contribution to beginning well in philosophy. But before pursuing our particular goal, we should see how it is only a part of the whole task of beginning well:

> Nothing is more necessary and nothing is more difficult in philosophy than to begin well. For everything else depends upon the beginning and yet the beginning is hard to see or acquire.[1]

The beginnings of philosophy are partly in reason (and the senses) and partly in the will (and feelings or emotions).[2] We can subdivide the beginnings in reason (and the senses). They are either about things or about how we know them. The beginnings of philosophy in reason *about things* can be called the *seeds* of philosophy while a knowledge of the way and order in which we know and the proper dispositions of the will (and

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[1] Plato and Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas often speak of the importance and difficulty of the beginning. See, for example, Plato: *Laws*, Book VI, 753e; *Republic*, Book II, 377a-b; *Cratylus*, 436c-d; Aristotle: *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, 1098a 33 - 1098b 8; *About the Universe* (*De Caelo et Mundo*), Book One, Chapter 5, 271b 4-18; *About Sophistical Refutations*, Chapter XXXIV, 183b 16-28. Thomas: *In I Ethicorum*, Lectio XI, nn. 137-138; *In I De Caelo et Mundo*, Lectio IX, nn. 96-97.

[2] The above texts speak of the importance of beginning well in the context of beginnings in reason, but we cannot forget that both Plato and Aristotle noted that wonder (which is in the will and emotions) is the beginning of philosophy (Plato in the *Theaetetus* and Aristotle in the *Metaphysics*). And indeed, the *philosopher* is named from the disposition of his will (the love of wisdom, whence he differs from the sophist).

emotions) help us to acquire these seeds and grow from them. The way we know includes the way beginnings become known and also how we proceed from these beginnings. And the application or non-application of our reason, and how it is applied, depend upon the dispositions of will and emotions.

Among the beginnings of philosophy *about things*, a special importance attaches to the opposition of contradiction and the statement about contradiction. For these two (the opposition of contradiction and the statement about contradiction) are *almost* the first seeds of the whole growth of reason. Before we can begin to see the truth of this statement, we must understand what it means. The meaning of a statement depends, of course, upon the meaning of its parts. Hence, we must begin there.

THE MEANING OF OUR STATEMENT

Contradiction[3] is one of the four kinds of opposition distinguished in the *Categories:*

> One thing is opposed to another in four ways: either as those towards another, or as contraries, or as lack and having, or as affirmation and negation. To speak in outline: as towards another, for example, double to half; as contraries, for example, bad to good; as lack and having, for example, blindness and sight; as affirmation and negation, for example, is sitting and is not sitting.[4]

Aristotle gives an explanation of these four in the rest of Chapter Ten and Chapter Eleven of the *Categories* which the reader may wish to consult sometime.

The *statement about contradiction* can be stated thus: it is impossible for the same to belong and not to belong to the same at the

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[3] The Greek word is *antiphasis*. See *Metaphysics*, Book , 1018a 20

[4] *Categories*, Chapter 10, 11b 16-23

same time and in the same way.[5] Or, it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time and in the same way.

The word *grow* can and should be carried over from the body to the soul and the mind or reason. For we know and name what cannot be sensed by likeness to what can be sensed. Shakespeare touches upon this carrying over in beautiful words:

> For nature crescent does not grow alone
> In thews and bulk, but as this temple waxes,
> The inward service of the mind and soul
> Grows wide withal.[6]

And the central thinker in human thought, Heraclitus, tells us: "The soul has a reason which makes itself grow."[7] And Empedocles says: "But come listen to my words. For learning will surely cause your mind to grow."[8] It is striking in these passages how the mind or reason or soul is said to grow rather than knowledge. Everyone sees that knowledge is said to grow or increase, but not everyone sees well that reason and the soul can be said to grow also. For the reason or understanding in act is the understood in act. Thus, reason grows by knowing *more* things or by knowing the same thing *more;* for reason is in some way what it knows. Hence, the Philosopher says that the soul is in some way all things by its reason and the senses.[9]

And as the word *grow* is carried over to reason, so also is the word *seed*. Antiphon touches upon this carrying-over:

> The first thing, I believe, for mankind is education. For whenever someone has made a beginning correctly in anything, it is likely that the end will also come about

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[5] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book G, 1005b 19-20

[6] *Hamlet*, Act I, Sc. 3

[7] DK 115

[8] DK 17

[9] Aristotle, *De Anima*, Book G, Chapter 8, 431b 21-22

> correctly. And as is the seed one has sown in the ground, so also are the things one ought to expect will come forth. And when one sows a noble education in a young body, this lives and blooms through the whole of life, and neither rain nor drought destroys it.[10]

Thomas Aquinas compares the beginning to a seed which is also small in size, but great in power:

> The beginning, although it be small in size, is nevertheless great in power, just as from a small seed is produced a great tree; and thus it is that what is small in the beginning, is multiplied in the end, because it stretches out to all that to which the power of the beginning extends, whether this is true or false.[11]

The likeness involved in carrying over the word *seed* is fourfold. A seed is (1) a beginning (2) that is natural (3) small in size (in comparison to what proceeds from it) but (4) great in its power (which is measured by what it give to). Reason grows from such seeds.

We say that the opposition of contradiction and the statement about contradiction are *almost* the first seeds of the growth of reason since being itself (and non-being) are before our understanding of the opposition of being and non-being and the impossibility of being and not-being at the same time in the same way. For as Thomas (following Avicenna) teaches us, *being* is what first falls into reason (and then non-being).[12] But since the opposition of contradiction is between being and

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[10] DK 60

[11] *In I De Caelo et Mundo*, Lectio IX, nn. 96-97: "principium, etsi sit modicum in magnitudine, est tamen magnum virtute, sicut ex modico semine producitur magna arbor: et inde est quod illud quod est modicum in principio, in fine multiplicatur, quia pertingit ad totum id ad quod se extendit virtus principii, sive hoc sit verum vel falsum".

[12] Thomas Aquinas, *De Ente et Essentia*, Proemium, Marietti Edition, Rome, 1948, p.: "ens autem et essentia sunt quae primo in intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in *Metaphys.*, (lib. I, c. 6)" (However, the

non-being and the statement about contradiction is also about being and non-being, it is not hard to see how close these are to the beginning of reason's knowledge.

THE TRUTH OF OUR STATEMENT

We are now in a position to begin to show the truth of our original statement: the opposition of contradiction and the statement about contradiction are almost the first seeds of the whole growth of reason. We can show this, not all at once, but in three parts. First, it can be shown that the opposition of contradiction is the beginning of all definition, division and distinction. Second, it can be shown that the statement about contradiction is the beginning of all statements and that all statements are judged by the statement about contradiction. Third, it can be seen how the opposition of contradiction and the statement about contradiction are seeds of the most important discoveries.[13] There is a common beginning for seeing that the opposition of contradiction is the beginning and cause of all opposition (and, hence, of all distinction and especially formal

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being which first falls into our reason is not the universal being of Metaphysics, but being considered in sensible things. In the *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 87, art. 3, Ad 1, Thomas explains: "obiectum intellectus est commune quoddam, scilicet ens et verum, sub quo comprehenditur etiam ipse actus intelligendi. Unde intellectus potest suum actum intelligere. Sed non primo, quia nec primum obiectum intellectus nostri, secundum praesentem statum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus materialibus, ut dictum est; ex quibus in cognitionem omnium aliorum devenit." Hence, men naturally think at first that whatever is must be somewhere; that is, in some place, which is a property of bodies.

[13] We can also see from this how the whole of logic presupposes the opposition of contradiction and the statement about contradiction since definition and division and distinction pertain to the logic of the first act of reason; statements, to the second act; and the logic of the third act was divided into the *scientia iudicandi* and the *scientia inveniendi.*

distinction which is based on some kind of opposition) and for seeing that the statement about contradiction is a beginning of all statements.

THE COMMON BEGINNING

In the Book Two of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle made the famous statement that "that is itself most of all such by which the same belongs to others".[14] When the same belongs to many because of one of them, it belongs most of all to this cause. Thomas state this in his commentary thus: "Unumquodque inter alia maxime dicitur, ex quo causatur in aliis aliquid univoce praedicatum de eis; sicut ignis est causa caloris in elementatis".[15] We also find this in the *Posterior Analytics* where Aristotle is showing that the premisses are more known and more certain than the conclusion. He says that "always that by which each belongs, belongs more to that; as that is more loved through we love".[16] Thomas state this thus: "Propter quod unumquodque et illud est magis; sicut si amamus aliquem, propter alterum; ut si magistrum propter discipulum, discipulum magis amamus."[17] We can put this more into English thus: If the same belongs to two things, but to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause. For example, if hot is said of fire and the air, but of the air because of the fire, the fire is hotter than the air. If sweet belongs to sugar and to coffee, but to coffee because of the sugar, the sugar is sweeter than the coffee. This beginning is important in every part of philosophy. In logic: if known is said of or belongs to the premisses and the conclusion, but to the conclusion because of the premisses, then the premisses are more known than the conclusion. Indeed, if they were not more known than the conclusion, we would not use them to prove the conclusion. In ethics: if good or desirable is said of the end and the means (such as health and medicine), but of the means because of the end (as medicine is desirable because of health), then the end is better and more desirable than the

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[14] *Metaphysics*, Book A Elatton, 993b 24-26

[15] *In II Metaphysicorum*, Lectio II, n. 292

[16] *Posterior Analytics*, Book I, 72a 29-31

[17] *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum,* Lectio VI, n. 55

means (as health is better and more desirable than medicine). Indeed, if the end were not more desirable than the means, we would not desire the means for the sake of the end. In natural philosophy: if mover is said of the unmoved mover and the moved mover, but of the latter because of the former, the unmoved mover is most of all the mover.

But one can also reason in the reverse direction: that is, one can reason from something to which the same belongs in a lesser way to that to which it belongs most of all and that that to which it belongs most of all is the cause of the same belonging to others.[18] Thomas gives the reason for this and also how one can reason from the more and the less to the most as their cause:

> What belongs to something by its nature and not by another cause, is not able to be lessened and weak. For if something essential is subtracted from, or added to a nature, already it will be another nature: just as happens in numbers, in which a unit added or subtracted varies the species. If, however, the nature or what it is of the thing remaining whole, something is found to be lessened, it is already clear that it does not simply depend upon that nature, but upon something else, by whose distance it is lessened. What therefore belongs less to something than to others, does not belong to it from its nature only, but from another cause. That therefore will be a cause of all in some genus to which most of all belongs the predication of that genus: whence we see that what is most hot is the cause of heat in all hot things, and what is most bright is the cause of all that is bright. [19]

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[18] Thomas also often proceeds in this way. For example, *Summa Theologiae*, Q. 2, Art. 3, Corpus: "Quod autem dicitur maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius generis" and *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber II, Caput XV: "Illud igitur erit causa omnium in aliquo genere cui maxime competit illius generis praedicatio"

[19] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II,Capitulum XV, in 2nd argument:: "Quod alicui convenit ex sua natura, non ex alia causa, minoratum in eo et deficiens esse non potest. Si enim naturae aliquid essentiale subtrahitur vel additur, iam altera natura erit: sicut et in numeris accidit, in quibus unitas addita vel subtracta speciem variat. Si autem, natura vel

If we find that the air is increasingly less warm or hot as we move away from the fire, it is clear that the warmth or heat of the air does not belong to it because it is air. Since the nature of the air is the same whether near or far from the fire, if the air was warm because of its nature only, it would be the same everywhere. The warmth or heat of the air is caused by what is most warm or hot, the fire. If we find that the air is less bright or darker as we move away from the candle, and yet the nature of air is the same everywhere, it is clear that the brightness of the air does not simply depend upon the nature of air, but upon what is most bright, the flame of the candle. Another text of Thomas on this very important beginning is in order here:

> ...when something is found to have been partaken of by many in diverse ways, it is necessary that it be attributed to all those in which it is more imperfectly found from that in which it is found most perfectly. For those which are said positively more and less have this by a more distant or nearer approach to something one: for if it belonged to each of them from itself, there would be no reason why it would be found more perfectly in one than in another; just as we see that fire which is in the extreme of heat, is the source of heat in all hot things. [20]

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quidditate rei integra manente, aliquid minoratum inveniatur, iam patet quod illud non simpliciter dependet ex illa natura, sed ex aliquo alio, per cuius remotionem minoratur. Quod igitur alicui minus convenit quam aliis, non convenit ei ex sua natura tantum, sed ex alia causa. Illud igitur erit causa omnium in aliquo genere cui maxime competit illius generis praedicatio: unde et quod maxime calidum est videmus esse causam caloris in omnibus calidis, et quod maxime lucidum causam omnium lucidorum."

[20] *De Potentia* , Q. 3, Art 5, corpus, in secunda ratio: "...cum aliquid invenitur a pluribus diversimode participatum oportet quod ab eo in quo perfectissime invenitur, attribuatur omnibus illis in quibus imperfectius invenitur. Nam ea quae positive secundum magis et minus dicuntur, hoc habent ex accessu remotiori vel propinquiori ad aliquid unum: si enim unicuique eorum ex se ipso illud conveniret, non esset ratio cur

THE ORDER IN WHICH TO SEE THE OPPOSITION OF CONTRADICTION AS A SEED

We must first see that the opposition of contradiction is the beginning and cause of all opposition. It is here that we shall apply our common beginning. Second, we must consider that opposition is the cause of distinction (and especially of formal distinction). Third, we must see that distinction is before division and division before definition. In this way, we will come to see that the opposition of contradiction is a seed of all that growth of reason and its knowledge which take place by defining, dividing and distinguishing.

THE OPPOSITION OF CONTRADICTION IS THE FIRST OPPOSITION AND THE CAUSE OF ALL OPPOSITION

Before we can apply our common beginning, we must consider the four kinds of opposition more carefully and distinctly. Thomas is very helpful here in his commentary on the *Metaphysics* where Aristotle also distinguishes them:

> he shows in how many ways opposites are said....that in four ways; to wit, as contradictories, contraries, lack and habit, and towards another. Something is placed against or opposed to another either by reason of dependence, by which it depends upon it, and thus are the relatively opposed. Or by reason of taking away which happens in three ways. Either it takes away wholly, leaving nothing, and such is negation. Or it leaves only the subject, and such is lack. Or it leaves the subject and the

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perfectius in uno quam in alio inveniretur; sicut videmus quod ignis, qui est in fine caliditatis, est caloris principium in omnibus calidis"

> genus, and such is the contrary. For contraries are not only in the same subject, but also in the same genus.[21]

From Thomas' laying out here of the four kinds of opposition, three things are clear. First how much more distinct the opposition of relatives is from the other three forms of opposition than they are from each other. Second, it is clear that how those opposed as relatives, or towards another, are the least opposed because one is not without the other; and that contradictories are more opposed than lack and had, and these, than contraries. And from this it is also clear that, in the *Categories*, Aristotle has enumerated the four kinds of opposition in order from those least opposed to those most opposed. For he begins with those opposed as relatives or towards another and, among the other three, he begins with contraries and ends with those opposed as contradictories.

We can now apply our common beginning as Thomas himself does in the first book of the *Sentences:*

> Affirmation and negation are said to be most of all opposed because in them there is not any agreement brought in. In things opposed privatively, there is brought in agreement as regards the subject because they are apt to come to be in the same. In contraries and relatives, there is also agreement as regards the genus because they are in the same genus. Whence in both of these oppositions, either of the extremes is signified by way of being and some nature. But that in which is found something not mixed with its contrary, is most of all and first in that genus, and the cause of all others; and therefore

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[21] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio XII, n. 922: "ostendit quot modis dicuntur opposita...quia quatuor modis; scilicet contradictoria, contraria, privatio et habitus, et ad aliquid. Aliquid enim contraponitur alteri vel opponitur aut ratione dependentiae, qua dependet ab ipso, et sic sunt opposita relative. Aut ratione remotionis, quia scilicet unum removet alterum. Quod quidem contingit tripliciter. Aut enim totaliter removet nihil relinquens, et sic est negatio. Aut relinquit subiectum solum, et sic est privatio. Aut relinquit subiectum et genus, et sic est contrarium. Nam contraria non sunt solum in eodem subiecto, sed etiam in eodem genere."

> the opposition of affirmation and negation in which is not mixed any agreement. is the first and greatest opposition and the cause of all opposition and distinction. And therefore it is necessary that affirmation and negation be included in every other opposition, as the first in what comes after. Whence more is required for the other kinds of opposition than for the opposition of contradiction; for they have something in addition to it.[22]

Someone might ask how the opposition of contradiction can be distinguished from the other three kinds of opposition since, as Thomas notes here, it is "included in every other opposition, as the first in what comes after." This can be answered by pointing out that, when we the distinguish between the opposition of contradiction and other kinds of opposition, we are distinguishing between what has *only* the opposition of being and non-being and what has something else in addition to this.[23]

Thomas is already anticipating our conclusion that the opposition of contradiction is the cause of all distinction since it is the cause of all opposition and opposition is the cause of distinction. But before we draw this conclusion, let us consider more fully the connection between opposition and distinction.

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[22] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist. V, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 1: "affirmatio et negatio dicuntur maxime opponi, quia in eis non importatur aliqua convenientia: in privative enim oppositis importatur convenientia quantum ad subjectum, quia nata sunt fieri circa idem: in contrariis autem et relativis etiam quantum ad genus, quia scilicet sunt in eodem genere. Unde in utraque oppositione utrumque extremorum significatur per modum entis et naturae cujusdam. Illud autem in quo invenitur aliquid non permixtum contrario, est maximum et primum in genere illo, et causa omnium aliorum; et ideo oppositio affirmationis et negationis, cui non admiscetur aliqua convenientia, est prima et maxima oppositio, et causa omnis oppositionis et distinctionis; et ideo oportet quod in qualibet alia oppositione includatur affirmatio et negatio, sicut primum in posteriori. Unde plura requiruntur ad alias oppositiones quam ad oppositionem contradictionis, quia se habent ex additione ad ipsam."

[23] In the same way, we distinguish between privation or lack and contraries even though one contrary is lacking in comparison to the other.

OPPOSITION IS THE CAUSE OF DISTINCTION

We can distinguish between material distinction and formal distinction.[24] Material distinction is based on the division of the continuous and is between different material singulars of the same kind. Since reason knows directly the universal, this kind of distinction is not the way reason grows. Formal distinction is based on some kind of opposition. One place in which Thomas states this and gives a reason for it is in the fourth book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles:* "in things having eliminated material distinction (which cannot take place in the divine persons), things are not found to be distinguished except by some kind of opposition. For what have no opposition to each other, are able to be together in the same; whence distinction cannot be caused through them: for white and triangular can be together in the same because, although diverse, they are not opposed."[25]

THE OPPOSITION OF CONTRADICTION IS THE BEGINNING OF ALL DISTINCTION

We can now conclude that the opposition of contradiction is the beginning of all distinction and especially of formal distinction. Thomas often states this most universally:

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[24] *Summa Contra Gentiles* , Liber II, Caput 44: "Omnis distinctio est aut secundum divisionem quantitatis...aut secundum divisionem formalem."

[25] *Summa Contra Gentiles* , Liber IV, Caput 24: "in rebus enim, remota materiali distinctione, quae in divinis personis locum habere non potest, non inveniuntur aliqua distingui nisi per aliquam oppositionem.Quae enim nullam oppositionem habent ad invicem, simul esse possunt in eodem, unde per ea distinctio causari non potest: album enim et triangulare, licet diversa sunt, quia tamen non opponuntur, in eodem esse contingit."

> Every distinction, whether of things or of reason, is founded in affirmation and negation.[26]

He gives a short explanation of this in the *Summa Contra Gentiles:*

> Wherever there is some distinction, it is necessary to find the opposition of negation and affirmation. Whatever differ according to no affirmation and negation are wholly indistinct: for it would be necessary that one would be what the other was as regards everything, and thus they would be wholly the same and in no way distinct.[27]

From this we can see a connection with the statement about contradiction. Anyone who would deny the statement about contradiction would also exclude all distinction (and hence all division and definition). Thomas touches upon this connection in his exposition of Aristotle's consideration of the statements about contradiction:

> The first reason of distinction is considered in affirmation and negation. Whence who says that affirmation and negation are one, excludes all determination or distinction.[28]

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[26] *Scriptum super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Dist XXXIV, Q. I, Art. I, Ad 2: "omnis distinctio, sive rei sive rationis, fundatur in affirmatione et negatione."

[27] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Caput 14: "Ubicumque enim est aliqua distinctio, oportet inveniri negationis et affirmationis oppositionem. Quae enim secundum nullam affirmationem et negationem differunt, penitus indistincta sunt: oportet enim quod quantum ad omnia unum esset quod et alterum, et sic essent penitus idem, et nullo modo distincta."

[28] *In IV Metaphysicorum*, Lectio IX, n. 660: "Prima enim ratio distinctionis consideratur in affirmatione et negatione. Unde qui affirmationem et negationem unum esse dicit, omnem determinationem sive distinctionem excludit."

We can also see a close connection with immediate negative statements and distinction. Thomas points out how negation is in the thought or definition of distinction:

> Negation is in the definition of distinction. Those are distinct of which one is not the other. Whence also the first things which are distinguished by themselves include mutually a negation of each other; and by reason of this, negative statements in them are immediate, as *No quantity is a substance.*[29]

An objection to contradiction being the cause of all distinction can be raised here. When Thomas investigates the distinction of Persons in God by a disjunctive syllogism in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*[30], he eliminates material distinction since there is no matter in God. God is not a body or continuous. And then he eliminates formal distinction by contradictories privation and contraries and concludes to formal distinction by relatives. Thus, he excludes distinguishing the Persons by the opposition of contradiction. But here, we must remember what was said above. When we distinguish the opposition of contradiction from the other kinds of opposition, we understand what has only being and non-being. The other kinds of opposition have something in addition to being and non-being. Thus, the opposition of privation involves the being and non-being of something *in a subject*.

DISTINCTION, DIVISION, DEFINITION

Distinction is before division (in the strict sense) and division is before definition. This is true not only in the first sense of *before*, but also

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[29] *Summa Contra Gentiles* , Liber I, Caput 71: "in ratione distinctionis est negatio: distincta enim sunt quorum unum non est aliud. Unde et prima, quae seipis distinguuntur, mutuo sui negationem includunt: ratione cuius negativae propositiones in eis sunt immediatae, ut, *Nulla quantitas est substantia.*"

[30] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber IV, Caput 24

in the second sense.[31] The first sense of before is in time and the second sense is in being. In the second sense, that is said to be before which can be without another, but not vice-versa. Distinction can be without division (in the strict sense), but the reverse is impossible. Likewise, division can be without definition, but definition cannot be without division.

In its broad sense, *division* is almost synonymous with *distinction*. But in the strict or narrow sense, division is the distinction of the parts of some whole. Hence, every division involves a distinction, but every distinction is not between the parts of some whole.[32] Thus distinction can be without division, but the reverse is impossible.

Likewise, division is before definition, not only because division is a way to definition, but because every definition itself involves the division of an integral or composed whole. Hence the Philosopher says in the beginning of the first book of the *Physics* that the definition "divides into particulars.".[33]

Hence, it is clear that whatever is a beginning of distinction is also a beginning of division and definition. Definition could not be without some kind of division and division could not be without some kind of distinction and distinction (at least formal) without opposition and opposition without contradiction.

Having seen that the opposition of contradiction is a beginning and cause and seed of all opposition and, hence, of all distinction, division and definition, we can turn to the statement about contradiction.

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[31] Aristotle distinguishes in order the central senses of the word *before* in the twelfth chapter of the *Categories*.

[32] Hence, Thomas allows the word *distinction* in regard to the Persons of the Trinity, but not the word *division*. See *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 31, Art. 2, c: "Vitandum est nomen separationis et divisionis, quae est totius in partes."

[33] 184B 2-3

THE ORDER IN WHICH TO SEE THE STATEMENT ABOUT CONTRADICTION AS A SEED

We can come to see the statement about contradiction as a seed of the growth of reason, first in judging and then in discovery. We judge all other statements to be true or false by the statement about contradiction, though not by it alone. And the impossibility of a contradiction in things leads us expect something hidden from us under a contradiction.

THE STATEMENT ABOUT CONTRADICTION AND JUDGING

Before trying to see how and to what extent all other statements are judged by the statement about contradiction, we should consider that the statement about contradiction is naturally before all other statements. First, the terms of the statement about contradiction are most universal, and the general is before the particular in our reason[34]; hence, this statement naturally comes before all the rest. Second, all other statements are either affirmative or negative, saying either that something is or that something is not, but not both, in obedience to the statement about contradiction. Third, since judgment is nothing other than the separation of the true from the false by some beginning in our knowledge[35] and true and false are defined by being and non-being[36], it is

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[34] The classic text for understanding why the general is before the particular is the first chapter of Aristotle's *Physics*. Thomas' Lectio on that chapter is very illuminating

[35] This is why we express our judgments with words pertaining to the senses, such as "nonsense" or "that makes sense" ,since sensing is the first beginning of our knowledge.

[36] When reason says that what is in things *is* and what is not in things *is not*, it is speaking truly. When it says that what is in things *is not* and what is not in things *is*, it is speaking falsely.

not surprising that the first statement separating being from non-being should be fundamental in the matter of judgment.

All other statements are judged in some way by the statement about contradiction, but this is seen most fully in the statements found in demonstrations. (We are using the word *demonstration* here in the strict sense, as a synonym for the *apodeixsis* of the *Posterior Analytics*.) But the statement about contradiction is also a beginning of the judgments in the looser sense (where complete certitude escapes us). *Judgment* in the strict sense of the word is with certitude, but we also use this word for something with less than certitude. We should consider how all other statements are judged by the statement about contradiction first in those statements which can be judged in the strict sense; that is, those statements which can be known with complete certitude. And then we can consider how it is used in judging those statements that cannot be known with complete certitude. But before this, we should consider this difference in the kind of judgments that we can make. Aristotle and Huygens both touch upon a fundamental difference in the kinds of judgment made by our reason. Perhaps it is best to begin with a text of Aristotle and one of Huygens that both touch upon these two kinds of judgment.

TWO KINDS OR WAYS OF JUDGING

In the Preface to his *Treatise on Light*, Huygens touches upon two ways of judging (one is in demonstration in the sense of the *Posterior Analytics* and the other in what would today be called experimental science):

> There will be seen in it [the Treatise] demonstrations of those kinds which do not produce as great a certitude as those of Geometry, and which even differ much therefrom, since whereas the Geometers prove their Propositions by fixed and incontestable Principles, here the Principles are verified by the conclusions to be drawn from them; the nature of these things not allowing of this being done otherwise. It is always possible to attain thereby to a degree of probability which very often is scarcely less than complete proof. To wit, when things which have been demonstrated by the Principles that have been

> assumed correspond perfectly to the phenomena which experiment has brought under observation; especially when there are a great number of them, and further, principally, when one can imagine and foresee new phenomena which ought to follow from the hypotheses which one employs, and when one finds that therein the fact corresponds to our prevision. But if all these proofs of probability are met with in that which I propose to discuss, as it seems to me they are, this ought to be a very strong confirmation of the success of my inquiry; and it must be ill if the facts are not pretty much as I represent them.[37]

Aristotle had criticized those who did not recognize the kind of principle or beginning to be sought in the particular knowledge of natural things or experimental sciences in his book *On the Universe* (the *De Caelo*):

> It happens that, in speaking about the phenomena, they say things that do not agree with the phenomena. The cause of this is not taking well first principles, but wishing to reduce all things to some determined opinions...For these men, on account of their love of those principles, seem to do the same as those maintaining positions in dialectic. They endure everything that follows as though having true principles; as if there were not some principles which ought to be judged from their results, and especially from the end result. Now the end of a science that makes is the product while of natural science it is always what appears authoritatively according to the senses.[38]

In this passage, Aristotle is talking about those the principles or beginnings which must be judged by their consequences or results. And he sees a likeness between "judging" in the experimental sciences and in dialectic and in the mechanical or productive arts. An hypothesis in science

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[37] Christian Huygens, Preface to his *Treatise on Light*, Dover Publications, pp. vi-vii:

[38] Aristotle, *On the Universe,* Book Three, Chapter 7, 306a 6-18

is judged by its consequences, and in dialectic we make a judgment on what someone says by the consequences of their opinion, and in the practical arts "the proof of the pudding is in the eating", not in the recipe which is thus a beginning to be judged by its result.

One could contrast the kind of beginning or principle which Aristotle is noting in this passage just quoted and the kind of beginning noted by him in the following passage:

> They all say that the elements and what they call the beginnings are contraries although they lay this down without giving a reason, as if being forced by the truth itself.[39]

A beginning that is forced on the mind by truth itself is used to judge what follows from it. But the kind of beginning which is found in the experimental sciences is, as Einstein said, "freely imagined"[40] and, hence, must be judged by its consequences.

JUDGMENT IN THE STRICT SENSE AND THE STATEMENT ABOUT CONTRADICTION

We can now proceed to consider the role of the statement about contradiction in regard to both kinds of judging. And in regard to the first kind of judgment, we can apply again our common beginning.

In book four of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle showed that the statement about contradiction is most known and most certain.[41] But what is most of all in some genus is the cause of all the rest. Hence, the statement about contradiction is the cause of other statements being known and being certain.

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[39] Aristotle, *Physics*, Book One, Chapter 5, 188b 27-30

[40] .....*Essays in*.....

[41] *Metaphysics*, Book G, Chapter 3, 1005b 8-34

If some statements are more known and more certain than others, it does not belong to statements as such alone to be known and certain. If it belonged to a statement because it is a statement to be known and certain, one statement would not be more known and more certain than another. (It belongs to two as such to be half of four and one two is not more half of four than another.) Hence, if we did not know that there is a statement most known and most certain (the statement about contradiction), we could reason to the existence of such a statement from the fact that some statements are more known and more certain than others.

Hence, other statements are certain because of the statement about contradiction and more certain as they approach the statement about contradiction. But what is concluded from this profound reason can also be seen in a way more proportioned to us in another way as follows.

The statements found in demonstrations are either known through themselves or through other statements. The statements known through other statements are judged by the statements known through themselves. The statements known through other statements rest upon the statements known through themselves. The statements known through themselves are of two kinds: some are known through themselves by all men and are common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge. These statements are sometimes called axioms.[42] And some statements are known through themselves by the wise or those learned in some reasoned out knowledge and are private to that reasoned out knowledge. Thus, Euclid distinguishes between the common axioms such as that the whole is larger than one of its parts and the postulates such as that all right angles are equal. Since everyone knows what a whole is and what a part is, the statement that a whole is larger than one of its parts is a statement known through itself by all and it is common to all forms of reasoned out knowledge. But the statement that all right angles are equal is known through itself by those who have learned the definition of right angle in geometry and it is private to geometry. Now it is not hard to see that to deny a statement known through itself results in a contradiction. For example, if one were to deny that a whole is larger than one of its parts,

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[42] One must not, of course, confuse this sense of *axiom* with the different sense in which that word is used is much modern thought.

one would deny that the whole has parts. But this is what a whole is, as everyone knows - something that has parts. Hence, one would be saying that what has parts does not have parts, a clear contradiction. In this way, the axioms all rest upon the statement of contradiction. Hence, Aristotle notes that the statement about contradiction is "by nature the beginning of all the other axioms".[43] Likewise, denying a statement known through itself by the learned also lands one in a contradiction. This can be immediately so or through the axioms. If one were to deny the statement *No odd number is even* (known through itself by all who know what an odd number and an even number are), one would be saying that the same number is both divisible into equal parts and not so divisible, a manifest contradiction. But denying that all right angles are equal would involve saying that the whole is not larger than one of its parts and sometimes the part is larger than the whole. Thus, to deny a statement known through itself immediately lands one in a contradiction. In this way, one can see that all statements known through themselves are made firm and rest upon the statement about contradiction.

Thus the statements known through other statements are judged by the statements known through themselves and the statements known through themselves all rest upon the statement about contradiction. Hence, Aristotle says that all demonstrations resolve to the statement about contradiction.[44]

If all statements formed a kingdom, the statement about contradiction is the king. For it rules over all the others. Or one can say that the statement about contradiction rules over all the statements

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[43] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book G, 1005b 33-34

[44] Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book G, 1005b 29-33. Thomas' paraphrase, *In IV Metaphysicorum*, Lectio VI, n. 603: "Si igitur quis opinetur simul duo contradictoria esse vera, opinando simul idem esse et non esse, habebit simul contrarias opiniones: et ita contraria simul inerunt eidem, quod est impossibile. Non igitur contingit aliquem circa haec interius mentiri et quod opinetur simul idem esse et non esse. Et propter hoc omnes demonstrationes reducunt suas propositiones in hanc propositionem, sicut in ultimam opinionem omnibus communem: ipsa enim est naturaliter principium et dignitas omnium dignitatum."

known through themselves and these in turn rule over all the statements known through other statements.

All statements known to be true rest upon the statement about contradiction. The statement about contradiction is the beginning and the end of all other statements in demonstration and the judging of them.

THE SECOND KIND OF JUDGMENT AND THE STATEMENT ABOUT CONTRADICTION

If we turn now to the second kind of judgment in which there is not the certitude of demonstration, the statement about contradiction plays a different role. We judge an hypothesis in experimental science by its consequences. The recipe or blueprint in the making arts is judged by the performance of the product made according to that recipe or blueprint. And in dialectic, we make some kind of judgment about an opinion by the conclusions drawn from it. But, in general, we are judging the beginning idea by whether the consequence expected is or is not contradicted by experience or other things. If the scientist, on the basis of his hypothesis, predicts that there will be an eclipse of the sun at ten o'clock and observation at ten o'clock show that there is not an eclipse at ten o'clock, the contradiction between what is predicted and what is observed will lead the scientist to reject or, at least, modify in some way his hypothesis. If the recipe gives promise of a delicious pudding, but eating the pudding contradicts this anticipation, the recipe is apt to be discarded. If we make an airplane according to our blueprint, but it doesn't get off the ground or stay off the ground, it is back to the drawing-boards. If a man's opinion leads to contradictions with other statements that he is more sure about, he should give up his opinion. The statement about contradiction especially enables us to give a negative judgment in all these cases.

Those who are accustomed to this second kind of beginning in human thought (which is judged by its consequences) sometimes think that every beginning in our thought is such. Since our age is dominated by the experimental sciences, we are apt to be deceived by our custom. But

beginnings in our thought such as *a whole is larger than one of its parts* or *no odd number is even* are beginnings by which we judge their consequences. Further, the other kind of beginning which is judged by whether its consequences or predictions are or are not contradicted presupposes a beginning of the other kind. Indeed, the first beginning of the other kind, the statement about contradiction underlies this second kind of judgment. It would be laughable, of course, to subject the statement about contradiction to such a test although some people do so. Some deny in words the statement about contradiction because they think that something contradicts it. But then they reject it because they accept it, an absurd procedure. The statement about contradiction is the first beginning by which all other statements are judged.

CONTRADICTION AND DISCOVERY

The ancients had distinguished the logic of the third act into the *scientia iudicandi* and the *scientia inveniendi.* Thomas calls these the pars iudicativa and the pars inventiva.[45] The judging part is found in the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics* and the finding part chiefly in the books *About Places* (or *Topics*). Contradiction is essential to distinguishing these two parts. The demonstrator lays down one side of a contradiction (one of two contradictory statements), the side which he sees to be necessarily true and rejects the other side as entirely false. But the dialectician asks which side of a contradiction seems probable to the respondent.[46] Further, the demonstrator can only reason to one side of a contradiction. For example, the geometer can demonstrate that the triangle has its inside angles equal to two right angles, but he could not demonstrate the contradictory statement (the triangle does not have its inside angles equal to two right angles) But the dialectician can reason to both sides of a contradiction with some probability. There are problems about which we can have

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[45] *Expositio in Libros Posteriorum Analyticorum* , Proemium, Marietti ed., 1955, n. 6

[46] Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, Book One, Chapter 1, 24a 23-26

probable arguments to both contradictory parts.[47] In this way, contradiction is necessary for understanding the difference between the demonstrator and the dialectician, both in their premisses and in their conclusions.

Having seen above in particular that the statement about contradiction is the end to which all the judgments of demonstration resolve, we can now ask what place do contradiction and the statement about contradiction have in discovery, beginning with dialectic. Is there a connection between dialectic belonging to the logic of discovery and dialectic being the ability to reason from probable opinions even to contradictory statements? Is the ability to reason with probability to the contradictory of what one thinks or what others think a reason why dialectic is useful for discovery? We can begin to consider this from what the Philosopher teaches us about dialectical reasoning and discovery.

There are two texts where Aristotle speaks of the usefulness of dialectic and dialectical reasoning. The first is in the eight books *About Places* (the so-called *Topics*):

> Next after what has been said, we should say for how many things and what the treatise is useful. It is useful for three things: towards exercise, towards meeting with others and towards philosophical reasoned out knowledge.
>
> That it is useful for exercise is clear from the same things. Having a method, we will easily be able to attack any proposed problem.
>
> It is useful for meeting with others because having enumerated the opinions of the many, we will be able to converse with them, not from alien but from their own opinions, leading another way what they seem not to say well.
>
> It is useful towards the philosophical forms of reasoned out knowledge because being able to raise difficulties towards

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[47] Aristotle, *Topics*, Book One, Chapter 11, 104b 12-14

> both sides, we will easily see clearly what is true or false in each thing.
>
> Further it is useful towards the first things in each reasoned out knowledge. For it is impossible to speak about these things in the reasoned out knowledge before us from its own beginnings since the beginnings are the first things of all - whence it is necessary to go through the opinions about each thing. But this is proper, or most of all appropriate, to dialectic. For being inquiring, it has a road towards the beginnings of all reasoned out knowledge.[48]

The other text is in the third book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy* (*Metaphysics*):

> It is necessary, towards the reasoned out knowledge sought, for us to go first through the things about which one ought to doubt first. These are whatever things about which some have taken up opposite positions and whatever else besides these happens to have been overlooked.
>
> To doubt well is useful for those wishing to discover. For the discovery after is an untying of the doubts before. But it is not possible for those ignorant of the knot to untie it. But the doubt of reason shows this about the thing. Insofar as it doubts, it undergoes something like those tied. It is impossible for either to go forward.
>
> Hence, it is necessary to have considered all the difficulties before on account of these things and because those seeking without doubting first are like those who do not know where one ought to go and further they do not know whether the sought has been found or not. For the end is not clear to such a one, but it is clear to the one who has doubted before.

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[48] *Topics*, Book A, Chapter 2, 101a 25-101b4

> Further, one who has heard all the arguments of those disputing, like that of parties in a lawsuit, is necessarily in a better position to judge.[49]

If we compare these two passages, it becomes clear that the text from the *About Places* is more universal. For the four reasons given in *First Philosophy* all pertain to the third reason in the *About Places* (*Topics*) why dialectic is useful; that is, "towards the philosophical forms of reasoned out knowledge". But since the first two reasons given in the *About Places* or *Topics* (towards exercise and meetings with others) are not proximate to our end (which is to consider contradiction and the growth of reason), but only the third, we must compare what is said under the third reason why dialectic is useful in the *Topics* with our text from *First Philosophy* or the *Metaphysics*.

Although the fourth or last reason given in *First Philosophy* would seem especially close to what is first said in the *About Places* under the usefulness of dialectic for philosophical reasoned out knowledge, a closer examination of the four reasons in *First Philosophy* shows that they all pertain in some way to that general reason. For all four reasons in *First Philosophy* involve the ability to reason to both sides of a contradiction or to see the probable argumentss for both sides.

The four reasons in *First Philosophy* can be considered an *ordered* expansion of the general reason given in the *About Places*. The order of the four reasons given in *First Philosophy* is from discovery to preparing for judgment. Discovery is before judgment in the growth of reason. The first reason makes explicit the word *discovery* (in Greek*euporia*) while the fourth reason speaks of *to judge* (in Greek: *to krinai*) The two middle reasons go together (just as they did in Meno's sophistical argument[50]) for if one does not know where one is going, one does not know when one has arrived. But knowing where one is going is closer to discovery, but knowing that one has arrived is closer to judgment.

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[49] *Metaphysics*, Book B, 995a 24-995b 4:

[50] *Meno*, 80D-E

None of these four reasons expanding the general reason of the *About Places* is opposed to the possibility of demonstrating later what has been investigated dialectically. But the particular reason given last in the *About Places* (useful towards the first things in each reasoned out knowledge) is opposed to the possibility of demonstration which produces reasoned out knowledge. For the beginnings proper to any reasoned out knowledge are that *from which* one demonstrates, but never what is demonstrated. Here we have reasoning that leads to the discovery of the beginnings. Dialectical reasoning cannot be the cause of our *knowing* with certitude the beginnings from which we demonstrate in some reasoned out knowledge. Rather dialectical reasoning is a cause of our *coming to know*. As the carpenter is a cause of the chair coming to be, but not of its being (for it can be even after he has died), so dialectical reasoning is a cause of coming to know the beginnings, but not of knowing them. Dialectic, in that way, has a road to the beginnings of all reasoned out knowledge.[51]

We can now consider why man has reasoning to opposites and how the contradiction to which he reasons is a beginning of discovery.

Reason has a way to both sides of a contradiction because it gathers the truth from sensible things and through signs. Thomas explains:

> It happens that man's reason has a way to both opposites because it gathers the truth from sensible things and through certain signs.[52]

These signs are the "probable signs from which the dialectical syllogism proceeds".[53] (This dependence upon the senses and the

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[51] In general, dialectic is a way to reasoned out knowledge, but reasoned out knowledge or *scientia* cannot be acquired by dialectical syllogism but by the demonstrative syllogism: *Summa Theologiae*, Tertia Pars, Q. 9, Art. 3, Ad 2:"opinio, ex syllogismo dialectico causata, est via ad scientiam, quae per demonstrationem acquiritur"

[52] *Summa Contra Gentiles* , Liber IV, Caput 55: "in hominis ratione contingit, quae, quia ex sensibilibus et per signa quaedam colligit veritatem, viam habet ad utrumque oppositorum."

imagination is also why our reason can err and why it must *guess* the natures of things from accidents and effects.)[54] This incertitude about the natures of things, what they are, is why demonstration in the strict sense is so rare outside of mathematics since definition is the beginning of demonstration.)

REASONING TO A CONTRADICTION AND DISCOVERY

Reasoning to a contradiction leads to discovery because under or behind a contradiction is something unknown. Three things need to be considered here: first, that contradiction is a sign of ignorance; and second, that the unknown can be said to be *under* or *behind* the contradiction; and third, the untying or breaking down of the contradiction is a discovery of what was hidden below or behind it.

There is no stronger sign of ignorance than contradiction. Hence, Socrates, who is most famous for showing men that they do not know what they think they know, used contradiction to show this. Hence, it very significant that Plato represents the young Socrates as learning from Parmenides (and his pupil Zeno) what we call the "Socratic" method of examining the thinking of men.[55] For Parmenides was the first to recognize the statement about contradiction as the beginning of thought. Likewise, the sophist, who wants to appear wise by making you appear ignorant, most of all aims at leading you into a contradiction.[56] Perhaps

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[53] In the *Summa Theologiae* , Tertia Pars, Q. 9, Ar t. 3, Ad 2, Thomas speaks of the "signa probabilia, ex quibus procedit dialecticus syllogismus"

[54] *Summa Contra Gentiles* , Liber III, Caput 91: " intelligentia nostra....Est etiam defectibilis, propter permixtionem phantasiae et sensus: ut errores hominum ostendunt....Nos autem quidditates rerum ex accidentibus et effectibus coniectamus."

[55] See the whole of the dialogue called the *Parmenides*.

[56] Aristotle, *On Sophistical Refutations*, Chapter 3, 165b 18-19

the reason why contradiction most of all shows our ignorance is that it is opposed to what we most of all know and opposites are more clear along side each other.

What is unknown, waiting to be discovered, can be said to be *under* the contradiction. It can also be said to be *behind* or *after* the contradiction. The former corresponds to reason gathering the truth from sensible things. The meaning of the English word *understanding* is connected with its etymology and with the dependence of reason upon the senses and with the way of distinguishing the reason from the senses. *Understanding* properly names knowing what is said to *stand under* something or knowing something by what is said to *stand under* it. We name *understanding* (both the act and the power) from sensible things both in the spatial origin of the words (hence, the puns in Shakespeare) and because the object of reason or the understanding is something that we speak of as *standing under* what is sensed. This is seen most clearly in understanding a word or an effect or in knowing substance. The word, spoken or written, is sensible, but the meaning or the thing named is spoken of as *under* the word. And it is reason or the understanding that knows the meaning or thing that stands under the word. (In Latin we speak of the *impositio nominis* or the *placing of a name upon* something. Hence, the thing named is thought of as *under* the name.) And we also speak of the *underlying* cause. (This also fits the use of *ground* for *cause* inEnglish.) The senses know more effects, but reason tries to know the underlying cause. To *understand* an effect means to know the cause standing under it. The senses know only accidents, but reason knows *substance* (which has the same etymology in Latin as *understanding* in English). But insofar as reason is discursive or runs from one thing to another, we would think of the cause as *after* (in our knowledge) the effect rather than under it. And we would hear the words *before* we come to the thoughts of the speaker or to the things of which they are thoughts. Thus, we can speak of the unknown as hidden *under* the contradiction or hidden *behind* or *after* the contradiction.

We must now consider the third point, that something is hidden under the contradiction and, thus, that reasoning to a contradiction leads to the discovery of what is hidden under that contradiction. But first, we should distinguish the forms of reasoning to a contradiction.

There are perhaps three main forms of reasoning to a contradiction found in three different kinds of conversation. (Aristotle distinguishes four argumentative conversations in the book *On Sophistical Refutations*,[57] but one of them does not lead to contradiction; namely, the teaching discussion since the demonstrator does not syllogize to contradictories.) One is that of the sophist where the respondent seems to contradict himself, but does not. Another is that of examiner where the respondent really does contradict himself. And finally the dialectician may reason from probable signs to opposite conclusions about the same.

We can see all three of these represented in the *Meno*. Meno attempts to catch Socrates in an apparent contradiction when Socrates proposes an investigation of what they do not know. How can one investigate what one does not know and how would you know that you had found it, if you did?[58] But the slave-boy really does contradict himself after he has said that the way to double a square is to double its side.[59] And finally Socrates as a dialectician, reasons that virtue can be taught and then that virtue cannot be taught.[60]

Perhaps we should begin with the sophistical conversation. Art is more known to us than nature and here the contradiction is more a work of art than nature (while the dialectician seems to begin more from the probable signs in the thing that lead to opposite conclusion about it). Since here there is only an apparent contradiction, one would expect discovery less than in the other two conversations that can lead to a contradiction.

But how contradiction leads to discovery can also be approached through sophistical contradictions. In chapter 16 of the book *On Sophistical Refutations*, Aristotle speaks of the usefulness of these contradictions for philosophy. In particular, he speaks of their usefulness in the most common mistake which is the result of mixing up the senses of a

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[57] *On Sophistical Refutations*, Chapter 2, 165a 39-165b 12

[58] *Meno*, 80D-E

[59] *Meno*, 82B-84C

[60] *Meno*, 87B-96C

word.[61] Being exercised in answering these apparent refutations produced by the sophist due to the difficulty to distinguishing the senses of a word both impresses upon us the necessity of distinguishing the senses of a word, but also strengthens our ability to do so. But it seems to us that after this kind of mistake on the side of speech, one can also look at the first two kinds of mistake outside of speech whose cause is in things. The first of these is the mistake from mixing up what is so through itself or by itself or as such and what happens or is accidental. Being exerecised in answering the sophist's apparent refutation due to this mix-up will also make us more aware of the necessity of this distinction and increase our ability to see this distinction. The second kind of mistake outside speech is from mixing up what is so simply and without qualification and what is so only in some imperfect and qualified way. Again, exercising our reason in untying contradictions due to this mix-up will help us to see the importance and necessity of this kind of distinction and help us to see this kind of distinction.

If we take what are perhaps the three most important mistakes for philosophy (the first in speech and the first and second outside speech or in things), underlying these contradictions are the three fundamental kinds of distinction. Each mistake is the result of not seeing some distinction. The unraveling of each of these mistakes is the discovery of the distinction hidden underneath it. Under one is the distinction of the senses of a word. Under another is the distinction of the as such and what happens. And under the third can be found the distinction of what is so simply and what is so not simply, but in some qualified and imperfect way. Meno's sophistical objection leads to the discovery of the distinction underlying all investigation of the unknown by the known. The ability to distinguish the senses of a word and the ability to distinguish the as such and the accidental and the ability to distinguish what is so simply and what is so only in some imperfect and qualified way enable reason to get to the beginnings of reasoned out knowledge.

Here we can join the end of our investigation to the beginning. We said before that distinction is before division in the strict sense of the separation of the parts of some whole. Every division is a distinction of the parts of some whole, but not every distinction is a division. The three most

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[61] *On Sophistical Refutations*, Chapter 16, 175a 5-10

common and important distinctions that are *not* divisions of a whole into its parts correspond to the three kinds of mistake just considered in the last paragraph. All philosophy, all reasoned out knowledge, rests upon these three kinds of distinction. This can be made more known by looking at what is common to all things and by looking at the roads underlying all knowledge.

What is common to all and said of all is distinguished in these three ways as can be seen in the distinctions of one and being in the fifth book of *Wisdom* or *First Philosophy*.[62] This is the book in which Aristotle distinguishes in order the senses of the words naming what is studied in wisdom. These are also the words used in the statements known through themselves by all. And they are used everywhere because of their universality. Further, both one and being are distinguished into by itself or through itself and by accident or happening. And when being through itself is distinguished into substance and accident or into act and potency, we find the distinction between what is so simply and what is so in some diminished imperfect way.

This third kind of distinction (between what is so simply and what is so in some diminished imperfect way) is in all knowledge of the roads and ways of going forward in our knowledge. When considering the first road in our knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish between what is more known simply and what is more known to us.[63] When considering the private road of a reasoned out knowledge, it is necessary to distinguish between what is the best simply and what is best in a given matter.[64] When speaking of the common road of reasoned out knowledge, it is necessary to see the distinction underlying the sophistical argument of Meno.[65]

In general, since every reasoned out knowledge is about the as such, it is necessary to see this distinction in every form of reasoned out knowledge. Whoever, for example, considers the first book of Aristotle's *Natural Hearing* or *Physics* with the exposition of Thomas Aquinas will be

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[62] *Metaphysics*, D, 1051b 17 - 1017b 9

[63] *Physics*, A, 184a 16 - 21

[64] *Metaphysics*, Book Two, 995a 14-20

[65] See, for example, the *Posterior Analytics*, A, 71a 24 - 71b 9

surprised as to how many of these three kinds of distinction (and especially that between the as such and the accidental) are necessary to find under contradictions before one can see clearly the beginnings of the subject.

One can object sophistically even to obvious things such as that change exists or a whole is always larger than one of its parts. But even here there are distinctions underlying these apparent contradictions, distinctions which not everybody sees and which were not seen clearly by anyone until after these apparent contradictions had been brought out. If then the apparent contradictions brought out by the sophist even about obvious things lead to the discovery of distinctions unknown before, how much more will contradictions arising from the probable opinions of men lead to the discovery of the unknown. Almost the whole of wisdom seems to lie under the contradictions brought out in the third book of *Wisdom*. But elsewhere the dialectic is particular and under each particular contradiction lies a truth waiting to be discovered and/or clarified.

THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE PHILOMUTHOS

We can see from the above another reason why the *philomuthos* is in some way a philosopher, as Aristotle said in his proemium to wisdom.[66] The reason given there was that the *muthos* is composed of wonderful things and wonder is the beginning of philosophy. The Greek word *muthos* can mean (1) myth, (2) more generally, story and (3) precisely, plot. In this third sense, we can say that the lover of plots is in some way a philosopher. For as Aristotle teaches us in the *Poetics*, the plot is composed of a tying up and an untying[67] or a twining (twisting) and unraveling.[68] This is like Aristotle's words in the beginning of the third book of *Wisdom* where he compares reason's state in dialectic to being tied up and the subsequent discovery to the untying of the mind. But in

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[66] *Metaphysics*, A, 982b 18-19

[67] *Poetics*, Chapter 18, 1455b 24

[68] *Poetics*, Chapter 18, 1456a 7-9

this comparison, we should also remember what Aristotle points out about poets: many tie up well, but untie badly.[69] It takes a master poet to untie well. How much more is this true in philosophy! Lesser minds can easily tie themselves or others into knots, but it takes an Aristotle or a Thomas to untie the difficult knots.

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[69] *Poetics*, Chapter 18, 1456a 9-10

FOREWORD TO CONSIDERATION OF MISTAKE OR ERROR

Although *mistake* and *error* can be considered synonyms, their etymologies are not the same. For *mistake* comes from missing in taking and *error* from the Latin word for wandering. (The Greeks also have a word for error derived from their word for wandering.)

Thus the etymology of *error* suggests that it is the result of a disordered movement of reason. Hence, when Thomas says that logic helps reason proceed *orderly, easily and without error*, there is a connection between *orderly* and *without error*. When reason proceeds orderly, it avoids errors. But when it moves in a disordered way, it is apt to wander into error. Thus, a knowledge of the roads to follow in our thinking helps us to avoid falling into error.

But the etymology of *mistake* suggests that it arises from taking one thing for another. We do not distinguish or see the distinction between two things and, therefore, take one for the other. The word *mixed-up* is closer to mistake than to error in its etymology. The one who is mistaken is mixed-up.

Since reason is defined by looking before and after (reason is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after) and distinction is presupposed to order or a before and after (for nothing is before or after itself), the words *mistake* and *error* in their etymologies touch upon their opposition to the good of reason which involves seeing the distinction of things and their order. But it is more the disorder in the act of reason which is the source of error.

Men are often mistaken. A sign of this is their frequent disagreement. Aristotle spoke of the prevalence of error in man and the other animals in the second book *About the Soul.*

As Aristotle shows in the second book of *Wisdom,* the consideration of truth belongs most of all to the wise man. Hence, also, the wise man is most of all is concerned with the elimination of error. And since it belongs to the wise man to consider things in the light of their causes, the wise man looks for the causes of mistakes or errors with a view to uprooting them.

And since wisdom is "to speak the truth, and to act, in accord with nature, giving ear thereto", the wise man wants to eliminate error which is contrary to nature:

> falsa enim iudicia in operationibus intellectus sunt sicut monstra in rebus naturalibus, quae non sunt secundum naturam, sed praeter naturam; nam bonum intellectus, et eius finis naturalis est cognitio veritatis.[1]

Moreover, it is also opposed to our natural desires. Just as man has a natural desire to know the truth, so too there is a natural desire in man to avoid error or mistake:

> Sicut omnes homines naturaliter scire desiderant veritatem, ita naturale desiderium inest hominibus fugiendi errores, et eos cum facultas adfuerit confutandi.[2]

This is another reason for the wise man in following nature to oppose error.

Moreover, it is opposed to our natural desire to be happy and avoid misery. As knowing truth is a great part of the happiness we all naturally desire most of all, so avoiding error is very important in escaping misery or wretchedness which we all naturally flee:

> deceptio autem et error magna pars miseriae est: hoc est enim quod omnes naturaliter fugiunt.[3]

And as Aristotle can reason from the natural desire to know both to the goodness and the possibility of knowledge, so we can reason from the natural desire to avoid error both to the desirability and the possibility of avoiding error. This does not mean, of course, that it is possible to eliminate all errors. There is something unlimited about eliminating error for mistakes are endless. We do well here to remember the words of Hilary in regard to another kind of infinite:

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[1] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber III, Caput 107

[2]Thomas Aquinas, *De Unitate Intellectus Contra Averroistas*, Proemium, Opuscula Philosophica, ed. Marietti, n. 173

[3]Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber III, Caput XXXIX

> incipe, procurre, persiste: etsi non perventurum sciam, gratulabor tamen profecturum. Qui enim....infinita prosequitur, etsi non contingat aliquando, semper tamen proficiet prodeundo.[4]

Goethe compared the wise man separating truth from falsity to a swimmer who momentarily parts the waters and, as he passes on in time, they come together again behind him.

Faced with the impossibility of eliminating all or even most errors, mankind can be consoled by two things in this life: the possibility of eliminating the more serious errors from some minds and the usefulness of error (per accidens) in developing the truth - for the refutation of error has often had this effect.

Our aim is to know the causes of mistake or error in our thinking. By "in our thinking", we separate from our aim the causes of mistake in our doing and making. We say in our *thinking* rather than in our *knowing* because knowing is the opposite of being mistaken.

The first division of the causes of error or mistake is made explicit by Thomas although Plato and Aristotle and Shakespeare and others have touched upon it. Hence, this foreword will be followed by a paper on the division of the causes of error or mistake. Then papers on the chief causes of mistake or error can be placed

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[4] *de Trin.*, Liber II, Capita 10 & 11

DIVISION OF THE CAUSES OF ERROR

Thomas Aquinas has divided the causes of error in his commentaries on the Epistles of St. Paul to Timothy. In the following text, he speaks of the *occasions of errors* and divides them into two kinds:

> dicit et resipiscant a diaboli laqueis, id est, ab occasionibus errorum ex parte intellectus, sicut falsae phantasiae, et ex parte affectus, sicut sunt invidia, superbia, et huiusmodi.[1]

Thomas uses the word *occasion* especially for accidental cause, the kind of cause that something bad is apt to have. The division is into those occasions or causes which are *ex parte intellectus* or on the side of the understanding and those causes which are *ex parte affectus* or on the side of desire. Since the understanding or reason depends upon the senses in its operation, the first kind of cause includes the senses as Thomas' example of false imagination brings out. The second kind of cause includes those in the will and the emotions.

The above text is from Thomas' commentary on the *Second Epistle to Timothy*. In his commentary on the *First Epistle to Timothy*, Thomas also touches upon the above division, speaking of the root of error:

> Radix autem erroris est duplex, scilicet superbiae affectus, et defectus intellectus.[2]

Here the use of the word *root* seems to touch upon what is most fundamentaland universal or strongest in both kinds of causes. On the side of desire, Thomas singles out *superbia* or pride. Thomas, in his commentary on the *Gospel of St. John,* says that every error is caused by pride:

> omnis error ex superbia causatur[3]

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[1]*II Ad Timothy*, II, Lection IV, n. 87

[2]*I Ad Timothy*, VI, Lection I, n. 238

[3]Super Joannem, IV, Lectio IV, n. 601

And in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Thomas calls pride or presumption[4] the *mother of error:*

praesumptio...est mater erroris[5]

And on the side of the understanding, he gives the failure to understand or the failure of the understanding as fundamental and universal. As Thomas says elsewhere, every error comes from a failure of understanding:

> In eo autem quod quis intelligit, non errat: ex defectu enim intelligendi provenit omnis error...[6]

Every error or mistake comes from a failure to understand something or from a misunderstanding. God cannot be mistaken because he understands everything.

Aristotle also touches upon causes on the side of the understanding and on the side of desire. In the *Rhetoric,* Aristotle considers the causes of the mistake of thinking that political rhetoric is political philosophy. He says that men claim this through not acquiring paideia or through boastfulness (which is a form of pride) and other human causes.[7] He gives ignorance and boastfulness as causes of error in the Eudemian Ethics.[8] Plato also in the *Phaedo* has Socrates see ignorance of the art of arguments and various defects in desire as causes of error or mistake. Shakespeare also sees causes on the side of our knowing powers and on the side of desire as will be seen in the papers on Shakespeare's understanding of error.

The reason why there are causes of error on both the side of reason and on the side of desire is not hard to find. Since a mistake or error is a defective act or product of reason, it is not strange to look for causes of error on the side

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[4] Thomas Aquinas, *De Malo,* Q. 8, Art. 3, Ad 1: "praesumptio...maxime videtur ad superbiam pertinere"

[5] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber I, Capitulum 5

[6] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber III, Capitulum CVIII:

[7] Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, Book I, Chapter 2, 1356a

[8] *Eudemian Ethics*, Book One, 1216b 40 - 1217a 10

of reason itself and the sense powers necessary for its act. But since the use and application of our reason also depends upon our will, for we can choose to apply or not apply our reason or apply it to this or to that, there can also be causes of error on the side of desire. And the emotions also influence our thinking as everyone knows.

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PRIDE AS A CAUSE OF ERROR

This paper is about pride as a cause of error. Sometimes Thomas calls this cause one of the two roots of error and sometimes he calls it the mother of error and both titles indicate the fundamental and universal importance of pride as a cause of error.

In his commentary on the *First Epistle to Timothy*, Thomas speaks of the root of error as twofold:

> Radix autem erroris est duplex, scilicet superbiae affectus, et defectus intellectus.
>
> The root of error is twofold, to wit the affection of pride and the defect of the understanding[1]

And in the beginning of the *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Thomas teaches us that pride or presumption[2] is the mother of error:

> praesumptio...est mater erroris
>
> presumption is the mother of error[3]

These titles for this cause of error touch, as we have said, upon the universal importance of this cause of error. Indeed, Thomas sometimes speaks directly of this universal causation of pride:

> omnis error ex superbia causatur
>
> every error is caused from pride[4]

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[1] *Super I Ad Timotheum*, VI, Lectio I, n. 238

[2] Thomas Aquinas, *De Malo*, Q. 8, Art. 3, Ad 1: “praesumptio...maxime videtur ad superbiam pertinere” “presumption most of all seems to pertain to pride”

[3] *Summa Contra Gentiles,* Liber I, Capitulum 5

But how is pride a cause of error? Thomas in one of the fundamental texts we have considered, his commentary on St. Paul's *First Epistle to Timothy*, says that pride is the root or cause of error in two ways:

> Dicitur autem superbia radix errorum dupliciter.
>
> Primo quia superbi volunt se intromittere de his ad quae non attingunt, et ideo necesse est, quod errent et deficiant. Is. XVI, v. 6: *Superbia eius et arrogantia eius, et indignatio eius plus quam fortitudo eius etc*.
>
> Item quia nolunt intellectum alteri subiicere; sed innituntur suae prudentiae, et ideo nolunt obedire scripturae sacrae. Contra hoc dicitur Prov. III, 5: *Ne innitaris prudentiae tuae*. Prov. XI, 2: *Ubi humilitas, ibi sapientia*.
>
> Pride is said to be the root of error in two ways.
>
> First because the proud wish to go among those things to which they do not attain, and therefore it is necessary that they err and fail. *Isaias* XVI, v. 6: "His pride and his arrogance and his indignation are more than his strength etc"
>
> Also because they do not will to subject their understanding to another, but they rest upon their own prudence, and therefore they do not will to obey sacred scripture. Against this it is said in *Proverbs*, III, 5: "Do not rely upon your own prudence. *Proverbs*, XI, 2: "Where humility, there wisdom."[5]

Thomas speaks more fully of this second way in which pride is a cause of error in the *Summa Theologiae:*

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[4] *Super Ioannem*, IV, Lectio II, n. 601

[5] *Super I Ad Timotheum* VI, Lectio I, n. 238

> Superbus enim neque Deo suum intellectum subiicit...Neque etiam ab hominibus addiscere dignantur.
>
> The proud neither subjects his understanding to God, nor does he condescend to learn from men.[6]

Since by our will we can apply our reason or not apply it, pride is a cause of error in the first way by applying our reason and in the second way by not applying our reason. When we apply our reason to judge something beyond our ability to judge or before we are able to judge it or before we are able to judge it well, we fail and fall into error. And when we do *not* apply it to the words of those wiser than us, we are not held back from, or recalled from, errors.

Shakespeare also seems to touch upon these two ways in which pride can be a cause of error in *Richard II* (Act I, Sc.1) where the king describes the proud Mowbray and Bolingbroke thus:

> High-stomach'd are they both, and full of ire,
> In rage deaf as the sea, hasty as fire.[7]

Mowbray and Bolingbroke are both proud or "High-stomach'd" and therefore full of anger for the proud are easily moved to anger. And this makes them "deaf as the sea" and "hasty as fire". Shakespeare often speaks metaphorically of the person who does not hear others whom he should, as deaf. Thus pride makes one unteachable. And haste, of course makes waste. There are many things we are not able to do in haste. Hence, Friar Laurence says to Romeo: "Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast." The proud man then is deaf to those he should listen to and attempts to do those things that are above his powers or in a way that they are above his powers.

We must consider more fully how pride is a cause of error in these two ways by looking more at what pride is and at the kinds of cause that error can have.

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[6] *Summa Theologiae,* Secunda Secundae, Q. 162, Art. 3, Ad 1
[7] *Richard II*, Act I, Sc.1

Pride is defined by Thomas in the *Summa Theologiae* as the disordered desire of one's own excellence.[8] Since Thomas considers humility and pride there with the virtues that resemble temperance and intemperance, we can also say that pride is an immoderate desire of one's own excellence. Pride is an excessive desire of one's own excellence, an unmeasured desire of one's own excellence. Augustine has a similar definition in the *City of God* (14, 13, 1):

> Quid est autem superbia nisi perversae celsitudinis appetitus? Perversa enim est celsitudo, deserto eo, cui debet animus inhaerere, principio, sibi quodammodo fieri atque esse principium. Hoc fit, cum sibi nimis placet...Unde superbi secundum Scripturas sanctas alio nomine appellantur sibi placentes (*2 Petr.*, 2, 10)
>
> What is pride except the desire of a perverse height? That height is perverse when the soul, deserting the beginning to which it should adhere, becomes and is for itself the beginning. This comes to be when the soul pleases itself too much...Whence the proud by another name in Scripture are called those pleasing themselves (2 *Peter*., 2, 10)

Augustine later in the *City of God* goes on to speak of pride as *amor sui* in the bad sense which would be a disordered or excessive love of oneself.

Although the excessive desire or love of one's own excellence of which Thomas and Augustine speak is clearly connected with the excessive and disordered love of oneself, yet they are not the same love. They are not, in fact, even the same kind of love even though both are involved in pride. In the *Summa Theologiae*, when speaking about love, Thomas distinguishes two kinds of love which are there called the love of friendship and the love of concupiscence.[9] This way of naming them could possibly be misleading to someone since the love of friendship can be had for oneself as well as for a friend and the love of concupiscence can be had for what is good for another as well as for oneself. The distinction is this: As Thomas explains there, following Aristotle, to love someone is to wish good to them. Hence, one is said to have the love of friendship for the one to whom one wishes well whether that one be

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[8] *Summa Theologiae*, Secunda Secundae, q. 162, a. 2

[9] *Summa Theologiae,* Prima Secundae, Q, 26, Art. 4

a friend or oneself. And one is said to have the love of concupiscence for the good which one wishes to oneself or to another.

Further, the love of friendship is the cause of the love of wanting. It is because I love my children that I want good things for them. And it is because I love myself that I want good things for myself. Hence, it is because one has an excessive or disordered love of oneself that one has an excessive or disordered love and desire of one's own excellence.

Now both of these kinds of love which we have distinguished are involved in pride and they are both involved in pride as a cause of error. But each love has a role to play in making pride a cause of error. Let us first look at the role of the love of concupiscence or the love of wanting in pride and then at the role of the love of friendship or the love of wishing well in pride.

The love of concupiscence or wanting in pride is the disordered or excessive love of one's own excellence. Now man excels the other animals by his knowledge and knowledge is also one of the most important ways that one man excels another. Knowledge is thus one of the most suitable matters for pride. And it is interesting to note as regards the two excellences most proper to man, knowledge and moral virtue, that men get less angry if you call them wicked than if you call them stupid.

It is not too difficult to see then how the disordered or excessive love and desire of one's own excellence is a cause of error. If one seeks the excellence of knowing or judging something which is above one's ability to know or judge, one can easily fall into error. But since pride is nothing other than the excessive desire of one's own excellence, it does cause us to try to know or judge something above our power to judge or know. The desire is excessive precisely because it makes us pursue something above our powers. One clearly has an excessive desire for one's own excellence when one seeks an excellence in that which is impossible for oneself or in a way in which it is impossible for oneself.

But the other love in pride, the love of friendship or wishing well, also has an important role to play in causing us to err. The love of friendship in pride is the excessive or disordered love of oneself. This love is a cause of error not only in that it is a cause of the excessive desire for one's own excellence, but also in the sense that it is a cause of a false estimate of one's powers. If one loves himself too much, one is apt to think one has more ability than one does.

Shakespeare has a good sonnet on this sinful self-love. The first two quatrains of *Sonnet 62:*

> Sin of self-love possesseth all mine eye
> And all my soul and all my every part;
> And for this sin there is no remedy,
> It is so grounded inward in my heart.
>
> Methinks no face so gracious is as mine,
> No shape so true, no truth of such account;
> And for myself mine own worth do define,
> As I all other in all worths surmount.

Thomas has a very good word in speaking of the proud not knowing themselves. In his commentary on the *Second Epistle to Timothy* of St. Paul, he says:

> Superbi enim inflantur in agendis, quia non metiuntur vires suas, et ideo deficunt.
>
> The proud are blown up in deeds because they do not measure their powers, and therefore they fail.[10]

The word *measure* is well chosen here. The proud cannot measure their powers or get a correct measure of their powers. Aristotle speaks in the same way in a more general context in the *Rhetoric*.[11] There he says that it is wrong to twist the jury by emotions before they judge. It is like, he says, warping the ruler before one measures. The passions make things seem either better or worse than they are. If I am angry with the man on trial, his crime and guilt will seem worse. If I pity or love him, he will seem better than he is. Pride, being a kind of love or desire, makes us seem better than we are, more capable than we are. Hence, Thomas' noteworthy phrase that the proud do not measure their powers.

We have said that pride is a cause of error not only in applying our reason to judge something above our ability to judge, but also applying it to judge

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[10] *In II Ad Timotheum*, III, Lectio I, n. 101

[11] BK. I, Ch. 1

something in a way that we are not able to judge it. There are some things which reason is simply unable to judge, but many other things that it can judge only in some way. This should be unfolded.

If reason tries to judge in reasoned out knowledge before it knows the road to follow, it can easily wander into error. The common road of reasoned out knowledge is learned in logic and the private road of each reasoned out knowledge should be learned in the beginning of that reasoned out knowledge. And both of these roads involve a knowledge of the way of judging. Part of logic, especially the part contained in the *Prior and Posterior Analytics*, is called the *scientia iudicandi* in the Latin tradition because it contains the common way of judging in reasoned out knowledge. But part of the private road of each reasoned out knowledge is the way of judging in that reasoned out knowledge. And the ways of judging in geometry and in natural philosophy and in wisdom or first philosophy are all different. Hence, the man who applies his reason to judging before he knows logic or the private road of the reasoned out knowledge where this judgment should be made is not able to judge well. If he does this out of pride (there can also be other causes of his doing this), he is using his reason to judge something before he is able or well able to do so. And in this way, pride can cause his reason to err.

And since judgment is the separation of the true from the false by some beginning in our knowledge, the man who has not acquired well the beginnings of the things about which he is trying to judge can err in his judgment. As Aristotle says in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, one must in reasoned out knowledge carefully distinguish the beginnings from what are not beginnings and the beginnings from each other. If a man out of pride tries to judge things before he has a firm grasp of their beginnings, he can easily err in trying to judge them.

Moreover, if the man who considers both sides of a question dialectically is better able to judge, just like the jury which has heard both sides, the man who tries to judge before dialectic may not be able to judge so well. And if out of pride, he thinks he does not need to consider the matter dialectically before trying to judge, he may make a mistake in his judgment. Moreover, the man who has not seen the difficulty before is not so well able to judge when the answer has been found.

And men often try to know the particular distinctly and judge things there before they have a distinct knowledge of the general. And in this way and

others in which they are too hasty, men often fail in their judgment. Hence, Friar Laurence's advice: Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast. We often warn people about "jumping" to conclusions for errors are easily made in this way.

But pride is a cause of error not only insofar as it leads us to apply our mind to judging a matter which is above our ability to judge or before we are able to judge it, but also, as we have heard from Thomas, insofar as it makes us unwilling to subject our reason to learning from those wiser than us. Here we must consider how pride leads us to refuse to subject our reason to those wiser than us and how this is a cause of error.

Pride as we have seen is a disordered or excessive love and desire of one's own excellence and also an excessive love of oneself. Hesiod, the great Greek poet, in a passage quoted by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, has distinguished in order three kinds of men in regard to any kind of knowledge. In Thomas' commentary there:

> ...audiat sententiam Hesiodi poetae. Qui dixit quod ille est optimus, qui scilicet potest per seipsum intelligere. Et ille etiam est bonus, qui recipit quae ab alio dicuntur. Ille autem qui neque per seipsum potest intelligere, neque alium audiens potest in animo reponere, est inutilis quantum ad acquisitionem scientiae.
>
> Let him hear the saying of Hesiod who says that he is best who is able to understand by himself. But he is also good who receives what is said by another. But he who neither understands by himself, nor hearing another places it in his soul, is useless as far as the acquiring of knowledge.[12]

The best man is the one who discovers the truth by himself. Next is the man who can learn it from the man who discovered it. And last is the man who can neither discover it by himself, nor learn it from another. Although we can all perhaps discover some little truth by ourselves, there are very few men who can discover a great truth by themselves. Most of us are at best in the second

[12] *In I Ethicorum*, Lectio IV, n. 54

group. And if you talk about many great truths, perhaps all of us are in the second or third group.

The proud man then in his excessive desire for excellence seeks the excellence of not needing a teacher. He is seeking the excellence of the great minds and perhaps more - for even the greatest minds learned many things from those who came before them. And because he cannot measure his powers but exaggerates them, as we have seen before, the proud man thinks himself capable of this excellence of not needing a teacher. Moreover, the proud man is apt to envy others who have some excellence and this envy prevents them from being teachable. And the proud are given to anger which also gets in the way of learning from or with others.

And why does not submitting your mind to the words of those wiser than oneself lead to error. Thomas gives a succinct explanation of this when commenting on Aristotle's critique of the early Greeks for not having explained the cause of error in man when they did try to explain the cause of knowledge. For error is more common than knowledge in man and the other animals. Thomas writes as follows:

> deceptio videtur esse magis propria animalibus quam cognitio secundum conditionem suae naturae. Videmus enim quod homines ex seipsis decipi possunt et errare. Ad hoc autem quod veritatem cognoscant, oportet quod ab aliis doceantur. Et iterum pluri tempore anima est in deceptione quam in cognitione veritatis; quia ad cognitionem veritatis vix pervenitur post studium longi temporis.
>
> Deception seems more proper to animals than knowledge according to the condition of their nature. For we see that men of themselves are able to be deceived and to err. But in order to know the truth, it is necessary that they be taught by others. And also the soul is a longer time in deception than in the knowledge of the truth because it is hard to arrive at a knowledge of the truth even after studying a long time.[13]

[13] *In III De Anima*, Lectio IV, n. 624

Every teacher, for example, has experience of how easily students make mistakes on their own. Every time, for example, that I teach the formal syllogism and put some valid and invalid forms on the board, many students will think the invalid forms valid (and sometimes the valid invalid).

Discretion is, of course, necessary in deciding whom to take as a teacher and on what and to what extent. As Thomas explains in his consideration of the good student in the *De Commendatione S. Scripturae,*[14] not only is humility required in the student, but also *rectitudo sensus*. The good student needs discernment about whom to believe. The classic treatment of how to select a teacher is found in Plato's work, the *Protagoras*.

We are first apt to believe someone because of their fame or position. But even here, we should see the difference between fame in one's own time and fame over the ages. In Samuel Johnson's circle, it was commonly said that it takes at least a hundred years to tell if a poet is worth reading. If he is still being read a hundred years after his death, this is *prima facie* evidence that there may be something by him worth reading. Plato and Aristotle are still being read over two thousand years after their death.

But as we listen to or read the famous, a second and stronger criterion comes to light. Does the famous one know how to proceed? When Socrates and Protagoras begin to converse, we see that Protagoras prefers to give a speech rather than to proceed by the short questions and answers that Socrates prefers. We begin to judge that Socrates knows more how to proceed to find the truth than does Protagoras. Although their will is less able to be known than how the famous proceed, we can also begin to discern that Protagoras wants to win more than to know the truth.

And when we see Protagoras beginning to contradict himself, we have perhaps the strongest criterion for hesitating to take him as our teacher.

One could also consider how these two ways pride is a cause of error are connected with the species of pride distinguished by Gregory the Great and Thomas Aquinas. Three kinds of pride can be distinguished (although one of

[14] III, n. 1214

these could be subdivided into two). These kinds of pride are distinguished especially by their effects. One kind of pride is boastfulness whereby a person thinks that they are better than they are or that they have an excellence which they do not have. Another kind or form of pride is that whereby what we do have, but from another, we think to have from our own effort (or merits). The third kind of pride is where we think that we excel all others even though they may have the same excellence as us or even more so. The first kind of pride seems more a cause of our attempting to judge something beyond our ability or in the way it is beyond our ability. But the second and third kinds of pride seem to have a special opposition to learning from those from whom we should learn. For if we want to have the excellence of knowing something from ourselves or we want to be above everyone else, we can hardly learn from another who would thus be above us in what we learn from them.

Having considered how pride is a cause of error, we can now ask the more precise question: what kind of cause of error is pride?

Before we can understand in particular what kind of cause pride is of error, we must first understand in general the kind of cause which error can have. For we understand the general before the particular.

Error is something bad. And it is the universal and constant teaching of Thomas that the bad can have only an accidental cause. This teaching is based especially on two truths. The first of these is that no agent ever intends the bad as such but always the good or, at least, what seems to be good. The second is that every agent acts insofar as it is in act and makes what is like itself. But it is the lack of act in a subject which is able to have and should have that act which is bad. We cannot expand upon these reasons here. But we shall take this teaching as the beginning of our investigation of the kind of cause that pride is of error.

Since error is something bad and the bad can have only an accidental cause, every cause of error is an accidental cause. Hence, this is also true of the roots of error which Thomas calls the desire of pride and the defect of understanding.

But there are many kinds of accidental cause and we must find the ways that fit pride and the defect of the understanding.

Thomas has given the division of accidental cause in more than one place. One important place where he does this in his commentary on the fifth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* when he is explaining the various divisions of cause which Aristotle makes there:

> Sciendum autem est, quod aliquid potest dici causa per accidens alterius dupliciter, Uno modo ex parte causae; quia scilicet illud quod accidit causae dicitur causa per accidens, sicut si album dicatur causa domus. Alio modo ex parte effectus; ut scilicet aliquid dicatur causa per accidens alicuius, quod accidit ei quod est effectus per se.
>
> It should be known that something can be called an accidental cause of another in two ways. In one way, on the side of the cause; because what happens to the cause is said to be an accidental cause, as if the white is said to be the cause of the house. In another way, on the side of the effect; as something is said to be the accidental cause of what happens to the effect as such.[15]

An example of the second is when a man is digging in the ground to plant a tree and he finds a treasure. His digging in the ground to plant a tree is said to be an accidental cause of what happens rarely - the finding of the treasure. The finding of the treasure is something which happens to his per se and intended effect, a hole in the ground for a tree.

Are the two roots of error, the defect of the understanding and the affection of pride, accidental causes by reason of what happens to the cause or what happens to the effect? I would suggest at this point that the defect of understanding is an accidental cause of error in the first way, that is, on the side of what happens to the cause; and pride is an accidental cause more in the second way, that is, on the side of what happens to the effect. Let us consider

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[15] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio III, n. 789

both of these separately, and first the defect of the understanding. We have seen already in the text from Thomas' commentary on the *First Epistle to Timothy*, that Thomas speaks of the root of error as twofold, one on the side of desire and the other on the side of the understanding:

> Radix autem erroris est duplex, scilicet superbiae affectus, et defectus intellectus.
>
> The root of error is twofold, to wit the affection of pride and the defect of the understanding.[16]

The connection between error and the *defectus intellectus* is immediately more clear than between error and the *superbiae affectus*. As Thomas points out in the *De Malo:*

> falsa opinio est quaedam defectiva operatio intellectus, sicut partus monstruosus est quaedam defectiva operatio naturae: Unde Philosophus dicit in *VI Ethic*. quod malum intellectus est falsum.
>
> Defectiva autem operatio semper procedit ex defectu alicuius principii, sicut ex aliquo defectu seminis procedit monstruositas partus, ut dicitur in *II Physic*. Unde necesse est quod omnis falsa aestimatio procedat ex defectu alicuius principii cognoscendi; sicut in nobis falsa opinio accidit plerumque ex indebita ratiocinatione.
>
> A false opinion is a defective operation of the understanding, as a monstrous offspring is a defective operation of nature. Whence the Philosopher says in the sixth book of the *Ethics* that the false is the bad of the understanding.
>
> A defective operation however always proceeds from the defect of some beginning, as from the defect of the seed proceeds the monstrous offspring, as is said

[16] *Super I Ad Timotheum*, VI, Lectio I, n. 238

> in the second book of the *Physics*. Whence it is necessary that every false estimate proceed from the defect of some beginning of knowing; as in us false opinion happens often from unsuitable reasoning.[17]

The word *defectus* is also used by Thomas in his major proemium to logic when talking about the defectus intellectus here, *indebita ratiocinatio:*

> Tertius vero rationis processus est, in quo ratio a vero deficit propter alicuius principii defectum; quod in ratiocinando erat observandum.
>
> The third proceeding of reason is that in which reason falls away from the true because of the defect of some beginning which should have been observed in the reasoning.[18]

This defect in the cause is a per accidens cause of the effect, even though it might seem to be per se to some (even the wise are deceived by the per accidens!) Thomas explains this in the *Summa Contra Gentiles:*

> Ex defectu causae sequitur defectus in effectu. Defectus autem in causa est aliquid malum. Non tamen potest esse causa per se: quia res non est causa per hoc quod est deficiens, sed per hoc quod est ens; si enim tota deficeret, nullius esset causa. Malum igitur est alicuius causa non per se, sed per accidens.
>
> From the defect of the cause follows a defect in the effect. But the defect in the cause is something bad. It is not however able to be a cause as such because a thing is not a cause through being deficient, but through this that it is a being; for if the whole was deficient, it would be the cause of nothing. The bad

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[17] *De Malo*, q. 16, Art. 6, c.
[18] *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Proemium, n. 5

> therefore is the cause of something, not as such, but by happening.[19]

But is this an accidental cause *ex parte causae* or *ex parte effectus*? It seems to be *ex parte causae* for the defect of the cause is something that happens to the cause. Yet this kind of accidental cause *ex parte causae* differs from the kind which Thomas uses to exemplify accidental cause *ex parte causae*. The example again in Thomas" commentary on the *Metaphysics:*

> Sciendum autem est, quod aliquid potest dici causa per accidens alterius dupliciter.
>
> Uno modo ex parte causae; quia scilicet illud quod accidit causae dicitur causa per accidens, sicut si album dicatur causa domus.
>
> Alio modo ex parte effectus...
>
> It should be known that something can be called an accidental cause of another in two ways.
>
> In one way because that which happens to the cause is said to be an accidental cause, as if the white is said to be a cause of the house.
>
> In another way, on the side of the effect.[20]

And in the *De Malo:*

> causa per accidens dicitur aliquid alicuius dupliciter.
>
> Uno modo ex parte causae, sicut causa domus per se est aedificator cui accidit esse musicum; et sic musicum, quod accidit causae per se, dicitur per accidens causa domus.

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[19] *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Liber II, Caput XIV
[20] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio III, n. 789

> Alio modo ex parte effectus...
>
> Something is said to be the accidental cause of another in two ways.
>
> In one way on the side of the cause; just as the cause as such of the house is the builder to whom it happens to be musical; and thus the musical, which happens to the cause as such, is said to be the accidental cause of the house.
>
> In another way, on the side of the effect.[21]

The kind of accidental cause *ex parte causae* which Thomas usually exemplifies does nothing for the achievement of the effect. Thomas uses the same example in the writing on the *Sentences:*

> Est enim quaedam causa per accidens quae nihil operatur ad effectum, sicut musica aedificatoris ad domum.
>
> There is an accidental cause which does nothing towards the effect, as the musical art of the builder, to the house.[22]

But the defect of the cause could seem to some to be a per se cause of the effect. The reason for this is that the defect in the cause is always followed by some defect in the effect. But it is not always so that musicians build houses. But some accidental things are more accidental than others. In the *De Malo*, Thomas says:

> Est ergo duplex modus quo malum causatur ex bono. Uno modo bonum est causa mali in quantum est deficiens; alio modo in quantum est per accidens.

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[21] *De Malo*, q. 1, art. 3, ad 14

[22] *In I I Sent.*, Dist. XLVI, Q. I, Art. II, Ad 3

> There are two ways in which the bad is caused by the good. In one way the good is the cause of the bad insofar as it is defective; in another way, by accident.[23]

But when Thomas says that *Superbiae affectus* is the other root of error, he does not use the word *defectus*. This makes me think that he does not think of pride as being an accidental cause on the side of the cause (*ex parte causae*) but in the side of the effect (*ex parte effectus*). But I am not sure about this.

Although there is a defect of will in pride and a defect in pride itself (for pride is a disordered or immoderate desire of one's own excellence), and this defect will of course enter into our understanding of the way in which pride is an accidental cause of error in reason, yet the defect in error cannot be understood to proceed immediately from the defect in pride or the will as it does from the defect in the understanding. The reason for saying this is that error or false opinion is a defective operation of the understanding or reason, as Thomas says in the *De Malo*.[24] Hence, we must understand the way in which pride is an accidental cause of error in another way than the defect of the understanding. The other way is the accidental cause *ex parte effectus*. We must examine then the division of accidental cause *ex parte effectus* or on the side of the effect.

Thomas Aquinas has given the division of accidental cause in his commentary on the fifth book of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* when he is explaining the various divisions of causes which Aristotle makes there. As quoted before:

> Sciendum autem est, quod aliquid potest dici causa per accidens alterius dupliciter, Uno modo ex parte causae; quia scilicet illud quod acccidit causae dicitur causa per accidens, sicut si album dicatur causa domus. Alio modo ex parte effectus; ut scilicet aliquid dicatur causa per accidens alicuius, quod accidit ei quod est effectus per se.

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[23] *De Malo,* Q. I, Art. 3, c.
[24] *De Malo*, q. 16, art 6, c. (quoted above).

> It should be known that something can be called an accidental cause of another in two ways. In one way, on the side of the cause; because what happens to the cause is said to be an accidental cause, as if the white is said to be the cause of the house. In another way, on the side of the effect; as something is said to be the accidental cause of what happens to the effect as such. [25]

He does not subdivide the first way, but immediately he subdivides the second way:

> Quod quidem potest esse tripliciter.
>
> Uno modo, quia habet necessarium ordinem ad effectum, sicut remotio impedimenti habet ordinem necessarium ad effectum. Unde removens prohibens dicitur movere per accidens; sive illud accidens sit contrarium, sicut cholera prohibet frigiditatem, unde scamonaea dicitur infrigidare per accidens, non quia causet frigiditatem sed quia tollit impedimentum frigiditatis, quod est ei contrarium, scilicet choleram: sive etiam si non sit contrarium, sicut columna impedit motum lapidis, unde removens columnam dicitur per accidens movere lapidem super positum.
>
> Alio modo, quando accidens habet ordinem ad effectum, non tamen necessarium, nec ut in pluribus, sed ut in paucioribus, sicut inventio thesauri ad fossionem in terra. Et hoc modo fortuna et casus dicuntur causae per accidens.
>
> Tertio, quando nullum ordinem habent, nisi forte secundum existimationem; sicut si aliquis dicatur se esse causam terraemotus, quia eo intrante domum accidit terraemotus.

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[25] *In V Metaphysicorum*, Lectio III, n. 789

> This can be in three ways.
>
> In one way, because it has a necessary order to the effect, as the removal of the impediment has a necessary order to the effect. Whence the one removing what prevents is said to move by accident; whether that accident is contrary, as cholera prevents coldness, whence the scamonaea is said to cool by accident, not because it causes coldness, but because it takes away the impediment of coldness, which is contrary to it, namely the cholera; or also if it is not contrary, as the column impedes the motion of the stone - whence the one removing the column is said by accident to move the stone placed upon it.
>
> In another way, when the accident has an order to the effect, not however necessary, nor for the most part, but rarely, as the finding of a treasure to digging in the earth. And in this way, fortune and chance are said to be accidental causes.
>
> Thirdly, when they have no order, except by estimation; as if someone is said to be the cause of the earthquake because the earthquake happened when he entered the house.[26]

I do not think that this division is complete for it leaves out a very important kind of accidental cause. Leaving aside the third way which is not too important for the philosopher although it is very important for the politician who sometimes wants to get credit for the good things that happen to the country during his administration even though he may not be responsible for them. (The same can be said for bad things that happen although here he would not like to be thought responsible.) We find another text of Thomas in his commentary on the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, the standard text in theology in the High Middle Ages, where he distinguishes another kind of accidental cause against the *causa removens prohibens:*

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[26] ibid., n. 789

malum non habet causam nisi per accidens dupliciter.

Primo modo, scilicet secundum quod agens per accidens dicitur respectu ejus quod accidit praeter intentionem agentis, quia omne agens agit propter finem, et intendit bonum quod est finis, et nulla privatio est intenta, sed sequitur ex forma inducta cui adjungitur: ignis enim non intendit a materia privare formam aeris, sed inducere formam propriam; sed inducendo formam propriam, privat formam aeris; similiter peccator intendit dulcedinem, quae est bonum alicujus partis ejus, scilicet concupiscibilis, et non intendit privationem gratiae.

Secundo, sicut dicitur agens per accidens, removens prohibens: prohibens enim privationem est forma vel res aliqua. Unde qui removet illam rem, dicitur causare privationem; sicut qui extinguit candelam, vel exportat a domo, dicitur causare tenebras.

The bad does not have an accidental cause except in two ways.

In the first way, as the agent is said to be accidental with respect to what happens outside the intention of the agent because every agent acts for an end and intends the good which is an end. And no lack is intended, but it follows from the form induced to which it is joined; for fire doe not intend to deprive matter of the form of air, but to induce its own form; but in inducing its own form, it causes a lack of the form of air. Likewise, the sinner intends sweetness which is a good of one of his parts, his concupiscible appetite, and he does not intend the loss of grace.

In the second way, as the one removing what prevents is said to be an agent by accident; what prevents a lack is a form or some thing, Whence who removes that thing is said to cause the lack; as the one who

> extinguishes the candle or carries it from the house, is said to cause the darkness.[27]

This fourth kind of accidental cause on the side of what happens to the effect is like chance or luck in that it is outside intention, but differs in that what results happens always or for the most part. If a man always pursues what is agreeable to his senses and avoids what is disagreeable to them, he is intending sense-pleasure and the avoidance of sense-pain. But it is not by luck or chance that he often does something unreasonable or often fails to do what is reasonable.

Which, if any, of these four kinds of accidental cause on the side of the effect can apply to pride as the root and mother of error? Since pride seems to be a rather universal, if not the most universal, cause of error, it would not seem to be a cause of error by luck or chance. And a fortiori it is not a cause in estimation only. For as the old proverb says, "pride goes before a fall", which seems to indicate that there is some order between the two unlike the accidental cause in estimation only. It remains to be seen then whether pride is an accidental cause in either of the two remaining ways. I think that it is an accidental cause in both of the remaining ways and that these two ways correspond to the two ways we saw before that pride is a cause of error.

We have seen before that by pride a man applies his mind to something he is unable to judge and hence falls into error. But by pride, we do not desire the mistake or error that happens when we apply our mind to judging something we are unable to judge. What we are desiring by pride is the excellence of knowing and judging those things. But to the pursuit of such excellence is joined always or for the most part the making of a mistake or error.

In this way, pride is a cause of error in somewhat the same way that luck or chance is said to be a cause. Digging in the ground to plant a tree might result in the finding of a buried treasure, but this was not intended by the man digging. In that way, his digging in the ground to plant a tree is the accidental cause of the finding of a treasure. Likewise, in applying his mind to judging a matter which is above his ability to judge, the proud man is not intending to make a mistake, but to acquire or have a certain excellence. But in pursuing this excellence, he falls into error since the matter is above his ability to judge.

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[27] *Scriptum super Lib. II Sententiarum*, Dist. I, Q. I, Art. 1, Ad 2

Yet there is also a very important difference between the kind of accidental cause which pride is and luck or chance is. For luck or chance is a cause of what happens rarely as a result of an action done for an end. One does not usually find a treasure when digging in the ground to plant a tree. (In New England, however, one always or usually finds a rock.) But when one applies his mind to judging a matter one is unable to judge, one always or for the most part falls into error.

Hence pride here resembles the accidental causes of what is not intended, but yet connected for the most part or always with what is intended. The bank robber intends to get money ('That's where the money is."), not the injustice of taking what is not his. But to getting money by holding up a bank is always connected the injustice of taking what does not belong to you.

In discussing this kind of accidental cause, Thomas sometimes uses the example of someone who drinks wine because he has a sweet tooth and the wine is sweet. Such a person does not intend to get drunk but to enjoy the sweetness of the wine. But if he gets drunk always or for the most part when trying to satisfy his sweet tooth, it is not by chance or luck that he gets drunk even though this is outside his intention. Likewise, the desire for the excellence of knowing something you are unable to judge is the accidental cause of your falling into error which happens always or for the most part in the pursuit of such excellence even though the error is not intended by you.

This is one way then in which pride is an accidental cause of error. Pride is here a universal cause, not insofar as it makes us have a false estimate about ourselves since this is true about every disordered passion or act of the will (that they incline us to have a false estimate about their objects). If I am too much afraid, for example, the object of my fear will seem more dangerous or difficult to avoid than it is. But insofar as pride gives us a false estimate about ourselves and, in particular, about our ability to judge things, it makes us seek an excellence in knowing things which we are in fact unable to judge well. And in this way it becomes a universal cause of error and not just about myself.

We must turn now to the other way in which pride is a cause of error which is by making us refuse to submit our mind to the words of those wiser than ourselves. Since the bad and consequently error can only have an accidental cause, what kind of accidental cause of error is pride here?

Pride here seems to be the accidental cause called in Latin *removens prohibens*. The classic example of this kind of cause is the man who removes the pillar from below a stone and, hence, is said to be the cause of the stone falling to the ground. Such a man has removed what prevents the stone from falling to the ground.

We have seen before that it is the office of the wise man not only to teach truth, but also to exclude errors opposed to the truth. The wise man by his words (if we hear or read them carefully, frequently and with respect) prevents us from making, or remaining in, many errors. The wise man does this in two ways. First he points out and refutes many individual errors. And second he teaches us the causes of error as Aristotle has done, for example, in his book *On Sophistical Refutations*. (The book *On Sophistical Refutations* is about the common fallacies in reasoning about general questions.)

When then because of pride we do not submit our mind to the words of those wiser than ourselves, we fall into many errors and remain in many errors because of the defect of our own understanding. Reading (carefully, frequently and reverently) the words of those wiser than ourselves would prevent us from making many of these errors or would call us back from many of them. But pride removes what in these cases would prevent us from falling into many errors or remaining in them. Hence, pride is here a *causa removens prohibens* of error. It is an accidental cause of error by removing what would prevent our falling into or remaining in error - namely, a suitable application to the words of those wiser than ourselves.

Pride then is an accidental cause of error in two ways or according to two kinds of accidental cause. It now remains to see why Thomas calls pride as a cause of error, the mother and the root of error. Let us consider the word mother first and then the word *root*.

The word *mother* is perhaps a proportional metaphor. Our pride is to our errors like a mother to her children. Now a mother is to her children in three ways: first, she conceives and gives birth to them; second, she nourishes them after they have been born; and third, she loves them very much, naturally even more than the father does. We can assume that Thomas knows that a mother conceives and gives birth to her children and nourishes them after they are born. And in many places he speaks of the strength of a mother's love. Two

texts on the last point from Thomas' commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics.* Here is the first:

> Matres enim quarum est vehemens amicitia ad filios
>
> Mothers whose friendship to their sons is very strong[28]

And the second:

> Et hanc rationem confirmat per exemplum matrum, quae magis amant filios quam patres. tum quia magis laborant circa eorum generationem portando et pariendo eos, quam patres. tum etiam quia matres magis possunt scire quod sint earum filii quam patres.
>
> And he confirms this reason by the example of mothers who love their sons more than the fathers do, both because they labor more about their generation by carrying and giving birth to them than did the fathers as well as because the mothers are more able than are the fathers to know that they are their sons.[29]

Pride then can be called the mother of error by likeness to these three ways in which a mother is to her children. First, pride is a common cause of many errors as a mother conceives and gives birth to many children. The likeness here is not in the particular kind of cause. Second, as a mother naturally nourishes her new born, so too pride makes us nourish and keeps alive our false opinions after we have given birth to them. Pride not only makes us fall into error, but it also makes us adhere to our false opinions and try to support them. It is a commonplace that thinkers often pay more attention to what confirms their opinion than to what seems to contradict it. In this way they seem to feed or nourish their false opinions. Perhaps the most important likeness of pride to the mother is the way in which pride makes us attached to our opinions as much as a mother is attached to her own children. Now this is, of course, good in a

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[28] *In VIII Ethicorum*, Lectio VIII, n. 1647
[29] *In IX Ethicorum*, Lectio VII, n. 1854

mother, but it is the end of the pursuit of truth when one adheres to his own opinions because they are his own.

Why is pride suitably called the root of error? We do have an explanation of *root* as a metaphor applied to Christ by Thomas in his work on Isaiah:

> Nota...super illo verbo: radix de terra, quia Christus est radix primo propter absconsionem, Eccli., I, 6: *Radix sapientiae cui revelata est*. Secundo, propter nutrimenti ministrationem, Jerem., XVII, 8: *Erit tanquam lignum quod ad humorem mittit radices*. Tertio, propter totius arboris sustentationem. Rom. XI, 18: *Non tu radicem portas.*
>
> Note upon those words a root from the earth, that Christ is a root first on account of being hidden. Eccli., I, 6 "To whom has the root of wisdom been revealed?" Second, on account of giving nourishment, Jerem., XVII, 8: "He will be a tree that sends down roots to the moisture." Third, on account of supporting the whole tree. Rom. XI, 18: "You do not carry the root."[30]

It is a common-place of the spiritual life that spiritual sins are more hidden than sensual sins. And this is especially true of pride. Hence pride is suitably called the root of error because of this first likeness. Like the hidden root of a tree, it is hidden. Pride is a hidden cause of error. The second likeness noted by Thomas in a root, "Propter nutrimenti ministrationem", is common to this metaphor and the mother metaphor. We have already noted that pride not only gives rise to errors but makes us nourish them once we have made them. The third likeness is "propter totius arboris sustentationem." Pride sustains or supports the whole tree of error. Shakespeare in the Sonnet we quoted earlier sees something of this likeness when he said in the first quatrain:

> Sin of self-love possesseth all mine eye
> And all my soul and all my every part;
> And for this sin there is no remedy,
> It is so grounded inward in my heart.

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[30] *In Isaiam,* super Caput LIII

Pride is well described by Shakespeare as "grounded inward" in the heart. This is why we use the word *stubborn* in speaking of the proud. The word *stubborn* is derived from the Old English word *stubb* meaning a tree stump. As everyone knows who tries to remove a tree from his property, the tree-stump is the hardest part to remove, the most stubborn part of the tree. Likewise, pride is the most difficult part of the tree of error to remove.

Duane H. Berquist

SHAKESPEARE ON ERROR

Shakespeare enlightens us on the subject of error beginning with the very etymology of the word itself. In his early play, *The Comedy of Errors,* he touches upon the very origin of the word itself. *Error* comes from the Latin word meaning *to wander*. Hence, we speak of a *knight-errant* or wandering knight. Antipholus of Syracuse says (in Act IV, Sc. 3):

> This fellow is distract, and so am I:
> And here we wander in illusions:
> Some blessed power deliver us from hence.

The line "And here we wander in illusions" expresses well the origin of the word *error*. When the mind is in error, it is wandering. The word *wander* applied to the mind signifies the disordered movement of reason. Error is the result of a disordered movement of reason. The disordered movement of reason ends in an error. One could compare the disordered movement of reason to that disordered movement of the planets to which Ulysses in *Troilus & Cressida* attributes many plagues upon this earth. In his famous speech (Act I, Sc. 3), Ulysses says:

> but when the planets
> In evil mixture to disorder wander,
> What plagues and what portents!

Likewise, the disordered movement of reason results in all kinds of diseases or errors of reason. In another scene of *The Comedy of Errors* (Act IV, Sc. 2), Antipholus of Syracuse, in speaking to Luciana, speaks of error in regard to wandering:

> Teach me, dear creature, how to think and speak;
> Lay open to my earthy-gross conceit,
> Smother'd in errors, feeble, shallow, weak,
> The folded meaning of your words' deceit.
> Against my soul's pure truth why labour you
> To make it wander in an unknown field.

Reason errs when it wanders in an unknown field. But, if you know the play, Luciana is not labouring to deceive Antipholus.

If there is an art of deceiving, it would seem to belong in some way more to the bad than to the good. For it is the bad that want to deceive. Hence, Aristotle names the art of deception in logic *the sophistic art* from the sophist whom, he says, differs from the philosopher by his choice or bad will. The philosopher would rather be wise than appear wise while the sophist desires more the appearance of wisdom than wisdom itself. The sophist clearly has a bad or disordered will, putting the appearance of wisdom or the glory of appearing wise before wisdom itself. Of course, the philosopher studies the art of the sophist because he wants to avoid being deceived. Yet this art of deceiving is named from the sophist, not from the philosopher. But in Christendom, when we want to talk about the art of deceiving, we go back to the father of lies himself, the devil, who wants to deceive us much more than the sophist does. The devil is, as Christ says (In *John*, Chapter 8, v. 44), "a liar and the father of lies." Hence, Thomas Aquinas divides the causes of error in his commentary on the words of St. Paul in the *Second Epistle to Timothy* where St. Paul (In Chapter II, vv. 24-26) says:

> But the servant of the Lord must not quarrel, but be gentle towards all, ready to teach, patient, gently admonishing those who resist, in case God should give them repentance to know the truth and they recover themselves from the snares of the devil.

Shakespeare is also in this Christian tradition. So we must turn to his play which is the closest to presenting deception by the devil for his division of the causes of deception. This play is, of course, *Macbeth*. Deception by the devil is, of course, in Shakespeare's sources for this play. Thus we read in Holinshed (quoted in the Yale Shakespeare edition of *Macbeth*, Appendix B, p. 136):

> In the beginning of his reigne he accomplished manie woorthie acts, verie profitable to the common-wealth (as ye have heard), but afterward by the illusion of the diuell, he deformed the same with the most terrible cruelties.

The devil, by reason of his great natural intelligence and his hatred for all mankind, is above all suited to practice the art of deception. Macbeth himself calls the devil (in Act II, Sc. 1) “the common enemy of man.” *Macbeth* opens with the words of the three witches, those instruments of hell. The whole of Act I, Sc. 1 is devoted to their conversation in twelve lines ending with the couplet which expresses with the brevity and beauty of Shakespeare, the two errors we can make about the good and the bad and touches upon the two sources of those errors. This is the couplet:

> Fair is foul, and foul is fair
> Hover through the fog and filthy air.

But before we unfold all this reason, we should concentrate our mind upon the words by looking at the poetic devices of Shakespeare here - for there is rhyme as well as reason in these words.

The lines, of course, rhyme (fair and air) and there is much alliteration beginning with the letter f (fair and foul, foul and fair, fog and filthy). Trochaic meter (enclitic) is used here by Shakespeare as he often does for unfamiliar creatures like witches or fairies rather than the iambic meter closer to daily human speech.

The first line touches upon the two possible mistakes about the good and the bad. One can think that the good is bad, the fair is foul; or that the bad is good, the foul is fair. If one can make the first mistake, one can also make the second. And vice-versa.

The second line touches upon the two sources or causes of the above errors. For the cause of error is either on the side of the mind, and this is signified by the word *fog*, or on the side of the heart, and this is signified by the word *filthy*.

Shakespeare emphasizes these words fair and foul and the possible confusion of the fair and the foul when he has Macbeth, just before he and Banquo meet the three witches, say (Act I, Sc. 3):

> So foul and fair a day I have not seen.

And after the witches have hailed Macbeth with present and future titles, Banquo says (ibid.):

> Good sir, why do you start and seem to fear
> Things that sound so fair?

We have said that by the word *fog*, Shakespeare signifies metaphorically the cause of error on the side of the mind. This is made explicit in the hilarious scene from *Twelfth Night* where the simile of fog is used. Malvolio has been locked up and treated as a madman as a result of the prank played upon him in the sub-plot of the play. Malvolio is locked-up in a darkroom and has the following conversation with the Clown impersonating Sir Topas through the door (Act IV, Sc. 2):

Malvolio:	I am not mad, Sir Topas; I say to you this house is dark.
Clown: (imp. Topas)	Mad man, thou errest. I say there is no darkness but ignorance, in which thou art more puzzl'd than the Egyptians in their fog.

Similar images are used by Shakespeare in the following passage from the *Tempest* where he speaks of darkness and ignorant fumes in the charm that Prospero had cast upon Alonso, Sebastian, and Antonio (Act V, Sc. 1 Prospero is speaking):

> .....The charm dissolves apace,
> And as the morning steals upon the night,
> Melting the darkness, so their rising senses
> Begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle
> Their clearer reason.

Shakespeare's words "the ignorant fumes that mantle their clearer reason" clearly confirm that fog or something like it signifies the cause of error on the side of reason or the mind.

We have said that the other alliterating word used in the couplet from Macbeth, the word *filth*, signifies the cause of error on the side of the heart or

the ability to desire. When the heart becomes vicious or we acquire a moral vice, our reason is blinded by this filth of our heart. And that I am not making a wild guess about the meaning of the word *filth* in this couplet from Macbeth can be seen from a magnificent passage in *Antony & Cleopatra* where Shakespeare again uses the word *filth* in describing how reason is blinded and led into error. Antony is the speaker in Act II, Sc. 11:

> But when we in our viciousness grow hard -
> O misery on't - the wise gods seel our eyes,
> In our filth drop our clear judgments; make us
> Adore our errors; laugh at's while we strut
> To our confusion.

The first line ("when we in our viciousness grow hard") speaks of us when, by repeated bad acts, we have acquired the habit of moral vice. For habit, being a disposition that is difficult to change, is suitably described by the word *hard*. The next words ("o misery on't") suitably precede the description of the process by which we come to "Adore our errors" (as is said in the fourth line) since (as Thomas Aquinas observes in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*) error is a great part of misery. The line "the wise gods seel our eyes" is suitable because he who does not live in accordance with reason is suitably punished by being deprived of the act of reason. The next part, "in our own filth drop our clear judgments; make us Adore our errors", should be contrasted with the phrase above from the *Tempest*, "the ignorant fumes that mantle their clearer reason." "Ignorant fumes" is one the side of reason or the knowing powers while "our own filth" refers to the viciousness in our heart or desiring powers. When our clear judgments have been dropped in our own filth, we proceed to the absurd conclusion of adoring our own errors and making ourselves laughable as we proceed to our own confusion. Confusion here is the opposite of glory.

The above passage from *Antony & Cleopatra* seems to speak of the filth of our heart as the cause of the error whereby we think the foul is fair or the bad is good. There is another passage in Shakespeare where the filth of the heart is spoken of as the cause of the reverse error where the good seems bad or the fair to be foul. This is in *King Lear* (Act IV, Sc. 2) after Albany has upbraided his evil and unnatural wife Goneril:

> Goneril: No more; the text is foolish.
>
> Albany: Wisdom and goodness to the vile seem vile.

Filths savor but themselves.

If you want a contemporary illustration of what Shakespeare is saying in the witches' couplet, you could not take a better example than that of the errors about abortion. Those who support abortion are trying to say that what is foul is fair. And when they attack those who oppose abortion, they are saying that what is fair is foul. But notice the fog that surrounds their position. Pro-abortion is called pro-choice; the painful murder of the unborn, termination of pregnancy; and those who are opposed to abortion are said to be interfering with the rights of women. Anything to avoid calling a spade a spade. The fog is so thick that it would take the knife of reason to cut it. Such a smoke-screen is thrown up before the eyes of the public so that, in the words of the *Tempest*, "ignorant fumes...mantle their clearer reason."

Likewise, on the side of the heart or desiring powers, there is the filth of two of the capital vices in which to "drop our clear judgments." The most fundamental vices, the vices that draw other vices and sins into the service of their ends, are divided according to the goods of man. Pride is concerned with the good of the soul, lust and gluttony with the good of the body, and avarice with exterior goods. The force behind abortion, like that behind the hard pornography run by the Mafia and the more insidious pornography pushed by Hollywood, involves the union of two capital vices - avarice and lust. There is avarice on the part of those who perform the abortions and lust behind those who have them (and sometimes avarice in those who kill their offspring to avoid having to stretch the pay check to provide for another mouth). In the union of two capital vices then, there is more than enough filth in which to "drop our clear judgments." If we add the inane glory of the politicians who seek abortion lobby money, we have a union of three capital vices, covering the whole spectrum of human goods.

There is another place where Shakespeare touches upon the division of the causes of error into those on the side of the mind or knowing powers and those on the side of the heart or desiring powers. This is in the casket scenes in *The Merchant of Venice*. The suitors to the beautiful and rich Portia are bound by the will of her father to choose between three caskets or chests. One of them contains her picture and the one who chooses this will win her in marriage. One chest is gold and bears the inscription, "Who chooseth me shall gain what many men desire." The second is silver and bears the inscription "Who chooseth me shall get as much as he deserves." The third chest is lead and bears the

inscription “Who chooseth me must give and hazard all he hath.” The third chest is the right one and contains the picture of Portia. But it is an error to chose the gold or the silver chest. And in their color and descriptions are contained two kinds of causes of error, one on the side of the knowing powers and the other on the side of the desiring powers. The Prince of Morocco chooses first in the play (Act II, Sc. 7) and chooses the gold chest. When he opens the chest, he finds a skull and in its empty eye a scroll with these words:

> All that glisters is not gold -
> Often have you heard that told.
> Many a man his life hath sold
> But my outside to behold.
> Gilded tombs do worms infold.
> Had you been as wise as bold,
> Young in limbs, in judgment old,
> Your answer had not been inscroll’d.
> Fare you well; your suit is cold.

The cause of error is here on the side of the knowing powers. Man’s knowledge begins with the senses and the senses know the outside of things. The next two suitors, the Prince of Arragon (in Act II, Sc. 9) and Bassanio (in Act III, Sc. 2) both avoid this error. And both see the cause of this error in judging things by their outside or outward appearance. Arragon says this in rejecting the golden chest (Act II, Sc. 9):

> What says the golden chest? Ha, let me see!
> “Who chooseth me shall gain what many men desire.”
> “What many men desire.” That “many” may be meant
> By the fool multitude, that choose by show,
> Not learning more than the fond eye doth teach;
> Which pries not to th’interior, but, like the martlet,
> Builds in the weather on the outward wall,
> Even in the force and road of casualty.

Bassanio also rejects the gold casket and, again, because of the deception due to our judging things by their outward appearance. he says in rejecting this in Act III, Sc. 2:

> So may the outward shows be least themselves;

The world is still deceived with ornament.
In law, what plea so tainted and corrupt
But, being season'd with a gracious voice,
Obscures the show of evil? In religion,
What damned error but some sober brow
Will bless it, and approve it with a text,
Hiding the grossness with fair ornament?
There is no vice so simple but assumes
Some mark of virtue on his outward parts.
How many cowards, whose hearts are all as false
As stairs of sand, wear yet upon their chins
The beards of Hercules and frowning Mars;
Who, inward search'd, have livers white as milk!
And these assume but valour's excrement
To render them redoubted. Look on beauty,
And you shall see 'tis purchas'd by the weight,
Which therein works a miracle in nature,
Making them lightest that wear most of it.
So are those crisped snaky golden locks
Which make such wanton gambols with the wind
Upon supposed fairness often known
To be the dowry of a second head,
The skull that bred them in the sepulchre.
Thus ornament is but the guiled shore
To a most dangerous sea; the beauteous scarf
Veiling an Indian beauty; in a word,
The seeming truth which cunning times put on
To entrap the wisest. Therefore, thou gaudy gold,
Hard food for Midas, I will none of thee.

The close friend of Bassanio, the Merchant of Venice, Antonio, had already made an observation on this cause of error in the first Act. He observes to Bassanio (Act I, Sc.3):

The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.
An evil soul, producing holy witness,
Is like a villain with a smiling cheek,
A goodly apple rotten at the heart.
O, what a goodly outside falsehood hath!

Reason is deceived about things because it does not know what they are or because it does not know very well what they are. Reason begins from what is sensed and the senses know things only in an outward way. Hence, reason lacks its own object, the *what it is* of things sensed or imagined. Hence, Heraclitus said that nature loves to hide. He could have added that nature loves to hide from us. Reason must read within things to get the truth about them and this is not easy for reason. The words *outward* and *sensible* are used as synonyms in English sometimes (as in the old definition of sacrament in which it is called an outward sign) and this is a sign of the senses knowing things in an outward way, with the result that our reason is in need of considerable discourse to arrive at the what it is of things.

But although the Prince of Arragon avoids the error made by the Prince of Morocco in choosing the gold chest, he does make the error of choosing the silver chest rather than the lead chest. Is the cause of this error on the side of the knowing powers or on the side of the desiring powers? The cause of the Prince of Arragon's mistake would seem to be his pride and is, therefore, on the side of the desiring powers. That he is proud is shown both by his words at the end of his discourse rejecting the gold chest and perhaps by his name. He says in continuance with the words quoted above:

> I will not choose what many men desire.
> Because I will not jump with common spirits
> And rank me with the barbarous multitude.

And his name fits for *Arragon* reminds us of *arrogant*, a synonym for proud. And the inscription on the silver chest aims at appealing to pride for it says, "Who chooseth me shall get as much as he deserves." Arragon thinks he deserves Portia and the inscription is saying that only the man who deserves her should get her. When he opens the silver chest, he exclaims:

> What's here? The portrait of a blinking idiot...
> Did I deserve no more than a fool's head?
> Is that my prize? Are my deserts no better?

If we compare the causes of error here with those in the couplet from the witches' speech in the beginning of Macbeth, we find the same order. The

causes of deception on the side of the knowing powers (there fog and here outward appearances) are put before those on the side of the desiring powers (there filth and here pride). Is this a coincidence? I do not think so. The causes of error on the side of the knowing powers are more known to us than those on the side of the desiring powers. A sign of this is found in the discourse of Bosanko when he chooses rightly the leaden chest. This discourse occupies 35 lines of blank verse, in which Bassanio expands on why he is not choosing the outwardly promising gold chest for 30 lines and in 1 & 1/2 lines passes over the silver chest to the lead one. It is not at all clear why he passes over the silver chest. He simply says:

> Nor none of thee, thou pale and common drudge
> 'Tween man and man.....

It is also interesting to note that The Philosopher and The Theologian gives these causes in the same order as The Poet here. When Aristotle is giving the reasons why some men possessing political rhetoric think they have political wisdom, he first assigns a cause on the side of the knowing powers (*apaideusia*) and then one on the side of the desiring powers (boasting, a form of pride). (See *Rhetoric*, Book I, Chapter 1, 1356a). Thomas Aquinas also gives the causes of error *ex parte intellectus* before those *ex parte appetitus* when he is dividing the causes of error in his commentary on the *Second Epistle to Timothy* of St. Paul (*II Ad Timotheum,* II, Lectio IV, n. 87)

We have seen then that Shakespeare touches upon the causes of error or the division of the causes of error in the witches' speech in *Macbeth* and in the casket scenes in *The Merchant of Venice*. Some are on the side of the mind or the knowing powers and the others are on the side of the heart or the desiring powers.

But what is the main cause of error on the side of the mind according to Shakespeare? Is it the senses that know things in an outward way? But the senses are not deceived about the outside of the gold chest; the Prince of Morocco is not deceived about the outside of the gold chest. He is deceived or in error about the inside. It is not the senses that tell us about the inside of the chest before we open it - it is our imagination that does so. There are many places where Shakespeare indicates that it is the imagination rather than the senses that is the cause of error. For example, in *Hamlet*, Marcellus and Bernardo have told Horatio about having seen the ghost of Hamlet's father.

Horatio does not believe them and says it is their imagination or fantasy. Marcellus then has invited Horatio to watch with them and see if it is but imagination. In Act I, Sc. 1, Marcellus says:

> Horatio says 'tis but our fantasy,
> And will not let belief take hold of him
> Touching this dreaded sight twice seen of us.
> Therefore I have entreated him along
> With us to watch the minutes of this night,
> That if again this apparition come,
> He may approve our eyes and speak to it.

Shortly thereafter the ghost walks again and Horatio sees it with his own eyes and Bernardo taunts him:

> How now, Horatio! you tremble and look pale.
> Is not this something more than fantasy?
> What think you on't?

And Horatio replies:

> Before my God, I might not this believe
> Without the sensible and true avouch
> Of mine own eyes.

Notice how Horatio couples "sensible and true." It is not the senses that are the cause of those ignorant fumes that mantle reason. In the passage from *The Tempest* also, it is the senses that chase away those ignorant fumes. Here it is again:

> .....The charm dissolves apace,
> And as the morning steals upon the night,
> Melting the darkness, so their rising senses
> Begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle
> Their clearer reason.

In this passage, ignorant fumes are distinguished from both the rising or awakening senses that chase them and from clearer reason. Ignorant fumes

refer to the imagination or fantasy which is between the sense and reason. There is another place where Shakespeare uses the word fumes when speaking of the imagination. In *Cymbeline*, when Imogen awakes in a strange place and situation after she has taken the sleeping-potion, she does not know whether she dreams or not. She says (Act IV, Sc. 2):

> .....I hope I dream;
> For so I thought I was a cave-keeper,
> And cook to honest creatures; but 'tis not so,
> 'Twas but a bolt of nothing, shot at nothing,
> Which the brain makes of fumes. Our very eyes
> Are sometimes like our judgments, blind. Good faith,
> I tremble still with fear; but if there be
> Yet left in heaven as small a drop of pity
> As a wren's eye, fear'd gods, apart of it!
> The dream's here still; even when I wake, it is
> Without me, as within me, not imagin'd, felt.

We can see in this passage that Shakespeare well understands that the sense of touch is the sense of certitude. It is the sense of touch that tells Imogen that her situation is not just a dream, but real - that it is outside her as well as inside her. It is for the same reason that Lear pricks his finger with a pin when he recovers from his madness and sleep (*King Lear,* Act IV, Sc.7):

> I will not swear these are my hands. Let's see.
> I feel this pin prick.....

But when Imogen thinks it is only her imagination, she says:

> .....but 'tis not so,
> 'Twas but a bolt of nothing, shot at nothing,
> Which the brain makes of fumes. .....

One is struck by how often Shakespeare speaks of *nothing* in comparison to the imagination and of *fumes or air* which seem to be without substance. In *Romeo and Juliet*, after Mercutio speaks of Queen Mab and dreams, Romeo says (Act I, Sc. 4):

Peace, peace, Mercutio, peace!
Thou talk'st of nothing!

And Mercutio replies:

True, I talk of dreams
Which are the children of an idle brain,
Begot of nothing, but vain phantasy,
Which is as thin a substance as the air
And more inconstant than the wind.....

A dream is nothing we say or about nothing, begot of nothing, unless of fumes or air which are like nothing substantial. In the play which has dream in its title, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Shakespeare gives the reason why he as a poet understands so well these things (Act V, Sc. 1):

Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
Such shaping fantasies that apprehend
More than cool reason ever comprehends.
The lunatic, the lover and the poet
Are of imagination all compact.....
And as imagination bodies forth
The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
A local habitation and a name.
Such tricks hath strong imagination.

The words "airy nothing" here can be compared with the words above "Begot of nothing, but vain phantasy, Which is as thin of substance as the air". The reason why the imagination is the cause of error rather that the senses is because the senses are in the presence of objects but the imagination in their absence. And the reason why the imagination rather than reason is the main cause of error on the side of the knowing powers is because reason is apt to have a reason for what it says (except when it blindly follows the imagination) while the imagination is free to imagine without any reason or cause for what it is imagining. As Shakespeare notes in his early work, *Venus And Adonis* (lines 897-898):

'tis a causeless fantasy, And childish error

The last line in the passage quoted above from *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (Act V. Sc. 1) is significant for Shakespeare's awareness of the imagination as the cause of error: "Such tricks hath strong imagination." This line is followed by two examples:

> Such tricks hath strong imagination
> That if it would but apprehend some joy,
> It comprehends some bringer of that joy;
> Or in the night, imagining some fear,
> How easy is a bush suppos'd a bear.

Trick is the common word for deception. To say that imagination tricks us is to say that it deceives us. When Malvolio in *Twelfth Night* is being deceived by the letter, but does not think he is being deceived, he says (Act II, Sc. 5):

> Daylight and champian discovers not more: this is open...I do not now fool myself, to let imagination jade me, for every reason excites to this, that my lady loves me.

The words "to let imagination jade me" mean "to let imagination trick me." (A *jade* was a worthless nag or horse that would cause one to stumble.)

There is also an order to be seen in what Shakespeare says about the causes of deception on the side of the heart or desiring powers. We have seen that filth, or our own moral vices, are a cause of deception on the side of the heart. And in the *Merchant of Venice*, we have seen that pride in particular among the vices is a cause of error. There are other places where Shakespeare singles out pride, notably in the sub-plot of *Twelfth Night* where Malvolio is deceived because of his pride or self-love (in the bad sense of self-love). Malvolio is the steward of Olivia and early in the play she notes his dominant vice (Act I, Sc. 5):

> O, you are sick of self-love, Malvolio, and
> taste with a distemper'd appetite.

The name *Malvolio* also (in accordance with the practice of comic drama) hints at the defect of his will. And it is upon this vice of pride or self-love that Maria says she will build the great deception and disgrace of Malvolio. Speaking of him in Act II, Sc. 3, as she opens her plot to her companions in the trick to be played on Malvolio, she says about him:

> The div'l a Puritan that he is, or anything constantly but a time-pleaser, an affection'd ass, that cons state without book and utters it by great swarths. The best persuaded of himself, so cramm'd (as he thinks) with excellencies that it is his grounds of faith that all that look on him love him: and on that vice in him will my revenge find notable cause to work.

Pride has a special place among the vices and hence among the causes of deception on the side of the heart. For pride is the queen of the vices as Gregory taught us. And that Shakespeare saw the special place of pride is shown in the place where he most explicitly speaks of the representation of virtue and vice by the dramatist and actor. This is in the advice which Hamlet gives to the players (*Hamlet*, Act II, Ac. 2):

> o'erstep not the modesty of nature: for anything so overdone is from the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is, to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.

Instead of saying "to show virtue her own face, vice her own image". Shakespeare says *scorn* instead of *vice*. Now scorn, as can be seen in many passages of Shakespeare, refers to pride, being an effect of it. Thus instead of saying vice, he puts the queen of the vices, pride, (by a metonym or using the name of the effect for the cause), whence we can understand also its subjects, the other moral vices.

One last point can be made about these two chief causes of deception, imagination (or false imagination as Thomas calls it) and pride. They seem to come together and reinforce each other and to be, as it were, one cause of error, in fact the beginning of error in man. There is one very striking passage of

Thomas Aquinas where, following Dionysius, he speaks of the *principium*, the beginning or source of error in man, as being *phantasia proterva*. The passage is in the *Quaestio Disputata De Anima* (Art. 19, Ad 8):

> malum hominis est secundum tria (scilicet phantasiam protervam, quae scilicet est principium errandi.....

Phantasia from the Greek can be carried over into English by the word *imagination*. *Proterva* is translated in Cassell's by trampling upon, violent, bold, impudent, shameless. I would choose here the word *bold* which tells us that we should not admire bold thinkers. Boldness seems to be tied to pride so that bold imagination touches upon the knowing powers and the desiring powers.

When we look again at the casket scenes from *The Merchant of Venice*, we see that Shakespeare in both errors – the error of the Prince of Morocco and the error of the Prince of Arragon – has actually touched upon bold imagination in both cases, even though in comparison to each other the gold chest involves more the cause on the side of the knowing powers and the silver chest, that on the side of the heart. When Bassanio passes over the silver chest, he does so for somewhat the same reason as he does the gold chest. Both appeal to men in an outward way and, hence, one is led to imagine the interior to be in accord with the exterior. But the gold is more deceptive in this way – that is, on the side of the knowing powers – than is the silver chest. But when the Prince of Morocco opens the gold chest, he is chastised for his boldness. Listen again to the words on the scroll in the eye of the skull which he finds (alas!) instead of the portrait of Portia:

> All that glisters is not gold –
> Often have you heard that told.
> Many a man his life hath sold
> But my outside to behold.
> Gilded tombs do worms infold.
> Had you been as wise as bold,
> Young in limbs, in judgment old,
> Your answer had not been inscroll'd.
> Fare you well; your suit is cold.

The first part touches upon the cause on the side of the knowing powers and the line "Had you been as wise as bold" on the side of the heart. This boldness or audacity is opposed to that fear of mistake which makes us go forward

slowly and carefully so as to avoid error. The Prince of Morocco, like the Prince of Arragon, is deceived by bold imagination.

The reason why pride and false imagination cooperate so closely and become, as it were, one cause is that the object of pride and empty glory is a *bonum imaginatum* or imagined good as Thomas points out in many places. Hence, in the scene where Malvolio takes the bait, Fabian says (*Twelfth Night,* Act II, Sc. 5):

> O. peace! Now he's deeply in. Look how imagination blows him.

Thus the pride of Malvolio makes him trust his imagination while the imagination inflates him with pride. The proud man is apt to imagine (falsely) himself to be greater than he is and this increases his pride by its object.

We can also see from the beginning of error in us, bold or proud imagination, why the poet can be so important a witness to the causes of error. For a man is a poet most of all by his imagination and the pride of a great man is tragic as Sophocles has taught us while the pride of a man like Malvolio or Parolles is laughable and comic.

Duane H. Berquist

FRIAR LAURENCE ON STUMBLING

Friar Laurence has two very wise statements about stumbling in Shakespeare's play *Romeo and Juliet*.

One of these statements about stumbling is at the end of Act II, Sc. 3. Romeo, who has suddenly changed from loving Rosalind to loving Juliet, has come to ask Friar Laurence to marry them. At the end of their conversation, Romeo says:

> O! let us hence; I stand on sudden haste.

And Friar Laurence replies:

> Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast.[1]

Friar Laurence perhaps has in mind the words in the book of *Proverbs:*

> Where there is no knowledge of the soul, there is no good; and he that is hasty with his feet shall stumble.[2]

The advice and warning of Friar Laurence is true in all three different senses of the word *running*. It is good advice not only in the sense of *running* he has most in mind here, but also in the sense before and in the sense after this. We want most of all to unfold the wisdom of his exhortation in the third sense.

But before looking at the whole exhortation where we want to understand the connection between going forward wisely and slowly and avoiding stumbling, we should concentrate for a moment on the coupling in the first three words: *Wisely and slow*. Why should wisdom and slowness be coupled together?

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[1]Friar Laurence perhaps has in mind the words in the book of Proverbs, Chapter 19, v. 2: "Where there is no knowledge of the soul, there is no good; and he that is hasty with his feet shall stumble."
[2]*Proverbs*, Chapter 19, v. 2

At first, it might seem paradoxical to couple them. For it is the stupid we think who are slow of mind, not the wise. And there is also the foolish slowness of those who are slow to act where promptness is necessary to achieve some good or avoid some evil. It is necessary to see the distinction between a wise slowness and a foolish slowness and between the slowness of the wise and the slowness of the stupid or dumb. They are often confused because of their likeness. Gamow tells us how at Copenhagen Niels Bohr was the last one to understand a new idea, but the first one to understand it correctly. The fellow students of Thomas Aquinas mistakenly called the greatest mind of the Middle Ages "The Dumb Ox". Likewise, the slowness of deliberation should not be confused with the slowness to act after due deliberation.

But there is also a slowness associated with wisdom. Indeed there is a number of ways in which wisdom is rightly connected with slowness.

Perhaps the most obvious connection is that wisdom is acquired slowly in life, not quickly. Wisdom is not easily acquired, but with difficulty. Hence, the great philosopher Empedocles warns us not to try to move quickly to the heights of wisdom.[3]

A second connection of wisdom with slowness is suggested by the Latin word for wisdom, *sapientia*. Thomas explains the etymology or origin of this word as *sapida scientia,* savoury knowledge. Wisdom is about things to be savoured by the mind. Wisdom is chiefly about God, as even the great philosophers knew. And God should be savoured by the mind. When we savour something, we are slow to let it go from our attention. This is why the saints can spend so much time before Christ in the Eucharist. In his famous prayer after consecrating, the *Adoro Te Devote*, Thomas Aquinas prays that he might be able to *dulce sapere*, to *sweetly savour*, the Lord in the Eucharist. And in the original meaning of the word, as when we *savour* a wine or some delicious food, we do not quickly consume it. Everything else we can think about we think about so we can eventually think about God. As Thomas says, I think about the

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[3]Empedocles, DK 3: "But gods, turn away from my tongue the madness of those men, and from pious mouths guide forth a pure stream. And you, much wooed, white-armed, virgin Muse, I pray to hear such things as are lawful for creatures of a day to hear; send me from piety driving the obedient chariot. Nor shall the flowers of honor from mortals force you to say rashly more than is pious and to move quickly to the heights of wisdom..."

body so I can think about the soul. And I think about the soul so I can think about an angel. And I think about an angel so I can think about God. But I don't think about God for the sake of knowing anything else. This is the end of all our thinking. So when we reach God in our thinking, it would be absurd to turn quickly to something else. Our reason should slowly go over and dwell at length on the attributes of God. We cannot think of anything better to think of. Why therefore be in a hurry to think of anything else?

Shakespeare also understands that wisdom is sweet and savoury knowledge as we can see from his use of their opposites to describe foolishness. When Romeo hears that Juliet has died, he rushes to get poison and to take his own life. His folly is compared to that of a ship-captain who crashes his ship upon the rocks. Listen to the words of Romeo just before he drinks the poison in the tomb of Juliet:

> Come, bitter conduct, come, unsavoury guide!
> Thou desperate pilot, now at once run on
> The dashing rocks thy sea sick weary bark!
> Here's to my love! [*Drinks*] O true apothecary!
> Thy drugs are quick. Thus with a kiss I die.[4]

The two metaphors applied to the foolish conductor and guide here (*conduct* here is a noun meaning *conductor*), *bitter* and *unsavoury*, also illuminate by opposition the contrary metaphors which we have seen before applied to wisdom when Thomas prayed in the *Adoro Te Devote* that he might *sweetly savour* Christ in the Eucharist. Wisdom is metaphorically called both *sweet* and *savoury* as folly is metaphorically called both *bitter* and *unsavoury* or *insipid*. We have seen before in part why wisdom is called *savoury* knowledge.

Why is wisdom called metaphorically *sweet?* Indeed why should it be called metaphorically, the *sweetest* knowledge?

The most complete explanation of the metaphor *sweet* that we have found is in Thomas' commentary on the Psalms.[5] There Thomas explains that

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[4]*Romeo and Juliet*, Act V, Sc. 3

[5]*In Psalmos Davidis* , Psalmus Davidis XXIV, n. 7: "Dulcedo proprie est in corporalibus, metaphorice autem dicitur in spiritualibus. Unde oportet quod in spiritualibus dulcedo sumatur ad similitudinem corporalis. Habet autem hoc

metaphor is based on likeness and the likeness in the metaphor *sweet* is based on three things: the sweet is pleasant, refreshing, and restful. Hence, Shakespeare calls a beautiful form *sweet* because the beautiful is what pleases when seen and the beautiful refreshes the eye (it is a "sight for sore eyes" as the proverb goes) and it is restful (Hence, we often say of a beautiful view or scene, "How restful!".) Since wisdom is a knowledge of the most beautiful things (beautiful not to the eye of the body, but rather to the eye of the soul), it can be called metaphorically most sweet.

The metaphor *savoury* also has some of this same meaning, but also judgment. Taste is judgment and judgment belongs most of all to wisdom. Judgment here means the separation of the true from the false by some beginning in our knowledge.

A third connection of wisdom with slowness is seen in the words of the wise man. "Brevity is the soul of wisdom". The wise man says much more than other men, but in fewer words. Hence, we must read the words of the wise very slowly, meditating at length upon them. Speed reading is worthless when it comes to the words of the wise. The words of Friar Laurence say so much in so few words that we must be very slow in trying to digest them.

Let us now come back to the whole sentence of Friar Laurence:

Wisely and slow: they stumble that run fast.

The word *run* here is used in its second sense. But the sentence is true also in the first and third sense of the word. We want to elaborate mainly in the third sense. But before doing this, we must distinguish in order the three senses of the word *run*.

The first meaning of a word is always the most sensible. The first meaning of the word *run* is thus the well known act of our legs. And everyone can see how we stumble when running fast in this sense, especially when we run up or down a stairs or through a cluttered room.

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dulcedo corporalis, quod reficit gustum corporalem et quietat et delectat: similiter et spiritualis dulcedo quietat et reficit et delectat spiritualem gustum."

We then carry over the word *run* and apply it in general to our actions. We speak of a *course of action* and the word *course* comes from the Latin word for running. Our Declaration begins with this sense: *When in the course of human events.* It is this sense which Friar Laurence has in mind when we warns Romeo here against acting in haste. As the old proverb goes, *Act in haste, repent in leisure*. Those who act without due deliberation make many serious mistakes. They stumble. This is the problem with Romeo, as Friar Laurence rightly sees. The truth of Friar Laurence's statement in the second meaning of *run* is seen in the hasty actions of Romeo.[6]

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[6]But see also Thomas' commentary on the *Epistle to the Hebrews* , Caput IV, Lectio II, nn. 211-212 and n. 215 from the secondary commentator: "Deinde cum dicit **Festinemus**, inducit ad festinationem...Dicit ergo....**festinemus ergo ingredi in illam requiem.** Et signanter dicit **ingredi**, quia non est in bonis exterioribus ad quae est egressus, sed est in bonis interioribus...Matth. XXV, v. 21: *Intra in gaudium Domini tui*.

Est ergo multiplex ratio, quare festinandum est intrare.

Una est, quia longinqua est via. Prov. VII, 19: *Abiit via longissima.* Luc. XIX, 12: *Homo quidam nobilis abiit in regionem longinquam*. Dicitur autem longinqua propter distantiam status, quia ibidem plenitudo omnis boni, et immunitas ab omni malo; est enim desideranti perfecta visio et tentio, hic autem omnia contraria istis.

Item festinandum est, quia tempus est valde breve. Iob. XIV, 5: *Breves dies hominis sunt.*

Item, quia istud tempus, cum hoc quod breve et modicum, est etiam incertum. Eccle. IX, v. 12: *Nescit homo finem suum*.

Item propter urgentem vocationem. Interior enim vocatio urget nos per stimulum charitatis. Is. LIX, 19: *Cum venerit quasi fluvius violentus, quem spiritus Domini cogit*, etc. II Cor. V, v. 14: *Charitas Christi urget nos*. Ps. CXVIII. v. 32: *Viam mandatorum tuorum cucurri.*

Item, propter periculum tardantis, sicut patet de fatuis virginibus, Matth. XXV, 1ss. quae tarde venientes intrare non potuerunt.....

The third sense of *run* is the discourse of reason. *Discourse* which comes from the Latin word for running, signifies coming to know or guess something through knowing or accepting other things. In this discourse, reason often stumbles when it does not proceed *wisely and slow*.

When the old man in *King Lear* wants to guide the cruelly blinded Gloucester lest he stumble, Gloucester notes that he stumbled when he saw. His reason was deceived about his sons and he acted to the great harm of his good son when he could still see with his eyes. Here is a bit of their conversation:

Gloucester: Away, get thee away; good friend, be gone:
Thy comforts can do me no good at all;
Thee they may hurt.

Old Man: You cannot see your way

Gloucester: I have no way, and therefore want no eyes;
I stumbled when I saw.[7]

The old man is concerned that Gloucester will stumble with his legs because he is blind, but the despairing Gloucester (who does not want to live) can only think of how he stumbled in his thinking and actions when he still had his eyesight. Metaphorically, we could say he was then mentally blind.

In the third sense of *run*, we can distinguish seven places where the wise are slow. The wise man proceeds slowly:

where many things must be considered before a judgment can be made

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Sed contra Prov. XIX, v. 2: *Qui festinus est pedibus offendet.*

Respondeo. Duplex est festinantia, scilicet praecipitationis: et haec est reprehensibilis; alia tenuitatis et celeritatis; et haec est laudabilis. Nam, sicut dicit Philosophus, omnes homines oportet consiliari diu, operari autem consiliata festinanter; quando ergo festinantia tollit consilium, tunc praecipitat, et est vitiosa, et secundum hanc verificatur obiectio; sed festinantia, quae est in executione consiliatorum, est virtuosa et laudatur, et ad hanc hortatur hic Apostolus."

[7]Shakespeare, *King Lear,* Act IV, Sc. 1

where a thing is difficult to understand

where there is a beginning small in size, but great in its power

where there is knowledge over a road and knowledge of the road to follow

where there is general knowledge and particular knowledge

where there is a word equivocal by reason

where there are the words of a wise man

Each of these seven can be considered briefly.

Perhaps the most obvious place in which a wise man goes forward slowly is where many things must be considered before a judgment or decision can be made. This reason for proceeding slowly can be found even in geometry, perhaps the easiest form of reasoned out knowledge for us. Thus, the proof of the Pythagorean theorem in the first book of Euclid's *Elements* has forty six theorems before it to be learned, most or all of which must be understood before the Pythagorean theorem can be judged. Euclid told the king that there is no *royal* road to geometry when the king asked for a shorter and quicker road

But in the second book of wisdom by Aristotle, we learn other reasons for going forward slowly in natural philosophy and in wisdom. We learn that the difficulty in knowing something can be in us or in the thing we are trying to know.

The reason why natural philosophy is so much more difficult than geometry is in the things we are trying to know there. Matter and motion and time are hardly real, they barely exist. Descartes hastily gives up trying to understand the definition of motion and the modern world has followed him in his haste, saying with Locke that it is impossible to define motion and with Mill that it is impossible to define any thing. The consequences of not proceeding wisely and slowly in defining motion leads not only to the modern stumbling over motion, but also to their stumbling over nature and God. Since nature is defined by motion, ignorance of motion is, of course, ignorance of nature. And since the first proof for the existence of God is based in part on the definition

of motion, the modern mind also stumbles at the threshold or doorstep of theology.

But we also learn in the second book of wisdom that the difficulty in knowing can be due to the weakness of reason. And this Aristotle says is the chief difficulty in knowing God. Our reason easily stumbles in thinking about God. The whole of philosophy is presupposed to thinking about God. And even this is not enough. St. Augustine speaks in the *De Trinitate* of an immature and perverse love of reason which is found in those who do not appreciate the difficulty of understanding God and the Trinity.

Thus, it is wise for reason to go forward slowly where there are many things to be considered and where there is a special difficulty in knowing something due either to the weakness of our reason or to the thing itself not being very understandable. Where else is it wise for reason to proceed slowly?

There are beginnings in our knowledge which, although small in size, are great in their power. They are like seeds which are also small compared to what they give rise to. But one should not judge the importance of such a seed or beginning by its size, but by its consequences. The wise man will consider these beginnings slowly, not only because this is necessary to share the power of these seeds, but also because even a small mistake in these beginnings will be a great one in the end. Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas compare a little mistake in the beginning to taking the wrong way at a fork in the road. Although the mistake is small in the beginning, it becomes greater the further one proceeds. Hence, one who does not consider a powerful beginning *wisely and slowly* will stumble more and more throughout all his subsequent thinking which is dependent on that beginning. Thus, the distinction of nature & reason and the distinction of nature & will underlie all or most of our knowledge. Hence, the misunderstanding of these beginnings in the modern philosophers has led to chaos in logic and in ethics, in our thinking and in our living.

Edgar Allan Poe, in *The Purloined Letter*, compared minds to bodies. The great mind, like a large body, is slow to get moving, but it is difficult to stop once it starts to move; while the small mind, like the small body, is easily put in motion, but also easily stopped. Why was the student with the greatest mind of the Middle Ages called *The Dumb Ox?* Because he proceed with a wise slowness in the beginning and his fellow students thought Thomas was slow out of stupidity. Gamow tells a similar story about how at Copenhagen Niels Bohr, the

great physicist, was the last man to get a new idea, but the first one to get it right.

The wise man thus sees the necessity of going forward slowly, not only where there are many things to be considered or where there is a special difficulty in knowing something, but also in those beginnings which are the seeds of all the rest of our reason's knowledge. Is there anywhere else that the wise man proceeds slowly?

Philosophy is knowledge over a road, knowledge that follows a road. Before one can acquire such knowledge well, one must know the road to follow. The wise man seeks knowledge of the road to follow and the way of going forward along that road before trying to acquire the knowledge which is over that road. Many thinkers seek knowledge over a road before they know sufficiently the road to follow.

But there is more than one road which reason must follow to reasoned out knowledge of anything. The wise man sees the need for distinguishing the roads in our knowledge and thinking out their order and understanding each road. Empedocles and others had begun to understand the first road in our knowledge which is the natural road therein. This is the road from the senses into reason. But the natural road is not enough. In addition, we must also follow the road of reason as reason which is the road from reasonable guesses toward reasoned out knowledge. And if this were not enough, each reasoned out knowledge has its own private road which also must be discovered. When paving the way for logic which is about the second road in our knowledge, Thomas Aquinas points out that logic helps reason to go forward *orderly, easily and without error* in its acts. The order of these three words here is significant. As in any art, knowing the order or road to follow enables one to proceed with greater ease and without error. It is not by chance that the Latin word for *error* comes from the Latin word for *wandering*. (The Greek word also has the same origin.) But this could be said of any road in our knowledge. Ignorance of any road to follow leads to wandering and thus to stumbling repeatedly.

Most thinkers hasten to consider interesting questions without knowing the road to follow. St. Augustine has a dialogue on this subject called appropriately *De Ordine.* The wise man must slowly go over the roads to follow. Men who do not do this either wander or adopt the road to which they are accustomed, or to which they are individually inclined, rather than the road they should follow.

Is there any other notable place where the wise man goes forward slowly? Man knows things in a confused way before distinctly. This is why he knows the general before the particular. Most men try to go forward from a confused knowledge of the general to a distinct knowledge of the particular. The wise man, however, moves from a confused to a distinct knowledge of the general before seeking a distinct knowledge of the particular. The moderns seek a distinct knowledge of the particular before having a distinct knowledge of the general. They stumble frequently in the particular because they do not understand the general sufficiently. They try to understand someone's reasoning distinctly before they understand distinctly what reasoning is. Or they try to understand what human virtue is, or even some particular human virtue is, before they distinctly understand what virtue is. Or they try to understand what is good or better for man before they understand good and better in general distinctly.

A sixth place in which the wise man goes forward slowly is where there is a word equivocal by reason. The words used most of all in wisdom and in the axioms (and also to some extent everywhere because wisdom and the axioms are about what is most common) are all equivocal by reason. Since the most common mistake in thinking is from mixing up the senses of a word and this is done much more with words equivocal by reason than with words equivocal by chance and the most common words are the most difficult of these, the wise man for this and other reasons slows down when he meets such a word. We see this in the fifth book of wisdom and elsewhere in Aristotle's works. It is necessary to distinguish the central senses of these words and to think out their order or connection.

The seventh place in which it is wise to slow down is where there are the words of a wise man. Since "brevity is the soul of wisdom", and the wise man says more in fewer words than other men, it is necessary to read the words of the wise carefully, frequently, and with reverence. Otherwise, we shall stumble over their words.

A second statement of Friar Laurence about stumbling is found in these words also from Act II, Sc. 3

For nought so vile that on the earth doth live
But to the earth some special good doth give,
Nor aught so good but strain'd from that fair use
Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse

Shakespeare here says that what revolts from true birth, stumbles on abuse.

We must first understand the words *true birth*. Shakespeare has carried over the English word *birth* here from its first meaning to its last meaning. Aristotle had studied the movement in the Greek word for birth which is *phusis* in the fifth book of Wisdom. And Thomas Aquinas had followed the same carrying over of the Latin word *natura.* The first meaning of the word is, of course, in the generation and coming of the baby out of its mother. The word is then carried over to the inward source of the baby in its mother and then carried over to the inward beginning of any change that is within the changing (this is the sense which is used in defining the subject of natural philosophy, things whose cause is nature); and then to matter and form in the genus of substance; and, at last, to what a thing is. It is in this last sense that Shakespeare is using the word here. But we must never forget to come to this last meaning through the meanings before it all the way back to the birth of the baby. Friar Laurence (or Shakespeare) is saying that when a thing revolts from its true nature or from what it truly is, it stumbles on abuse. The word *birth* or *natura* is a word equivocal by reason. But as often happens in English, the word equivocal by reason is not carried over much to its later meanings because we have adopted the later meanings of the Greek or Latin word. This gets the modern mind out of order and it cannot function well until it either goes through in order all the meanings of the Greek or Latin word it has borrowed in a later sense or until it moves the English word forward (as Shakespeare as done here with *birth*) to its later meanings.

What does it mean *to stumble on abuse?* It is to make a mistake or error in the use of something. But when do we misuse something or abuse it? What is it to misuse something?

We misuse or abuse a thing when we use it against its nature and the end (or purpose) of that nature. The end or purpose of a thing is tied to its nature. Hence, the revolt from the nature of a thing and its end causes us to stumble on abuse of that thing.

There is a revolt from the natural end of man and from the natural ends of his parts in modern thought. This leads to the moral chaos in which we find the contemporary world.

The application of this truth to the body should be well known.

We have hands to take care of our body & to take care of our children. but when we use our hands to drink to excess or to take harmful drugs or to abort our own children, we stumble on abuse. When our hands, which are for the sake of feeding ourselves and providing for our material needs and those of our children and others are *strain'd from that fair use* and used to kill or harm them, one *revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse.*

We misuse our vocal chords and tongue when we lie or blaspheme. For speech is given by nature to man to communicate in life together with other men and to honor and praise God.

And men and women often misuse their sexual organs, revolting from true birth, stumbling on abuse. The sexual organs are by nature for the sake of very great goods: the reproduction of oneself, the perpetuation of the species and the generation of new members of the city and the Church. But, using Shakespeare's words, when these organs are *strain'd from that fair use* of them for those many goods, someone *revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse.*

It is important to understand that nature makes things for an end and an understanding of that end is necessary before we can judge whether something is being used fairly, or being misused or abused. If man and his parts are by nature, but did not have any natural end or purpose, one could not be said to be misusing or abusing a man or some part of him. If I ground you up and used you for fertilizer in my garden, would I be abusing you or misusing you? Since you are among the things that are by nature, if you had no higher end or purpose by nature, I could not be misusing you to fertilize my garden (assuming that you would make a good fertilizer).

The modern world and modern thinkers seem often to be characterized by a revolt from nature. The most glaring example of this is, of course, the *revolt from the natural love of one self and one's offspring* seen in abortion and contraception. But in modern thinkers there is a more hidden, but multiple revolt from nature in the life of the mind

At the threshold of the life of the mind, we find a revolt from the imitation of the natural in our fiction and art. Since imitation is natural to man, this involves a twofold or double revolt from true birth.

The life of the mind rises from or depends upon three natural things. And many modern thinkers have revolted from more than one of these.

First, there is a revolt from wonder, the natural desire to know what and why, in the modern philosophers. This is very explicit in Hobbes and Marx, but it is implicit in most of them, starting from Descartes and Bacon. Werner Heisenberg, in his Gifford Lectures, sees a connection between this revolt from wonder and the union of natural and technical science in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is this desire, as both Plato and Aristotle note, which gave rise to philosophy and eventually led human reason to a knowledge of God. Plato had already seen how this wonder leads our reason in the end to God. Christian belief and Christian theology are in harmony with this natural wonder as the definitions of belief and theology indicate. St. Augustine's definition of belief and St. Anselm's definition of theology indicate this harmony of belief and theology with natural desire.

There is also a revolt from the natural road in our knowledge in the modern world from the time of Descartes. The natural road in our knowledge is the road from the senses into reason. Since this is the first road in our knowledge and presupposed to all the other roads and enters into them, the revolt from this road leaves the modern mind to wander in illusions, not knowing the road to follow. And when reason wanders, it stumbles into error. It is not by chance that the Greek and Latin words for error come in both languages from the verb for *wandering*.

There is moreover a revolt from our *natural understanding* or *natural knowledge* of the statements (and their parts) known by all men. There are some statements and their parts which we naturally know or naturally come to know. And it is through these statements and their parts that we come to know eventually whatever other statements that we know. When a thinker revolts from this natural knowledge, he can no longer use his reason to know anything. Since all other statements are known through the statements we naturally come to know, it is commonly thought now that no statements are known. (See Mill *On Liberty*) Everything becomes arbitrary. This way of thinking dominates our thinking today. If nothing is truly known, one man has as much right as the next man to think whatever he wants to think.

The complete dependence of philosophy upon the natural can be considered in these three statements:

> There are some statements and their parts which our reason naturally knows or naturally comes to know.
>
> There is in our will a natural desire to understand and know what our reason does not naturally know or naturally come to know.
>
> Our reason comes to know what it does not naturally know through what it naturally knows.

Hence, a revolt from true birth, a revolt from the natural, leads to a complete collapse of philosophy. This is what we find in the history of modern philosophy. The above threefold revolt from nature or true birth is why we have stumbled into a bastard philosophy in modern times.

In conclusion, we can see more clearly the truth in the advice of Polonius to Laertes:

> This above all: to thine own self be true,
> And it must follow, as the night the day,
> Thou canst not then be false to any man.[8]

No one can be true to himself if he is not true to his own nature.

Duane H. Berquist

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[8]Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act I, Sc. 3

THOMAS AQUINAS, PROEMIUM TO PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

(BEGINNING OF HIS LAYING OUT OF THE 1ST BK OF NICOMACHAEAN ETHICS)

As the Philosopher says in the beginning of the *Metaphysics*, it belongs to the wise to order. The reason for this is that wisdom is the greatest perfection of reason whose property it is to know order. For, although the sense powers know some things absolutely, to know the order of one thing to another belongs only to understanding or reason.

But a twofold order is found in things. One is of the parts of some whole or some multitude to each other, as the parts of a house are ordered to each other. The other is the order of things to their end. And this order is more the chief one than the first. For, as the Philosopher says in the XII book of the *Metaphysics*, the order of the parts of an army to each other is because of the order of the whole army to its leader.

Order however is compared to reason in four ways:

> There is an order which reason does not make, but only considers, as is the order of natural things.
>
> There is also an order which reason by considering makes in its own act, as when it orders its thoughts to each other, and the signs of thoughts which are signifying vocal sounds.
>
> There is moreover a third order which reason by considering makes in the acts of the will.
>
> And there is a fourth order which reason by considering makes in exterior things of which it is the cause, such as a box or a house.

And because the consideration of reason is perfected by the firm disposition of knowledge, there are diverse forms of knowledge according to the diverse orders which reason properly considers.

For the consideration of the order of things which human reason considers but does not make belongs to natural philosophy; thus that with natural philosophy, we also include metaphysics.

The order however which reason by considering makes in its own acts belongs to rational philosophy which considers the order of the parts of a speech to each other and the order of beginnings to conclusions.

But the order of voluntary acts belongs to the consideration of moral philosophy

And the order which reason by considering makes in exterior things constructed by human reason belongs to the mechanical arts.

Thus therefore it belongs to moral philosophy, about which turns the present intention, to consider human acts as they are ordered to each other and to the end. I call acts *human* which proceed from the will of man according to the order of reason. For if there are some acts in man which are not subject to the will and reason, they are not properly called human, but natural, just as is clear about the acts of the plant soul which in no way come under the consideration of moral philosophy. Therefore just as the subject of natural philosophy is motion or a movable thing, so also the subject of moral philosophy is human act ordered to an end, or also man insofar as he is voluntarily acting for an end.

It should be known however that, because man is naturally a social animal, since he needs many things for his life which he cannot himself alone prepare for himself, it follows that man is naturally a part of some multitude through which he is given help to live well. This help he needs for two things.

First for those things necessary for life without which the present life is not able to be gone through. And the domestic household, of which he is a part, aids man in this. For every man has from his parents generation and nourishment and discipline and likewise also the individuals who are parts of the domestic family aid each other in the necessities of life.

In another way man is aided by the multitude of which he is a part for a complete sufficiency of life, so that man not only lives, but lives well, having all the things which suffice for his life. And thus the civil multitude, of which he is a part, helps him not only as far as bodily things (as regards many artificial things for which one household is not sufficient), but also as regards

> moral things insofar as insolent youth, whom paternal admonition is not able to correct, are forced through public power by the threat of punishment.

It should de known however that this whole which is a multitude of citizens or the domestic family has only a unity of order by which something is not simply one. And therefore a part of this whole can have an act which is not an act of the whole, as the soldier in the army has an act which is not that of the whole army.

Nevertheless the whole itself has some act which is not private to some part, but of the whole, as the striking together of the whole army. And the drawing of the ship is an act of the multitude drawing the ship. There is however another whole which has a unity not only in order, but in composition or binding together, or even in continuity by which unity something is one simply; and therefore there is no act of the part which is not of the whole. For there is the same motion of the whole and the part in continuous things. And likewise in things composed or bound together, the act of the part is chiefly of the whole. And therefore it is necessary that the consideration of such a whole and its part belong to the same knowledge. However it does not belong to the same knowledge to consider the whole which has only a unity of order and its parts. And hence it is that moral philosophy is divided into three parts.

> The first of these considers the acts of one man ordered to an end and is called *monastic*. [from one: we call it *ethics*]
>
> The second however considers the acts of the domestic multitude and is called *domestics.*
>
> But the third considers the acts of the civil multitude and is called *politics.*

NOTE ON THOMAS' PROEMIUM TO PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

The distinction of the kinds of philosophy is into two by their ends. Looking philosophy (which some call theoretical or speculative philosophy from the Greek or Latin words for looking) and practical philosophy or the philosophy of doing are the two chief kinds of philosophy and they differ by their ends. The end of looking philosophy, as it name indicates, is to see in the sense of to understand; but the end of practical philosophy is doing or action. Just as we use our eyes sometimes just to see (as to see, for example, a beautiful sunset or painting) and sometimes to do something (as to drive or make dinner), so likewise, proportionally, the use of reason in the two chief kinds of philosophy is for distinct ends or purposes.

We could state more precisely the ends of the two principal kinds of philosophy. The end of looking philosophy is to understand what and why while the end of practical philosophy is to do what is good or better for oneself, or for one's family, or for one's city or nation.

The distinction of looking philosophy into three kinds (natural, mathematical, and first philosophy or wisdom) is shown by Aristotle in the sixth book of *Wisdom* (the *Metaphysics*) and following him by Boethius in the *de Trinitate* which Thomas has laid out carefully for us.

The distinction of practical philosophy into three kinds (ethics, domestics and politics or political philosophy) is shown by Thomas in the last part of this Proemium.

Whoever compares the distinction of the kinds of looking philosophy shown by Aristotle with the distinction of the kinds of practical philosophy shown by Thomas will see how different are the ways in which the two are distinguished. And each is distinguished in the way that fits its end.

Since the ability to understand is immaterial (as we learn in the third book *About the Soul*) and something must stop moving or stand still before it can be understood, the kinds of looking philosophy are distinguished by how the things considered are to matter and motion in their existence and in their definition.

Since I can do something for my own good without intending the good of my family, or do something for the good of my family without intending the good of

the city, and some things I can do for the good of my city, there is here, as Thomas teaches us in the Proemium, a basis for the distinction of the kinds of practical philosophy.

If we can call the tool of philosophy a kind of philosophy, logic could be considered a third kind of philosophy. But it is not one of the chief or principal kinds, but is sought for the sake of acquiring them.

In the beginning of this Proemium, Thomas points out another way of distinguishing the knowledge of reason. He begins with pointing out a connection between wisdom and reason. Wisdom is the highest or greatest perfection of reason. Hence, what is characteristic of reason is especially found in wisdom. Aristotle had given as the sixth, and perhaps crowning attribute of the wise man, that he orders all others. And Thomas gives as the reason for this that wisdom is the highest perfection of reason and it is proper to reason to know order or to make order. We can see this in Shakespeare's definition of reason as the ability for large discourse, looking before and after. *Before and after* define order and by defining reason as *looking before and after*, Shakespeare had taught us that reason especially looks for order. Since wisdom is the highest perfection of this ability to look before and after, the wise man must most of all see the before and after, or order.

Wisdom is not only connected with reason in the way that Thomas indicates, but also in another way. It is acquired by the use of reason. And since we are most of all using reason when we look before and after, reason's knowledge must also be a knowledge of before and after or order. Hence, wisdom must also be a knowledge of before and after or order.

Aristotle had distinguished in the sixth book of wisdom between the looking sciences, the doing sciences, and the making sciences, starting from the cause they consider. But this distinction also includes logic.

But Thomas here begins from something proper to reason which is to know or consider order.

Although Thomas, *studens brevitati*, divides order in comparison to reason into four, it is easy to see that the first order is divided against the last three by the

distinction between order not made by reason and order made by reason. And thus the rule of two or three is being followed.

About the order which reason does not make, but only considers, Thomas has placed natural philosophy and also metaphysics or wisdom. Some texts add mathematics, but some lack this. The order considered in mathematics is to some extent made by our reason. For we construct equilateral triangles etc.. Hence, Thomas may have left mathematics out of the knowledge of the first order (the order not made by reason but only considered by reason) as not a clear case of such an order.

This distinction of the knowledge of reason is useful for considering the offshoots of more than one kind of knowledge. Rhetoric, the art of persuasion, is an offshoot of the second and third kinds of knowledge here. For as Aristotle teaches us in the *Rhetoric,* the art of persuasion is an offshoot of dialectic which is a part of logic and political philosophy. And modern experimental science is an offshoot of natural philosophy or natural science and the mechanical arts, an offshoot of natural science and technical science as Heisenberg says in his Gifford Lectures. Hence, the oldest part of modern science is a part of physics (a word dereived from the Greek word for nature) called mechanics.

Duane H Berquist

ARISTOTLE, PROEMIUM, N. ETHICS, BOOK I, READING 1

Every art and every science, and likewise every action and choice, seems to aim at some good. Whence it has been well said that the good is what all desire.

But a difference of ends is seen: for some are acts while others are products beyond these. Where there are ends in addition to the acts, in these the products are better than the acts.

Since there are many acts and arts and sciences, there come to be many ends: for of medicine, health; of the art of shipbuilding, the ship; of the military art, victory; and of the household art, wealth.

When many of these come under one power - as the art of bridle-making is under horsemanship and whatever other arts are about the instruments for riding horses, and this and every other military act under the military art; and in the same way, others under others - in all these, the ends of the chief arts are more desirable than all those of the arts under them. For the latter are pursued for the sake of the former.

It makes no difference whether the acts themselves are the ends of the acts or something besides these, as in the said sciences.

ARISTOTLE, PROEMIUM, N. ETHICS, BOOK I, READING 2

If there is some end of what we do that we will for itself and other things for it, and we do not choose all things for the sake of something else (for thus it would go on without end so that desire would be empty and foolish), clearly this will be the good, and the best.

Would not then the knowledge of this weigh greatly upon life; and just as archers having a target, will we not hit more upon what is right?

If this is so, we ought to try to get hold of in outline what this is and to which of the sciences or powers it belongs.

It would seem to belong to the most authoritative knowledge or science and the one that is most of all a chief art; and such is clearly political knowledge. For this sets in order which sciences are needed in cities, what sort each shall learn and up to what point; and we see the most honored of powers are under this, as the military art, the household art, and the art of speech. Thus using the rest of the practical sciences, and further ordaining by law what one ought to do and what stay away from, the end of this science must embrace those of other sciences, so that this will be the good of man.

For if it is the same for one man and the city, nevertheless it is better and more perfect to achieve and preserve that of the city. For it is worthy of love when done for one man only, but it is more beautiful and god-like when done for a nation and cities.

The knowledge then aims at these things, being something political.

ARISTOTLE, PROEMIUM, N. ETHICS, BOOK I, READING 3

Enough will be said if it is made clear according to the underlying matter. For certitude ought not to be sought in like manner in speaking about all things, just as neither in the products of the arts. But there is much difference and error about good and just things which political knowledge considers, so that they seem to be by custom only, and not by nature. And there is much error about good things due to many being harmed as a result of them. For some have perished through wealth and others, through courage.

We should be content therefore, in speaking about such things and from such things, to show the truth roughly and in outline; and in speaking about such things and from such things as are for the most part, to conclude such as are the same.

In the same way, one should receive each thing said. For it belongs to the educated man to seek certitude in each kind of subject to the extent that the nature of the thing admits. For it seems about the same to accept the mathematician persuading and to demand demonstration from a rhetorician.

Each man judge well what he knows and of these things he is a good judge - the man educated in something, about that; and simply, the man educated in all things. Hence, the young man is not the proper hearer of political knowledge. For he is without experience of the actions in life while the arguments are from these and about these.

Further, being a follower of the emotions, he will listen in vain and uselessly since the end is not knowledge, but action. It makes no difference whether he is young in age or youthful in character. For the defect is not by time, but through living and pursuing each thing by emotion. But knowledge is useless to such, as it is to the incontinent. But to those desiring and acting according to reason, it will be very useful to know about such things.

Let this much about the hearer and how it should be received and what we propose pave the way.

NOTE ON ARISTOTLE'S PROEMIUM TO NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Almost every work of Aristotle begins with a Proemium which paves the way for that work. A Proemium should at least show what is being aimed at in the work and the desirability of that end if it is not manifest. If it is not too difficult, the Proemium should also show how one should go forward to that end.

Among the Proemia of Aristotle, the Proemium to the *Fourteen Books of Wisdom* (the so called *Metaphysics* or *After the Books in Natural Philosophy*) and the Proemium to the ten books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* seem to have a special importance. For the Proemium to the *Fourteen Books of Wisdom* is to some extent a Proemium to Looking Philosophy and the Proemium to the ten books of the *Nicomachean Ethics* is likewise somewhat a Proemium to Practical Philosophy. (And these are the chief kinds of philosophy.) Hence, Aristotle gives an epilogue to each of these Proemia in which he recalls the two or three things he has done in that Proemium in the reverse order he has done it (recalling the last thing he has done and then back to the first). Aristotle's Proemia usually do not have an epilogue.

Duane H. Berquist

A NOTE ON PRACTICAL PHILOSOPHY

One must first know the end and matter of practical philosophy.

We sometimes say briefly that the end of practical philosophy is to do (just as the end of looking philosophy is to understand). But more precisely and correctly, we can say that the end of practical philosophy is to do what is good or better for oneself, or to do what is good or better for one's family, or to do what is good or better for one's city or nation. For the end of practical philosophy is not to do just anything, whether good or bad for ourselves, or for our family, or for our city or nation. Rather the end is to do what is good, or even better, for ourselves, or for our family. or for our city or nation.

Practical philosophy is about the things that are by choice and by custom. Although custom may be the result of repeated choices of the same, custom is also a beginning and cause of choice. Moreover, we are introduced to many customs by our society and country that we have not chosen.

If the end of practical philosophy is to do what is good or better for ourselves, or for our family, or for our city or nation, then we must first understand what is good and what is better. And perhaps we must understand what is good and what is better in general before we can understand what is good or better in particular. (In his Proemium to the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle teaches us the first definition of good and touches upon what is better in general.)

And since better is defined by good, we must begin with a general understanding of good.

Now if Socrates asked the slave-boy of Meno or an American boy what is good, he would probably get a number of examples of what the boy considers good. Candy is good, ice cream is good, pizza is good, baseball is good, vacation is good, health is good and so on. And if Socrates was then to react to these examples as we find him doing in the *Dialogues* or *Conversations*, he would point out the difference between giving examples of a thing and defining

it. What do all these examples have in common that makes the boy call them all *good*.

The boy might have a hard time saying what this is. Not every good is sweet like the candy and ice cream. Not every good is eatable like the pizza, the candy and the ice cream.

But since the boy wants all these things, he might see that the good in every case is something wanted. This might suggest a first definition of good. The good is what is wanted. As Socrates points out in the *Meno,* we all want good things for ourselves. Even the bad want good things for themselves. The man who robs the bank wants a good thing for himself for it is good to have money. This seems to be the first definition of good. The good is what all want.

But in the *Euthyphro*, Socrates teaches to ask a very necessary kind of question about this definition. Is something good because we want it, or do we want it because it is good? This is a question of before and after in the sense of cause and effect. Is wanting the cause of something being good or an effect of its being good? Does our wanting something make it good for us or does the goodness of the thing arouse in us a desire for it?

There seems to be some difficulty in saying either.

If we say that something is good because we want it, we are going against, or contradicting, an experience that we have all had. Everyone has the experience of having wanted something that afterwards they came to know was bad for them. The host says, “Do you want another drink?” and you say “Yes”. But after consuming it, you realize that it was one too many and bad for you. The kid wanted to drive his new car very fast down the winding road. But after rapping it around a tree and injuring himself, he realizes that what he wanted to do was not good for himself or for his new car.

But if we say that something is wanted because it is good, there seems to be some evidence that people do not always want what is good for them. If the good is the cause of wanting, why is it not always wanted?

Moreover, if contrary causes have contrary effects and the good is the cause of wanting, then the bad should be the cause of aversion, the contrary of wanting. But as we saw before, people often want what is bad for them.

Perhaps one should try to give a preliminary answer to the question by an argument of the kind more known to us. Induction is more proportioned to us animals than syllogism. But any preliminary answer to the question, coming down on one of the two sides of the above dilemma, must eventually take into account the objection(s) to that side and answer them reasonably.

Induction is an argument from many particulars to one general statement. Let us examine some particular goods and the desires for them and see what seems to be true in each of them.

And let us look at the most fundamental goods and the desires for them in man and many of which are shared in some way by the other animals. Let us make a table of these fundamental goods and the desires for them. (Only some of these desires, as we will see, have a name for them).

Food is one such good and the desire for it has a name, hunger.

Water is another such good and the desire for it has also a name, thirst.

Sleep is another such good, but the desire for sleep does not seem to have a familiar name.

Air (or something in the air) is another good and there is a desire to breathe.

Health is another good and all want to be healthy.

Pleasure is another good which all want.

People also want money which is good for many things.

People also want houses and clothing which are good to have in many ways.

It is good to know many things and people want this knowledge.

Now if we begin to examine each of these goods in particular, we can see a reason why they are good apart from our desire for them.

Food is good and indeed necessary for man and the other animals. Without food they would wither and die. Hence, nature has not given hunger to man and the other animals to make food good for them. But because food is good and necessary for them, nature has implanted a desire for it so that man and the other animals will pursue what is good for them. And we see that, generally speaking, hunger is greater when we more need food. And when you were sick as a child and temporarily lost your appetite, your mother might well have said to you "Try to eat a little to maintain your strength", seeing that the food is good for you even though you may temporarily due to sickness have lost you appetite or desire for it.

The same is true of water. We can that this is good and necessary for man and the other animals (and even the plants) apart from their thirst for it. So again, nature did not give us thirst to make water good for us. But because it is good and necessary, nature has given man and the other animals a desire for it so they will pursue what is good and indeed necessary for their life. Hence, usually we are more thirsty when we are more in need of water. And sometimes a coach or military instructor will encourage his men to drink more even though they do not have the inclination to do so because it is not the desire to drink water that makes it good for us.

Likewise, sleep can be seen to be good for man and the other animals apart from their desire to sleep when they are tired. If a man was deprived of sleep (as when the communists were trying to brainwash them), they would go out of their mind. And mother told you to go to bed when you were young, even though you did not want to, because she saw that it was good for you to get a good night's sleep before going to school. So animals have a desire to sleep, not to make sleep good for them, but so they will pursue what is good for them.

Man and many other animals must breathe in order to live so it is not the desire to breathe that makes breathing good for man and these other animals.

And health is better than sickness (or rather sickness is not good at all), not because we want to be healthy rather than to be sick. But because health is the good condition of our body, we and the other animals naturally desire it.

Likewise, is pleasure good and pain bad because we want the former and want to avoid the latter? Any one who has experienced pleasure and pain knows

that one is desired and not the other because of what they are. Hence, we see all animals seeking pleasure and trying to avoid pain.

And is money useful in our society because we want it? Or do we not rather want it because it is useful for so many things. Our wanting money is *not* what makes it useful for us, but its usefulness is why we want it.

And men have wanted houses and shelter because they are good. The house does not protect us from the weather and give us privacy and a place for our possessions and a safe place to sleep and eat because we want a house. But because it is useful for these and many other things, we want a house.

And is a car useful for getting to many places because we want it or do we want it because of its usefulness?

And is knowledge good and useful because we want it or do we not want it because it is good and useful?

Inductively, then, we can see that something is not good because we want it. Rather we want it because it is good.

Now the truth of this conclusion of our induction will be confirmed and shown by many other considerations, but this induction is perhaps the place for us to begin to see the truth.

However, as we said before the induction, it is necessary to answer the objections against the position we have reached before we can begin to be sure of our conclusion. Let us restate those objections.

If something is wanted because it is good for us, why do we not always want what is good for us?

And if contrary causes have contrary effects, why do we sometimes want what is bad for us? If the good is the cause of desire, then the contrary of good (which is the bad) should be the cause, not of desire, but of its contrary which is a turning away from.

As Shakespeare teaches us, reason is the ability for large discourse, looking before and after. And we have been using reason for a discourse about good that is very large. And in this discourse, we have looked before and after for the crowning sense of before and after in the sense in which the cause is said to be before its effect. In asking whether desire is the cause or the effect of the good, we are looking before and after in that sense.

And now to answer the objections to the conclusion to which our discourse has led, we must again look before and after. Is there something after the good, but before our desire for it? For example, is there something after the beauty of Juliet and before Romeo's wanting that beauty? If Romeo had not gone to the fatal house of her father and seen how beautiful she was, he would not have wanted her. The good must be known by either our senses or our reason before we want it. If we do not know what is good for us, we will not want it. The good as known moves our desire. The good when sensed or understood moves us to want it. This helps to explain why we do not always want what is good for us.

Moreover, the senses or reason may know something in the object that is good and not see what is bad in it. The man who wants to drink a delicious poison is moved not by its being poison (which escapes his knowledge), but by its good taste. Hence, the bad as such is not moving us to want it.

Further, both the senses and reason can be deceived by likeness. Men have wanted to eat poisonous mushrooms because they look like those that are good. And in this case, the bad as such does not arouse desire for it. Rather it is the good that it resembles which is the first cause of wanting.

Thus when we say that the good is the cause of wanting, we mean the good *as such* (and as known). The bad *as such* is not wanted. If the bad is in some way wanted it is because of the good in it which is seen (when the bad in it is not seen) or because it is like the good (and the senses or reason cannot distinguish them).

The mistake from mixing up the through itself (or the as such) and the through happening (or by happening) is made even by the wise, as the father of logic teaches us. The bad *as such* is not wanted. The bad is not wanted through

itself; that is, through being bad. Rather it is desired because of the good that happens to be in it or because it resembles the good which is desired as such.

It should not surprise us that the good is first defined by its effect. We usually know effects before their causes. Every time we ask why, we know the effect but not its cause. The reason for this is that our knowledge begins with our senses and they know effects more than their causes.

We can now turn to the general question of what is better.

And we can first eliminate a false answer from the truth we have seen about the good. If something is not good because we want it, then it is not better or more good because we want it more. This if-then statement is like the following: if something is not sweet because it is white, then something is not sweeter because it is whiter. And vice-versa. If something is sweeter because it is whiter, then it is sweet because it is white. And since the consequent is false, the antecedent must be false. Likewise, if something is better because it is wanted more, then it is good because it is wanted. But the consequence is false; therefore the antecedent is false.

What is better in general? We could say somewhat abstractly that the perfect is better than the imperfect. But since the word *perfect* is equivocal by reason, it would be better to recall that the central meanings of *perfect* are tied to whole and end. The whole is perfect or complete while the part is imperfect or incomplete. And that is perfect which has achieved its end or arrived at it end or purpose.

And of these two meanings of perfect, perhaps the end is more basic. For we could say that the part is for the sake of the whole and therefore, the whole is the end of the part.

We should not be led astray here by the equivocation of the word *end*. We do not mean here the limit of a thing's time or existence beyond which it is no longer. Rather we mean by end here *that for the sake of which* something is or is done.

The end is always better than that which is for the sake of it (when both are good). This can be seen first by induction and then by syllogism.

Health is better than taking medicine. Having money is better than making money. Knowing is better than studying. Having a house is better than building a house.

But we can also reason out that the end is better than what is for the sake of it from something more universal. When the same belongs to two things, but to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause. Thus, if hot is said of the fire and the air around the fire, but of the air because of the fire, it (hot) belongs more to the fire than the air. And if wet is said of the water and the cloth, but of the cloth because of the water, the water is wetter. And if sweet belong to sugar and my coffee, but to my coffee because of the sugar, the sugar is sweeter.

This famous beginning is applied in logic. If the premises of s syllogism and the conclusion of it are both known, but the conclusion is known because of the premises, the premises are more known than the conclusion. And if the premises were not more known than the conclusion, we would not use them to know the conclusion.

Hence, if good or desirable can be said of the end and that which is desired for the sake of it, but is said of the latter because of the former, the end is more desirable (or more good). If good is said of health and of medicine, but of medicine because health is good (medicine is good because health is good and it leads to health), then health is better.

If the good is first defined by its effect (the good is what all want or desire), the good is a cause and a more perfect definition of the good will be as a cause. But what kind of cause is the good? In natural philosophy, we learn the four kinds of cause: matter (that from which something comes to be, existing within it), form (the definition of what was to be), mover (whence first there is a beginning of motion) and end (that for the sake of which). We have just seen that the good is chiefly the end and this teaches us that the good is a cause in the sense of an end. Hence, Thomas, in the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate et Bonitate*, brings out that the good is *perfectivum alterius per modum finis*.

Moreover, since the good is what all desire and men aim at what is desired by them, it is clear that the good will be a cause in the sense of what is aimed at, or *that for the sake of which* something is or is done.

When we see later that the end of a thing and what it is are necessarily connected, we can see that the good is in things and not a denomination from our desire for it. Moreover, in the second book of *Natural Hearing* (the so-called *Physics*), we learn that nature acts for an end. So there are ends and consequently goods which are by nature and not by our desire for them.

In the *Apology*, Socrates recounts that he has been examining his fellow Athenians especially about their thinking and acting as if the goods of the body and outside goods are better than the goods of the soul. Socrates thinks that the goods of the soul are much better than the goods of the body and exterior goods. This is a disagreement about all the goods of man since all the goods of man are either the goods of the soul (the goods that involve reason, such as the moral virtues and the virtues of reason itself), the goods of the body (such as health, beauty and strength) and the outside goods such as food, clothing, house etc.). Aristotle also considers this disagreement between the philosopher and most men in the seventh book of the *Politics*.

One cannot say that the goods of the body and exterior goods are better for the Athenians or men in general because they want them more; and the goods of the soul are better for Socrates because he wants them more. For we have already shown that something is not good because we want it. And therefore something is not better, or more good, because we want it more. Hence, we must give a reason for saying that one of these kinds of goods is better than another. And this reason will involve our general understanding of what is better: the end is always better than what is for the sake of it.

It can be shown by induction that outside goods are for the sake of inside goods. Shoes are for the sake of the feet and not –vice-versa. Clothes are for the sake of the body (if the reverse were true, you would be a manikin as in the department stores), glasses and paintings are for the sake of the eyes seeing, and books are for the sake of the mind. If some good of the soul as the art of cooking, or the art carpentry, is for the sake of something outside of us, nevertheless that outside thing is further ordered to the inside as food and the chair are ordered to the good of the body.

If then the outside goods are for the sake of the inside, and the end (or that for the sake of which) is always better, clearly the inside goods (of the body and soul) are better than the outside goods. We therefore by reason must place the outside goods in third place when we order in goodness all the goods of man.

If we know from natural philosophy that the body is for the sake of the soul, just as in general matter is for the sake of form, we can syllogize again that the soul is better than the body and, hence, the goods of the soul better than the goods of the body.

Or after we reason out the end of man in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics,* we can see that the goods of the soul are closer to or more involved in the end of man than the goods of the body. And we can then syllogize from this and the basic statement about what is better in general (the end is always better than what is for the sake of it) that the goods of the soul are better than the goods of the body.

One could ask why most men think the lesser goods are better or love the lesser goods more. This could be explained in part, at least, by what comes between the good and desire: namely, some kind of knowledge or mistake. The outside goods and the goods of the body are much more known to us for they are sensible while the goods of the soul are not sensible.

But if we maintain that the Athenians are right, it would be difficult to explain Socrates thinking otherwise.

Duane H. Berquist

WHAT IS GOOD & WHAT IS BETTER - THE ORDER OF THE DISCOURSE

When a machine does not work, we sometimes hang up a sign on it saying *out of order.* Likewise, when our thoughts are out of order, our reason does not work well. Our reason is out of order when it puts the unknown before the known and even when it puts the less known before the more known. Plato and Aristotle teach us what should come before and what after in our thinking or knowing. And they do this in particular about the good and the better. But Kant's thinking about good is out of order because he does not know where to begin, or what should come before and what after, in our thinking about good. He want to begin with the good will before he knows what is good.

In what follows, following Plato and Aristotle, I shall try to outline the order to be followed in coming to know what is good and what is better.

WHAT IS GOOD – ORDER OF THE DISCOURSE

Plato frequently represents Socrates asking the question what is something. The respondent is then represented as giving examples of the thing to be defined rather than the universal definition sought by Socrates. This order of giving examples before defining is natural for it follows the road from the senses into reason. The senses know only examples while it is reason that comes to the universal definition. Socrates then must explain the difference between giving examples of a thing and defining it. Then the respondent can attempt to give the universal definition bringing out distinctly what is common to the many examples. Hence, the order in the *first* part of a discourse about what is good would be as follows:

The question: What is good?

Examples of good things

The distinction between giving examples of a thing and defining it

The first definition of good: the good is what all want

If Socrates asked the slave boy of Meno or a modern boy what is good, he would get examples of things the boy thinks to be good. This is natural. If after Socrates pointed out to him the distinction between giving examples of a thing and defining it, the boy tried to say what is common to all the things he calls good, all he could probably say at first was that he wanted each of them. The good then is what all want. In criticizing Meno's attempted definition of virtue, Socrates point out that bad men as well as good men want good things for themselves. The good then is what all want. Aristotle also shows this in the beginning of the *Nicomachean Ethics* by an induction. This then is the first definition of good: the good is what all want.

The *second* part of the discourse about what is good begins with the *kind of question* which Socrates asks about Euthyphro's definition of piety. (Is something pious because the gods approve of it, or do the goods approve of it because it is pious?) The order in this second part of the discourse about what is good would be as follows:

The kind of question Socrates taught us to ask in the *Euthyphro*

Asking that kind of question about the good: Is something good because we want it or do we want it because it is good? (Is wanting the cause or the effect of the good?)

Dialectic about this question:

The objection to saying something is good because we want it: Everyone has the experience of having wanted something that they themselves afterwards recognized was not good for them.

Objections to saying something is wanted because it is good:

The good is not always wanted.

And since contrary causes have contrary effects, the bad should be a cause of aversion. Why then is the bad sometimes wanted? And if the bad is sometimes wanted, then what all want is not convertible with good.

The induction from the basic desires and the goods corresponding to them (hunger and food, thirst and water, sleep and the desire for it, health and the desire for it. etc.) beginning the answer to the question. This leads to the answer that we want something because it is good because we can see that food and water and sleep and so on are good for man (and the other animals) apart from their wanting them.

Untying the objections against the conclusion of the induction. The good as known through the senses or reason moves us to want it. But the senses and reason can be ignorant of some good, or see the good in the bad but not what is bad in it (as a delicious poison), or be deceived by the likeness of the bad to the good (as when poisonous mushrooms are confused with the good ones.) The bad *as such,* then, is not wanted

The *third* part of the discourse on good tries to say more perfectly what is the good. This part starts from having seen that something is not good because it is wanted. Rather it is wanted because it is good or appears to be good

Since the good is the cause of wanting or desire, a more perfect definition of the good requires us to understand what kind of cause is the good.

There are four kinds of cause: matter, form, mover and end.

What kind of cause is the good of wanting?

Is wanting made out of the good?

Or are we shaped by what we love and want, as Goethe said?

If the good moves us to want it, is it a cause in the sense of the mover? Or is this to equivocate on the word *move?*

> The end is that for the sake of which something is or is done. And that for the sake of which we act is always the good or the apparent good. The good then is a cause in the sense of end. This is also seen when we have considered that the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end. Hence, the good is chiefly the end.

WHAT IS BETTER? – ORDER OF THE DISCOURSE

We must first understand what is better than what *in general* before we can understand *in particular* what is better than what. Aristotle shows in the Proemium to the eight books of *Natural Hearing* (the so called *Physics*) that the general should be understood before the particular. Indeed how can we understand what is a prime number before we have understood what is a number? And can we understand what is a rhombus before we have understood what is a quadrilateral?

In general, we can see that the whole is better than the part and that the end is better than what is for the sake of it. Both of these statements can first be seen by induction. Perhaps the more basic of these two statements is the second for the part can be said to be for the sake of the whole.

That the end is better than what is for the sake of it can be seen, not only by induction, but also by a general reason. This is the famous reason stated briefly by Aristotle and Thomas thus: *that on account of which, more so*.

But we can state it more fully thus: *when the same belongs to two things, but to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the cause*. Thus, if hot is said of the fire and the air around the fire, but the air around the fire is hot because of the fire, the fire is more hot than the air. And in logic we see that if the premisses of a syllogism and its conclusion are known, but the conclusion is known because of the premisses, the premisses are more known. Indeed, if they were not more known, we would not show the conclusion through them. Hence, if good or desirable is said of the end and that which is for the sake of the end. But the latter is desirable because the end is desirable. Then the end is more desirable than what is for the sake of it.

Duane H. Berquist

DRAWING A LINE AROUND THE END OF MAN - N. ETHICS, BK. I, READING TEN

But to say that happiness is the best seems to be agreed upon, and it is desired that what it is, be said more distinctly.

Perhaps this will come about if what man does is taken up. For just as the fluteplayer and the sculptor and every artist and generally everyone for whom there is something to do and some act, the good and well-being seems to be in doing this., so also it would seem for man if there is something he does.

Are there then some doings and acts of the carpenter and the shoemaker, but of man there is none, and he is by nature without anything to do?

Or just as there seems to be something done by the eye and the hand and the foot and generally by each of the parts, should one also lay down something that man does besides all these?

What then will this be? To live seems to be common even to the plants, but what is man's own is sought. The nourishing and growing life therefore should be set aside. Following this, there would be something sensing. But this also seems to be common to the horse and the ox and every animal. There remains the doing of what has reason. But of this, the one as obeying or persuaded by reason and the other as having reason and thinking And this being said in two ways, that according to act should be laid down. For this seems to be said principally.

If then the activity of man is an act of the soul by reason or not without reason, while we say that the act of something and its good act are the same generically - as of a harpist and a good harpist and generally thus in all, adding that it excels by virtue - for it belongs to the harpist to play the harp, but to the good harpist to play the harp well; then if this is so and further that we lay it down that the act of man is some life and this the act of the soul and actions with reason, but of the good man these well and fairly, and each is completed well by its own virtue; if then it is thus, the human good turns out to be the act of the soul by virtue. And if there are many virtues, according into the best and most perfect.

But further in a complete life. For one swallow does not make a spring, nor one day. And thus neither one day nor a short time makes one blessed and happy.

A line therefore has been draw around the good.

NOTE ON END OR PURPOSE OF MAN

The end of man can be reasoned out by the syllogism and by the two common kinds of compound syllogism (the if-then syllogism and the either-or syllogism).

The first way by syllogism is after an induction which establishes the major premise. The induction is preceded by two definitions, the definition of a thing's own act and the definition of end (in the sense of purpose).

A thing's own act is *the act which that thing alone can do or, at least, do better than other things.* Thus, for example, if we see only through our eyes seeing is the eye's own act. And walking is the legs' own act for, although some can walk on their hands, one cannot walk on one's hands well as one can walk with legs.

End is *that for the sake of which* (something is or is done).

The induction of the major premise of the syllogism can proceed in two steps. First we show by an induction that a tool's own act is its end. And then we show by another induction that an organ's own act is its end. And finally we show by yet another induction that an occupation's own act is its end. And then in a second stage, we can induce from these three universal conclusions an even more universal conclusion that a thing's own act is its end.

The first induction proceeds thus:

> A knife's own act is to cut and to cut is the end of a knife
>
> A pen's own act is to write and to write is the end of the pen
>
> A screwdriver's own act is to screw and to screw is the end of the screwdriver
>
> And so on for each tool which has its own act and is for the sake of that act

The second induction proceeds thus:

> The eye has its own act which is to see and to see is the end of the eye

> The ear has its own act which is to hear and to hear is the end of the ear
>
> The heart own act is to pump blood and to pump blood is the end of the heart
>
> And each organ of the body has its own act which is also its end

And the third induction proceeds thus:

> The cook's own act is to cook and to cook is the end of the cook
>
> And the pianist's own act is to play the piano and to play the piano is the end of the pianist
>
> And the teacher's own act is to teach. And to teach is the purpose of the teacher.
>
> And likewise each occupation has its own act which is the purpose of that occupation.

We can then make an even more universal induction from the three universal statements already induced. If a tool's own act is its end and an organ's own act is also its end and an occupation's own act is the reason for that occupation, then in general a thing's own act is its end.

We can then syllogize that the act with reason is man's own act and man's own act is his end, and conclude that the act with reason is man's end.

We say the act *with* reason rather than the act *of* reason because man is not reason, but an animal with reason. Every act of reason is an act with reason, but other acts of man can be with reason, or be reasonable, with out beings acts of reason. Love or anger, for example, can be reasonable. Likewise, eating moderately can be reasonable and even walking can be a reasonable thing to do. Whether the end of man consists more in the act of reason itself or in some other act directed and measured by reason is something we find out later in a longer study of the virtues and their acts.

We can also be more precise going through this whole proceeding.

The knife's purpose is not just to cut, but to cut well. And the pen's purpose is no just to write, but to write well. And in general, a tool's end is to do its own act well.

Likewise the purpose of the eye is not just to see, but to see well, and so on for each organ.

And the purpose of the cook or the pianist is not just to cook or play the piano, but to do so well.

And then we induce the more precise statement that a thing's own act *done well* is its end or purpose.

And then we syllogize that man's own act, the act with reason, *done well* Is man's end.

We could come back once more and go through the proceeding adding that the end of each thing having its own act is to do that act well for the life of that thing. We want to see well, not just for a day or month or year but for life. And thus the end of man is the act with reason done well, throughout life.

One can substitute for *done well* the words *according to virtue* or *by virtue.* In order to understand this, we should recall what virtue is in general. In general, virtue and vice can be spoken of in whatever has its own act. Virtue is the disposition of a thing which makes it good and its own act good. Thus, the virtue of a knife is sharpness for this enables the knife to cut well and makes it a good knife. And dullness would be the vice of a knife for the dull knife cuts badly.

One needs to know what a thing's own act is before one can know what is its virtue or vice. Unless one knew that the knife's own act is to cut, one would not be able to figure out that its virtue is sharpness and its vice, dullness.

Human virtue is, of course, more difficult to discover than the virtue of a knife. So after we conclude that man's end is the act with reason according to human virtue through life, we must investigate what human virtue is, which Aristotle does in Books Two through Six of the *Nicomachean Ethics.*

And just as we ask what is a knife's own act (to cut) before we seek to know what is its virtue (sharpness) and what is its virtue before we ask how to acquire that virtue (how to sharpen a knife), so likewise we ask what is man's own act before we investigate what is his virtue and the latter before we ask how man can acquire his virtue (or virtues).

A shorter way to see the end of man is by seeing a proportion (a likeness of ratios) and from this getting the if-then statement in an if-then syllogism.

What is to man as seeing is to the eye? Is there an act which is to man as seeing is to the eye? The act with reason is to man as seeing is to the eye.

If seeing is the end of the eye, then the act with reason is the end of man. But seeing is the end of the eye. Therefore, the act with reason is the end of man.

One could reason in the same way from a ratio in a tool and its own act. What is to man as cutting is to the knife? The act with reason is to man as cutting is to the knife. If then cutting is the end of the knife, the act with reason is the end of man. But cutting is the end of the knife. Therefore, the act with reason is the end of man.

Likewise, one could reason from the ratio of an occupation's act to that occupation. What is to man as cooking is to the cook? The act with reason is to man as cooking is to the cook. If therefore cooking is the purpose or end of the cook, then the act with reason is the purpose or end of man. But cooking is the end or purpose of the cook. Therefore, the act with reason is the end of purpose of man.

It is more known to us that cutting is the end of the knife and seeing, of the eye and cooking, of the cook than that the act with reason is the end of man (which you can see if you ask the man in the street what is the end of each of these. He will say right away what is the end of the eye or the knife or the cook, but hesitate about the end of man. Hence, we reason from the more known ratio to the less known ratio. We can reason in this way from countless proportions from every tool in our house and every organ in our body and every occupation of man.

And as in the first argument, we can be more precise in our reasoning once the way it proceeds has been grasped. We can ask what is to man as seeing *well* is to the eye. One can no longer say just the act with reason, but one is forced to preserve the likeness of ratios to say that the act with reason *done well* is to man as seeing *well* is to the eye. Since then seeing well is the end of the eye, the act with reason done well is the end of man.

Likewise, if we ask what is to man as cutting well is to the knife, we are forced (to preserve the likeness of ratios) to say that the act with reason well done is to man as cutting well is to the knife. Hence, since cutting well is the end of the knife (for a knife has fully achieved its purpose only when it cuts well), the act with reason done well must be the end of man.

And if the purpose of the cook is not only to cook, but to cook well, then the end of man must be what is to man as cooking well is to the cook. This is, of course, the act with reason done well.

Finally, even more precisely, we can say that if the purpose of the eye is not only to see well for a day but through life, then also the end of man must be the act with reason done well throughout life.

A third way of coming to see in outline the end of man is to start from the common agreement that the goal of man is to live well. And then by a disjunction asking whether a man is living well by the life he shares with the plants or by the life he shares with the beasts or by the life which is his own, the life with reason. Clearly a man does not live well just by the life of plant or a beast for then man would be no more than a beast or a plant. Aristotle, in the Tenth Reading of the First Book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, proceeds somewhat in this way.

FOREWORD TO CONSIDERATION OF LOVE AND FRIENDSHIP

The importance of love and friendship does not have to be shown at length. Everything a man does, he does out of some kind of love; hence, as the loves of men differ, so do their lives. And some say that love is the beginning of the whole universe.

Further, many think that some form of love is the best thing in life. Many people think that the love between man and women is the best thing in human life while any saint will tell you that the love of God is the best.

Thus love seems to be the source of all our actions and, perhaps, an end of all of them.

Friendship seems to be the highest form of love, and no man would choose to live without any friends.

Let these things suffice for the present as regards the importance of our matter.

But should we speak of love or friendship first?

It seems of love first because love is more general than friendship. Friendship is love between persons, but there can also be some kind of love of things that are not persons, such as the love of candy or the love of wealth or the love of music.

And even love of another person is not always friendship. For friendship requires that the person we love, love us in return. And this often does not happen.

Moreover, love is in the definition of friendship. So how can we understand friendship if we do not first understand love?

Since it is necessary to understand the general before the particular, a consideration of human love should begin with a general consideration of it. Now the most universal, complete, and well-ordered consideration of human

love with the brevity of wisdom is found in three questions (containing fourteen articles) of the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas. Hence, we should begin with a study of these three questions.

In the first of these questions, Thomas considers the nature of love in general and the two most general distinctions of the kinds of love.

In the second, he considers the causes of love; and in the third, the effects of love.

From the first of these questions to which the second and third are proportional, we can see that the consideration is most universal. We can also see from this somewhat the completeness of the treatise since he looks at love in itself and before and after it.

But there is a difficulty in speaking about love. How should we speak of it?

It seems that we should speak of love in the way that love itself speaks. How can we speak well of love, if we have no experience of it? And does not the lover speak of love from the experience which he has of it? And surely the experience of love is necessary for speaking well of love.

But often true love prefers to be silent or show its love by deeds rather than words. Thus the Poet:

> O, learn to read what silent love hath writ.[1]

If love is silent, how can we speak of love as the lover speaks? In the first scene of *King Lear,*[2] Lear, about to divide his kingdom among his three daughters, asks them how much they love him. The first two daughters (Regan and Goneril) protest in words how much they love their father Lear (but their deeds later in the play show that they do not). But Cordelia, who truly loves him, makes this aside while Regan speaks:

> What shall Cordelia speak? Love and be silent.

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[1] Shakespeare, *Sonnet 23*, line 13

[2] Act I, Sc. 1

When Goneril professes her love in fulsome words and is granted rich lands. Cordelia in another aside:

> Then, poor Cordelia!
> And yet no so, since I am sure my love's
> More richer than my tongue.

And finally Cordelia says to Lear himself:

> Unhappy that I am, I cannot heave
> My heart into my mouth.

Antigone, in the play of that name, says to her sister (who professes love for their fallen brother, but) who will not help her bury their brother against the edict of Creon:

> I cannot love a friend whose love is words.[3]

In *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* [4], Julia leaves silently when Proteus, her betrothed, bids her farewell:

> Julia, farewell [Exit Julia]
> What! gone without a word?
> Ay. so true love should do; it cannot speak;
> For truth hath better deeds than words to grace it.

When Troilus receives a letter from Cressida, whom he knows by her deeds to be unfaithful, he says:

> Words, words, mere words, no matter from the heart;
> Th'effect doth operate another way. [He tears the letter]
> Go wind, to wind! There turn and change together.
> My love with words and errors still she feeds,
> But edifies another with her deeds.[5]

Thus, although an experience of love is surely necessary for understanding love (indeed all our knowledge seems to begin from some experience), yet the way we speak about love in order to understand it does not seem to be the way that love itself speaks. For true love shows itself by deeds more than by words. It is silent. True love does not speak.

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[3] line 543
[4] Act II, Sc. 2
[5] Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, Act V, Sc. 3

But perhaps someone will object saying that lovers do sometimes speak of their love. But to whom do they speak fully of their love? It seems to the one whom they love. But why do we express our love in words to those whom we love? Not in order to understand our love. But most of all so that the one we love will express in turn, their love for us, so that the one we love will be pressed to make a return of our love. This and perhaps also to delight the one whom we love, if they delight in our love. But most of all, it seems in order that there might be a mutual declaration of love. Indeed if you truly love someone, you naturally want them to love you in return.

Hence, if we wish to understand love, we cannot speak about it in the way that love itself speaks. For true love is either silent or speaks to provoke a mutual declaration of love, not to understand love.

Perhaps we should speak about love in the way the philosopher speaks. The philosopher tries to understand all things in some way, and especially the most important things, and love is surely among the most important things.

But there seems to be too great a distance between the philosopher and the lover. The philosopher seeks to be wise and there seems to be a great distance between love and wisdom in mankind. Thus Cressida says:

> to be wise and love
> Exceeds man's might. That dwells with gods above.[6]

The lover is often described as foolish, the opposite of wise. Listen to the conversation between the two gentlemen of Verona where Valentine speaks with his friend Proteus who is in love with Julia:

> Valentine: To be in love, where scorn is bought with groans
> Coy looks with heart-sore sighs; one fading moment's mirth
> with twenty watchful, weary, tedious nights:
> If haply won, perhaps a hapless gain;
> If lost, why then a grievous labor won;
> However, but a folly bought with wit,
> Or else a wit by folly vanquished!
>
> Proteus: So, by your circumstance, you call me fool.
>
> Valentine: So, by your circumstance, I fear you'll prove.
>
> Proteus: 'Tis love you cavil at; I am not Love.
>
> Valentine: Love is your master, for he masters you,
> And he that is so yoked by a fool,

---

[6] Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, Act III, Sc. 2

Methinks should not be chronicled for wise.

Proteus: Yet writers say, as in the sweetest bud
The eating canker dwells, so eating love
Inhabits in the finest wits of all.

Valentine: And writers say, as the most forward bud
Is eaten by the canker ere it blow,
Even so by love the young and tender wit
Is turned to folly, blasting in the bud
Losing his verdure even in the prime,
And all the fair effects of future hopes.
But wherefore waste I time to counsel thee
That art a votary to fond desire.[7]

Wisdom is the perfection of reason, and reason and love do not seem to go together. As Bottom says:

> reason and love keep little company together now-a-days;
> the more the pity that some honest neigbours will not make them friends[8]

Indeed, love seems to escape the grasp of reason that seeks to know why and give reasons for things. It is said in *Cymbeline:*

> I know not why
> I love this youth; and I have heard you say,
> Love's reason's without reason.[9]

The last line reminds one of Pascal's famous saying that the heart has reasons that the reason does not know. Indeed, men often do not love those whom they have the most reason to love. And likewise, they love or continue to love those whom they have reason not to love Thus it is said of Mariana's continuous love of Angelo:

> This forenamed maid hath yet in her the continuance of her first affection: his unjust unkindness, that in all reason should have quenched her love, hath, like an impediment in the current, made it more violent and unruly.[10]

Love seems to carry people below or beyond reason, and therefore how can reason (or the philosopher who seeks the perfection of reason) speak well about love. The philosopher teaches us to live by reason; and, hence, in the

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[7] Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 1
[8] Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 1
[9] Shakespeare, *Cymbeline,* Act IV, Sc. 2
[10] Shakespeare, *Measure for Measure*, Act III, Sc. 1

matter of love, what does he have to say, if men are not ruled by reason in love.

But whom then shall we listen to about love? Between the lover and the philosopher comes the poet. And it is to the poet rather than to the philosopher that we are sometimes referred in the matter of love. In *The Taming of the Shrew,* Lucentio is studying philosophy (the part concerned with human life), but Tranio refers him to a poet in the matter of love. Here is a bit of their conversation:

Lucentio: And therefore, Tranio, for the time I study,
Virtue and that part of philosophy
Will I apply that treats of happiness
By virtue especially to be achiev'd...

Tranio: *Me pardonato*, gentle master mine:
I am in all affected as yourself,
Glad that you thus continue your resolve
To suck the sweets of sweet philosophy.
Only, good master, while we do admire
This virtue and this moral discipline,
Let's be no stoics nor no stocks, I pray;
Or so devote to Aristotle's checks
As Ovid be an outcast quite abjur'd.[11]

Ovid is, of course, known as the poet of love. There is indeed a connection between the poet and the lover. Touchstone's poetry is wasted on the country wench Audrey he courts. And he touches upon the connection of the lover with poetry in speaking to her about this:

Touchstone: I would the gods had made thee poetical.

Audrey: I do not know what poetical is. Is it honest
in deed and word? Is it a true thing?

Touchstone: No, truly, for the truest poetry is the most
feigning, and lovers are given to poetry. And
what they swear in poetry may be said, as
lovers they do feign.[12]

We can single out the line here "lovers are given to poetry." If the lover speaks, he is most apt to adopt a way of speaking proper to the poet. The figurative, and especially the metaphoric, way of speaking is appropriate to the poet (for example *honey* or *sweetheart)*

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[11] Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew,* Act I, Sc. 1
[12] Shakespeare, *As You Like It,* Act III, Sc. 3

In *Love's Labour's Lost*, love is seen to play a crucial role in the writing of the poet:

> And when Love speaks, the voice of all the gods
> Makes heaven drowsy with the harmony.
> Never durst poet touch a pen to write
> Until his ink were temper'd with Love's sighs;
> O! then his lines would ravish savage ears,
> And plant in tyrants mild humility.[13]

The connection between the lover and the poet is seen in the imagination, a faculty which also characterizes the madman. This is why they all seem to be different from the man of reason:

> Loves and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> The lunatic, the lover and the poet
> Are of imagination all compact.[14]

Indeed we found The Poet most useful to quote on love in this Proemium. It is because of the connection of love with the poet that Plato has a discussion of love with poets in a *Symposium* in honor of the poet Agathon.

No one can understand love who does not understand love's own way of expressing itself and love's own way of speaking. But even though we must understand love's way of expressing itself and speaking, we cannot speak about this using love's own way of speaking, except to exemplify.

The experience of love (which is the lover's experience) is the beginning of thought about love. But one cannot go from that singular experience of love to the universal consideration of love by the philosopher. One must go through the poet's words in which the universal is singularized or the singular universalized. The lover is too particular and agitated, but the poet's way of speaking is more universal and more beautiful and more tranquil. In the very whirlwind of passion, he has a calmness as we see in Shakespeare and Homer. (See Hegel's remarks on the similes of Homer.) It is curious that Socrates hardly ever claims to know anything, but he does in the *Symposium* make such a claim about love. Is this Plato, the philosopher with some poetic gifts?

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[13] Shakespeare, *Love's Labour's Lost* Act IV, Sc. 3
[14] Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Sc. 1

Perhaps the deepest reason why this is so can be seen from the reason why true love seeks to express itself. True love does not seek an understanding of itself. It is reason that seeks to understand true love. What is it that true love seeks at last? A real union with the beloved that cannot be untied and to be loved in return. True love expresses itself because it wants to be loved in return. Nothing moves us more to love another than the other's love for us. This is why true love expresses itself in deeds or suffering more than in words. For deeds are a more sure sign of love than words.

Love's own way of expressing itself and speaking is a necessary *manuductio* for understanding love. But when we define and divide love and state its causes and effects, we must use another way of speaking which is that of the philosopher.

We must not overlook the difference between *expressing* love and *explaining* it, between expressing it and *understanding* it. The poet expresses love, but the philosopher tries to explain and understand it.

The philosopher's way of speaking about love is good when our end is to understand and explain love and to the extent that love can be understood and explained.

The poet's way of speaking about love is good for three reasons. First, to express love. Second, to speak about love insofar as it goes beyond our ability to explain and understand it. Metaphors and similes are necessary to speak about things that we cannot fully understand or that are above or below our ability to understand. Third, the poet's way of speaking about love is useful for the philosopher's understanding of love insofar as the poet's "mirror" of love is a natural bridge between our singular experience of love and the philosopher's universal understanding of love; and insofar as the poet way of expressing love is itself an object for the philosopher to understand; and insofar as the poet's way of expressing love contains signs of the truth of what the philosopher says.

Since the end of a philosophic study of love is to explain and understand it so far as possible, the poet's way of speaking is good for such a course chiefly in the third way.

Music is perhaps the most perfect expression of love, but one does not play music when trying to say what love is or what is the cause or effect of love. In the *Symposium*, the first three speakers give a speech in praise of love. Praise has a special connection with love. No one can praise well who does not love well. But we do not want to praise love, but to understand it. We do not want to speak well of love in the sense of praising it, but in the sense of

speaking truly about it. The poets are placed next to Socrates in the order of speakers in the *Symposium*. A common beginning of Plato's dialogues is that Socrates discusses the topic with one who would seem to have, or be apt to have, some experience or knowledge of the topic discussed. In the *Symposium*, we have the poets and three who can give a speech of praise. Pope Paul VI, following Augustine, emphasized the connection between love and praise:

> Love and praise call for each other, as St. Augustine again says: "amare et laudare: laudare in amore: amare in laudibus: to love and to praise, to praise in love, to love in praises" (*Enarr. in Ps. 147*).[15]

The beginning of a consideration of love for anyone is his or her experience of love. This is singular and we, following Thomas Aquinas, are going to consider human love in a most universal way. Because of this distance between our starting-point and the treatise of Thomas, it is perhaps well to go through the poet's representation of love. For this is more universal than our experience of love. (Hence, Aristotle said that poetry or fiction is more philosophical than history in being more about the universal while history is about the singular.) At the same time, it is closer to our experience of love. Thus, we can be led by the hand from our individual experience of love through the poet's words to the most universal consideration of Thomas.

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APPENDIX ON THE THE SILENCE OF LOVE

Sonnet 102, lines 1-4:

> My love is strengthen'd, though more weak in seeming.
> I love not less, though less the show appear:
> That love is merchandiz'd whose rich esteeming
> The owner's tongue doth publish everywhere.

The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Act I, Sc. 2:

> Julia: Why, he of all the rest hath never mov'd me.

---

[15] Homily delivered during the Mass celebrated on Sunday, Sept. 24, 1972 in the Basilica of St. Peter for the Italian St. Cecilia Association

Lucetta: Yet he of all the rest, I think, best loves ye.

Julia: His little speaking shows his love but small.

Lucetta: Fire that's closest kept burns most of all.

Julia: They do not love that do not show their love.

Lucetta: O! they love least that let men know their love.

Julia: I would I knew his mind.

The Merchant of Venice, Act I, Sc. 1, Bassanio:

In Belmont is a lady richly left,
And she is fair, and fairer than that word,
Of wondrous virtues. Sometimes from her eyes
I did receive fair speechless messages.

Much Ado About Nothing, Act. II, Sc. 1:

Silence is the perfectest herald of joy:
I were but little happy, if I could say how much.

APPENDIX ON THE FOLLY OF LOVE

Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Sc. 2, Friar Laurence to Romeo:

Jesu Maria! What a deal of brine
Hath wash'd thy sallow cheeks for Rosaline,
How much salt water thrown away in waste
To season love, that of it doth not taste.

Much Ado About Nothing, Act II, Sc. 3, Benedick:

I do much wonder that one man, seeing how much another man is a fool when he dedicates his behaviours to love, will, after he hath laughed at such shallow follies in others, become the argument of his own scorn by falling in love: and such a man is Claudio.

The Merchant of Venice, Act II, Sc. 6, Jessica:

But love is blind, and lovers cannot see
The pretty follies that themselves commit.

The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Act I, Sc. 2:

Julia: Of all the fair resort of gentlemen
That every day with parle encounter me,

In thy opinion which is worthiest love?...
What thinks't thou of gentle Proteus?

Lucetta: Then thus: of many good I think him best.

Julia: Your reason?

Lucetta: I have no reason but a woman's reason:
I think him so because I think him so.

Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Sc. 1, Mercutio:

Romeo! humors! madman! passion! lover!

Sonnet 148:

O me! what eyes hath Love put in my head,
Which have no correspondence with true sight;
Of, if they have, where is my judgment fled,
That censures falsely what they see aright?

If that be fair whereon my false eyes dote,
What means the world to say it is not so?
If it be not, then love doth well denote
Love's eye is not so true as all men's: no.

How can it? O, how can Love's eye be true,
that is so vex'd with watching and with tears?
No marvel then, though I mistake my view;
The sun itself sees not till heaven clears.

O cunning Love! with tears thou keep'st me blind,
Lest eyes well-seeing thy foul faults should find.

Sonnet 72:

O. lest the world should task you to recite
What merit lived in me, that you should love
After my death - dear love, forget me quite,
For you in me can nothing worthy prove;

Unless you would devise some virtuous lie,
To do more for me than mine own desert,
And hang more praise upon deceased I
Than niggard truth would willingly impart:

O, lest your true love may seem false in this,
That you for love speak well of me untrue,
My name be buried where my body is,
And live no more to shame nor me nor you.

For I am sham'd by that which I bring forth,

And so should you, to love things nothing worth.

APPENDIX ON LOVE AND THE POET

Love's Labour's Lost, Act I, Sc. 2, Armado:

> Adieu, valour! rust, rapier! be still, drum! for your manager is in love; yea, he loveth. Assist me some extemporal god of rime, for I am sure I shall turn sonnet. Devise, wit; write, pen; for I for double volumes in folio.

Aristotle, *About the Poetic Art*, Chapter 17, 1455a 30-34:

> Those in the passions are the most believable by nature - the one in a rage rages and the angry is violent most truly. Hence the poetic art belongs either to one well endowed by nature or mad - the former are easy to mould and the latter, outside themselves.

APPENDIX ON MUSIC AND LOVE

Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, first line:

If music be the food of love, play on.

Shakespeare, *Antony & Cleopatra*, Act II, Sc. 5, lines 1-2, Cleopatra:

Give me some music: music, moody food
Of us that trade in love.

S. Kierkegaard, from *Either/Or*:

> The experts...all continue to reiterate that Mozart's Don Juan is the crown of all operas, but without explaining what they mean by that, although they all say it in a manner which clearly demonstrates that by this statement they intend to say something more than Don Juan is the best opera, that there is a qualitative difference between it and all other operas, which cannot well be sought in anything other than in the absolute relationship between idea, form, subject and medium.
>
> The happy characteristic that belongs to every classic, that which makes it classic and immortal, is the absolute harmony of the two forces, form and content. this concord is so absolute that a later reflective age will scarcely be able to separate, even for thought, the two constituent elements here so

intimately united, without running the risk of entertaining or provoking a misunderstanding. Thus when we say that it was Homer's good fortune that he had the most remarkable epic subject conceivable, we may forget that we always see this epic material through Homer's eyes, and that it seems to us the most perfect subject, is clear to us only in and through the transubstantiation which we owe to Homer. But if, on the other hand, we stress Homer's poetic energy in interpreting the material, we easily run the risk of forgetting that the poem would never have become the thing it is, if the thought with which Homer has imbued it were not its own thought, if the form were not precisely the form that belongs to it.

The fortunate has two factors: it is fortunate that the most distinguished epic subject fell to the lot of Homer; here the accent falls as much on Homer as on the material. It is this profound harmony which reverberates through every work of art we call classic. and so it is with Mozart; it is fortunate that the subject, which is perhaps the only strictly musical subject, in the deeper sense, that life affords, fell to - Mozart. With his Don Juan, Mozart enters the little immortal circle of those whose names, whose works, time will not forget, because eternity remembers them.

....it is not probable that Mozart will ever have a rival. It was Mozart's good fortune to have found a subject that is absolutely musical, and if some future composer should try to emulate Mozart, there would be nothing else for him to do than compose Don Juan over again.

From Pope Paul VI's homily delivered during the Mass celebrated on Sunday, Sept. 24, 1972 in the Basilica of St. Peter for the Italian St. Cecilia Association:

Singing is a necessity of love and manifests it. Listen to how St. Augustine speaks about it: "singing comes from cheerfulness, but if we observe more carefully, from love: canticum res est hilaritatis, et si diligentius consideremus, res est amoris."(*Sermo 34*) and again: "cantare et psallere negotium esse solet amantium: singing and chanting is characteristic of those who love.'"(*Sermo 33*)

The natural sign of love, singing, has, therefore, an irreplaceable role in Christian worship, which is service of charity: of that love, in which, as we recalled in the prayer of Holy Mass, "the foundation of the whole law is placed." Since "de illo quem amas cantare vis'"(St. Augustine, *Sermo 34*, PL 38), our love for God is also expressed in singing.

Love and praise call for each other, as St. Augustine again says: "amare et laudare: laudare in amore: amare in laudibus: to love and to praise, to praise in love, to love in praises" (*Enarr. in Ps. 147*).

But singing manifests and foments also love among brothers. The community is formed in singing, assisting with the fusion of voices that of hearts...uniting everyone in one aspiration, in praise

Duane H. Berquist

NATURE AND KINDS OF LOVE

NATURE OF LOVE

Thomas' most universal consideration of love is situated in the treatise on the passions or emotions or feelings in the *Prima Secundae*. But his consideration is more universal (as will be seen) than just the emotion of love. But this is the love most known to us.

And since the emotions are divided into the concupiscible (in Latin, but in the Greek they are put under *epithumia*) and the irascible (referred to in the Greek of Aristotle as *thumos*). The emotions or feelings of the concupiscible have as their object what is pleasant or painful to the senses while the irascible emotions regard some difficulty of getting the pleasant or of avoiding or getting rid of the painful. Thomas first situates love in one of these.

Love is one of the emotions in the concupiscible regarding the pleasant or good. It is the conformity or agreement of the heart (desiring power) with its object whence arise desire or wanting for the agreeable that is absent or not had and pleasure when it is present or had.

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 26, Art. 1, Whether love (amor) is in the concupiscible appetite:

> One proceeds thus to the first. It seems that love is not in the concupiscible [desiring power].
>
> For it is said in the book of *Wisdom*, Chapter 8, v. 2 "I have loved and sought this [wisdom]". But the concupiscible, since it is part of the sensible desiring power, is not able to tend to wisdom, which is not grasped by sense. Therefore love is not in the concupiscible.
>
> Moreover, love seems to be the same as any passion. For Augustine says in the fourteenth book of *The City of God:* "For love longing to have what is loved is desire; but having it and delighting in it is joy; fleeing what is opposed to it is fear; but sensing this, if it should happen, is sadness." But not every passion is in the concupiscible;

but fear, also enumerated here, is in the irascible. Therefore it ought not to be said simply that love is in the concupiscible.

Moreover, Dionysius, in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names,* lays down a certain natural love. But natural love seems more to belong to the natural powers, which belong to the living soul. Therefore love is not simply in the concupiscible.

But against this is what the Philosopher says in the second book *About Places*, that “love is in the concupiscible”.

I answer that love is something pertaining to [the ability to] desire since the object of both is a good. Hence, there is a difference of love according to the difference of desire.

There is a certain desire not following upon the grasping of the one desiring, but of another. And this kind is called natural desire. For natural things desire what is suitable to them according to their nature, not through their own grasping, but through the grasping of the one instituting nature, as has been said in the first book.

There is however another desire following upon the grasping of the one desiring, but from necessity, not from free judgment. And such is sense desire in the beasts, which nevertheless in men partakes in something of freedom, insofar as it obeys reason.

There is moreover another desire following upon the grasping of the one desiring by free judgment. And such is reasonable or understandable desire, which is called *willing*.

In each of these desires, that is called *love*, which is the beginning of a motion tending towards the end loved. In natural desire, the beginning of this motion is the connaturality of the one desiring to that to which it tends, which can be called natural love; just as the connaturality of a heavy body to the middle place is through heaviness, and can be called natural love. And likewise the fitting of the sense desire or the will to some good; that is the agreement of the good, is called sense love, or understandable or reasonable [love].

Sense love therefore is in sense desire, as understandable love is in understandable desire. And it pertains to the concupiscible because

> it is said with respect to good absolutely, not by reference to the difficult, which is the object of the irascible.
>
> To the first therefore it should be said that that authority speaks of understandable or reasonable love.
>
> To the second it should be said that love is said to be fear, joy, desire and sadness, not to be sure essentially, but as a cause.
>
> To the third it should be said that natural love is not only in the powers of the living soul, but in all powers of the soul, and also in all parts of the body, and generally in all things because, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names:* "the beautiful and good is lovable for all" since each thing has connaturality to that which is suitable to it according to its nature.

The second article of the first question on love brings out the nature of love as more an undergoing (*passio* in Latin) than an acting upon. Since the powers or abilities of the soul are distinguished by their objects, and either the power acts on the object (as the feeding pr digestive power on food)or the object acts on the power (as color acts upon the eye or sound upon the ear), love as an undergoing fits with the heart or desiring power being one that is acted upon by its object.

Sometimes The Poet uses the Latin words *passion* in speaking of love because this signifies undergoing. Thus Warwick, representing a King, says to Lady Bona:

> And, gracious madam, in our king's behalf,
> I am commanded, with your leave and favour,
> Humbly to kiss your hand, and with my tongue
> To tell the passion of my sovereign's heart;
> Where fame, entering at his heedful ears,
> Hath plac'd thy beauty's image and thy virtue.[1]

And a King has passion from the description of a woman's rare beauty:

> Your wondrous rare description, noble earl,

[1] Shakespeare, *Henry VI, Part III*, Act III, Sc. 3

Of beauteous Margaret hath astonish'd me!
Her virtues, graced with external gifts
Do breed love's settled passions in my heart.[2]

And Julia remarks about the love message of Proteus:

Lo! here in one line is his name twice writ,
Poor forlorn Proteus, passionate Proteus.[3]

Passion in Latin means first suffering which is very much an undergoing. Shakespeare sometimes uses the English word:

Beatrice: But for which of my good parts did
You first suffer love for me?

Benedick: "Suffer love," a good epithet! I do
Suffer love indeed, for I love thee
Against my will.[4]

Sometimes the lover is said to be overcome by the beloved. In one play, after a wrestling contest, Shakespeare uses this metaphor several times:

Rosalind to Orlando: Sir, you have wrastled well and overthrown
More than your enemies.

Orlando to himself afterwards: What passion hangs these weights upon my tongue?
I cannot speak to her, yet she urg'd conference.
O poor Orlando, thou are overthrown;
Or Charles or something weaker masters thee.[5]

And later in the same play:

Celia: Come, come, wrastle with thy affections.

Rosalind: O, they take the part of a better wrastler than myself.[6]

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[2] Shakespeare, *Henry VI. Part One*, Act V, Sc. 5
[3] Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 2
[4] Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act V, Sc. 2

[5] *As You Like It*, Act I, Sc. 2

[6] *As You Like It*, Act I, Sc. 3

Helena speaks to Demetrius as if he is responsible for her pursuing him, that he is moving her:

> You draw me, you hard-hearted adamant!
> But yet you draw not iron, for my heart
> Is true as steel: leave your power to draw,
> And I shall have no power to follow you.[7]

Likewise, Antony attributes his mistake in following Cleopatra out of the battle to her drawing powers as if his heart was moved by her:

> Egypt, thou knew'st too well
> My heart was to thy rudder tied by th'strings,
> and thou couldst tow me after: o'er my spirit
> Thy full supremacy thou knew'st, and that
> Thy beck might from the bidding of the gods
> Command me.[8]

And Titania says to Bottom that she is moved to love him:

> I pray thee, gentle mortal, sing again:
> Mine ear is much enamour'd of thy note;
> So is mine eye enthralled to thy shape;
> And thy fair virtue's force, perforce, doth move me,
> On the first view, to say, to swear, I love thee.[9]

THE WOUND OF LOVE

Perhaps nothing brings out more that love is an undergoing than the lover being said to be *wounded* by the loved. For this reason also the first most known meaning of the word *passio* or *undergoing* has the sense of *suffering.*

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[7] Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 1

[8] Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act III, Sc. 11

[9] Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 1

When Mercutio has made fun of Romeo being love-sick over Rosaline, Romeo later observes:

> He jests at scars that never felt a wound.[10]

And Romeo relates to Friar Laurence the sudden mutual falling in love of himself and Juliet thus:

> I have been feasting with mine enemy,
> Where on a sudden one hath wounded me
> That's by me wounded. Both our remedies
> Within thy help and holy physic lies.[11]

Romeo here even uses the medical likeness of Friar Laurence to heal their wounds (by marrying them).

Julia speaks of healing the wound of Proteus as she reads his love-note:

> And here is writ "love-wounded Proteus"
> Poor wounded name! my bosom as a bed
> Shall lodge thee till thy wound be throughly heal'd.[12]

When Lucentio speaks of his sudden love (which is aroused through his sight of the beloved), he speaks even of his eye as wounded:

> Tranio, be so, because Lucentio loves,
> And let me be a slave, t'achieve that maid
> Whose sudden sight hath thrall'd my wounded eye.[13]

Hence, in mythology, Cupid is said to act upon us by shooting an arrow from his bow. Hermia, in love, swears by this bow and arrow:

> I swear to thee by Cupid's strongest bow
> By his best arrow with the golden head.[14]

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[10] Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 1

[11] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 2

[12] Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 2

[13] Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act I, Sc. 3

Oberon describes how he acquired a love-potion by watching where Cupid's arrow fell upon a flower wounding it:

> Yet mark'd I where the bolt of Cupid fell:
> It fell upon a little western flower,
> Before milk-white, now purple with love's wound,
> And maidens call it Love-in-idleness. [the pansy][15]

And the sad Silvius says to Phebe who will not return his love and mocks him:

> O dear Phebe,
> If ever, as that ever may be near,
> You meet in some fresh cheek the power of fancy,
> Then shall you know the wounds invisible
> That Love's keen arrows make.[16]

And in *Wuthering Heights*, Catherine jokes about her rival for the love of Heathcliff as being ready to shoot a shaft or arrow into him:

> "No, no, Isabella, you sha'n't run off," she continued, arresting, with feigned playfulness, the confounded girl, who had risen indignantly. "We were quarreling like cats about you, Heathcliff, and I was fairly beaten in protestations of devotion and admiration: moreover, I was informed that if I would but have the manners to stand aside, my rival, as she will have herself to be, would shoot a shaft into your soul that would fix you for ever, and send my image into eternal oblivion."[17]

Receiving love as a wound is spoken of, not only in romantic love, but also in spiritual love. Listen to St. Teresa of Avila recounting her receiving an increase of love under a likeness of an angel wounding her:

> It pleased the Lord that I should see this angel in the following way. He was not tall, but short and very beautiful, his face so aflame that he appeared to be one of the highest types of angel who seem to be all afire...In his hands I saw a long golden spear and at the end

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[14] Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act I, Sc. 1
[15] *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 1

[16] Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, Act III, Sc. 5
[17] Emily Bronte, *Wuthering Heights*, Chapter 10

> of the iron tip I seemed to see a point of fire. With this he seemed to pierce my heart several times so that it penetrated to my entrails. When he drew it out, I thought he was drawing them out with it and he left me completely afire with a great love of God. The pain was so sharp that it made me utter several moans; and so excessive was the sweetness caused me by this intense pain that one can never wish to lose it, nor will one's soul be content with anything less than God.[18]

In a similar way, St. Therese of Lisieux received an intense increase in love:

> On another occasion she related the following incident: "A few days after the oblation of myself to God's Merciful Love I was in the choir, beginning the Way of the Cross, when suddenly I felt myself wounded by a dart of fire so ardent that I thought I should die. I cannot describe the transport, and no comparison would convey an idea of the intensity of the flame. It seemed as though an invisible force had plunged me wholly into fire...But what fire! what sweetness!"[19]

Wonder is also said to wound us as. Thus Shakespeare speaks of "wonder-wounded hearers".[20] But wonder is already an imperfect love or connected with love just as is reverence:

> ...homo proximum in reverentia debet habere, quod pertinet ad rationem honoris. Nullus enim potest vere diligere eum quem despicit.[21]

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 26, Art. 2, Whether love is an undergoing:

> It is moved forward to the second thus. It seems that love is not an undergoing.

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[18] St. Teresa of Avila, *Autobiography*, Chapter 29

[19] Epilogue to the *Autobiography of St. Therese of Lisieux* by the Carmel of Lisieux

[20] *Hamlet*, Act V, Sc. 1

[21] Thomas Aquinas, *Ad Romanos*, XII, Lectio II, n. 986

1. For no virtue is an undergoing. But every love is some virtue, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names*. Therefore, love is not an undergoing.

2. Moreover, love is a certain union or binding according to Augustine in the book *About the Trinity*. But union or binding is not an undergoing, but more a relation. Therefore, love is not an undergoing.

3. Further, Damascene says in the second book that undergoing is a motion. Love, however, does not imply the movement of the desiring power which is desire, but the origin of this motion. Therefore, love is not an undergoing.

But against this is what the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the *Ethics*, that love is an undergoing.

I answer that it should be said that undergoing is the effect of the agent in what is acted upon. A natural agent however brings about a twofold effect in what is acted upon. For first it gives the form, and second, it gives the motion following the form; as the generator gives weight to the body, and the motion following it. And the weight itself, which is the source of the motion to a connatural place on account of the weight, is able in some way to be called natural love.

Thus also the desirable itself gives to the desiring power first a certain adaptation, or fitting with it, which is the agreeableness of the desirable, from which there follows movement to the desirable. For *the motion of the desiring power is made in a circle*, as is said in the third book *On the Soul* For the desirable moves the desiring power, putting itself in the other's aim, and the desiring power tends towards really achieving the desirable, so that, there is the end of the motion where was its beginning.

The first change therefore of the desiring power by the desirable is called *love* which is nothing other than the agreement with it of the desirable; and from this agreement there follows movement to the desirable which is desire; and, at last, rest which is joy.

Therefore, since love consists in a certain change of the desiring power by the desirable, it is manifest that love is an undergoing -

properly as it is in the concupiscible, commonly, however, and by extended name, as it is in the will.

To the first, therefore, it should be said that, because *virtue* signifies the origin of motion or action, therefore love, insofar as it is the source of the desiring power's movement, is called virtue by Dionysius.

To the second, it should be said that union pertains to love insofar as the lover, through the agreement of the desiring power, has himself to what is loved, as to himself or to something of himself. And thus it is clear that love is not the relation itself of union, but that union follows upon love. Whence also Dionysius says that love is a power that unites; and the Philosopher says in the second book of the *Politics*, that union is the work of love.

To the third, it should be said that *love*, although it does not name the motion of the desiring power tending towards the desirable, names nevertheless the motion of the desiring power by which it is changed by the desirable so that the desirable is agreeable with it.

Appendix to Love is an Undergoing

In the following reading, Thomas unfolds how we find and speak of *undergoing* or *passion* in the parts of the soul:

...ex dictis de facili potest patere qualiter in anima possit esse passio. Quia cum anima sit quid incorporeum, sibi proprie non accidit pati, nisi secundum quod corpori applicatur. Applicatur autem corpori et secundum essentiam suam, secundum quod est forma corporea, et secundum operationem suarum potentiarum, prout est motor ejus.

Secundum autem quod applicatur corpori ut forma, sic non consideratur ut quid subsistens, sed ut adveniens alteri. Unde sic non patitur per se, sed per accidens, sicut aliae formae moventur motis subjectis compositis.

In viribus autem animae quantum ad operationem applicantur corpori solum vires partis sensitivae et partis nutritivae. Sed quia

operatio virium nutritivae partis est in movere, non in moveri; ideo secundum eas anima non patitur, sed magis agit.

Relinquitur ergo quod pati proprie sit animae secundum partem sensitivam, ut dicitur in VII Physicorum. Sed quia hujusmodi vires non sunt subsistentes, sed formae organorum corporalium, ideo non dicuntur pati per se, neque anima secundum eas, sed per accidens, inquantum compositum patitur, ut dicitur in *I De Anima*.

Sed quia potentiae apprehensivae sensitivae sunt tantum in recipiendo speciem - quae quidem non recipitur in sensu per modum rei, sed per modum intentionis - ideo in operatione harum virium est quidem aliquo modo pati, quantum ad hoc quod sunt vires materiales et quantum ad hoc quod aliquid recipitur. Et propter hoc diditur in *II De Anima* quod *sentire est pati quoddam*.

Sed quia sensus non movetur a sensibili secundum conditionem moventis, cum forma sensiblis non recipiatur in sensu secundum esse materiale prout est in sensibili, sed secundum esse spirituale, quod est proprium sensui - unde non habet contrarietatem ad sensum, sed est perfectio ejus, nisi secundum quod excedit proportionem sensus - ideo non proprie dicitur pati secundum has vires, nisi secundum quod excellentia sensibilium corrumpit sensum, aut debilitat.

Relinquitur ergo quod passio proprie dicatur secundum vires appetivas sensitivas, quia hae vires et materiales sunt et moventur a rebus secundum proprietatem rei, quia non est appetitus intentionis, sed rei ipsius; et secundum hoc habet res convenientiam ad animam vel contrarietatem. Et ideo dicit Philosophus in II Ethicorum quod passio est quam sequitur delectatio vel tristitia; et Remigius dicit quod *passio est motus animae per suspicionem [susceptionem] boni vel mali*.

Sed quia accidit delectatio secundum conjunctionem convenientis et connaturalis, ideo adhuc magis proprie dicuntur passiones illae affectiones sensitivae ad quas sequitur tristitia, vel etiam quae sunt cum vehementia sive delectationis sive tristitiae, ut dicit Philosophus, V Metaphysicorum, quia sic trahitur anima extra modum suum naturalem.

...sed in viribus intellectivae partis, quamvis non sit proprie passio, quia immateriales sunt, tamen est ibi aliquid de ratione passionis,

quia in apprehensione intellectus creati est receptio; et secundum hoc dicitur in *III De Anima* quod "intelligere est pati quoddam."

In appetitu autem intellectivo, est adhuc plus de ratione passionis, quia voluntas movetur a re secundum quod est bona vel mala, quae sunt conditiones rei; intellectus autem movetur secundum apprehensionem veri vel falsi, quae non sunt rei per se, sed secundum quod sunt in anima, ut dicitur in VI *Metaphysicorum.*

Unde magis recipit anima a re secundum affectum, et vehementius movetur quam secundum intellectum. Et sic dicit Dionysius, 2 cap. *De Div, Nom.,* quod "Hierotheus ex patiendo divina didicit divina", idest ex affectu in divina in intellectum devenit.

Et quia movetur affectus a re secundum proprietatem rei quam res habet in se ipsa, ideo per hunc modum contingit quod res habeat contrarietatem et convenientiam ad animam; sed secundum quod apprehenditur ab intellectu, omnis res habet convenientiam, inquantum apprehenditur ut verum. Et ideo in operatione apprehensivae semper est delectatio, in operatione autem affectivae est delectatio et tristitia. Et sic etiam tristitia magis proprie adhuc dicitur passio, sicut in affectu sensibili dictum est...[22]

LOVE IS A FORMING-OVER, A TRANSFORMATION OR METAMORPHOSIS

Following upon an understanding of love as an undergoing of the heart, we can see that love is a forming-over, a transformation or metamorphosis of the heart.

Proteus, in love with Julia, contrasts himself with his friend, Valentine. He says that Juliet has transformed him:

> He after honour hunts, I after love.
> He leaves his friends to dignify them more;
> I leave myself, my friends, and all, for love.
> Thou, Julia, thou hast metamorphos'd me;
> Made me neglect my studies, lose my time,

[22] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XV, Q. II, Art. I, Sol. II, nn. 64-75

War with good counsel, set the world at nought;
Made wit with musing weak, heart sick with thought.[23]

But later, when Valentine also falls in love, his servant, Speed, says to him that he can hardly recognize him since he has also has undergone a metamorphosis:

> and now you are metamorphosed with a mistress, that, when I look on you, I can hardly think you my master.[24]

But when Proteus sees Silvia, the form of his heart from Julia begins to be lost, as he notes:

She's fair; and so is Julia that I love, -
That I did love, for now my love is thaw'd,
Which, like a waxen image 'gainst a fire,
Bears no impression of the thing it was.[25]

Likewise, the Duke says the form impressed upon his daughter Silvia's heart by Valentine will start to disappear as they are separated by his banishment:

This weak impress of love is as a figure
Trenched in ice, which with an hour's heat
Dissolves to water and doth lose his form.
A little time will melt her frozen thoughts,
And worthless Valentine shall be forgot.[26]

Because love is a transformation of the heart, the heart that is apt to love is metaphorically said to be soft and that slow to love is said to be hard. Thus it is said that women's hearts are as wax:

How easy is it for the proper-false
In women's waxen hearts to set their forms![27]

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[23] Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 1

[24] *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act II, Sc. 1

[25] *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act II, Sc. 4

[26] *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act III, Sc. 2

[27] Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act II, Sc. 2

And Olivia, unable to get the one she loves to return her love says:

> I have said too much unto a heart of stone.[28]

Benedick playfully attributes his not being in love to the hardness of his heart:

> it is certain I am loved of all ladies, only you excepted: and I would I could find in my heart that I had not a hard heart, for truly I love none.[29]

When one's heart is transformed with the excellent, there is a certain pride:

> His heart, like an agate, with your print impress'd,
> Proud with his form, in his eye pride express'd.[30]

The knowing powers play a role in this transformation:

> As love is full of unbefitting strains;
> Form'd by the eye, and, therefore, like the eye,
> Full of straying shapes, of habits and of forms,
> Varying in subjects, as the eye doth roll
> To every varied object in his glance.[31]

> O spirit of love! how quick and fresh art thou,
> That, notwithstanding thy capacity
> Receiveth as the sea, nought enters there,
> Of what validity and pitch soe'er,
> But falls into abatement and low price,
> Even in a minute: so full of shapes is fancy,
> That it alone is high fantastical.[32]

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[28] *Twelfth Night*, Act III, Sc. 4

[29] Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act I, Sc. 1

[30] Shakespeare, *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act II, Sc. 1

[31] *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act V, Sc. 2

[32] Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act I, Sc. 1, Orsino

In the following text, Thomas unfolds the reason why the heart or desiring power is transformed by love as a result of its undergoing:

> Love pertains to the desiring power which is an undergoing ability. Whence the Philosopher says in the third book *On the Soul* that *the desirable moves as an unmoved mover, but desire as a moved mover*.
>
> But everything undergoing is perfected as it is formed by the form of what acts upon it and its motion ends and rests in this.
>
> Thus, the understanding, before it is formed through the form of the understandable, inquires and doubts; but when it has been informed with this, the investigation ceases and the understanding is made firm in this; and then the understanding is said to adhere firmly to that thing.
>
> Likewise, when affection or the desiring power is entirely filled with the form of the good which is placed before it, it is in agreement with it and adheres to it as made firm in it; and then it is said to love it. Whence love is nothing other than a transformation of the affection into the thing loved.[33]

LOVING AND GIVING

Since the good is in things (while truth is primarily in the mind), as Aristotle teaches us in the sixth book of *Wisdom* (the so called *Metaphysics*), the lover is said *to give* his love or heart to the beloved.

In the garden scene, Juliet speaks of her being able to give love without end:

> Juliet: What satisfaction canst thou have tonight?
>
> Romeo: The exchange of thy love's faithful vow for mine.

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[33] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVII, Q. I, Art. I

Juliet: I gave thee mine before thou didst request it;
And yet I would it were to give again.

Romeo: Wouldst thou withdraw it? for what purpose love?

Juliet: But to be frank, and give it thee again.
And yet I wish but for the thing I have.
My bounty is as boundless as the sea,
My love as deep; the more I give to thee,
The more I have, for both are infinite.[34]

In the following reading, Thomas notes how spiritual things can be given and yet retained:

> Similiter etiam non potest dici quod Pater dans substantiam suam Filio, ea sibi non retinuerit, quia sic Pater desiisset esse divina substantia.
>
> In corporalibus enim quod datur, non retinetur; sicut qui dat equum, non retinet ipsum. Sed in spiritualibus simul datur aliquid et retinetur: sicut qui communicat alii scientiam, retinet ipsum.[35]

Juliet says that the more she gives, the more she has to give. Rosalind also speaks of this infinity of love:

> O coz, coz, coz, my pretty little coz, that thou didst know how many fathom deep I am in love! But it cannot be sounded; my affection hath an unknown bottom, like the Bay of Portugal.[36]

And even Antony of his love as endless:

Cleopatra: If it be love indeed, tell me how much.

Antony: There's beggary in the love that can be reckon'd.

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[34] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 2

[35] Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio Super Secundum Decretalem,* n. 1197

[36] Shakespeare, *As You LIke It*, Act IV, Sc. 1

Cleopatra: I'll set a bour n how far to be belov'd.

Antony: Then must thou needs find out new heaven, new earth.[37]

And Helena, in her confession of love for Bertram (who is above her in his state of life) to Bertram's mother, speaks of lending and giving where she is sure to lose:

> Then, I confess,
> Here on my knee, before high heaven and you,
> That before you, and next unto high heaven,
> I love your son.
> My friends were poor, but honest; so's my love:
> Be not offended, for it hurts not him
> That he is lov'd of me: I follow him not
> By any token of presumptuous suit;
> Nor would I have him till I do deserve him;
> Yet never know how that desert should be.
> I know I love in vain, strive against hope;
> Yet in this captious and intenible sieve
> I still pour in the waters of my love,
> And lack not to lose still.....
> Let not your hate encounter with my love
> For loving where you do: but, if yourself,
> Whose aged honour cites a virtuous youth,
> Did ever in so true a flame of liking
> Wish chastely and love dearly, that your Dian
> Was both herself and Love, O! then, give pity
> To her, whose state is such that cannot choose
> But lend and give where she is sure to lose,
> That seeks not to find that her search implies,
> But riddle-like, lives sweetly where she dies.[38]

She speaks of *lending* because she wants Bertram to return her love. When we *lend* someone something, we expect it to be returned to us.

When Thomas explains why the Holy Spirit (who proceeds by way of love) is called the *Gift of God*, he brings out that love is the first giving:

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[37] Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act I, Sc.1
[38] Shakespeare, *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act I, Sc. 1

> *Gift*, as it is understood to refer to a person in God, is a proper name of the Holy Spirit. In evidence of which, it should be known that a gift is properly a *giving not to be returned or given back* according to the Philosopher, that is, which is not given with the intention of being returned; and thus it implies a gratuitous giving. But love is the reason for a gratuitous gift. For we give something *gratis* to someone because we wish good to him. The first thing then we give to him is the love by which we wish good to him. Whence, it is clear that love has the aspect of a first gift through which all gratuitous gifts are given. Whence, since the Holy Spirit proceeds as Love, as has been said, he proceeds as the first gift. Whence, Augustine says in the fifteenth book *On The Trinity*, that "through the Gift which is the Holy Spirit, many private goods are distributed to the members of Christ."[39]

Having considered the nature of love, we can now come to the first two distinctions of love. One distinction is between the love that is an emotion and the love that is an act of the will, between what might be called sense love and chosen love. The second distinction is between the love of wanting and the love of wishing well.

TWO KINDS OF LOVE: SENSE LOVE AND CHOSEN LOVE

Since we name things as we know them, the order in naming follows the order in knowing. Hence, the word *love* first seems to name the emotion. And since romantic love is called love by antonomasia (just as the romantic lover is called a *lover* by antonomasia), love is said to be without reason. Thus in two famous passage in *A Midsummer Night's Dream:*

> to say the truth, reason and love keep little company together now-a-days[40]

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[39] Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Pars, Q. 38, Art. 2, c.

[40] Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream,* Act III, Sc. 1

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> The lunatic, the lover, and the poet
> Are of imagination all compact.[41]

But Hamlet has a chosen love for his friend Horatio as he tells him:

> Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice
> And could of men distinguish, her election
> Hath seal'd thee for herself; for thou hast been
> As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing,
> A man that fortune's buffets and rewards
> Hast ta'en with equal thanks; and bless'd are those
> Whose blood and judgment are so well co-mingled
> That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger
> To sound what stop she please. Give me that man
> That is not passion's slave, and I will wear him
> In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of heart
> As I do thee. Something too much of this.[42]

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 26, Art. 3, Whether *amor* [love or sense love] is the same as *dilectio* [chosen love]

> One proceeds thus to the third. It seems that *amor* [sense love] is the same as *dilectio* [chosen love].
>
> For Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names* that *amor* [sense love] and *dilectio* [chosen love] are to each other *just as four and twice two, rectilineal and having straight lines*. But these signify the same. Therefore, *amor* [sense love] and *dilectio* [chosen love] signify the same.
>
> Moreover, the motions of the desiring power differ by their objects. But there is the same object of *dilectio* and *amor*. Therefore, they are the same.
>
> Moreover, if *dilectio* and *amor* differ in something, they would seem most of all to differ in this, that *dilectio should be taken in the*

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[41] *A Midsummer Night's Dream,* Act V, Sc. 1

[42] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2

good, but amor in the bad, as some say as Augustine narrates in the fourteenth book of the *City of God.* But they do not differ in this way because, as Augustine also says in the same place, each in Sacred Scripture is taken in good and bad. Therefore, *amor* and *dilectio* do not differ, just as Augustine himself in the same place concludes that *it is not different to say amor and to say dilectio*

But against this is what Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names* that to *some of the saints the name amor seems more divine than the name dilectio.*

I answer that it should be said that four names are found in some way pertaining to the same: to wit, *amor* [love or sense love], *dilectio* [chosen love], *charity* and *friendship*. They differ however in this, that friendship, according to the Philosopher in the eighth book of the *Ethics*. *is as a habit; amor* however and *dilectio* signify by way of act or undergoing; *charity* however can be taken in either way.

Act however is differently signified by these three. For *amor* [love] is more general among them. For every *dilectio* or *charity* is a love, but not the reverse. For *dilectio* adds above love a choice preceding, as its name sounds. Whence *dilectio* is not in the concupiscible, but in the will only, and it is in only in a reasonable nature. *Charity* however adds above love a certain perfection of love, insofar as that which is loved is estimated to be of great worth, as the name itself indicates.

To the first therefore should be said that Dionysius speaks of love and chosen love as they are in the reasonable ability to desire. For thus love is the same as chosen love.

To the second it should be said that the object of love is more common than the object of chosen love because love extends to more than chosen love, as has been said.

To the third should be said that love and chosen love do not differ by the difference of good and bad, but as has been said. In the understanding part however love is the same as chosen love. And thus Augustine speaks there about love. Whence a little afterwards he adds that *a rectified willing is a good love and a perverse willing is a bad love.* Because however the love which is a concupiscible

> passion inclines many to the bad, hence they had an occasion who assign the foresaid difference.
>
> To the fourth should be said that therefore some maintain that even in the will the name of love [amor] to be more divine than the name of chosen love [dilectio] because love [amor] implies a certain passion, especially as it is in the sensible ability to desire while chosen love presupposes the judgment of reason.

The love which is an emotion follows upon sense knowledge or the imagination while the love which is an act of the will follows upon an act of reason. The love which is an emotion is partly a bodily movement while the love which is an act of the will is immaterial as is universal reason.

The distinction which can be made between pain and sadness (or between pleasure and joy) shows that pain is even more material and bodily than sadness.

Thomas, in the following reading, distinguishes in three ways pain and sadness:

> ...in dolore et tristitia duo inveniuntur: scilicet contrarietas contristantis et dolorem inferentis ad contristatum et dolentem, et perceptio ejus; et quantum ad haec duo tripliciter differunt.
>
> Primo quantum ad contrarietatem; quae quidem in dolore attenditur quantum ad ipsam naturam dolentis quae per laesivum corrumpitur; sed in tristitia quantum ad repugnantiam appetitus ad aliquid quod quis odit
>
> Secundo quantum ad perceptionem: quae quidem in dolore semper est secundum sensum tactus, ut dictum est; in tristitia autem secundum apprehensionem interiorem.
>
> Tertio, quantum ad ordinem istorum duorum, quia dolor incipit in laesione et terminatur in perceptione sensus, ibi enim completur ratio doloris; sed ratio tristitiae incipit in apprehensione et terminatur in affectione
>
> Unde dolor est in sensu sicut in subjecto, sed tristitia in appetitu.
>
> Ex quo patet quod tristitia est passio animalis, sed dolor est magis passio corporalis.

> Quandoque tamen tristitia, large loquendo, dolor dicitur. Unde Augustinus *in psalm XLII*, distinguit dolorem animae secundum se qui proprie dicitur tristitia, et dolorem animae per corpus qui proprie dicitur dolor.[43]

Thomas notes after the last reading that in the same way joy and pleasure can be distinguished:

> Impressio vero relicta in concupiscibili ex praesentia boni, dicitur delectatio vel gaudium; sed ex praesentia mali dicitur tristitia vel dolor.
>
> Qualiter autem tristitia et dolor differant, supra 15d, dictum est. Eodem modo differunt delectatio sensibilis et gaudium.[44]

Thomas here notes another place where Augustine makes the same distinction between pain and sadness:

> ...tristitia et dolor hoc modo differunt: quod tristitia est quaedam passio animalis, incipiens scilicet in apprehensione nocumenti, et terminatur in operatione appetitus, et ulterius in transmutatione corporis; sed dolor est secundum passionem corporalem. Unde Augustinus dicit, XIV *de Civitate Dei*, cap. VII, in fine, quod dolor usitatius in corporibus dicitur; et ideo incipit a laesione corporis, et terminatur in apprehensione sensus tactus, propter quod dolor est in sensu tactus ut in apprehendente.[45]

TWO KINDS OF LOVE - LOVE OF WANTING AND LOVE OF WISHING WELL

The distinction between the love of wanting (called *amor concupiscentiae* in Latin) and the love of wishing well (called *amor amicitiae* in Latin since a friend should wish well to his friend) is more a distinction of the love which is an act of will than of the love which is an emotion or passion. For the latter seems to be

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[43] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XV, Q. II, Art. III, Sol. II

[44] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVI, Q. I, Art. III, n. 43

[45] *De Veritate*, Q. 26, Art. 3, Ad 9

as such always a love of wanting and this is true especially as it is a love of sense pleasure for this is the good of the lover. But the love which is an act of will may be either a love of wanting or a love of wishing well.

We love ourselves by the love of wishing well for we wish well to ourselves. We love food and wine and money by the love of wanting for we do not wish well to them, but they are goods that we want for ourselves. But for another person, we may have only the love of wanting or also the love of wishing well.

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 26, Art. 4, Whether love is suitably divided into the love of friendship and the love of wanting.

> It is moved forward to the fourth thus. It seems that love is not suitably divided into the love of friendship and the love of wanting.
>
> 1. For *love is a passion, but friendship is a habit*, as the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the *Ethics*. But habit cannot be a part dividing passion. Therefore, love is not suitably divided by the love of wanting and love of friendship .
>
> 2. Further, nothing is divided by that which is numbered with it: for *man* is not numbered with *animal*. But wanting is numbered with love as another passion from love. Therefore, love cannot be divided by wanting.
>
> 3. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in the eighth book of the *Ethics*, friendship is threefold - the useful, the pleasant and the honorable. But the useful and pleasant friendships have wanting. Therefore, wanting ought not to be divided against friendship.
>
> But against this: some things we are said to love because we want them, just as someone is said to love wine on account of the sweetness which he wants in it, as is said in the second book of the *Topics*. But to wine and other things of this sort, we do not have friendship, as is said in the eighth book of the *Ethics*. Therefore, the love of wanting ought not to be divided against the love of friendship.
>
> I answer that it should be said, as the Philosopher says in the second book of the *Rhetoric*, that *to love is to wish good to someone*. Hence, the movement of love tends thus to two things: to the good which someone wishes to someone, either himself or

another; and to the one to whom he wishes the good. To that good therefore which someone wishes to another is had the love of wanting; but to the one to whom one wishes the good is had the love of friendship.

This division is according to before and after. For that which is loved by the love of friendship is simply and through itself loved. But what is loved by the love of wanting is not simply and by itself loved, but is loved for another. For just as being simply is what has existence and being in some respect, what is in another; so also the good which is convertible with being, is simply what has goodness, but what is the good of another is good only in a limited sense. And consequently the love by which is loved something so that good might be for it is love simply; but the love by which something is loved that it might be the good of another, is love in some respect.

To the first, therefore, it should be said that love is not divided by friendship and wanting, but by the love of friendship and of wanting. For the one to whom we wish some good is properly called a friend, but what we wish for ourselves, we are said to want.

And through this is clear the solution to the second.

To the third it ought to be said that, in the friendship of the useful and the pleasant, one does wish some good to the friend; and in this regard the definition of friendship is kept there. But since that good is brought back further to one's own pleasure or utility; hence it is that the friendship of the useful or pleasant, insofar as it is drawn to the love of wanting, falls short of the definition of true friendship.

Another short reading from Thomas on these two kinds of love:

...cum objectum amoris sit bonum, dupliciter aliquis tendere potest in bonum alicujus rei.

Uno modo, ita quod bonum illius rei ad alterum referat, sicut quod bonum unius rei, optet alteri, si non habet; vel complaceat sibi, si habet; sicut amat quis vinum inquantum dulcedinem vini peroptat [praeoptat], et in hoc gaudet quod eo fruatur, non quod vinum ipsum habeat; et hic amor vocatur a quibusdam *amor*

> *concupiscentiae*. Amor autem iste non terminatur ad rem quae dicitur amari, sed reflectitur ad rem illam cui optatur bonum illius rei.
>
> Alio modo amor fertur in bonum alicujus rei ita quod ad ipsam rem terminatur, inquantum bonum quod habet complacet quod habeat, et bonum quod non habet optatur ei; et hic est *amor benevolentiae* qui est principium amicitiae, ut dicit Philosophus in IX *Ethic*.[46]

In this other reading on the two loves, Thomas teaches us that by the love of wishing well or friendship, we more love another; and by the love of wanting another, we more love ourselves:

Super Ioannem, Caput XV, Lectio IV, 2036:

> Dicendum, quod duplex est amor: amicitiae scilicet et concupiscentiae, sed differunt: quia in amor concupiscentiae, quae sunt nobis extrinseca, ad nos ipsos trahimus, cum ipso amore diligamus alia, inquantum sunt nobis utilia vel delectabilia; sed in amore amicitiae est e converso, quia nosmetipsos trahimus ad ea quae sunt extra nos; quia ad eos quos isto amore diligimus, habemus nos sicut ad nosmetipsos, communicantes eis quodammodo nosmetipsos.
>
> Unde in amore amicitiae similitudo est causa amoris, non enim sic diligimus aliquem nisi inquantum sumus unum cum eo: similitudo autem est unitas quaedam.
>
> Sed in amore concupiscentiae, sive sit utilis, sive delectabilis, similitudo est causa separationis et odii. Cum enim isto amore aliquem diligam inquantum est mihi utilis vel delectabilis, quidquid est impeditivum utilitatis seu delectationis, habeo odio contrarium. Et inde est quod superbi iurgantur adinvicem, inquantum unus usurpat sibi gloriam quam alius amat, et in qua delectatur; figuli etiam, inquantum unus trahit ad se lucrum, quod alius pro se volebat.
>
> Sed sciendum, quod amor concupiscentiae non est rei concupitae, sed concupiscentis: propter hoc enim quis hoc amore aliquem diligit,

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[46] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXIX, Art. III, Resp. , nn. 35-36

> inquantum est sibi utilis, ut dictum est. Et ideo magis diligit in hoc se quam illum: sicut qui diligit vinum quia est sibi delectabile, se potius quam vinum diligit.
>
> Sed amor amicitiae est potius rei amatae quam amantis, quia diligit aliquem propter ipsum dilectum, non propter ipsum diligentem. Sic ergo, quia in amore amicitiae similitudo causa est amoris, dissimilitudo causa odii, inde est quod mundus odio habet quod suum non est et sibi dissimile, et diligit, idest dilectione amicitiae, quod suum est. Sed de dilectione concupiscentiae est e converso, Et ideo dicit *Si de mundo fuissetis, mundus quod suum erat diligeret,* scilicet amore amicitiae.

In the follwing two readings Thomas teaches us about these two loves in our love of God:

> Caritas autem ordinat actum voluntatis in Deum; non solum sic quod homo bono divino fruatur, hoc enim pertinet ad amorem qui dicitur concupiscentiae; sed secundum quod bonum divinum est in ipso Deo, quod ad amorem amicitiae pertinet.[47]

> culpa separat a Deo separatione quae opponitur unioni caritatis, secundum quod quis vult bonum ipsius Dei, secundum quod in se est; poena autem separat a Deo separatione quae opponitur fruitioni, qua homo fruitur bono divino; et sic separatio culpae est peior quam separatio poenae.[48]

A short reading touching upon these two loves said of God:

> ...quamvis nos non diligamus creaturas inanimatas amore benevolentiae, quia eorum bonum non est a nobis; Deus tamen eas diligit amore benevolentiae, quia per hoc quod eis bonum vult, sunt et bonae sunt. Tamen Deus quamvis non amet aliquid concupiscendo sibi, amat tamen concupiscendo alteri...[49]

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[47] *De Malo*, Q. I, Art. 5, corpus

[48] *De Malo*, Q. I, Art. 5, Ad 3

[49] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum* , Dist. XXXII, Art. II, Ad 2, n. 28

Duane H. Berquist

CAUSES OF LOVE

FIRST CAUSE OF LOVE - SOMETHING GOOD

Benedick speaks of his resistance to loving a woman until every human good (the good of the soul, the good of the body and even exterior goods) is found in her:

> One woman is fair, yet I am well; another is wise, yet I am well; another virtuous, yet I am well; but till all graces be in one woman, one woman shall not come in my grace. Rich she shall be, that's certain.[1]

Bassanio also touches upon all these goods in the ascending order in the most loveable Portia and adds that she seems to encourage him to pursue her:

> In Belmont is a lady richly left,
> And she is fair, and, fairer than that word.
> Of wondrous virtues: sometimes from her eyes
> I did receive fair speechless messages:
> Her name is Portia; nothing undervalu'd
> To Cato's daughter, Brutus' Portia:
> Nor is the wide world ignorant of her worth,
> For the four winds blow in from every coast
> Renowned suitors; and her sunny locks
> Hang on her temples like a golden fleece;
> Which makes her seat of Belmont Colchos' strond,
> And many Jasons come in quest of her.[2]

The fact that there is so much good in Portia is why there are so many suitors from the four corners of the world.

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[1] Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act II, Sc. 3
[2] Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice,* Act I, Sc. 1

The citizen's clever proposal of a possible marriage of the Dauphin with Blanch likewise touches upon these three kinds of human good:

> That daughter there of Spain, the Lady Blanch,
> Is near to England: look upon the years
> Of Lewis the Dauphin and that lovely maid.
> If lusty love should go in quest of beauty,
> Where should he find it fairer than in Blanch?
> If zealous love should go in search of virtue,
> Where should he find it purer than in Blanch?
> If love ambitious sought a match of birth,
> Whose veins bound richer blood than Lady Blanch?
> Such as she is, in beauty, virtue, birth,
> Is the young Dauphin every way complete.
> If not complete of, say he is not she;
> And she again wants nothing, to name want,
> If want it be not that she is not he.
> He is the half part of a blessed man,
> Left to be finished by such as she;
> And she a fair divided excellence,
> Whose fulness of perfection lies in him.[3]

There is also the good of the whole of which Blanch and the Dauphin are possible parts.

The above three examples touch upon the distinction of all the goods of man into the goods of the soul, the goods of the body and the outside goods. Socrates and the Athenians disagreed about which are better (as we learn in the *Apology*), a disagreement which Aristotle also discusses in the seventh book of the *Politics*. But of course, love does not require all of these goods. Thus the disappointed suitor of the beautiful woman says:

> Kindness in women, not their beauteous looks,
> Shall win my love: and so I take my leave.[4]

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[3] Shakespeare, *Life and Death of King John*, Act II, Sc. 1

[4] Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act III, Sc. 4

Kindness or sweetness in a woman seems even more essential than beauty. Thus Jane Austen says:

> sweetness...makes so essential a part of every woman's worth in the judgment of man, that though he sometimes loves where it is not, he can never believe it absent.[5]

And perhaps women are especially attracted to courage in a man so that Othello's account of how he and Desdemona came to love each other touches upon the characteristic goods of man and woman:

> She lov'd me for the dangers I had pass'd,
> And I lov'd her that she did pity them.[6]

Although one can be moved to love someone for some particular good that one finds in them, love is more aroused by finding every good in them. Thus Ferdinand says about Miranda:

> Admir'd Miranda,
> Indeed the top of admiration, worth
> What's dearest to the world: full many a lady
> I have ey'd with best regard, and many a time
> Th' harmony of their tongues hath unto bondage
> Brought my too diligent ear; for several virtues
> Have I lik'd several women, never any
> With so full a soul, but some defect in her
> Did quarrel with the noblest grace she ow'd
> And put it to the foil. But you, O you,
> So perfect and so peerless, are created
> Of every creature's best.[7]

There is the same knowledge of opposites. Richard sees himself as unlovable because his body is ugly:

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[5] Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park*, Chapter XXX

[6] Shakespeare, *Othello*, Act I, Sc. 3

[7] Shakespeare, *Tempest*, Act III, Sc.1

> Why, love forswore me in my mother's womb:
> And, for I should not deal in her soft laws,
> She did corrupt frail nature with some bribe,
> To shrink mine arm up like a wither'd shrub;
> To make an envious mountain on my back,
> Where sits deformity to mock my body:
> To shape my legs of an unequal size;
> To disproportion me in every part,
> Like to a chaos, or an unlick'd bear-whelp
> That carries no impression like the dam.
> And am I then a man to be belov'd?
> O monstrous fault! to harbor such a thought.[8]

When peace comes after war, Richard thinks that he cannot turn to love because of his body's ugliness:

> Now is the winter of our discontent
> Made glorious summer by this sun of York;
> And all the clouds that lour'd upon our house
> In the deep bosom of the ocean buried.
> Now are our brows bound with victorious wreaths;
> Our bruised arms hung up for monuments;
> Our stern alarums changed to merry meetings;
> Our dreadful marches to delightful measures.
> Grim-visag'd war hath smooth'd his wrinkled front;
> And now, - instead of mounting barbed steeds,
> To fright the souls of fearful adversaries, -
> He capers nimbly in a lady's chamber
> To the lascivious pleasing of a lute.
> But I, that am not shap'd for sportive tricks,
> Nor made to court an amorous looking-glass;
> I, that am rudely stamp'd, and want love's majesty
> To strut before a wanton ambling nymph;
> I, that am curtail'd of this fair proportion,
> Cheated of feature by dissembling nature,
> Deform'd, unfinish'd, sent before my time
> Into this breathing world, scarce half made up,

[8] Shakespeare, *Henry VI, Part III*, Act III, Sc. 2

> And that so lamely and unfashionable
> That dogs bark at me, as I halt by them;
> Why I, in this weak piping time of peace,
> Have no delight to pass away the time,
> Unless to see my shadow in the sun
> And descant on my own deformity:
> And therefore, since I cannot prove a lover,
> To entertain these fair well-spoken days,
> I am determined to prove a villain,
> And hate the idle pleasures of these days.[9]

Helena is not ugly. But when the man she loves does not return her love, but instead loves Hermia, she doubts her own beauty in comparison to Hermia:

> O! I am out of breath in this fond chase.
> The more my prayer, the lesser is my grace.
> Happy is Hermia, where soe'er she lies;
> For she hath blessed and attractive eyes.
> How came her eyes so bright? Not with salt tears:
> If so, my eyes are oftener wash'd than hers.
> No, no, I am as ugly as a bear;
> For beasts that meet me run away for fear;
> Therefore, no marvel though Demetrius
> Do, as a monster, fly my presence thus.
> What wicked and dissembling glass of mine
> Made me compare with Hermia's sphery eyne?[10]

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Art. 1 - Whether something good is the cause of love

> It seems that not only the good is the cause of love.
>
> 1. For the good is not a cause of love except because it is loved. But it happens also that the bad is loved, according to that in Psalm 10, v. 6: "Who loves iniquity, hates his own soul." Otherwise, all

[9] Shakespeare, *Richard III*, Act I, Sc. 1
[10] Shakespeare, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 2

love would be good. Therefore, the good is not the only cause of love.

2. Moreover, the Philosopher says, in Book Two of the *Rhetoric*, that "we love those who say something bad about themselves." Therefore, it seems that the bad is a cause of love.

3. Moreover, Dionysius says, in the fourth chapter *On the Divine Names*. that not only the good, but also "the beautiful is lovable to all."

But against this is what Augustine says in the eighth book *On the Trinity*: "Surely nothing is loved except the good." Therefore, only the good is the cause of love.

I answer that, as has been said before, love pertains to the desiring ability which is an ability that is acted upon. Whence its object is compared to it as the cause of its motion or act. It is necessary therefore that what is the object of love be properly the cause of love.

But the proper object of love is the good because, as has been said, love implies a certain natural fit or agreement of the lover with the loved; and what naturally fits or agrees with something and is proportioned to it, is good for it. Whence it remains that the good is the proper cause of love.

To the first therefore it ought to be said that the bad is never loved except under the notion of the good; to wit, insofar as it is in some way good and is grasped as simply good. And thus some love is bad insofar as it tends toward what is not simply a true good. And in this way, man loves iniquity, insofar as he attains some good by iniquity, as pleasure or money or something of this sort.

To the second, it ought to be said that those who say what is bad about themselves, are not loved because of those bad things, but on account of this, that they say these bad things; for to say what is bad about oneself can be considered good insofar as it excludes lying or pretense.

> To the third, it ought to be said that the beautiful is the same as the good, differing only in definition. For since the good is what all desire it belongs to the definition of the good that desire rests in it; but it belongs to the definition of the beautiful that desire rests in the sight or knowledge of it. Whence also those senses especially regard the beautiful which are most knowing - to wit, sight and hearing which serve reason. For we call sights beautiful and sounds beautiful. In the sensibles of the other senses, however, we do not use the name of beauty - we do not call smells or odors beautiful. And thus it is clear that beautiful adds above good a certain order to a knowing ability, so that is called good which simply agrees with desire, but that is called beautiful of which the knowledge itself is agreeable.

The first part of the body of the article leads to concluding the major premise of the chief syllogism (the object of love is the cause of love). And the second part of the body of the article states the minor premise of the chief syllogism (the good is the object of love) first and then backs it up with a prosyllogism. The contrary orders in the two parts enables the reader to see the two premises of the chief syllogism together in the middle.

As regards the major premise of the chief syllogism, one could also manifest it by the other passions of the soul and their objects. The object of my anger is also a cause of my anger and the object of my fear is also a cause of my fear and the object of my sadness is also a cause of my sadness.

SECOND CAUSE OF LOVE - KNOWLEDGE

Shakespeare quotes Marlowe when Phebe says

> Dead shepherd, now I find thy saw of might:
> "Whoever lov'd that lov'd not at first sight."[11]

[11] Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, Act III, Sc. 5; Marlowe, *Hero & Leander*, 1.176

One might ask whether true love is always at first sight or can it be at a later sight? But whatever the answer, it is at some sight. The poet likes to represent it at first sight. Thus Ferdinand to Miranda:

> .....Hear my soul speak!
> The very instant that I saw you did
> My heart fly to your service, there resides
> To make me slave to it.[12]

Juliet understands that looking can move us to liking:

> Mother: Speak briefly, can you like of Paris' love?
>
> Juliet: I'll look to like, if looking liking move.[13]

And Romeo addresses his sight about Juliet as responsible for a unique love:

> Did my heart love till now? forswear it sight!
> For I ne'er saw true beauty till this night.[14]

And the Duke in this conversation speaks of the first time that he did see Olivia:

> Curio: Will you go hunt, my lord?
>
> Duke: What, Curio?
>
> Curio: The hart
>
> Duke: Why, so I do, the noblest that I have.
> O! when mine eyes did see Olivia first,
> Methought she purg'd the air of pestilence;
> That instant was I turned into a hart,
> And my desires, like fell and cruel hounds,
> E'er since pursue me.[15]

---

[12] Shakespeare, *Tempest*, Act III, Sc. 1

[13] Shakespeare, *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 3

[14] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 4

Antony is also in love with Cleopatra at first sight:

> Upon her landing, Antony sent to her,
> Invited her to supper: she replied,
> It would be better he became her guest,
> Which she entreated. Our courteous Antony,
> Whom ne're the word of "No" heard speak,
> Being barber'd ten time o're, goes to the feast,
> And for his ordinary pays his heart
> For what his eyes eat only.[16]

And Fr. Laurence says that young men's love lies not in their heart, but in their eyes since they cause it:

> Holy Saint Francis! what a change is here!
> Is Rosaline, that you didst love so dear,
> So soon forsaken? Young men's love then lies
> Not truly in their hearts but in their eyes.[17]

And in the words of a song, fancy (meaning love) is said to be engendered in the eyes:

> Tell me where is fancy bred,
> Or in the heart or in the head?
> How begot, how nourished?
> Reply, reply.
> It is engendered in the eyes
> With gazing fed.[18]

Even when Shakespeare represents magic potions that cause people to fall in love, he represents them as acting through the eyes. Listen to the words of Oberon, the king of the fairies:

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[15] Shakespeare, *Twelfth Nlght*, Act I , Sc. 1
[16] Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act II, Sc. 2
[17] *Romeo and Juliet,* Act II, Sc. 2, Fr. Laurence to Romeo

[18] Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act III, Sc. 2, song:

.....Having once this juice
I'll watch Titania when she is asleep,
And drop the liquor of it in her eyes:
The next thing then she waking looks upon,
Be it on lion, bear, or wolf, or bull,
On meddling monkey, or on busy ape,
She shall pursue it with the soul of love:
And ere I take this charm off from her sight,
As I can take it with another herb,
I'll make her render up her page to me.[19]

And after Oberon anoints Titania's eyes with the magic juice, he says:

What thou seest when thou dost awake,
Do it for thy true-love take;
Love and languish for his sake:
Be it ounce, or cat, or bear
Pard, or boar with bristled hair,
In thy eye that shall appear
When thou wak'st, it is thy dear.
Wake when some vile thing is near.[20]

Puck is also sent on a similar mission to the Athenians where he notes the flower (from which the magic potion is derived) will show its force through the eyes:

Through the forest have I gone,
But Athenian found I none,
On whose eyes I might approve
This flower's force in stirring love.[21]

Oberon corrects Puck who places the love-juice on the wrong eyes:

What hast thou done? thou hast mistaken quite,
And laid the love-juice on some true-love's sight:

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[19] *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 1

[20] *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 2

[21] *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 2

> Of thy misprision, must perforce ensue
> Some true-love turn'd, and not a false turn'd true.[22]

Oberon expands on the effect of this magic potion on one of the Athenians through his eyes:

> Flower of this purple dye
> Hit with Cupid's archery,
> Sink in apple of his eye.
> When his love he doth espy,
> Let her shine as gloriously
> As the Venus of the sky.
> When thou wak'st, if she be by,
> Beg of her for remedy.[23]

Lysander, unaware of the magic juice acting upon his sight, thinks that it is by reason that he now loves Helena:

> Content with Hermia! No: I do repent
> The tedious minutes I with her have spent.
> Not Hermia, but Helena I love:
> Who will not change a raven for a dove?
> The will of man is by his reason sway'd,
> And reason says you are the worthier maid.
> Things growing are not ripe until their season;
> So I, being young, till now ripe not to reason;
> And touching now the point of human skill,
> Reason becomes the marshal to my will,
> And leads me to your eyes; where I o'erlook
> Love's stories written in love's richest book.[24]

But Hamlet has a chosen love for Horatio as expressed in his words to him:

> Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice
> And could of men distinguish, her election
> Hath seal'd thee for herself; for thou hast been

---

[22] *A Midsummer Night's Dream,* Act III, Sc. 2
[23] *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 2
[24] *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act II, Sc. 2

> As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing,
> A man that fortune's buffets and rewards
> Hast ta'en with equal thanks: and blest are those
> Whose blood and judgment are so well commingled,
> That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger
> To sound what stop she please. Give me that man
> That is not passion's slave, and I will wear him
> In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of heart,
> As I do thee.—Something too much of this.[25]

This is a love or friendship whose cause is the knowledge of reason.

FIRST TWO CAUSES OF LOVE

Since the cause of love is the good as known (by the senses or by reason), knowledge is often spoke of as a cause with the good on the side of the object and not by itself.

Capulet urges Paris to use his senses to see which lady is the most desirable:

> At my poor house look to behold this night
> Earth-treading stars that make dark heaven light.
> Such comfort as do lusty young men feel
> When well-apparel'd April on the heel
> Of limping Winter treads, e'en such delight
> Among fresh fennel buds shall you this night
> Inherit at my house - hear all, all see,
> And like her most whose merit most shall be:
> Which, on more view of many, mine (being one)
> May stand in number though in reck'ning none.[26]

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[25] Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2
[26] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 2

Likewise, Benvolio urge to the disappointed lover Romeo to look elsewhere at other beauties to forget the one that has rejected him:

Romeo: She hath forsworn to love, and in that vow
Do I live dead that live to tell it now.

Benvolio: Be rul'd by me, forget to think of her.

Romeo: O teach me how I should forget to think.

Benvolio By giving liberty unto thine eyes,
Examine other beauties.....

Romeo: Farewell, thou canst not teach me to forget.

Benvolio: I'll pay that doctrine or else die in debt.[27]

And further in their conversation, one can see how the good as known is the cause of love:

Benvolio: Tut man, one fire burns out another's burning,
One pain is lessen'd by another's anguish,
Turn giddy and be holp by backward turning,
One desp'rate grief cures with another's languish.
Take thou some new infection to thy eye
And the rank poison of the old will die...
At this same ancient feast of Capulet's
Sups the fair Rosaline, whom thou so loves,
With all th'admired beauties of Verona.
Go thither and with unattainted eye
Compare her face with some that I shall show,
And I will make thee think thy swan a crow.

Romeo: When the devout religion of mine eye
Maintains such falsehood, then turn tears to fires,
And these who, often drown'd, cold never die,
Transparent heretics, be burnt for liars.
One fairer than my love? th'all-seeing sun

[27] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 1

Ne'er saw her match since first the world begun.

Benvolio: Tut, you saw her fair none else being by,
Herself pois'd with herself in either eye.
But in that crystal scales let there be weigh'd
Your lady's love against some other maid
That I will show you shining at this feast,
And she shall scant show well that now seems best.

Romeo: I'll go along, no such sight to be shown
But to rejoice in splendor of mine own.[28]

And Juliet says she will have to look at the good qualities of Paris to see if she can like or love him:

Mother: What say you, can you love this gentleman?
This night you shall behold him at our feast,
Read o'er the volume of young Paris' face
And find delight writ there with Beauty's pen,
Examine every married lineament
And see how one another lends content,
And what obscur'd in this fair volume lies
Find written in the margent of his eyes...
Speak briefly, can you like of Paris' love?

Juliet: I'll look to like, if looking liking move,
But no more will I endart mine eye
Than your consent gives strength to make it fly.[29]

And Romeo's words about Juliet when he first sees how beautiful she is and begins to love her reveal the moving power of the good or beautiful as seen to cause love:

O she doth teach the torches to burn bright.
It seems she hangs upon the cheek of night
As a rich jewel in an Ethiop's ear -

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[28] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 2

[29] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 3:

> Beauty too rich for use, for earth too dear.
> So shows a snowy dove trooping with crows
> As yonder lady o'er her fellows shows.
> The measure done, I'll watch her place of stand,
> And touching her make blessed my rude hand.
> Did my heart love till now? forswear it, sight!
> For I ne'er saw true beauty till this night.[30]

Romeo thinks he never truly loved until he saw such beauty.

And Olivia catches the "plague" of love when the youth's perfections (and therefore good qualities) creep into her eyes:

> How now!
> Even so quickly may one catch the plague?
> Methinks I feel this youth's perfections
> With an invisible and subtle stealth
> To creep in at mine eyes. Well, let it be..
>
> I do I know not what, and fear to find
> Mine eye too great a flatterer for my mind.
> Fate show thy force: ourselves we do not owe;
> What is decreed must be, and be this so.[31]

Lorenzo, in understanding his love for Jessica, combines three good things in her with his knowledge of them:

> Beshrew me, but I love her heartily;
> For she is wise, if I can judge of her,
> And fair she is, if that mine eyes be true,
> And true she is, as she hath prov'd herself;
> And therefore, like herself, wise, fair, and true,
> Shall she be placed in my constant soul.[32]

Proteus, when tempted to abandon Julia for Silvia, speaks of both his knowledge of her and her goodness or excellence:

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[30] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 4
[31] Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act I, Sc. 5
[32] Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice,* Act II, Sc. 6

Even as one heat another heat expels,
Or as one nail by strength drives out another,
So the remembrance of my former love
Is by a newer object quite forgotten.
Is it mine eye, or Valentinus' praise,
Her true perfection, or my false transgression,
That makes me reasonless to reason thus?
She's fair; and so is Julia that I love, -
That I did love, for now my love is thaw'd,
Which like a waxen image 'gainst a fire,
Bear no impression of the thing it was...
'Tis but her picture I have yet beheld
And that hath dazzled my reason's light;
But when I look on her perfections,
There is no reason but I shall be blind.[33]

Proteus also uses the word *object* in describing the cause of his new love.

And when Lucentio tells Tranio of his sudden love for Bianca he speaks of the good he saw in her, thus joining the second cause of love to the first:

Tranio: I pray, sir, tell me, is it possible
That love should of a sudden take such hold

Lucentio: O Tranio! till I found it to be true
I never thought it possible or likely.
But see, while idly I stood looking on,
I found the effect of love in idleness,
And now in plainness do confess to thee,
That art to me as secret and as dear
As Anna to the Queen of Carthage was,
Tranio, I burn, I pine, I perish, Tranio,
If I achieve not this young modest girl....

Tranio: Master, you look'd so longly on the maid
Perhaps you mark'd not what's the pith of all.

[33] Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act II, Sc. 4

Lucentio: O yes, I saw true beauty in her face,
Such as the daughter of Agenor had,
That made great Jove to humble him to her hand
When with his knees he kiss'd the Cretan strond.

Tranio: Saw you no more? mark'd you not how her sister
Began to scold and raise up such a storm
That mortal ears might hardly endure the din?

Lucentio: Tranio, I saw her coral lips to move
And with her breath she did perfume the air.
Sacred and sweet was all I saw in her.[34]

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Art. 2 - Whether knowledge is a cause of love.

It seems that knowledge is not a cause of love.

1. It results from love that something is sought. But some things are sought that are unknown, as the sciences. For since in these, "it is the same to have them as to know them," as Augustine says in the book of the *Eighty-Three Questions;* if they are known, they are had, and are not sought. Therefore, knowledge is not a cause of love.

2. It seems to amount to the same that something unknown is loved and that something is loved more than it is known. But some things are loved more than they are known; as God, who is able in this life to be loved through himself, but not to be known through himself. Therefore, knowledge is not the cause of love.

3. Further, if knowledge were the cause of love, love could not be found where there is no knowledge. But love is found in all things, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *On the Divine Names*. Knowledge however is not found in all.

[34] Shakespeare, *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act I, Sc. 3:

But against this is what Augustine proves in the tenth book *On the Trinity* that "no one is able to love something unknown."

I answer that it ought to be said, as has been said, that the good is a cause of love by way of an object. The good, however, is not an object of desire except insofar as it is grasped. And therefore love requires some grasping of the good that is loved. And because of this the Philosopher says in the ninth book of the *Ethics*, that bodily sight is the beginning of sense love. And likewise, contemplation of spiritual beauty or goodness is the beginning of spiritual love. Thus therefore knowledge is a cause of love for the same reason as the good which is not able to be loved unless known.

To the first therefore, it ought to be said that he who seeks a science is not entirely ignorant of it; but he foreknows it in some way, either in general, or in some effect of it, or through this that he hears it praised, as Augustine says in the tenth book *On the Trinity*. To know it thus however is not to have it, but to know it perfectly.

To the second, it ought to be said that something is required for the perfection of knowledge that is not required for the perfection of love. For knowledge belongs to reason of which it is proper to distinguish between those that are joined in the thing, and to put together in some way those which are diverse, by comparing one to the other. And thus for the perfection of knowledge, it is required that man know one by one whatever is in the thing, as parts, powers, and properties. But love is in the desiring ability which regards the thing as it is in itself. Whence it suffices for the perfection of love that the thing be loved insofar as it is grasped in itself. On account of this therefore, it happens that something is loved more than it is known; because it is able to be perfectly loved, even if it is not perfectly known - as is most clear in the sciences which some love because of some slight knowledge which they have about them; as that they know rhetoric to be the science through which a man is able to persuade, and they love this in rhetoric. And one ought to speak likewise about the love of God.

To the third, it ought to be said that the natural love which is in all things is also caused from some knowledge, not existing to be sure

in the natural things themselves, but in the one who instituted the nature, as has been said above.

THIRD CAUSE OF LOVE - LIKENESS

When Lorenzo praises Portia for urging her new husband to go to the rescue of his friend, the merchant of Venice, whom she has never met, she reasons that he must be like her husband since they love each other so much. She reasons from the effect (love) to the cause (likeness):

Lorenzo: Madam, although I speak it in your presence,
You have a noble and a true conceit
Of god-like amity; which appears most strongly
In bearing thus the absence of your lord.
But, if you knew to whom you show this honour,
How true a gentleman you send relief,
How dear a lover of my lord your husband.
I know you would be prouder of the work
Than customary bounty can enforce you to.

Portia: I never did repent for doing good,
Nor shall not now: for in companions
That do converse and waste the time together,
Whose souls do bear an equal yoke of love,
There must be needs a like proportion
Of lineaments, of manners, and of spirit;
Which makes me think that this Antonio,
Being the bosom lover of my lord,
Must needs be like my lord. If it be so,
How little is the cost I have bestow'd
In purchasing the semblance of my soul
From out the state of hellish cruelty.[35]

[35] Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act III, Sc. 4

Richard, when killing Henry, says that there can be no love between him and other men because he is not like them:

> If any spark of life be yet remaining [stabs again]
> Down, down to hell; and say I sent thee thither,
> I, that have neither pity, love, nor fear.
> Indeed, 'tis true, that Henry told me of;
> For I have often heard my mother say
> I came into the world with my legs forward.
> Had I not reason, think ye, to make haste,
> And seek their ruin that usurp'd our right?
> The midwife wonder'd, and the women cried
> "O! Jesus bless us, he is born with teeth."
> And so I was; which plainly signified
> That I should snarl and bite and play the dog.
> Then, since the heavens have shap'd my body so,
> Let hell make crook'd my mind to answer it.
> I have no brother, I am like no brother;
> And this word "love", which greybeards call divine,
> Be resident in men like one another
> And not in me: I am myself alone.[36]

But those who are most like one another in the same art or occupation may come into conflict because of competition for the same honor or customers (as in the rivalry of Dickens and Thackeray). Hence, those who are like, but not so much as to be in competition, may be more sincere friends than those whose likeness brings them into competition:

> There are no friendships among men of talents more likely to be sincere than those between painters and poets. Possessed of the same qualities of mind, governed by the same principles of taste and natural laws of grace and beauty, but applying them to different yet mutually illustrative arts, they are constantly in sympathy and never in collision with each other. A still more congenial intimacy of the kind was that contracted by Goldsmith with Mr. afterwards Sir Joshua Reynolds. The latter was now about forty years of age, a few years older than the poet, whom he charmed by the blandness and benignity of his manners and the

[36] Shakespeare, *Henry VI, Part III*, Act V, Sc. 6

> nobleness and generosity of his disposition, as much as he did by the graces of his pencil and the magic of his coloring. They were men of kindred genius, excelling in corresponding qualities of their several arts, for style in writing is what color is in painting; both are innate endowments, and equally magic in their effects. Certain graces and harmonies of both many be acquired by diligent study and imitation, but only in a limited degree; whereas by their natural possessors they are exercised spontaneously, almost unconsciously, and with ever-varying fascination. Reynolds soon understood and appreciated the merits of Goldsmith, and a sincere and lasting friendship ensued between them.[37]

And because two men can be like a third in different ways, they may not be inclined to like each other, as Boswell unfolds:

> My desire of being acquainted with celebrated men of every description, had made me, much about the same time, obtain an introduction to Dr. Samuel Johnson and to John Wilkes, Esq. Two men more different could perhaps not be selected out of all mankind. They had even attacked one another with some asperity in their writings; yet I lived in habits of friendship with both. I could fully relish the excellence of each...Sir John Pringle, "mine own friend and my father's friend," between whom and Dr. Johnson I in vain wished to establish an acquaintance, as I respected and lived in intimacy with both of them, observed to me once, very ingeniously, "It is not in friendship as in mathematics, where two things, each equal to a third, are equal between themselves. You agree with Johnson as a middle quality, and you agree with me as a middle quality; but Johnson and I should not agree."[38]

Fanny thinks that mutual love between herself and Mr. Crawford is impossible because they are so dissimilar. She speaks strongly to him in this vein:

> She told him, that she did not love him, could not love him, was sure she never should love him: that such a change was quite

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[37] Washington Irving, *The Life of Oliver Goldsmith*, Chapter XIV

[38] Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson*, observation by Boswell in 1776

> impossible, that the subject was most painful to her, that she must intreat him never to mention it again, to allow her to leave him at once, and let it be considered as concluded forever. And when further pressed, had added, that in her opinion their dispositions were so totally dissimilar, as to make mutual affection incompatible; and that they were unfitted for each other by nature, education and habit.[39]

But when she discusses her relation to Mr. Crawford with Edmund, he is not so sure:

> "We are so totally unlike," said Fanny, avoiding a direct answer, "we are so very, very different in all our inclinations and ways, that I consider it as quite impossible we should ever be tolerably happy together, even if I *could* like him. There never were two people more dissimilar. We have not one taste in common. We should be miserable.."
>
> "You are quite mistaken, Fanny. The dissimilarity is not so strong. you are quite enough alike. You *have* tastes in common. You have moral and literary tastes in common. You have both warm hearts and benevolent feelings; and, Fanny, who that heard him read, and saw you listen to Shakespeare the other night, will think you unfitted as companions? You forget yourself; there is a decided difference in your tempers, I allow. He is lively, you are serious; but so much the better; his spirit will support yours. It is your disposition to be easily dejected, and to fancy difficulties greater than they are. His cheerfulness will counteract this. He sees difficulties nowhere; and his pleasantness and gaiety will be a constant support to you. Your being so far unlike, Fanny, does not in the smallest degree make against the probability of your happiness together: do not imagine it. I am myself convinced that it is rather a favourable circumstance. I am perfectly persuaded that the tempers had better be unlike: I mean unlike in the flow of the spirits, in the manners, in the inclination for much or little company, in the propensity to talk or to be silent, to be grave or to be gay. Some opposition here is, I am thoroughly convinced, friendly to

[39] Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park*, Chapter XXXIII, Fanny to Mr. Crawford

> matrimonial happiness. I exclude extremes of course; and a very close resemblance in all those points would be the likeliest way to produce an extreme. A counteraction, gentle and continual, is the best safeguard of manners and conduct.[40]

Boswell attributes a temporary irritation of Johnson with him to a dissimilarity between them:

> Coll called me up, with intelligence that it was a good day for a passage to Mull; and just as we rose, a sailor from the vessel arrived for us. We got all ready with dispatch. Mr. Johnson was displeased at my bustling and walking quickly up and down. He said it did not hasten us a bit. It was getting on horseback in the ship. "All boys do it," said he; "and you are longer a boy than others." He himself had no alertness or whatever it may be called; so he may dislike it, as *Oderunt hilarem tristes*. [Horace: "Gloomy people hate a merry fellow.][41]

Thomas speaks of love as founded on likeness in his exposition of St Paul's *Epistle to the Ephesians:*

> Dilectio enim fundatur super similitudine. Unde dicitur *Eccli.*, c. XIII, 19: *Omne animal diligit sibi simile*. Filius autem est per naturam suam similis patri, et ideo principaliter et per se dilectus est, et ideo naturaliter et excellentissimo modo est patri dilectus. Nos autem sumus filii per adoptionem, inquantum scilicet sumus conformes Filio eius, et ideo quamdam participationem divini amoris habemus.[42]

And in his exposition of St Paul's *Epistle to the Galatians*, Thomas speaks of union and likeness as the beginning of love:

> Sed dubitatur hic, utrum liceat plus unum diligere, quam alium.

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[40] Jane Austen, *Mansfield Park*, Chapter XXXV

[41] James Boswell, *The Journal of a Tour to the Hebrides with Samuel Johnson, LL. D,* Wednesday, 13 October 1773

[42] Thomas Aquinas, *Ad Ephesios*, I, Lectio II, n. 16

> Ad quod sciendum, quod amor potest dici maior vel minor dupliciter. Uno modo ex obiecto; alio modo ex intensione actus. Amare enim aliquem, est velle ei bonum. Potest ergo aliquis alium magis alio diligere, aut quia vult ei maius bonum, quod est obiectum dilectionis, aut quia magis vult ei bonum, id est ex intensiori dilectione.
>
> Quantum ergo ad primum, omnes aequaliter debemus diligere, quia omnibus debemus velle bonum vitae aeternae. Sed quantum ad secundum, non oportet quod omnes aequaliter diligamus: quia cum intensio actus sequitur principium actionis, dilectionis autem principium sit unio et similitudo, illos intensius et magis debemus diligere, qui sunt nobis magis similes et uniti.[43]

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Art. 3 - Whether Likeness is a cause of love.

> One goes forward to the third thus. It seems that likeness is not the cause of love,
>
> 1. For the same is not a cause of contraries. But likeness is a cause of hate: for it is said, *Proverbs*, Chapter 13, v. 10, that "there are always disputes between the proud"; and the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the *Ethics* that "potters quarrel with each other." Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.
>
> 2. Moreover, Augustine says in the fourth book of the *Confessions* that "someone loves in another what he would not want to be; as a man loves an actor who would not wish to be an actor." This however would not happen if likeness were the proper cause of love; for thus a man would not love in another what he himself had or wished to have. Therefore, likeness is not a cause of love.
>
> 3. Moreover, each man loves what he needs, even if he does not have it; as the sick love health and the poor love wealth. But insofar

[43] Thomas Aquinas, *Ad Galatas,* VI, Lectio II, n. 364

as he needs and lacks them, he has an unlikeness towards them. Therefore, not only likeness, but also unlikeness is a cause of love.

4. Moreover, the Philosopher says in the second book of the *Rhetoric* that "we love those who have done well to us in matters of money and safety; and likewise, all love those who preserve friendship towards the dead." All however are not such. Therefore, likeness is not the cause of love.

But against this is what is said in *Ecclesiasticus* Chapter 13, v. 19: "Every animal loves what is like itself."

I answer that likeness properly speaking is the cause of love. But it should be considered that likeness can be found between things in two ways. In one way from this, that both have the same in act; as two having whiteness are said to be alike. In another way from this, that one has in ability and in a certain inclination what the other has in act.; as if we say that a heavy body existing outside its place has a likeness with a heavy body existing in its place. Or also as ability has a likeness to act itself; for act is in ability itself in some way.

The first way of likeness, therefore, causes the love of friendship or well-wishing. For from this, that any two are alike as having one form, they are in some way one in that form; as two men are one in the form of human nature and two whites, in whiteness. And therefore, the affection of one tends toward the other, as in something one with itself; and therefore, it wills the good for the other, just as for itself.

But the second way of likeness causes the love of wanting or the friendship of the useful or the pleasant for there is a desire for its act in each thing existing in ability as such, and it delights in reaching this if it is sensing and knowing.

It has been said above, however, that in the love of wanting, the lover properly loves himself when he wills that good which he wants. However, one loves himself more than another because he is one in substance with himself; but to another, in the likeness of some form. And therefore, if from this, that another is like him in partaking of a form, he is himself impeded from reaching the good

he loves, the other is made hateful to him, not insofar as he is alike, but insofar as the other is impeding his own good. And because of this "potters quarrel with each other", because they impede each other in their own profit; and "there are disputes among the proud", because they impede one another in their own excellence which they want.

And through this is clear the response to the first.

To the second, it should be said that in this also, that someone loves in another what he does not love in himself, there is found the likeness according to proportionality; for just as the other is toward what is loved in him, so the man himself is towards what he loves in himself. For example: if a good singer loves a good writer, there can be noted there a likeness of proportion, according as each has what belongs to him according to his art.

To the third, it should be said that he who loves the very thing he lacks, has a likeness to that which he loves; as what is in ability, to act, as has been said.

To the fourth, it should be said that according to the same likeness of ability to act, the one who is not liberal loves him who is liberal, insofar as he expects from him something that he wants. For on both sides there seems to be a friendship of usefulness.

Or it ought to be said that, although all men do not have virtues of this kind according to complete habit, they have them nevertheless according to seedlike things of reason whereby he who does not have virtue, loves the virtuous as conformed to his natural reason.

APPENDIX TO THE THIRD KIND OF CAUSE - LIKENESS

In the following text, Thomas gives a reason why one desires the like and turns away from the diverse, but also why by happening the reverse is also possible:

Est ergo prima conceptio, quod *omnis diversitas est discors, et similitudo est appetenda*.

> Circa quod considerandum est, quod discordia importat contrarietatem appetitus: unde illud dicitur esse discors quod repugnat appetitui. Omne autem diversum, inquantum huiusmodi, repugnat appetitui: cuius ratio est, quia simile augetur et perficitur suo simili. Unumquodque autem appetit suum augmentum et perfectionem, et ideo simile inquantum huiusmodi est unicuique appetibile: et pari ratione diversum repugnat appetitui, inquantum diminuit et perfectionem impedit.
>
> Et ideo dicit, quod *omnis diversitas* est *discors*, idest ab appetitu discordans; *similitudo vero est appetenda*.
>
> Contingit tamen per accidens quod aliquis appetitus abhorret simile et appetit diversum sive contrarium. Nam sicut dictum est, unumquodque primo et per se appetit suam perfectionem, quae est bonum uniuscuisque, et est semper proportionatum suo perfectibili, et secundum hoc habet similitudinem ad ipsum. Alia vero quae sunt exterius, appetuntur vel refutantur inquantum conferunt ad propriam perfectionem: a qua quidem deficit quandoque aliquid per defectum, quandoque autem per excessum. Nam propria perfectio uniuscuiusque rei in quadam commensuratione consistit: sicut perfectio corporis humani consistit in commensurato calore; a quo si deficiat, appetit aliquid calidum per quod calor augetur: si autem superexcedat, appetit contrarium, scilicet frigidum, per quod ad temperamentum reducatur, in quo consistit perfectio conformis naturae.
>
> Et sic etiam unus figulus abhorret alium, inquantum scilicet aufert ei perfectionem desideratum, scilicet lucrum.[44]

In the following text, Thomas distinguishes three ways in which by happening the unlike can be the cause of love and likeness the cause of hate:

> amoris radix, per se loquendo, est similitudo amati ad amantem, quia est ei bonum et conveniens.

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[44] Thomas Aquinas, *In Boetii de Hebdomadibus*, Lectio II, n. 37

> Contingit autem per accidens dissimilitudinem esse amoris et similitudinem esse odii causam tripliciter.
>
> Uno modo, quando affectus amantis non sibi complacet neque quiescit in conditione vel aliqua proprietate sui ipsius, sicut cum quis aliquid in se ipso odit. Et tunc oportet quod diligat ipsum qui est sibi in hoc dissimilis, quia ex hoc ipso quod sibi est dissimilis in conditione, efficitur similis affectui suo et e contrario odit illum qui sibi similatur et affectui non similatur.
>
> Secundo, quando aliquis ex ipsa similitudine impedit amantem ab amati fruitione. Et hoc invenitur in omnibus rebus quae non possunt simul a multis haberi, sicut sunt res temporales. Unde qui amat lucrum de aliqua re vel delectationem, impeditur a fruitione sui amati per alium qui sibi vult similiter illud appropriare. Et hinc oritur *zelotypia* quae non patitur consortium in amato, et *invidia* inquantum bonum alterius aestimatur impeditivum boni proprii.
>
> Tertio secundum quod dissimilitudo praecedens facit percipi amorem sequentem. Quia enim sentimus in hoc quod sensus movetur, quae quidem motio cessat quando sensibile jam effectum est forma sentientis, ideo ea quae consuevimus non ita percipimus; sicut patet de fabris quorum aures plenae sunt sonis malleorum. Et propter hoc amor magis sentitur, quando affectus de novo per amorem ad aliquid transformatur. Et ideo etiam quando aliquis non habet praesentiam sui amati, magis fervet et arctatur de amato, inquantum magis amorem percipit, quamvis apud praesentiam amati non sit minor amor, sed minus perceptus.[45]

And in the following reading, Thomas explains why likeness is more a cause of love in the love of friendship or wishing well and less so in the love of concupiscence or wanting:

> ...duplex est amor: amicitiae scilicet et concupiscentiae, sed differunt: quia in amore concupiscentiae, quae sunt nobis extrinseca, ad nos ipsos trahimus, cum ipso amore diligamus alia, inquantum sunt nobis utilia vel delectabilia; sed in amore amicitiae est e converso, quia nosmetipsos trahimus ad ea quae sunt extra

[45] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVII, Quaestio I, Art. I, Ad 3

nos; quia ad eos quos isto amore diligimus, habemus nos sicut ad nosmetipsos, communicantes eis quodammodo nosmetipsos.

Unde in amore amicitae similitudo est causa amoris, non enim sic diligimus aliquem nisi inquantum sumus unum cum eo: similitudo autem est unitas quaedam.

Sed in amore concupiscentiae, sive sit utilis sive delectabilis, similitudo est causa separationis et odii. Cum enim isto amore aliquem diligam inquantum est mihi utilis vel delectabilis, quidquid est impeditivum utilitatis seu delectationis habeo odio contrarium. Et inde est quod superbi iurgantur adinvicem, inquantum unus usurpat sibi gloriam quam alius amat, et in qua delectatur; figuli etiam, inquantum unus trahit ad se lucrum, quod alius pro se volebat.

Sed sciendum, quod amor concupiscentiae non est rei concupitae, sed concupiscentis: propter hoc enim quis hoc amore aliquem diligit, inquantum est sibi utilis, ut dictum est. Et ideo magis diligit in hoc se quam illum: sicut qui diligit vinum quia est sibi delectabile, se potiius quam vinum diligit.

Sed amor amicitiae est potius rei amatae quam amantis, quia diligit aliquem propter ipsum dilectum, non propter ipsum diligentem.

Sic ergo, quia in amore amicitiae similitudo est causa amoris, dissimilitudo causa odii, inde est quod mundus odio habet quod suum non est et sibi dissimile, et diligit, idest dilectione amcitiae, quod suum est.

Sed de dilectione concupiscentiae est e converso.

Et ideo dicit *Si de mundo fuissetis, mundus quod suum erat diligeret*, scilicet amore amicitiae.[46]

[46] *Super Ioannem*, XV, Lectio IV, n. 2036

FIRST AND THIRD CAUSES OF LOVE

One could raise the question whether the good or likeness is a greater cause of love. In *Wuthering Heights*, Emily Bronte has represented a woman drawn to two men, one because of the good in him and the other because he is like her. In this conversation between Ellen (Nelly) and Catherine, Bronte seems to represent likeness as the stronger cause:

> "I'm very far from jesting, Miss Catherine," I replied. "You love Mr. Edgar, because he is handsome and young, and cheerful, and rich, and loves you. The last, however, goes for nothing: you would love him without that, probably; and with it you wouldn't, unless he possessed the four former attractions."
>
> "No, to be sure not: I should only pity him - hate him, perhaps, if he were ugly, and a clown."....."If I were in heaven, Nelly, I should be extremely miserable."
>
> "Because you are not fit to go there," I answered. "All sinners would be miserable in heaven."
>
> "But it is not for that. I dreamt once that I was there."
>
> "I tell you I won't hearken to your dreams, Miss Catherine! I'll go to bed, " I interrupted again. She laughed and held me down; for I made a motion to leave my chair.
>
> "This is nothing," cried she: "I was only going to say that heaven did not seem to be my home; and I broke my heart with weeping to come back to the earth; and the angels were so angry that they flung me out into the middle of the heath on the top of Wuthering Heights; where I woke sobbing for joy. That will do to explain my secret, as well as the other. I've no more business to marry Edgar Linton than I have to be in heaven; and if the wicked man in there had not brought Heathcliff so low, I shouldn't have thought of it. It would degrade me to marry Heathcliff now; so he shall never know I love him: and that, not because he's handsome, Nelly, but because he's more myself than I am. Whatever our souls are made of, his and mine are the same; and Linton's is as different as a moonbeam

> from lightning, or frost from fire...My great miseries in this world have been Heathcliff's miseries, and I watched and felt each from the beginning: my great thought in living is himself. If all else perished, and *he* remained, I should still continue to be; and if all else remained, and he were annihilated, the universe would turn to a mighty stranger: I should not seem a part of it. My love for Linton is like the foliage in the woods: time will change it, I'm well aware, as winter changes the trees. My love for Heathcliff resembles the eternal rocks beneath: a source of little visible delight, but necessary. Nelly, I *am* Heathcliff! He's always in my mind: not as a pleasure, anymore than I am always a pleasure to myself, but as my own being."[47]

But a love which is based on both goodness and likeness has more to recommend it (as Elizabeth notes) between Jane and Bingley:

> Elizabeth, who was left by herself, now smiled at the rapidity and ease with which an affair was finally settled that had given them so many previous months of suspense and vexation. "And this," she said, "is the end of all his friend's anxious circumspection! of all his sister's falsehood and contrivance! the happiest, wisest, and most reasonable end!
>
> In a few minutes she was joined by Bingley, whose conference with her father had been short and to the purpose. "Where is your sister?" said he hastily, as he opened the door. "With my mother upstairs. She will be down in a moment, I dare say."
>
> He then shut the door, and coming up to her, claimed the good wishes and affection of a sister. Elizabeth honestly and heartily expressed her delight in the prospect of their relationship. They shook hands with great cordiality; and then till her sister came down, she had to listen to all he had to say of his own happiness, and of Jane's perfections; and in spite of his being a lover, Elizabeth really believed all his expectations of felicity to be rationally founded, because they had for their basis the excellent

[47] Emily Bronte, *Wuthering Heights*, Chapter Nine

> understanding and super-excellent disposition of Jane, and a general similarity of feeling and taste between her and himself.[48]

FOURTH CAUSE OF LOVE - ANOTHER EMOTION OR ACT OF THE WILL

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 27, Art. 4 - Whether any other emotion can cause love.

> To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that some other emotion is able to be the cause of love.
>
> 1. For the Philosopher says in the eighth book of the *Ethics* that some are loved because of pleasure. But pleasure is a certain emotion. Therefore, some other emotion is a cause of love.
>
> 2. Moreover, desire is a certain emotion. but we love some because of the desire of something that we look for from them; just as appears in every friendship which is on account of usefulness. Therefore, some other emotion is the cause of love.
>
> 3. Moreover, Augustine says in the tenth book *On the Trinity*, "either one loves lukewarmly or one does not love at all that thing which one has no hope of obtaining, even though one sees how beautiful it is." Therefore, hope also is a cause of love.
>
> But against this is that all other affections of the soul are caused by love, as Augustine says in the fourteenth book *On the City of God*.
>
> I answer that it should be said that there is no other emotion of the soul which does not presuppose some love. The reason for this is that every other emotion of the soul implies motion to something or rest in something. But all motion to something or rest in

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[48] Jane Austen, *Pride and Prejudice*, Chapter LV

> something, proceeds from some kindredship with, or fitting with, which pertains to the notion of love. Whence it is impossible that some other emotion of the soul is the cause universally of all love.
>
> It happens, however, that some other emotion is the cause of some love, just as one good is the cause of another.
>
> To the first therefore, it should be said that, when someone loves something because of pleasure, that love is caused by pleasure. But that pleasure is again caused from another preceding love; for no one takes pleasure except in a thing in some way loved.
>
> To the second, it should be said that the desire of some thing always presupposes the love of that thing. But the desire of one thing is able to be the cause that another thing is loved; just as he who desires money, loves, because of this, him from whom he receives money.
>
> To the third, it should be said that hope causes or increases love both by reason of pleasure, because its causes pleasure, and also by reason of desire, because hope strengthens desire - for we do not so intensely desire that which we do not hope for. Nevertheless, hope itself is also of some good loved.

Here is another passage where Thomas speaks of the priority of love over other passions of the soul:

> ...inter alias affectiones animae amor est prior. Amor enim dicit terminationem affectus per hoc quod informatur suo objecto. In omnibus autem hoc invenitur quod motus procedit a primo immobili quieto. Quod quidem patet in naturalibus; quia primum movens in quolibet genere est non motum illo genere motus, sicut primum alterans non est alteratum. Similiter patet in intellectualibus; quia motus rationis discurrentis procedit a principiis et quidditatibus rerum, quibus intellectus informatus terminatur.
>
> Cum ergo affectus informetur amore et terminetur, sicut intellectus principiis et quidditatibus, ut prius dictum est; oportet quod omnis motus affectivae procedat ex quietatione et terminatione amoris.

> Et quia omne quod est primum in aliquo genere est perfectius, sicut intellectus principiorum in demonstrabilibus, et motus caeli in naturalibus; ideo oportet quod amor inter alias affectiones etiam sit vehementior, ut patebit per singula.[49]

St. Augustine speaks of the influence of hope upon love (as Thomas has just done in the reply to the third objection):

> For what he sees in the light of truth is one thing, and what he desires within his own faculty is another thing. For in the light of truth, he realizes how great and how good it is to understand and speak all the languages of all countries, to hear no language as foreign, and to be heard in every language that no one may detect him as a foreigner. The splendor of such knowledge is already seen in his thoughts, and is loved by him as something known; and it is so seen and so arouses the zeal of learners that they are spurred into activity on account of it. They yearn for it in all the labor which they expend in acquiring this faculty, so that they may also embrace in practice what they already know in theory.
>
> And so the closer he comes to this faculty in hope, the more ardently he is inflamed with love. For he devotes himself more intensely to those sciences when he does not despair of being able to master them; while one who is not buoyed up by the hope of acquiring something either loves it tepidly or does not love it at all, though he may perceive how beautiful it is. Consequently, since almost all despair of knowing all languages, each one strives to become particularly proficient in that of his own people.[50]

Shakespeare speaks of hope as a lover's staff:

> Hope is a lover's staff; walk hence with that
> And manage it against despairing thoughts.[51]

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[49] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist XXVII, Q. I, Art. III, Resp., n. 57-59
[50] *On the Trinity*, Bk. X, Ch. 1, n. 2
[51] *The Two Gentlemen of Verona,* Act III, Sc. 1

And the difficulty of getting what we love seems also to increase our love. Thus Bertram says:

> She knew her distance and did angle for me,
> Madding my eagerness with her restraint,
> As all impediments in fancy's course
> Are motives of more fancy.[52]

And Prospero says about the sudden love of Ferdinand and Miranda:

> They are both in either's power! But this swift business
> I must uneasy make, lest the light winning
> Make the prize light.[53]

APPENDIX TO THE CAUSES OF LOVE

Special mention should made of the cause of love which is being aware of being loved. Even if this can in some way comes under good and likeness (for it is good to be loved especially by the love of wishing well; and when someone wishes well to us, they are like us who love ourselves in this way), this cause of love is so important that it deserves special consideration.

St. Augustine has an excellent discourse on this cause of love:

> Moreover, what greater reason could there be for the Lord's coming than that God might manifest His love, ardently recommending it in our persons; because "when as yet we were enemies, Christ died for us"?
>
> And for this reason, that, inasmuch as love is the "end of the commandment" and the "fulfillment of he law", we also may love one another, and even as He laid down His life for us, so we also may lay down our life for the brethren.

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[52] Shakespeare, *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act V, Sc. 3

[53] Shakespeare, *Tempest*, Act I, Sc. 2

And with regard to God Himself, inasmuch as He first loved us and spared not His only Son, but delivered Him up for us all, even if at first we found it irksome to love Him, now at least, it should not prove irksome to return that love.

For there is nothing that invites love more than to be beforehand in loving: and that heart is overhard which, even though it were unwilling to bestow love, would be unwilling to return it.

But if we see that, even in the case of sinful and base attachments, those who desire to be loved in return make it their one concern to disclose and display by all the tokens in their power how much they love; if they also strive to counterfeit genuine affection in order that they may, in some measure, claim a return of love from the hearts which they are designing to ensnare; if, again, their own passions are the more inflamed when they perceive that the hearts which they are eager to win are also moved now by the same fire; if then, I say, both the hitherto callous heart is aroused when it is sensible of being loved, and the heart which was already aflame is the more inflamed the moment it learns that it is loved in return, it is obvious that there is no greater reason either for the birth or growth of love than when one, who does not yet love, perceives that he is loved, or when he who loves already hopes that he may yet be loved in return, or actually has proof that he is loved.

And if this holds good even in the case of base passions, how much more so in friendship? For what else do we have to be on our guard against in an offense against friendship than that our friend should think either that we do not love him, or that we love him less than he loves us? And if he believes this, he will be cooler in that love which men enjoy by the exchange of intimacy; and if he is not so weak that this offense causes him to grow cold in his affection altogether, he yet restricts himself to that form of affection which has as its object, not enjoyment, but utility.

But again, it is worthwhile to observe how, although even those that are superior desire to be loved by those who are inferior and are pleased by the eager deference these give them - and the more they become sensible of his affection, the more they love them - yet, with how much love is one who is inferior fired when he

> discovers that he is loved by him who is superior. For love is more welcome when it is not burnt up with the drought of want, but issues forth from the overflowing stream of beneficence. For the former springs from misery, the latter from mercy.
>
> And, furthermore, if the inferior person has been despairing that even he could be loved by the superior one, he will now be unspeakably moved to love if the superior one deigns of his own accord to show him how much he loves one who could by no means venture to promise himself so great a blessing.
>
> But what could be higher than God when he judges, and what more helpless than man when he sins? - than man who had so much the more submitted himself to the custody and dominion of insolent powers which cannot make him blessed, as he had the more despaired of the possibility of becoming the care of that power which wills not to be exalted in wickedness, but is exalted in goodness.[54]

Thomas also speaks of this cause:

> Since the perfect beatitude of man consists in the enjoyment of God, it was necessary that the affection of man be disposed to the desire of the enjoyment of God. The desire of enjoying some thing however is caused by the love of that thing. It is necessary then that man, tending to perfect beatitude, be induced to love God.
>
> Nothing however leads us to love someone as the experience of the same towards us.
>
> The love of God for men, however, can be shown in no way more efficaciously to man than through this, that he will to be united to man in person; for it is a property of love to unite the lover with the loved so far as it is possible.

---

[54] *De Catechizandis Rudibus*, Chapter Four

> It was necessary therefore for man tending in perfect beatitude that God become man.[55]

Why does someone loving us, and especially by a love that is not self-seeking, move us to love them in return? Here it seems that we are not so much loving a good in that person (although their love may be a good), but the return of love itself is seen to be good. To love seems itself to be good in this case. Returning love (at least a non-selfish one) seems to be just. Hence Augustine's words *rependere*. And in *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act I, Sc. 3 "lend and give". In one way we owe everyone some love. St. Catherine tells us to pay the "debt" of love we owe our neighbor. But if someone gives us a special love, do we not owe them a like love? We speak of returning someone's love as if the original was, as it were, lent.

Duane H. Berquist

[55] St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book Four, Chapter 54

EFFECTS OF LOVE

FIRST EFFECT OF LOVE - UNION

Rosalind speaks to Orlando about the sudden love of Oliver and Celia which leads to their union:

> O, I know where you are: nay, 'tis true: there was never any thing so sudden but the fight of two rams, and Caesar's thrasonical brag of - "I came, saw, and overcame."; for your brother and my sister no sooner met but they look'd; no sooner look'd but they lov'd; no sooner lov'd but they sighed; no sooner sigh'd but they ask'd one another the reason; no sooner knew the reason but they sought the remedy: and in these degrees have they made a pair of stairs to marriage which they will climb incontinent: they are in the very wrath of love and they will together: clubs cannot part them.[1]

Love can unite those who are far apart in their station in life as Helena believes and says:

> O, were that all! I think not on my father,
> And these great tears grace his remembrance more
> Than those I shed for him. What was he like?
> I have forgot him: my imagination
> Carries no favour in't but Bertram's.
> I am undone: there's no loving, none,
> If Bertram be away. 'Twere all one
> That I should love a bright particular star
> And think to wed it, he is so above me:
> In his bright radiance and collateral light
> Must I be comforted, not in his sphere.
> Th' ambition in my love thus plagues itself:
> The hind that would be mated by the lion
> Must die for love. 'Twas pretty, though a plague,

---

[1] Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, Act V, Sc. 2

To see him every hour; to sit and draw
His arched brows, his hawking eye, his curls,
In our heart's table; heart too capable
Of every line and trick of his sweet favour:
But now he's gone, and my idolatrous fancy
Must sanctify his relics. Who comes here?.....

Our remedies oft in ourselves do lie,
Which we ascribe to heaven: the fated sky
Gives us free scope; only doth backward pull
Our slow designs when we ourselves are dull.
What power is it which mounts my love so high,
That makes me see, and cannot feed mine eye?
The mightiest space in fortune nature brings
To join like likes, and kiss like native things.
Impossible be strange attempts to those
That weigh their pains in sense, and do suppose
What hath been cannot be: whoever strove
To show her merit, that did miss her love?
The king's disease - my project may deceive me,
But my intents are fix'd and will not leave me.[2]

Love itself makes us united with the loved, but we seek a further union with the loved because of this spiritual union. And this second union is not always possible as the poet laments:

Let me confess that we two must be twain,
Although our undivided loves are one.[3]

Love in making two to be one destroys number (since one is not a number) and amazes reason that two can be one:

So they lov'd, as love in twain
Had the essence but in one;
Two distincts, division none
Number there in love was slain.

---

[2] Shakespeare, *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act I, Sc. 1
[3] Shakespeare, *Sonnet 36,* lines 1-2

Hearts remote, yet not asunder,
Distance, and no space was seen
'Twixt the turtle and his queen
But in them it were a wonder.

So between them love did shine,
That the turtle saw his right
Flaming in the phoenix' sight;
Either was the other's mine.

Property was thus appall'd,
That the self was not the same,
Single nature's double name
Neither two nor one was call'd.

Reason, in itself confounded
Saw division grow together,
To themselves yet either neither,
Simple were so well compounded.

That it cried, "How true a twain
Seemeth this concordant one!
Love hath reason, reason none
If what parts can so remain![4]

Love of a man and woman can lead to marriage where they are made even more one. Thus Hymen (the god of Marriage) sings:

Then is there mirth in heaven
When earthly things made even
Atone together.
Good Duke, receive thy daughter;
Hymen from heaven brought her,
Yea, brought her hither
That thou mightst join her hand with his
Whose heart within his bosom is.[5]

---

[4] Shakespeare, *The Phoenix and the Turtle*, lines 25-48

[5] Shakespeare, *As You LIke It,* Act V, Sc. 4

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 28, Art. 1 - Whether union is an effect of love.

To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that union is not an effect of love.

1. For absence is opposed to union. For the Apostle says in the *Epistle to the Galatians*, Chapter 4, v. 18, "But be zealous for that which is good in the good always" (speaking of himself, as the Gloss says) "and not only when I am present with you." Therefore, union is not an effect of love.

2. Moreover, every union either is by nature, as form is united to matter and accident to subject, and part to whole or to another part to constitute a whole; or it is by likeness, either of genus or species or accident. But love does not cause the union of nature - otherwise love would never be had toward those who are divided by nature. And the union which is by likeness, love does not cause, but more is caused by it, as has been said. Therefore union is not an effect of love.

3. Moreover, the sense in act becomes the sensible in act and the understanding in act becomes the understood in act. But the lover in act does not become the loved in act. Therefore, union is more an effect of knowledge than of love.

But against this is what Dionysius says in chapter four *On the Divine Names* that any love is a "uniting power."

I answer that it should be said that there is a twofold union of the lover with the loved. One is according to things; for example, when the loved is present to the lover. And another by affection, which union should be considered from the preceding grasping - for the movement of desire follows grasping.

But there are two loves, namely, of wanting and of friendship; and each proceeds from some grasping of the unity of the loved with

the lover. For when someone loves something as wanting it, he grasps it as pertaining to his well-being. Likewise, when someone loves someone by the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good for himself. And hence it is that a friend is said to be *another self*. And Augustine says in the fourth book of the *Confessions*, "Someone said well about his friend: 'half of my soul'."

Love makes the first union then as an efficient cause, because it moves to desiring and seeking the presence of the loved as suitable to oneself and pertaining to one self.

It makes the second union, however, formally because love itself is such a union or binding.

Whence Augustine says in the eighth book *On the Trinity* that love is as a "certain life joining together or desiring to join together some two, namely, the lover and what is loved." For when he says "joining together". he refers to the union of affection without which there is no love; and that which he says "desiring to join together" pertains to the union in things.

To the first, therefore, it should be said that that objection proceeds about the union in things which pleasure requires as a cause; desire to be sure is in the real absence of the loved; love, indeed, both in the absence and in the presence.

To the second, it should be said that union is to love in three ways.

For some union is the cause of love. And this is the union of substance, as regards the love by which someone loves himself; as regards the love by which someone loves another, it is the union of likeness, as has been said.

But some union is essentially love itself. And this is the union by the fitting together of affection which is like the union of substance insofar as the lover is to the loved, in the union of friendship, as to himself; in the love of wanting, however, as to something of himself.

> And some union is the effect of love. And this is the real union which the lover seeks with the thing loved. And this union is according to the suitability of love. For as the Philosopher reports in the second book of the *Politics*, "Aristophanes said that lovers desire from two to become one"; but because "from this it would happen either that both or one of them would be corrupted", they seek a union which is suitable and fitting, as that they stay together and talk together and are joined in other things of this kind.
>
> To the third, it should be said that knowledge is perfected through this that the known is united to the knower by its likeness. But love brings about that the thing itself which is loved is united in some way to the lover, as has been said. Whence, love is more unifying than knowledge.

APPENDIX TO FIRST EFFECT OF LOVE - UNION

In the following reading, Thomas explains that love makes one *simpliciter* and not just *secundum quid:*

> ...unio est duplex: quaedam quae facit unum secundum quid, sicut unio congregatorum se superficialiter tangentium; et talis non est unio amoris, cum amans in interiora amati transformatur, ut dictum est.
>
> Alia est unio quae facit unum simpliciter, sicut unio continuorum et formae et materiae; et talis est unio amoris, quia amor facit amatum esse formam amantis; et ideo supra unionem addit *concretionem* ad differentiam primae unionis, quia concreta dicuntur quae simpliciter unum sunt effecta; unde et alia littera habet *continuativa*.[6]

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[6] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVII, Quaest. I, Art. I, Ad 5, n. 28:

In this reading, Thomas explains the order of love and pleasure and how love unites more than pleasure:

> ...amor naturaliter praecedit delectationem. Delectatio enim contingit ex conjunctione rei convenientis realiter; amor autem facit quod amatum sit amanti conveniens et quasi connaturale, inquantum unit affectum amantis amato, ut dictum est; et ideo ex amati reali praesentia consurgit delectatio.
>
> Sed quia delectatio etiam potest amari ut quoddam bonum, ideo contingit per accidens ut aliquis amor ex delectatione causetur, sicut actus ab objecto vel fine. Qui enim aliquid propter delectationem amat, delectationem ipsam praecipue amat.
>
> Quamvis ergo quaedam delectatio quodam amore sit prior, tamen amor delectatione simpliciter prior est.
>
> Similiter etiam vehementior; quia amor est per informationem appetitus ab appetibili, delectatio autem per conjunctionem rei ex re praesente sibi conveniente. Non autem est conjunctio rei ad rem quanta conjunctio appetitus ad appetibile; quia res adveniens quae delectationem causat, non conjungitur secundum naturam, quia hoc non fit illud; unde est ibi quasi conjunctio contactus, sed appetitus est ipsius appetibilis secundum suam naturam et substantiam. Unde quando appetitus informatur per appetible, est quasi conjunctio continuitatis et concretionis. Unde amor plus unit quam delectatio, quia facit quod amans sit secundum affectum ipsa res amata; delectatio autem est per participationem alicujus ab illo, secundum quod est realiter praesens.
>
> Sciendum autem quod quando amatum est praesens realiter, secundum quod possibile est, tunc est delectatio, sicut ex conjunctione maxime convenientis. Quando autem est omnino absens secundum rem, tunc maxime affligit; sicut ex divisione continui sequitur dolor, quia amor est continuativa vis, ut dictum est; et inde dicitur quod amor languere facit. Quando autem est secundum aliquid praesens et secundum aliquid absens, tunc habet delectationem admixtam afflictioni.[7]

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[7] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXVII, Quaest. I, Art. III, nn. 62-63

SECOND EFFECT OF LOVE - MUTUAL STAYING WITHIN

Antony says to Cleopatra that they will remain with each other even though they will be separated in place when he leaves Egypt to go to Rome:

> Come. Our separation so abides and flies,
> That thou residing here, goes yet with me.
> And I hence fleeting here remain with thee.[8]

And the Poet speaks of this remaining even after the body perishes:

> But be contented: when that fell arrest
> Without all bail shall carry me away,
> My life hath in this line some interest,
> Which for memorial still with thee shall stay.
>
> When thou reviewest this, thou dost review
> The very part was consecrate to thee:
> The earth can have but earth, which is his due;
> My spirit is thine, the better part of me:
>
> So then thou hast but lost the dregs of life,
> The prey of worms, my body being dead;
> The coward conquest of a wretch's knife,
> Too base of thee to be remembered.
>
> The worth of that is that which it contains,
> And that is this, and this with thee remains.[9]

---

[8] Shakespeare, *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act I, Sc. 3
[9] Shakespeare, *Sonnet 74*

And after Antony's marriage of convenience with Octavia, it is said of him:

> Antony will use his affection where it is.
> He married but his occasion here.[10]

And the Poet sees this mutual staying within as immovable when they continue to love each other:

> Then happy I, that love and am belov'd,
> Where I may not remove nor be remov'd.[11]

Helena speaks as if she cannot leave because her heart will stay behind with the one she loves:

> Hermia: Why, get you gone. Who is't that hinders you?
>
> Helena: A foolish heart, that I leave here behind.[12]

Romeo says that he must go back where his heart is:

> Can I go forward when my heart is here?
> Turn back, dull earth, and find thy centre out.

And it is said of Oliver and Cecilia that the heart of each is in the other's heart:

> you and you are heart in heart[13]

And the King says to his beloved:

> Hence ever then my heart is in thy breast.[14]

Benedick couples inwardness and love:

> And...you know my inwardness and love

---

[10] *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act II, Sc. 6:s
[11] Shakespeare, *Sonnet 25*, lines 13-14:
[12] Shakespeare, *A Midsummer NIght's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 2
[13] Shakespeare, *As You Like It*, Act V, Sc. 4
[14] Shakespeare, *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act V, Sc. 2

Is very much unto the prince and Claudio.[15]

Shakespeare often has the metaphor of love being *rooted* in the beloved. (Thomas also in this second article speaks of love as *rooted.*) Thus the Countess says about her love for Helen:

> I would I had not known him; it was the death of the most virtuous gentlewoman that ever nature had praise for creating. If she had partaken of my flesh, and cost me the dearest groans of a mother, I could not have owed her a more rooted love.[16]

And Helen herself says about another:

> But this exceeding posting, day and night,
> Must wear your spirits low; we cannot help it:
> But since you have made the days and nights as one,
> To wear your gentle limbs in my affairs,
> Be bold you do so grow in my requital
> As nothing can unroot you.[17]

And in *Henry VI, Part III:*

> Myself have often heard him say and swear
> That this his love was an eternal plant,
> Whereof the root was fix'd in virtue's ground,
> The leaves and fruit maintain'd with beauty's sun.[18]

Duncan says to Macbeth and Banquo who have served him so well:

> Welcome hither:
> I have begun to plant thee, and will labor
> To make thee full of growing. Noble Banquo,
> Thou hast no less deserv'd, nor must be known
> No less to have done so, let me infold thee
> And hold thee to my heart.[19]

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[15] Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act IV, Sc. 1
[16] *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act IV, Sc. 5
[17] *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act V, Sc. 1
[18] *Henry VI, Part III*, Act III, Sc. 3

When friends have thus grown together, their separation can be compared to the pulling apart of a body:

> I grow to you, and our parting is a tortured body.[20]

The beloved seems to be a part of the lover. Don Pedro says:

> I would she had bestowed this dotage on me; I would have daffed all other respects and made her half myself.[21]

And Romeo speaks of Juliet as his soul:

> It is my soul that calls upon my name.[22]

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 28, Art. 2 - Whether mutual staying within is an effect of love.

> One goes forward thus to the second. It seems that love does not cause a mutual staying within; that is to say, that the lover is in the loved and the reverse.
>
> 1. For what is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contained. Therefore, mutual staying within, so that the loved is in the lover and vice-versa, cannot be caused by love.
>
> 2. Moreover, nothing can penetrate into the interior of some whole without division. But to divide what are joined in the thing does not pertain to the desiring power in which love is, but to reason. Therefore, mutual staying within is not an effect of love.

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[19] *Macbeth*, Act I, Sc. 4
[20] Shakespeare, *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act II, Sc. 1
[21] Shakespeare, *Much Ado about Nothing*, Act II, Sc. 3

[22] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 1

3. Moreover, if the lover through love is in the loved and vice-versa, it follows that the loved is in this way joined to the lover, just as the lover to the loved. But this union is itself love, as has been said. Therefore, it follows that always the lover is loved by the loved, which is clearly false. Therefore, mutual staying within is not an effect of love.

But on the other side is what is said in the *First Epistle of John*, Chapter 4, v. 16" "Who remains in charity, remains in God and God in him." Charity however is the love of God. Therefore for the same reason, every love makes the loved to be in the lover and vice-versa.

I answer that this effect of mutual staying within can be understood as regards the knowing power and as regards the desiring power.

For as regards the knowing power, the loved is said to be in the lover insofar as the loved remains within the knowledge of the lover, according to that in the *Epistle to the Philippians*, Chapter 1, v. 7, "in that I have you in mind."

The lover is said to be in the loved by knowledge insofar as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial knowledge of he loved, but strives to search into everything which pertains to the loved; just as it is said about the Holy Spirit, who is the love of God, in the *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, Chapter 2, v. 10, that "he searches even into the depths of God."

But as regards the desiring power, the loved is said to be in the lover according as it is in his affection through a certain agreement so that he delights in it or in its good when present; or when absent he tends towards the loved itself through the love of wanting or to the goods he wills to the loved through the love of friendship, and not from some cause as when someone desires something for another thing or when someone wishes good to another because of something else, but because the agreement of the loved is rooted within. Whence love is said to be *intimate* and the *bowels* of charity are mentioned.

Conversely, the lover is in the loved, but in one way by the love of wanting and in another way by the love of friendship.

For the love of wanting does not rest in the extrinsic or superficial attaining or enjoyment of the loved, but seeks to have perfectly the loved, by arriving at the intimate parts of it.

In the love of friendship, the lover is in the loved insofar as he considers the good or bad things of the friend as his own and the will of the friend as his own, so that he seems to undergo and be affected, as if in his friend And because of this, it is a property of friends "to wish the same things, and to sorrow and rejoice in the same" according to the Philosopher in the ninth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* and in the second book of the *Rhetoric*.

Thus the lover, insofar as he regards what belongs to the loved as his own, seems to be in the loved as made the same as the loved. However, insofar as conversely, he wills and acts for the friend as for himself, as considering the friend the same as himself, thus the loved is in the lover.

Mutual staying within can be understood in a third way in the love of friendship according to the way of returning love, insofar as friends mutually love one another and will and do good for each other.

To the first therefore, it should be said that the loved is contained in the lover insofar as it is pressed upon his emotions by a certain agreement. Conversely, the lover is contained in the loved, insofar as the lover pursues what is intimate in the loved. Nothing however prevents something from being a container and contained in diverse ways, as the genus is contained in the species and vice-versa.

To the second, it should be said that the knowledge of reason precedes the affection of love. And therefore, as reason inquires within, so the affection of love enters deeply into the loved, as is clear from what has been said.

To the third, it should be said that that argument proceeds about the third way of mutual staying within, which is not found in every love.

THIRD EFFECT OF LOVE - ECSTASY

Proteus speaks of leaving himself and all because of his love for Julia:

> He after honour hunts, I after love.
> He leaves his friends to dignify them more;
> I leave myself, my friends, and all, for love.[23]

And Romeo speaks of having lost himself in his ecstasy from the love of Juliet:

> I have lost myself; I am not here,
> This is not Romeo, he's some other where.[24]

Ferdinand hopes that Miranda's love has not gone forth yet:

> O, if a virgin,
> And your affection not gone forth, I'll make you
> The queen of Naples.[25]

When Bassanio chooses rightly, Portia fears that the ecstasy may be too much for her:

> O love,
> Be moderate, allay thy ecstasy;
> In measure rain thy joy; scant this excess,
> I feel too much thy blessing: make it less
> For fear I surfeit.[26]

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[23] Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 1
[24] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 1
[25] Shakespeare, *Tempest*, Act I, Sc. 2
[26] Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice*, Act III, Sc. 2

Polonius thinks that the madness of Hamlet is a result of the ecstasy he has undergone as a result of his love for Ophelia (and the denying of access to her):

> This is the very ecstasy of love,
> Whose violent property fordoes itself
> And leads the will to desperate undertakings
> As oft as any passion under heaven
> That does afflict our natures.[27]

Ecstasy is seen sometimes to be very dangerous:

> and the ecstasy hath so much overborne her, that my daughter is sometimes afeard she will do a desperate outrage to herself.[28]

Parents can undergo ecstasy in regard to the child they love so much. Thus Leontes about his only daughter Hero:

> But mine, and mine I lov'd, and mine I prais'd,
> And mine that I was proud on, mine so much
> That I myself was to myself not mine,
> Valuing of her....[29]

And when Juliet is found apparently dead on her wedding day, her mother and father go out of themselves:

> Capulet's wife: O me, O me! my child, my only life!
> Revive, look up, or I will die with thee.....
>
> Capulet: O child, O child! my soul and not my child!
> Dead art thou. Alack! my child is dead,
> And with my child my joys are buried.[30]

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[27] *Hamlet*, Act II, Sc. 1
[28] Shakespeare, *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act II, Sc. 3
[29] *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act IV, Sc. 1

[30] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act IV, Sc. 4

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 28, Art. 3 - Whether ecstasy is an effect of love.

One goes forward to the third thus: it seems that ecstasy is not an effect of love.

1. For ecstasy seems to bring in some alienation of mind. But love does not always make alienation; for lovers are sometimes in full possession of their mental powers. Therefore, love does not make ecstasy.

2. Moreover, the lover wants the loved to be united to himself. Therefore, he draws the loved to himself more than he goes forward to the loved, going outside himself.

3. Moreover, love joins the loved to the lover, as has been said. If therefore the lover tends outside himself so that he may go into the loved, it follows that he always loves the loved more than himself, which is clearly false. Therefore, ecstasy is not an effect of love.

But on the other side is what Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names*, that "divine love makes ecstasy" and that "God himself undergoes ecstasy because of love." Since then every love is some participating likeness of the divine love, as is said there, it seems that any love causes ecstasy.

I answer that someone is said to undergo ecstasy when he is placed outside himself, which happens both according to the grasping power and according to the desiring power.

According to the knowing power, someone is said to be placed outside himself when he is placed outside the knowledge proper to him - either because he is lifted up to a higher one, as man, when he is raised up to comprehending some things which are above sense and reason, is said to undergo ecstasy, insofar as he is placed outside the connatural knowledge of reason and sense; or because he is pressed down to the lower, as when someone who falls into fury or madness is said to undergo ecstasy.

> By the desiring power, someone is said to undergo ecstasy when his desire is carried into another, going forth in some way outside himself.
>
> Love makes the first ecstasy by way of disposition, insofar as it makes one meditate on the loved, as has been said; intense meditation on one thing withdraws from other things.
>
> But love makes the second ecstasy directly - the love of friendship, simply, and the love of wanting, not simply, but in some respect. For in the love of wanting, the lover is in some way carried outside himself insofar as, not content to rejoice in the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside of himself, But because he seeks to have that extrinsic good for himself, he does not go outside himself simply, but such affection in the end is enclosed within him. But in the love of friendship, the affection of someone goes outside himself simply, because he wills good to his friend as having care and foresight over him for the sake of the friend himself.
>
> To the first, therefore, it should be said that that reason proceeds in regard to the first ecstasy.
>
> To the second, it should be said that that reason proceeds about the love of wanting which does not make ecstasy simply, as has been said
>
> To the third, it should be said that the one who loves goes outside himself to the extent that he wishes and does what is good for his friend Nevertheless, he does not wish the goods of his friend more than his own. Whence, it does not follow that he loves the other more than himself.

And a reading where Thomas speaks of the ecstasy of God:

> ...amor omnis tranfert quodammodo amantem in amatum, sed diversimode. Uno modo secundum quod amans transfertur in participandum ea quae sunt amati; alio modo ut communicet amato ea quae sunt sua.

> Primo ergo modo Deus non transfertur in amatum quod est creatura, sed secundo modo, inquantum bonitatem suum ei communicat; et sic dicit Dionysius, 4 cap. *De div. nom.* quod ipse Deus est per amorem extasim passus.[31]

FOURTH EFFECT OF LOVE - JEALOUSY OR ZEAL

The Latin word for this effect can be carried over by *jealousy* or by *zeal*. These do not mean the same for the jealous person is more moving against what prevents him from enjoying the loved while zeal is more moving against what can or does harm the loved.

Shakespeare often puts the effect of a cause in the adjective modifying that cause:

> .....more vindicative than jealous love.[32]

Valentine speaks to Proteus of his jealousy in regard to his beloved, Silvia:

> My foolish rival, that her father likes,
> Only for his possessions are so huge,
> Is gone with her along, and I must after,
> For love, thou know'st, is full of jealousy.[33]

In one of his narrative poems, Shakespeare teaches us the role of jealousy in defending the interests of love:

> For where Love reigns, disturbing Jealousy
> Doth call himself Affection's sentinel.[34]

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[31] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum*, Dist. XXXII, Art. I, Ad 3, nn. 17-18

[32] *Troilus and Cressida,* Act IV, Sc. 5

[33] Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona,* Act II, Sc. 4

[34] *Venus and Adonis*, lines 649-650

Grushenka approves of her lover's jealousy for this effect of love is a true sign of his love for her:

> I am not offended that he is jealous of a girl like me. I would be offended if he were not jealous. I am like that. I am not offended at jealousy. I have a fierce heart, too. I can be jealous myself.[35]

Roderick Random's jealousy is very familiar:

> The ball-night being arrived, I dressed myself in a suit I had reserved for some grand occasion; and having drunk tea with Narcissa and her brother, conducted my angel to the scene, where she in a moment eclipsed all her female competitors for beauty, and attracted the admiration of the whole assembly. My heart dilated with pride on this occasion, and my triumph rejected all bounds, when, after we had danced together, a certain nobleman, remarkable for his figure and influence in the *beau monde*, came up, and in the hearing of all present, honoured us with a very particular compliment upon our accomplishments and appearance. But this transport was soon checked, when I perceived his lordship attach himself with great assiduity to my mistress, and say some warm things, which, I thought savoured too much of passion. It was then I began to feel the pangs of jealousy - I dreaded the power and address of my rival - I sickened at his discourse; when she opened her lips to answer, my heart died within me. When she smiled, I felt the pains of the damned! I was enraged at his presumption; I cursed her complaisance; at length he quitted her, and went to the other side of the room. Narcissa, suspecting nothing of the rage that inflamed me, put some questions to me as soon as he was gone, to which I made no reply, but assumed a grim look, which too well denoted the agitation of my breast, and surprised her not a little. She no sooner observed my motion, than she changed colour, and asked what ailed me.[36]

Jealousy makes one notice another's attention to one's beloved:

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[35] Feodor Dostoyevsky, *The Brothers Karamazov*, Book XI, Chapter 1

[36] Tobias Smollett, *The Adventures of Roderick Random*, Chapter LVII

> Frances had, with the keen eye of jealous love, easily detected the attachment of Isabella Singleton to Dunwoodie.[37]

But jealousy in the sense of zeal to defend the loved against what could harm the beloved is seen more in the words of Antonio to Sebastian:

> I could not stay behind you: my desire,
> More sharp than filed steel, did spur me forth;
> And not all love to see you, though so much
> As might have drawn one to a longer voyage,
> But jealousy what might befall your travel,
> Being skilless in these parts, which to a stranger,
> Unguided and unfriended, often prove
> Rough and inhospitable: my willing love,
> The rather by these arguments of fear,
> Set forth in your pursuit.[38]

But when the love cools, so does the zeal:

> This act so evilly borne shall cool the hearts
> Of all his people and freeze up their zeal,
> That none so small advantage shall step forth
> To check his reign, but they shall cherish it.[39]

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 28, Art. 4 - Whether jealousy or zeal is an effect of love.

> One goes forward to the fourth thus. It seems that jealousy is not an effect of love.

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[37] James Fenimore Cooper, *The Spy*, Chapter XIX, Dodd, Mead and Company, 1946, p. 183

[38] Shakespeare, *Twelfth Night*, Act III, Sc. 3

[39] Shakespeare, *King John*, Act III, Sc. 4

1. For jealousy is the beginning of strife. Whence it is said in the *First Epistle to the Corinthians*, Chapter 3, v. 3: "Since there is jealousy and strife among you etc." But strife is opposed to love. Therefore jealousy is not an effect of love.

2. Moreover, the object of love is the good which communicates itself. But jealousy is opposed to communication. For it seems to pertain to jealousy that someone does not endure sharing of the loved; as men are said to be jealous about their wives whom they do not want to have in common with others. Therefore, jealousy is not an effect of love.

3. Further, jealousy is not without hate, just as not without love; for it is said in *Psalm 72*, v. 3, "I was jealous over the wicked." Therefore, it ought not to be said to be an effect of love more than of hate.

But against this is what Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names*, that "God is called jealous because of the great love which he has for existing things."

I answer that jealousy, in whatever way it is taken, comes from the intensity of love. For it is clear that when some power tends more intensely towards something, the more strongly does it repel everything contrary or opposing. Since therefore love is a *certain motion toward the loved,* as Augustine says in the book of the *Eighty-Three Questions*, an intense love seeks to exclude everything which is repugnant to it.

But this happens otherwise in the love of wanting and in the love of friendship.

For in the love of wanting, the one who intensely desires something is moved against everything that opposes the getting or the quiet enjoyment of what is loved. And in this way, men are said to be jealous for their wives lest, through the sharing of others, there be impeded the uniqueness which they seek in a wife. Likewise, those who seek excellence are moved against those who seem to excel, as impeding their excellence. And this is the jealousy of envy about

which it is said in *Psalm 36*, v. 1: "Do not be jealous of the wicked, nor envious of those who do wrong."

But the love of friendship seeks the good of the friend; whence, when it is intense, it makes a man move against everything which is opposed to the good of the friend. And according to this, someone is said to have jealousy (zeal) for a friend, when, if anything is said or done against the good of the friend, a man is eager to repel it. And in this way, someone is said to be jealous (zealous) for good when he ties to drive away, according to his ability, those things which are against the honour or the will of God, according to that in the third book of *Kings*, Chapter 19, v. 14: "With zeal Have I been zealous for the Lord God of hosts." And *John*, Chapter 2, v. 17, the Gloss says, about the words "The zeal for thy house has eaten me up," that "he is consumed with a good zeal, who strives to correct the evils he sees; and if he is unable to do so, he tolerates them and laments them."

To the first, therefore, it ought to be said that the Apostle speaks there of the jealousy of envy which is the cause of strife, not against the thing loved, but for the thing loved against the impediments to it.

To the second it ought to be said that the good is loved insofar as it is communicable to the one loving. Whence everything that impedes the perfection of this communication is made hateful. And thus jealousy is caused from the love of the good. But it happens, from defect of goodness, that some small goods are not able as a whole to be possessed together by many. And from the love of such things is caused the jealousy of envy. But this does not properly happen in those things which are able as a whole to be possessed by many. For no one envies another in the knowledge of truth, which is able to be known as a whole by many, except perhaps about the excellence of such knowledge.

To the third, it should be said that the very fact that someone hates those things which are opposed to the loved, proceeds from love. Whence jealousy is placed more as an effect of love than of hate.

FIFTH EFFECT OF LOVE - LOVER BETTER OR WORSE

A good love is a perfection of the lover and perfects the lover. A bad love is a corruption of the lover and corrupts him.

A love can be bad either because the object loved is bad (for example, murder) or because the way it is loved is bad (for example, if I love wine or food too much or before everything else).

Hence, for a love to be good, both the object loved and the way it is loved must be good.

Further, one love is better than another either because the object loved is better (for example, the love of wisdom is better than the love of candy) or because the way it is loved is better (it is better to love someone by the love of wishing well than by the love of wanting).

Proteus sees his love for Julia as making him weak and sick:

> He after honour hunts, I after love.
> He leaves his friends to dignify them more;
> I leave myself, my friends, and all, for love.
> Thou, Julia, thou hast metamorphos'd me;
> Made me neglect my studies, lose my time,
> War with good counsel, set the world at nought;
> Made wit with musing weak, heart sick with thought.[40]

Unrequited love especially seems harmful to the lover:

> Benvolio: Good morrow, cousin.
>
> Romeo: Is the day so young?
>
> Benvolio: But new struck nine.

[40] Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 1

Romeo: Ay me! sad hours seem long.
Was that my father that went hence so fast?

Benvolio: It was. What sadness lengthens Romeo's hours?

Benvolio: In love?

Romeo: Out -

Benvolio: of love?

Romeo: Out of her favour, where I am in love.

Benvolio: Alas, that love, so gentle in his view,
Should be so tyrannous and rough in proof![41]

Iago also sees the effect of love upon Roderigo:

.....Now, my sick fool Roderigo,
Whom love hath turn'd almost the wrong side out,
To Desdemona hath to-night carous'd
Potations pottle-deep; and he's to watch.[42]

A common effect of love upon the lover is melancholy:

Claudio: That's as much as to say the sweet youth's in love.

D. Pedro: The greatest note of it is his melancholy.[43]

Love is blind; that is, it makes the lover blind. But it is bad to be blind. Therefore, love makes the lover worse.

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[41] *Romeo and Juliet,* Act I, Sc.1

[42] Shakespeare, *Othello*, Act II, Sc. 3

[43] Shakespeare, *Much Ado about Nothing*, Act III, Sc. 2

Sherlock Holmes says that love is destructive of the logical faculty and it is commonly said that the lover is made foolish by love. But man is man by his reason.

Love often brings the lover often to some kind of excess:

> she loves him with an enraged affection: it is past the infinite of thought.[44]

Hence, Lucetta urges Julia to be moderate:

> Julia: Didst thou but know the inly touch of love,
> Thou wouldst as soon go kindle fire with snow
> As seek to quench the fire of love with words.
>
> Lucetta: I do not seek to quench your love's hot fire,
> But qualify the fire's extreme rage,
> Lest it should burn above the bounds of reason.[45]

Portia also tries to moderate herself:

> O love,
> Be moderate, allay thy ecstasy;
> In measure rain thy joy; scant this excess,
> I feel too much thy blessing: make it less
> For fear I surfeit.[46]

Goethe said "We are shaped and fashioned by what we love". And this can be seen in Silas:

> He had clung with all the force of his nature to his work and his money; and like all objects to which a man devotes himself, they had fashioned him into correspondence with themselves. His loom,

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[44] Shakespeare, *Much Ado about Nothing*, Act II, Sc. 3

[45] Shakespeare, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act II, Sc. 7

[46] Shakespeare, *Merchant of Venice,* Act III, Sc. 2

> as he wrought in it without ceasing, had in its turn wrought on him. and confirmed more and more the monotonous craving for its monotonous response. His gold, as he hung over it and saw it grow, gathered his power of loving together into a hard isolation like its own.[47]

Cooper, in the introduction to his novel, *The Spy*, has touched upon the elevating effect of one kind of love:

> The author has often been asked if there was any foundation in real life for the delineation of the principal character in this book. He can give no clearer answer to the question than by laying before his readers a simple statement of the facts connected with its original publication. Many years since, the writer of this volume was at the residence of an illustrious man, who had been employed in various situations of high trust during the darkest days of the American Revolution. The discourse turned upon the effects which great political excitement produces on character, and the purifying consequences of a love of country, when that sentiment is powerfully and generally awakened in a people. He who, from his years, his services, and his knowledge of men, was best qualified to take the lead in such a conversation, was the principal speaker. After dwelling on the marked manner in which the great struggle of the nation, during the war of 1775, had given a new and honorable direction to the thoughts and practices of multitudes whose time had formerly been engrossed by the most vulgar concerns of life, he illustrated his opinions by relating an anecdote, the truth of which he could attest as a personal witness.[48]

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 28, Art. 5 - Whether love is a passion harming the lover.

> One goes forward to the fifth thus. It seems that love is a harmful passion.

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[47] George Eliot, *Silas Marner,* Chapter Five

[48] James Fenimore Cooper, *The Spy*, from the Author's Introduction

1. For weakness signifies a certain harming of the one weakened. But love causes weakness; for it is said in the *Song of Songs*, Chapter 2, v. 5: "stay me up with flowers, compass me about with apples, because I faint with love." Therefore, love is a harmful passion.

2. Moreover, melting is a certain dissolution. But love is a melter; for it is said in the *Song of Songs*, Chapter 5, v. 6: "My soul melted when he (my beloved) spoke." Therefore, love dissolves. It is therefore corruptive and harmful.

3. Moreover, raging or boiling signifies a certain excess in heat, which excess is corrupting. But raging or boiling is caused from love. For Dionysius puts in the seventh chapter of the *Celestial Hierarchy*, among other properties pertaining to the love of the Seraphim, *hot* and *acute* and *boiling over*. And in the *Song of Songs*, Chapter 8, v. 6, it is said about love that "the lamps thereof are fire and flames." Therefore, love is a harmful and corrupting passion or emotion.

But against this is what Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names*, that "individual things love themselves in a containing way", that is, in a conserving way. Therefore, love is not a harmful passion, but more a conserving and perfecting one.

I answer that it should be said, as has been said above, that love signifies the fitting of the desiring power with some good. Nothing however which is fitted to something which is suitable to it is harmed from this; but rather it advances and is made better. But what is fitted to something that is not suitable to it is harmed and made worse from this. Love, therefore, of a suitable good perfects and makes better the lover. Love however of a good which is not suitable to the lover harms and makes worse the lover. Whence man is most of all perfected and made better by the love of God. But he is harmed and made worse by the love of sin according to that in *Osee,* Chapter 9, v. 10: "They are made abominable just as those things they have loved."

And this has been said about love as regards what is formal in it which is from the desiring power. But as regard what is material in

the passion of love, which is some bodily change, it happens that love is harmful because of the excess of change; just as happens in sense and in every act of a power of the soul which is performed through some change of a bodily organ.

To those which are objected contrariwise, it should be said that four proximate effects can be attributed to love: namely, melting, enjoyment, faintness and raging.

Among which melting is first which is opposed to hardening. Things which are hardened are drawn together in themselves so that they are not able to admit easily the entrance of another. But it pertains to love that the desiring power be fitted to the reception of the good loved insofar as the loved is in the lover, as has been said. Whence the freezing or hardness of the heart is a disposition which is opposed to love. But melting signifies a certain softening of the heart by which the heart shows itself as suitable for the loved to enter into it.

If then the loved is present and had, it causes delight or enjoyment

If however it is absent, there follows two passions: namely sadness over the absence which is signified by *faintness* or *weakness* (whence Tully in the third book of the *Tusculan Questions* most all names sadness *sickness*) and intense desire of obtaining the loved which is signified by *raging*.

And these are the effects of love taken formally according to the relation of the desiring power to its object. But in the passion of love, there follows some effects proportional to these, according to the change of the organ.

SIXTH EFFECT OF LOVE - ALL THE LOVER DOES

All the passions of Cleopatra seem to proceed from her love and Shakespeare expresses this by saying they are *made of love:*

her passions are made of nothing but the finest part of pure love[49]

And Romeo sees how even hate is an effect of love:

> .....O me! What fray was here?
> Yet tell me not, for I have heard it all.
> Here's much to do with hate, but more with love.
> Why, then, O brawling love! O loving hate![50]

Cressida, under the influence of her passionate love of Troilus, thinks that it will draw all things to it:

> I will not, uncle! I have forgot my father;
> I know no touch of consanguinity;
> No kin, no love, no blood, no soul, so near me
> As the sweet Troilus. O, you gods divine!
> Make Cressid's name the very crown of falsehood
> If ever she leave Troilus! Time, force, and death
> Do to this body what extremity you can,
> But the strong base and building of my love
> Is as the very center of the earth,
> Drawing all things to it. I will go in and weep.[51]

And David is inspired by love of Dora to do all that will lead to her:

> I began the next day with another dive into the Roman bath, and then started to Highgate. I was not dispirited now...What I had to do was, to turn the painful discipline of my younger days to account, by going to work with a resolute and steady heart. What I had to do was, to take my woodsman's axe in my hand, and clear my own way through the forest of difficulty, by cutting down the trees until I came to Dora. And I went on at a mighty rate, as if it could be done by walking...it seemed as if a complete change had come on my whole life. But that did not discourage me. With the

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[49] *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act I, Sc. 2

[50] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 1

[51] Shakespeare, *Troilus and Cressida*, Act IV, Sc. 2

> new life came new purpose, new intention. Great was the labour; priceless the reward. Dora was the reward, and Dora must be won. I got into such a transport that I felt quite sorry my coat was not a little shabby already. I wanted to be cutting at those trees in the forest of difficulty, under circumstances that should prove my strength. I had a good mind to ask an old man, in wire spectacles, who was breaking stones upon the road, to lend me his hammer for a little while, and let me begin to beat a path to Dora out of granite. I stimulated myself into such a heat, and got so out of breath, that I felt as if I had been earning I don't know how much.[52]

St. Augustine:

> Where there is love, either no labor is felt, or the labor itself is loved.

Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, Prima Secundae, Q. 28, Art. 6 - Whether love is the cause of all the lover does.

> It seems that the lover does not do all things from love.
>
> 1. For love is a certain passion, as has been said above. But man does not do all things from passion, but some he does from choice and some from ignorance, as is said in the fifth book of the *Ethics*. Therefore, a man does not do from love all things that he does.
>
> 2. Moreover, desire is the beginning of motion and action in all animals, as is clear in the third book *On The Soul*. If therefore a man did from love all that he does, the other passions of the desiring part would be superfluous.
>
> 3. Moreover, nothing is caused at once from contrary causes. But some things come to be from hate. All things, therefore, are not from love.

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[52] Charles Dickens, *David Copperfield*, Chapter XXXVI, Enthusiasm

But against this is what Dionysius says in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names*, that "all things do whatever they do through love of the good."

I answer that it ought to be said that every agent acts for some end, as has been said above. The end, however, is the good desired and loved by each. Whence it is clear that every agent, whatever it be, does any action from some love.

To the first, therefore, it ought to be said that that objection proceeds as regards the love which is a passion existing in the sense desiring power. We, however, are speaking now about love taken commonly, insofar as it comprehends under itself intellectual, rational, animal and natural love - for thus speaks Dionysius about love in the fourth chapter *About the Divine Names*.

To the second, it ought to be said that from love, as has been said, are caused desire and sadness and pleasure, and consequently all other passions. Whence every action which proceeds from any passion, proceeds also from love, as from a first cause. Whence the other passions, which are proximate causes, are not superfluous.

To the third, it should be said that hate is also caused from love, as will be said below.

Duane H. Berquist

SHAKESPEARE'S ETHICS

Shakespeare tells us in a very succinct way what ethics is about in the words of Lucentio:

> Vincentio's son, brought up in Florence,
> It shall become to serve all hopes conceiv'd,
> To deck his fortune with his virtuous deeds.
> And therefore, Tranio, for the time I study
> Virtue and that part of philosophy
> Will I apply that treats of happiness
> By virtue especially to be achieved.[1]

Whoever has studied the *Nicomachean Ethics* can see how precise are the words of Lucentio. Ethics is that part or kind of philosophy which is about happiness and how it can be achieved, which is chiefly through virtue.[2]

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[1] *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act I, Sc. 1

[2] In the longer passage from which this is taken, Shakespeare also touches upon the other parts of philosophy:

The Taming of the Shrew, Act I, Sc. 1:

Lucentio: Tranio, since for the great desire I had
To see fair Padua, nursery of arts,
I am arriv'd for fruitful Lombardy,
The pleasant garden of great Italy,
And by my father's love and leave am arm'd
With his good will and thy good company,
My trusty servant well approv'd in all.
Here let us breathe and haply institute
A course of learning and ingenious studies.
Pisa, renowned for grave citizens,
Gave me my being and my father first,
A merchant of great traffic through the world,
Vincentio come of the Bentivolii.
Vincentio's son, brought up in Florence,
It shall become to serve all hopes conceiv'd,
To deck his fortune with his virtuous deeds:
And therefore, Tranio, for the time I study
Virtue and that part of philosophy
Will I apply that treats of happiness

Shakespeare touches upon the connection between virtue and happiness with a pun on the word *mean* in the words of Nerissa:

> they are as sick that surfeit with too much, as they that starve with nothing. It is no mean happiness, therefore, to be seated in the mean.[3]

Virtue, and especially moral virtue, lie in the middle or mean. (But the virtue of reason is also a mean for truth is between two mistakes.) And to hit the golden mean is to go a long way towards happiness. One will be very happy if

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By virtue especially to be achiev'd.
Tell me thy mind, for I have Pisa left
And am to Padua come, as he that leaves
A shallow plash to plunge him in the deep
And with satiety seeks to quench his thirst.

Tranio: *Me pardonato*, gentle master mine:
I am in all affected as yourself,
Glad that you thus continue your resolve
To suck the sweets of sweet philosophy.
Only, good master, while we do admire
This virtue and this moral discipline,
Let's be no stoics nor no stocks, I pray;
Or so devote to Aristotle's checks
As Ovid be an outcast quite abjur'd.
Balk logic with acquaintance that you have
And practice rhetoric in you common talk.
Music and poesy use to quicken you;
The mathematics and the metaphysics,
Fall to them as you find your stomach serves you.
No profit grows where is no pleasure tane;
In brief, sir, study what you most affect.

Lucentio: Gramercies, Tranio, well dost thou advise.

Shakespeare mentions just the beginning and the end of looking philosophy so he can alliterate. In *king Lear,* he calls the middle part, *the wisdom of nature*. And he seems to put together logic and rhetoric, and then music and poesy, as more tools than the main or chief parts of philosophy.

[3] *The Merchant of Venice*, Act I, Sc. 2

one hits the mean in one's feelings and actions and thinking. And Shakespeare rightly compares virtue to the health of the body which is between the two sick extremes of too much or too little (like an overactive or underactive thyroid, for example). Virtue could be considered as the health of the soul. (Even the virtues of reason are in the middle between two errors or mistake.) Thus, the Queen speaks of sin's true nature as a kind of sickness of the soul:

> To my sick soul, as sin's true nature is,
> Each toy seems prologue to some great amiss.[4]

But in Portia's replying to the words of Nerissa, Shakespeare touches upon the much greater difficulty of doing what is good than knowing what is good:

> Portia: Good sentences and well pronounced.
>
> Nerissa: They would be better if well followed.
>
> Portia: If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches, and poor men's cottages princes' palaces. It is a good divine that follows his own instructions: I can easier teach twenty what were good to be done, than be one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching. The brain may devise laws for the blood, but a hot temper leaps o'er a cold decree: such a hare is madness the youth, to skip o'er the meshes of good counsel the cripple.

Since the end of ethics is to do what is good or what is better, it is important to see that knowing is not enough and that ethics should be followed by the effort to do what one has learned is good or better and that here will be the greatest difficulty.[5]

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[4] *Hamlet*, Act IV, Sc. 5

[5] Perhaps, it is good to quote the whole passage from which these two quotes are taken.

The Merchant of Venice, Act I, Sc. 2:

> Portia: By my troth, Nerissa, my little body is

HAPPINESS IS THE CHIEF GOOD AND END OF MAN

Shakespeare see the chief importance of the end (in the sense of purpose). In the words of Helena:

> All's well that ends well: still the fine's the crown;
> Whate'er the course, the end is the renown.[6]

("fine" here, like its Latin origin, means end or purpose.)

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aweary of this great world.

Nerissa: You would be, sweet madam, if your miseries were in the same abundance as your good fortunes are: and yet, for aught I see, they are as sick that surfeit with too much as they that starve with nothing. it is no mean happiness therefore to be seated in the mean: superfluity comes sooner by white hairs, but competency lives longer.

Portia: Good sentences and well pronounced.

Nerissa: They would be better if well followed.

Portia: If to do were as easy as to know what were good to do, chapels had been churches, and poor men's cottages princes' palaces. It is a good divine that follows his own instructions: I can easier teach twenty what were good to be done, than be one of the twenty to follow mine own teaching. The brain may devise laws for the blood, but a hot temper leaps o'er a cold decree: such a hare is madness the youth, to skip o'er the meshes of good counsel the cripple.

[6] *All's well that Ends Well*, Act IV. Sc. 4

Metaphorically, happiness is called sweet:

> And, to be short, what not that's sweet and happy.[7]

> Lo, as at English feasts, so I regreet [greet]
> The daintiest last, to make the end most sweet.[8]

The likeness in this metaphor is that the sweet is pleasant, restful and refreshing. It is pleasant for man to reach his end for the end is good and restful for the end is not for the sake of anything else so that one can rest in it and refreshing for rest refreshes us.

But the opposite of happiness could be called metaphorically *sour:*

> Sour woe[9]

And after the happy victory of the Britons over the Romans, Cornelius, bringing in news of the Queen's death, says:

> Hail, great king!
> To sour your happiness, I must report
> The queen is dead.[10]

But speaking properly, the opposite of happy is *wretched* or *miserable.* As Lady Capulet says when Juliet is found apparently dead on the day which was supposed to be her wedding day

> Accurs'd, unhappy, wretched, hateful day!
> Most miserable hour that e'er Time saw
> In lasting labour of his pilgrimage.[11]

And in *Measure for Measure:*

> Unhappy Claudio! Wretched Isabel![12]

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[7] *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act V, Sc. 1
[8] *Richard II*, Act I, Sc. 3
[9] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act III, Sc. 2
[10] *Cymbeline,* Act V, Sc. 5
[11] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act IV, Sc. 4
[12] Act IV, Sc. 1

The name of the opposite of *happy* in English is *wretched* and this is connected with the wreck or wrack of a ship. Human life can be compared to an uncertain sea voyage where the port sought is happiness, but in which one may easily suffer shipwreck. Timon speaks of *life's uncertain voyage* which *nature's fragile vessel* undertakes*:*

> .....Commend me to them;
> And tell them, that, to ease them of their griefs,
> Their fears of hostile strokes, their aches, losses,
> Their pangs of love, with other incident throes,
> That nature's fragile vessel doth sustain
> In life's uncertain voyage, I will some kindness do them.[13]

And King Henry, seeing happiness in the possession of Margaret, strives to have *fruition of her love* (a Latin word for happiness, *felicitas,* means fruitfulness for the fruit is last and sweet), or else, to suffer shipwreck:

> Your wondrous rare description, noble earl,
> Of beauteous Margaret hath astonish'd me:
> Her virtues, graced with external gifts
> Do breed love's settled passions in my heart:
> And like as rigour of tempestuous gusts
> Provokes the mightiest hulk against the tide,
> So am I driven by breath of her renown
> Either to suffer shipwrack, or arrive
> Where I may have fruition of her love.[14]

And Lucentio says in winning Bianca:

> And happily I have arriv'd at last
> Unto the wished haven of my bliss.[15]

But Romeo, thinking Juliet dead, takes his own life, comparing it to a pilot driving his own ship upon the rocks:

> Come, bitter conduct, come unsavoury guide!
> Thou desperate pilot, now at once run on
> The dashing rocks thy sea-sick weary bark!
> Here's to my love. [drinks] O true apothecary!

---

[13] *Timon of Athens*, Act V, Sc. 1
[14] *Henry VI, Part I*, Act V, Sc. 1
[15] *The Taming of the Shrew,* Act V, Sc. 1

Thy drugs are quick. Thus with a kiss I die.[16]

Unsavoury is a beautiful way of saying foolish. The Latin word for wisdom, *sapientia,* could be rendered from its etymology as *sapida scientia* or *savoury knowledge*. Wisdom is about things that reason must savour. Hence, the opposite, *unsavoury*, means foolish. The foolish is *insipid*.

And Othello, before taking his own life, sees his miserable fate as the end of his sea-voyage:

Who can control his fate? 'Tis not so now.
Be not afraid, though you do see me weapon'd.
Here is my journey's end, here is my butt
And very sea-mark of my utmost sail.[17]

And Queen Katherine sees the *unhappy* or *wretched* condition to which she and her ladies have been reduced as a kind of shipwreck:

What will become of me now, wretched lady?
I am the most unhappy woman living.
Alas! poor wenches, where are now your fortunes?
Shipwrack'd upon a kingdom, where no pity,
No friends, no hope; no kindred weep for me,
Almost no grave allow'd me.[18]

In using again the metaphor of life as a sea voyage, Shakespeare beautifully talks about opportunity and fortune in this voyage in the words of Brutus:

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.[19]

And sometimes fortune is said to bring in our boat to a destination to which we have not steered it. Thus Pisanio says:

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[16] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act V, Sc. 3
[17] *Othello*, Act V, Sc. 2
[18] *Henry VIII*, Act III, Sc. 2

[19] *Julius Caesar*, Act IV, Sc. 3

Fortune brings in some boats that are not steer'd.[20]

And at other times, a higher power is said to steer our boat, as Romeo says:

But He, that hath the steerage of my course,
Direct my sail! On, lusty gentlemen.[21]

THE ETYMOLOGY OF HAPPINESS

Shakespeare is aware of the etymology of the word *happiness* which perhaps corresponds to the common man's thinking that happiness is result of good luck. Moreover, in fiction, the maker of fiction want to emphasize the role of luck or fortune in becoming happy or wretched. In tragedy, we feel pity for the tragic character, even though his misery is a result of his mistake. But his mistake *happens* to have such tragic results beyond his deserts, due to misfortune or fate. Aristotle uses the Greek word for good fortune (*eutuxia*) for happiness in the book *About the Poetic Art* rather than the word *eudaimonia* (which he uses in the *Nicomachean Ethics*). When what happens by fortune or luck is very good or very bad, it especially arouses the wonder of the philomuthos.

Proteus says to his departing friend Valentine:

Wilt thou be gone? Sweet Valentine, adieu!
Think on thy Proteus, when thou haply seest
Some rare note-worthy object in thy travel:
Wish me partaker in thy happiness,
When thou dost meet good hap; and in thy danger,
If ever danger do environ thee,
Commend thy grievance to my holy prayers,
For I will be thy beadsman, Valentine[22]

Happiness is here spoken of as an effect of *good hap* or good luck. And Proteus wishes his friend happiness in Milan where he is going:

All happiness bechance to thee in Milan.[23]

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[20] *Cymbeline*, Act IV, Sc. 3
[21] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 5
[22] *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 1
[23] *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 1

And note that here Shakespeare uses the word *bechance.*

And in the last words of the play spoken by Valentine, the other gentleman of Verona, we see that the mutual happiness is somewhat a result of fortune:

> Please you, I'll tell you as we pass along,
> That you will wonder what hath fortuned.
> Come, Proteus, 'tis your penance but to hear
> The story of your loves discovered:
> That done, our day of marriage shall be yours;
> One feast, one house, one mutual happiness.[24]

Note that Valentine says to the Duke that *you will wonder what hath fortuned.*

But bad luck will result in the opposite of happiness as Shakespeare says in the words of Aegeon:

> In Syracusa was I born; and wed
> Unto a woman, happy but for me,
> And by me, too, had not our hap been bad...
>
> Thus have you heard me sever'd from my bliss;
> That by misfortunes was my life prolong'd
> To tell sad stories of my own mishaps.
>
> Hapless Aegeon, whom the fates have mark'd
> To bear the extremity of dire mishap.[25]

But notice the word *bliss* above and the word *blessed* below

> Some blessed power deliver us from hence[26]

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[24] Act V, Sc. 4
[25] *The Comedy of Errors*, Act I, Sc. 1

[26] *The Comedy of Errors*, Act IV, Sc. 3

But is it by chance or vice that the Prince of Morocco and the Prince of Arragon choose the wrong casket? And is it by chance or virtue that Bassanio chooses right?

Morocco: If Hercules and Lichas play at dice
Which is the better man, the greater throw
May turn by fortune from the weaker hand.
So is Alcides beaten by his page.
And so may I, blind fortune leading me,
Miss that which one unworthier may attain,
And die with grieving.

Portia: You must take your chance;
And either not attempt to choose at all,
Or swear before you choose, if you choose wrong,
Never to speak to lady afterward
In way of marriage: therefore be advis'd.

Morocco: Nor will not! come, bring me unto my chance.

Portia: First, forward to the temple: after dinner
Your hazard shall be made.

Morocco: Good fortune then!
To make me blest or cursed'st among men![27]

But if fortune rather than reason determines one's choice, one might invoke the help of some superior power. Hence, the Prince of Morocco, before he chooses, says:

Some God direct my judgment[28]

But the Prince of Arragon merely seems to invoke fortune before he chooses:

Fortune now To my heart's hope.[29]

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[27] *The Merchant of Venice*, Act II, Sc. 1

[28] *The Merchant of Venice*, Act II, Sc. 7, line 13
[29] *The Merchant of Venice,* Act II, Sc. 9

And even when Bassanio chooses correctly, the scroll speaks of his fortune as giving rise to his bliss:

> And hold your fortune for your bliss.[30]

This is in accord with what Plutarch's Cassius says: "the gods have so ordained it that the greatest and chiefest things amongst men are most uncertain."

TRUE HAPPINESS IS NOT BY LUCK, BUT IS BY AND WITH REASON

But there is a distinction between reason and luck or hap as causes. As Anthony says about the soothsayer:

> Be it art, or hap,
> He hath spoken true.[31]

If happiness is by hap or luck, there is no art of happiness. Art is something of reason

Insofar as happiness or man's chief good may depend upon luck or upon some higher power, the philosopher by knowledge cannot direct us to it. But insofar as man's chief good can be known by man and therefore aimed at by men, the philosopher by his knowledge can give us some direction. Antiochus speaks like Aristotle in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* where knowing the chief good and end of man enables us to aim at it, just like an archer at a target

> .....an arrow shot
> From a well-experience'd archer hits the mark
> His eye doth level at[32]

Shakespeare, in the words of Hamlet, gives us a good introduction to a knowledge of the chief good of man and the goal of his life:

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[30] *The Merchant of Venice*, Act III, Sc. 2, line 136
[31] *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act II, Sc. 3
[32] *Pericles, Prince of Tyre*, Act I, Sc. 1

.....What is a man
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? a beast, no more.
Sure, he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and god-like reason
To fust in us unused.....[33]

We should note first that Shakespeare identifies the *chief good* of man with the *market of his time*, that is, the mark or goal or end of his life. For the good (*what all want*) and the end (*that for the sake of which* something is or is done) are the same thing. The metonym for the life of man, *his time,* is well chosen by Shakespeare for man is the animal who has the sense of time (as the Philosopher teaches us in the third book *About the Soul*).

Hamlet reasons in the first three lines here from a proportion or likeness of ratios. The chief good of man is to man as the chief good of the beast (to sleep and feed) is to the beast. Then alternating the proportion, we can say that as the chief good of man is to the chief good of the beast, so is man to the beast. Hence, if the chief good of man were no more than the chief good of the beast, then man would be no more than a beast. But man is more than a beast. Hence, the chief good of man must be more than the chief good of the beast.

One could also reason by the other form of the if-then syllogism from this proportion. If man is more than a beast, then the chief good of man is more than the chief good of the beast. But man is more than a beast. Therefore, the chief good of man is more than the chief good of the beast.

In the last four lines, Hamlet or Shakespeare points out what man has in addition to the beast that will be involved in his chief good. This is reason, the ability for large discourse, looking before and after, as Hamlet teaches us.[34] Man's chief good will involve the use of reason, a use that is perfected by virtue. Hence, the highest use of reason will be found in the most perfect of the virtues. And therefore a knowledge of the chief good of man will follow upon the study of each of the virtues.

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[33] *Hamlet*, Act IV, Sc. 4

[34] An explanation of this definition of reason as reason can be found in the Lyceum, under Looking Philosophy under Wisdom and Reason.

Without reason, a man would be divorced from himself, a beast or a picture of a man, but not man properly speaking, as the King says about Ophelia who has gone out of her mind:

> .....poor Ophelia
> Divided from herself and her fair judgment,
> Without the which we are pictures, or mere beasts[35]

Hamlet touches upon, at least, five reasons why we should use our reason or use it more than we do. We could divide these in comparison to man and what is before and after man in perfection. God is before man in perfection and the beast after him.

If reason is godlike, then man becomes like what is better than himself by using well his reason. And he obeys God's plan for him in using reason. These two excellent reasons for using reason, or using it more than we do, are in comparison to what is before man in perfection. They also hint that God's plan for us is to become like himself. Socrates or Plato in the *Theaetetus* stated that philosophy is becoming like God so far as possible for man. And Plato's pupil, Aristotle, stated (in his Proemium to Wisdom) that wisdom, the end of the philosopher, is the most divine knowledge. And in practical philosophy, Aristotle had pointed out that it is more godlike to achieve happiness for a city than for oneself or one's friend only. This anticipates Aristotle's last consideration of happiness in the tenth book of the *Nicomachean Ethics.* Happiness consist in the act of political foresight or the act of wisdom itself, the one happiness more human and the other more divine.

In comparison to what is after man in perfection, the beast, we can see a third excellent reason for using our reason, If we do not, we fall to the level of the beast, something less than ourselves. Thus, if we use reason, we become like what is better than ourselves; and if we do not, we become like what is less than ourselves.

But there can also be seen two others reason and these in comparison to man himself.

Hamlet has pointed out the necessary connection between what man is and the use of reason. As Polonius advises his son Laertes:

> This above all: to thine own self be true,

---

[35] *Hamlet*, Act IV, Sc. 5

> And it must follow, as the night the day,
> Thou canst not then be false to any man.[36]

A man cannot be true to himself if he does not use his reason.

Further, as we have seen, man cannot achieve his chief good and the very end or purpose of his life without using his reason.

REASON SHOULD RULE THE WILL AND EMOTIONS

Since reason is the ability to look before and after, and before and after is the definition of order, it is clear that reason should rule or direct the will and the emotions. For to rule or direct another is nothing other than to impose some order upon it. It is impossible that will and emotion, not knowing order or the before and after, could rule anything, let alone reason.

But the emotions often resist reason and especially before they are habituated by virtue to follow reason. Shakespeare speaks of reason as wrestling with the emotions which is especially true before one has virtue:

> But I persuaded them, if they lov'd Benedick,
> To wish him wrestle with affection,
> And never let Beatrice know of it.[37]

And in *As You LIke It:*

Celia: Come, come, wrestle with thy affections.

Rosalind: O, they take the part of a better wrestler than myself.[38]

Shakespeare has a most apt and strong metaphor to describe reason when it accepts sense desire that is unreasonable and excessive and tries to justify it or rationalize it. Adonis says to Venus:

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[36] *Hamlet*, Act I, Sc. 3
[37] *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act III, Sc. 1

[38] *As You LIke It*, Act I, Sc. 3

I hate not love, but your device in love
That lends embracements unto every stranger.
You do it for increase: O strange excuse
When reason is the bawd to lust's abuse.[39]

The bawd does not examine whether the customer should want what he does, but merely tries to give him what he wants. So when reason does not examine the emotion to see if it is reasonable, but merely tries to satisfy it, reason becomes, metaphorically speaking, a *bawd.*

And as reason should rule the emotions, so also it should rule the will. Shakespeare has the same strong metaphor in *Hamlet* (but with a different word) for the disposition of the soul when reason merely listens to the will as master and tries to obtain what it wants without even examining whether the desire of the will is reasonable:

And reason panders will.[40]

The word *panders* comes, of course, from *Pandarus,* the famous pimp in the story of Troilus and Cressida. "reason panders will" and "reason is the bawd" are the same metaphor or likeness.

And for this reason Antony is blamed:

Cleopatra: Is Antony or we in fault for this?

Enobarbus: Antony only, that would make his will
Lord of his reason.[41]

Men in power especially can be tempted to follow their will rather than their reason. Thus Isabella upbraids Angelo:

.....O perilous mouths,
That bear in them one and the self-same tongue.
Either of condemnation or approof;
Bidding the law make court'sy to their will;
Hooking both right and wrong to the appetite,

---

[39] *Venus and Adonis*, lines 789-792

[40] *Hamlet*, Act II, Sc. 4

[41] *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act III, Sc. 11

To follow[42]

Cornwall also is doing the like which he admits in speaking about Gloucester:

Though well we may not pass upon his life
Without the form of justice, yet our power
Shall do a court'sy to our wrath, which men
May blame, but not control.[43]

Since law is something of reason or should be, the robbers or outlaws in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* are described well thus:

These are my mates, that make their wills their law[44]

Friar Laurence speaks of the bad will as predominating also over grace:

Two such opposed kings encamp them still
In men as well as herbs, Grace and rude Will,
And where the worser is predominant
Full soon the canker death eats up that plant.[45]

Sometimes when we can see no reason for our suffering, we think we can dispense with the governance of reason over our emotions:

Marcus: But yet let reason govern thy lament.

Titus: If there were reason for these miseries,
Then into limits could I bind my woes.[46]

Being ruled or rather misruled by a passion is like tyranny. Paulina says to the Lords afraid to confront the insanely jealous king Leontes:

Fear you his tyrannous passion more, alas,

---

[42] *Measure for Measure*, Act II, Sc. 4

[43] *King Lear*, Act III, Sc. 7
[44] *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act V, Sc. 4
[45] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 3

[46] *Titus Andronicus*, Act III, Sc. 1

Than the queen's life?[47]

And to Leontes himself:

.....I'll not call you tyrant
But this most cruel usage of your queen, -
Not able to produce more accusation
Than you own weak-hing'd fancy, - something savours
Of tyranny.[48]

(And notice how fancy or imagination is called *weak-hing'd* meaning that it has little or nothing to support it. When will or emotion are opposed to reason, they are following imagination rather than reason.)

And Leontes tries to clear himself from the charge of tyranny by consulting the Oracle as to his wife's conduct (although in the end, he does not accept the judgment of the Oracle):

.....Let us be clear'd
Of being tyrannous, since we so openly
Proceed in justice, which shall have due course,
Even to the guilt or purgation.[49]

Men may imagine the purpose of things other than it is. As Cicero says:

Indeed, it is a strange-disposed time:
But men may construe things after their fashion,
Clean from the purpose of the things themselves.[50]

A strong passion or emotion may seem to give us a purpose, but this disappears when the emotion subsides. The Player King says in *Hamlet:*

Most necessary 'tis that we forget
To pay ourselves what to ourselves is debt;
What to ourselves in passion we propose,
The passion ending, doth the purpose lose.

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[47] *Winter's Tale*, Act II, Sc. 3

[48] *Winter's Tale*, Act II, Sc. 3
[49] *Winter's Tale*, Act III, Sc. 2
[50] *Julius Caesar*, Act I, Sc. 3

> The violence of either grief or joy
> Their own enactures with themselves destroy.[51]

Reason should rule over the passions or feelings. Only when this is so can a man rule or direct himself. When the passions or feelings overcome the reason, they are in rebellion and the man himself can be said to suffer a kind of insurrection. The result of this is that the man can be come enslaved to his own passions or feelings.

Hamlet seeks a friend who is not passion's slave:

> A man that fortune's buffets and rewards
> Hast ta'en with equal thanks: and blest are those
> Whose blood and judgment are so well commingled
> That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger
> To sound what stop she please. Give me that man
> That is not passion's slave.....[52]

When the passion or emotion tries to rule over reason and the person, it can be called metaphorically a rebel:

> .....it seem'd she was a queen
> Over her passion, who most rebel-like
> Sought to be king o'er her.[53]

As Camillo says of Leontes led by his unreasonable passion or emotion:

> one....in rebellion with himself[54]

Octavius Caesar, criticizing Antony's following his passions, compares it to boys who pursue the present pleasure, not looking before and after, and hence *rebel* to the judgment of reason:

> .....'tis to be chid
> As we rate boys, who, being mature in knowledge,
> Pawn their experience to their present pleasure,

---

[51] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2

[52] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2
[53] *King Lear*, Act IV, Sc. 3
[54] *The Winter's Tale,* Act I, Sc. 2

> And so rebel to judgment.[55]

And Laertes warns his sister Ophelia about Hamlet:

> Be wary then; best safety lies in fear:
> Youth to itself rebels, tough none else near.[56]

Since reason more than anything else is man, when the emotions rebel against reason, one can be said to rebel to oneself.

And Hamlet upbraids his mother at her age:

> O shame! Where is thy blush? Rebellious hell,
> If thou canst mutine in a matron's bones,
> To flaming youth let virtue be as wax,
> And melt in her own fire.....[57]

But Caesar says that he is above such rebellion:

> .....Be not fond,
> To think that Caesar bears such rebel blood
> That will be thaw'd from the true quality
> With that which melteth fools; I mean sweet words,
> Low-crooked curtsies, and base spaniel fawning.[58]

In *All's Well That Ends Well,* this condition is both called a rebellion and being a traitor to oneself (for reason more than anything else is man):

> Be not so holy-cruel: love is holy;
> And my integrity ne'er knew the crafts
> That you do charge me with. Stand no more off,
> But give yourself unto my sick desires,
> Who then recover.
>
> Now, God delay our rebellion! as we are ourselves,
> What things are we!

---

[55] *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act I, Sc. 4

[56] *Hamlet*, Act I, Sc. 3
[57] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 4
[58] *Julius Caesar*, Act III, Sc. 1

Merely our own traitors.[59]

And in *Sonnet CLI,* this betrayal is well described:

.....I do betray
My nobler part to my gross body's treason;
My soul doth tell my body that he may
Triumph in love; flesh stays no farther reason.

Coriolanus speaks of the body's action sometimes teaching the soul or mind a baseness:

.....I will not do't
Lest I surcease to honour mine own truth,
And by my body's action teach my mind
A most inherent baseness.[60]

Reason must moderate the passions or emotions before it can direct us:

..... Stay, my lord,
And let your reason with your choler question
What 'tis you go about.....
I say again, there is no English soul
More stronger to direct you than yourself,
If with the sap of reason you would quench,
Or but allay, the fire of passion.[61]

REASON, HOWEVER, CAN BE DECEIVED

Although we say that reason should rule, this should not lead us to overlook that reason can be deceived. Listen to the words of the three witches:

Fair is foul, and foul is fair
Hover through the fog and filthy air.[62]

---

[59] *All's Well That Ends Well,* Act IV, Sc. 2
[60] *Coriolanus*, Act III, Sc. 2
[61] *King Henry VIII*, Act I, Sc. 1

In the first line, the witches note the two possible mistakes of reason in regard to our doings: thinking that the good is bad (the fair is foul) or thinking that the bad is good (the foul is fair).

The second line touches upon the two sources or causes of these two mistakes. For the cause of mistake is either in reason's confusion and this is signified by the word *fog*, or in the heart, and this is signified by the word *filthy*.

Some light on *fog* as a metaphor for the cause of mistake or error on the side of reason itself can be seen in the hilarious scene from *Twelfth Night* where the simile of fog is used. Malvolio has been locked up and treated as a madman as a result of the prank played upon him in the sub-plot of the play. Malvolio is locked-up in a darkroom and has the following conversation with the Clown impersonating Sir Topas through the door:

Malvolio: I am not mad, Sir Topas; I say to you
this house is dark.

Clown: Mad man, thou errest. I say there is no darkness
but ignorance, in which thou art more puzzl'd
than the Egyptians in their fog.[63]

Similar images are used by Shakespeare in the *Tempest* where he speaks of darkness and ignorant fumes in the charm that Prospero had cast upon Alonso, Sebastian, and Antonio (Prospero is speaking):

.....The charm dissolves apace,
And as the morning steals upon the night,
Melting the darkness, so their rising senses
Begin to chase the ignorant fumes that mantle
Their clearer reason.[64]

Shakespeare's words "the ignorant fumes that mantle their clearer reason" clearly confirm that fog or something like it signifies the cause of mistake on the side of reason.

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[62] *Macbeth,* Act I, Sc. 1
[63] *Twelfth Night,* Act IV, Sc. 2
[64] *Tempest*, Act V, Sc. 1

We have said that the other alliterating word used in the couplet from Macbeth, the word *filth*, signifies the cause of error on the side of the heart or the ability to desire. When the heart becomes vicious or we acquire a moral vice, our reason is blinded by this filth of our heart. And that I am not making a wild guess about the meaning of the word *filth* in this couplet from Macbeth can be seen from a magnificent passage in *Antony & Cleopatra* where Shakespeare again uses the word *filth* in describing how reason is blinded and led into error. Antony is the speaker in Act II, Sc. 11:

> But when we in our viciousness grow hard -
> O misery on't - the wise gods seel our eyes,
> In our filth drop our clear judgments; make us
> Adore our errors; laugh at's while we strut
> To our confusion.

The first line ("when we in our viciousness grow hard") speaks of us when, by repeated bad acts, we have acquired the habit of moral vice. For habit, being a disposition that is difficult to change, is suitably described by the word *hard*. The next words ("o misery on't") suitably precede the description of the process by which we come to "Adore our errors" (as is said in the fourth line) for, as Thomas Aquinas observes in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, error is a great part of misery. The line "the wise gods seel our eyes" is suitable because he who does not live in accordance with reason is suitably punished by being deprived of the act of reason. The next part, "in our own filth drop our clear judgments; make us Adore our errors", should be contrasted with the phrase above from the *Tempest*, "the ignorant fumes that mantle their clearer reason." "Ignorant fumes" is one the side of reason or the knowing powers while "our own filth" refers to the viciousness in our heart or desiring powers. When our clear judgments have been dropped in our own filth, we proceed to the absurd conclusion of adoring our own errors and making ourselves laughable as we proceed to our own confusion. Confusion here is the opposite of glory.

Another passage in Shakespeare where the filth of the heart is spoken of as the cause of mistake is when Albany upbraids his evil and unnatural wife Goneril:

> Goneril: No more; the text is foolish.
>
> Albany: Wisdom and goodness to the vile seem vile.
> Filths savor but themselves.[65]

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[65] *King Lear*, Act IV, Sc. 2

But sometimes Shakespeare represents the bad as more openly rejecting the voice of reason:

1st Murderer: Where is thy conscience now?

2nd Murderer: In the Duke of Gloucester's purse.

1st Murderer: How if it comes to thee again?

2nd Murderer:

> I'll not meddle with it: it is a dangerous thing: it makes a man a coward: a man cannot steal, but it accuseth him; he cannot swear, but it checks him; he cannot lie with his neighbour's wife, but it detects him: it is a blushing shamefast spirit that mutinies in a man's bosom; it fills one full of obstacles: it made me once restore a purse of gold, that I found; it beggars any man that keeps it: it is turned out of all towns and cities for a dangerous thing; and every man that means to live well, endeavours to trust to himself and to live without it.[66]

Richard III awakens from his dream and hears conscience, but tries to silence it:

> Give me another horse! bind up my wounds!
> Have mercy, Jesu! soft! I did but dream.
> O coward conscience, how dost thou afflict me!
> The lights burn blue. It is now dead midnight.
> Cold fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh.
> What? do I fear myself? There's none else by:
> Richard loves Richard; that is, I am I.
> Is there a murtherer here? No. Yes, I am:
> Then fly: what! from myself? Great reason : why?
> Lest I revenge. What " myself upon myself?
> Alack! I love myself. Wherefore? for any good
> That I myself have done unto myself?
> O, no: alas! I rather hate myself
> For hateful deeds committed by myself.

---

[66] *Richard III*, Act I, Sc. 4

> I am a villain. Yet I lie; I am not.
> Fool, of thyself speak well: fool, do not flatter.
> My conscience hath a thousand several tongues,
> And every tongue brings in a several tale,
> And every tale condemns me for a villain....[67]

But when fully awake and about to lead his army, he scorns the "weakness" of listening to conscience:

> Let not our babbling dreams affright our souls;
> Conscience is but a word that cowards use,
> Devis'd at first to keep the strong in awe:
> Our strong arms be our conscience, swords our law.[68]

Since doing is in the singular, Shakespeare notes how the opportunity and means to do bad can influence the will. Thus the King John to Hubert:

> How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds
> Makes deeds ill done! Hadst not thou been by,
> A fellow by the hand of nature mark'd,
> Quoted and sign'd to do a deed of shame,
> This murther had not come into my mind.[69]

And Ferdinand says he will resist such opportunity:

> .....the murkiest den
> The most opportune place, the strong'st suggestion
> Our worser Genius can, shall never melt
> Mine honour into lust.....[70]

NATURE IS THE MEASURE OF WHAT IS GOOD AND BAD

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[67] *Richard III,* Act V, Sc. 3

[68] *Richard III,* Act V, Sc. 3

[69] *King John,* Act IV, Sc. 2

[70] *The Tempest*, Act IV, Sc. 1

Since reason should rule the will and the emotions, but reason can think the good is bad or the bad is good, reason itself must be measured by something else. This measure is nature.

In connecting the chief good and end of man and his life with what man is, Hamlet or Shakespeare is showing that the good is in things and that the nature of a thing, or what it is, is a measure of what is good or bad. Hence, the order in what the playwright or poet makes a likeness of, as Hamlet explains to the players:

> o'erstep not the modesty of nature; for anything so overdone is from the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is,
>
> to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature:
>
> to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image,
>
> and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.[71]

When distinguishing the objects of imitation in the play, Shakespeare gives the order in which they must also be judged in life. Nature is the measure of what is virtuous (in harmony with nature) and what is vicious (against nature). And an age is to be judged good or bad according to the virtues or vices that predominate in that age. Scorn is used as a metonym for pride which is the queen of the vices. There is an interesting observation of Coleridge on the connection of scorn with bad men in commenting on the representation of Antonio and Sebastian in the *Tempest:*

> In the delineation of Antonio and Sebastian, short as it is, we have a volume of wise science which Coleridge remarks upon thus:
>
> "In the first scene of the second act, Shakespeare has shown the tendency in bad men to indulge in scorn and contemptuous expressions as a mode of getting rid of their own uneasy feelings of inferiority to the good and also of rendering the transition of others to wickedness easy by making the good ridiculous. Shakespeare never puts habitual scorn into the mouths of other

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[71] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2

than bad men, as here in the instance of Antonio and Sebastian."[72]

Custom can be called metaphorically a monster when it is not in harmony with our nature:

> That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat,
> Of habits devil...[73]

A monster is something unnatural.

Shakespeare likes to stay close to the origin of the word *nature* from birth. Hence, the unnatural is very concretely spoken of when the natural bond of parent and child, or brother or sister, is broken. Thus Hamlet says before he goes to upbraid his mother:

> .....Soft! now to my mother!
> O heart! lose not thy nature; let not ever
> The soul of Nero enter this firm bosom;
> Let me be cruel, not unnatural;
> I will speak daggers to her, but use none.[74]

And in the tremendous scene of *Coriolanus* where the mother (and wife and child) of Coriolanus intercede on their knees to Coriolanus to have him spare Rome, Coriolanus somewhat stupefied says:

> What have you done? Behold the heavens do ope.
> The gods look down, and this unnatural scene
> They laugh at.[75]

It is unnatural for a mother to have to intercede on her knees with her son who should honor her.

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[72] *The New Hudson Shakespeare. The Tempest*, Introduction, XLVII-XLVIII

[73] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 4

[74] *Hamlet* Act III, Sc. 2

[75] *Coriolanus*, Act V, Sc. 3

And when Macduff abandons his wife and children, Lady Macduff see this as against nature ("He wants the natural touch") and consequently against reason and wisdom:

Lady Macduff: His flight was madness. When our actions do not,
Our fears do make us traitors.

Ross: You know not
Whether it was his wisdom or his fear.

Lady Macduff: Wisdom! to leave his wife, to leave his babes,
His mansion, and his titles, in a place
From whence himself does fly? He loves us not;
He wants the natural touch. For the poor wren,
The most diminutive of birds will fight,
Her young ones in her nest, against the owl.
All is the fear and nothing is the love;
As little is the wisdom, where the flight
So runs against all reason.[76]

Wisdom is to follow nature as Heraclitus taught us.

Thus Prospero can upbraid his brother who usurped his throne and exiled him to almost certain death;

You, brother mine, that entertain'd ambition,
Expell'd remorse and nature.....[77]

Acts against nature are also so much opposed to reason that they must lack a name to escape the scrutiny of reason which will bring to light their evil:

Macbeth: How now, you secret, black, and midnight hags?
What is't you do?

All witches: A deed without a name.[78]

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[76] *Macbeth*, Act IV, Sc. 2
[77] *Tempest*, Act V, Sc. 1

[78] *Macbeth*, Act IV, Sc. 1

And Lady Macbeth, who also instigates Macbeth to a deed without a name, must revolt from her true nature as a woman to do so, as she says in her soliloquy:

> The raven himself is hoarse
> That croaks the fatal entrance of Duncan
> Under my battlements. Come, you spirits
> That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here
> And fill me from the crown to the toe top-full
> Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood,
> That no compunctious visitings of nature
> Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between
> Th' effect and it! Come to my woman's breasts,
> And take my milk for gall, you murth'ring ministers,
> Wherever in your sightless substances
> You wait on nature's mischief! Come, thick Night,
> And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
> That my keen knife see not the wound it make,
> Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark,
> To cry "hold, hold!"[79]

Notice also how the scene is set in Macbeth's words:

> .....Now o'er the one half world
> Nature seems dead, and wicked dreams abuse
> The curtain'd sleep.[80]

And the unnatural acts in the world of man reverberate in the other animals and even in the heavens, so much does Shakespeare wish to emphasize their unnatural character:

> Ross: Thou seest the heavens, as troubled with man's act,
> Threatens his bloody stage. By th' clock 'tis day,
> And yet dark night strangles the traveling lamp.
> Is't night's predominance, or the day's shame,
> That darkness does the face of earth entomb,
> When living light should kiss it?
>
> Old man: 'Tis unnatural,
> Even like the deed that's done. On Tuesday last,

[79] *Macbeth*, Act I, Sc. 5
[80] *Macbeth*, Act II, Sc. 1

A falcon, tow'ring in her pride of place,
Was by a mousing owl hawk'd at and kill'd.

Ross: And Duncan's horses - a thing most strange and certain -
Beauteous and swift; the minions of their race,
Turn'd wild in nature, broke their stalls, flung out
Contending 'gainst obedience, as they would
Make war with mankind.

Old Man: 'Tis said they eat each other.

Ross: They did so, to th' amazement of mine eyes,
That look'd upon't.[81]

We see this represented in *As You Like It* where two pairs of brother are in conflict because in the one case the younger brother has usurped the throne of the older and in the other the older brother is denying the younger any share in his inheritance. But both pairs of brothers are finally reconciled in the forest which represents a return to nature and what is naturally good. Hence, the exiled duke in the forest speaks thus:

And this our life exempt from public haunt
Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
Sermons in stones and good in every thing.[82]

We should become accustomed to what is natural for this is like health which is good. Bad customs are like a sickness and they make us unable to recognize that we are unreasonable or bad.

But, like in sickness, did I loathe this food;
But, as in health, come to my natural taste,
Now I do wish it, love it, long for it,
And will for evermore be true to it.[83]

Our natural taste is our true judgment.

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[81] *Macbeth*, Act II, Sc. 4
[82] *As You Like It*, Act II, Sc. 1

[83] *A Midsummer-Night's Dream*, Act IV, Sc. 1

And the doctor says in commenting on Lady Macbeth's troubles after partaking in the murder of her king:

> .....Unnatural deeds
> Do breed unnatural troubles.[84]

Virtue is the road to happiness and vice, the road to misery. Happiness seems to be the natural result of virtuous doings and misery, the natural result of vicious doings. The one begets happiness and the other begets wretchedness. And in this way, there can be an art of happiness and misery for there is a road to each which can be known for our direction.

But although the word *nature* first means *birth*, the word is eventually moved to what a thing is in Greek and Latin.[85] In the following words of Friar Laurence, Shakespeare has move the English word to the sense of what a thing is:

> For nought so vile that on the earth doth live
> But to the earth some special good doth give.
> Nor ought so good but strain'd from that fair use
> Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse![86]

When a thing revolts or departs from its true nature, it stumbles or falls into an abuse of itself and its abilities.

When Shakespeare says that nature or what is by nature is the measure of good and bad, he is thinking of our common nature as an animal that has reason. But individuals are also born with their own singular dispositions whereby they are well or ill disposed toward being an animal with reason or to having the virtues that are suitable to such animal. Thus Macbeth in his conversation with the murderers:

1st Murtherer: We are men, my liege.

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[84] *Macbeth*, Act V, Sc. 1

[85] The full distinction and order of the senses of the word *phusis* or *nature* is given by Aristotle in the fifth book of *Wisdom*. See, of course, Thomas's laying out of Aristotle's text there.

[86] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act ll, Sc. 3

Macbeth: Ay, in the catalogue ye go for men,
As hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs,
Shoughs, water-rugs, and demi-wolves, are clipt
All by the name of dogs. The valued file
Distinguishes the swift, the slow, the subtle,
The housekeeper, the hunter, everyone
According to the gift which bounteous nature
Hath in him clos'd, whereby he does receive
Particular addition, from the bill
That writes them all alike; and so of men.[87]

What is individual in addition to our common nature may be good or a *gift,* as Macbeth says, or a vicious mole, as Hamlet says:

So. oft it chances in particular men,
That for some vicious mole of nature in them,
As in their birth, wherein they are not guilty,
Since nature cannot choose his origin,
By the o'ergrowth of some complexion,
Oft breaking down the pales and forts of reason,
Or by some habit that too much o'er-leavens
The form of plausive manners, that these men,
Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect,
Being nature's livery, or fortune's star,
Their virtues else, be they as pure as grace,
As infinite as man may undergo,
Shall in the general censure take corruption
From that particular fault.....[88].

Insofar as these faults come in our birth, we are not responsible for them because we did not choose them. As Lepidus says about Antony:

His faults in him seem as the spots of heaven,
More fiery by night's blackness; hereditary
Rather than purchas'd: what he cannot change
Than what he chooses.[89]

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[87] *Macbeth*, Act III, Sc. 1

[88] *Hamlet*, Act I, Sc. 4

[89] *Antony and Cleopatra,* Act I, Sc. 3

In another passage, Shakespeare touches upon individual dispositions towards, or away from, the virtue concerned with the laughable:

> Nature hath framed strange fellows in her time:
> Some that will evermore peep through their eyes,
> And laugh like parrots at a bag-piper;
> And others of such vinegar aspect.
> That they'll not show their teeth in way of smile
> Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.[90]

But when a man is individually disposed towards virtue, he seems more a man because he is well disposed by nature for being a man. Thus Antony's eulogy over the body of Brutus:

> His life was gentle and the elements
> So mix'd in him that Nature might stand up
> And say to all the world "This was a man!"[91]

But Caliban is called by Prospero "a beast" because his individual nature is so opposed to the acquisition of virtue:

> A devil, a born devil, on whose nature
> Nurture can never stick; on whom my pains,
> Humanely taken, all, all lost, quite lost;
> And as with age his body uglier grows,
> So his mind cankers.[92]

Sometimes this individual disposition is spoken of concretely with the four elements of Empedocles. Cleopatra says

> I am fire and air; my other elements
> I give to baser life.[93]

But Prospero sees the basest element as predominating in Caliban:

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[90] *The Merchant of Venice*, Act I, Sc. 1

[91] *Julius Caesar,* Act V, Sc. 5

[92] *The Tempest,* Act IV, Sc. 1

[93] *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act V, Sc. 2

What, ho! Slave! Caliban!
Thou earth, thou! speak.[94]

Shakespeare also speaks of the dispositions characteristic of one's age as natural:

Natural rebellion, done i' the blaze of youth,
When oil and fire, too strong for reason's force,
O'erbears it and burns on.[95]

WHAT IS VIRTUE

Virtue is first seen as a praiseworthy quality, as Le Beau says about Rosalind:

....the people praise her for her virtues[96]

But this is to know virtue by its effect for we are praised because of our virtues. But we are apt to know things in this outward way first. Hence, since the virtues of the body (such as health, strength and beauty) are more known to us than the virtues of the soul, we sometimes speak of the latter by likeness to the former

We have seen already the likeness of virtue of the soul to the health of the body. It could also be compared to the strength of the body for the man of virtue has a strong soul. And since beauty also is in the middle or mean, that is one reason for calling virtue beauty. It is the beauty of the soul:

Virtue is beauty.[97]

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[94] *The Tempest,* Act I, Sc.
[95] *All's Well That End Well*, Act V, Sc. 3

[96] *As You Like It*, Act I, Sc. 2
[97] *Twelfth Night*, Act III, Sc. 4

And as Bassanio says, the beauty of virtue is greater than the beauty of the body:

> In Belmont is a lady richly left,
> And she is fair, and, fairer than that word.
> Of wondrous virtues: sometimes from her eyes
> I did receive fair speechless messages:
> Her name is Portia; nothing undervalu'd
> To Cato's daughter, Brutus' Portia:
> Nor is the wide world ignorant of her worth,
> For the four winds blow in from every coast
> Renowned suitors; and her sunny locks
> Hang on her temples like a golden fleece;
> Which makes her seat of Belmont Colchos' strond,
> And many Jasons come in quest of her.[98]

And the Duke consoles Brabantio with this same thought:

> .....And, noble signior,
> If virtue no delightful beauty lack,
> Your son-in-law is far more fair than black.[99]

Moral virtue is a habit bred by custom in us:

> How use doth breed a habit in a man![100]

The word "breed" is used because of the likeness of habit to the acts that produce it. The word use here means custom.[101] In the following passage, both "breeds" and "mother" are used in the generation of courage.

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[98] *Merchant of Venice,* Act I, Sc. 1
[99] *Othello*, Act I, Sc. 3
[100] *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act V,Sc. 4
[101] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum Super Lib. I Sententiarum*, Distinctio 1, Quest I. Art. 1I, Solutio:

> ...uti dicitur multipliciter.
>
> Aliquando enim nominat quamlibet operationem, secundum quod dicimus usum alicujus rei esse bonum vel malum....

> Plenty and peace breeds cowards, hardness ever
> Of hardiness is mother.[102]

When we become accustomed to something, it becomes pleasant for us and perhaps more so than what was previously enjoyed by us:

> Now, my co-mates and brothers in exile,
> Hath not old custom made this life more sweet
> Than that of painted pomp? Are not these woods
> More free from peril than the envious court?[103]

Custom can also be an angel and custom or use can greatly change individual nature or even obscure our common nature. Thus, Hamlet says to his mother:

> Good night; but go not to mine uncle's bed;
> Assume a virtue, if you have it not.
> That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat,
> Of habits devil, is angel yet in this,
> That to the use of actions fair and good
> He likewise gives a frock or livery,
> That aptly is put on. Refrain to-night;
> And that shall lend a kind of easiness
> To the next abstinence: the next more easy;
> For use almost can change the stamp of nature.[104]

But the custom of doing the bad can eliminate the most suitable feelings:

> Aliquando dicit frequentiam operationis, secundum quod usus est idem quod consuetudo...
>
> Dicitur etiam aliquando uti eorum quae ad finem ordinantur aliquem.

[102] *Cymbeline*, Act III, Sc. 6 [hardness: difficulty; hardiness: courage]

[103] *As You Like It*, Act II, Sc. 1
[104] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 4

All pity choked with custom of fell deeds.[105]

Custom can insulate us sometimes from reason, as Hamlet notes to his mother:

> ...let me ring your heart; for so I shall
> If it be made of penetrable stuff,
> If damnéd custom have not brass'd it so
> That it is proof and bulwark against sense.[106]

The word *wanton*, sometimes used for the vicious, especially the unchaste. has in its etymology that one has not been brought up well:

> wanton is made up of a compound - wan, which means "not", and a form of an old participle meaning "brought up" or "trained"[107]

It lies within our power to correct our sense inclinations or feelings and acquire virtue:

> .....'tis in ourselves that we are thus or thus. Our bodies are gardens; to the which our wills are gardeners: so that if we will plant nettles or sow lettuce, set hyssop and weed up thyme, supply it with one gender of herbs or distract it with many, either to have it sterile with idleness or manured with industry, why, the power and corrigible authority of this lies in our wills. If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us to most preposterous conclusions: but we have reason to cool our raging motions, our carnal stings, our unbitted lusts.[108]

The seeds of the moral virtues are in reason.

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[105] *The Tragedy of Julius Caesar*, Act III, Sc. 1

[106] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 4

[107] Kittredge note on *Merchant of Venice*, Act V, Sc. 1, line 71

[108] *Othello*, Act I, Sc. 3

Although virtue as such makes us good, Shakespeare is also aware of how by happening virtue can make us fall and sin rise in the moral order:

> Some rise by sin, and some by virtue fall.[109]

The man who falls into manifest sin may acquire humility from seeing his defect and weakness and then rise on the foundation of humility while the man who has virtue may become proud and pride goeth before a fall. Moreover, the virtue of another my be a source of temptation as Angelo speaks in his soliloquy about the virtuous Isabella:

> From thee; even from thy virtue!
> What's this? what's this? Is this her fault or mine?
> The tempter or the tempted, who sins most?
> Ha!
> Not she; nor doth she tempt: but it is I,
> That, lying by the violet in the sun,
> Do as the carrion does, not as the flower,
> Corrupt with virtuous season. Can it be
> That modesty may more betray our sense
> Than woman's lightness? Having waste ground enough
> Shall we desire to raze the sanctuary,
> And pitch our evils there? O, fie, fie, fie!
> What dost thou, or what art thou, Angelo?
> Dost thou desire her foully for those things
> That make her good? O, let her brother live!
> Thieves for their robbery have authority
> When judges steal themselves. What! do I love her,
> That I desire to hear her speak again,
> And feast upon her eyes? What is't I dream on?
> O cunning enemy, that, to catch a saint,
> With saints dost bait thy hook! Most dangerous
> Is that temptation that doth goad us on
> To sin in loving virtue: never could the strumpet,
> With all her double vigour, art and nature,
> Once stir my temper; but this virtuous maid
> Subdues me quite. Ever till now,
> When men were fond, I smil'd and wonder'd how.[110]

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[109] *Measure for Measure,* Act II, Sc. 1

[110] *Measure for Measure*, Act II, Sc. 2

VIRTUE IS ITS OWN REWARD

Coriolanus, Act II, Sc. 2, Cominius about Coriolanus:

> Our spoils he kick'd at,
> And look'd upon things precious as they were
> The common muck of the world: he covets less
> Than misery itself would give, rewards
> His deeds with doing them, and is content
> To spend the time to end it.

VIRTUE IS MANHOOD

Courage was the most praised virtue in ancient times. It is the most honored. The Medal of Honor can be received for one glorious day on the battlefield, but one who is temperate or just all his life does not receive a Medal of Honor. Thus Cominius praises Coriolanus:

> I shall lack voice: the deeds of Coriolanus
> Should not be utter'd feebly. - It is held
> That valour is the chiefest virtue,
> And most dignifies the haver: if it be,
> The man I speak of cannot in the world
> Be singly counterpois'd.....[111]

And read the note on the following line about Coriolanus:

> he did it to please his mother, and to be partly proud; which he is, even to the altitude of his virtue.[112]
>
> [Hudson Shakespeare note 38. *virtue:* valour, courage. The original (Latin) meaning. "Now in those days, valiant ness was honored in Rome above all other virtues: which they call *virtues*,

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[111] *Coriolanus*, Act II, Sc. 2
[112] *Coriolanus*, Act I, Sc. 1

> by the name of virtue itself, as including...all other special virtues besides." Plutarch]

Virtue first means the courage of a man from *vie* meaning man as opposed to woman. Hence, Beatrice's complaint to Benedict:

> O! that I were a man for his sake, or that I had any friend would be a man for my sake! But manhood is melted into curtsies, velour into compliment, and men are only turned into tongue, and trim ones too: he is now as valiant as Hercules, that only tells a lie and swears it. I cannot be a man with wishing, therefore I will die a woman with grieving.[113]

But a strong woman seems to be like a man or to be a virago. Consider the words of Spiciness to the angry Vilonia (the formidable mother of Coriolanus):

Spiciness: Are you mankind?

Vilonia: Ay, fool; is that a shame? Note but this, fool;
Was not a man my father?[114]

We could also understand *man* in *manhood* as opposed to the beast who is ruled by his passions. Note here the connection between beast and cowardly:

Ominous to Tribunes: You have brought
A trembling upon Rome, such as was never
So incapable of help.

Both Tribunes: Say not, we brought it.

Enemies: How! Was it we? We loved him; but like beasts
And cowardly nobles, gave way unto your clusters
Who did hoot him out other city.[115]

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[113] *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act IV, Sc. 1
[114] *Coriolanus*, Act IV, Sc. 2
[115] *Coriolanus*, Act IV, Sc. 6

Albany would seems to be using the word *virtue* for courage in particular when he says to Edmund:

> Trust to thy single virtue; for thy soldiers,
> All levied in my name, have in my name
> Took their discharge.[116]

Manhood first means the virtue of courage as can be seen in Henry's Exhortation to his soldiers before the battle of Agincourt:

> And Crispin shall ne'er go by
> From this day to the ending of the world,
> But we in it shall be remembered -
> We few, we happy few, we band of brothers.
> For he today that sheds his blood with me
> Shall be my brother. Be he ne'er so vile,
> This day shall gentle his condition.
> And gentlemen in England now abed
> Shall think themselves accord's they were not here,
> And hold their manhood's cheap whiles any speaks
> That fought with us upon Saint Crispin's day.[117]

Earlier in these same exhortation, Henry touches upon the honor that attaches to courage which is the first meaning of manhood. Virtue, of course, is a praiseworthy or honorable quality:

> God's will! I pray thee wish not one man more.
> By Jove, I am not covetous for gold,
> Nor care I who doth feed upon my cost.
> It yearns me not if men my garments wear;
> Such outward things dwell not in my desires.
> But if it be a sin to covet honor,
> I am the most offending soul alive.
> No, faith, my coz, wish not a man from England.
> God's peace! I would not lose so great an honor
> As one man more, methinks would share from me
> For the best hope I have. O, do not wish one more.

Falstaff also speaks of courage as manhood in this great scene:

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[116] *King Lear*, Act V, Sc. 3
[117] *Henry V,* Act IV, Sc. 3

Falstaff: A plague of all cowards, I say, and a vengeance too! Marry and amen! Give me a cup of sack, boy. Ere I lead this life long, I'll sew nether-stocks, and mend them, and foot them too. A plague of all cowards! Give me a cup of sack, rogue. Is there no virtue extant? [He trinket]

Prince: Didst thou ever see Titan kiss a dish of butter? Pitiful-hearted butter, that melted at the sweet tale of the sun! If thou didst, then behold that compound.

Falstaff: You rogue, here's lime in this sack too! There is nothing but roguery to be found in villainous man. Yet a coward is worse than a cup of sack with lime in it - a villainous coward! Go thy ways, old Jack, die when thou wilt; if manhood, good manhood, be not forgot upon the face of this earth, then am I a shorten herring. There lives not three good men unhinged in England; and one of them is fat, and grows old. God help the while! A bad world, I say. I would I were a weaver; I could sing psalms or anything. A plague of all cowards, I say still.[118]

But one could extend the word *manhood* to the man as opposed to the child. Not only should a man be well disposed towards anger, but also towards all the passions.

Thus when Antonio tries to soothe his brother Leona to, he compares the man who cannot control his emotions to a child:

Leonato: But there is no such man; for, brother, men
Can counsel and speak comfort to that grief
Which they themselves not feel; but tasting it,
Their counsel turns to passion, which before
Would give preceptial medicine to rage,
Fetter strong madness in a silken thread,
Charm ache with air and agony with words.
No, no; 'tis all men's office to speak patience
To those that wring under the load of sorrow,
But no man's virtue nor sufficiency
To be so moral when he shall endure
The like himself. Therefore give me no counsel:

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[118] *King Henry the Fourth, Part One*, Act II, Sc. 4

My griefs cry louder than advertisement.

Antonio: Therein do men from children nothing differ.

Leonato: I pray thee peace! I will be flesh and blood;
For there was never yet philosopher
That could endure the toothache patiently
However they have writ the style of gods
And made a push at chance and sufferance.[119]

In the following passage, after commenting upon the cowardliness of Bardolph, Nym & Pistol, their boy-servant goes onto their injustice and how this is opposed to his *manhood. Manhood* has now been carried over to justice and is roughly equivalent with all moral virtue. But since man is man by reason, the virtues of reason could also be called *manhood*. But these are the least like courage. (See *Protagoras* etc.) Consider the lack of courage observed in Bardolph, Nym & Pistol by their boy servant in the first paragraph and then their injustice as against his manhood in the second paragraph where manhood seems to said of the boy's justice:

> As young as I am, I have observ'd these three swashers. I am boy to them all three, but all three, though they would serve me, could not be man to me; for indeed three such antics do not amount to a man. For Bardolph, he is white-liver'd, and red-fac'd, by the means whereof a' faces it out, but fights not. For Pistol, he hath a killing tongue and a quiet sword, by the means whereof a' breaks words and keeps whole weapons. For Nym, he hath heard that men of few words are the best men, and therefore he scorns to say his prayers, let a' should be thought a coward. But his few bad words are match'd with as few good deeds, for a' never broke any man's head but his own, and that was against a post when he was drunk.
>
> They will steal anything, and call it purchase. Bardolph stole a lute case, bore it twelve leagues, and sold it for three halfpence. Nym and Bardolph are sworn brothers in filching, and in Calice they stole a fire shovel. I knew by that piece of service the men would carry coals. They would have me as familiar with men's pockets as their gloves or handkerchiefs, which makes much

[119] *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act V, Sc. 1

against my manhood, if I should take from another's pocket to put into mine; for it is plain pocketing up of wrongs. I must leave them and seek some better service. Their villainy goes against my weak stomach, and therefore I must cast it up.[120]

COURAGE OR VALOR

The virtue of courage (or valor or manhood) is between two extremes, foolhardiness and cowardliness. The Romans were known for their courage. Cominius upon retreating with his forces in *Coriolanus* says:

> Breathe you, my friends: well fought, we are come off
> Like Romans, neither foolish in our stands,
> Nor cowardly in retire.[121]

Courage or manhood is closer to foolhardiness than to cowardliness. Foolhardiness would seem to be courage without discretion as said in the same play:

> But now ‘tis odds beyond arithmetic;
> And manhood is call’d foolery when it stands
> Against a falling fabric. Will you hence?[122]

A truly courageous man may seem foolhardy to those less brave. Coriolanus appears to be so to the soldiers who refuse to follow him into the midst of the enemy city, but Shakespeare represents Coriolanus as truly courageous. But in their remarks he is characterized as foolhardy.

Marcius Coriolanus: So, now the gates are ope: now prove good seconds
'Tis for the followers Fortune widens thems,
Not for the fliers: mark me, and do the like.
[enters the gates]

First Soldier: Foolhardiness! not I

---

[120] *Henry V*, Act III, Sc. 2
[121] *Coriolanus*, Act I, Sc. 6
[122] *Coriolanus*, Act III, Sc. 1

Second soldier: Nor I[123]

The French, before the battle of Agincourt, mock the courage of the greatly outnumbered and exhausted English as foolish

Rambures: That island of England breeds very valiant creatures;
Their mastiffs are of unmatchable courage.

Orleans: Foolish curs, that run winking into the mouth of a
Russian bear and have their heads crush'd like
rotten apples.

Constable: Just, just; and the men do sympathize with the mastiffs
In robustious and rough coming-on, leaving their wits
With their wives.[124]

King Henry prays before the battle of Agincourt that the English would lose their ability to count if the numbers would make them regard courage as foolhardy:

O God of battles! steel my soldiers' hearts;
Possess them not with fear; take from them now
The sense of reckoning if th'opposed numbers
Pluck their hearts from them.[125]

Youth is thought to be braver and also more foolish than the old who see the danger better. This is a sign that courage is closer to foolhardiness than to cowardliness. In *As You Like It*, Celia says:

All's brave that youth mounts and folly guides.[126]

In the same play, Celia and the Duke think that the young Orlando about to take on the strong and brutal Charles is foolhardy:

Celia:

Young gentleman, your spirits are too bold for your years. You have seen cruel proof of this man's

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[123] *Coriolanus*, Act I, Sc. 4
[124] *King Henry V*, Act III, Sc. 7

[125] *King Henry V*, Act IV, Sc. 1
[126] *As You Like It* Act III, Sc. 4

> strength. If you saw yourself with your eyes or knew yourself with your judgment, the fear of your adventure would counsel you to a more equal enterprise. We pray you for your own sake to embrace your own safety and give over this attempt.....

Duke:

> Come on. since the youth will not be entreated, his own peril on his forwardness
>
> [Yale Shakespeare: forwardness: foolhardiness][127]

We should note the words “the fear of your adventure would counsel you”. Shakespeare often speaks of fear as advising or counseling us. Hence, the coward seems to think more than the foolhardy man and even more than the courageous man.

But even the old and wary Caesar is warned by Calpurnia in *Julius Caesar:*

> Alas, my lord, your wisdom is consumed in confidence.[128]

And the witches say about Macbeth:

> He shall spurn fate, scorn death, and bear
> His hopes 'bove wisdom, grace and fear;
> And you all know, security
> Is mortals' chiefest enemy[129]

Shakespeare is accustomed to modify a noun with an adjective that expresses the cause or the effect of what is signified by the noun. Consider the connection of cause and effect in the following:

In *Twelfth Night*, the Duke says to Antonio:

> What foolish boldness brought thee to their mercies
> Whom thou in terms so bloody and so dear

---

[127] *As You Like it*, Act I, Sc. 2
[128] Act II, Sc. 2

[129] *Macbeth*, Act III, Sc. 5

Hast made thine enemies?[130]

And in *Coriolanus:*

.....All the regions
Do smilingly revolt; and who resist
Are mock'd for valiant ignorance,
And perish constant fools.[131]

But the man who truly has courage and not the vice of foolhardiness is guided by foresight or practical wisdom in his actions like Banquo about whom Macbeth says:

Our fears in Banquo stick deep,
And in his royalty of nature reigns
That which would be fear'd. 'Tis much he dares,
And to that dauntless temper of his mind
He hath a wisdom that doth guide his valor
To act in safety.[132]

Moreover, the boldness of the truly courageous man should not extend to what is beyond what is naturally good for a man to do. If only Macbeth had followed his own words at first to Lady Macbeth's urging him on to the murder of Duncan:

I dare do all that may become a man;
who dare do more is none.[133]

This is why the drunk man, although bold by his drink, is not courageous because he has lost the use of his reason. Thus in *Timon of Athens:*

He's a sworn rioter; he has a sin that often
Drowns him and takes his valour prisoner.[134]

The courageous man follows nature in defending his country which is called instead of one's kingdom, one's birthdom (which has the same root-meaning as *nation*):

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[130] *Twelfth Night*, Act V, Sc. 1
[131] *Coriolanus,* Act IV, Sc. 6
[132] *Macbeth*, Act III, Sc. 1
[133] *Macbeth* , Act I, Sc. 7
[134] *Timon of Athens*, Act III, Sc. 5

Malcolm: Let us seek out some desolate shade, and there
Weep our bosoms empty.

Macduff: Let us rather
Hold fast the mortal sword, and like good men
Bestride our downfall'd birthdom.[135]

Courage has two integral parts, one of which is shown in advancing towards the dangerous and the other in bearing up under the evils that cannot be avoided. The former is more seen in men and the latter in women. In *Timon of Athens*, we have this conversation:

First Senator: To revenge is no valour, but to bear.

Alcibiades: My lords, then, under favour, pardon me,
If I speak like a captain.
Why do fond men expose themselves to battle,
And not endure all threats? sleep upon't,
And let the foes quietly cut their throats,
Without repugnancy? If there be
Such valour in the bearing, what make we
Abroad? Why then, women are more valiant
That stay at home, if bearing carry it.[136]

And Prospero recalls the bearing up patience or fortitude of his daughter, Miranda:

.....Thou didst smile,
Infused with a fortitude from heaven,
When I have deck'd the sea with drops full salt,
Under my burden groan'd; which rais'd in me
An undergoing stomach, to bear up
Against what should ensue.[137]

But even men must bear misfortune:

Messala: Even so great men great losses should endure.

---

[135] *Macbeth*, Act IV, Sc. 3

[136] *Timon of Athens*, Act III, Sc. 5

[137] *The Tempest*, Act I, Sc. 2

Cassius: I have as much of this in art as you,
But yet my nature could not bear it so.[138]

Sometimes Shakespeare calls valiant men *men of heart:*

He whin'd and roar'd away your victory
That pages blush'd at him, and men of heart
Look'd wondering each at others.

[Yale: men of heart: valiant men][139]

GREATNESS OF SOUL OR MAGNANIMITY

Following the order of likeness where we consider together virtues that have the same mode, we can put magnanimity or greatness of soul after courage or manhood. For when men are drawn back by their emotions from what they should do, they need to be strengthened to face dangers or to attempt great and honorable things. Shakespeare often associates this striving for the honorable with the courageous. Thus in the words of Hotspur:

O gentlemen, the time of life is short!
To spend that shortness basely were too long,
If life did ride upon a dial's point,
Still ending at the arrival of an hour.[140]

And in Henry's Exhortation to his soldiers before the battle of Agincourt:

God's will! I pray thee wish not one man more.
By Jove, I am not covetous for gold,
Nor care I who doth feed upon my cost.
It yearns me not if men my garments wear;
Such outward things dwell not in my desires.
But if it be a sin to covet honour,
I am the most offending soul alive.
No, faith, my coz, wish not a man from England.

---

[138] *Julius Caesar,* Act IV, Sc. 3
[139] *Coriolanus*, Act V, Sc. 5

[140] *King Henry IV, Part One,* Act V, Sc. 2

> God's peace! I would not lose so great an honour
> As one man more, methinks would share from me
> For the best hope I have. O, do not wish one more.[141]

But the small-souled prefer life to their honor:

> thou preferr'st thy life before thine honour[142]

But the pursuit of honor can be seen as requiring bad things which is vicious. Thus Lady Macbeth to Macbeth:

> Glamis thou art, and Cawdor, and shalt be
> What thou art promis'd. Yet do I fear thy nature.
> It is too full o' th' milk of human kindness
> To catch the nearest way. Thou wouldst be great,
> Art not without ambition, but without
> The illness should attend it.[143]

MODERATION OR TEMPERANCE

Courage is closer to the extreme that seems more foolish (hence, called foolhardiness). But moderation or temperance is further away from the extreme that seems more foolish or more opposed to it. This is why Socrates reasons in the *Protagoras* that wisdom and moderation are both opposed to folly, but does not try to reason that courage and wisdom are opposed to the same

The intemperate man who goes to excess is more like the fool:

> Olivia: What's a drunken man like, fool?
>
> Clown: Like a drown'd man, a fool, and a madman: one draught above heat makes him a fool; the second mads him; and a third drowns him.[144]

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[141] *Henry V*, Act IV, Sc. 3
[142] *King Henry VI, Part Three*, Act I, Sc. 1
[143] *Macbeth*, Act I, Sc. 5
[144] *Twelfth Night*, Act I, Sc. 5

Likewise, men who go to excess in love seem to have lost reason:

> The expedition of my violent love
> Out ran the pauser reason.[145]

And in *A Midsummer Night's Dream:*

> to say the truth, reason and love keep little company together now-a-days[146]

Reason should not eliminate, but moderate, love, as Lucetta says to Julia:

> I do not seek to quench your love's hot fire,
> But qualify the fire's extreme rage,
> Lest it should burn above the bounds of reason.[147]

What can happen when reason is abandoned in love is said well in the sonnet:

> My reason, the physician to my love,
> Angry that his prescriptions are not kept,
> Hath left me.....
> Past cure I am, now reason is past care
> And frantic-mad with evermore unrest;
> My thoughts and my discourse as madmen's are.[148]

Jealousy, which is an effect of love, can take away the judgment of reason, as Iago says about Othello:

> .....yet that I put the Moor
> At least into a jealousy so strong
> That judgment cannot cure.....[149]

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[145] *Macbeth*, Act II, Sc. 3

[146] *A Midsummer Night's Dream,* Act III, Sc. 1

[147] *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act II, Sc. 7

[148] *Sonnet CXLVII*

[149] *Othello*, Act II, Sc. 1

Thus Iago's advice to Roderigo is good:

> If the balance of our lives had not one scale of reason to poise another of sensuality, the blood and baseness of our natures would conduct us to most prepost'rous conclusions. But we have reason to cool our raging emotions, our carnal stings, our unbitted lusts.....[150]

As Thomas explains in the Secunda Secundae of the *Summa Theologiae* temperance or moderation has two integral parts, *verecundia* and *honestas*. Shakespeare often uses *honest* in close meaning to its Latin origin of the state of honor. Thus when the jealous Leontes thinks his wife is an adulterer, he says:

'Tis pity she's not honest, honourable

Celia touches upon these two parts using a metonym (blush) for shame or *verecundia:*

Celia: Therefore, my sweet Rose, my dear Rose, be merry.

Rosalind: From henceforth I will, coz, and devise sports.
Let me see; what think you of falling in love?

Celia: Merry, I prithee, do, to make sport withal: but
love no man in good earnest; nor no further in sport
neither than with the safety of a pure blush thou
mayst in honour come off again.[151]

When Hamlet upbraids his mother about her hasty second marriage, he also uses the metonym of "blush" for shame or *verecundia* and "grace" for the spiritual beauty of *honestas*.

Hamlet: .....let me ring your heart; for so I shall
If it be made of penetrable stuff,
If damned custom have not brass'd it so

---

[150] *Othello*, Act I, Sc. 3

[151] *As You Like it*, Act I, Sc. 2

That it is proof and bulwark against sense.

Queen: What have I done that thou dar'st wag thy tongue
In noise so rude against me?

Hamlet: Such an act
That blurs the grace and blush of modesty[152]

Later in that same act (line 83), Hamlet touches upon the meaning of the metonym:

O shame! where is thy blush?

And in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, it is said about Julia disguised as a boy:

I think the boy hath grace in him; he blushes[153]

In *Venus and Adonis*, Venus is described as forgetting these two integral parts of temperance:

And having felt the sweetness of the spoil,
With blindfold fury she begins to forage;
Her face doth reek and smoke, her blood doth boil,
And careless lust stirs up a desperate courage,
Planting oblivion, beating reason back,
Forgetting shame's pure blush and honour's wrack.[154]

And in *Much Ado About Nothing*, the deceived Claudio, who thinks his bride to be has had a lover the night before, says bitterly to her father and others present in the Church these words, touching again upon the integral parts of temperance:

There, Leonato, take her back again:
Give not this rotten orange to your friend;
She's but the sign and semblance of her honour.
Behold! how like a maid she blushes here.
O! What authority and show of truth
Can cunning sin cover itself withal.
Comes not that blood as modest evidence

---

[152] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 4
[153] *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act V, Sc. 4
[154] *Venus and Adonis*, lines 553-558

> To witness simple virtue? Would you not swear,
> All you that see her, that she were a maid,
> By these exterior shows? But she is none:
> She knows the heat of a luxurious bed;
> Her blush is guiltiness, not modesty.....
> Out on thee! Seeming! I will write against it.[155]

A maid was proverbially modest (at least before our corrupt age). Hence, in, Helena says to Hermia who she thinks has stolen her lover these words:

> Have you no modesty, no maiden shame,
> No touch of bashfulness?[156]

When Adam explains why he is still vigorous in old age, he also speaks of the opposite of bashful found in young men who take advantage of the weaker sex. In:

> Though I look old, yet I am strong and lusty;
> For in my youth I never did apply
> Hot and rebellious liquors in my blood,
> Nor did not with unbashful forehead woo
> The means of weakness and debility.[157]

In the following conversation between Angelo and Isabella, it can be seen that Angelo has lost all control over his sensual desires and is ready to abuse his power over Isabella's brother to get her body. He wishes her to set aside her blushes and all nicety (to what does nicety refer?):

> Angelo: .....I have begun
> And now I give my sensual race the rein.
> Fit thy consent to my sharp appetite;
> Lay by all nicety and prolixious blushes,
> That banish what they sue for: redeem thy brother
> By yielding up thy body to my will,
> Or else he must not only die the death,
> But thy unkindness shall his death draw out
> To ling'ring sufferance. Answer me tomorrow,
> Or, by the affection that now guides me most,
> I'll prove a tyrant to him.

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[155] *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act IV, Sc. 1
[156] *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 2
[157] *As You Like It*, Act II, Sc. 3

Isabella: .....O perilous mouths!
That bear in them one and the selfsame tongue,
Either of condemnation or approof,
Bidding the law make curtsy to their will,
Hooking both right and wrong to th'appetite,
To follow as it draws.[158]

Shame is a form of fear. And when Theseus speaks of those local officials who are bashful or embarrassed when called upon to greet or speak before Theseus, he connects modesty with fear in these words:

And in the modesty of fearful duty[159]

Othello's great metaphor touches more upon the *honestas* or spiritual beauty of modesty in which the light of reason shines forth through the rarely reasonable passions involved in the bodily pleasures of the sense of touch:

Let me not name it to you, you chaste stars.[160]

He will not name adultery to the chaste stars. The light of the stars is especially beautiful against the black sky. The words of Hamlet to Laertes, although in a different matter, help us to understand the metaphor of Othello and the integral part of temperance that it expresses:

I'll be your foil, Laertes. in mine ignorance
Your skill shall, like a star i'th' darkest night,
Stick fiery off indeed.[161]

And Lepidus about Antony:

His faults in him seem as the spots of heaven,
More fiery by night's blackness; hereditary
Rather than purchas'd: what he cannot change
Than what he chooses.[162]

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[158] *Measure for Measure*, Act II, Sc. 4
[159] *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act V, Sc. 1
[160] *Othello*, Act V, Sc. 2
[161] *Hamlet* Act V, Sc. 2
[162] *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act I, Sc. 3

The first line of *Sonnet 129* touches upon one, perhaps both of the integral parts of temperance:

> The expense of spirit in a waste of shame
> Is lust in action; and till action, lust
> Is perjur'd, murderous, bloody, full of blame,
> Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to trust;
> Enjoy'd no sooner but despised straight;
> Past reason hunted; and no sooner had
> Past reason hated, as a swallow'd bait,
> On purpose laid to make the taker mad:
> Mad in pursuit, and in possession so,
> Had, having, and in quest, to have. extreme;
> A bliss in proof, and prov'd, a very woe;
> Before, a joy propos'd; behind a dream.
> All this the world well knows; yet none knows well
> To shun the heaven that leads men to this hell.

The man who does to excess in the pleasures of the body makes the flesh his god and becomes himself a beast:

> This is the liver-vein, which makes flesh a deity.
> A green goose a goddess: pure, pure idolatry
> God amend us, God amend! we are much out o'the way.[163]

And in *The Rape of Lucrece:*

> While she the picture of true piety,
> Like a white hind under the gripe's sharp claws,
> Pleads, in a wilderness where are no laws,
> To the rough beast that knows no gentle right,
> Nor ought obeys but his foul appetite.[164]

The words *honest* and *dishonest* in the works of Shakespeare often keep their Latin original meaning as pertaining to moderation or modesty. Thus Audrey to Touchstone:

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[163] *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act IV, Sc. 3

[164] *The Rape of Lucrece*, lines 542-546

> I hope it is no dishonest desire to desire to be a woman of the world.[165]

Honest often means *chaste* in Shakespeare, like *honestas* is an integral part of temperance. See the following conversation:

Hamlet: Are you honest?

Ophelia: My lord!

Hamlet: Are you fair?

Ophelia: What means your lordship?

Hamlet: That if you be honest and fair, your honesty should admit no discourse to your beauty.

Ophelia: Could beauty, my lord, have better commerce than with honesty?

Hamlet: Ay, truly; for the power of beauty will sooner transform honesty from what it is to a bawd than the force of honesty can translate beauty into his likeness: this was sometimes a paradox, but now the time gives it proof.[166]

And Marina sees honesty or chastity as the virtue of a woman:

Bawd: Ay, and you shall live in pleasure

Marina: No

Bawd: Yes, indeed, shall you, and taste gentlemen of all fashions. You shall fare well; you shall have the difference of all complexions. What! do you stop your ears?

Marina: Are you a woman?

Bawd: What would you have me be, an I be not a woman?

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[165] *As You Like It*. Act V, Sc. 3 [Hudson Shakespeare note **dishonest**: immodest. Cf. 'honest' in I, ii, 34; III, iii, 22. Ben Jonson described his wife to Drummond of Hawthornden as "a shrew, yet honest."]

[166] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 1

Marina: An honest woman or not a woman.[167]

There are other virtues which have the mode of temperance, consisting more in restraining desire from going to excess than defect in what is naturally attractive to us. Humility (which moderates the desire for excellence) is attached to temperance in the division of the virtues according to mode (in the Secunda Secundae). In the following passage, Shakespeare (when Hamlet upbraids his mother for her hasty second marriage) seems to use a metaphor from species to species, calling the sexual emotions *humble* when they are apt to obey reason:):

> You cannot call it love, for at your age
> The heyday in the blood is tame, it's humble,
> And waits upon the judgment; and what judgment
> Would step from this to this.[168]

MILDNESS

Mildness is also like moderation or temperance for it moderates anger, a strong passion that needs to be moderated. Thus it is said about Coriolanus:

> Put him to choler straight: he hath been used
> Ever to conquer and to have his worth
> Of contradiction: being once chafed, he cannot
> Be rein'd again to temperance.[169]

Sometimes Shakespeare uses a metaphor from species to species, calling very strong love *wrath* as Rosalind says about the sudden strong love of Oliver and Celia:

> they are in the very wrath of love and
> they will together; clubs cannot part them[170]

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[167] *Pericles*, Act IV, Sc. 2

[168] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 4
[169] *Coriolanus*, Act III, Sc. 3
[170] *As You Like It*. Act V, Sc. 2

Although love and anger are quite different emotions, they are alike in being very strong and in being in need of the moderation and restraint of reason. And this is why mildness that moderates anger is considered with temperance that moderates sexual love or desire in the Secunda Secundae of the *Summa Theologiae*.

Because anger and sensual love are such strong passions, the man undergoing them may identify himself with them and think he must follow their impetus in order to be true to himself. Thus Coriolanus, who is given to anger, says when he is told to moderate his anger:

> Why did you wish me milder? would you have me
> False to my nature? Rather say, I play
> The man I am.[171]

Likewise, in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Proteus thinks he must be false to his betrothed and to his friend Valentine in order to be true to himself in following the sudden passion he has for Silvia. But when one follows a strong passion in opposition to reason rather than tempering this passion, one is not true to oneself, but is acting like a beast. Thus Friar Laurence says to Romeo:

> .....thy wild acts denote
> The unreasonable fury of a beast.....
> I thought thy disposition better temper'd.[172]

As Socrates or Plato compared the soul dominated by a passion to the rule of the city by a tyrant, so Antonio says about Shylock:

> .....I do oppose
> My patience to his fury, and am arm'd
> To suffer with a quietness of spirit
> The very tyranny and rage of his.[173]

---

[171] *Coriolanus*, Act III, Sc. 2

[172] *Romeo and Juliet,* Act III, Sc. 2

[173] *Merchant of Venice*, Act IV, Sc. 1

Tyranny is a form of misgovernment. Hence, Shakespeare speaks of government by what helps to restrain anger:

> Quite besides the government of patience.[174]

Hence, it is necessary to use reason to moderate one's anger, as Prospero says:

> Though with their high wrongs I am struck to th' quick,
> Yet with my nobler reason 'gainst my fury
> Do I take part: the rarer action is
> In virtue than in vengeance; they being penitent,
> The sole drift of my purpose doth extend
> Not a frown further. Go, release them, Ariel.[175]

And Norfolke says to Buckingham that this is necessary before one can direct oneself:

> .....Stay, my lord,
> And let your reason with your choler question
> What 'tis you go about.....
> I say again, there is no English soul
> More stronger to direct you than yourself,
> If with the sap of reason you would quench,
> Or but allay, the fire of passion.[176]

EASILY TURNING OR EUTRAPELIA

This virtue also has the mode of temperance or moderation and therefore in the order of the Secunda Secundae we placed it after mildness

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[174] *Cymbeline*, Act II, Sc. 4

[175] *The Tempest,* Act V, Sc. 1

[176] *King Henry VIII*, Act I, Sc. 1

The virtue concerned with the laughable is called *eutrapelia* in Greek by Aristotle. We see the same way of speaking of this virtue when Biron is described as having the virtue concerned with the laughable:

> Biron they call him; but a merrier man,
> Within the limit of becoming mirth,
> I never spent an hour's talk withal:
> His eye begets occasion for his wit;
> For every object that the one doth catch,
> The other turns to a mirth-moving jest.[177]

Men are by their individual natures sometimes inclined to one extreme or the other in this matter of the laughable.

> Nature hath framed strange fellows in her time:
> Some that will evermore peep through their eyes,
> And laugh like parrots at a bag-piper;
> And others of such vinegar aspect.
> That they'll not show their teeth in way of smile
> Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.[178]

Melancholy is the sadness opposed to mirth, the joy over the laughable. In the following conversation between Jacques and Rosalind, we see this as well as the importance of avoiding the two extremes in the matter of the laughable:

Jaques:	I prithee, pretty youth, let me be better acquainted with thee.
Rosalind:	They say you are a melancholy fellow.
Jaques:	I am so; I do love it better than laughing.
Rosalind:	Those that are in extremity of either are abominable fellows, and betray themselves to every modern censure worse than drunkards.
Jaques:	Why, 't is good to be sad and say nothing.

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[177] Love's Labour's Lost, Act II, Sc. 1

[111] *The Merchant of Venice,* Act I, Sc. 1

Rosalind: Why, then 't is good to be a post.

Jaques: I have neither the scholar's melancholy, which is

emulation; nor the musician's which is fantastical; nor the courtier's, which is proud; nor the soldier's, which is ambitious; nor the lawyer's. which is politic; nor the lady's, which is nice; nor the lover's, which is of all these; but it is a melancholy of mine own, compounded of many simples, extracted from many objects, and, indeed, the sundry contemplation of my travels, in which my often rumination wraps me in a most humorous sadness.

Rosalind: A traveller! By my faith, you have great reason to be sad: I fear you have sold your own lands to see other men's; then, to have seen much, and to have nothing, is to have rich eyes and poor hands.

Jaques: Yes, I have gain'd my experience.

Rosalind: And experience makes you sad: I had rather have a fool to make me merry than experience to make me sad; and to travel for it too.[179]

JUSTICE

Shakespeare sees the connection of justice with equality. Indeed *just* sometimes is a synonym for equal:

The prince is here at hand: pleaseth your lordship
To meet his grace just distance 'tween our armies

[*just* here means equal][180]

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[179] *As You Like It*, Act IV, Sc. 1

[180] *Henry IV, Part Two*, Act IV, Sc. 1

And justice can be called inequality:

> .....nor do not banish reason
> For inequality.
>
> [Yale Shakespeare: inequality: injustice][181]

And justice is to be even rather than at odds:

> even-handed justice[182]

Justice consists in paying one's debts, or giving to each his due, whether it be to God, as Belarius says:

> Where I have liv'd at honest freedom, paid
> More pious debts to heaven than in all
> The fore-end of my time.[183]

Or to another human being:

> .....Marina gets
> All praises, which are paid as debts,
> And not as given.[184]

Slander is opposed to justice:

> 'tis slander; whose edge is sharper than the sword[185]

TRUTHFULNESS

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[181] *Measure for Measure,* Act V, Sc. 1

[182] *Macbeth*, Act I, Sc. 7, line 10

[183] *Cymbeline*, Act III, Sc. 3

[184] *Pericles*, Act IV, Chorus or Gower lines

[185] *Cymbeline*, Act III, Sc. 4

The virtue of truthfulness is attached to justice as a potential part of it as Thomas explains in the Secunda Secundae of the *Summa Theologiae.* In these beautiful words, Shakespeare also seems to associate this virtue with justice:

> Falseness cannot come from thee, for thou lookest
> Modest as justice, and thou seem'st a palace
> For the crown'd truth to dwell in.[186]

LIBERALITY OR GENEROSITY

The vice which is opposed to liberality by defect, stinginess or avarice, is incurable according to Aristotle because men are naturally inclined more to keep material goods as necessary for their life and as they get older they become even more dependent upon these goods as their bodily powers decline. In discussing the persistence of vices, Macduff makes this point:

> This avarice
> Sticks deeper, grows with more pernicious root
> Than summer-seeming lust, and it hath been
> The sword of our slain kings.[187]

The man in excess, who is extravagant, is the extreme which seems more like the fool:

> Sir Toby: Why, he has three thousand ducats a year.
>
> Maria: Ay, but he'll have but a year in all these ducats; he's a very fool and a prodigal.[188]

---

[186] *Pericles*, Act V, Sc. 1

[187] *Macbeth*, Act IV, Sc. 3

[188] *Twelfth Night,* Act I, Sc. 3

It is said of the misanthrope, Timon, that he never knew the middle which is the virtue in this matter:

> The middle of humanity thou never knewest, but the extremity of both ends: when thou wast in thy gilt and thy perfume, they mocked thee for too much curiosity; in thy rags thou know'st none, but art despised for the contrary.[189]

Shakespeare on love and friendship will be considered under the eighth and ninth books of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

DUANE H. BERQUIST

[189] *Timon of Athens*, Act IV, Sc. 3

A FOREWORD TO THE POETICS

ON THE MATTER OR SUBJECT OF THE POETICS

Since this science gets its name from the poet, it might be good to ask what a poet is.

The word *poet* comes from the Greek word meaning a maker, but not everyone who makes is called a poet. Hence, two questions arise: “What is the poet a maker of?” and “Why is this name which is common to many (maker) applied to the poet in particular?” The answers to these two questions are connected.

The poet is said to make a likeness of human life in words. He is a maker of plots or stories with their characters.

The poet is also said to be a maker of verses. He puts words into meter. Thus some people call anything with meter a poem, especially if it has metaphor and/or simile in addition.

These two meanings of poet and poem are not equivalent. Every likeness of human life in words does not have meter. The novel and the short story do not have meter. And everything in meter is not a likeness. Philosophy has been written in verse (as by Empedocles and Lucretius and Boethius) and prayers have been put into meter.

The *Poetics* or the book *About the Poetic Art* is named from the poet who makes a likeness of human life in words, regardless of whether these words do or do not have meter (even though Aristotle may have had in mind most of all works written in meter or verse). Of course, the first great poets wrote or spoke in words with meter; and most works in verse may also be likenesses of human life; and it is perhaps more appropriate for the maker of likenesses in words to use meter than anyone else.

The meanings of poem can be distinguished in the same way as poet. And only in the corresponding meaning does it belongs to poetics. Sometimes also the word poem is used for the smallest of its species, as plant is distinguished against tree (although a tree can also be called a plant in the general sense). The poems that Aristotle is most interested in, however, are the large or great ones.

It is difficult to give the reason why the common name *maker* is given to the poet in particular. Two reasons might be assigned. One is in comparison to the other ways in which a man might be led to a conclusion by something expressed in words or within rational philosophy. The second is in comparison to all the kinds of making.

Within rational philosophy (which considers the ways in which reason is led to a conclusion), the poetic art alone or most properly is about the way of leading the mind to a conclusion from fictions or things made: "Si autem procedit ex fictis facientibus delectationem vel abominationem, erit alia pars logicae quae vocatur poesis vel poetica." (St. Albert, *De Praedicabilibus*, Ed. Doyon, p. 5B) Moreover, the poet makes in something exterior (words) more than the dialectician or demonstrator. A sign of this is that the excellence of a poet's work makes it untranslatable; so that Samuel Johnson could say that the preservers of language are the poets who compel us to learn the language in which they wrote if we are to appreciate them. But Euclid's work need not suffer in translation. Rhetoric is closer to poetry in this respect (as in many other ways) than are dialectic and demonstration. The enthymeme and examples of the rhetorician are translatable, but his persuasive power also depends on his language (See Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, Bk. III), which does not lend itself so much to translation (although more so than the poet's language). This is why the rhetorician is called a speaker although the dialectician and demonstrator also speak. (Dialectic in turn has a more exterior work than demonstration, as can be seen in Book VIII of the *Topics* of Aristotle and as indicated by the origin of the word *dialectic* itself.)

There is also a reason why the poet might be called a *maker* in some special sense, distinguishing him from other makers. A carpenter (for example) who makes in a stable exterior matter might in some way be thought to leave an exterior product after his activity more than the poet whose matter (words) is transient. Yet in another way, a poet might be thought to be even more a maker, and this in two ways. First, the matter of the poet, words, is a product of man himself who forms the words and gives them a meaning by convention.

The carpenter takes his material from nature, as does the statue-maker. Even the musician uses sounds that signify more by nature. He imitates the natural sign of the human feelings in our voice. *Poetic* means made-up, fictitious. Do we not apply *made-up* more readily to stories and plots than to other things made? We speak especially of stories or plots as being made-up. This implies almost made out of nothing, something not real; and therefore the poet might seem to be more master of what he has made than the carpenter.

Insofar as the major forms of fiction (epic, drama, novel, short story) are about happiness and misery and the change between them, fiction or the poem seems to be about something far greater in importance than, say, the chair of the carpenter which is directed to some lesser and particular good (sitting). The poet or maker of fiction seems to take in the whole of human life in some way. Moreover, the Greeks thought of the poet as inspired by the gods in the making of his work.

But if one thinks that *maker* is said more of the one who makes in some matter such as wood than the one who makes in words, it is safer to say that maker distinguishes the poet in comparison to rhetoric, dialectic and demonstration; just as *places* distinguishes one part of logic from other parts although place is said more properly in natural science.

Having considered briefly the word *poet*, we can now turn back to the subject and title of the so-called Poetics.

The actual title of what is called the *Poetics* in English is *About the Poetic Art*. And in the beginning of the book, it is also said to be about the poetic art and not just the poem. In this way it is like the *Rhetoric*, which is also about the art of persuasion and not just about the speech. This is not indifferent, even though the one who talks about the poetic art will also talk about the poem (drama, epic etc.). Since a poem is a thing made by us, a proper or scientific consideration of it must include how it is to be made. Common principles do not suffice for science; science must proceed from proper principles or the principles private to the matter under consideration. The proper or private principles of a thing made or done by us must express how it is made or done. By giving the poetic art as his aim, Aristotle shows that he is going to make a scientific consideration, one based on the private principles of the thing. The *Poetics* instructs the poet, to some extent, at least in general, as to how to make his work.

This casts light on the division of imitations in the first part of the *Poetics*. This is not a division of the subject of one science (called *aesthetics or the philosophy of art* by some). There cannot be one science concerned with all imitations if by science is meant a knowledge of things by their private principles. When that in which the imitation or likeness is made differs generically, there cannot be the same proper or private principles of what is made (although there may be common beginnings). Thus, for example, one cannot understand how a likeness in line and color is made by the same private beginnings as a likeness in words. This is also true of the servile arts. The private beginnings of the art of carpentry are adapted to working with wood while the private principles of the art of sewing are adapted to working with cloth or threads. The art of carpentry must differ from the art of sewing as it does from the art of glass blowing. The poetic art, thus, can only be concerned with things made in words.

Again there cannot be one science or art about everything in words. Science and art are a work of reason, and reason seeks order or makes order. But not every order of things in words can be understood by the same proper principles. The order in Euclid's *Elements* and the order in Sophocles' *Oedipus Rex* cannot be understood by the same proper or private principles. The order which the grammarian considers is understood by proper principles different from either of the above. There cannot be one science of everything written in verse or meter. For example: prayers as well as imitations have been put into meter, and the excellence of a prayer and the excellence of a likeness of human life cannot be judged by the same proper principles. And the suitability of one meter rather than another must be judged by what it is that is being put into meter. Thus, it seems that the poetic art, and consequently the book *About the Poetic Art,* can be concerned only with imitations made in words.

But does every likeness of human life in words belong to one art or science? Only imitations in words having plots of some length are considered in the book *About the Poetic Art*. If some of the principles of this work (such as those concerned with diction and metaphor) can be applied to small poems like sonnets, the latter certainly do not belong to the main or principal subject of the book.

Aristotle, moreover, does not consider all the species of imitations in words that have plots. Of the imitations in words having plots of some length, Aristotle considers two main types or species - tragedy and comedy (in the lost

part of the *Poetics*). There are reasons for considering these two species before all the rest.

First, the kind of tragedy and the kind of comedy that Aristotle considers are contraries in the genus of imitation in words that have plots; that is, they are the species which are the farthest apart. But contraries are the first beginnings - all things come to be from contraries. (See the fragments of Heraclitus, the *Phaedo* of Plato, Aristotle's first book of *Natural Hearing* (the so-called *Physics)* and the tenth book of his *Metaphysics*. Thus although there may not be a determinate number of species between the tragedy and the comedy considered by Aristotle, we can arrange the intermediate species as closer or further from each contrary as they share in or resemble one contrary more than another. The contraries considered by Aristotle thus serve as principles in knowing all other species.

Another reason for considering these two species can be given. Tragedy is the highest or noblest species of imitation in words having a plot and therefore should be considered according to the rule of Ammonius Hermias, the great commentator on Aristotle. And there is the same knowledge of opposites and comedy is opposed to tragedy.

Aristotle considered tragic drama and we assume comic drama. To the consideration of tragic drama is attached the consideration of the tragic epic. And if there is a kind of work which is to comedy as the Iliad is to tragedy (say perhaps, the lost *Margites* of Homer), this could be attached to the consideration of comic drama. (Fielding called his *Joseph Andrews* a *comic epic in prose*.)

If there are species between tragedy and comedy, or species inferior to the tragedy and comedy considered by Aristotle, it does not seem that he considered them in the *Poetics*. However, this is not because they belong to a different science. There are many instances in the other sciences (e.g., logic and natural science) of Aristotle's considering only the main or greatest types (For example, we have books by Aristotle on the categorical statement and syllogism, but not on the hypothetical and disjunctive. If we consider these other species of imitation in words having plots of some length, we are continuing to work within the same science to which the *Poetics* belongs. Drama, epic and novel seem greater forms than the many forms of short story.

The putting together of deeds or actions in the plot of a tragedy or comedy and consequently the choice of characters and diction would seem to be determined by the emotional effect aimed at in tragedy or in comedy, the feelings moved and purged by tragedy and comedy. This raises the question whether the order in imitations such as *The Divine Comedy*, *The Faery Queene*, and *Paradise Lost* can be considered by the same science as that to which the *Poetics* belongs. The same question could be raised about the Platonic dialogues which are imitations even further removed from those considered in the book *About the Poetic Art*.

Perhaps where the end differs so does the science. And the purgation of the feelings is one end. And there are mixed forms. Do opera and ballet belong to one art or more than one? Even in the *Poetics* one is referred to rhetoric for the thought element. But the rhetorician is far closer to the poet than is the dialectician.

ON THE RESTRICTION OF THE SUBJECT OF THE POETICS

The restriction of the subject or matter of the *Poetics* of Aristotle is apt to appear strange to a modern reader. Our purpose is to consider that restriction in the light of the principles and kinds of restriction that are found in many books of Aristotle. It may contribute to the usefulness of the *Poetics* to find reasons why its author could begin where he did and go no further.

We shall find that there are two kinds of restriction that can be noted in the *Poetics*. The first restriction is to what can be the subject of one science or art. The second restriction is *within* what can be the subject of one science or art. These two kinds of restriction should not be confused, and the reasons for them are not the same, as will appear.

We are accustomed to an academic discipline called *aesthetics*, but it is very doubtful that Aristotle would agree that there is one science or art corresponding to that word. The term *aesthetics* refers to all the fine arts. These are approximately the same as the imitative arts which are divided in the first chapters of the *Poetics* on the basis of that in which they make their imitations, and what they imitate, and how they imitate. This division gives the specific differences of the poetic art, which has already been assigned as the subject of the *Poetics* in the first sentence of that book. Is Aristotle dividing

one general science (which some today might call aesthetics) into its parts, one of which is the poetic art? The text of the *Poetics* here cannot justify such an interpretation, and it would seem to be contrary to what Aristotle has taught us about what can or cannot constitute the subject of one science or art. In order to make this clear, let us review this teaching on the diversity of the sciences and arts.

At the beginning of the sixth book of the *Metaphysics*, Aristotle observes that every science (and we might add art) has some principles or beginnings that it considers. But it is in the *Posterior Analytics* (Bk. I, Chs. 9-10) that he makes his crucial distinction between the common and proper or private beginnings of a science; and the same distinction could be made in the arts. The proper principles or private beginnings of a science are adapted to a subject that is related to our mind in one way. The science of geometry, for example, is related to our mind in a different way from that of natural science. The subject of natural science is based on our sense-experience of natural things, and conclusions in it must correspond to or agree with our sense-experience. The subject of geometry, however, does not seek or need confirmation in our sense-experience. Taking a science such as geometry, we can find that it uses beginnings adapted to its subject, and beginnings that are common to it and other sciences. The definitions of a point, the straight line and the circle, or the postulate that all right angles are equal are examples of beginnings that fit the subject of geometry or that are private to it. But common beginnings, such as that the whole is larger than one of its parts, do not fit the subject of geometry anymore than that of natural science or any other science. Such common beginnings do not suffice to constitute one science because nothing can be concluded from them until they are adapted to some particular subject. (See *Posterior Analytics*, Bk. I, Ch. 28)

The distinction between common and private beginnings or principles can also be made in the arts. If we take the practical arts of carpentry and glass blowing, for example, we shall see that there are both common beginnings and beginnings or principles adapted to the particular matter with which that art works. A common beginning in the arts is that one should work in a way suitable to the matter, yet such a principle does not suffice for having one art, because nothing can be made on the basis of it until it has been applied to the particular matter at hand. But when we turn to wood and glass, we see that they cannot be worked in the same way. The proper principles, or private beginnings, that actually enable one to know how to make something out of wood are not the same as those that do this for glass or cloth. A sign of this is the diversity of

their tools - the carpenter cannot use the tools of the glass blower and vice-versa. The common beginnings do not enable one to know how to make anything, and hence cannot constitute an art which is defined in terms of the capacity to make.

What has been said of the above arts is also true in the imitative arts. These latter arts differ in the first place by difference of that in which they imitate or make their likeness. (It is significant that Aristotle begins with this difference when he distinguishes the arts.) And, for example, the way of making a likeness out of line and color (a painting) and the way of making a likeness out of sounds having rhythm and harmony (music) are not the same. And like in the practical arts, the tools are not the same. The brush is useless to the musician, as is the piano to the painter. The imitative arts then have a unity only of common principles, which does not suffice to make one art or science out of them. This is why Aristotle in the *Poetics*, restricts himself to the consideration of imitations in words, or the art which imitates in words.

If it be asked why he shows in the beginning of the book how to distinguish all the imitative arts, it should be known that not only is some knowledge of these differences necessary to understand the poetic art in particular, but since that art is the highest of the imitative arts and has most of the character of wisdom among those arts, it belongs to that art or the consideration of it to distinguish it from all the other imitative arts. And that distinction must be made in words.

But Aristotle does not consider every kind of imitation in words in the *Poetics*. There would also seem then to be not only a restriction to one science or art, but also a restriction within one art or science.

It is reasonable to expect such a restriction. Alexis de Tocqueville has pointed out the aristocratic desire to see a few things (the best) well. There is also the limitation of time for any author. The great commentator Ammonius Hermias has noted Aristotle's restriction to highest forms in logic. And we note this restriction in other parts of philosophy. We attribute to Aristotle the books on animals, but little on plants whose consideration he left principally to his disciple, Theophrastus. Aristotle wrote the *Politics*, but one of his students apparently wrote the book on domestic philosophy.

In the *Poetics,* Aristotle considered the highest forms of fiction. These are a likeness of happiness and misery and the change from one to the other.

Tragedy, representing this change in men better than us, would seem to be the highest. (Epic is similar and is to be considered for the same reason, even though Aristotle will argue that tragedy as a form is superior even to epic.) Comedy needs to be considered also because it is the contrary of tragedy and there is the same knowledge of opposites (as Socrates is pointing out to the tragic poet Agathon and the comic poet Aristophanes at the end of the *Symposium*). Moreover, every other major form of fiction would seem to be mixed from these two contrary forms. Even if tragedy were not the highest form, we would still consider it first as one of the two contraries; just as Aristotle considers democracy and oligarchy before the republic even though the latter is better. The contraries being simpler and extremes are easier to grasp than any forms intermediate between them which seem to arise from them like grey from black and white.

ON THE PLACE OF THE POETICS IN THE DIVISION OF PHILOSOPHY

Philosophy is divided into two chief parts, which are theoretical or looking philosophy and practical philosophy. These differ by their end. For the end of looking philosophy is just to understand, but the end of practical philosophy is to do. But if we consider the tool of philosophy also a part of it, we could add to the two chief parts, rational philosophy or logic.

Under looking philosophy come three particular kinds of philosophy: natural philosophy, mathematical philosophy and first philosophy or wisdom.

And under practical philosophy come ethics, domestics and political philosophy.

To which of the three parts of philosophy does the *Poetics* belong?

Not to looking philosophy, because the truth of these things is so little, being posterior to natural things and even to human action, which is not studied primarily for the sake of truth.

Not to practical philosophy because the subject of poetics is not human action, but the imitation of such action and the art of making such imitations.

When Albert the Great and Thomas divide rational philosophy or logic, they will consider rhetoric and poetics as being about ways of coming to conclusions that are weaker than dialectical reasoning and even more so than demonstrative reasoning.

Logic in the more strict or narrow sense (which includes the books on demonstration and dialectical reasoning, but not rhetoric which is an offshoot of political studies and dialectic, or the poetic science) is more a tool of looking philosophy than practical philosophy. Although we might follow logic in the beginning of practical philosophy, the latter is completed by knowing how to do something (e.g., how to become virtuous or how to preserve or overthrow a government) and this is not a concern of logic.

But rhetoric and poetics seem to be more tools of practical philosophy. For it is the statesman who wants to persuade the crowd and rhetoric is the art of persuasion. And the poetics is about things that can dispose men for virtue. Hence, Thomas says: “poëtae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per aliquam decentem representationem.” Moreover, fiction gives the practical philosopher many examples to illustrate his teaching. Fiction does not give the looking philosopher many examples although the wonder of the *philomuthos* is a necessary stepping-stone to the wonder of the philosopher.

Rational philosophy as a whole is about the tools of philosophy. But logic in the strict or narrow sense is more about the tools of looking philosophy, definition and demonstration and dialectical arguments, while rhetoric and poetics are about the speech and the play, which are more the concern of the practical philosopher.

Is the poetic art an offshoot of practical philosophy as rhetoric is in part? Or does the *Poetics* have more a unity of its own private principles? There are reasons to think both.

PURPOSE OF THE POETICS

Is the *Poetics* written for the poet or for his audience or for the literary critic?

A careful reading of the book will show that it is ordered to all three. Aristotle does instruct the poet, for example, as to how to construct his plot and make his characters. But by pointing out the pleasure and the catharsis private to each form of fiction, he is teaching the audience how to approach each form of fiction and not to seek, for example, the pleasure of a happy ending in tragedy. And in explaining how the plot and characters and diction should be, he is obviously also instructing the literary critic.

The *Poetics*, then, is useful for (1) writing good tragedies, etc. (2) to know what pleasure to seek in each form of fiction or from each form, and (3) to judge whether a particular work is well made or not.

ON THE ROAD OF THE POETICS

The *Poetics* is divided into a short proemium (paving the way) and then the *tractatus* or drawing out of the work.

In the proemium, Aristotle gives first the aim or subject of the *Poetics* and then the order in which he shall proceed by pointing out the natural beginning for a consideration of that subject.

In the *tractatus* or drawing out of the work, Aristotle first considers the poetic art and its species in general; and then, second, descends to a particular consideration of tragedy (along with epic) and comedy (which part has been lost)

In the general consideration of the poetic art and its species, Aristotle first considers the differences of the poetic art from the other imitative arts and the differences of the species of the poetic art from each other. And second, he considers the origin of the poetic art and its species. For as he points out in the beginning of the *Politics*, he who considers things from their origin will get the clearest understanding of them.

To the particular consideration of tragedy is attached the consideration of epic. The particular consideration of comedy is lost, although there are allusions to it in other works of Aristotle.

The *Division of the Poetics* can be consulted for a more complete division of the *Poetics.*

Longinus has told us that literary criticism is the last fruit of a long experience. We, of course, are lacking much of the experience of Greek drama which Aristotle had, especially that from the performances of the plays. And someone who lacks this experience is not a good judge of what Aristotle says. We have experience of the plays of Shakespeare, of course, and others, but there are differences between these plays and those which Aristotle knew.

And in accord with this dependence upon experience for judgment, it should be noted that *a drama or epic is good or bad* is more known to us than *why it is good or bad.* One should recognize the excellence of Homer or Sophocles before one can give the reasons for this excellence.

Literary history is important for a knowledge of the origin of literary forms and their nature. A good example for us is the *Allegory of Love* by C. S. Lewis which helps us to understand at least one kind of Shakespeare's plays. Aristotle is said to have done some research into literary history, but the details of that are lost to us.

This science demonstrates especially from the end or purpose of tragedy or comedy, but these demonstrations cannot have the rigor of those found in geometry or arithmetic.

Judgments in this science must return to the works themselves. This is why Goethe said that a work of art should be discussed in its presence.

Aristotle considers those literary forms that have reached a certain stability in their evolution, and he proceeds fairly quickly to the species without a long consideration of the genus. It is difficult or impossible to understand something which is changing; and the variability of the matter and the ease of falling into equivocation are avoided better by trying to define the species before the genus.

Moderns might consider tragic and comic drama together, but Aristotle considers tragedy and epic together. This is because what they imitate is more essential than how they imitate.

A DIVISION OF THE POETICS OF ARISTOTLE

A DIVISION OF THE WHOLE

PROEMIUM OR PAVING THE WAY CH. 1 TO 1447a 13

- AIM OR SUBJECT 1447A 8-12
- ORDER OF PROCEEDING 1447A 12-13

TRACTATUS OR DRAWING OUT OF THE SUBJECT Ch. 1, 1447a 13 to end

- DIFFERENCES OF THE IMITATIVE ARTS, ESPECIALLY OF THOSE THAT REPRESENT IN SPEECH, RHYTHM AND HARMONY, SEPARATELY OR IN COMBINATION CH. 1, 1447a 13 TO END OF CH. 3
- CONSIDERATION OF THE POETIC ART AND ITS CHIEF SPECIES CH. 4 TO END
  - Origin of the poetic art and its chief species Ch. 4 to Ch. 5 1449b 8
  - Consideration of the chief species of the poetic art (tragedy, epic & comedy) Ch. 5 1449b 9 to end of book

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A DIVISION OF THE DIFFERENCES OF THE IMITATIVE ARTS

Three kinds of difference found in imitative arts Ch. 1, 1447a 13-18

Consideration of each kind of difference Ch. 1, 1447a 18 - Ch.3,1448b1

Differences of that in which they imitate 1447a 18 to end Ch. 1
Differences of what they imitate Ch. 2
Differences of how they imitate Ch. 3 to 1448a 24

Conclusion from this about the three chief species of the poetic art. Ch. 3 1448a 24-1448b 1

Epilogue Ch. 3 1448b 2-3 (end of Ch. 3)

A DIVISION OF THE ORIGIN OF THE POETIC ART & ITS CHIEF SPECIES

Origin of the poetic art in general Ch. 4 to 1448b 23

The two natural causes of the poetic art Ch. 4 to 1448b 21

How the poetic art arose from these causes 1448b 22-23

Origin of the species of poetic art 1448b 24 to 1449b 8 in Ch. 5

Division of poetic art leading to tragedy & comedy1448b 24-1449a 6

Particular history and character of tragedy and comedy 1449a 7 to end of Ch. 5, 1449b 8
Tragedy Ch. 4, 1449a 7 to end of Ch. 4
Comedy Ch. 5 to 1449b 8

A DIVISION OF THE CONSIDERATION OF THE CHIEF SPECIES OF POETIC ART

Order of considering them

Presupposed to understanding this order - tragedy & epic 1449b 9 to end of Ch. 5

Order of considering them Ch. 6, 1449b 21-22

Consideration of the chief species Ch. 6, 1449b 22 to end of work

Consideration of the art of tragedy and also that of epic

The art of tragedy Ch. 6, 1449b 22 to end of Ch. 22

The art of the epic Chs. 23-24

Problems and solutions Ch. 25

Which is better: tragedy or epic? Ch. 26 (end of what we have)

Consideration of the art of comedy (lost part of the *Poetics*)

A DIVISION OF THE ART OF TRAGEDY

DEFINITION OF TRAGEDY - CH. 6, 1449b 22-30

Definition 1449b 22-28

One part of definition explained 1449b 28-30

PARTS OF TRAGEDY

Parts distinguished Ch. 6, 1449b 31 to end of Ch. 6

Parts distinguished 1449b 31 to 1450a 14

Order of parts in importance 1450a 15 - end of Ch. 6

Parts considered at length Chs. 7-22

Plot and character Chs, 7-18

General rules for plot and character Chs. 7-15

Rules for plot Chs. 7-14

Rules regarding character Ch. 15

Particular rules to be followed in constructing plot Chs. 16-18

Thought and diction Chs. 19-22 (put together as in Rhetoric)

What pertains to the poetic art Ch. 19

Consideration of diction Chs. 20-22

Parts of diction Chs. 20-21

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A DIVISION OF RULES FOR PLOT

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A DEFINITION OF COMEDY

ARISTOTLE'S book *About the Poetic Art* (usually called the *Poetics*) contained a discussion of comedy as well as that on tragedy. Unfortunately, the second part, that devoted to comedy, has been lost. There remain only a few references to it. Since the definition of tragedy was central to the first part, we may assume that a definition of comedy likewise would be central to the second part. Our purpose in this article, in faithfulness to Aristotle's model, will be to investigate the definition of comedy.

Before beginning our investigation, let us set three limits to it. First, the word comedy is to be taken in its strict sense of a likeness of the laughable in words. Sometimes the word comedy is used in a broad or loose sense for any likeness whose plot goes from misery to happiness or that ends happily. Thus, in the famous First Folio Edition of Shakespeare's plays published in 1623, the plays are divided into Comedies, Histories and Tragedies, but here comedy is taken in the broad or loose sense. Plays such as *The Winter's Tale* or *Measure for Measure*, which are included under the Comedies, are by no means imitations of the laughable, even though they end happily. In this paper, we shall limit ourselves to comedy in the strict sense — a likeness of the laughable in words. Such a treatment seems to have been Aristotle's aim in the lost second part of the *Poetics* as is clear from his remarks on comedy at the beginning of chapter five of that work.

A second limit of our aim will be to restrict our treatment to comic drama. The reason for this is not because the word comedy seems to call to mind the comic drama rather than the comic novel (or some other likeness of the laughable in words), but because there are good reasons for considering comic drama and comic novel in an order proportional to that in which Aristotle considers tragedy (tragic drama) and epic in the first part of his book. He first defines tragedy and considers its parts. Then, he considers epic insofar as it differs from or adds to tragedy, assuming without much discussion the many things in which epic is essentially the same as tragedy. It makes sense to define the more simple and more perfect form first (unless it were less known) for a number of reasons. Our reason can see and define the essential in the more simple and more perfect form better than in the more mixed and less unified form. (There are similar reasons for considering the

polis in political philosophy before the nation or empire.) Likewise, the more simple, more perfect, more unified form serves to some extent as a measure of the other. We should also consider that the spoken word of the comic drama is naturally before the written word of the novel (or short story, for that matter). I shall not, however, hesitate to use good examples from the comic novel in talking about the laughable.

A third and final limit in the scope of this paper is to restrict our consideration to two parts of the definition of comedy or comic drama. This restriction assumes that Aristotle has correctly defined tragedy and that comedy would be defined similarly, having in common all but two parts of the definition of tragedy. The explanation and defense of those parts of the definition of comedy which are common to it and the definition of tragedy should be sought in what remains of the Poetics.

Aristotle defines tragedy as an imitation or likeness of an action that is serious (spoudaîon), complete and of some magnitude, in sweetened speech, acted out rather than narrated, through pity and fear completing the purgation of those passions. To someone who has followed Aristotle's discourse, it is not difficult to see that comedy is also an imitation or likeness of an action that is complete and of some magnitude, in sweetened speech, acted out rather than narrated. But what should be placed in the definition of comedy instead of an action that is serious (spoudaîon)? And what shall we put in place of pity and fear? Surely it is in these two parts that the definition of comedy will differ from that of tragedy. Accordingly, our paper will have two parts corresponding to these two places where the definition of comedy must differ from that of tragedy. Our way of proceeding will be similar to that of Aristotle himself in the *Peri Hermeneias* (ch. 2 & 3) where, when defining verb after noun, he touches only upon those parts of the definition of verb wherein it differs from that of noun. I suspect that he would have proceeded in the same way in the lost part of the Poetics**.** He would not repeat the explanation of those parts of the definition of comedy which are common to it and tragedy, but would bring out those things wherein comedy differs from tragedy.

PART ONE

A Definition of Comedy

We do not have to seek far to find the word to be substituted in the definition of comedy for serious (spoudaîon) in the definition of tragedy. It has already been used many times in limiting our aim. That word is, of course, laughable (geloîon in Greek). Comedy is a likeness of the laughable. Aristotle praises Homer for first showing the form of comedy, turning from lampoons to the laughable.[1] Hence, our task in this part of our paper will be to give some explanation of the laughable. Fortunately, we have a good beginning for this task in some words of Aristotle on the laughable in the introductory chapters of the *Poetics* before he has defined tragedy.[2] This part of our paper, then, will take the form of a commentary on these words of Aristotle about the laughable.

Aristotle first gives the genus of the laughable and then something like a definition of it. The first part is as follows:

> Comedy is, as we have said, a likeness of those worse, not however according to every badness, but the laughable is a part of the aischros (ugly or shameful).[3]

It is difficult to find an exact English equivalent of the Greek word aischros. Cicero found such an equivalent in Latin when he gives the genus of the laughable in the *De Oratore:*

> Locus autem et regio quasi ridiculi ... turpitudine et deformitate quadam
>
> continetur.[4]

Turpis in Latin has the sense of both ugly and shameful. But these two senses are very closely related. Graceful in English often means beautiful, but its opposite, disgraceful, signifies shameful more so than ugly, even though ugly is the direct opposite of beautiful. To keep the richness of the Greek word ais or the Latin word turpis, we must in English retain part of the meaning both of ugly and shameful. Further, these words may at times have too strong a sense to cover all cases of the laughable. Shameful, for example,

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[1] Cf. Poetics**,** 4, 1448b34-37.

[2] Cf. Poetics**,** 4, 1449a 32-37.

[3] Poetics, 5, 1449a 32-34.

[4] De Oratore, II, n. 236.

should be understood broadly enough to include the embarrassing. Everyone knows how often the embarrassing is laughable.

To explore the richness of Aristotle's word (aischros), let us examine first how the laughable comes under the shameful or embarrassing and, afterwards, how it comes under the ugly.

Homer's *Margites* stands in the same relation to comedy as does his Iliad to tragedy.[5] Unfortunately, the *Margites* has been lost. But we do have Homer's

[5] Poetics, 4, 1448b38 seq.

representation of the blind poet Demodokus singing first in a tragic vein (about the Trojan war) and then, later, in a comic way in the eighth book of the Odyssey. The comic story is certainly an illustration of the shameful or embarrassing as laughable. It concerns how Hephaistos caught his adulterous wife Aphrodite and Ares in a strong net, much to their surprise and shame. The other gods come in to see Aphrodite and Ares caught in the net:

> All the others
> were crowding in now to the brazen house -
> Poseidon who embraces earth, and Hermes
> the runner, and Apollo, lord of distance.
> The goddesses stayed at home for shame, but
> these munificences ranged there in the doorway,
> and irrepressible among them all
> arose the laughter of the happy gods.
> Gazing hard at Hephaistos' handiwork
> the gods in turn remarked among themselves:
> "No dash in adultery now".[6]

It is not by accident that disorder or apparent disorder in the relations of men and women is an abundant source both of the shameful or embarrassing and of the laughable. We need think only of Mr. Pickwick when he gets into a lady's room by mistake at the inn or innocently into a girls' boarding school or with the misunderstanding Mrs. Bardell in his arms.[7] Charles Knight makes the following observation about *The Merry Wives of Windsor* which is, perhaps, Shakespeare's comic masterpiece:

> He (Shakespeare) made the lover (Falstaff) old and fat and avaricious; betrayed by his own greediness and vanity into the most humiliating scrapes, so that his complete degradation was the natural dénouement of the whole adventure, and the progress of his shame the proper source of merriment.[8]

One could hardly find a stronger sign of the truth that the laughable is a part of the shameful than these last words of Knight.

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[6] Odyssey, lines 340-350, Robert Fitzgerald's transl., New York : Everyman's Library, Alfred Knopf, 1992, p.134.

[7] Cf. Charles Dickens, The Pickwick Papers.

[8] Introductory Notice to The Merry Wives of Windsor, Imperial Edition of Shakespeare's Works (Imp. Ed.), vol. I, p. 74.

Besides the disorder in the relations between men and women, there are, of course, many other shameful or embarrassing events which are laughable. One thinks of the Pickwickians caught in the middle of the army maneuvers on field day[9], or Parolles being exposed as a real coward after boasting of his bravery and fidelity[10]. In general, all exposure of affectation is both shameful or embarrassing and laughable as Henry Fielding emphasizes in his Preface to *Joseph Andrews:*

> The only true source of the true ridiculous (as it appears to me) is affectation...Now affectation proceeds from one of these two causes, vanity or hypocrisy: for as vanity puts us on affecting false characters in order to purchase applause; so hypocrisy sets us on an endeavour to avoid censure, by concealing our vices under the appearance of their opposite virtues... From the discovery of this affectation arises the ridiculous, which always strikes the reader with surprise and pleasure; and that in a higher and stronger degree when the affectation arises from hypocrisy, than when from vanity; for to discover any one to be the exact reverse of what he affects, is more surprising and consequently more ridiculous, than to find him a little deficient in the quality he desires the reputation of.[11]

Thus the man who pretends to a knowledge of wine that he does not have is embarrassed when he is found praising a cheap wine that has been poured from a bottle bearing the label of an expensive, high-quality wine.

In addition to meaning shameful or embarrassing, Aristotle's word aïscròß also has the sense of ugly. Hence, we must show how the laughable is a part of the ugly. Perhaps the best way to do this is to examine the forms of the ugly, and these are best seen in opposition to the main forms of the beautiful. For the latter, there is an important text of Aristotle in the *Metaphysics:*

> The greatest forms of the beautiful are order and symmetry and the limited, which the mathematical sciences especially show.[12]

Hence, there are perhaps three main forms of the ugly: disorder, asymmetry, and the unlimited. Perhaps limited and unlimited could be identified with

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[9] Cf. Charles Dickens, The Pickwick Papers, ch. 4.

[10] All's Well That Ends Well**,** Act IV, Sc. iii.

[11] Henry Fielding, Joseph Andrews, New York: Random House [Modern Library ed.], 1939, pp. xxviii-xxix.

[12] Metaphysics**,** XIII**,** 3, 1078a37-1078b2.

moderate and excessive. Whoever considers the laughable in comparison to these three forms of the ugly will see that the laughable falls under one or more of these.

Puck's laughter is aroused by the disorder of the lovers:

> Shall we their fond pageant see?
> Lord, what fools these mortals be...
> Then will two at once woo one;
> That must needs be sport alone;
> And these things do best please me
> That befall preposterously.[13]

As it is characteristic of the wise man to order[14], folly, by opposition, especially consists in disorder. Thus Puck speaks of the lovers as fools and their "pageant" as fond (this word originally meant foolish) and touches upon the definition of disorder when he says preposterously (which Latin word means putting what comes after before or "putting the cart before the horse"). We saw how Fielding regards the discovery of affectation as a very important source of the laughable.[15] Affectation is a kind of disorder since it is opposed to the moral virtue of veracity or truthfulness which consists in a kind of order as Thomas explains:

> Since the good … consists in order, it is necessary to consider a special reason for good in each order. There is, however, a special order by which our exterior words or deeds are suitably ordered to something as a sign is to the signified. And man is perfected in regard to this by the virtue of truthfulness.[16]

It is laughable often in the practical order when someone does something out of order; as someone painting himself into a corner is an

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[13] A Midsummer Night's Dream**,** Act III, Sc. ii.

[14] Cf. Metaphysics, I, 2, 982a18.

[15] Fielding uses *ridiculous* in a somewhat narrower sense than the *laughable* for he distinguishes between the ridiculous and burlesque. Burlesque would fall under the unlimited or excessive.

[16] Summa Theologiae**,** IIa IIae, q. 109, a. 2, c. «Cum bonum ... consistat in ordine necesse est specialem rationem boni considerari ex determinato ordine. Est autem specialis ordo secundum quod exteriora nostra vel verba vel facta debite ordinantur ad aliquid sicut signum ad signatum. Et ad hoc perficitur homo per virtutem veritatis.»

example of ending where he should have begun. It seems laughable to Socrates to investigate the stories about the gods when he does not yet know even himself.[17] It is a striking instance of the natural genius of Shakespeare that he should have introduced his greatest comic character, Falstaff, with an observation by Hal of the irrelevance of even the first sense of order, that of time.[18] We are first introduced to Falstaff by this dialogue:

> Falstaff: Now Hal, what time of day is it, lad?
>
> Prince: Thou art so fat-witted with drinking of old sack, and unbuttoning thee after supper, and sleeping upon benches after noon, that thou hast forgotten to demand that truly which thou wouldst truly know. What a devil hast thou to do with the time of the day? Unless hours were cups of sack, and minutes capons, and clocks the tongues of bawds, and dials the signs of leaping-houses, and the blessed sun himself a fair hot wench in flame-color'd taffeta, I see no reason why thou shouldst be so superfluous to demand the time of the day.[19]

This passage also touches very completely upon the excessive or unlimited character of Falstaff as well.

The unsymmetrical is the second main form of the ugly. Here it will be useful to recall Aristotle's observation that the mathematical sciences especially show the beautiful. For in speaking of the laughable, we often use two words taken from the mathematical sciences, one from each of the two basic sciences of arithmetic and geometry. These words are odd and eccentric. Both words can be used to indicate something unsymmetrical for the odd number is divided into unequal parts and what is eccentric or off-centered is lopsided. And thus we borrow words from the mathematical sciences to name the unsymmetrical or the disproportioned which is a form of the ugly. So not only do the mathematical sciences especially show the beautiful, but they also provide us with a vocabulary for talking about the ugly. This is not surprising since we name things as we know them and there is the same knowledge of opposites.

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[17] Plato, Phaedrus**,** 229e.

[18] Cf. Categories**,** 12.

[19] Henry IV, Part I**,** Act I, Sc. ii.

There are many examples where the laughable or comic is spoken of as odd or coupled with odd. L. Rice-Oxley writes about Fielding's comic works:

> In them the oddities of men are laughed at.[20]

Dickens also couples odd with comical or ridiculous as when he speaks of "an odd and comical expression"[21] or writes, "I married Fanny under the oddest and most ridiculous circumstances possible"[22]. But the best example in Dickens is found in his favorite and best novel, *David Copperfield,* where, speaking of Mr. Micawber, one of the greatest comic characters of all fiction, the novelist uses odd to indicate something unsymmetrical or disproportioned:

> I think now, how odd it was, but how wonderfully like Mr. Micawber, that when he went from London to Canterbury he should have talked as if he was going to the farthest limits of the earth, and when he went from England to Australia as if he were going for a little trip across the Channel.[23]

The geometrically-rooted word eccentric is used to describe the laughable by Thackeray in his essay on Addison:

> Addison ... looks on the world and plays with the ceaseless humors of all of us - laughs the kindest laugh - points out our neighbor's foible or eccentricity to us with the most good-natured, smiling confidence, and then, turning over his shoulder, whispers our foibles to our neighbor. What would Sir Roger de Coverley be without his follies and his charming little brain-cracks... We love him for his vanities as much as for his virtues. What is ridiculous is delightful in him. We are so fond of him because we laugh at him so. And out of that laughter, and out of that weakness, and out of those harmless eccentricities and follies, and out of that touched brain, and out of that honest manhood and simplicity - we get a result of happiness, goodness, tenderness, pity, piety.[24]

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[20] L. Rice-Oxley, Introduction to Henry Fielding, Joseph Andrews, London: Oxford Univ. Press [World's Classics ed.], 1929, p. xvii.

[21] Barnaby Rudge, ch. 2. New York: Dodd Mead ed., 1944, p. 17.

[22] Sketches by Boz**,** London: Oxford Illustrated ed., 1973, p. 439.

[23] Ch. 57, "The Emigrants". Philadelphia, Penn.: Franklin Lib. ed., 1980, p. 740.

[24] William Thackeray, The English Humorists of the Eighteenth Century in The Works of William Makepeace Thackeray, Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincot, vol. 23, pp. 194-196.

Washington Irving likewise describes the comic aspects of Goldsmith's character and actions by employing odd and eccentric interchangeably.[25] Shakespeare also speaks of the odd as an object of laughter as when the Lord proposes the prank to dress up the drunken tinker Sly as a Lord:

> But I am doubtful of your modesties,
> Lest, over-eyeing of his odd behavior-
> For yet his honor never yet heard a play -
> You break into some merry passion.[26]

Such frequent use, then, of the words odd and eccentric in describing the laughable seems to indicate that the laughable often falls under one of the main forms of the ugly, the unsymmetrical or disproportioned.

The laughable also comes many times under the third main form of the ugly which is the unlimited or excessive. Margites, the hero of the mock heroic poem attributed to Homer, gets his name from the Greek word márgoß which can mean: (1) raging mad, (2) greedy, gluttonous, (3) lustful; all of which indicate something excessive or unlimited. Falstaff also is greedy, gluttonous and lustful. The laughableness of Falstaff (apart from his wit) is very much tied to the excessive or unlimited. Thus the Prince says to Poins after the trick they have played on Falstaff:

> Away, good Ned. Falstaff sweats to death
> And lards the lean earth as he walks along.
> Were't not for laughing, I should pity him.[27]

And Mrs. Ford says about Falstaff:

> What tempest, I trow, threw this whale, with so many tuns of oil in his belly, ashore at Windsor? How shall I be revenged on him? I think, the best way were to entertain him with hope, till the wicked fire of lust have melted him in his own grease.[28]

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[25] Cf. Washington Irving**,** Life of Oliver Goldsmith, in *The Works of Washington Irving*, author's revised edition, New York: G.P. Putnam's and Son, 1868, vol. VII, p. 448.

[26] The Taming of the Shrew**,** Induction, i.

[27] Henry the Fourth**,** Part One**,** Act II, Sc. ii.

[28] The Merry Wives of Windsor**,** Act II, Sc. i.

The word humour is often used in discussing the comic or laughable, and in Ben Jonson and others, humour is often understood to be tied to some kind of excess. Thus Asper, in the Introduction to Jonson's *Every man Out of His Humour* speaks of humour thus:

> .....in every human body,
> The choler, melancholy, phlegm, and blood
> By reason that they flow continually
> In some one part, and are not continent,
> Receive the name of humours. Now thus far
> It may, by metaphor, apply itself
> Unto the general disposition:
> As when some peculiar quality
> Doth so possess a man, that it doth draw
> All his effects, his spirits, and his powers,
> In their confluxions, all to run one way.
> This may be truly said to be a humour.

And turning to the audience, Asper continues :

> .....Now, gentlemen, I go
> To turn an actor, and a humourist;
> Where, ere I do resume my present person
> We hope to make the circle of your eyes
> Flow with distilled laughter.[29]

Thus when Master Ford is dominated by jealousy to excess in *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, Evans says about him:

> This is very fantastical humours and jealousies.[30]

And when Master Ford tries once more to get his friends to follow him to the supposed exposing of his wife's affair:

> Ford: Will you follow, gentlemen? I beseech you, follow: see but the issue of my jealousy. If I cry out upon no trail, never trust me when

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[29] Ben Jonson, Every Man Out of His Humour. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1966, vol. III, pp. 431-436.

[30] Act III, Sc. iii.

I open again.

Page: Let's obey his humour a little further.[31]

Congreve, speaking of Morose, one of Jonson's characters, says:

> Why, It is his excess of this Humour, that makes him become Ridiculous, and qualifies his character for Comedy.[32]

And we again find the word humour when Mercutio makes fun of Romeo for his excess:

Benvolio: He ran this way, and leap'd this orchard wall.
Call, good Mercutio.

Mercutio: Nay, I'll conjure too.
Romeo! humours! madman! passion! lover!
Appear thou in the likeness of a sigh:
Speak but one rhyme, and I am satisfied;
Cry but "Ay, me!" pronounce but "love" and "dove."[33]

The laughable, then, is often something unlimited, immoderate or excessive.

We have shown to some extent the truth of Aristotle's statement that the laughable is a part of the ugly. For the laughable is especially spoken of in regard to one or more of the three main forms of the ugly - the disordered, the unsymmetrical and the unlimited or excessive.

The second part of Aristotle's brief text on the laughable, at the beginning of Chapter Five of the *Poetics*, seems to be a sort of definition:

> The laughable is some mistake and shame free from pain and not destructive, as some mask that is ugly and distorted without pain is laughable.[34]

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[31] Act IV, Sc. ii.

[32] Congreve, Letter to Dennis Concerning Humour in Comedy (1695), in The Complete Works of William Congreve**,** New York: Russell & Russell, 1964, p. 164.

[33] Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Sc. ii.

[34] Poetics**,** 5, 1449a 34-37.

Aristotle uses two words for the genus in this definition: mistake (error or failure - ~martía) and shame (disgrace, ugliness, deformity - aïscróß). The second of these words we have already seen in the above text where he says that the laughable is a part of the ugly or shameful. Now we must examine this new word, mistake, in the genus of the definition - why it is added and whether it is a key to understanding the laughable and comedy.

The previous text we have explored[35] set out from the character in comedy (as was done also in Chapter One of the *Poetics*), but this new text defines the laughable more fully as the object of comedy. Comedy as well as tragedy is more a likeness of action than a likeness of character. Now although the shameful or ugly can be applied both to action and character, mistake is more fitting to action (and words) than to character. Hence, the addition of mistake in the genus of the laughable is to bring out more fully what is laughable in action. But it is now necessary to manifest that what is laughable in action is a mistake. This does not mean, of course, every mistake. There are also tragic mistakes. That is why Aristotle will add the differences free from pain and not destructive to separate the comic mistake from the tragic mistake.

We can manifest that the laughable in action is a mistake, ascending from the lowest to the highest kind of comedy. Joseph Addison has a very good passage on the low common humour of the West European peoples :

> There is a set of merry drolls, whom the common people of all countries admire, and seem to love so well that they could eat them, according to the old proverb; I mean those circumforaneous wits whom every nation calls by the name of that dish of meat which it loves best. In Holland they are called Pickled Herrings; in France, Jean Pottages; in Italy, Maccaronies; and in Great Britain, Jack Puddings. These merry wags, from whatsoever food they receive their titles, that they may make their audiences laugh, always appear in a fool's coat, and commit such blunders and mistakes in every step they take, and every word they utter, as those who listen to them would be ashamed of.[36]

Addison not only notes how these "merry drolls" make people laugh by the "blunders and mistakes" they make, but also how these blunders or mistakes are such that the common people would be "ashamed of" making

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[35] Cf. Poetics, 5, 1449a 32-34.

[36] Addison, The Spectator, Number 47 (1711), in Theories of Comedy, p. 243-244.

them. It can be seen, then, how the two words in the genus of Aristotle's definition of the laughable, namely mistake and shame, and their order fit perfectly the laughable in these forms of "low" but very natural comedy. Puck's humour, involving deception and mistake, is somewhat on this level as well:

> I am that merry wanderer of the night.
> I jest to Oberon, and make him smile
> When I a fat and bean-fed horse beguile,
> Neighing in likeness of a filly foal:
> And sometimes lurk I in a gossip's bowl,
> In very likeness of a roasted crab;
> And, when she drinks, against her lips I bob
> And on her wither'd dewlap pour the ale.
> The wisest aunt, telling the saddest tale,
> Sometimes for three-foot stool mistaketh me;
> Then slip I from her bum, down topples she,
> And "tailor" cries, and falls into a cough;
> And then the whole quire hold their lips and laugh;
> And waxen in their mirth, and neeze, and swear
> A merrier hour was never wasted there.[37]

If we ascend, now, to the highest forms of comedy, the relevance of the word mistake or error can immediately be seen even in the titles of some famous comedies. Goldsmith's great comedy *She Stoops to Conquer*, which has had such a long successful career on the stage, was originally named *The Mistakes of a Night;* and this is still given as a sub-title or alternate title. And if we think of Shakespeare's first comedy, The Comedy of Errors, and how it is to some extent based on Roman models, we can see how naturally the word mistake or error comes to mind when thinking of the laughable in the plots of comedies. Charles Knight has preserved a wonderful account by Brown of a good performance of *The Comedy of Errors:*

> Until I saw it on the stage ... I had not imagined the extent of the mistakes, the drollery of them, their unabated continuance, till, at the end of the fourth act, they reached their climax with the assistance of Dr. Pinch, when the audience in their laughter rolled about like waves.[38]

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[37] A Midsummer Night's Dream**,** Act II, Sc. i.

[38] Knight, Supplementary Notice to The Comedy of Errors, Imp. Ed., vol. I, p. 129.

But any examination of the genus in Aristotle's definition of the laughable which utilizes Shakespeare's plays should draw upon what is perhaps the best comedy of the Poet, *The Merry Wives of Windsor*. In his Supplementary Notice to this play, Knight quotes Warton that *The Merry Wives of Windsor* is "the most complete specimen of Shakespeare's comic powers"[39]. The plot of this play is built around so many mistakes: the mistakes of Falstaff in his apparent encouragement by the merry wives, Ford's mistaken jealousy about his wife, and the deception of almost all in the secret marriage of Anne Page. In some ways, the mistaken jealousy of Ford is the funniest because Ford is so sure of himself. As Ford says about Page (the husband of the other merry wife):

> Has Page any brains? hath he any eyes? hath he any thinking? Sure, they sleep; he hath no use of them. Why, this boy will carry a letter twenty mile, as easy as a cannon will shoot point-blank twelve score. He pieces out his wife's inclination; he gives her folly motion and advantage; and now she's going to my wife, and Falstaff's boy with her! A man may hear this shower sing in the wind: and Falstaff's boy with her! Good plots! they are laid; and our revolted wives share damnation together. Well; I will take him, then torture my wife, pluck the borrowed veil of modesty from the so seeming Mistress Page, divulge Page himself for a secure and wilful Actaeon; and to these violent proceedings all my neighbours shall cry aim. [Clock Strikes] The clock gives me my cue, and assurance bids me search; there I shall find Falstaff. I shall be rather praised for this than mocked; for it is as positive as the earth is firm, that Falstaff is there. I will go.[40]

Shakespeare's genius in making Ford so confident that he will be vindicated in his jealousy and the credulity of Page exposed, makes Ford's mistake the more laughable. And when he arrives on the scene of the apparent affair, Ford's assurance makes his mistake all the more enjoyable. He says to Page, Caius and Sir Hugh Evans whom he has brought as witnesses:

> Pray you, come near: if I suspect without cause, why then make sport at me; then let me be your jest; I deserve it.[41]

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[39] Knight, *loc. cit.*

[40] The Merry Wives of Windsor**,** Act III, Sc. ii.

[41] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act II, Sc. iii.

Falstaff is carried out (concealed) in a clothes-basket by the servants and the merry wives comment a few lines later on the double deception - that of Falstaff in his amorous hopes and that of Ford in his mistaken jealousy:

Mrs. Page:	Is there not a double excellency in this?
Mrs. Ford:	I know not which pleases me better; that my husband is deceived, or Sir John.[42]

It is, of course, the excellency of comedy or the laughable that the merry wives are looking for; and the double excellency of comedy is here seen to be the double deception or mistake. This is a striking confirmation of the first word in the genus of Aristotle's definition of the laughable. The second word in the genus (shame) is also touched upon in this scene when Page says a little later to Ford when no Falstaff has been produced:

> Fie, fie, Master Ford! are you not ashamed? What spirit, what devil suggests this imagination? I would not ha' your distemper in this kind for the wealth of Windsor Castle.[43]

The second time Ford mistakenly goes to expose his wife with Falstaff is, if possible, even more laughable. Having heard that Falstaff was carried out in a basket, he is determined, among other things, not to let any clothes-basket be carried out without inspection. Again, his assurance and confidence of being at last vindicated make his mistake all the more ludicrous. In the next Act, Ford enters with a whole tribe of witnesses (Page, Caius, Evans, Shallow):

Ford:	Come hither Mistress Ford; the honest woman, the modest wife, the virtuous creature, that hath the jealous fool to her husband! I suspect without cause, mistress, do I?
Mrs. Ford:	Heaven be my witness, you do, if you suspect me in any dishonesty.
Ford:	Well said, brazen-face! hold it out. Come forth, sirrah! [44]

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[42] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act III, Sc. iii.

[43] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act III, Sc. iii.

[44] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act IV, Sc. ii.

Here Ford starts pulling clothes out of the basket being carried out by the servants and throwing the clothes about in a vain attempt to find Falstaff. After this laughable mistake, the other characters again touch upon the second word in the genus of the laughable (shame):

Page:	This passes!
Mrs. Ford:	Are you not ashamed? let the clothes alone...
Shallow:	By my fidelity, this is not well, Master Ford, this wrongs you.
Evans:	Master Ford, you must pray, and not follow the imaginations of your heart: this is jealousies.
Ford:	Well, he's not here I seek for.
Page:	No, nor nowhere else but in your brain. [45]

Shame is brought out strongly again in the planning for the final deception of Falstaff. This is first seen in the following conversation of the merry wives:

Mrs. Ford:	Shall we tell our husbands how we have served him?
Mrs. Page:	Yes, by all means; if it be but to scrape the figures out of your husband's brains. If they can find in their hearts the poor unvirtuous knight shall be any further afflicted, we two will still be the ministers.
Mrs. Ford:	I'll warrant they'll have him publicly shamed, and methinks there would be no period to the jest, should he not be publicly shamed.[46]

And after Ford and Page have been let into the plot for the final deception of Falstaff, Ford says:

> But let our plot go forward: let our wives Yet once again, to make us public sport,
> Appoint a meeting with this fat old fellow,
> Where we may take him and disgrace him for it.[47]

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[45] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act IV, Sc. ii.

[46] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act IV, Sc. ii.

The word jest is used here by Shakespeare for the comic action. There will be no period or completion to the comic action without the public shame or disgrace of Falstaff's final mistake. We can begin to see, then, the truth in the genus of Aristotle's definition of the laughable: "The laughable is some mistake and shame."

It remains to comment on the difference in the definition of the laughable. One must distinguish between the comic mistake and the tragic mistake. Aristotle adds as a difference free from pain and not destructive. The obvious sense of these words can be seen if we compare the jealous mistake of Ford in *The Merry Wives of Windsor* with that of Othello. Othello's mistake is destructive of his innocent wife and, eventually, of himself. Cassio is also destroyed. But after all the mistakes or errors in *The Merry Wives of Windsor,* Mrs. Page can still propose a good laugh and have that proposal accepted:

> Good husband, let us every one go home,
> And laugh this sport o'er by a country fire;
> Sir John and all.[48]

No one is permanently hurt, let alone destroyed. Even the opprobrium that falls on Falstaff in his deception is lessened by the deception of the Pages in the elopement of their daughter.

When Aristotle says free from pain, the Greek word involves a negation of ödúne which first means the pain of the body although it can be extended to the pain of the mind. He certainly means to exclude any severe pain of the body which is accompanied by its destruction. But he would also exclude that pain of the mind which comes from a tragic mistake or whose disgrace would lead the one suffering under it to suicide. If we compare the disgrace of Ajax in Sophocles' great play of that name and the disgrace of the comic character Parolles in Shakespeare's *All's Well That Ends Well,* we can see the difference. Ajax' disgrace leads to his tragic suicide, as his wife and brother frantically search for him. But Parolles is able to recuperate rather quickly after his boasted courage and fidelity have been exposed. Parolles is left to himself right after his disgrace, but he can still say:

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[47] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act IV, Sc. iv.

[48] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act V, Sc. v.

> Yet am I thankful; if my heart were great
> 'Twould burst at this. Captain I'll be no more;
> But I will eat and drink and sleep as soft
> As captain shall: simply the thing I am
> Shall make me live. Who knows himself a braggart,
> Let him fear this; for it will come to pass
> That every braggart shall be found an ass.
> Rust, sword! cool, blushes! and Parolles, live
> Safest in shame! being fool'd, by foolery thrive
> There's place and means for every man alive.
> I'll after them.[49]

We can see here in passing how the character is selected for the sake of the plot and for either a tragic or a comic mistake. If Parolles' heart were great or he had the heart of Ajax, he would have belonged in a tragic plot. Likewise, if Ford were the man that Othello is, he would not have been suitable for perhaps the greatest of Shakespeare's comic plots.

[49] All's Well That Ends Well**,** Act IV, Sc. iii.

PART TWO

The above is sufficient for the present to understand what is the laughable. But since laughable is what must be substituted for spoudaîon or serious in the definition, it remains to see what must be substituted in the definition of comedy for through pity and fear completing the purgation of those passions which is in the definition of tragedy. Surely, comedy will move different emotions than tragedy, as was indicated by the tragic and comic masks represented in the theater. But here we do not have the help from Aristotle that we did in the definition of the laughable.

The natural beginning for an investigation of the emotions or passions moved by comedy is to find the emotion most closely connected with laughter. If we stay close to the comic writers themselves, it is not hard to find this emotion. There is an emotion that is commonly coupled with laughter. The clown's song in *Twelfth Night* contains this line:

> Present mirth hath present laughter.[50]

Gratiano also couples mirth and laughter in *The Merchant of Venice:*

> Let me play the fool.
> With mirth and laughter let old wrinkles comes,
> And let my liver rather heat with wine
> Than my heart cool with mortifying groans.[51]

Another example of the link between mirth and laughter is found in the following exchange between Brutus and Cassius:

Brutus:	I'll use you for my mirth, yea for my laughter, When you are waspish.
Cassius:	Hath Cassius liv'd To be but mirth and laughter to his Brutus? [52]

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[50] Twelfth Night**,** Act II, Sc. iii.

[51] The Merchant of Venice**,** Act I, Sc. i.

[52] Julius Caesar**,** Act IV, Sc. iii.

And the Countess says to Talbot:

> Laughest thou, wretch? thy mirth shall turn to moan.[53]

And In *Love's Labour's Lost* can be found this bit of conversation:

> Princess: Here comes Boyet, and mirth is in his face.
>
> Boyet: O, I am stabb'd with laughter.[54]

And later in that play, when Biron gets his penance, he complains:

> To move wild laughter in the throat of death?
> It cannot be; it is impossible.
> Mirth cannot move a soul in agony.[55]

This same connection of mirth with laughter is also found in other comic writers. Heartfree says to Constant, in Vanbrugh's comedy *The Provok'd Wife:*

> Now laugh till thy soul's glutted with Mirth.[56]

And Sterling complains of Lovewell in *The Clandestine Marriage:*

> If my young man here would but laugh at my jokes, which he ought to do, as Mounseer does at yours, my Lord, we should be all life and mirth.[57]

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[53] Henry VI, Part One**,** Act II, Sc. iii.

[54] Love's Labour's Lost**,** Act V, Sc. ii.

[55] *Ibid.*, Act V, Sc. ii.

[56] John Vanbrugh, The Provok'd Wife**,** Act Four, Scene - A Bed-Chamber, in Famous Plays of the Restoration and the Eighteenth Century**,** New York: Mod. Lib. Ed., 1933, p. 389.

[57] Colman and Garrick, The Clandestine Marriage, Act II, Scene - An antechamber to Lord Ogleby's bedchamber, in Famous Plays…**,** p. 672.

Other examples of the connection between mirth and laughter could be brought forward, but let these suffice. We should now look more carefully at the connection between mirth and laughter. Laughter is, of course, the outward expression of an inward passion called mirth. Hazlitt expresses this relation admirably in his famous lectures on comic writers:

> We laugh at a thing merely because we ought not. If we think we must not laugh, this perverse impediment makes our temptation to laugh the greater; for by endeavouring to keep the obnoxious image out of sight, it comes upon us more irresistibly and repeatedly; and the inclination to indulge our mirth, the longer it is held back, collects its force, and breaks out the more violently in peals of laughter.[58]

The words indulge and breaks out signify this connection where the inward is shown in an outward way. Just as inward sadness when indulged can break out in tears, so inward mirth when indulged can break out in laughter. And as tears vent or give a certain relief or outlet to our sadness, so too does laughter give relief to our mirth when it gets too much for us. James Fenimore Cooper brings this out well in the following two examples from *The Pioneers:*

> Billy Kirby gave vent to his mirth in peals of laughter that he seemed to heave up from his very soul.
>
> Overcome by mirth, the good-natured fellow seated himself on the ground, kicking the earth with delight, and giving vent to peal after peal of laughter.[59]

The phrase "overcome with mirth" is well chosen. We all have experienced being overcome with mirth, just as we have experienced being overcome by sadness or some other emotion. The word overcome signifies that the emotion is strong; stronger than us or our reason, at least temporarily. It is especially when we are overcome with some emotion or the emotion is strong, that the outward expression of emotion is seen. But it is possible to have emotion with little or no outward expression. This is true of mirth as well as the other emotions. A less strong mirth may express itself in a smile rather than a laugh.

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[58] William Hazlitt, Lectures on the Comic Writers Etc. of Great Britain, in Theories of Comedy**,** p. 268.

[59] James Fenimore Cooper, The Pioneers**,** New York: Dodd, Mead & Company, 1958, pp. 348 and 453.

If comedy is a likeness of the laughable and the laughable moves us to mirth, then comedy must move us to mirth. But this reason is confirmed by the comic writers themselves. Thus at the end of *King Henry VI, Part III,* the new king says:

> And now what rests but that we spend the time
> With stately triumphs, mirthful comic shows,
> Such as befits the pleasure of the court?[60]

There is a contemporary reference to this about one of Shakespeare's comedies in a letter from Sir Walter Cope to Lord Cranborne in 1604/1605:

> Burbage is come and says there is no new play that the queen hath not seen, but they have revived an old one, called Love's Labour's Lost, which for wit and mirth he says will please her exceedingly.[61]

Shakespeare's most famous comic character is Falstaff and he is introduced in Henry IV, Part I. That play was entered by Andrew Wyse in the Stationers' Register on February 25, 1598, as "The historye of Henry the IIIIth with his battaile of Shrewsburye againt Henry Hottspurre of the Northe with the conceipted mirthe of Sir John Falstoff."[62]

Thomas Heywood also touches upon the connection of comedy with mirth:

> If a comedy, it is pleasantly contrived with merry Accidents, and intermixt with apt and witty jests... And what is then the subject of this harmless mirth?[63]

William Congreve, one of the best of the Restoration comic dramatists, touches upon comedy as moving our mirth when he considers what should or should not be used in comedy. In the Dedication of *The Way of the World* (1700), his last comedy, to Ralph, Earl of Montague, he rejects certain characters as unsuitable for comedy:

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[60] King Henry VI, Part III, Act V, Sc. vii.

[61] Shakespeare of Stratford, Chief Contemporary Allusions to Shakespeare's Plays, Yale, 1947, III, B, p. 102A .

[62] Cf. *Arber's Transcript*, III, 105.

[63] Heywood, An Apology for Actors**,** Bk. III (1612), in Theories of Comedy**,** p. 130.

> Those characters which are meant to be ridiculed in most of our comedies, are of fools so gross, that in my humble opinion, they should rather disturb than divert the well-natured and reflecting art of an audience; they are rather objects of charity than contempt; and instead of moving our mirth, they ought very often to excite our compassion.[64]

In the same vein, Congreve's concern with what he should use to move the audience to mirth is shown in his letter to the critic John Dennis:

> Sure the poet must both be very ill-natured himself, and think his Audience so, when he ... hopes to raise their Mirth, by what is truly an object of compassion.[65]

We can see in these quotes from Congreve, the working dramatist's concern with what he should use to move mirth.

Boswell has preserved for us the observation of Johnson on the success of Goldsmith's comedy *She Stoops to Conquer:*

> Dr. Goldsmith's new play, "She stoops to Conquer", being mentioned; JOHNSON; "I know of no comedy for many years that hath so much exhilirated an audience, that has answered so much the great end of comedy - making an audience merry."[66]

Merry is almost a synonym for mirthful, especially when it has an outward expression. But there is a very strong passage from Johnson in The Rambler about mirth being in the definition of comedy:

> Comedy has been particularly unpropitious to definers; though perhaps they might have contented themselves with declaring it to be such a dramatic representation of human life, as may excite mirth ... any man's reflections will inform him that every dramatic composition which raises mirth is comic.[67]

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[64] Congreve, in Famous Plays…, p. 423.

[65] Congreve, Concerning Humour in Comedy, in Theories of Comedy, p. 208.

[66] James Boswell, Life of Johnson, 1773, Oxford ed., 1953, p. 525.

[67] Johnson, The Rambler, Number 125 (1751), in Theories of Comedy, p. 254.

To conclude with an example from the 19th century, there is the phrase of Charles Dickens in his favorite novel, "convulsed with mirth at the comic parts"[68].

There can be little doubt then that comedy moves us to mirth if it moves us to any emotion, and that Johnson is correct in putting mirth into the definition of comedy. But what is mirth?

The genus of mirth is joy or pleasure. This can be seen from the connection between mirth and feasting and drinking. Thus in Pericles:

> Prepare for mirth, for mirth becomes a feast.[69]

And in *King John:*

> Nor met with fortune other than at feasts,
> Full warm of blood, of mirth, of gossiping.[70]

And the words of Gratiano quoted before connect mirth with wine:

> Let me play the fool
> With mirth and laughter let old wrinkles come
> And let my liver rather heat with wine
> Than my heart cool with mortifying groans.[71]

The Duke of Burgundy, speaking of France, also notes the connection of wine and mirth:

> Her vine, the merry chearer of the heart.[72]

And in *Henry VIII:*

> .....and he would have all as merry

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[68] David Copperfield**,** ch. 7. Philadelphia, Penn.: Franklin Lib. Ed., 1980, p. 86.

[69] Pericles**,** Act II, Sc. iii.

[70] King John, Act V, Sc. ii.

[71] Merchant of Venice, Act I, Sc. i.

[72] Henry V**,** Act V, Sc. ii.

> As first, good company, good wine, good welcome
> Can make good people.[73]

Smollett has left us an entertaining picture of the connection between feasting and drinking and mirth in his picture of Quin:

> In my last I told you I had hopes of seeing Quin in his hours of elevation at the tavern, which is the temple of mirth and good-fellowship; where he, as priest of Comus, utters the inspirations of wit and humour. I have had that satisfaction. I have dined with his club at the Three Tuns, and had the honour to sit him out. At half an hour past eight in the evening, he was carried home with six good bottles of claret under his belt; and it then being Friday, he gave orders that he should not be disturbed till Sunday at noon.[74]

In real life, James Quin (1693-1766) was an actor of the old declamatory school, especially celebrated in the part of Falstaff, and famous for his wit and gourmandise. He retired to Bath in 1751. Comus was the God of festive mirth.

The Greek word for mirth or merriment, eüfrosúnh, is also tied up especially with feasting and festivity as can be seen in Homer.[75] It is also personified as the Grace who presides at festive meetings.

The association of mirth, then, with feasting and drinking of wine is a sign that it is a form of joy or pleasure. Hence, Shakespeare will couple it with either joy or pleasure, as in *The Tempest,* where Caliban says:

> Thou mak'st me merry; I am full of pleasure
> Let us be jocund.[76]

And again in *Henry VI:*

> Reignier: Dauphin, command the citizens make bonfires,
> And feat and banquet in the open streets

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[73] Henry VIII, Act I, Sc. iv.

[74] The Expedition of Humphry Clinker**,** Westminster: The Folio Society, Richard Clay & Company Ltd., 1955, p. 62.

[75] Odyssey**,** Bk. 20, 8; Bk. 10, 465, for example.

[76] The Tempest**,** Act III, Sc. iii.

> To celebrate the joy that God hath given us.
> Alencon: All France will be replete with mirth and joy.[77]

The genus, then, of mirth is joy or pleasure.

The difference in the definition of mirth must be taken from its object or cause which is, of course, the laughable as we have explained it above. Mirth is a pleasure or joy whose object and cause is the laughable. We are not defining mirth by laughter. Although the laughable is named from laughter or the laugh, it was not defined by laughter as can be seen from Aristotle's definition of the laughable. If laughter is the outward expression of mirth, mirth would be in the definition of laughter.

That the laughable causes pleasure is a matter of experience. Why it causes pleasure is another question. Three reasons can be given here. First, the laughable is easily seen to be a mistake and such knowing is pleasant. Second, the laughable is not taken seriously and therefore it invites a certain relaxation of our powers and this is pleasant, as is rest. Aristotle seems to touch upon this reason in the chapter on pleasure in the first book of the *Rhetoric:*

> Since play and all relaxing are among the pleasant things, laughter also is among the pleasant things; and it is necessary that laughable things, whether men or words or deeds, be pleasant.[78]

Laughable things are pleasant because they relax us and make us playful rather than serious. (Note Aristotle's division of the laughable into men or words or deeds.) A third reason is suggested by a passage quoted by Addison from Hobbes:

> Mr. Hobbes, in his discourse of human nature, which in my humble opinion, is much the best of all his works, after some very curious observations upon laughter, concludes thus: "The passion of laughter is nothing less but sudden glory arising from some sudden conception of some eminency in ourselves by comparison with the infirmity of others, or with our own formerly:

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[77] Henry VI, Part One, Act I, Sc. vi.

[78] Rhetoric, I, 11, 1372a.

> for men laugh at the follies of themselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance, except they bring with them any present dishonor."[79]

Hobbes seems to be saying that it is pleasant to rise above the mistakes of others, or our own, when they can no longer harm us. Thus my son Marcus laughs when he remembers that at one time he thought that Shakespeare was some beer that his daddy especially liked.

We have seen what mirth is and that comedy moves us to mirth. But should one add that comedy purges or purifies mirth? As there is a catharsis of pity and fear in tragedy, is there also a catharsis of mirth in comedy or by comedy?

Before we can try to answer this question, we must first examine whether mirth can be in need of purification or purgation or catharsis. The words purgation or catharsis are first used in medicine in regard to the body. Later they are applied to the emotions by a proportion. As there can be something excessive or defective in the body which is in need of catharsis or purgation, so likewise there can be something excessive or defective in the emotions. And this is also true of the emotion we feel towards the laughable. There can be excess or defect here and sometimes it is inborn as Shakespeare observes in *The Merchant of Venice:*

> Nature hath framed strange fellows in her time:
> Some that will evermore peep through their eyes
> And laugh like parrots at a bag-piper;
> And others of such vinegar aspect,
> That they'll not show their teeth in way of smile
> Though Nestor swear the jest be laughable.[80]

As in the other emotions, the excess or defect of mirth is bad, whereas what is good is found in the golden mean. Biron would seem to be a praiseworthy exemplar in the following passage:

> Biron they call him, but a merrier man,
> Within the limit of becoming mirth,
> I never spent an hour's talk withal:

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[79] Addison, The Spectator, Number 47 (1711), in Theories of Comedy**,** p. 242.

[80] The Merchant of Venice**,** Act I, Sc. i.

His eye begets occasion for his wit;
For every object that the one doth catch,
The other turns to a mirth-moving jest.[81]

Biron obviously does not have the defect of those with "vinegar aspect", nor does he go to excess, beyond "the limit of becoming mirth". Since mirth is a form of pleasure and one associated with eating and drinking, it is not hard to see that mirth is an emotion more in need of being moderated than in need of being strengthened - for men tend to go to excess in that which is pleasant.

We can find several instances in Shakespeare of the need to moderate mirth. Concerned about his servants going to excess in the prank or joke they are playing on Sly, the Lord says:

I long to hear him call the drunkard husband,
And how my men will stay themselves from laughter
When they do homage to this simple peasant.
I'll in to counsel them: haply my presence
May well abate the over merry spleen
Which otherwise would grow into extremes.[82]

Similarly, Bassanio cautions Gratiano to be more moderate in his mirth:

.....Pray thee, take pain
To allay with some cold drops of modesty
Thy skipping spirit, lest through thy wild behaviour
I be misconst'red in the place I go to
And lose my hopes.[83]

The jealous Ford thinks that his wife is going to excess:

Some say, that though she appear honest to me, yet in other instances she enlargeth her mirth so far that there is shrewd construction made of her.[84]

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[81] Love's Labour's Lost, Act II, Sc. i.

[82] The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, i.

[83] The Merchant of Venice, Act II, Sc. ii.

[84] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act II, Sc. ii.

But the merry wives intend to show that their mirth does not go to excess, that they are merry without ceasing to be "honest" (chaste or modest). Hence, Mrs. Page says:

> We'll leave a proof, by that which we will do,
> Wives may be merry, and yet honest too:
> We do not act that often jest and laugh;
> 'Tis old but true, "Still swine eats all the draff."[85]

On the other hand, it is possible for mirth to suffer from defect. Another instance of this in Shakespeare is when Volumnia says to Valeria about Virgilia:

> Let her alone, Lady, as she is now she will but disease our better mirth.[86]

The word disease is here applied to the emotion of mirth. Like other emotions, it is possible for our mirth to be sick through excess or defect. As Nerissa says:

> They are as sick that surfeit with too much as they that starve with nothing. It is no mean happiness therefore to be seated in the mean.[87]

The comic dramatist or novelist should aim, not only at arousing mirth, but at a mirth that is healthy or free from excess or defect. In this way, comedy can be said to purify mirth or purge it of those unhealthy tendencies that are often found in it. Many comic writers have understood this and practiced it. Nicholas Udall seems to have understood this explicitly:

> What creature is in health, either young or old,
> But some mirth with modesty will be glad to use -
> As we in this interlude shall now unfold?
> Wherein all scurrility we utterly refuse,
> Avoiding such mirth wherein is abuse;
> Knowing nothing more commendable for a man's recreation

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[85] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act IV, Sc. ii.

[86] Coriolanus, Act I, Sc. iii.

[87] The Merchant of Venice, Act I, Sc. ii.

Than mirth which is used in an honest fashion.

For mirth prolongeth life and causeth health;
Mirth recreates our spirits and voideth pensiveness;
Mirth increaseth amity, not hindering our wealth;
Mirth is to be used both of more and less,
Being mixed with virtue in decent comeliness -
As we trust no good nature can gainsay the same:
Which mirth we intend to use, avoiding all blame.[88]

An experience of Shakespeare's comedies convinces us that he also is aiming at this healthy mirth, as one would expect from the passages on mirth quoted above which indicate there is excess and defect in mirth as well as the mean (which it is no mean happiness to attain). Charles Knight has a delightful image of what it might have been like for students of the Middle Temple to undergo that purification and catharsis of their mirth from Shakespearean comedy:

> There is something to our minds very precious in that memorial of Shakspere which is preserved in the little Table-book of the student of the Middle Temple: "Feb. 2, 1601 At our feast we had a play called Twelfth Night or What You Will." What a scene do these few plain words call up before us... Here Shakspere's Twelfth Night was acted in the Christmas of 1601... its ever-gushing spirit of enjoyment, - of fun without malice, of wit without grossness, of humour without extravagance, - taught the swaggering, roaring, over grown boy, miscalled student, that there were higher sources of mirth than affrays in Fleet Street, or drunkenness in White Friars.[89]

And Sir Walter Scott's judgment on Goldsmith (both a dramatist and a novelist) is cited by Thackeray:

> He was a friend to virtue, and in his most playful pages never forgets what is due to it.[90]

The virtue which regulates mirth is like temperance or moderation rather than courage. This is why Aquinas considers it in the Secunda Secundae of the Summa Theologiae under the virtues that have the same mode as temperance.

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[88] Udall, Prologue to Ralph Roister Doister (c. 1553), in Theories of Comedy, p. 113.

[89] Knight, Suppl. Notice to Twelfth Night, Imp. Ed., vol. I, p. 315.

[90] Thackeray, English Humorists of the 18th Century, p. 326.

Likewise, the great poet Edmund Spenser, somewhat contemporary with Shakespeare, considers it, and the opposite vice, in the second book of The Faerie Queene, which is devoted to "The Legend of Sir Guyon or of Temperaunce". One passage will indicate why Spenser has put the matter of mirth in the book on temperance:

> And by the way, as was her wonted guize,
> Her mery fitt shee freshly gan to reare,
> And did of joy and jollity devize,
> Her selfe to cherish, and her gueste to cheare.
> The knight was courteous, and did not forbeare
> Her honest merth and pleasaunce to partake;
> But when he saw her toy, and gibe, and geare,
> And passe the bonds of modest merrimake,
> Her dalliaunce he despisd, and follies did forsake.[91]

We have seen already in several passages from Shakespeare that he also would put mirth among those passions or emotions which are more in need of being moderated than strengthened. And in speaking of Biron who has the virtue concerned with mirth, he has the same roots in English that Aristotle used to name this virtue (eütrapelía, or easily-turning, is the Greek word).

However, not every comic writer achieves this purpose of comedy. Thackeray states his preference for Dickens over Sterne in this regard:

> The foul satyr's eyes leer out of the leaves constantly... I think of these past writers and of one who lives amongst us now, and am grateful for the innocent laughter ... which the author of "David Copperfield" gives to my children.[92]

And so we can conclude that good comedy moves us to a mirth that is pure or purged of excess and disorder. But does comedy have an effect upon any other emotion besides mirth?

There is reason to think that comedy is intended also to purge us of melancholy, to expel melancholy from us. These lines from The Taming of the Shrew indicate that comedy is not only to move us to mirth, but also to expel melancholy:

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[91] The Faerie Queene**,** Book II, Canto VI, XXI.

[92] Thackeray, English Humorists of the 18th Century, p. 325.

> Your honor's players, hearing your amendment,
> Are come to play a pleasant comedy;
> For so your doctors hold it very meet,
> Seeing too much sadness hath congeal'd your blood,
> And melancholy is the nurse of frenzy:
> Therefore they thought it good you hear a play
> And frame your mind to mirth and merriment,
> Which bars a thousand harms and lengthens life.[93]

We must consider then what is melancholy, whether it is a harmful passion, and whether comedy should expel it.

Melancholy is without doubt a form of sadness. Thus the Poet speaks of "The sad companion, dull-ey'd melancholy"[94] and there is this dialogue between Jacques (called Monsieur Melancholy at one point) and Rosalind:

> Jacques: I have a melancholy of mine own, compounded of many simples, extracted from many objects, and indeed the sundry contemplation of my travels, in which my often rumination, wraps me in a most humorous sadness.
>
> Rosalind: ... Your experience, makes you sad. I had rather have a fool to make me merry than experience to make me sad, and to travel for it too.[95]

Another place where Shakespeare speaks of melancholy as sadness is in this exchange:

> Armado: Boy, what sign is it when a man of great spirit grows melancholy.
>
> Boy: A great sign, sir, that he will look sad.
>
> Armado: Why sadness is one and the self-same thing, dear imp.[96]

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[93] The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Sc. ii.

[94] Pericles, Act I, Sc. ii.

[95] As You Like it, Act IV, Sc. i.

[96] Love's Labour's Lost, Act I, Sc. ii.

Melancholy, however, is not the only form of sadness. How does it differ from other forms. We can perhaps find the object which differentiates melancholy from other forms of sadness by contrasting it with the sadness which is close enough to melancholy that it is sometimes confused with it. Tragedy moves us to pity, but some say it leaves us melancholic. But there is a difference between melancholy and pity. Pity is sadness over the misfortune or misery of another, especially when it is undeserved. But melancholy is sadness over one's own misfortune or misery (or over the general misery of the world of which one is a part). Shakespeare touches upon both forms of sadness when he says:

> Now by the gods, I pity his misfortune,
> And will awake him from his melancholy.[97]

The first person has pity or sadness over the misfortune of another while the second person has melancholy or sadness over his own misfortune.

There is still another form of sadness, envy, which it is useful to contrast with melancholy and pity. It is helpful to consider together the goodness or badness of these forms of sadness. Envy is sadness over the good fortune or success or happiness of another. But there does not seem to be a fourth form of sadness about good fortune and misfortune because no one would seem to be sad over his own good fortune.

These three forms of sadness (pity, melancholy and envy) differ greatly as far as being good or bad. Pity is a good emotion (unless it is excessive) while envy is always a bad emotion. Melancholy is harmful to the one undergoing it (and perhaps to those who must bear with the melancholic person), but it does not seem to involve a perversion of our natural desire as does envy. Shakespeare even has the exiled duke call pity sacred:

> True is it we have seen better days,
> And have with holy bell been knoll'd to church,
> And sat at good men's feasts, and wip'd our eyes,
> Of drops that sacred pity hath engender'd. [98]

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[97] Pericles, Act II, Sc. iii.

[98] As You Like It, Act II, Sc. vii.

Pity is substantially the same as mercy although the word mercy may imply some ability to relieve the misery or misfortune of another. Portia's words to Shylock are oft quoted:

> The quality of mercy is not strain'd,
> It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
> Upon the place beneath: it is twice bless'd;
> It blesseth him that gives and him that takes:
> 'Tis mightiest in the mightiest; it becomes
> The throned monarch better than his crown;
> His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
> The attribute to awe and majesty,
> Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
> But mercy is above this sceptred sway,
> It is enthroned in the hearts of kings,
> It is an attribute to God himself,
> And earthly power doth then show likest God's
> When mercy seasons justice.[99]

So if pity is "sacred" and mercy, which is substantially the same as pity, is "an attribute to God himself," pity is then a good emotion unless it is excessive. (Mercy should not eliminate justice, but season it.) Envy, however, is unnatural and diabolic. Gower says in Pericles:

> That monster envy, oft the wrack
> Of earned praise.[100]

The word monster often has the sense of something unnatural in Shakespeare, as does the Latin word from which it is derived. Envy is opposed to that love which is natural between men who belong to the same species and are by nature political and social animals. And yet how common is this monster, as Henry Fielding observes:

> In fact, I have remarked, that most of the defects which have discovered themselves in the friendships within my observation have arisen from envy only: a hellish vice; and yet one from which I have known very few absolutely exempt.[101]

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[99] The Merchant of Venice**,** Act IV, Sc. i.

[100] Pericles, Act IV, Chorus.

[101] Tom Jones, Book 17, ch. 5.

Fielding does well to call envy hellish for it is an attribute of the devil, just as mercy is an attribute of God. Thus we read in the Bible:

> For God created man incorruptible, and to the image of his own likeness he made him. But by the envy of the devil, death came into the world: and they follow him that are of his side.[102]

Envy then is at the opposite extreme from pity in terms of goodness and badness. Melancholy, we shall see, is also bad, but not diabolic or unnatural as is envy. Likewise, melancholy is not as opposed to friendship as is envy. Envy is opposed to what is most fundamental in friendship: wishing well to one's friend. Melancholy, on the other hand, is opposed to the act of friendship which is living together, as the melancholy of Antonio is something of a burden to his friends, as he himself admits.[103] It is not difficult to see in many ways how melancholy is a passion or emotion that is bad or harmful to the one undergoing it. Melancholy is a sadness which weighs down a person to an inactive state, if not to death:

> He made her melancholy, sad, and heavy;
> And so she died…[104]

This is why the poets attribute melancholy to the heavy elements (earth and water) as opposed to the light elements (air and fire):

> But, ah! thought kills me that I am not thought,
> To leap large lengths of miles when thou art gone,
> But that, so much of earth and water wrought,
> I must attend time's leisure with my moan;
> Receiving nought by elements so slow
> But heavy tears, badges of either's woe.[105]
>
> The other two, slight air and purging fire,
> Are both with thee, wherever I abide;
> The first my thought, the other my desire,

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[102] The Book of Wisdom, ch. 2, vv. 23-25.

[103] Merchant of Venice, Act I, Sc. i.

[104] Love's Labour's Lost, Act V, Sc. ii.

[105] Shakespeare, Sonnet 44, lines 9-14.

> These present-absent with swift motion slide.
> For when these quicker elements are gone
> In tender embassy of love to thee,
> My life, being made of four, with two alone
> Sinks down to death, oppress'd with melancholy.[106]

This is why Saturn, the god of melancholy, is called "heavy Saturn" by Shakespeare in Sonnet 98. Not only does melancholy weigh down the person so afflicted, but it is also bad for the person who lives with the melancholic person. Thus Lady Hotspur complains to Hotspur:

> Why hast thou lost the fresh blood in thy cheeks
> And given my treasures and my rights of thee
> To thick-ey'd musing and curs'd melancholy?[107]

Melancholy, then, seems to be an enemy of life itself:

> Sweet recreation barr'd, what doth ensue
> But moody and dull melancholy
> Kinsman to grim and comfortless despair,
> And at her heels a huge infectious troop
> Of pale distemperatures and foes to life?[108]

But it is as "Kinsman to grim and comfortless despair" that the harmfulness of melancholy is most fully seen. Cassius takes his own life after a mistake engendered by his own melancholy and despair. Messala makes this observation on that suicide and its causes:

> Mistrust of good success hath done this deed.
> O hateful error, melancholy's child,
> Why dost thou show to the apt thoughts of men
> The things that are not? O error, soon conceiv'd
> Thou never com'st unto a happy birth,
> But kill'st the mother that engender'd thee.[109]

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[106] Shakespeare, Sonnet 45 , lines 1-8.

[107] Henry the Fourth, Part One**,** Act II, Sc. iii.

[108] The Comedy of Errors, Act V, Sc. i.

[109] Julius Caesar**,** Act. V, Sc. iii.

And when Enobarbus takes his life, he invokes the moon as mistress of melancholy:

> O sovereign mistress of true melancholy,
> The poisonous damp of night disponge upon me,
> That life, a very rebel to my will,
> May hang no longer on me.[110]

We can listen to Q. Elizabeth giving way to "black despair" and Rivers counseling her against this "desperate sorrow":

> Q. Elizabeth: Ah! who shall hinder me to wail and weep?
> To chide my fortune, and torment myself?
> I'll join with black despair against my soul,
> And to myself become an enemy.....
>
> Rivers: Drown desperate sorrow in dead Edward's grave,
> And plant your joys in living Edward's throne.[111]

Such "black despair" is very much in need of being purged. The pious king prays over the dying Beaufort:

> O thou eternal Mover of the heavens!
> Look with a gentle eye upon this wretch;
> O! beat away the busy meddling fiend
> That lays strong siege unto this wretch's soul,
> And from his bosom purge this black despair.[112]

Beaufort, who has led a wicked life, is an extreme case. A lesser melancholy might be relieved by a walk as Hippocrates recommended:

> So it is, besieged with sable-coloured melancholy, I did commend the black-oppressing humour to the most wholesome physic of thy health-giving air; and as I am a gentleman, betook myself to walk.[113]

Sometimes melancholy is relieved by travel.

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[110] Antony and Cleopatra, Act IV, Sc. vii.

[111] Richard III, Act II, Sc. ii.

[112] Henry VI, Part Two, Act III, Sc. ii.

[113] Love's Labour's Lost, Act I, Sc. i.

There is a virtue which is opposed to this excessive sadness and Shakespeare touches upon this in the conversation of Guiderius and Arviragus about the melancholic Imogen (disguised as a boy):

Guiderius: .....I do note
That grief and patience, rooted in him both,
Mingle their spurs together.

Arviragus: Grow, patience!
And let the stinking-elder, grief, untwine
His perishing root with the increasing vine![114]

The elder was a tree of evil repute. Its leaves and blossoms have an unpleasant odor and black fungus droops from it. Judas Iscariot is said to have hung himself on the elder.

There can be little doubt, then, that melancholy is a bad emotion, weighing people down and leading them to despair and being opposed to life and the virtue of patience. Hence, it should be driven away or we should be purged of it.

Before we try to answer the question whether comedy purges melancholy, we should distinguish the ways in which emotions are purged. There are three ways, at least.

One way is by bringing them to an excess so that they are exhausted and so die. Shakespeare touches upon this way in the opening verses of *Twelfth Night* where the Duke Orsino says:

If music be the food of love, play on!
Give me excess of it, that surfeiting,
The appetite may sicken and so die.[115]

In this way, some people are relieved of their sadness by crying. But comedy does not move us to melancholy so that it can purge melancholy by bringing it to an excess.

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[114] Cymbeline, Act IV, Sc. ii.

[115] Twelfth Night, Act I, Sc. i.

A second way the emotions are purged is by generating another emotion of the same kind but without the excess or disorder of the first. This does not eliminate the emotion but makes it more reasonable. The purpose of this purgation is similar to that of Lucetta when she says to Julia:

> I do not seek to quench your love's hot fire,
> But qualify the fire's extreme rage,
> Lest it should burn above the bounds of reason.[116]

Lucetta does not seek to "quench" or eliminate Julia's passion for Proteus but, rather, to "qualify" or moderate it. But melancholy is a passion that we want to eliminate as far as possible, not to qualify or moderate. Further, if comedy does not move us to melancholy, it cannot move us to a qualified melancholy. The third kind of purgation is by generating an emotion of a contrary species. Thus Juliet's mother says to Juliet:

> Well, well, thou hast a careful father, child,
> One who to put thee from thy heaviness
> Hath sorted out a sudden day of joy
> That thou expect'st not nor I look'd not for.[117]

The "sudden day of joy" to which her mother refers is the day of marriage with the Count Paris which Juliet's father and mother think will drive away her "heaviness" or melancholy. The generation of joy purges us of the opposite or contrary passion of sadness. Good music often purges us of mild melancholy by generating a contrary joy. A wedding-day is a day of joy and mirth, as Theseus says about the newlyweds:

> Here come the lovers, full of joy and mirth.
> Joy, gentle friends! joy and fresh days of love
> Accompany your hearts![118]

And hence Juliet's father and mother expect her melancholy to be purged by her marriage. Opposed to the joy and mirth of the wedding-day is the sadness and melancholy of the funeral day. When Juliet is discovered apparently dead

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[116] The Two Gentlemen of Verona, Act II, Sc. vii.

[117] Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Sc. v.

[118] A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act V, Sc. i.

on her wedding-day, there is a change to the contrary as noted in these words of her father:

> All things that we ordained festival
> Turn from their office to black funeral -
> Our instruments to melancholy bells,
> Our wedding cheer to a sad burial feast,
> Our solemn hymns to sullen dirges change,
> Our bridal flow'rs serve for a bury'd corse,
> And all things change them to the contrary.[119]

Theseus looks for mirth in the days leading up to his marriage and again contrasts this mirth with the melancholy of funerals. Hence, he says to his master of revels:

> .....Go, Philostrate
> Sir up the Athenian youth to merriments;
> Awake the pert and nimble spirit of mirth;
> Turn melancholy forth to funerals;
> The pale companion is not for our pomp.[120]

The contrariety of mirth and melancholy is brought out not only by the contrariety of joy and sadness, but also by the words "pert and nimble spirit of mirth". Pert means lively while nimble and spirit bring out that mirth is light and active. But melancholy is dead and heavy and inactive. The purgation of melancholy by the spirit of mirth reminds us of Titania's words to Bottom:

> And I will purge thy mortal grossness so
> That thou shalt like an airy spirit go.[121]

Shakespeare compares spirits to air which is thin and light:

> Our revels now are ended: these our actors -
> As I foretold you - were all spirits and
> Are melted into air, into thin air.[122]

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[119] Romeo and Juliet, Act IV, Sc. iv.

[120] A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act I, Sc. i.

[121] A Midsummer Night's Dream, Act II, Sc. i.

[122] The Tempest, Act IV, Sc. i.

This fits so well with the extended meaning of the medical word catharsis or purgation. Melancholy is said to thicken the blood, but mirth prevents this condition or purges the blood of this thickness. Thinning is a common example of purgation in ancient medicine and when we get too thick around the middle, we also need a thinning. Polixenes notes the good effect his young son's mirth and liveliness has upon him:

> He's all my exercise, my mirth, my matter,
> Now my sworn friend and then mine enemy,
> My parasite, my soldier, statesman, all:
> He makes a July's day short as December,
> And with his varying childishness cures in me
> Thoughts that would thick my blood.[123]

Although the word spirit is also used sometimes for melancholy, it is not because melancholy is light or thin. King John speaks of the "spirit" of melancholy to Hubert while emphasizing its being thick and heavy:

> Of if that surly spirit, melancholy,
> Had bak'd thy blood and made it heavy, thick,
> Which else runs tickling up and down the veins,
> Making that idiot, laughter, keep men's eyes
> And strain their cheeks to idle merriment,
> A passion hateful to my purpose.[124]

Many words then are used in bringing out the contrariety of mirth and melancholy. Melancholy is heavy, thick, lifeless, dark while mirth is light, thin, nimble, lively and, like all joy, mirth may be said to brighten the face. Shakespeare touches upon this contrariety again and again:

> He made her melancholy, sad, and heavy;
> And so she died: had she been light, like you
> Of such a merry, nimble, stirring spirit
> She might ha' been a grandam ere she died;
> And so may you, for a light heart lives long.[125]

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[123] The Winter's Tale, Act I, Sc. ii.

[124] King John, Act III, Sc. iii.

[125] Love's Labour's Lost, Act V, Sc. ii.

Mirth then will purge melancholy because it is contrary to it. Hence, in Stevenson's *The Black Arrow,* Sir Daniel observes:

> "Nay, now, good cousin," replied Sir Daniel, with some earnestness, "think not that I mock at you, except in mirth, as between kinsfolk and singular friends… Tut! ye will not shy for honest laughter; it purgeth melancholy."[126]

And Dromio of Syracuse is described by his master as doing the same for him:

> A trusty villain, sir: that very oft,
> When I am dull with care and melancholy,
> Lightens my humour with his merry jests.[127]

The contrariety of mirth and melancholy is such that just as mirth can expel melancholy, so too when one becomes melancholic, as does Hamlet, one can lose his mirth:

> I have of late (but wherefore, I know not) lost all my mirth, foregone all custom of exercise: and indeed it goes so heavily with my disposition, that this goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory; this most excellent canopy, the air, look you - this brave o'erhanging firmament - this majestical roof fretted with golden fire, why, it appears no other thing to me, than a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours.[128]

Hamlet lost his mirth when his disposition became heavy; i.e., melancholic.

If mirth and melancholy are contraries so that one expels the other, and comedy moves us to mirth, it is reasonable to conclude that comedy expels melancholy or purges us of melancholy, at least temporarily.

One witness of this is the very concrete title (as far as purgation goes) of the chief source book of the comic work The Beggar's Opera by John Gay in the 18th century. It was Thomas D'Urfey's *Wit and Mirth: Or Pills to Purge Melancholy.*

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[126] Robert Louis Stevenson**,**The Black Arrow**,** ch. 1. C. Scribner's ed., 1955, p. 29.

[127] The Comedy of Errors, Act I, Sc. ii.

[128] Hamlet, Act II, Sc. ii.

Another witness is Henry Fielding in his Preface to *Joseph Andrews* where, speaking of one kind of comedy (which he calls burlesque), he says that "it contributes more to exquisite mirth and laughter than any other; and these are probably more wholesome physic for the mind, and conduce better to purge away spleen, melancholy, and ill affections, than is generally imagined"[129].

A third witness is Shakespeare himself in a passage we looked at earlier:

> Your honor's players, hearing your amendment,
> Are come to play a pleasant comedy;
> For so your doctors hold it very meet,
> Seeing too much sadness hath congeal'd your blood,
> And melancholy is the nurse of frenzy:
> Therefore they thought it good you hear a play
> And frame your mind to mirth and merriment,
> Which bars a thousand harms and lengthens life.[130]

Someone might wonder whether mirth is not also opposed to pity and hence whether comedy also expels pity. It cannot be denied that mirth in some way does exclude pity. Prince Hal, for example, after the trick he and Poins have played upon Falstaff, says:

> Away, good Ned. Falstaff sweats to death
> And lards the lean earth as he walks along.
> Were't not for laughing I should pity him.[131]

And in *Twelfth Night*, Toby says in the prank they are playing on Malvolio:

> Come, we'll have him in a dark room and bound. My niece is already in the belief that he's mad. We may carry it thus, for our pleasure and his penance, till our very pastime, tired out of breath, prompt us to have mercy on him.[132]

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[129] Henry Fielding, Joseph Andrews, p. xxvi.

[130] The Taming of the Shrew, Induction, Sc. ii.

[131] Henry IV, Part One, Act II, Sc. ii.

[132] Twelfth Night, Act III, Sc. iv.

Yet mirth seems to be more directly opposed to melancholy than to pity as the many quotes above witness. Mirth is commonly spoken of as a remedy for melancholy, not for pity. Further, all melancholy seems to be bad while pity has something sacred or divine about it. Hence, mirth should be used to expel melancholy, not pity. Further, a mirth that would exclude pity could be cruel. Hence, the mirth that the comic poet should aim at, should be one that excludes melancholy far more than it does pity. The mirth aroused by the comic poet should perhaps temper pity so that it is not excessive or maudlin, but it should not try to eradicate pity. Cruelty is more directly opposed to pity than is mirth. It would be an excessive or disordered mirth that would lead to cruelty and the elimination of pity.

That mirth and pity are more compatible than mirth and melancholy is shown by the works of the comic writers themselves. It is remarkable that Shakespeare should have been able to combine comic scenes with tragic scenes in the one play of *Henry IV, Part One*, and yet write such a successful play. But he is perhaps an exception. In those works that have melancholic scenes alternating with comic scenes, such as some 19th century novels, the melancholy interferes with the mirth. Dickens's most comic work is *The Pickwick Papers,* which is free of any melancholy to speak of. But the comedy, in *Great Expectations* and in *David Copperfield*, is weakened, to some extent, in the second part, because of the melancholic element.

Milton confuses pity and melancholy somewhat in *Il Penseroso*, for the effect of tragedy should be pity, not melancholy. Pity leads us to relieve others when we can, while melancholy induces inactivity. Pity and mirth are not opposed as are melancholy and mirth. Pity and mirth keep each other balanced; they keep each other from being excessive or disordered. Pity keeps our merriment from being cruel and mirth keeps our pity from becoming maudlin or excessive and from turning into melancholy. This is why Shakespeare can combine tragedy and comedy with an altogether unsuspected success in *Henry the IV, Part One*. The Greeks followed the performance of three tragedies with a comedy because they realized the need to balance the emotional effect of tragedy with that of comedy. Melancholy and mirth, however, do not balance each other; they destroy each other.

It is difficult for a comic poet or writer to achieve the catharsis he should. In trying to moderate mirth or merriment, he may slip into the

melancholic. Or in trying to eliminate melancholy, he may be led into some excess or disorder in his mirth. Dickens and Thackeray are apt to let in some melancholy while Smollett and Sterne and Fielding are apt to go to some excess or disorder in their mirth.

Should any other emotion be in the definition of comedy? We think that one other emotion should be in the definition. This is the emotion of hope which is the opposite of despair. As despair goes with melancholy often, so hope (despair's opposite) should go with mirth (melancholy's opposite).

Mirth without hope is incomplete or too transitory. The Poet touches upon the transitory character of mirth in the Clown's Song in *Twelfth Night:*

> What is love? 'Tis not hereafter;
> Present mirth hath present laughter
> What's to come is still unsure:
> In delay there lies no plenty;
> Then come kiss me, sweet and twenty!
> Youth's a stuff will not endure.[133]

Good things come to an end, as the proverb says. But man naturally seeks a lasting joy. At the end of *Henry VI, Part Three*, the king expresses this natural longing:

> And now what rests but that we spend the time
> With stately triumphs, mirthful comic shows,
> Such as befits the pleasure of the court?
> Sound drums and trumpets! farewell sour annoy!
> For here, I hope, begins our lasting joy.[134]

But this "lasting joy" is not possible without hope. This is why the comic writers, whether by art or by nature, have been led so often to end their comedies by marriage or the promise of a marriage. For marriage naturally combines both present joy and hope. There is hope both for the continued happiness of the couple (hence, the fairy-tale ending: "they were married and lived happily ever afterwards") and for the human race which is continued by marriage and what it is ordered to. It is not by chance that Shakespeare has

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[133] Twelfth Night, Act II, Sc. iii.

[134] Henry VI, Part Three, Act V, Sc. vii.

intertwined the secret plans for the marriage of Fenton and Anne Page with the final disgrace of Falstaff. Fenton himself notes how they have become intertwined when he speaks of the plans for the final disgrace of Falstaff and his own plan to run off with Anne to the Host of the Garter Inn who is going to assist him in the matter of a priest to marry them:

> From time to time I have acquainted you
> With the dear love I bear to fair Anne Page;
> Who mutually hath answer'd my affection,
> So far forth as herself might be her chooser,
> Even to my wish. I have a letter from her
> Of such contents as you will wonder at;
> The mirth whereof so larded with my matter,
> That neither singly can be manifested,
> Without the show of both; wherein fat Falstaff
> Hath a great scene: the image of the jest
> I'll show you here at large.[135]

The sub-plot of the elopement of Fenton and Anne Page not only adds mirth to this superb comedy (many are deceived who have other plans for Anne, including her parents), but it especially adds the element of hope. And what is remarkable here is that Shakespeare has added a strong element of hope, not only in the marriage of the young people with its inevitable strong current of hope, but by increasing the hope of all the other principal characters in a theatrical tour de force that is stunning. Shakespeare uses the surprise wedding even to relieve the disgrace of Falstaff who can hope for recovery in the midst of the confusion generated by the deception of the Pages. It also helps Ford, who was deceived about his wife, to be able to see the mistakes or deception of the Pages. And the Pages, being easy-going, easily adjust to their handsome new son-in-law who, they realize, will make their daughter happy, and they wish them "many, many merry days!" The final lines of this comedy are worth quoting here. Falstaff's disgrace was earlier and Fenton has just announced the secret marriage:

Ford:	Stand not amaz'd: here is no remedy: In love the heavens themselves do guide the state: Money buys land, and wives are sold by fate.
Falstaff:	I am glad, though you have ta'en a special stand

[135] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act IV, Sc. vi.

to strike at me, that your arrow hath glanced.

Page: Well, what remedy? - Fenton, heaven give thee joy!
What cannot be eschew'd must be embrac'd.

Falstaff: When night dogs run all sorts of deer are chas'd.

Mrs. Page: Well, I will muse no further. Master Fenton,
Heaven give you many, many merry days!
Good husband, let us every one go home,
And laugh this sport o'er by a country fire;
Sir John and all.

Ford: Let it be so. Sir John,
To Master Brook you yet shall hold your word;
For he to-night shall lie with Mistress Ford.[136]

Another major reason why hope should be in the definition of comedy can be seen if we consider two things. One is that tragedy and comedy are the principal forms of likeness of human life and character in words. The other is that there are four principal passions or emotions.

From the Greeks and Romans, we have received tragedy and comedy as the principal forms of likeness of human life and character in words. Aristotle's Poetics follows experience and tradition when it was built around a discussion of these two principal forms. Likewise, when Socrates talks about love with the poets in the *Symposium,* there are two poets present, one a comic poet (Aristophanes) and the other a tragic poet (Agathon). Hence, in our theaters, there is often a representation of the tragic and comic masks.

The four principal passions are joy and sadness, hope and fear. The reasons why these are the principal passions belongs to the consideration of the passions and we cannot enter into those reasons here.[137] Shakespeare also touches upon these four passions in the words of King Henry:

Master lieutenant, now that God and friends

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[136] The Merry Wives of Windsor, Act V, Sc. v.

[137] Thomas Aquinas considers why they are the principal passions in his treatise on the passions or emotions, in the Summa Theol., IaIIae, q. 25, a. 4. There is also a consideration of these four emotions being the principal ones in the Q. D. de Veritate**,** q. 26, a. 5.

> Have shaken Edward from the regal seat,
> And turn'd my captive state to liberty,
> My fear to hope, my sorrows unto joys,
> At our enlargement, what are thy due fees?[138]

The line "My fear to hope, my sorrows unto joys" not only touches upon the four principal passions, but also of a change from fear and sorrow to hope and joy. Fear and sorrow go together to some extent and hope and joy likewise. One could say that fear and sorrow or sadness are contrary to hope and joy.

Since tragedy and comedy are contrary; and tragedy moves us to two of the principal passions - pity (a form of sadness) and fear which are contrary to mirth (as a form of joy) and hope; we would expect that comedy would move us to both mirth and hope. Otherwise, one of the four principal passions would not be moved by the two principal forms of likeness of human life and character in words. The plots of tragedy and comedy are often contrary (that of tragedy tending to move from happiness to misery and that of comedy, in the reverse direction; or that of tragedy from good fortune to bad and that of comedy, in the opposite direction). Shakespeare touches upon these four principal passions as they relate to these contrary movements in the plots of tragedy and comedy in these words of Edgar in *King Lear:*

> Yet better thus, and known to be contemn'd,
> Then still contemn'd and flatter'd. To be worst,
> The lowest and most dejected things of fortune,
> Stands still in esperance, lives not in fear.
> The lamentable change is from the best;
> The worst returns to laughter.[139]

The change from the best (happiness or good fortune) to the worst (misery or bad fortune) involves fear and is lamentable or sad while the contrary change is in esperance or hope and laughter or mirth. Thus as the plot of tragedy moves us both to a form of sadness (pity) and to fear, likewise the plot of comedy should move us both to a form of joy (mirth) and to hope.

We can take Terence as a witness to the importance of hope in Greek and Roman comedy. Terence is praised as a comic dramatist and he took

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[138] King Henry in Henry VI, Part Three, Act IV, Sc. vi.

[139] King Lear, Act IV, Sc. i.

Menander as a model. Congreve, in his praise of Terence, traces the influences on him back to Aristotle:

> As Terence excelled in his performances, so had he great advantages to encourage his undertakings; for he built on the foundations of Menander; his plots were generally modelled, and his characters ready drawn to hand. He copied Menander, and Menander had no less light in the formation of his characters, from the observations of Theophrastus, of whom he was a disciple; and Theophrastus, it is known, was not only the disciple, but the immediate successor of Aristotle, the first and greatest judge of poetry.[140]

Palmer Bovie, the editor and one of the translators in a recent edition of the complete comedies of Terence, has noted this element of hope in the plays of Terence:

> Terence is as much an anima naturaliter Christiana as Virgil was - he believed in faith, hope and love. But for Terence the greatest of these was hope.[141]

Although the hope of Terence is not the Christian theological virtue of hope, Bovie, as a translator and editor and student of Terence's plays, is valuable as a witness to the connection of Terence's comedies with hope.

Antonio Sebastiano Minturno, the Italian Renaissance critic, has emphasized the importance of surprise in the emotional effect of Terence's plays:

> But it is typical of the comic poet to give a pleasing and gay ending to his fable, which could not be possible unless he were able to induce surprise; things happening outside of our expectation are considered surprising. I do not know how the plots whose ending is not such can amuse anyone; it is for this reason that the Terentian lovers, when they expect it least … can begin to enjoy their love. Listen how unexpectedly in The Woman of Andros Pamphilus shows that what he could hardly have hoped for happened to him:
>
> Someone may think perhaps that I don't think this

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[140] Congreve, Dedication of The Way of the World to Ralph, Earl of Montague**,** in Famous Plays…**,** p. 424.

[141] Palmer Bovie, Introduction to Terence's play The Girl from Andros (Andria) in The Complete Comedies of Terence, Modern Verse Translations, by Palmer Bovie, Constance Carrier and Douglas Parker, Edited and with a foreword by Palmer Bovie, Newark, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1974, p. 7.

to be true, but I like the idea of it being true.

Chaerea in The Eunuch confesses that he achieved such happiness by the will of the gods without really having any hope of attaining it… Chremes in Phormio expresses his surprise this way:

> O gods, how at times things which one could never dare
> to hope for happen inconsiderately and fortuitously.[142]

One can see here a certain likeness between the use of surprise in comedy and in tragedy to move hope in the former and fear in the latter. Tragedy arouses fear in part because the change for the worse comes upon the tragic hero unexpectedly. Solon said: "Call no man happy until he be dead", because one cannot foresee the lamentable reverse of fortune he may still undergo while alive. Hence, Sophocles paraphrases Solon's words at the end of his tragedies. Likewise, when an unexpected change for the better takes place, our hope is suddenly and strongly aroused.

Comedy then moves us to mirth and to hope, purging us of melancholy. Someone might want to add "purging us of despair", since hope is the opposite of despair. But perhaps this is not necessary since melancholy is not always accompanied by despair. Further, if one's melancholy has led one to despair, perhaps one's case is too serious to be cured by comedy. The witness of the comic writers here is important also for they speak often of the comic as driving away melancholy, but rarely of driving out despair. Men often have a touch of melancholy - they need only listen to the news - but despair is not so common a condition.

If comedy moves us to mirth and hope and hence drives away melancholy (and perhaps some mild despair or discouragement), we can see again that mirth is more opposed to melancholy than to pity. Pity, as we have said, is more opposed to cruelty, and melancholy, to mirth. Thus the Duke opposes the apparent cruelty of Shylock to mercy or pity:

> Shylock, the world thinks, and I think so too,
> That thou but leadest this fashion of thy malice
> To the last hour of act; and then 'tis thought
> Thou'lt show thy mercy and remorse more strange
> Than is thy strange apparent cruelty;

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[142] Minturno, The Art of Poetry (1563), in Theories of Comedy, p. 84.

> And where thou now exacts the penalty,
> Which is a pound of this poor merchant's flesh,
> Thou wilt not only loose the forfeiture,
> But, touch'd with humane gentleness and love,
> Forgive a moiety of the principal
> Glancing an eye of pity on his losses.[143]

But just as pity is coupled with fear as the effect of tragedy, so cruelty goes with audacity, the opposite of fear:

> But to my charge. The king hath sent to know
> The nature of your griefs; and whereupon
> You conjure from the breast of civil peace
> Such bold hostility, teaching his duteous land
> Audacious cruelty.[144]

We can counterbalance the "audacious cruelty" spoken of here with the "desperate sorrow" of which Rivers spoke in *Richard III:*

> Drown desperate sorrow in dead Edward's grave,
> And plant your joys in living Edward's throne.[145]

Since audacity is directly opposed to fear and cruelty to pity, "audacious cruelty" is directly opposed to the fearful pity of tragedy. Likewise, since despair is directly opposed to hope and the sorrow of melancholy, to the joy of mirth, who does not see that "desperate sorrow" is directly opposed to hopeful mirth? Hence, the hopeful mirth of comedy is much more opposed to the desperate sorrow of melancholy than it is to fearful pity. It was not necessary for Aristotle to put the exclusion of cruelty in the definition of tragedy as we are putting the exclusion of melancholy in the definition of comedy because cruelty is not as common as is melancholy. Further cruelty is unnatural while melancholy is natural: it is natural to be saddened by one's own misfortunes or the miserable condition of the world, just as one naturally loves oneself and the whole of which one is a part.

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[143] The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, Sc. i.

[144] King Henry the Fourth, Part One, Act IV, Sc. iii, Blunt to Hotspur.

[145] *Richard III*, Act II, Sc. ii, To Q. Elizabeth.

Comedy, therefore, moves us to mirth and hope, driving away melancholy. We have had occasion previously to speak of Goldsmith's comic powers and to note Washington Irving's admiration of him. To conclude our consideration of the emotions in the definition of tragedy, it is worthwhile to cite an appreciation of Irving and Goldsmith:

> We have always fancied that there was a strong resemblance between Goldsmith and Irving… They have the same quick perception of the ludicrous… There is the same quiet vein of humor in both, and the same cheerful spirit of hopefulness… If you would learn to … make for yourself sunshine where half your fellow-men see nothing but shadows and gloom, read and meditate Goldsmith and Irving.[146]

We can now put together the definition of comedy from those parts of the definition which are common to it and the definition of tragedy (these parts are shown in Aristotle's Poetics) and from those parts considered in this paper which distinguish or separate comedy from tragedy.

Comedy is a likeness of an action that is laughable, complete and of some magnitude, in sweetened speech, acted out, moving us to mirth and hope so as to purify these and expel melancholy.

Duane H. Berquist

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[146] Quoted from G. W. Greene's Biographical Studies, in Heath's English Classic Edition of Washington Irving, Life of Oliver Goldsmith, D.C. Heath & Co., 1904, pp xx-xxi.

SHAKESPEARE'S POETICS – NOTE

Reading Shakespeare's works (and about them), reflecting on and discussing them with friends, for over forty years, has convinced me of this: Shakespeare's own words about the poet or dramatist, his art and works, are in remarkable harmony with our own experience of those works. This harmony suggests that a general understanding of those works (which must come from a long experience of them) can be usefully brought together with the words of Shakespeare, which touch upon these matters. The usefulness of such a bringing together lies not only in the possible confirmation of one's own understanding of Shakespeare's works and the relevance of Shakespeare's words for the same, but also in the mutual help and stimulus each gives to the penetration of the other.

Shakespeare, of course, did not write an ordered treatise on his art and works. His words on them are scattered through the plays and other works. And we should not expect completeness in those words even if they are brought together in an orderly way. But we can weave an ordered treatment of his art and works around his words, beginning with those words, unfolding them, and filling them out from our experience and reflection on those words.

Granted that Shakespeare did not write an ordered book about his art and the products of that art, yet his scattered remarks both confirm and stimulate the understanding of those works, which must come from a long experience of them. The usefulness of such a study does not depend upon the exhaustive nature of Shakespeare's observations. For that matter, no study of Shakespeare could be exhaustive of the subject. Nor is it only the authority of Shakespeare's own observations about his art and works that is important here - significant as that may be - but the harmony of those remarks with our own experience of those works. Further, although the study of Shakespeare's works does not stop with what he has explicitly noticed about them in passing, yet it may be that the latter, especially when it fits our experience, may be a kind of cornerstone of our general understanding of those works.

Anyone who wants to make use of Shakespeare's scattered remarks for the above purpose must begin by ordering them. The natural way of doing this is to consider first his general remarks on the poet, his art and works; and then those observations, which are particular and lead to an understanding of the different kinds of his works. But since Shakespeare also has many general remarks or

observations on the poet, his art and works, we must also order them. And we cannot order them without finding where to begin - for this will determine the order in which we consider them.

Shakespeare is above all a dramatist or playwright. We must begin then with what Shakespeare thinks about the play and its purpose. Perhaps the most basic texts are in Hamlet's remarks to the players. Yet that passage, as we shall see, must be supplemented by a number of other passages which are necessary, not only to fill it out, but also to avoid some possible serious misunderstandings and omissions.

When reading and interpreting Shakespeare's own words, we must remember that he writes as a poet. He often speaks figuratively and sometimes we shall put his meaning in plain language. And although he is a very accurate writer, we must be aware that his choice of words is somewhat governed by the requirements of sound and style. This could mislead some who do not have a sufficient experience of his works or who do not compare different passages on the same or complementary matters.

We shall post eventually some papers in which I have tried to express Shakespeare's understanding of a play in his words from my experience of those plays. They are all about the same words, more or less, of Shakespeare and therefore cover somewhat the same ground. But those words need to be examined more than once. And although this involves some repetition, the freshness and flavor of each consideration is better preserved by not combining them. After that, we can post a paper on the division of his plays into particular kinds. Papers on particular kinds of play or on individual plays can be reasonably ordered next.

Duane H. Berquist

MIRROR AND DREAM: SHAKESPEARE'S UNDERSTANDING OF A PLAY

Shakespeare's words compel our wonder. There is a twofold excellence in them. One is according to the poetic art and the purpose of the play. The other is outside the poetic art and serves no obvious dramatic purpose. In both, there is remarkable precision or brevity which reminds one of the words of Polonius - "brevity is the soul of wit" that is, of wisdom.

When Shakespeare in a few words sketches a character so vividly that we never forget that character who seems more real and interesting than those of daily life, as in the introduction of Falstaff in *Henry IV, Pt. I* (Act I, Sc. 2):

Falstaff: Now Hal, what time of day is it, lad?

Prince: Thou art so fat-witted with drinking of old sack, and unbuttoning thee after supper, and sleeping upon benches after noon, that thou hast forgotten to demand that truly which thou wouldst truly know What a devil hast thou to do with the time of the day? Unless hours were cups of sack, and minutes capons, and clocks the tongues of bawds, and dials the signs of leaping-houses, and the blessed sun himself a fair hot wench in flame-color'd taffeta, I see no reason why thou shouldst be so superfluous to demand the time of the day.

or when in a few words he sets an emotional tone to a dramatic scene as in *As You Like It* (Act I Sc. 1):

Oliver: Where will the old duke live?

Charles: They say he is already in the forest of Arden, and a many merry men with him. And there they live like the old Robin Hood of England. They say many young gentlemen flock to him every day and fleet the time carelessly as they did in the golden world.

or when he expresses in metaphor or simile the feeling natural to an event in a way that seems impossible to be improved upon, as in the words of Capulet when his daughter Juliet is found (apparently) dead in her bed on her wedding morn (*Romeo and Juliet*, Act IV, Sc 4):

> Death lies on her like an untimely frost
> Upon the sweetest flow'r of all the field.

In all this we recognize an excellence and brevity in Shakespeare's words that is according to the poetic art and which serves an obvious dramatic purpose.

But at other times, there is an excellence in Shakespeare's words which serves no obvious poetic or dramatic purpose. Two examples of this can be given here which will help to introduce what I intend to do in this paper. When Lucentio says to Tranio in *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act I, Sc. 3:

> And therefore, Tranio, for the time I study
> Virtue and that part of philosophy
> Will I apply that treats of happiness
> By virtue especially to be achiev'd.

he gives a remarkably precise statement of what ethics is about, as can be seen from the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. And when Antony in his speech to the crowd in *Julius Caesar* (Act III, Sc. 2) says:

> For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worth,
> Action, nor utterance, nor the power of speech,
> To stir men's blood: I only speak right on.

he gives, as Kittredge notes, a complete enumeration of the qualities of a good orator, a compendium of the headings in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*. (The order, of course, is somewhat dictated by the requirements of alliteration and meter.) Such precision and wise brevity seems more appropriate to the philosopher than to the poet or dramatist. I do not intend here to investigate the purpose of such precision except to say that it does not serve any obvious poetic or dramatic purpose and that I do not think that Shakespeare is trying to show off his learning. But I do intend to make use of this wise brevity in his words. If Shakespeare can speak so wisely about those arts or sciences that are close to the poetic and dramatic art, such as rhetoric and ethics, as we have seen above, we should not be surprised to find the same kind of wise precision when he speaks of the poet or the poetic art or the dramatic art or the play itself. Indeed a long experience of his plays and reflection helps us to understand and appreciate how wise are his brief words about the poet and the play and how fitting to our experience of those plays.

Any attempt to investigate Shakespeare's understanding of a play from his own words must begin somewhere. And perhaps no better beginning can be made

than in that play where Rolfe (in his preface to his edition of *Hamlet*) says that Furness does not exaggerate when he says:

> No one of mortal mould (save Him 'whose blessed feet were nailed for our advantage to the bitter cross') ever trod this earth, commanding such absorbing interest as this Hamlet, this mere creation of a poet's brain. No syllable that he whispers, no word let fall by any one near him, but is caught and pondered as no words ever have been, except of Holy Writ. Upon no throne built by mortal hands has ever 'beat so fierce a light' as upon that airy fabric reared at Elsinore.

This may be an exaggeration, but it is still a great testimony from someone who knew the writings on *Hamlet*.

But apart from the general excellence of Hamlet, there is good reason to begin an investigation of Shakespeare's understanding of a play from the words of Hamlet to the players in Act III, Sc. 2. This is an opportunity for Shakespeare to speak at length about the play and playing. Kittredge in his first note on Act III, Sc. 2, says:

> Hamlet's advice to the players has always been understood - and rightly - to embody Shakespeare's own views of the art of acting.

Further, it is here that he touches upon the very immediate end or purpose of playing and the play when he says:

> o'erstep not the modesty of nature: for anything so overdone is from the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is, to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image, and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.

And the end or purpose of anything is always what is most important about it.

Moreover, the beginning of these words find an echo in a couple of witnesses who were friends and fellow actors of Shakespeare and remembered in his will where he left them money to buy memorial rings and indeed the famous editors of the immortal Folio of 1623 - the single most important publication in the history of English literature, if not of world literature. I refer, of course, to Heminge and Condell, who in their Preface To the great variety of Readers at the beginning of the Folio say that Shakespeare was

Moreover, in speaking of the play as a mirror and an image and the actor as imitating men, Shakespeare is at the natural beginning of a consideration of the dramatic or poetic art as Aristotle noted in his book *About the Poetic Art*.

For these and other reasons, as well as a long experience of his plays, I am convinced that these words of Hamlet to the players are one place where one must begin to investigate Shakespeare's understanding of a play from his own words. I call the above words from *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2 on the purpose of playing, a corner-stone passage. The word *corner-stone* indicates, of course, that I do not consider those words as giving, even briefly, Shakespeare's complete understanding of a play in general. There are two things essential to Shakespeare's understanding of a play which are not even touched upon in this corner-stone passage. And two things said in this corner-stone passage must be balanced by what he says elsewhere to avoid misunderstanding. After considering this corner-stone passage, I will briefly indicate the two things not touched upon in that passage and the two things that need to be balanced, one of which I intend to explore further in this paper.

In saying that "the purpose of playing...is. to hold...the mirror up to nature etc.," Shakespeare is clearly saying that the play is a likeness of something. For in a mirror, we have a likeness of something. This is also shown by his use of the word *image* which comes from the Latin word for likeness. Shakespeare would seem here to be in agreement with Aristotle who speaks of the play or drama as a *mimesis*, an imitation. Indeed, in the words to the players that follow this corner-stone passage, Hamlet criticizes some actors thus:

> O, there be players that I have seen play, and heard others praise, and that highly (not to speak it profanely), that, neither having the accent of Christians, nor the gait of Christian, pagan, nor man, have so strutted and bellowed that I have thought some of nature's journeymen had made men, and not made them well, they imitated humanity so abominably.

Hamlet is thus seen to speak in these two passages, first metaphorically, calling the play a *mirror* because it is a likeness, and then second, an *imitation*, which is to speak properly or non-figuratively. One should note, however, that the word *imitation* in Shakespeare, or in the translation of Aristotle, does not have the narrow and somewhat bad sense that it does today. Our commercial society, for example, uses the word *imitation* for what is usually a cheap or inferior copy of the

original. But nothing prevents the word *imitation* in the sense in which Aristotle or Shakespeare use it from meaning a likeness that is in some way superior to the original. Again, imitation in Aristotle does not have the narrow sense of copy. Aristotle, for example, said in the book *About the Poetic Art* that the poet or dramatist can represent men as they are, or as they are thought to be, or as they ought to be. But because of the degradation in meaning of the word *imitation* in our culture, I use the word *likeness* which does not convey to our mind the idea of an inferior likeness.

For Shakespeare, then, the play is a mirror, a likeness. But a mirror or likeness of what? Returning to this corner-stone passage, we find an order that is not accidental, an order in the things of which the play is a likeness, an order which harmonizes with all our experience of his wonderful plays. Shakespeare says first that the purpose of playing is to hold the mirror up to nature; then second, to show virtue her own feature and scorn her own image; and third, to show the very age and body of the time his form and pressure. The word *scorn* here signifies by two figures of speech the opposite of virtue, namely, vice. *Scorn* signifies pride by metonymy for scorn is an effect of pride. And since pride is the queen of the vices, it can signify the vices by synecdoche. How careful Shakespeare is to avoid sounding like a teacher rather than a poet. Every intense student of Shakespeare's plays is aware how he constantly presents nature as the measure of what is good and bad in human action and character, or of what is virtuous and vicious in them. And in turn, Shakespeare measures the character of an age by the virtues or vices that predominate in it.

In beginning to consider Shakespeare's understanding of a play from his own words, we stated that this corner-stone passage is both incomplete and in need of balance. It is incomplete, I think, for two reasons. It says nothing about that in which the dramatist imitates and second, it says nothing about the emotional effect of the drama. Likewise, what is said in this corner-stone passage is in need of being balanced both as regards it being a mirror or imitation and also as regards what it is a likeness of. The words of Hamlet to the player and by himself in Act II, Sc. 2 of *Hamlet* supply both balances that are needed and one of the two essential things in Shakespeare's understanding of a play that are not touched upon in this corner-stone passage. Hamlet (in Act II, Sc. 2) speaks to a player about "an excellent play" which words are followed immediately by this description:

> well digested in the scenes, set down with as much modesty as cunning.

> I remember one who said that there were no sallets in the lines to make the matter savory, nor no matter in the phrase that might indict the author of affection; but he called it an honest method, as wholesome as sweet, and by very much more handsome than fine.

The first part of this passage on the excellence of a play balances, if not corrects, a possible misunderstanding that could arise from this corner-stone passage. When Shakespeare said that "the purpose of playing...is, to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature; to show virtue her own feature etc.", does he mean that character is more important, or more the end of the play, than the plot, as some have thought? But in Act II, Sc. 2, when Hamlet thinks of the excellence of play, he speaks of the plot rather than the characters. For it is the plot which is "well digested in the scenes" and "set down with as much modesty as cunning." The word *digested* is explained in the Yale Shakespeare as arranged, which clearly refers to the plot (as does, of course, scenes). Shakespeare himself couples indigested with deformed as in *Henry VI, Part III* (Act V, Sc. 6):

> an indigested and deformed lump

And consequently he would think of *digested* as going with *formed*. But the form of a play would seem to be its order or plot, just as the order of a treatise was called the *forma tractatus*. And Shakespeare himself would seem to use words in this way (*Richard III*, Act III, Sc. 1):

> We may digest our complots in some form

The phrase "well digested in the scenes", then, clearly refers to the excellence of the plot. Perhaps the use of the metaphor *mirror* in the corner-stone passage made it more natural to speak of virtue than action, but one should not conclude from this that Shakespeare sees character as more important than plot. (Aristotle also first distinguishes tragedy from comedy by the characters they represent even though he understands that the plot is more important than the characters.) For the corner-stone passage itself is followed, as we have seen, by one criticizing actors who imitate men in their actions as they are not. In this later passage, where Hamlet speaks properly (speaking of imitation) he seems to speak more of act:

> O, there be players that I have seen play, and heard others praise, and that highly (not to speak it profanely), that, neither having the accent of Christians, nor the gait of Christian, pagan, nor man, have so strutted and bellowed that I have thought some of nature's journeymen had made men, and not made them well, they imitated humanity so abominably.

In the opening words of the next phrase explaining the excellence of a play ("set down with as much modesty as cunning"), the words *set down* also refer to the plot. They are like the phrase Shakespeare uses in his Prologue to *Romeo and Juliet:* "where we lay our scene." A plot has some resemblance to an argument in logic where something is laid down or set down and something else follows (as in the definition of syllogism). Hence, the summary of the plot of a play is sometimes called the *argument* of the play. The next part of the second phrase that the play or its scenes were "set down with as much modesty as cunning," reminds one with its words "with as much modesty" of the words in the corner-stone passage "o'erstep not the modesty of nature." We may have something to say about the word *cunning* later when we have discussed the dream metaphor.

After speaking of the excellence of a play by its plot, Hamlet in this passage from Act II, Sc. 2, goes on to speak of its excellence by that in which it imitates. This is, of course, an essential part of Shakespeare's understanding of a play, a part not touched upon in the corner-stone passage. The words of a play should be "as wholesome as sweet" and "by very much more handsome than fine." We cannot enter here into a discussion of Shakespeare's profound understanding of what the words of a play should be by explaining these two key phrases.

It would requires a long discourse through Shakespeare's works to bring out his understanding of the emotions and their catharsis which is the second thing not touched upon in the corner-stone passage. We must also then set this aside for another time.

But Act II, Sc. 2 of *Hamlet* supplies another balance to the corner-stone passage when it calls a play a *dream*. When Hamlet upbraids himself alone at the end of the act for lacking the passion which the actor has in reciting the lines from a play, he calls the play a *dream* and a *fiction:*

> O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I!
> Is it not monstrous that this player here,
> But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
> Could force his soul so to his own conceit etc.

He calls the play a *dream* and a *fiction*. *Dream* is the metaphor and *fiction* is the proper or non-figurative word for what he wants to express here about the play. *Dream* balances *mirror* and *fiction*, *imitation* in the corner-stone passage. Shakespeare's care is remarkable in these two passages to express himself both with a metaphor and with the non-figurative word.

What is the difference between calling a play a *dream* and a *mirror?* A mirror is a work of reason and art. And we expect a mirror to show us as we are. And this is the good of reason: to know things as they are, to know the truth. But the dream is a work of the imagination, not measured by the real world through the senses. We do not look for truth from dreams. As the Poet says in *Sonnet 87:*

> Thus have I had thee as a dream doth flatter.
> In sleep a king, but waking no such matter.

And likewise, we do not look for truth from the imagination. Hence, Marcellus says in Act I, Sc. 1 of Horatio's disbelief in the apparitions of the ghost of Hamlet's father:

> Horatio says 'tis but our fantasy,
> And will not let belief take hold of him.

But in the play that is called a dream, *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (Act V, Sc. 1), the often-quoted words of Shakespeare point to the imagination as more characteristic of the poet than reason:

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> The lunatic, the lover and the poet
> Are of imagination all compact.

It is not by chance that the lover is described as blind and that Homer represents the poet as blind - for both work out of their imagination. Hence, Shakespeare also calls the play a *fiction* for a fiction is something made up by the imagination and is not true. *Fiction* and *feign* come from the same root in Latin and Shakespeare also uses the word *feigning* describing poetry as not being a true thing. In *As You Like It*, Act III, Sc. 2, the following dialogue brings this out:

Touchstone: I would the gods had made thee poetical.

Audrey: I do not know what "poetical" is: is it honest
in deed and word? Is it a true thing?

Touchstone: No, truly, for the truest poetry is the most feigning;
and lovers are given to poetry, and what they swear
in poetry may be said as lovers they do feign.

But if the poet is characterized by imagination more than by reason and "the truest poetry is the most feigning," then the play is more a dream and a fiction than a mirror and an imitation. Yet every reader of Shakespeare's plays knows also that they are a mirror and an imitation. As Heminge and Condell said, Shakespeare was "a happy imitator of Nature...a most gentle expresser of it." It seems then that for Shakespeare a play should be *both* a dream and a mirror. What does this mean? Perhaps it could be stated briefly by saying that the play should be an *imaginative likeness* of nature etc. An imaginative likeness is both a mirror and a dream. (But the *difference* is imaginative. Hence, the poet's work is perfected by the imagination.)

I think that all great poets have to some extent realized the necessity of making something that is at the same time both a mirror and a dream, and that lesser or defective poets have not seen the necessity of both. Consider an example of each of these. Knight quotes Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria* (1817, Vol. II, p. 15) in a supplementary note in the second volume of the *Imperial Edition of Shakespeare* (p. 671R):

> During the first year that Mr. Wordsworth and I were neighbours, our conversations turned frequently on the two cardinal points of poetry - the power of exciting the sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of nature and the power of giving the interest of novelty by the modifying colours of imagination.

These two cardinal points of poetry here correspond to mirror and dream, for the mirror involves "a faithful adherence to the truth of nature" and the dream brings in "the modifying colours of the imagination." But some poets and artists attempt to avoid imitation and end up with a lifeless work. An interesting passage in the dialogues of Paul VI with Jean Guitton (*The Pope Speaks*, Meredith Press, N. Y., p. 209) (Paul VI is speaking):

> And I myself also am troubled, my heart bleeds, when I see contemporary art detach itself from humanity, from life. Sometimes certain of our artists seem to forget that art must express things. Sometimes it is impossible to know what it says. It is the Tower of Babel, It is chaos, confusion...When I said this one day to some artist friends, they replied, "Whose fault is that? You impressed on us the rule of imitation. We are not imitators, we are creators."

Whoever these artist friends were, they obviously did not understand the two cardinal points of poetry, or the necessity of the play or work of art being an

imaginative likeness. The word *creation* is opposed to imitation, just as fiction is opposed to imitation. Because it is not based on things or reality, the work of the imagination, its fiction, is sometimes called a *creation.* Creation in its theological sense gives existence to what was nothing before creation. And in the passage on the poet, the lover and the madman being made of imagination in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (Act V, Sc. 1), Shakespeare says:

> And, as the imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
> A local habitation and a name.

When the Queen in *Hamlet* (Act III, Sc. 4) thinks Hamlet to be mad when seeing his father's ghost (which she does not see), she says:

> This is the very coinage of your brain.
> This bodiless creation ecstasy
> Is very cunning in.

The use of the word *cunning* here may help us to understand its use in the key passage from Act II, Sc. 2 (of *Hamlet*) about the excellence of a play whose plot Hamlet said was "set down with as much modesty as cunning." Seeing the connection of modesty with holding the mirror up to nature which is modest (truth also is modest), why should we not understand cunning as referring to the dream aspect of the play, its being a fiction or creation, a work of the imagination. The word *cunning* is used in more than one sense by Shakespeare. It is sometimes used in the sense of knowing and even applied to nature and to reason. But more often, Shakespeare uses it in the context of deception. If it is contrasted with modesty in this key passage on the excellence of a play, it makes sense to understand it as referring to the work of the imagination. The "lunatic, the lover and the poet are of imagination all compact." Just as ecstasy or madness is called *cunning* by the queen in her words to Hamlet, so also Shakespeare calls love *cunning* in *Sonnet 148:*

> O cunning Love! with tears thou keep'st me blind

Thus when Hamlet says the excellent play was set down with as much modesty as cunning, he is saying that it is as much a mirror as a dream. This is indeed the first part of Shakespeare's understanding of a play.

APPENDIX ON THE POET OR WRITER OF FICTION AS A DREAMER: FROM *SLEEPY HOLLOW* BY GEOFFREY CRAYON, GENT., IN THE COLLECTION *WOLFERT'S ROOST AND MISCELLANIES* BY WASHINGTON IRVING

Having pitched my tent, probably for the remainder of my days, in the neighborhood of Sleep Hollow, I am tempted to give some few particulars concerning that spell-bound region; especially as it has risen to historic importance under the pen of my revered friend and master, the sage historian of the New Netherlands. Besides, I find the very existence of the place has been held in question by many; who, judging from its odd name and from the odd stories current among the vulgar concerning it, have rashly deemed the whole to be a fanciful creation, like the Lubber Land of mariners. I must confess there is some apparent cause for doubt, in consequence of the coloring given by the worthy Diedrich to his descriptions of the Hollow; who, in this instance, has departed a little from his usually sober if not severe style; beguiled very probably, by his predilection for the haunts of his youth, and by a certain lurking taint of romance whenever any thing connected with the Dutch was to be described. I shall endeavour to make up for this amiable error on the part of my venerable and venerated friend by presenting the reader with a more precise and statistical account of the Hollow; although I am not sure that I shall not be prone to lapse in the end into the very error I am speaking of, so potent is the witchery of the theme.

I believe it was the very peculiarity of its name and the idea of something mystic and dreamy connected with it that first led me in my boyish ramblings into Sleepy Hollow. The character of the valley seemed to answer to the name; the slumber of past ages apparently reigned over it; it had not awakened to the stir of improvement, which had put all the rest of the world in a bustle...

As I have observed, it was the dreamy nature of the name that first beguiled me in the holiday ravings of boyhood into this sequestered region. I shunned, however, the populous parts of the Hollow, and sought its retired haunts far in the folding of the hills, where the Pocantico 'winds it wizard stream' sometimes silently and darkly through solemn woodlands; sometimes sparkling between grassy borders in fresh, green meadows; sometimes stealing along the feet of rugged heights under the balancing sprays of beech and chestnut trees. A thousand crystal springs, with which this neighborhood abounds, sent down from the hillsides their whimpering rills, as if to pay tribute to the Pocantico. In this stream I first essayed my unskillful hand at angling. I loved to loiter along it with rod in hand, watching my float as it whirled amid the eddies or drifted into dark holes under twisted roots and sunken logs, where the largest fish are apt to lurk. I delighted to follow it into the brown recesses of the woods; to throw by my fishing-gear and sit upon rocks beneath towering oaks and clambering grape-vines; bathe my feet in the cool current, and listen to the summer breeze playing among the tree-tops. My

boyish fancy clothed all nature around me with ideal charms, and peopled it with fairy beings I had read of in poetry and fable. Here it is was I gave full scope to my incipient habit of day-dreaming, and to a certain propensity, to weave up and tint sober realities with my own whims and imaginings, which has sometimes made life a little too much like an Arabian tale to me, and this ‘working-day world rather like a region of romance.

SHAKESPEARE'S UNDERSTANDING OF A PLAY

Anyone who reads carefully the works of Shakespeare will discover that he is both a poet or maker of fictions and a wise man. But there is a tension or opposition between reading Shakespeare as a poet and as a wise man. We read works of fiction first for the good of our emotions, second for the good of our imagination, and last, if at all, for the good of our reason. But we read the words of a wise man for the good of our reason. And what appeals to our emotions and our imagination is not the same as what perfects our reason. We could hardly read or follow a play of Shakespeare as a work of fiction and stop to think about everything that his words give us to think about. Shakespeare is a teacher, not only through his fictions, but through his words and the way he uses them, apart from those words being that in which he imitates.

Often there is an excellence in Shakespeare's words which serves no obvious poetic or dramatic purpose. With the brevity of wisdom, Shakespeare says much in a few words. Among these are his words about what a play should be. It should not surprise us that Shakespeare is wise in what he says about the play when he can be so about other arts and kinds of knowledge close to the dramatic art. When Lucentio says to Tranio in *The Taming of the Shrew:*

> And therefore, Tranio, for the time I study
> Virtue and that part of philosophy
> Will I apply that treats of happiness
> By virtue especially to be achiev'd.[1]

he gives a remarkably precise statement of what ethics is about, as can be seen from the *Nicomachean Ethics* of Aristotle. And when Antony in his speech to the crowd in *Julius Caesar* says:

> For I have neither wit, nor words, nor worth,
> Action, nor utterance, nor the power of speech,
> To stir men's blood: I only speak right on.[2]

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[1]Act I, Sc. 3
[2]Act III, Sc. 2

he gives, as Kittredge notes, a complete enumeration of the qualities of a good orator. If you study all three books of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, you will see that Kittredge is not exaggerating.

Given the excellent wise precision with which he speaks of these kindred arts or forms of knowledge, one should expect that Shakespeare would also speak wisely about his own art as a playwright. And indeed he does so. What Shakespeare says about the play helps us to understand his own plays and appreciate them more. What he says about the play also agrees with our experience of his plays.

Perhaps the first or most fundamental and central words of Shakespeare on the play are found in his most thoughtful play which is *Hamlet*. Someone who has collected much of what has been thought and written about this play made this strong statement:

> The play is one of the longest...and the amount that has been written about it far exceeds that on any other of Shakespeare's works. Furness does not exaggerate when he says:
>
> > "No one of mortal mould (save Him 'whose blessed feet were nailed for our advantage to the bitter cross') ever trod this earth, commanding such absorbing interest as this Hamlet, this mere creation of a poet's brain.
> >
> > No syllable that he whispers, no word let fall by anyone near him, but is caught and pondered as no words ever have been, except of Holy Writ.
> >
> > Upon no throne built by mortal hands has ever "beat so fierce a light" as upon that airy fabric reared at Elsinore."[3]

Hamlet praises a play in these five phrases:

an excellent play

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[3]William J. Rolfe, *The Tragedy of Hamlet*, Preface, Harper & Brothers, New York, 1894, p. 5:

well digested in the scenes,

set down with as much modesty as cunning...

as wholesome as sweet,

and by very much more handsome than fine.[4]

We shall give something of Shakespeare's understanding of a play by commenting on these five phrases.

AN EXCELLENT PLAY

Shakespeare tells us what a play should be, speaking both properly and metaphorically. Speaking metaphorically, he says that a play should be both a *mirror* and a *dream*. Speaking properly, he says that a play should be both an *imitation* or likeness and a *fiction* or something made up.

Shakespeare speaks of the play as a mirror in the words of Hamlet to the players:

o'erstep not the modesty of nature; for anything so
overdone is from the purpose of playing, whose end,
both at the first and now, was and is,

to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature:

to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image,

and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.[5]

Shakespeare tells us the things of which the play is a mirror in a certain order. And this order is most revealing in two ways.

We cannot imitate an age well or significantly without imitating the virtues and vices which predominate in the men who live in that age. And we cannot

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[4]*Hamlet*, Act II, Scene 2
[5]*Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2

represent virtue or vice well without imitating nature since virtue and vice are nothing other than habits by which we are well or ill disposed towards our nature. (This is why habit is the *first* species of quality in Aristotle's *Categories* since the nature of anything is always what is first in it.)

The second reason why this order is important is that nature is the measure by which we judge between virtue and vice and an age is judged in turn by the virtues or vices that predominate in it. By imitating nature as the measure of virtue and vice and the latter as the measure of the age, the plays of Shakespeare are a moral education.

The play is a likeness, as the metaphor *mirror* and also the word *image* in Hamlet's words indicate. Shortly after this, Shakespeare tells us plainly in non-figurative language that the players imitate so that the play must be an imitation or likeness:

> O, there be players that I have seen play, and heard others praise, and that highly, not to speak it profanely, that neither having the accent of Christians nor the gait of Christian, pagan, nor man, have so strutted and bellow'd that I have thought some of nature's journeymen had made men, and not made them well, they imitated humanity so abominably.[6]

Hamlet also refers to the play as a *dream and* indeed one of his plays is called a *dream*.[7] When Hamlet upbraids himself for lacking the passion which the actor has in reciting the lines from a play, he calls the play a *dream* and a *fiction*:

> O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I!
> Is it not monstrous that this player here,
> But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
> Could force his soul so to his own conceit etc.[8]

Dream is the metaphor and *fiction* is the proper or non-figurative word for what he wants to express here about the play.

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[6] *Hamlet,* Act III, Sc. 2
[7] *A Midsummer Night's Dream*
[8] *Hamlet*, Act II, Sc. 2

Shakespeare is telling us metaphorically that a play should be both a *mirror* and a *dream*. Or in non-figurative language, that a play should be both an *imitation* and a *fiction*. Shakespeare's care is remarkable to express this truth about a play both metaphorically and properly. We should not miss what he is teaching us here

What is the difference between calling a play a *dream* and a *mirror?* A mirror is a work of reason and art. And we expect a mirror to show us as we are. And this is the good of reason: to know things as they are, to know the truth. But the dream is a work of the imagination, not measured by the real world through the senses. We do not look for truth from dreams. As the Poet says in *Sonnet 87*:

> Thus have I had thee as a dream doth flatter
> In sleep a king, but waking no such matter.

But in the play that is called a dream, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, the often quoted words of Shakespeare point to the imagination as more characteristic of the poet than reason:

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> The lunatic, the lover and the poet
> Are of imagination all compact.[9]

It seems then that for Shakespeare a play should be both a dream and a mirror. What does this mean? Perhaps it could be stated briefly by saying that the play should be an imaginative likeness of nature etc., a made-up likeness. An imaginative likeness is both a mirror and a dream. I think that all great poets have to some extent realized the necessity of making something that is at the same time both a mirror and a dream and that lesser or defective poets have not seen the necessity of both. Coleridge mentions a similar point in an account of his conversations with Wordsworth:

> During the first year that Mr. Wordsworth and I were neighbours, our conversations turned frequently on the two cardinal points of poetry - the power of exciting the sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth

[9]Act V, Sc. 1

> of nature and the power of giving the interest of novelty by the modifying colours of imagination.[10]

These two cardinal points of poetry here correspond to mirror and dream, for the mirror involves "a faithful adherence to the truth of nature" and the dream brings in "the modifying colours of the imagination." But some poets and artists attempt to avoid imitation and end up with a lifeless work. Pope Paul VI spoke of this in regard to some artist friends:

> And I myself also am troubled, my heart bleeds, when I see contemporary art detach itself from humanity, from life. Sometimes certain of our artists seem to forget that art must express things. Sometimes it is impossible to know what it says. It is the Tower of Babel, It is chaos, confusion...When I said this one day to some artist friends, they replied, "Whose fault is that? You impressed on us the rule of imitation. We are not imitators, we are creators."[11]

Whoever these artist friends were, they obviously did not understand the two cardinal points of poetry or the necessity of the play or work of art being an imaginative likeness. To try to choose between being an imitator and a creator is a great mistake for the artist.

An *excellent* play is one that not only is both a mirror and a dream, but also one that combines these in the right ratio. This ratio need not be the same in all plays, just as we would not expect the same ratio in a fairy tale and in an historical novel. We should not expect the same ratio in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* and in the English History Plays, or in the tragedies and what are now called the Romances of Shakespeare. We must understand the different kinds of plays that Shakespeare has written and have a long experience of the plays before we can see that he has achieved the proper ratio in each.

In giving us the order of nature, virtue & vice, and the age and body of the time, Shakespeare also teaches us an order of the causes: nature, choice and custom or fashion. But not everything in life is represented by

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[10]Coleridge, *Biographia Literaria*, 1817, Vol. II, p. 15, quoted in a supplementary note in the second volume of Knight's *Imperial Edition of Shakespeare*, p. 671R

[11]Jean Guitton, The *Pope Speaks,* Meredith Press, N. Y., p. 209

Shakespeare as due to these causes. He also speaks of what is by luck or fortune, or by fate, or by divine providence in human affairs.

Again, the play must represent both about what is by nature, choice, and custom and what is by luck or fate or divine providence. And it must do so in the right ratio. But this ratio is not the same everywhere. Speaking comparatively, for example, of the ten tragedies of Shakespeare (leaving aside the English History plays), we can see that the ratio in the three Northern European tragedies is different from that in the two Italian tragedies. In *Hamlet* (which is set in Denmark) and *King Lear* (which is set in England) and *Macbeth* (which is set in Scotland), nature is more emphasized than in *Romeo & Juliet* and *Othello*. But the latter emphasize more the role of fortune and fate in our lives. There is a reason why the ratio should be different in these plays, why the same ratio would not be right in all these plays. The Greco-Roman tragedies are in-between. Fortune and fate are prominent in *Titus Andronicus* and to a lesser extent in *Julius Caesar* and *Antony and Cleopatra*. But individual nature is more important in *Coriolanus* and *Timon of Athens*. Likewise, the role of divine providence is emphasized more in those plays where luck or fortune are more prominent. Thus at the end of the tragedy of Romeo *and Juliet*, the Prince says:

> Where be these enemies? Capulet! Montague!
> See what a scourge is laid upon your hate,
> That heaven finds means to kill your joys with love[12]

The plays Shakespeare wrote towards the end of his life, what are now called the Romances in the Greek sense of that word, also involve more luck or fortune than nature compared to the North European or Anglo-Saxon tragedies. Hence, too, the greater reference to divine providence in them. Thus, for example, in the most happy ending of *Cymbeline*, the Soothsayer says:

> The fingers of the powers above do tune
> The harmony of this peace.[13]

WELL DIGESTED IN THE SCENES

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[12]Act V, Sc. 3
[13]Act V, Sc. 5

Someone might think that Shakespeare approves the modern mistake that a play is more a likeness of character than of a course of action from his words about what is mirrored therein. But when he spoke properly of what was imitated, it was action. And here he again emphasizes the action. But what does it mean to say the action is *well digested?*

A play is well-digested in its scenes when the superfluous is eliminated from them, the universal is brought out in the singular, they are ordered in a plot (a plot should have a beginning, middle and end), and the knots are not only tied well, but even what is more difficult, untied well.

In the Prologue to *Troilus & Cressida*, Shakespeare tells us that the source materials for the play must be reduced

> To what may be digested in a play.

If one knows the sources of Shakespeare's plays one can see his condensation of events to fit a play and the elimination of the superfluous. This is most easily seen in the history plays where much must be condensed or left out to fit a play. Hence, Hamlet speaks of the players as the "the abstract and brief chronicles of the time".

> Good my lord, will you see the players well bestowed? Do you hear, let them be well used, for they are the abstract and brief chronicles of the time. After your death you were better have a bad epitaph than their ill report while you live.[14]

In distinguishing between the universal and the singular in men and their doings, it is good to keep in mind that these are not separated in good fiction as they are in the philosopher's thinking. Some authors have spoke of the universal singularized or the singular as universalized in fiction. Charles Knight has an interesting quote from Coleridge's "The Friend" on Shakespeare in this regard:

> Speaking of...his works themselves, we may define the excellence of their method as consisting in that just proportion, that union and interpenetation of the universal and the particular.....

Knight comments on these words:

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[14] *Hamlet,* Act II, Sc. 2

> Nothing can be more just and more happy than this definition of the distinctive quality of Shakespeare's works - a quality which puts them so immeasurably above all other works - "the union and interpenetration of the universal and the particular."[15]

When the singular lacks universal significance, it is undigested.

The word *digested* is explained in the Yale Shakespeare as *arranged* which clearly refers to the plot. Shakespeare himself couples indigested with deformed. in *Henry VI, Part III:*

> an indigested and deformed lump[16]

And consequently he would think of digested as going with form. But the form of a play is its order or plot, just as the scholastics called the order of a book the *forma tractatus*. And Shakespeare himself speaks this way in *Richard III:*

> We may digest our complots in some form.[17]

And in *King John:*

> Be of good comfort; for you are born
> To set a form upon that indigest
> Which he hath left so shapeless and so rude.[18]

The phrase *well digested in the scenes* then clearly refers to the excellence of the plot.

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[15]Supplementary Notice to *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Imperial Edition of Shakespeare's Works, Vol. I, p. 35

[16]Act V, Sc. 6

[17]Act III, Sc. 1

[18]Act V, Sc. 7, lines 25-27(Note 26-27 indigest ...rude. So is Ovid's description of chaos: "Quem dixere Chaos, rudis indigestaque moles." Chaos has for us the sense of something disordered unlike the plot which should be ordered. The Yale Shakespeare note on *digested* is this "*digested*: ordered")

Likewise, in *Henry VI, Part III*, Clifford says to Richard (the hunchback, with a withered arm, the future Richard III);

> Hence, heap of wrath, foul indigested lump,
> As crooked in thy manners as thy shape.[19]

A *heap* has no order. And since order is one of the three main species of the beautiful, the foul is disordered. (Richard also lacks the other two species, lacking in symmetry and moderation - hence, *lump). Order*, is defined by before and after and these define beginning, middle and end which the plot of a play should have. The scenes of a play, then, are undigested, when they lack order and arrangement, a beginning, middle and an end.

But a plot not only has a beginning, middle and end. It also should have a tying of a knot(or knots) and an untying of the knot (or knots). In *Twelfth Night*, when the knot has been tied, Viola remarks:

> O Time, thou must untangle this, not I
> It is too hard a knot for me t'untie.[20]

Aristotle notes in his book *About the Poetic Art* that many poets or playwrights are better at tying the knot or knots than in untying them:

> Many weaving together well, untie badly. It is necessary to do both well.[21]

The scenes of a play are well digested when the knot or knots are untied well.

We cannot here go through Shakespeare's plays one by one to show that their scenes are well digested in this sense. But we can touch upon some testimonies to one example of this in the late play *Cymbeline*.

Hazlitt, the famous critic, speaks of the plot of *Cymbeline* thus:

> The business of the plot evidently thickens in the last act: the story moves forward with increasing rapidity at every step; its various ramifications are

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[19]Act V, Sc. 1
[20]Act II, Sc. 2, lines 40-41
[21]*About the Poetic Art*, Chapter 18, 1456a 9-10

> drawn from the most distant points to the same centre; the principal characters are brought together and placed in very critical situations; and the fate of almost every person in the drama is made to depend on the solution of a single circumstance - the answer of Iachimo to the question of Imogen respecting the obtaining of the ring from Posthumus.[22]

Nosworthy, a recent editor of the play, in a note on this amazing last scene, has written that

> This scene is incomparable in its technical virtuosity. Wendell enumerates twenty-four distinct denouements, "which in my opinion o'ervalues it something." Nevertheless, about a dozen of them are of sufficient magnitude to be termed denouements.[23]

No wonder when Shakespeare is untying from twelve to twenty-four knot in one stroke or as Hazlett says "the fate of almost every person in the drama is made to depend on the solution of a single circumstance - the answer of Iachimo to the question of Imogen respecting the obtaining of the ring from Posthumus", Nosworthy can speak of the scene with this image:

> ...in the final scene, the clouds disappear with a swiftness that is almost explosive.[24]

SET DOWN WITH AS MUCH MODESTY AS CUNNING

The opening words of the next phrase *set down* also refer to the plot. They are like the phrase *where we lay our scene*. which Shakespeare uses in his Prologue to *Romeo and Juliet* A plot has some resemblance to an argument in logic where something is laid down or set down, and something else follows (as in the definition of syllogism). Hence, the summary of the plot of a play is sometimes called the argument of the play. In the *The Merry*

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[22]*Characters from Shakespeare's Plays,* 1817, quoted *Cymbeline*, The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare, edited by J.M. Nosworthy, Harvard University Press, 1953, p. xli

[23]*Cymbeline*, The Arden Edition of the Works of William Shakespeare, edited by J.M. Nosworthy, Harvard University Press, 1953, p. 172

[24]op. cit., p. lxxvii

Wives of Windsor, where plots are laid within the play, we find such words as

> Good plots! they are laid[25]

and:

> I will lay a plot to try that.[26]

And just as in a syllogism, when the premisses have been laid down, reason goes forward to a conclusion, so in the *The Merry Wives of Windsor* it is said:

> But let our plot go forward.[27]

But what does Shakespeare mean by saying that the plot must be set down *with as much modesty as cunning?* What is this *modesty* and *cunning* that must be balanced?

One sense has been touched upon before when Hamlet advised the players:

> o'erstep not the modesty of nature; for anything so
> overdone is from the purpose of playing, whose end,
> both at the first and now, was and is,
>
> to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature[28]

As we have seen, the play or plot should be as much an imitation of nature as something made up by the imagination. The Queen says to Hamlet when he sees the ghost that she does not:

> This is the very coinage of your brain:
> This bodiless creation ecstasy
> Is very cunning in.[29]

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[25]Act III, Sc. 2
[26]Act III, SC 3
[27]Act IV, Sc. 4
[28]*Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2
[29]*Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 4

Ecstasy, which here means madness[30], reminds us of the key passage from *A Midsummer Night's Dream* comparing the lover, the madman and the poet because they all work out of the imagination. The poet is like the madman and the lover in being all compact of imagination. Hence, the cunning of the imagination in making up the plot and characters, this "bodiless creation", must be balanced by the imitation of nature. The word *creation* also has become common now in speaking of the poet when he invents as it were out of nothing rather than imitating what he has seen. We see the word *creation* in the these words from *Macbeth:*

> A false creation, proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain.[31]

In the magisterial words from *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, lovers and madmen are said to have "such seething brains". But notice also the word *false* modifying *creation*. False imagination is the chief cause of error on the side of our knowing powers. The cunning of the imagination in creating must be balanced by the modesty of nature and truth. For truth, as well as nature, is modest

A second sense of this phrase is in regard to beauty. The three greatest forms of the beautiful are order, symmetry, and the limited or moderation or modesty as the chief philosophers, Plato and Aristotle teach us. In the *Philebus*, Plato says:

> For moderation and symmetry everywhere are found to be beauty and virtue.[32]

And Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* teaches us that:

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[30]Hamlet goes on to say:

> Ecstasy!
> My pulse, as yours, doth temperately keep time,
> And makes as healthful music. It is not madness
> That I have utter'd: bring me to the test,
> And I the matter will re-word, which madness
> Would gambol from.....

[31]Act II, Sc. 1

[32]Plato, *Philebus*, 64E

> The greatest forms of the beautiful are order and symmetry and the limited....[33]

The beauty of a play, then, is not only in the order and symmetry of the plot which are the result of the cunning of reason and imagination, but also in its moderation or modesty.

Sir Arthur Conan Doyle gives us a clue to perhaps the most profound way of understanding *with as much modesty as cunning*. In the "The Adventure of the Norwood Builder", Jonas Oldacre is described by one person as "malignant and cunning"[34] and by another as "crafty, vicious, malignant."[35]

Indeed, so cunning and crafty was Oldacre that he almost succeeded in deceiving the great Sherlock Holmes himself. As Holmes says, Oldacre's plan "was a masterpiece of villainy...It was a net from which it seemed to me...that there was no possible escape."[36] Yet Oldacre's plan does fail in the end to deceive Holmes. And why? Because as Holmes says, "he had not that supreme gift of the artist, the knowledge of when to stop."[37]

Knowing when to stop is important in all great art, in painting and music as well as in fiction. One of the greatest paintings of all time, and according to some, the greatest of all, is Titian's painting of the Assumption which dominates the Church of the Frari in Venice. The student of art, H. H. Powers, speaking of this masterpiece has written:

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[33]*Metaphysics*, Book Thirteen, 1078b 1-4

[34]"The Adventure of the Norwood Builder "from *The Return of Sherlock Holmes,* in *The Complete Sherlock Holmes*, Garden City Publishing Co., Inc. , N. Y., 1938, p. 583

[35]ibid., p. 590
[36]ibid., p 592
[37]ibid., p. 592

> It is difficult to know which to admire most, the masterly psychology of this grandest of dramatic interpretations or the perfect mastery of color and shadow by which this interpretation is effectively expressed. Let us repeat, it is the greatest dramatic painting...In dramatic painting Titian knew how to conceive and to execute. Above all he knew where to stop.[38]

Mozart is both praised for knowing when to stop and speaks himself of the golden mean. In a letter of 28 December 1782 to his father, 1782, complained of an onerous task he was asked to perform and spoke of the mean:

> ...I am engaged in a very difficult task, the music for a bard's song by Denis about Gibralter...The ode is sublime, beautiful, anything you like, but too exaggerated and pompous for my fastidious ears. But what is to be done? The golden mean of truth in all things is no longer either known or appreciated. In order to win applause one must either write stuff which is so inane that a fiacre could sing it, or so unintelligible that it pleases precisely because no sensible man can understand it[The golden mean, the truth, is no longer recognized or valued. To win applause one must write stuff so simple that a coachman might sing it, or so incomprehensible that it pleases simply because no sensible man can comprehend it.][39]

Alfred Einstein adds to this that

> Mozart added that he would like to write a short introduction to music, with musical examples, to make clear his esthetic ideal: the golden mean, avoiding both the trivial and the precious. His opinions sound like those of an old man, singing the praises of bygone days. But they are the views of a musician of eternity.[40]

Einstein gives an interesting anecdote about Mozart and the Emperor, Joseph II:

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[38]H. H. Powers, Ph. D, *Venice and Its Art,* Macmillan Company, New York, 1930, pp. 322-323

[39]Quoted by Alfred Einstein in *Mozart, His Character, His Work* (Oxford University Press, Eight Printing, 1977 - copyright, 1945), p. 95:

[40]*Mozart, His Character, His Work* (Oxford University Press, Eight Printing, 1977 - copyright, 1945), p. 95

> *Die Entfuhrung*..."Too beautiful for our ears, and far too many notes, my dear Mozart," Joseph II is supposed to have said after the first performance, on July 16, 1782; whereupon Mozart is said to have replied, "Exactly as many, Your Majesty, as are needed."[41]

Karl Barth has strongly emphasized this moderation of Mozart:

> Mozart makes music, knowing everything from a mysterious center, and thus he knows and keeps the boundaries on the right and on the left, upward and downward. He observes moderation... He was (and I quote Grillparzer's beautiful words) the musician "who never did too little, and never did too much, and who always arrived at but never went beyond his goal" [42]

But if the chief gift of the artist is knowing when to stop as the author of the Sherlock Holmes' stories has told us and hitting the golden mean is the perfection of art as Mozart taught, and Titian "Above all... knew where to stop", then likewise the playwright must set down or lay down his scenes with as much modesty as cunning

AS WHOLESOME AS SWEET

In these words, Shakespeare is saying that a play should have as much a good moral effect as be pleasant. *Sweet* is a common metaphor for pleasant and *wholesome* is used by Shakespeare for what is reasonable and therefore virtuous. In *Coriolanus*, Menenius urges Coriolanus to be reasonable and control his anger in speaking to the crowd:

> You'll mar all:
> I'll leave you: pray you, speak to 'em, I pray you,

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[41] *Mozart, His Character, His Work* by Alfred Einstein (Oxford University Press, Eighth Printing, 1977 - copyright, 1945), pp. 457-458

[42] In *The Freedom of Mozart*

> In wholesome manner.[43]
>
> [Hudson Shakespeare note. 56. *wholesome*: reasonable.]

And Guildenstern begs Hamlet (pretending to be mad)

> ...make me a wholesome answer[44]

Sidney (a near contemporary of Shakespeare) in his *Apologie For Poetrie* says that

> ...poesie is full of vertue-breeding delightfulness" and that it "doth intende the winning of the mind from wickedness to vertue: even as the childe is often brought to take most wholsom things by hiding them in such other as have a pleasant tast...So is it in men most of which are childish in the best things.

Notice the words *wholsum* and *pleasant* and compare with Hamlet's words "As wholesome as sweet"

As we can see from Sidney, the health of the emotions is as much an end of the poetic art as the health of the body is an end of the medical art. If the doctor were to try to make his patient sick or to kill him (as in abortion or euthanasia), he would not only be an evil man, but he would also be a bad doctor, acting contrary to the end of the medical art.

We should ask a question about these words with an analogy to food. Food should be both tasty and healthy. But both are not the concern of the same art. The art of cooking aims at tasty food while the medical art aims at healthy food. Although the cook should make healthy as well as tasty food, it is not as cook or through the art of cooking that he knows which foods are healthy or more healthy. Likewise, a work of fiction should be both wholesome or healthy for the soul and sweet or pleasant to the senses and imagination. Someone might think that the poet as poet or through the poetic art aims only at the sweet or pleasant. And Shakespeare often speaks of this goal.

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[43] *Coriolanus,* Act II, Sc. 3, Menenius to Coriolanus:

[44] *Hamlet*, Act. III, Sc. 2, 328

The last lines of *Twelfth Night*:

> A great while ago the world begun
> With hey, ho, the wind and the rain;
> But that's all one, our play is done,
> And we'll strive to please you every day.

And the Epilogue spoken by the king in *All's Well That Ends Well*:

> The king's a beggar, now the play is done:
> All is well ended if this suit be won,
> That you express content; which we will pay,
> With strife to please you, day exceeding day:
> Ours be your patience then, and yours our parts;
> Your gentle hands lend us, and take our hearts.

And the Epilogue spoken by Prospero in *The Tempest*:

> Now my charms are all o'erthrown,
> And what strength I have's mine own,
> Which is most faint. Now, 'tis true,
> I must be here confin'd by you
> Or sent to Naples. Let me not,
> Since I have my dukedom got
> And pardon'd the deceiver, dwell
> In this bare island by your spell,
> But release me from my bands
> With the help of your good hands!
> Gentle breath of yours my sails
> Must fill or else my project fails
> Which was to please.....

It is more known to us and more openly spoken of by the poet that he is trying to please us. But is it accidental to the poetic art that the fictions it makes be wholesome? Is this something the poet does only if he happens to be a good man or is directed by ethics or politics or some other knowledge?

When Thomas Aquinas places the book *About the Poetic Art* among the works of Aristotle, he states that

> Poetae est inducere ad aliquod virtuosum per decentem representationem.[45]

[45] *In I Posteriorum Analyticorum*, Proemium, n. 6

Thomas does not speak of what is accidental in such contexts. And when Aristotle defined tragedy, he put *catharsis* in its very definition. But no definition should be from the accidental. The word *catharsis* is carried over from the body and the medical art to the emotions and the poetic art. As the catharsis or purgation of the body restores it to health, so the catharsis of the emotions puts them in a more healthy disposition.

If the poetic art is then proportional as regards the soul, or our senses and emotions, to *both* the art of cooking and the medical in regard to food, the play should be *as wholesome as sweet*.

Perhaps we should reason from the more known that the playwright aims to imitate in a way pleasing to his audience to the less known that he is trying to have a wholesome effect upon the audience's emotions and lead the hearers into something virtuous.

Can the playwright's imitation or likeness be pleasing if it does not bring out the difference between good and bad men, and between good and bad actions? The poet cannot imitate well without representing the natural as natural and the unnatural as unnatural, and the virtuous as virtuous and the vicious as vicious. The pleasure of recognition is impossible without a good imitation. So when the poet represents virtue as virtue and vice as vice, we are naturally attracted to the former and repelled by the latter. And when these are seen in their true colors, the good is naturally attractive and the bad repulsive. Hence, the conscience of the king is caught in the play within the play.

> There is a play tonight before the king;
> One scene of it comes near the circumstance
> Which I have told thee of my father's death:
> I prithee, when thou seest that act afoot,
> Even with the very comment of thy soul
> Observe mine uncle; if his occulted guilt
> Do not itself unkennel in one speech,
> It is a damned ghost that we have seen,
> And my imaginations are as foul
> As Vulcan's stithy. Give him heedful note;
> For I mine eyes will rivet to his face,
> And after we will both our judgments join

In censure of his seeming.[46]

And in the Bible, David condemns himself in the story told by Nathan.

And since the playwright aims more at the universal than the singular, this is especially true. For the judgment of reason is suspended more in the singular which is attractive to the senses and engages the emotions. For as Boethius teaches us, a thing is singular when sensed and universal when understood. A man can know in general that adultery and fornication are bad, but be tempted in regard to this woman who appeals to his senses and emotions. Aristotle observes in the book *About the Poetic Art* that fiction is more philosophical than history because it more about the universal:

> Hence, poetry is more philosophical and noble than history. for the poem says more the universal, but history the singular.[47]

When the playwright represents well the bad more universally than in the singular, the bad is not attractive.

But is it accidental to a good imitation that it leads us into something virtuous through a suitable representation? It is natural to learn at first by imitation. Hence, it is natural for men to be inclined by imitation to virtue.

We should also remember the beginning about pleasure which Aristotle touches upon in the book *About the Poetic Art*. One should not, he says, seek the pleasure of comedy from tragedy, but that which is proper to it:

> But this is not the pleasure from tragedy, but more that proper to comedy.[48]

And this is true of everything that is sought because of some pleasure. Each thing has its own pleasure. This is true of food as well as of everything else. It takes much experience of things and appreciation of them before we can judge what pleasure is proper to each. The chief pleasure from tragedy and comedy is from the catharsis or purgation and purification of the

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[46] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2
[47] *About the Poetic Art*, Chapter 9, 1451b 5-7
[48] *About the Poetic Art*, Chapter 13, 1453a 35-36

emotions. This is why Aristotle has put the catharsis of pity and fear in the definition tragedy. Comedy purges our mirth and hope while eliminating the harmful passion of melancholy. The catharsis of the emotions leaves them in a more reasonable disposition. Hence, in aiming at the pleasure of catharsis, the good playwright is making the play as wholesome as sweet.

We can object to pornography in fiction not only as a good man or as a father or as a citizen, but also as a mistake regarding the pleasure proper to tragedy.

John Masefield writes in his Introduction on Shakespeare and Stratford that:

> We know now that Shakespeare...had a righteous mind. The beauty of the right course, the evil of the wrong course, is clear in each play. From the very first, there is an insistence upon truth, of every kind, as the life in human affairs, the enduring thing.[49]

When Pius the XII became Pope, he made sure that his Shakespeare volumes were brought into his new quarters. The favorite poets of Paul VI were Dante and Shakespeare. In his conversations with Guitton, Paul VI spoke of the plays of Shakespeare as a moral education.

The words of Shakespeare are pleasing because of their meter, rhyme and alliteration, and even more so on account of the metaphors, similes and other figures of speech contained in them. There are also particular charms in his arrangement of words that are hard to describe, however they are sensed or felt.

AND BY VERY MUCH MORE HANDSOME THAN FINE

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[49]General Introduction on Shakespeare and Stratford, *Three Tragedies, Julius Caesar, Hamlet, Macbeth,* Dodd, Mead & Company, N. Y., 1965, p. xii

These words refer to the excellence of style. Style is an elusive thing, difficult or impossible to teach. It is inborn in the good writer, as our best stylist and writer, Washington Irving, has taught us. (Irving replace Addison as the model of English prose style.) It is difficult to define the excellence of style which Aristotle said should be clear, but not mean. The good speaker or writer must speak or write in a way that is above our ordinary way of speaking and writing. His language must be more elevated than our daily speech, yet not so as to be unclear.

Before we try to explain these words, a few examples from others. In his edition of *Hamlet,* Rolfe quotes Delius who says that *handsome* denotes genuine, natural beauty and *fine*, artificial laboured beauty. Kittredge simply says that *more handsome than fine* means elegant, but not gaudy or over-decorated. The Yale Shakespeare edition explains *handsome* by saying that its beauty was not that of elaborate diction or polish, but that of structure and proportion. We can see something of what these authors are trying to get at in the literary criticisms written by Washington Irving. In a review of a volume of poems by Edwin C. Holland, Irving wrote:

> But the chief fault which infests the style of the poems before us, is a passion for hyperbole, and for the glare of extravagant images and flashing phrases. This taste for gorgeous finery and violent metaphor prevails throughout our country, and is characteristic of the early efforts of literature. Our national songs are full of ridiculous exaggeration, and frothy rant and commonplace bloated up into fustian. The writers seem to think that huge words and mountainous figures constitute the sublime. Their puny thoughts are made to sweat under loads of cumbrous imagery....We would advise these writers, if they wish to see what is really grand and forcible in patriotic minstrelsy, to read the national songs of Campbell and the "Bannock-Burn" of Burns, where there is the utmost grandeur of thought conveyed in striking but perspicuous language.
>
> It is much easier to be fine than correct in writing.
>
> A rude and imperfect taste always heaps on decoration, and seeks to dazzle by a profusion of brilliant incongruities. But true taste evinces itself in pure and noble simplicity, and a fitness and chasteness of ornament. The Muses of the ancients are described as beautiful females, exquisitely proportioned, simply attired, with no ornaments but the diamond clasps that connected their garments; but were we to paint the Muse of one of our popular poets, we should represent her as a pawnbroker's widow, with

> rings on every finger, and loaded with borrowed and heterogeneous finery.[50]

Irving makes a similar criticism in his comments on a poem by Robert Treat Paine:

> The "Invention of Letters" is another poem, where the author seems to have exerted the full scope of his talents. It shows that adroitness in the tricks of composition, that love for meretricious ornament, and at the same time that amazing store of imagery and illustration, which characterize this writer. We see in it many fine flights of thought, and brave sallies of the imagination, but at the same time a superabundance of the luscious faults of poetry; and we arise from it with augmented regret that so rich and prolific a genius had not been governed by a purer taste.[51]

Irving points out the contrary in the speeches of George Washington and in the acting of certain actors and singers. Washington wrote to Hamilton about the style he sought in his Farewell Address:

> "My wish is, that the whole may appear in a plain style; and be handed to the public in an honest, unaffected, simple garb."

and Irving commenting on the speech writes in the same place:

> The address certainly breathes his spirit throughout, is in perfect accordance with his words and actions, and, "in an honest, unaffected, simple garb," embodies the system of policy on which he acted throughout his administration.[52]

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[50]Washington Irving, "Edwin C. Holland", in "Biographies and Miscellanies", The *Works of Washington Irving*, Kinderhook Edition, Edited by his Literary Executor, Pierre M. Irving, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1866, pp. 397-399

[51]Washington Irving, "Robert Treat Paine", in "Biographies and Miscellanies", The *Works of Washington Irving*, Kinderhook Edition, Edited by his Literary Executor, Pierre M. Irving, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1866, p. 382

[52]Washington Irving, *Life of George Washington*, Part Fifth, Chapter Thirty, pp. 348-349:

A striking example of this is found in Washington's address to his soldiers tempted to armed redress of their injuries after the war when their pay etc. was in arrears. Here is Irving's account:

> Major Shaw, who was present, and from whose memoir we note this scene, relates that Washington, after reading the first paragraph of the letter, made a short pause, took out his spectacles, and begged the indulgence of his audience while he put them on, observing at the same time that *he had grown gray in their service, and now found himself growing blind*. "There was something," adds Shaw, "so natural, so unaffected, in this appeal, as rendered it superior to the most studied oratory; it forced its way to the heart, and you might see sensibility moisten every eye."[53]

We see similar comments by Irving when writing about excellent actors or singers. In a letter to a friend, he write the following about the acting of Grisi in the *Barber of Seville* playing Rosina:

> Her acting, like all great achievements of art, is worthy of especial examination. It is a perfect study. Like all great achievements of art, it is delightful from its simplicity.[54]

And in writing of the performance of the Shakespearean actor Cooke:

> One of his best performances may be compared to a master-piece of ancient statuary, where you have the human figure, destitute of idle ornament, depending upon the truth of anatomical proportion and arrangement, the accuracy of character and gracefulness of composition; in short, a simple display of nature. Such a production requires the eye of taste and knowledge to perceive its eminent excellences; whereas, a vulgar spectator will turn from it to be enraptured with some bungling workmanship loaded with finery and drapery, and all the garish ornaments in which unskillfulness takes refuge.[55]

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[53]Washington Irving, *Life of George Washington*, Part Fourth, Chapter Thirty-One

[54]From a letter of Washington Irving to J. P. Kennedy, Nov. 22, 1854

[55]From a letter of Washington Irving to Brevoort, April 11, 1811

But some examples from Shakespeare will best help us to understand what he means by *and by very much more handsome than fine*. Each example is a couplet or two lines

First let us take two couplets in which Shakespeare's characters note the break of day, the beginning of morning:

The first is from *Romeo and Juliet:*

> Night's candles are burnt out, and jocund day
> Stands tiptoe on the misty mountain tops.[56]

The second is from *Hamlet:*

> But look, the morn in russet mantle clad
> Walks o'er the dew of yon high eastern hill.[57]

How would you express in a way that is more handsome than fine the fact that vibrant young people will grow old and die. Listen to how Shakespeare does it:

> Golden lads and girls, all must
> As chimney sweepers come to dust.[58]

How would you have Horatio speak as his friend of friends Hamlet dies? Listen again to Shakespeare's words:

> Now cracks a noble heart! Good night, sweet prince
> And flights of angels sing thee to thy rest.[59]

How would you express the feeling and thought of a father when his only daughter, a beautiful young girl, is found dead on her wedding morning. Listen once more to the words of the Poet:

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[56]*Romeo and Juliet*, Act III, Sc. 5
[57]*Hamlet*, Act I, Sc. 1
[58]*Cymbeline*, Act IV, Sc. 2:

[59]*Hamlet*, Act V, Sc. 2

> Death lies on her like an untimely frost
> Upon the sweetest flow'r of all the field.[60]

In each of these couplets, we recognize an excellent brevity and a noble simplicity.

All things considered, one is inclined to agree with our first great author Washington Irving, himself a master of English style, in his judgment of Shakespeare's words:

> During his last days Irving told his biographer that "SHAKESPEARE has a phrase for everything." Considering Shakespeare and "one or two others; it seemed idle for anyone else to pride himself upon authorship."[61]

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[60] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act IV, Sc. 4

[61] *Washington Irving, Moderation Displayed*, by Edward Wagenknecht, p. 56

AN EXCELLENT PLAY

Since Shakespeare is chiefly a dramatist or playwright, Shakespeare's *Poetics* must begin with his plays. Any attempt to investigate Shakespeare's understanding of a play from his own words must begin somewhere. And perhaps no better beginning can be made than in that play where Rolfe (in his preface to his edition of *Hamlet*) says that Furness does not exaggerate when he says:

> No one of mortal mould (save Him 'whose blessed feet were
> nailed for our advantage to the bitter cross') ever trod this earth, commanding such absorbing interest as this Hamlet, this mere creation of a poet's brain. No syllable that he whispers, no word let fall by any one near him, but is caught and pondered as no words ever have been, except of Holy Writ. Upon no throne built by mortal hands has ever 'beat so fierce a light' as upon that airy fabric reared at Elsinore.

But apart from the general excellence of *Hamlet*, there is good reason to begin an investigation of Shakespeare's understanding of a play from the words of Hamlet to the players in Act II, Sc. 2 and Act III, Sc. 2. This is an opportunity for Shakespeare to speak at length about the play and playing. Kittredge in his first note on Act III, Sc. 2, says:

> Hamlet's advice to the players has always been understood - and rightly - to embody Shakespeare's own views of the art of acting.

The beginning text is in Act II, Sc. 2 where Hamlet speaks of an "excellent play" to a player:

> the play, I remember, pleased not the million;
> 'twas caviary to the general: but it was (as I
> received it, and others, whose judgments in such
> matters cried in the top of mine)
>
> an excellent play
>
> well digested in the scenes,
>
> set down with as much modesty as cunning.

> I remember one said there were no sallets in the
> lines to make the matter savory, nor no matter in
> the phrase that might indict the author of affection;
>
> but called it an honest method,
>
> as wholesome as sweet,
>
> and by very much more handsome than fine.

We haved divided or separated the words of Hamlet while keeping his order so that we might discuss each part separately.

> *THE PLAY, I REMEMBER, PLEASED NOT THE MILLION; 'TWAS CAVIARY TO THE GENERAL: BUT IT WAS (AS I RECEIVED IT, AND OTHERS, WHOSE JUDGEMENTS IN SUCH MATTERS CRIED IN THE TOP OF MINE*

In Act III, Sc. 2, Hamlet also says to the players, after urging them to hit the mean, these words:

> Now this overdone, or come tardy off, though it make the unskilful laugh, cannot but make the judicious grieve, the censure of which one must in your allowance o'erweigh a whole theatre of others.

It is strange, perhaps, that Shakespeare should have said openly in both these key places that the ability to judge is found in few or even just one.

AN EXCELLENT PLAY

What does Shakespeare understand a play to be? The natural beginning for a consideration of this is the words of Hamlet to the players Act III, Sc. 2 of *Hamlet*:

> o’erstep not the modesty of nature; for anything so
> overdone is from the purpose of playing, whose end,
> both at the first and now, was and is,
>
> to hold, as ‘twere, the mirror up to nature:

> to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image,
>
> and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.

Shakespeare here gives the immediate or proximate end (purpose) of playing which is very important since the end of anything is always what is most important about it. In speaking of the end of playing, Hamlet is, of course, speaking of the immediate end. Whether this immediate end of playing is ordered to some further end; and if so, what is that further end; are questions that need not detain us at present. Shakespeare has given us the immediate end which is also more known and more certain for us than any further end. (A sign of which is that men disagree more about any further end.)

And in telling us what is the end of playing and the play, he helps us to understand both words in the phrase "an excellent play." Since the end of a thing pertains to what it is, these words help to tell us what Shakespeare thinks a play is in general. And likewise, since a thing is perfect when it has achieved its end, part of the perfection or excellence of a play must consist in how it achieves this immediate end. (I say "part" because, if this immediate end is ordered to a further end, the perfection of a play must be considered even more in reference to this last end).

The play is a likeness, as the metaphor *mirror* and also the word *image* in Hamlet's words indicate. Shortly after this, Shakespeare tells us plainly in non-figurative language that the players imitate so that the play must be an imitation or likeness (*Hamlet,* Act III, Sc. 2):

> O, there be players that I have seen play, and heard others praise, and that highly, not to speak it profanely, that neither having the accent of Christians nor the gait of Christian, pagan, nor man, have so strutted and bellow'd that I have thought some of nature's journeymen had made men, and not made them well, they imitated humanity so abominably.

Moreover, the beginning of these words find an echo in a couple of witnesses who were friends and fellow actors of Shakespeare and remembered in his will where he left them money to buy memorial rings and indeed the famous editors of the immortal Folio of 1623 - the single most important publication in the history of English literature, if not of world literature. I refer, of course, to Heminge and

Condell, who in their Preface To the great variety of Readers at the beginning of the Folio say that Shakespeare was

> a happie imitator of Nature...a most gentle expresser of it

Moreover, in speaking of the play as a *mirror* and an *image* and the actor as imitating men, Shakespeare is at the natural beginning of a consideration of the dramatic or poetic art as Aristotle noted in his book *About the Poetic Art*. What Shakespeare sees as the end of playing also corresponds with what Aristotle regarded as the natural starting-point for a consideration of the poetic art - that it is one of the imitative arts. (See *Poetics*, Ch. 1, 1447a 12-16) Shakespeare's longer poems, *Venus & Adonis* and *The Rape of Lucrece,* are also clearly imitations or likenesses. Even his *Sonnets*, taken by themselves, though they may have personal references, are small likenesses of thought and feeling. Hamlet is thus seen to speak in these two passages, first metaphorically, calling the play a *mirror* because it is a likeness, and then second an *imitation,* which is to speak properly or non-figuratively.

The Greek word for imitation, *mimesis*, did not have the pejorative sense that our word has acquired. This Greek word undoubtedly has the same root as the name for a player or actor. In *A Midsummer Night's Dream,* Act III, Sc. 2, an actor or player is called a *mimic*. In calling a play today an imitation, however, we must be aware how this word has deteriorated in meaning. It has come to mean in our commercial society an inferior and cheap likeness. Hence, we often prefer to use more the word *likeness*. One should note, however, that the word *imitation* in Shakespeare, or in the translation of Aristotle, does not have the narrow and somewhat bad sense that it does today. Our commercial society, for example, uses the word *imitation* for what is usually a cheap or inferior copy of the original. But nothing prevents the word *imitation* in the sense in which Aristotle or Shakespeare use it from meaning a likeness that is in some way superior to the original. Again, imitation in Aristotle does not have the narrow sense of copy. Aristotle, for example, said in the book *About the Poetic Art* that the poet or dramatist can represent men as they are or as they are thought to be or as they ought to be. But because of the degradation in meaning of the word *imitation* in our culture, it may be better to use the word *likeness* which does not convey to our mind the idea of an inferior likeness or a mere copy.

We can now go forward from the beginning word of *imitation* or *likeness* to what it is a likeness of. Let us recall the words of Hamlet again (*Hamlet,* Act III, Sc. 2):

> o'erstep not the modesty of nature; for anything so overdone is from the purpose of playing, whose end, both at the first and now, was and is,
>
> to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature:
>
> to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image,
>
> and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.

For Shakespeare, then, the play is a mirror, a likeness. But a mirror or likeness of what? We find an order that is not accidental, an order in the things of which the play is a likeness, an order which harmonizes with all our experience of his wonderful plays. Shakespeare says that the purpose of playing is first. to hold the mirror up to nature; then second, to show virtue her own feature and scorn her own image; and third, to show the very age and body of the time his form and pressure. The word *scorn* here signifies by two figures of speech the opposite of virtue, namely, vice. Scorn signifies pride by metonymy for scorn is an effect of pride. And since pride is the queen of the vices, it can signify the vices by synecdoche. How careful Shakespeare is to avoid sounding like a teacher rather than a poet. Every intense student of Shakespeare's plays is aware how he constantly presents nature as the measure of what is good and bad in human action and character or of what is virtuous and vicious in them. And in turn, Shakespeare measures the character of an age by the virtues or vices that predominate in it.

Shakespeare is telling us that a play is a likeness of what is natural and (we can also understand from the plays) the unnatural; of the virtuous and the vicious (scorn is an effect of pride which is the queen of the vices); and of what is customary in an age. The order here is not accidental. Shakespeare sees that nature is the measure of what is virtuous and vicious in men's actions and their dispositions; and the character of an age is determined by the virtues or vices that predominate in it. All of these points should be considered more at length.

The emphasis on nature is not to be ignored. It is also touched upon by Heminge and Condell, the associates of Shakespeare, in their Epistle to the readers of the First Folio of 1623. There they say about Shakespeare that (quoted in Yale Shakespeare, *Shakespeare of Stratford*, n. LXIX, B, p. 90):

> he was a happy imitator of nature, was a most gentle

expresser of it.

The word gentle here reminds us also of Hamlet's words "o'erstep not the modesty of nature". But what does Shakespeare mean by the word *nature?* In his use of the word, Shakespeare always keeps in mind its root meaning of birth. In *All's Well That Ends Well* (Act I, Sc. 1), for example:

> Helena: I will stand for't a little, though therefore I die a virgin.
>
> Parolles: There's little can be said in't: 'tis against the rule of nature. To speak on the part of virginity, is to accuse your mothers; which is most infallible disobedience. He that hangs himself is a virgin: virginity murders itself: and should be buried in highways out of all sanctified limit, as a desperate offendress against nature."

And in *Hamlet* (Act I, Sc. 4):

> So, oft it chances in particular men,
> That for some vicious mole of nature in them.
> As, in their birth, - wherein they are not guilty,
>
> Since nature cannot choose his origin.....

Further, when Shakespeare is said to be "a happy imitator of nature" and the purpose of playing, "to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature", the word *nature* is used by those speaking for human nature. This is clear from experience and also from the continuation of Hamlet's remarks where he criticizes the actors who have "imitated humanity so abominably." Hence, by the word *nature* here, Shakespeare means what man has by birth or from birth, what is inborn in him. This means both our common nature (what a man is) and our particular or private inborn gifts or defects. In *Macbeth*, Act III, Sc. 1, the distinction is made between the common and the private by nature:

> Ay, in the catalogue ye go for men;
> As hounds and greyhounds, mongrels, spaniels, curs
> Shoughs, water-rugs and demi-wolves are clept
> All by the name of dogs: the valued file
> Distinguishes the swift, the slow, the subtle,
> The housekeeper, the hunter, everyone
> According to the gift which bounteous nature

Hath in him clos'd, whereby he does receive
Particular addition, from the bill
That writes them all alike: and so of men.

The word *gift* is well-chosen here because one cannot earn what he has by birth. But people are also born with some particular defect, as pointed out in the quote from Hamlet before the last. To give the full quote (Act I, Sc. 4):

So, oft it chances in particular men,
That for some vicious mole of nature in them,
As, in their birth, - wherein they are not guilty,
Since nature cannot choose his origin, -
By the o'ergrowth of some complexion,
Oft breaking down the pales and forts of reason,
Or by some habit that too much o'er-leavens
The form of plausive manners, that these men, -
Carrying, I say, the stamp of one defect,
Being nature's livery, or fortune's star, -
Their virtues else - be they as pure as grace,
As infinite as man may undergo -
Shall in that general censure take corruption
From that particular fault.....

From these passages, we can also see that our particular nature, or what we have by birth in addition to our common nature, is called a gift or a fault (or defect) by its agreement with or opposition to our common nature. For our common nature is completed by the possession of reason, as Hamlet notes in his great exhortation to use reason (*Hamlet,* Act IV, Sc. 4):

.....What is a man,
If his chief good and market of his time
Be but to sleep and feed? a beast. no more.
Sure, he that made us with such large discourse,
Looking before and after, gave us not
That capability and god-like reason
To fust in us unused.....

Hence, Shakespeare has very significantly described those natural defects or faults as "breaking down the pales and forts of reason."

The Note of Knight (*Imperial Edition*, Volume I, p. 101) on the words of Slender "I had rather than forty shillings, I had my book of Songs & Sonnets here" are a piquant observation of particular nature:

> The exquiste bit of nature of poor Slender wanting his book of Songs and Sonnets, and his book of Riddles to help him out in his talk with Anne Page is not found in the original sketch.

In distinguishing between the universal and the singular nature of human beings, it is good to keep in mind that these are not separated in good fiction as they are in the philosopher's thinking. Some authors have spoke of the universal singularized or the singular as universalized in fiction. Charles Knight has an interesting quote from Coleridge's "The Friend" on Shakespeare in this regard and a comment on it in his Supplementary Notice to *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* (Imperial Edition, Vol. I, p. 35):

Coleridge	Speaking of the effect, that is, his works themselves, we may define the excellence of their method as consisting in that just proportion, that union and interpenetation of the universal and the particular.....
Knight's comment	Nothing can be more just and more happy than this definition of the distinctive quality of Shakespeare's works - a quality which puts them so immeasurably above all other works - "the union and interpenetration of the universal and the particular."

Underlying all plays is the fact that we naturally love happiness and hate misery, and the natural differences between man and beast, between man and woman, between young and old, between individuals and so on, and the natural relation or order of father and son, father and daughter, mother and son, mother and daughter, brother and brother, brother and sister, sister and sister, husband and wife and so on.

It also belongs to the play, as Hamlet says, “to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image”. By virtue here is meant moral virtue which Shakespeare understands in the same way as Aristotle does in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, to be a golden mean between two vices. In *The Taming of the Shrew,* Act I, Sc. 1:

> .....for the time I study
> Virtue and that part of philosophy
> Will I apply that treats of happiness
> By virtue especially to be achieved.

And in the *Merchant of Venice*, Act I, Sc. 2, he puns upon the *mean* character of virtue which leads to happiness:

> they are as sick that surfeit with too much, as
> they that starve with nothing. It is no mean
> happiness, therefore, to be seated in the mean.

By *scorn*, Shakespeare touches upon vice or moral vice which is opposed to moral virtue. Two figures of speech are involved here. Scorn, being an effect of pride, can stand for pride by metonymy. Two passages follow where Shakespeare touches upon the connection of scorn with pride. The first is from *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act III, Sc. 1:

> But nature never fram'd a woman's heart
> Of prouder stuff than that of Beatrice
> Disdain and scorn ride sparkling in her eyes.

And in *Troilus & Cressida*, Act I, Sc. 3, Hector:

> What glory our Achilles shares from Hector.
> Were he not proud, we all shou'd wear with him:
> But he already is too insolent;
> And we were better parch in Afric sun
> Than in the pride and salt scorn of his eyes.

And since pride had long been known to Christendom as the queen of the vices, it very appropriately can stand by synecdoche for moral vice. This fits in with our experience of Shakespeare's works where, of course, moral vice as well as virtue are represented (how could any great work of literature fail to do both?) and the context where scorn is juxtaposed to virtue.

Finally, Hamlet indicates that a play is a likeness of an age or that it shows "the very age and body of the time his form and pressure". This is one reason why Hamlet says that one must treat the players or actors well (*Hamlet,* Act II, Sc. 2):

> Good my lord, will you see the players well bestowed?
> Do you hear, let them be well used, for they are the
> abstract and brief chronicles of the time. After your
> death you were better have a bad epitaph than their ill
> report while you live.

Although Shakespeare uses the words *nature*, *virtue* and *scorn* standing for vice, we should not conclude from this that he thinks that a play is more a likeness of forms or dispositions or qualities than of acts or deeds. He goes on with his thought in Act III, Sc. 2 to criticize actors:

> O, there be players, that I have seen play and heard others praise, and that highly, not to speak it profanely, that, neither having the accent of Christians, nor the gait of Christian, pagan, nor man, have so strutted and bellowed, that I have thought some of Nature's journeymen had made men, and not made them well, they imitated humanity so abominably.

In this passage, he is speaking of what they do. He uses the words *nature*, *virtue* etc. rather than natural, virtuous etc. because of the personification necessary to go well with his mirror metaphor. But since the whole passage indicates that he is concerned with the likness of deeds as well as of dispositions and this agrees with our experience of his works and it is impossible to represent dispositions except through words and deeds (hence, we divide a play into acts, not into dispositions or qualities), we can state more explicitly that a play is a likeness of what is natural and unnatural, virtuous or vicious, and customary in an age in human deeds and dispositions (or acts and qualities). We have added *unnatural* for Shakespeare often represents doing that are clearly seen as unnatural and even called so. But the unnatural should be represented as such. For example, the famous lines in *Macbeth*, Act V, Sc. 1:

> .....unnatural deeds
> Do breed unnatural troubles.

And in *Richard III*, Act I, Sc. 2:

Anne	For 'tis thy presence that exhales this blood
to	From cold and empty veins, where no blood dwells;
Richard	Thy deed, inhuman and unnatural
	Provokes this deluge most unnatural

An experience of the plays reveals that nature is seen as the measure of virtue and vice. And there are many passages that touch upon this explicitly as in those just quoted from *Macbeth* and *Richard III*. Here are some other key pasages that speak most eloquently on nature as the measure of virtue and vice. It is important to recall that the word *nature* first meant birth and that Shakespeare always stays

close to the original meaning or, at least, has it in mind. A first passage is from *As You Like It*, Act II, Sc. 1 (lines 15-17):

> And this our life, exempt from public haunt,
> Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
> Sermons in stones and good in every thing.

A second passage is from *Romeo & Juliet*, Act II, Sc. 2 (lines 13-16):

> For nought so vile that on the earth doth live
> But to the earth some special good doth give.
> Nor aught so good but strain'd from that fair use
> Revolts from true birth, stumbling on abuse.

A third passage is from *King Lear,* Act IV, Sc. 2:

> .....O Goneril
> You are not worth the dust which the rude wind
> Blows in your face. I fear your disposition:
> That nature, which contemns its origin,
> Cannot be border'd certain in itself;
> She that herself will sliver and disbranch
> From her material sap, perforce must wither
> And come to deadly use.

And a fourth passage from *Coriolanus,* Act V, Sc. 3:

> My wife comes foremost; then the honour'd mold
> Wherein this trunk was framed, and in her hand
> The grand child to her blood. But out, affection!
> All bond and privilege of nature, break!
> Let it be virtuous to be obstinate.
> What is that curtsy worth? or those doves' eyes,
> Which can make gods forsworn? I melt, and am not
> Of stronger earth than others. My mother bows;
> As if Olympus to a molehill should
> In supplication nod: and my young boy
> Hath an aspect of intercession, whih
> Great nature cries 'Deny not'. Let the Volsces
> Plough Rome, and harrow Italy: I'll never
> Be such a gosling to obey instinct; but stand.
> As if a man were author of himself
> And knew no other kin.

And a fifth passage (as above) from *Macbeth,* Act V, Sc. 1:

.....unnatural deeds
Do breed unnatural troubles.

And war and especially fighting against one's own country are unnatural. *Henry V,* Act V, Sc. 2, Burgundy about war's effects:

And everything that seems unnatural

Henry VI, Part I, Act III, Sc. 3:

Pucelle: Behold the wounds, the most unnatural wounds,
Which thou thyself hast given her woeful breast.

The vice of avarice is seen as corrupting nature in *Henry IV, Part II,* Act IV, Sc. 4:

How quickly nature falls into revolt
When gold becomes her object

The investigation so far then has reached this point. A Shakespearean play is a likeness or imitation of what is natural and unnatural, virtuous and vicious, and customary in human deeds and dispositions. But this is not the whole truth. We must balance the statement that a play is an imitation and also the statement that it is an imitation of what is natural and unnatural etc.

Act II, Sc. 2 of *Hamlet* supplies balance to the passage in Act III, Sc. 2, that the play is a mirror and an imitation. When Hamlet upbraids himself alone at the end of the act for lacking the passion which the actor has in reciting the lines from a play, he calls the play a *dream* and a *fiction*:

O, what a rogue and peasant slave am I!
Is it not monstrous that this player here,
But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,
Could force his soul so to his own conceit etc.

He calls the play a *dream* and a *fiction*. *Dream* is the metaphor and *fiction* is the proper or non-figurative word for what he wants to express here about the play. *Dream* balances *mirror* and *fiction, imitation,* in the passage from Act III, Sc. 2. Shakespeare ‘s care is remarkable in these two passages to express himself both with a metaphor and with the non-figurative word.

What is the difference between calling a play a *dream* and a *mirror*? A mirror is a work of reason and art. And we expect a mirror to show us as we are. And this is the good of reason: to know things as they are, to know the truth. But the dream is a work of the imagination, not measured by the real world through the senses. We do not look for truth from dreams. As the Poet says in *Sonnet 87:*

> Thus have I had thee as a dream doth flatter
> In sleep a king, but waking no such matter.

And likewise, we do not look for truth from the imagination. Hence, Marcellus says in Act I, Sc. 1 of Horatio's disbelief in the apparitions of the ghost of Hamlet's father:

> Horatio says 'tis but our fantasy,
> And will not let belief take hold of him.

But in the play that is called a dream, *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (Act V, Sc. 1), the often quoted words of Shakespeare point to the imagination as more characteristic of the poet than reason:

> Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
> Such shaping fantasies that apprehend
> More than cool reason ever comprehends.
> The lunatic, the lover and the poet
> Are of imagination all compact.

Twelfth Night touches upon the name of the above play and madness when Olivia says about Malvolio in Act III, Sc. 4:

> Why, this is very midsummer madness

And the puzzled Sebastian also says (*Twelfth Night,* Act IV, Sc. 1):

> What relish is in this? How runs the stream?
> Or I am mad, or else this is a dream.
> Let fancy still my sense in Lethe steep;
> If it be thus to dream, still let me sleep

For reasons similar to those of Sebastian, the audience also wants an *imaginative* likeness.

It is not by chance that the lover is described as blind and that Homer represents the poet as blind - for both work out of their imagination. Hence, Shakespeare also calls the play a *fiction* for a fiction is something made up by the imagination and is not true. *Fiction* and *feign* come from the same root in Latin and Shakespeare also uses the word *feigning* describing poetry as not being a true thing. In *As You Like It*, Act III, Sc. 2, the following dialogue brings this out:

Touchstone:	I would the gods had made thee poetical.
Audrey:	I do not know what "poetical" is: is it honest in deed and word? is it a true thing?
Touchstone:	No, truly, for the truest poetry is the most feigning; and lovers are given to poetry, and what they swear in poetry may be said as lovers they do feign.

But if the poet is characterized by imagination more than by reason and "the truest poetry is the most feigning," then the play is more a dream and a fiction than a mirror and an imitation. Yet every reader of Shakespeare's plays knows also that they are a mirror and an imitation. As Heminge and Condell said, Shakespeare was "a happy imitator of Nature...a most gentle expresser of it." It seems then that for Shakespeare a play should be both a dream and a mirror. What does this mean? Perhaps it could be stated briefly by saying that the play should be an *imaginative likeness* of nature etc., a made-up likeness An imaginative likeness is both a mirror and a dream. I think that all great poets have to some extent realized the necessity of making something that is at the same time both a mirror and a dream and that lesser or defective poets have not seen the necessity of both. An example of each of these. Knight quotes Coleridge's *Biographia Literaria* (1817, Vol. II, p. 15) in a supplementary note in the second volume of the *Imperial Edition of Shakespeare* (p. 671R):

> During the first year that Mr. Wordsworth and I were neighbours, our conversations turned frequently on the two cardinal points of poetry - the power of exciting the sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of nature and the power of giving the interest of novelty by the modifying colours of imagination.

These two cardinal points of poetry here correspond to mirror and dream, for the mirror involves "a faithful adherence to the truth of nature" and the dream brings in "the modifying colours of the imagination." But some poets and artists attempt to avoid imitation and end up with a lifeless work. An interesting passage in the dialogues of Paul VI with Jean Guitton (*The Pope Speaks,* Meredith Press, N. Y., p. 209) - Paul VI is speaking:

> And I myself also am troubled, my heart bleeds, when I see contemporary art detach itself from humanity, from life. Sometimes certain of our artists seem to forget that art must express things. Sometimes it is impossible to know what it says. It is the Tower of Babel, It is chaos, confusion...When I said this one day to some artist friends, they replied, "Whose fault is that? You impressed on us the rule of imitation. We are not imitators, we are creators."

Whoever these artist friends were, they obviously did not understand the two cardinal points of poetry or the necessity of the play or work of art being an imaginative likeness. To try to choose between being an imitator and a creator is a great mistake for the artist. The word *creation* is opposed to imitation, just as fiction is opposed to imitation. Because it is not based on things or reality, the work of the imagination, its fiction, is sometimes called a *creation*. Creation in its theological sense gives existence to what was nothing before creation. And in the passage on the poet, the lover and the madman being made of imagination in *A Midsummer Night's Dream* (Act V, Sc. 1), Shakespeare says:

> And, as the imagination bodies forth
> The forms of things unknown, the poet's pen
> Turns them to shapes, and gives to airy nothing
> A local habitation and a name.

When the Queen in *Hamlet* (Act III, Sc. 4) thinks Hamlet to be mad when seeing his father's ghost (which she does not see), she says:

> This is the very coinage of your brain.
> This bodiless creation ecstasy
> Is very cunning in.

The poet is not only an imitator, but also a maker by his imagination. At first sight, these two things seem to be opposed. The imitator strives to be true to his original while the one who works by his imagination strives to be original, to make something that may have nothing quite like it in the real world. Perhaps all great

poets have striven to reconcile these two aspects or to strike the proper balance or ratio of them.

The good maker of fiction knows how to make his work both a mirror and a dream, both an imitation and a fiction. Some works achieve this balance more than others. Some movies on individual men like Roosevelt, Truman or MacArthur would seem to aim more at imitation, an exact copy of the original while in the works of Edgar Allen Poe there is an emphasis on imagination. But Shakespeare combines both in a superlative way. Sometimes inferior artists want to choose, when the problem is, as Coleridge and Wordsworth saw, to combine them in the right way. Some want to choose between the imitator (who is closer to copying) and the creator (who works out of his imagination, but lacks, to quote Coleridge, “the power of exciting the sympathy of the reader by a faithful adherence to the truth of nature."). To try to choose between being an imitator and a creator is a great mistake for the artist.

We must also balance the statement that a play is likeness of the natural, of virtue and vice, and of the customs of the age. If we consider the lines towards the end of *Hamlet* (Act V, Sc. 2), we see that the accidental and chance event are also found in the poet's work:

Hamlet: You that look pale and tremble at this chance

Horatio: And let me speak to th' yet unknowing world
How these things came about. So shall you hear
Of carnal, bloody, and unnatural acts,
Of accidental judgments, casual slaughters,
Of deaths put on by cunning and forc'd cause,
And, in this upshot, purposes mistook
Fall'n on th'inventors' heads.

And the accidental points sometimes to a cause higher than nature. *Measure for Measure*, Act IV, Sc. 3:

O, 'tis an accident that heaven provides.

And in the *Tempest* (Act V, Sc. 1), Alonso says:

This is as strange a maze as ere men trod,

> And there is in this business more than nature
> Was ever conduct of! Some oracle
> Must rectify our knowledge

Experience of the plays reveals what an important role fortune plays in them. And there are many references to this in the plays themselves. But Hamlet does not mention this in his description of the purpose of playing. He does not say that the mirror is held up to fortune and misfortune. But there is a good reason for this. Fortune and misfortune do not enter into the order of nature, virtue and vice, and what is customary in an age. For nature is the measure of virtue and vice and these in turn determine the character of an age. But nature does not measure fortune, or fortune, nature. Likewise, virtue and vice do not measure fortune and misfortune or vice-versa, or determine their character. In regard to fortune and misfortune in the play, we can first consider Shakespeare's understanding of the distinction between nature and fortune and what fortune is and then some places where it is spoken of as having a role in our life or in the play. Closely related to fortune is fate and also hints to divine providence extending even to these events of fortune. The reason why fortune may be united with divine providence is that mind or reason can unite what are accidental. Reason could give a name to white logician. We can begin with a passage from *King John,* Act III, Sc. 1 where Shakespeare touches upon nature and fortune as being distinct causes:

> But thou art fair, and at thy birth, dear boy,
> Nature and Fortune join'd to make thee great:
> Of Nature's gifts thou mayst with lilies boast
> And with the half-blown rose. But Fortune O,
> She is corrupted, changed and won from thee;
> She adulterates hourly with thine uncle John,
> And with her golden hand hath pluck'd on France
> To tread down fair respect of sovereignty
> And made his majesty the bawd to theirs.
> France is a bawd to fortune and king John
> That strumpet Fortune, that usurping John!

Since nature is determined to one, nature is not at all like a strumpet. When Aufidius speaks of Coriolanus' down fall and discusses several possible causes, he touches upon nature being determined to one (*Coriolanus,* Act IV, sc. 7):

> First, he was
> A noble servant to them, but he could not
> Carry his honours even: whether 'twas pride,
> Which out of daily fortune ever taints

> The happy man; whether defect of judgment
> To fail in the disposing of those chances
> Which he was lord of; or whether nature,
> Not to be other than one thing, not moving
> From the casque to the cushion, but commanding peace
> Even with the same austerity and garb
> As he controll'd the war.....

The above text also touches on the distinction of will and reason from nature. It is not a defect of nature to be determined to one.

Another passage on fortune itself in *King Henry V,* Act III, Sc. 6:

> Fortune is painted blind, with a muffler afore her eyes,to signify to you that Fortune is blind; and she is painted also with a wheel, to signify to you, which is the moral of it, that she is turning, and inconstant, and mutability, and variation.

In the above, we see a distinction between reason, the eye of the soul, and fortune which is painted blind. Order in human life, which is an effect of reason, is opposed to the serious haps. Lucius has the last words of the play in *Titus Andronicus,* Act V, Sc. 3:

> See justice done on Aaron, that damn'd Moor,
> By whom our heavy haps had their beginning.
> Then afterwards, to order well the state,
> That like events may ne'er it ruinate.

And since order belongs to wisdom, similar lines are found in *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act III, Sc. 2, (lines 80-83):

> Wisdom and fortune combating together,
> If that the former dare but what it can,
> No chance may shake it.

To the extent that something is subject to reason, it is not subject to fortune. (Thomas, I believe touches upon this in II *Natural Hearing*) If fortune is important for the emotional effect of tragedy, then the tragic character must not be expecially characterized by reason. Or if he is rather reasonable, like Hamlet, one can write some play(s) in which even such a man is unable to anticipate what happens.

And in *Romeo and Juliet*, Act III, Sc. 5, Juliet:

> O fortune, fortune; all men call thee fickle.

And in *Hamlet*, Act III, sc. 2:

> Fortune...is a strumpet.

And in *Timon of Athens,* Act V, Sc. 1 (lines 196-197 & 202-207):

> But yet I love my country, and am not
> One that rejoices in the common wrack
>
> .....Commend me to them;
> And tell them, that, to ease them of their griefs,
> Their fears of hostile strokes, their aches, losses
> Their pangs of love, with other incident throes
> That nature's fragile vessel doth sustain
> In life's uncertain voyage, I will some kindness do them.

This is a common image for the uncertainty of life which fortune has much to do with: "nature's fragile vessel" in "life's uncertain voyage." Which is of chief interest in drama; "nature's fragile vessel" or "life's uncertain voyage"? Is not the vessel, however interesting in itself, for the sake of the voyage? Are we not chiefly interested in Columbus' voyage, not his boats? Hence also the great line in *Cymbeline,* Act IV, Sc. 3, line 46:

> Fortune brings in some boats that are not steer'd.

Life's uncertain voyage is in search of happiness which is the port we are trying to reach. In *The Taming of the Shrew,* Act I, Sc. 1:

> And happily I have arriv'd at last
> Unto the wished haven of my bliss.

But not to reach that port is to suffer shipwreck or misery. The English word *wretched* is related to shipwreck. Consider Henry's words in *Henry VI, Part One*, Act V, Sc. 1, (lines 1-9):

> Your wonderous rare description, noble earl,
> Of beauteous Margaret hath astonish'd me:
> Her virtues, graced with external gifts

Do breed love's settled passions in my heart:
And like as rigour of tempestuous gusts
Provokes the mightiest hulk against the tide,
So I am driven by breath of her renown
Either to suffer shipwrack, or arrive
Where I may have fruition of her love.

And when Romeo is about to take his life in *Romeo and Juliet,* Act V, Sc. 3, lines 116-120:

Come, bitter conduct, come unsavoury guide!
Thou desperate pilot, now at once run on
The dashing rocks thy sea-sick weary bark!
Here's to my love.(drinks) O true apothecary!
Thy drugs are quick. Thus with a kiss I die.

And the famous lines in *Julius Caesar,* Act IV, Sc. 3 (lines 217-220):

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.

Again, in *Titus Andronicus*, Act II, sc. 1, Aaron about Tamora:

This Syren, that will charm Rome's Saturnine,
And see his shipwrack, and his commonweal's.

And in Act IV, Sc. 4, Tamora says:

But, Titus, I have touch'd thee to the quick,
Thy life-blood out; if Aaron now be wise.
Then is all safe, the anchor's in the port.

Sometimes fate is brought in as a cause of one's voyage, as in *Othello*, Act V, Sc. 2, (lines 265-268):

Who can control his fate? 'Tis not so now.
Be not afraid, though you do see me weapon'd.
Here is my journey's end, here is my butt
And very sea-mark of my utmost sail.

And sometimes there is a reference of God's providence, as in *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 5 , Romeo:

> I fear too early: for my mind misgives
> Some consequence, yet hanging in the stars,
> Shall bitterly begin his fearful date
> With this night's revels and expire the term
> Of a despised life closed in my breast,
> By some vile forfeit of untimely death.
> But He, that hath the steerage of my course,
> Direct my sail!

The connection between fortune and divine providence in seen in two quotes from *Cymbeline*. The first in Act IV, Sc. 3:

> Fortune brings in some boats that are not steer'd.

And in Act V, Sc. 5:

> The fingers of the powers above do tune
> The harmony of this peace.

And in punishment, the judgment of God is seen. In *King Lear*, Act V, Sc. 3, Albany says on the miserable end of Goneril and Regan:

> Produce the bodies, be they alive or dead.
> This judgment of the heavens, that makes us tremble,
> Touches us not with pity

Sometimes a character in a play is in a position like God or the poet overseeing contingent events. In *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act IV, Sc. 3:

> All hid, all hid, an old infant play.
> Like a demigod here I sit in the sky,
> And wretched fools' secrets heedfully o'er-eye.

But sometimes misfortune is attributed to the stars or planets. *Henry VI, Part I*, Act I, Sc. 1:

> What! Shall we curse the planets of mishap
> That plotted thus our glory's overthrow?

(The word "plotted" should be thought about in this quote.)

A sea-voyage was, of course, much more uncertain in Shakespeare's time than in our own. (Hence, the custom of laying down money against another's return from a voyage.) The image of the ship is very suggestive, in English especially. Our native word for misery is *wretchedness*. A wretch is orignally an exile, someone driven out. It is connected etymologically with wreck and with something driven out by the sea - a ship-wreck. The wretched Boethius, in the beginning of the *Consolation of Philosophy*, is described by Lady Philosophy as an exile, having been driven out of his true country, reason The saints refer to this life as an exile, as in the Hail, Holy queen: "and after this our exile, show unto us the blessed fruit of thy womb, Jesus." We speak metaphorically of the ship of state.

A play is a likeness of human happiness and wretchedness and of the passage from one to the other. And the very words happiness and wretchedness point to the importance of fortune or luck or hap in those passages. In *The Two Gentlemen of Verona,* Act I, Sc. 1, Proteus says:

> Wilt thou be gone? Sweet Valentine, adieu!
> Think on thy Proteus, when thou haply seest
> Some rare note-worthy object in thy travel:
> Wish me partaker in thy happiness,
> When thou dost meet good hap.....

And in *Titus Andronicus*, Act I, Sc. 1, the speech of Marcus:

> And welcome, nephews, from successful wars:
> You that survive, and you that sleep in fame!
> Fair Lords, your fortunes are alike in all,
> That in your country's service drew your swords:
> But safer triumph is this funeral pomp,
> That hath aspired to Solon's happiness,
> And triumphs over chance in honour's bed.

The opposite of happiness in English is wretchedness. OE *wrecan* means to drive out. From this comes a *wretch,* one driven out, an exile, a fugitive. Akin to OE wrecan is OE *wrek,* wrec meaning something driven ashore from the sea, a wreck, whence, in fact, wreck. These combine nicely in the metaphor of life as a sea-voyage. See the water washed grave of Timon of Athens (in *Timon of Athens*, Act V, Sc. 4):

> Here lies a wretched corse, of wretched soul bereft.

But there are many other references to wretchedness that may not use the sea-image as in *Romeo and Juliet*, Act V, Sc. 1:

> Art thou so bare and full of wretchedness
> And fear'st to die?

But it is important to see the connection of these words with unhappy or unlucky or unfortunate in life. Lady Capulet's words bring together many of these in *Romeo and Juliet*, Act IV, Sc. 5:

> Accurst, unhappy, wretched, hateful day!
> Most miserable hour that e'er time saw.

And the connection between happiness and luck or fortune or chance as in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act I, Sc. 1 (lines 61-62):

Proteus: All happiness bechance to thee in Milan!

Valentine: As much to you at home! and so, farewell.

Or in *Romeo and Juliet,* Act III, Sc. 4:

> Every good hap to you that chances here.

Or the link of unhappy and unlucky as in *Titus Andronicus*, Act II, Sc. 4, Martius says:

> The unhappy son of old Andronicus,
> Brought hither in a most unlucky hour
> To find thy brother Bassianus dead.

Happily can mean perhaps as in *The Taming of the Shrew* (Act IV, Sc. 2):

Baptista: Besides , old Gremio is heark'ning still,
And happily we might be interrupted

And in *Hamlet,* Act III, Sc. 1:

> The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune

It is significant that Aristotle uses the word *eutuxia* in the *Poetics* rather than *eudaimonia* as in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. *Eutuxia* emphasizes the role of luck or fortune in human affairs and in achieving happiness. And likewise the use of the word *dustuxia* for ill fortune or misfortune or unhappiness which also indicate the role of bad luck or fortune in becoming miserable or wretched. *Eudaimonia* points to the role of a higher being. *Felicitas,* the Latin word, seems to suggest that happiness is the result of our actions and our virtue. As in *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act I, Sc. 1 (lines 17-20):

> .....for the time I study
> Virtue and that part of philosophy
> Will I apply that treats of happiness
> By virtue especially to be achieved.

And in *The Merchant of Venice,* Act I, Sc. 2 (lines 5-8):

> they are as sick that surfeit with too much,
> as they that starve with nothing. It is no mean
> happiness, therefore, to be seated in the mean.

A play would be uninteresting if it simply represented the good as achieving happiness by their virtue and the bad as becoming miserable by their vice. The play may do this to some extent. (Did Plato or Socrates in the *Republic* demand this too much of the poet?) There is surely an interesting example of this summed up in the lines from *Macbeth*, Act V, Sc. 1, (lines 74-75):

> .....Unnatural deeds
> Do breed unnatural troubles.

The above line speaks of misery as the natural result of bad acts. By their fruits you shall know them. But properly speaking, we have a fruit of our actions only when they are good and in accord with nature. And thus in *The Taming of the Shrew,* Act V, Sc. 1, it is said with the brevity of wisdom by Petruchio:

> Marry, peace it bodes, and love, and quiet life,
> An awful rule and right supremacy;
> And, to be short, what not that's sweet and happy.

A fruit is something *ultimum* (last) and *delectabile* (pleasant or sweet) as Aquinas explains the word fruit in the fruits of the Holy Spirit. Woe, misery or misfortune can be called sour or bitter *(Romeo and Juliet*, Act III, Sc. 2, Juliet):

.....Tybalt's death
Was woe enough, if it had ended there:
Or, if sour woe delights in fellowship...

And in Act V, Sc. 3. Romeo to the slain Paris:

One writ with me in sour misfortune's book.

A DIGRESSION ON SOME LATIN WORDS:

fors : chance, luck
forsitan (fors sit an) : perhaps
fortasse: perhaps
fortuna: luck, fortune, lot fate
fortunatus: happy, lucky, fortunate

felix: I. fruitful, fertile II, fortunate, lucky, happy
felicitas: fertility II. happiness, felicity, good fortune

misereo : to pity, have compassion on
miser : pitiable, miserable, wretched, unhappy, unfortunate
miseria: wretchedness, unhappiness, misery
misericordia:: pity, compassion, mercy

(If mercy differs at all from pity, mercy is more in the will and implies the capacity to help or relieve misery.)

The word eudaimonia, although signifying a dependence upon a superior being, is perhaps more easily combined with luck and fate than is felicity.

See *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act II, Sc. 3:

Antony: Say to me, whose fortunes shall rise higher,
Caesar's or mine?

Soothsayer: Caesar's.
Therefore, O Antony, stay not by his side:
Thy demon, that's thy spirit which keeps thee, is
Noble, courageous, high, unmatchable,
Where Caesar's is not; but near him, thy angel
Becomes a fear, as being o'erpower'd: therefore
Make space enough between you.

Antony: Speak this no more.

Soothsayer: To none but thee; no more but when to thee.
If thou dost play with him at any game,
Thou art sure to lose; and of that natural luck,
He beats thee 'gainst the odds: thy lustre thickens
When he shines by: i say again, thy spirit
Is all afraid to govern thee near him,
But he away, 'tis noble. (Exit soothsayer)

Antony: .....Be it art or hap,
He hath spoken true: the very dice obey him,
And in our sports my better cunning faints
Under his chance: if we draw lots, he speeds;
His cocks do win the battle still of mine
When it is all to nought, and his quails ever
Beat mine, inhoop'd, at odds.

But to a man like Boethius or Horatio (in Hamlet's description of him), fortune and misfortune have little power. *Hamlet* , Act III, Sc. 2:

A man that fortune's buffets and rewards
Hast ta'en with equal thanks: and blest are those
Whose blood and judgment are so well commingle
That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger
To sound what stop she please. Give me that man
That is not passion's slave.....

We cannot have "Adversity's sweetmilk, philosophy."(*Romeo and Juliet*, Act III, Sc. 3) Rather we need a man who will be affected by (Hamlet, Act III, sc. 1) "The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune". As Alcibiades seeks to excuse his friend (*Timon of Athens*, Act III, sc. 5):

It pleases time and fortune to lie heavy
Upon a friend of mine, who in hot blood
Hath stepp'd into the law.....
He is a man, setting his fate aside,
Of comely virtue.

Happiness and unhappiness are especially seen to be an effect of fortune if happiness is identified with the goods of fortune. *Timon of Athens*, Act III, Sc. 2:

Lord Timon's happy hours are done and past,

And his estate shrinks from him.

Likewise, in *Timon of Athens,* Act IV, Sc. 3, Flavius says:

O, the fierce wretchedness that glory brings us!
Who would not wish to be from wealth exempt
Since riches point to misery and contempt?

And in Act IV, Sc. 3, Timon says:

Here, take: the gods out of my misery
Have sent thee treasure. Go, live rich and happy.

The importance of luck or fortune in a plot is very prominent in *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* which begins and ends on that note. In Act I, Sc. 1, of *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Proteus says:

Wilt thou be gone? Sweet Valentine, adieu!
Think on thy Proteus, when thou haply seest
Some rare note-worthy object in thy travel:
Wish me partaker in thy happiness,
When thou dost meet good hap.....

And the last words of the play (in Act V, Sc. 4) are spoken by Valentine, the other gentleman of Verona:

Please you, I'll tell you as we pass along,
That you will wonder what hath fortuned...
Come, Proteus, 'tis your penance but to hear
The story of your loves discovered:
That done, our day of marriage shall be yours;
One feast, one house, one mutual happiness.

The story of love or romantic love especially lends itself to events by luck or fortune. Troilus says the famous line in *Troilus and Cressida,* Act IV, Sc. 5 (line 294):

But still sweet love is food for Fortune's tooth.

We need think only of Tristan and Isolt. The man (or woman) who lives by his passions, as does the lover especially, is food for fortune's tooth. Lodovico notes the effect of this on Othello in Act IV, Sc. of *Othello*:

Is this the noble Moor whom our full senate
Calls all in all sufficient? This the nature
Whom passion could not shake? whose solid virtue
The shot of accident nor dart of chance
Could neither graze nor pierce?

In that play that emphasizes fortune and misfortune so much, *Titus Andronicus* (Act III, Sc. 2, Titus says to Lavinia:

I'll to thy closet; and go read with thee
Sad stories chanced in the times of old.

A play represents the change for happiness to misery or from misery to happiness. The three main causes are fortune, choice and nature. (God is a cause before all three of these.) In *The Merchant of Venice*, Act III, Sc. 2:

And hold your fortune for your bliss

WELL DIGESTED IN THE SCENES

What is first to be note in the passage is that the excellence of this play is judged on the part of what it imitates and on the part of that in which it imitates. And on the part of what it imitates, the judgment is made on the basis of the plot rather than the characters. The word *digested* is explained in the Yale Shakespeare as *arranged* which clearly refers to the plot. Shakespeare himself couples indigested with deformed. in *Henry VI, Part III* (Act V, Sc. 6):

an indigested and deformed lump

And consequently he would think of digested as going with formed. But the form of a play is its order or plot, just as the scholastics called the order of a book the *forma tractatus*. And Shakespeare himself speaks this way in *Richard III*, Act III, Sc. 1:

We may digest our complots in some form.

And in *King John*, Act V, Sc. 7, lines 25-27:

Be of good comfort; for you are born
To set a form upon that indigest
Which he hath left so shapeless and so rude.

(Note 26-27 indigest ...rude. So is Ovid's description of chaos: "Quem dixere Chaos, rudis indigestaque moles." Chaos has for us the sense of something disordered unlike the plot which should be ordered. The Yale Shakespeare note on *digested* is this "*digested*: ordered")

The phrase *well digested in the scenes* then clearly refers to the excellence of the plot.

Likewise, in *Henry VI, Part III* (Act V, Sc. 1), Clifford says to Richard (the hunchback, with a withered arm, the future Richard III);

Hence, heap of wrath, foul indigested lump,
As crooked in thy manners as thy shape.

A *heap* has no order. And since order is one of the three main species of the beautiful, the foul is disordered. (Richard also lacks the other two species, lacking in symmetry and moderation - hence, *lump). Order*, is defined by before and after and these define beginning, middle and end which the plot of a play should have. (Shakespeare understood this, of course, as we can see in Signior Baptista.)

The digested plot is tying a knot (or knots) and untying it (them). In *Twelfth Night*, Act II, Sc. 2 (lines 40-41), Viola touches upon this in the very plot of that play:

O Time, thou must untangle this, not I
It is too hard a knot for me t'untie.

And in *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act I, Sc. 3 (lines 189-190), the Countess says to Helena as the plot of that story developes:

.....Speak, is't so?
If it be so, you have wound a goodly clew.

(Study the word clew - original and later meanings)

And in regard to the plot to reveal Parolles in *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act IV, Sc. 3 (lines 362-364):

Inter: You are undone, captain, all but

Your scarf; that has a knot on't yet.

Parolles: Who cannot be crushed with a plot?

In regard to Aristotle's remark that the plot is the soul of the play, the words of Cleopatra to the asp are interesting (*Antony and Cleopatra*, Act V, Sc. 2, lines 308-311):

.....Come, thou mortal wretch,
With thy sharp teeth this knot intrinsicate
Of life at once untie: poor venomous fool,
Be angry, and dispatch.

SET DOWN WITH AS MUCH MODESTY AS CUNNING

The opening words of the next phrase *set down* also refer to the plot. They are like the phrase *where we lay our scene*. which Shakespeare uses in his Prologue to *Romeo and Juliet* A plot has some resemblance to an argument in logic where something is laid down or set down, and something else follows (as in the definition of syllogism). Hence, the summary of the plot of a play is sometimes called the argument of the play. See also *The Merry Wives of Windsor*:

Act III, Sc. 2:

Good plots! they are laid

Act III, Sc 3:

I will lay a plot to try that.

Act IV, Sc. 4:

But let our plot go forward.

Reason also in argument goes forward by laying down some statement from which another follows.

The next part of this phrase that the play or its scenes were *set down with as much modesty as cunning*, reminds one with its words *with as much modesty* of the words in the passage in Act III, Sc. 2: *o'erstep not the modesty of nature*. The

reason given there is that the play is a likeness of nature. (Even in representing the unnatural, one must avoid excess as the doctor says about Lady Macbeth *unnatural deeds do breed unnatural troubles*. Even the unnatural or the wicked must have some limit or it would destroy itself.)

But one can also apply modesty to how much should be put into a plot. This is close to the vegetative use of the word. In the Prologue to *Troilus & Cressida*:

> To what may be digested in a play.

The word *cunning* refers to work of reason and art more than the imitation of nature. The Yale Shakespeare note has this: "*modesty*: moderation " and "*cunning*: skill in technique) Kittredge's note is simply this: "*cunning*: skill".

Or it can be understood to refer to the work of the imagination as in the opening words about a play being an imaginative likeness. The play is a fiction, a dream, a work of the imagination to some extent. Hamlet says:

> Is it not monstrous that this player here,
> But in a fiction, in a dream of passion,

And note the word *cunning* in the following words in *Hamlet*, Act II, Sc. 4:

> This is the very coinage of your brain,
> This bodiless creation ecstasy
> Is very cunning in.

Ecstasy, which here means madness, reminds us of the key passage from A *Midsummer Night's Dream* comparing the lover, the madman and the poet because they all work out of the imagination. The word *creation* also has become common now in speaking of the poet when he invents as it were out of nothing rather than imitating what he has seen. We see the word *creation* in the these words from *Macbeth*, Act II, Sc. 1:

> A false creation, proceeding from the heat-oppressed brain.

In the magisterial words from *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, lovers and madmen are said to have "such seething brains".

AN HONEST METHOD

Washington Irving, *Life of George Washington*, Part Fifth, Chapter Thirty (pp. 348-349), from Washington's Letter to Hamilton about his desire for the style of his Farewell Address:

> "My wish is, that the whole may appear in a plain style; and be handed to the public in an honest, unaffected, simple garb."

and Irving commenting on the speech writes in the same place:

> The address certainly breathes his spirit throughout, is in perfect accordance with his words and actions, and, "in an honest, unaffected, simple garb," embodies the system of policy on which he acted throughout his administration.

AS WHOLESOME AS SWEET

"As wholesome as sweet" could refer to the union or balance of what is morally healthy with what is beautiful to the senses and imagination. The plays of Shakespeare move us to the principal passions in a most healthy and reasonable way.

The art of the playwright is not like that of the cook whose purpose is to please the body while another art, the medical art, is concerned with the health or good disposition of the body. The art of the playwright aims at both pleasing the audience and leading them into what is virtuous or good through a suitable representation. But it is more necessary and more known to us and more openly spoken of by the poet that he is trying to please us.

The last lines of *Twelfth Night*:

> A great while ago the world begun
> With hey, ho, the wind and the rain;
> But that’s all one, our play is done,
> And we’ll strive to please you every day.

And the Epilogue spoken by the king in *All's Well That Ends Well*:

> The king's a beggar, now the play is done:
> All is well ended if this suit be won,
> That you express content; which we will pay,
> With strife to please you, day exceeding day:
> Ours be your patience then, and yours our parts;
> Your gentle hands lend us, and take our hearts.

And the Epilogue spoken by Prospero in *The Tempest*:

> Now my charms are all o'erthrown,
> And what strength I have's mine own,
> Which is most faint. Now, 'tis true,
> I must be here confin'd by you
> Or sent to Naples. Let me not,
> Since I have my dukedom got
> And pardon'd the deceiver, dwell
> In this bare island by your spell,
> But release me from my bands
> With the help of your good hands!
> Gentle breath of yours my sails
> Must fill or else my project fails
> Which was to please.....

Why is a Shakespearean play pleasing?

We should first recall that likeness or imitation is naturally pleasing for the reasons given by Aristotle in his book *About the Poetic Art*.

Further, since it is pleasing to the ear and the imagination and reason, it is necessarily beautiful. And since the main forms of the beautiful are order, moderation, and symmetry, we have three possible reasons why his works are pleasing. The order in a play or a narrative poem (like *The Rape of Lucrece*) is called its plot, but there is also an order in a Sonnet. In *The Two Genlemen of Verona* (Act III, Sc. 2), Shakespeare speaks of the power of poetry:

> Much is the force of heaven-bred poesy

And much of this force comes from the plot, *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act IV, Sc. 3:

> Who cannot be crushed with a plot?

Hamlet's plan to catch the conscience of the king is to catch him by the plot, as he explains to Horatio (*Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2):

> There is a play tonight before the king;
> One scene of it comes near the circumstance
> Which I have told thee of my father's death:
> I prithee, when thou seest that act afoot,
> Even with the very comment of thy soul
> Observe mine uncle; if his occulted guilt
> Do not itself unkennel in one speech,
> It is a damned ghost that we have seen,
> And my imaginations are as foul
> As Vulcan's stithy. Give him heedful note;
> For I mine eyes will rivet to his face,
> And after we will both our judgments join
> In censure of his seeming.

Shakespeare often speaks of the importance of moderation in the play. We have seen him praise above (*Hamlet,* Act II, Sc. 2) an excellent play as "set down with as much modesty as cunning" and tell the actors"o'erstep not the modesty of nature" and how the editors of the First Folio praise him as a "a happy imitator of nature... a most gentle expresser of it." And Hamlet gives this famous advice to the players (*Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2):

> Speak the speech, Ipray you, as I pronounced it to you, trippingly on the tongue; but if you mouth it, as many of our players do, I had as lief the town-crier spoke my lines. Nor do not saw the air too much with your hand, thus; but use all gently, for in the very torrent, tempest, and (as I may say) whirlwind of your passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance that may give it smoothness...Be not too tame neither, but let your own discretion be your tutor.

Hegel points out how Homer's similes contribute to a certain tranquility, even in terrible things. Shakespeare has achieved the same in the beautiful simile of her

father when Juliet is found apparently dead on her wedding-day (*Romeo and Juliet*, Act IV, Sc. 4):

> Death lies on her like an untimely frost
> Upon the sweetest flow'r of all the field.

There is, of course, an obvious symmetry in the Sonnets and a more involved one in the plays.

The words of Shakespeare are pleasing because of their meter, rhyme and alliteration, and even more so on account of the metaphors, similes and other figures of speech contained in them. There are also particular charms in his arrangement of words that are hard to describe, however they are sensed or felt.

There is also the chief pleasure of a play which comes from the purgation or catharis of the emotions. This catharsis is different in different kinds of plays.

Sidney in his *Apologie For Poetrie* says that "poesie is full of vertue-breeding delightfulness" and that it "doth intende the winning of the mind from wickedness to vertue: even as the childe is often brought to take most wholsom things by hiding them in such other as have a pleasant tast...So is it in men most of which are childish in the best things." Notice the words *wholsum* and *pleasant* and compare with Hamlet's words "As wholesome as sweet"

Coriolanus, Act II, Sc. 3, Menenius to Coriolanus:

> You'll mar all:
> I'll leave you: pray you, speak to 'em, I pray you,
> In wholesome manner.
>
> [Hudson Shakespeare note. 56. *wholesome*: reasonable. Cf. *Hamlet*, III, ii, 328: "make me a wholesome answer"]

PURGATION

Purgation is a word used first in medecine. In *All's Well That Ends Well*, Helen, the daughter of a physician, eventually heals the sick king. In Act II, Sc. 1, lines 75-79, Lafeu says:

..... I have seen a medecine
That's able to breathe life into a stone,
Quicken a rock, and make you dance canary
With spritely fire and motion; whose simple touch
Is powerful to araise King Pepin.....

And Helen says to the King in the same Act II, Sc. 1 (lines 113-117):

And, hearing your high majesty is touch'd
With that malignant cause wherein the honour
Of my dear father's gift stands chief in power,
I come to tender it and my appliance
With all bound humbleness.

And later in the same scene (lines 170-171), Helen says to the sick king:

What is infirm from your sound parts shall fly.
Health shall live free and sickness freely die.

Purgation drives out what is bad from the body, leaving what is left healthy. Sometimes the air is thought to be unwholesome and in need of purgation. Portia says to Brutus in *Julius Caesar*, Act II, Sc. 1 (lines 263-267):

.....What! is Brutus sick,
And will he steal out of his wholesome bed
To dare the vile contagion of the night,
And tempt the rheumt and unpurged air
To add unto his sickness?"
(Yale Shakes. - unpurged ; unpurged by the sun)

(Notice the word *wholesome* for healthy here)

The word *purgation* is then carried over to the emotions as can be clearly seen in these passages. First in *Richard II,* Act I, Sc. 1 (lines 152-159):

Wrath-kindled gentlemen, be rul'd by me;
Let's purge this choler without letting blood.
This we prescribe, though no physician.
Deep malice makes too deep incision.
Forget, forgive, conclude and be agreed;
Our doctors say this is no month to bleed.
Good uncle, let this end where it begun;

We'll calm the duke of Norfolk, you your son.

And in *Richard II,* Act I, Sc. 3, lines 302-303:

Fell sorrow's tooth doth never rankle more
Than when he bites, but lanceth not the sore.

(rankle OED inflict a festering wound)

And in *Macbeth,* Act V, Sc. 3 (lines 37-47):

Macbeth: How does your patient, doctor?

Doctor: Not so sick, my lord,
As she is troubled with thick-coming fancies
That keep her from her rest.

Macbeth: Cure her of that!
Canst thou not minister to a mind diseas'd,
Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,
Raze out the written troubles of the brain,
And with some sweet oblivious antidote
Cleanse the stuff'd bosom of that perilous stuff
Which weighs upon the heart?

Doctor: Therein the patient
Must minister to himself.

Macbeth: Throw physic to the dogs; I'll none of it.

(Lady Macbeth is, of course, in need of a purgation of will as well as of emotion.)

Reason is to the emotions something like a doctor to the body. See *Sonnet 147*:

My love is as a fever, longing still
For that which longer nurseth the disease;
Feeding on that which doth preserve the ill,
The uncertain sickly appetite to please.
My reason, the physician to my love,
Angry that his prescriptions are not kept,
Hath left me, and I desperate now approve
Desire is death, which physic did except.
Past cure I am, now reason is past care,

> And frantic-mad with evermore unrest;
> My thoughts and my discourse as madmen's are,
> At random from the truth vainly express'd.
> For I have sworn thee fair and thought thee bright,
> Who art as black as hell, as dark as night.

Since the plot is a work of reason in its order and the playwright represents more the universal than the singular, the play is able to be a tool of reason in purging the emotions of an unreasonable element in them. More. of course, is required for this purgation than these two facts.

The emotions can be purged. In *Richard III*, Act II, Sc. 1 (line 9):

> By heaven, my soul is purg'd from grudging hate.

And in *King Henry VI, Part II,* Act III, Sc. 3 (lines 19-23), the king prays about the dying Beaufort:

> O thou eternal Mover of the heavens!
> Look with a gentle eye upon this wretch;
> O! beat away the busy meddling fiend
> That lays strong siege unto this wretch's soul,
> And from his bosom purge this black despair.

(In the above two quotes, hate and despair could also be taken as acts of the will.) And the King urges Hamlet to get rid of his sadness (*Hamlet*, Act I, Sc. 2):

> We pray you, throw to earth
> This unprevailing woe.

For Hamlet's sadness seems to have gone to excess, as he himself describes it (*Hamlet*, Act II, Sc. 2):

> I have of late, - but wherefore I know not, - lost all my mirth, foregone all custom of exercises; and indeed it goes so heavily with my disposition that this goodly frame, the earth, seems to me a sterile promontory, this most excellent canopy, the air, look you, this brave o'erhanging firmament, this majestical roof fretted with golden fire, why, it appeareth nothing to me but a foul and pestilent congregation of vapors. What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! how infinite in faculties! in form and moving how express and admirable! in action how like an angel! in apprehension how like a god! the beauty of the world, the paragon

of animals. and yet to me what is this quintessence of dust? Man delights not me

And later in the same scene, Hamlet says:

.....The spirit that I have seen
May be a de'il, and the de'il hath power
T'assume a pleasing shape; - yea, and perhaps
Out of my weakness and my melancholy
(As he is very potent with such spirits)
Abuses me to damn me.

An emotion can be purged in two ways. In one way by its outward expression. In another way, by the generation of another emotion; and this in two ways: either by the generation of an opposite emotion of a different kind or by the generation of an emotion of the same kind but with a different object.

The first way of purging an emotion is by its outward expression, as sadness is relieved by crying or anger by "letting off steam". In *Titus Andronicus* (Act II, Sc. 4, lines 36-37) it is said:

Sorrow conceal'd. like to an oven stopp'd,
Doth burn the heart to cinders where it is.

And in *Macbeth*, Act IV, Sc. 3 (lines 215-216 and 229-230):

Let's make us med'cines of our great revenge,
To cure this deadly grief.....

Be this the whetstone of you sword; let grief
Convert to anger, blunt not the heart, enrage it.

The above quotes however might seem to be touching upon purging by opposite emotion since the one who succeeds in revenge might rejoice.

Perhaps the first way is more clearly spoken of in this passage from *Macbeth*, Act IV, Sc. 3 (lines 208-210) where Malcom says to Macduff:

What, man! Ne'er pull your hat upon your brows.
Give sorrow words; the grief that does not speak
Whispers the o'er-fraught heart and bids it speak.

An emotion can also be purged by an opposite emotion of another kind. In *Romeo and Juliet*, Act III, Sc. 5 (lines 107-110), Lady Capulet says to Juliet:

> Well, well, thou hast a careful father child,
> One who, to put thee from thy heaviness,
> Hath sorted out a sudden day of joy,
> That thou expect'st not, nor I look'd not for.

And in *Richard II*, Act I, Sc. 2 (lines 292-293):

> For gnarling sorrow hath less power to bite
> The man that mocks at it and set it light.

And in *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act IV, Sc. 10 (lines 126-129), about Cleopatra in regard to Antony:

> ..... .for when she saw -
> Which never shall be found - you did suspect
> She had dispos'd with Caesar, and that your rage
> Would not be purg'd, she sent you word she was dead.

But it is also possible to purge or drive out an emotion by another emotion of the same kind but with a different object. The lines of Brutus to Antony in *Julius Caesar,* Act III, Sc. 1 (lines 165-172):

> Though now we must appear bloody and cruel,
> As, by our hands and this our present act,
> You see we do, yet see you but our hands
> And this the bleeding business they have done:
> Our hearts you see not; they are pitiful;
> And pity to the general wrong of Rome -
> As fire drives out fire, so pity pity,
> Hath done this deed on Caesar.....

In a similar way, Romeo's love for Rosalind (unreturned) is driven out by his love for Juliet.

Because of the likeness of music and poetry, we can also look at the purgation which music effects. We can purge an emotion by an excess through music. In *Twelfth Night,* Act I, Sc. 1 (lines 1-3), the Duke says:

If music be the food of love, play on,
Give me excess of it, that, surfeiting,
The appetite may sicken and so die.

In *Henry VIII*, Act III, Sc. 1, Shakespeare seems to touch upon the purgation of sadness by generating a joy through sweet music:

Q. Katherine: Take thy lute, wench: my soul grows sad with troubles:
Sing, and disperse them if thou canst.

In song: In sweet music is such art:
Killing care and grief of heart.

Wolsley: We are to cure such sorrows, not to sow them.

And in *The Taming of the Shrew*, Act III, Sc. 1 (lines 9-14), Lucentio:

Preposterous ass, that never read so far
To know the cause why music was ordain'd!
Was it not to refresh the mind of man
After his studies or his usual pain? [pains: toils]

Again *The Tempest*, Act I, Sc. 2 (lines 387-393), Ferdinand speaks of the effect of the music upon his passions, purging them by generating something opposed to them:

Where should this music be? i'th'air, or th'earth?
It sounds no more! And sure it waits upon
Some god o'th'island; sitting on a bank,
Weeping again the king my father's wrack,
This music crept by me upon the waters,
Allaying both their fury and my passion
With its sweet air.

Perhaps the purgation spoken of in *Twelfth Night*, Act II, Sc. 4 (lines 1-5). by the Duke, touches upon purgation by generating a more noble emotion than the one experienced before:

Give me some music. Now, good morrow, friends.
Now, good Cesario, but that piece of song,

> That old and antique song we heard last night.
> Methought it did relieve my passion much,
> More than light airs and recollected terms
> Of these most brisk and giddy-paced times.

The connection between music and poetry is touched upon many times by Shakespeare. In *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act III, Sc. 2 (lines 78-81):

> For Orpheus' lute was strong with poets' sinews,
> Whose golden touch could soften steel and stones
> Make tigers tame and huge leviathan
> Forsake unsounded depths to dance on sands.

Again since "music is the food of love", the following words not only in themselves, but also in their connection with music are of the greatest importance (*Love's Labour's Lost*, Act IV, Sc. 3):

> And when Love speaks, the voice of all the gods
> Makes heaven drowsy with the harmony.
> Never durst poet touch a pen to write
> Until his ink were temper'd with Love's sighs;
> O! then his lines would ravish savage ears,
> And plant in tyrants mild humility.

Plato in the *Symposium* has also pointed to the connection of the poet with love. The connection of disordered and unreasonable passions with tyranny is in the proportion of the *Republic*. Paulina speaks of the king's passion in *The Winter's Tale*, Act II, Sc. 3 in these words:

> Fear you his tyrannous passion...

And in the same scene she speaks of purgation:

> I come to bring him sleep. "Tis such as you,
> That creep like shadows by him and do sigh
> At each his needlesss heavings, such as you
> Nourish the cause of his awaking: I
> Do come with words as med'cinal as true,
> Honest as either, to purge him of that humour
> That presses him from sleep.

The opposite of purgation can also be caused by words (*Coriolanus,* Act I, Sc. 3):

Volumnia: Let her alone, lady: as she is now she will but disease our better mirth.

Valeria: In truth, I think she would, Fare you well then. Come, good sweet lady. Prithee Virgilia, turn thy solemnness out o'door, and go along with us.

Virgilia: No, at a word, madam; indeed, I must not. I wish you good mirth.

We should note the contrast between good mirth and a diseased mirth. Beatrice and Benedick are merry in *Much Ado About Nothing*.

Much Ado About Nothing Act II, Sc. 1:

Beatrice: I was born to speak all mirth and no matter

D. Pedro ...to be merry best becomes you; for, out of question you were born in a merry hour

Leonato: There's little of the melancholy element in her.

Much Ado About Nothing Act III, Sc. 1:

Hero about She would mock me into air: O! She would laugh me

Beatrice Out of myself, press me to death with wit.

Much Ado About Nothing Act III, Sc. 2:

Claudio: Nay, but his jesting spirit; which is now crept into a lute-string, and new governed by stops.

D. Pedro Indeed, that tells a heavy tale for him. Conclude, conclude he is in love.

N. Hudson: love songs were usually sung to the lute Cf. *I Henry IV,* I, 2, 84]

And here Claudio and Don Pedro seek purgation from their melancholy. *Much Ado About Nothing*, Act V, Sc. 1

Claudio to Benedick	We have been up and down to seek thee; for we are high-proof melancholy and would fain have it beaten away. [high-proof = in the highest degree}

Shakespeare also speaks about the purgation of the will. In *Hamlet*, Act I, Sc. 5 (lines 9-13), the Ghost says:

I am thy father's spirit,
Doom'd for a certain term to walk the night,
And for the day confin'd to fast in fires,
Till the foul crimes done in my days of nature
Are burnt and purg'd away.

And when Hamlet delays taking the king's life at prayer (*Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 5), he says:

.....And am I then reveng'd,
To take him in the purging of his soul,
When he is fit and season'd for his passage?

And Lady Macbeth is more in need of the purgation of the will than of the body, Hence, the doctor says (*Macbeth*, Act V, Sc. 1, lines 61, 74-78):

This disease is beyond my practice.....
Foul whisp'rings are abroad. Unnatural deeds
Do breed unnatural troubles. Infected minds
To their deaf pillows will discharge their secrets.
More needs she the divine than the physician.
God, God forgive us all!

Finally there is a purgation of the city or nation. Brutus sees himself thus in *Julius Caesar* Act II, Sc. 1 (lines 177-180):

.....This shall make
Our purpose necessary and not envious;
Which so appearing to the common eyes,
We shall be call'd purgers, not murderers.

And in *Macbeth*, Act III, Sc. 4 (lines 75-76):

> Blood hath been shed ere now, i'th'olden time,
> Ere human statute purg'd the gentle weal.

And in *Macbeth*, Act V, Sc. 2, lines 25-30:

> Cathness: Well, march we on.
> To give obedience where 'tis truly ow'd.
> Meet we the med'cine of the sickly weal,
> And with him pour we in our country's purge
> Each drop of us.
>
> Lennox: Or so much as it needs
> To dew the sovereign flower and drown the weeds.

And the words of *Macbeth,* Act V, Sc. 3 (lines 50-56) spoken by Macbeth to the doctor:

> .....If thou couldst, doctor, cast
> The water of my land, find her disease,
> And purge it to a sound and pristine health,
> I would applaud thee to the very echo,
> That would applaud again. - Pull't off, I say -
> What rhubarb, cyme, or what purgative drug
> Would scour these English hence.

AND BY VERY MUCH MORE HANDSOME THAN FINE

Much more handsome than fine could refer to the difference we see between Shakespeare's lines and those of the 18th century., such as those of Pope. See Dryden's adaptation of *Antony and Cleopatra*.

Kittredge:	more handsome than fine: elegant, but not gaudy or over-decorated
New Hudson Shakespeare	more handsome than fine: really beautiful, not merely showy

Rolfe's edition:	Handsome denotes genuine, natural beauty; fine, artificial laboured beauty (Delius)
Yale Shakespeare:	handsome i.e., its beauty was not that of elaborate diction or polish, but that of structure and proportion

Washington Irving, *Life of George Washington*, Part Fifth, Chapter Thirty (pp. 348-349), from Washington's Letter to Hamilton about his desire for the style of his Farewell Address:

> "My wish is, that the whole may appear in a plain style; and be handed to the public in an honest, unaffected, simple garb."

and Irving commenting on the speech writes in the same place:

> The address certainly breathes his spirit throughout, is in perfect accordance with his words and actions, and, "in an honest, unaffected, simple garb," embodies the system of policy on which he acted throughout his administration.

Washington Irving, *Life of George Washington*, Part Fourth, Chapter Thirty-One, from Major Shaw's account of Washington speaking to the soldiers tempted to armed address of their injuries:

> Major Shaw, who was present, and from whose memoir we note this scene, relates that Washington, after reading the first paragraph of the letter, made a short pause, took out his spectacles, and begged the indulgence of his audience while he put them on, observing at the same time that *he had grown gray in their service, and now found himself growing blind.* "There was something," adds Shaw, "so natural, so unaffected, in this appeal, as rendered it superior to the most studied oratory; it forced its way to the heart, and you might see sensibility moisten every eye."

In the magisterial text AN EXCELLENT PLAY quoted above from *Hamlet*, Act II, Sc. 2, it is interesting that Hamlet refers to the plot and then immediately to the language or speech, passing over character and thought. (This reminds one of Aristotle's definition of tragedy which also refers to plot and language, but not to character or thought.) The words used in that magisterial text in speaking of the language or speech are:

> I remember one said there were no sallets in the
> lines to make the matter savory, nor no matter in
> the phrase that might indict the author of affection;
> but called it an honest method, as wholesome as sweet,
> and by very much more handsome than fine.

A BRIEF SELECTION OF SOME NOTES ON KEY WORDS IN THE ABOVE TEXT

Yale Shakespeare:	no sallets..savory: No ribaldry to spice the lines
New Hudson Shakespeare	sallets; salads, of spicy herbs pungently dressed. "Spicy improprieties." - Dowden. The reference is to ribald impertinences or extravagances in words or expressions

Some texts have affectation for affection and, at any rate, the commentators agree that affection here means affectation.

Kittredge: honest: gentlemanly, in good taste

Kittredge: wholesome: sound and clear

Shakespeare understands a play to be a pleasing imaginative likeness of what is natural & unnatural, virtuous & vicious, and customary mixed with the fortunate & the unfortunate in a well-digested plot, set down with as much modesty as cunning, tying a knot (or knots) and untying it (them), in words as wholesome as sweet and more handsome than fine, moving us to the principal passions in a most healthy and reasonable way.

Charles Knight, Supplementary Notice to Macbeth, *The Works of Shakspere*, Imperial Edition, Vol. II, p. 367:

> The principle which we have thus so imperfectly attempted to exhibit as the leading characteristic of this glorious tragedy is, without doubt, that which constitutes the essential difference between a work of the highest genius and a work of mediocrity. Without *power* - by which we here especially mean the ability to produce strong excitement by the display of scenes of horror - no

> poet of the highest order was ever made; but this alone does not make such a poet. If he is called upon to present such scenes, they must, even in their most striking forms, be associated with the beautiful. The preeminence of his art in this particular can alone prevent them affecting the imagination beyond the limits of pleasurable emotion. To keep within these limits, and yet to preserve all the energy which results from the power of dealing with the terrible apart from the beautiful, belongs to few that the world has seen: to Shakspere it belongs surpassingly

Charles Knight, "On Locrine" (a play wrongly attributed to Shakespeare), *The Works of Shakspere*, Imperial Edition, Vol. II, p. 679:

> Can we, then, believe that "Locrine" was the earliest work of Shakspere, as Tieck would believe? or are we to think with Schlegel that it belongs to the same class, and the same hand, as *Titus Andronicus*? We doubt much whether it is the work of a very young man at all. It is wrought up to the author's conception of a dramatic poem; it has no inequalities: its gross defects were intended to be beauties. It was written unquestionably by one who had received a scholastic training, and who saw the whole world of poetry in the remembrance of what he had read; he looked not upon the heart of men; he looked not even upon the commonest features of external nature. Did Shakspere work thus in the poems that we *know* he produced when a young man? Assuredly not. If his training had been scholastic, his good sense would have taught him to see something in poetry besides the echo of his scholarship. Nor can "Locrine" be compared with *Titus Andronicus*. The faults of that play are produced by the uncontrolled energy which, straining for effect in action and passion, destroys even its own strength through the absence of calmness and repose. Even Shakspere could not at first perceive the universal truth which is contained in his own particular direction to the players: - "In the very torrent, tempest, and (as I may say) the whirlwind of your passion, you must acquire and beget a temperance that may give it smoothness."

THE DIVISION OF SHAKESPEARE'S PLAYS

A division of Shakespeare's plays is (to paraphrase Longinus) the last fruit of a long experience. There are some differences and likenesses which are more felt than able to be articulated. Some plays one tends to put together, or separate, more as the natural result of one's experience of them than by the understanding of differences. One should not, moreover, demand more certitude or precision than the matter admits.

A good division should orient both our imagination and our emotions in seeing or reading each play. As Aristotle said long ago, one should not seek the same pleasure from every kind of play. Each kind of play and, to some extent, each individual play, has its own delight. But there is a kinship among those of the same kind. Perhaps, too, one should be in a different mood or disposition to read a different kind of play. Or when one is in a different mood, a different kind of play may appeal to him. A mood, however, is easily changed.

We can begin a consideration of the division of Shakespeare's plays by recalling that given by the editors (who were also players, and friends and associates of Shakespeare) of what has often been called the single most important publication in the history of English fiction - the *Folio* of 1623. In this *Folio*, the plays are divided into tragedies, histories, and comedies.

This division is deficient in perhaps three ways. First, the same basis for division is not used throughout. Tragedies are divided against comedies on a different basis from that of tragedies against histories. Tragedy and comedy seem contrary in their plots, the characters they represent and the emotions which they arouse. But the history plays are distinguished from the tragedies only by having a more particular interest in the singular of history. (We do not mean that, in the history plays, Shakespeare is more concerned with the singular than the universal. All great plays and the epic are more concerned with the universal than the singular. That is why Aristotle said that fiction is more philosophical than history. Nevertheless, Shakespeare's English history plays have a more particular interest, especially for a citizen of England, than the tragedies. The novel, and the historical novel in particular, go even further in the direction of interesting us in the singular, but even in the great novels our interest is more in the universal than the singular.) The history plays hold up a mirror more to the age than do the tragedies. But this is a secondary difference in comparison to that of tragedy and comedy and, as we

have already noted, a different kind of difference than that between tragedy and comedy.

The second major defect of the *Folio* division is that the *Comedies* do not contain one kind of play, but three kinds of plays equivocally called *comedy*. Although all three could be called comedy in the loose sense of a play that ends happily for the main (good) characters, one of them is more a likeness of the serious than of the laughable. It is closer to tragedy than to pure comedy. Comedy, strictly speaking, is a likeness of the laughable. But between this kind of comedy and tragedy, there are perhaps two kinds of play among Shakespeare's works. One of these is closer to tragedy and the other to comedy (meaning a likeness of the laughable). These plays could perhaps be called *romances*. One has an affinity with the so-called Hellenistic Romance and this is more serious and closer to tragedy. The other has an affinity with the Medieval Romance and is closer to comedy or the likeness of the laughable. I call the former sometimes a Mercy and Forgiveness Romance. (Mercy is like the pity of tragedy.) But the latter Romance, I sometimes call the Love and Friendship Romance. Romantic love in these plays is sometimes in conflict with friendship. This kind of play has an element of the pitiful in that unrequited love makes one miserable, but there is so prominent an element of the laughable in these plays that one has a hard time making them altogether distinct from the pure comedy or the likeness of the laughable.

One has a more balanced view of Shakespeare's plays in their likeness and difference, a better spectrum of them, going from tragedy to pure comedy or comedy in the strict sense, if one distinguishes these two kinds of Romance from the comedies in the strict sense.

A third individual defect in the Folio is the placing of *Cymbeline* with the tragedies. It belongs with the comedies in the loose sense of that word in the Folio division since things end happily for the main good characters. But it would be better to place *Cymbeline* among the Mercy and Forgiveness Romances. And indeed in many editions of Shakespeare's plays now, it is placed with the other (mercy and forgiveness) Romances such as *The Winter's Tale*, *The Tempest* and *Pericles*. However, the mistake of the Folio in placing *Cymbeline* among the tragedies is perhaps a sign of the more serious character of the Mercy and Forgiveness Romances whereby (on the spectrum of Shakespeare plays) they are closer to tragedy while the Love and Friendship Romances are close to comedy in the strict sense. In other words, the particular mistake of the place of *Cymbeline* is a sign both of the defect in designation of three kinds of play as *Comedies* and the more serious nature of one of these kinds.

Although the ten history plays are separated from the tragedies on a different basis than are the comedies, they are, for the most part, more like tragedies than comedies. Nevertheless, an experience of trying to divide the plays suggests that one should set aside for awhile the ten history plays because of something particular and unique about some of them at least and divide the remaining twenty-seven plays into their kinds. Then one can compare the ten history plays with the division of the twenty seven other plays. We thus acknowledge some reason for the separation in the *Folio* of the history plays from the others.

Looking at the twenty-seven plays, we see at one end the ten tragedies and at the other end, the five comedies. In-between, we find the romances which are of two kinds: Six plays closer to tragedy (we do not mean here closer to tragedy than comedy, but closer to tragedy or more serious than the other six romances) and six plays closer to comedy.

Perhaps then there are four kinds of plays of Shakespeare, starting from one contrary and going to the other contrary. Starting with tragedy, one goes to the mercy and forgiveness romance and then to the love and friendship romance and ends with the other contrary the pure comedy.

The history plays are mainly tragedies while the *Henry the IV* and *Henry V* plays, with their mixed comic and tragic scenes, cannot be put into the spectrum from tragedy to pure comedy. We can consider them to be a prologue to the plays or a foretaste of them.

Although our understanding of the history plays may require us to know the chronological order of the historical events enacted there, the appreciation of the them as a kind of play may make that chronological order of secondary importance. We should understand and enjoy *Richard II*, for example, as a tragedy although the events therein are something to have in mind when reading the *Henry IV* plays and the *Henry VI* plays. (Of course, if one wants to consider the political problem revealed in the English history plays or in the Roman history plays, one would want to read them in chronological order. The same would be true if one wanted to read them as an historian.

Coming back to the word *comedy,* one kind of play is a comedy in the strict sense, a likeness of the laughable in words, acted out. *The Merry Wives of Windsor* is an example of this kind of play. Another kind of play called a *comedy* in the folio is a likeness of the serious, even though it ends happily. *The Winter's Tale*

and *Measure for Measure* are examples of this kind of play. Such plays are called comedies, not because they are representations of the laughable, but because they end happily for the main characters although after much suffering and forgiveness. (For a similar reason, Dante calls his great work *The Divine Comedy* even though it is most serious in what it represents.) The Greeks called such serious works tragedies (such as *Oedipus at Colonus* and *Philoctetes* by Sophocles) even though they do not end tragically. Indeed this use of words is found in the Folio of 1623 where *Cymbeline* is put with the tragedies, even though it is the same kind of play as *The Winter's Tale*. Such plays can also be called mercy and forgiveness romances. They should be ordered immediately after tragedy or included with tragedy as a second kind of tragedy (a less tragic kind). The third kind of play found under the word comedy is the love and friendship play. This kind of play is between the comedy in the strict sense of a likeness of the laughable and the tragedy in the Greek or broad sense (including the mercy and forgiveness play). Indeed the lover is in one way pitiful and, in another way, laughable. Hence, Benvolio pities Romeo in his unreturned love for Rosalind and Mercutio makes fun of him.

The main reason for a division of Shakespeare's plays into kinds is to give the reader a different way to approach each or to receive each. One should not seek the same pleasure from each kind of work. As Aristotle observed in his book *About the Poetic Art*, one should not seek in tragedy the pleasure which is appropriate to comedy, but that which fits tragedy. Likewise Henry Fielding, in the preface to his work *Joseph Andrews* , finds it necessary to speak about the kind of work he is writing (it being an unfamiliar form to his readers) so that, as he says, the reader will not expect a pleasure other than the one intended.

One should not demand more precision in a division than is possible in the matter being divided. But Shakespeare's plays do not admit of a very precise division. Many of his plays, for example, have a mixed character; and others, a sub-plot somewhat different in spirit from the main plot. Hence a division of his works should not be taken too precisely, but should be understood with some qualifications and exceptions and border-line cases. Many works must be divided against others, not by something which they have which the others do not, but because they have more of something in comparison to the others.

One way to understand more the division of Shakespeare's plays is to consider the principal passions whose differences can be used to distinguish the plays on the basis of the passions to which they move us. In *Henry VI, Part Three*, Act IV, Sc. 6 (lines 1-5), King Henry touches upon the four principal passions:

> Master lieutenant, now that God and friends
> Have shaken Edward from the regal seat,
> And turn'd my captive state to liberty,
> My fear to hope, my sorrows unto joys,
> At our enlargement what are thy due fees?

These are the four chief or principal passions or emotions as Thomas explains in many places. His explains them thus in *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sent.,* Dist XXVI, Q. I, Art. IV, Ad 5:

> omnes praedictae passiones ad has principales passiones reducuntur
>
> vel sicut species ad genus, sicut admiratio ad timorem;
>
> vel sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, sicut concupiscentia ad gaudium;
>
> Vel sicut effectus ad causam et participans ad participatum, sicut audacia et ira ad spem, quia spes tendit in arduum bonum quod de se est tale ut in illud debeat tendi, audacia autem et ira tendunt in arduum nocivum repellendum, quod quidem non est tale ut in ipsum tendi debeat, sed magis ut fugiatur; tendunt tamen in ipsum inquantum participat aliquid de ratione boni quod est victoria ipsius; et ideo spes participatur quodammodo in audacia et ira, sicut quod est per se, in eo quod est per accidens.

Joy and sorrow or sadness are direct opposites. But hope and fear are not. Hope is directly opposed to despair. In *The Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act III, Sc. 1 (lines 247-248) Proteus says to Valentine who has been banished from the court and hence from Silvia:

> Hope is a lover's staff; walk hence with that,
> And manage it against despairing thoughts.

And In *Richard II*, Act II, Sc. 2 (lines 45-48 & 66-71):

> Queen: Then wherefore dost thou hope he is not shipp'd?
>
> Green: That he, our hope, might have retir'd his power
> And driven into despair an enemy's hope
> Who strongly hath set footing in this land...

Bushy: Despair not, madam.

Queen: Who shall hinder me?
I will despair, and be at enmity
With cozening Hope. He is a flatterer,
A parasite, a keeperback of Death.
Which false Hope lingers in extremity.

And fear is more directly opposed to confidence. In *Henry IV, Part Two*, Act IV, Sc. 1:

For, lo! within a ken our army lies
Upon mine honour, all too confident
To give admittance to a thought of fear.

There is a question about the words here. Should confidence or rather audacity or boldness be considered the opposite of fear? Consider this text of Thomas in *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sent.,* Dist XXVI, Q. I, Art. III, Ad 5:

> cum arduum sive difficile est proprium objectum irascibilis, differentiae facientes oppositiones in passionibus irascibilis sunt difficile facultatem superans vel non superans; et utrumque vel est bonum vel malum.
>
> Fiducia ergo seu confidentia importat motum irascibilis in quod aestimatur ut facultatem non excedens, quod quidem specialiter circa bonum importat spes, circa mala autem audacia, nisi quod audacia excessum importat quandoque, unde in malum quandoque accipitur.
>
> Motus autem appetitus in id quod aestimatur ut superans facultatem sive in bonum sive in malum, est diffidentia. In bonum autem specialiter est desperatio, in malum autem timor. Ira autem est passio composita ex audacia et tristitia et spe, ut ex dictis patere potest.

But hope of victory gives confidence (or audacity or boldness) and fear leads to despair. *Henry VI, Part Three,* Act I, Sc. 1 (line 178), Westmoreland says:

Base, fearful, and despairing Henry!

And in *Henry VIII,* Act II, Sc. 2:

fears and despairs

And in *Richard III*, Act V, Sc. 3:

Ghost of Vaughan to sleeping Richard:

Think upon Vaughan; and, with guilty fear,
Let fall thy lance! despair and die!

Ghost of Buckingham to Richard:

O, in the battle think on Buckingham,
And die in terror of thy guiltiness!
Dream on, dream on, of bloody deeds and death
Fainting, despair; despairing, yield thy breath!

And when Richard wakes:

Cold fearful drops stand on my trembling flesh.
What do I fear myself? there's none else by.....
I shall despair - There is no creature loves me.

And in *Henry VIII,* Act II, Sc. 2, Norfolk on Wolsley:

He dives into the king's soul; and there scatters
Dangers, doubts, wringing of the conscience
Fears and despairs; and all these for his marriage.

There is a cycle by fortune that goes from hope and joy to fear and sadness and back again, or vice-versa.

In *Antony & Cleopatra,* Act IV, Sc. 8 (lines 20-23):

.....Antony
Is valiant and dejected, and by starts
His fretted fortunes give him hope and fear
Of what he has and has not.
[fretted: checkered, varied]

And more fully in the wonderful lines from *King Lear,* Act IV, Sc. 1 (lines 1-6) spoken by Edgar:

Yet better thus, and known to be contemn'd,
Than still contemn'd and flatter'd. To be worst,
The lowest and most dejected thing of fortune,

Stands still in esperance, lives not in fear.
The lamentable change is from the best;
The worst returns to laughter.

This is the cycle which goes from misery to happiness and from happiness to misery. The one in happiness fears to fall from it to misery as represented in the great tragedies. But the one who is miserable could wish to die. *Timon of Athens*, Act IV, Sc. 3:

Thou shouldst desire to die, being miserable.

And yet there is this medicine for the miserable they may stand still in *esperance* (hope). *Measure for Measure*, Act III, Sc. 1:

The miserable have no other medicine
But only hope.

But such a one may be in despair rather than hope. *Measure for Measure*, Act IV, Sc. 3:

But I will keep her ignorant of her good,
To make her heavenly comforts of despair,
When it is least expected.

In life, one should try to strike a balance, as in *Henry IV, Part One*, Act IV, Sc. 4:

Gent.: Doubt not, my lord, he shall be well oppos'd.

Arch.: I hope no less, yet needful 'tis to fear.

One can distinguish the kinds of play and, in general, the kinds of fiction by the emotions which they move. Even simple tales are so divided. Thus, in *Richard II*, Act III, Sc. 4:

Lady: Madam, we'll tell tales.

Queen: Of sorrow or of joy?

Here Shakespeare divides tales (and presumably plays) by two of the principal passions, if not the most principal passions. This is common. See, for example, Sir Walter Scott (Marmion?) quoted in Washington Irving's *Abbotsford*:

And ever by the winter hearth,

Old tales I heard of woe or mirth.

And in *Cymbeline*, Act II, Sc. 1:

Hermione: .....pray you, sit by us,
And tell's a tale.

Mamillus: Merry or sad shall't be?

Hermione: As merry as you will.

Mamillus: A sad tale's best for winter.

Sometimes, as in these words of Mamilllus, the sad tale is appropriated to winter and the merry tale to summer. A few examples of this will be useful.

In *Cymbeline,* Act III, Sc. 4, lines 12-14:

.....If't be summer news,
Smile to't before; if winterly, thou need'st
But keep that count'nance still.

And in *Richard III*, Act I, Sc.1 (lines 1-2):

Now is the winter of our discontent
Made glorious summer by this sun of York.

And in *Sonnet 98*, lines 7:

Summer's story. [pleasant tale]

And the names of two plays: *A Midsummer-Night's Dream* and *Winter's Tale*

But there is also something in-between the sad and the merry, as there is something in-between winter and summer. In *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act I, Sc. 5, lines 50-52:

Cleopatra: What was he, sad or merry?

Alexas: Like to the time o'th'year between the extremes
Of hot and cold, he was nor sad nor merry.

Sometimes the plays at the end of the spectrum, tragedy and comedy, are spoken of under other opposites, the heavy and the light. In *Hamlet*, Act II, Sc. 2 (lines 403-404):

> Seneca cannot be too heavy, nor Plautus too light.

And we find the following from Francis Meres' *Palladis Tamia*, 1598, in The Yale Shakespeare, *Shakespeare of Stratford*, n. XIX, (A), p. 26:

> As Plautus and Seneca are accounted the best for comedy and tragedy among the Latins: so Shakespeare among the English is the most excellent in both kinds for the stage. For comedy witness his Gentlemen of Verona, his Errors, his Love Labors Lost, his Love Labors Won, his Midsummer's Night Dream, and his Merchant of Venice: for tragedy his Richard the 2, Richard the 3, Henry the 4, King John, Titus Andronicus, and his Romeo and Juliet."

But just as there is something in-between the contraries of summer and winter, so there is something in between the heavy and the light. Thus, in the play*Coriolanus*, Act II, Sc. 1, lines 202-203, Menenius:

> A hundred thousand welcomes; I could weep,
> And I could laugh; I am light, and heavy.

The first and greatest difference in Shakespeare's plays is between those that imitate a serious action and those that imitate a laughable action. Although plays are an imitation of human acts and these are divided by good and bad, that difference does not seem to be the first difference to be used in distinguishing plays. Rather the difference between the serious and the laughable is first. Shakespeare, having a noble nature, most of all imitates serious action. But the universality of his genius and art extends also to excellent comedy. (note that the word *sad* is often used as a synonym for serious.)

The serious and the laughable are contrary. One expels the other. Hence, the advice of Gorgias approved of by Aristotle in the *Rhetoric (1419b):*

> And one ought, as Gorgias says rightly, destroy the serious by the laughable and the laughable by the serious, their being contraries.

Likewise, the pity which is aroused by tragedy is excluded by the mirth of laughter. In *King Henry IV Part One* (Act II, Sc. 2), Prince Hal says:

.....Falstaff sweats to death,
And lards the lean earth as he walks along:
Were't not for laughing, I should pity him.

Cleopatra also touches upon this opposition of the mirth of comedy and the honor of tragedy in these words about Antony (*Antony and Cleopatra,* Act I, Sc. 2):

He was dispos'd to mirth, but on the sudden
A Roman thought hath struck him.

[Yale: A Roman thought - thought inspired by Roman virtue]

But Antony may forget his honor in eating and sleeping, as Pompey says about him (*Antony and Cleopatra*, Act II, Sc. 1):

Tie up the libertine in a field of feasts,
Keep his brain fuming; Epicurean cooks
Sharpen with cloyless sauce his appetite,
That sleep and feeding may prorogue his honor
Even till a Lethe'd dullness.

[Yale prorogue...dullness suspend completely his sense of honor]

Mirth becomes a feast. But Antony can remember his honor. (*Antony and Cleopatra,* Act II, Sc. 2):

The honor is sacred which he talks on now.

Our forefathers pledged their "sacred honor." (It is perhaps important to recall how pity is also called "sacred" by Shakespeare. Indeed pity or mercy is said to be an attribute of God himself to whom most of all honor is owed.)

Their contrariety is also spoken of in the Prologue to *King Henry VIII:*

I come no more to make you laugh: things now,
That bear a weighty and a serious brow,
Sad, high and working, full of state and woe,
Such noble scenes as draw the eye to flow,
We now present. Those that can pity, here
May, if they think it well, let fall a tear;

The subject will deserve it. Such as give
Their money out of hope they may believe,
May here find truth too. Those that come to see
Only a show or two, and so agree
The play may pass, if they be still and willing,
I'll undertake may see away their shilling
Richly in two short hours. Only they
That come to hear a merry bawdy play,
A noise of targets, or to see a fellow
In a long motley coat guarded with yellow,
Will be deceived; for, gentle hearers, know
To rank our chosen truth with such a show
As fool and fight is, besides forfeiting
Our own brains and the opinion that we bring
To make that only true we now intend,
Will leave us never an understanding friend.
Therefore, for goodness' sake, and as you are known
The first and happiest hearers of the town,
Be sad, as we would make ye: think ye see
The very persons of our noble story
As they were living; think you see them great,
And follow'd with the general throng and sweat
Of thousand friends; then, in a moment, see
How soon this mightiness meets misery:
And if you can be merry then, I'll say
A man may weep upon his wedding-day.

Here Shakespeare distinguishes between tragedy and comedy (a likeness of the laughable). The tear is to pity as laughter is to mirth. *Richard III*, Act IV, Sc. 2:

Tear-falling pity

But it is pity over the fall of the great in tragedy. *Antony and Cleopatra*, Act V, Sc. 2:

She shall be buried by her Antony:
No grave upon the earth shall clip in it
A pair so famous. High events as these
Strike those that make them; and their story is
No less in pity than his glory which
Brought them to be lamented.

And in *Richard II*, Act II, Sc. 4:

Ah, Richard,with the eyes of heavy mind
I see thy glory like a shooting star

Fall to the base earth from the firmament.
The sun sets weeping in the lowly west,
Witnessing storms to come, woe and unrest:
Thy friends are fled to wait upon thy foes,
And crossly to thy good all fortune goes.

Richard II, Act V, Sc. 1, Richard to Queen:

In winter's tedious nights sit by the fire
With good old folks, and let them tell thee tales
Of woeful ages long ago betid;
And ere thou bid good night, to quite their griefs
Tell thou the lamentable tale of me,
And send the hearers weeping to their beds;

Tragedy moves us to fear as well as to pity. This is seen in the Prologue to *Romeo and Juliet:*

Two households, both alike in dignity
In fair Verona, where we lay our scene,
From ancient grudge break to new mutiny,
Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean

From forth the fatal loins of these two foes
A pair of star-cross'd lovers take their life;
Whose misadventur'd piteous overthrows
Doth with their death bury their parents' strife

The fearful passage of their death-mark'd love,
And the continuance of their parents' rage,
Which, but their children's end, nought could remove,
Is now the two hours' traffick of our stage.

The which if you with patient ears attend,
What here shall miss, our toil shall strive to mend.

Pity is named in the second quatrain before fear in the third quatrain. Those two emotions go together as do their opposites. In *Henry IV, Part I*, Act IV, Sc. 1 (lines 41-45):

But to my charge. The king hath sent to know
The nature of your griefs. and whereupon
You conjure from the breast of civil peace
Such bold hostility, teaching his duteous land

Audacious cruelty.

Audacious cruelty is opposed to fearful pity.

There is also element of wonder as an effect of tragedy which, although sometimes considered a form of fear, can be distinguished from fear as ordinarily understood in tragedy. In *Hamlet*, Act V, Sc. 2, Horatio says:

> What is it you would see?
> If aught of woe or wonder, cease your search.

Fear is not mentioned here because of the alliteration, as is Shakespeare's custom. And in *King Henry VIII*, Act III, Sc. 2:

> Wolsley: Why, how now, Cromwell!
>
> Cromwell: I have no power to speak, sir.
>
> Wolsley: What amazed
> At my misfortunes? can thy spirit wonder
> A great man should decline? Nay, an you weep
> I am fall'n indeed.

As You Like It, Act III, Sc. 5. Rosalind to Phebe:

> Must you be therefore proud and pitiless?

Perhaps there is more connection here than alliteration. Fear retains pride and humility and pity have some connection. Tragedy humbles us. We fear because the same could happen to us. We pity others knowing that it could happen to us. But the proud man thinks it could not happen to him

The mirth and hope which comedy arouse (See my article on the Definition of Comedy) are opposed to the pity and fear of tragedy. LIkewise, when we speak of *laughing to scorn* we see how comedy is more akin to pride. Laughter is even closer to cruelty than to pity. Those who torture others may laugh, but not pity.

If tragedy and comedy are contraries, the other forms of the play or drama are in-between them and derived in some way from them, as the lukewarm is in-between the hot and the cold and having something of both of them.

But is there anything in Shakespeare's words useful for the consideration of whether it is reasonable to distinguish between tragedy and comedy two other kinds of play, the mercy romance and the love romance. In *Hamlet*, Act II, Sc. 2, lines 323-332:

Hamlet: He that plays the king shall be welcome,
his majesty shall have tribute of me;
the adventurous knight shall use his foil and target;
the lover shall not sigh gratis;
the humorous man shall end his part in peace;
the clown shall make those laugh whose lungs
are tickle o'the sere...What players are they?

Rosencrantz: Even those you were wont to take delight in,
the tragedians of the city."

Could Shakespeare in the above be touching a bit upon our distinction of the four kinds of play and in the same order?

Romantic love between men and women is close to comedy. In *As You Like It*, Act II, Sc. 4:

But if thy love were ever like to mine,
(As sure I think did never man love so)
How many actions most ridiculous
Hast thou been drawn to by thy fantasy."

See also *Love's Labour's Lost*, Act V, Sc. 2, lines 761-784, spoken by Biron.

But insofar as the lover is not only ridiculous, but also pitiful in his misery, the love romance may depart a little from the pure comedy in the direction of the serious. In *Romeo and Juliet*, Act I, Sc. 1 before it becomes tragic, Romeo is both laughable and pitiful:

Romeo: .....O me. What fray was here?
Yet tell me not, for I have heard it all.
Here's much to do with hate, but more with love.
Why, then, O brawling love! O loving hate!
O any thing, of nothing first create!
O heavy lightness! serious vanity!
Mis-shapen chaos of well-seeming forms!
Feather of lead, bright smoke, cold fire, sick health!
Still-waking sleep, that is not what it is!

This love feel I, that feel no love in this.
Dost thou not laugh?

Benvolio: No, coz., I rather weep.

Romeo: Good heart, at what?

Benvolio: At thy good heart's oppression.

Compare the above words such as "O heavy lightness" with Seneca cannot be too heavy, nor Plautus too light above.

And later in *Romeo and Juliet*, when Mercutio makes fun of Romeo and his unrequited passion and Romeo comments (Act II, Sc. 2, line 1):

He jests at scars that never felt a wound.

We have in Bandello, a source for Shakespeare, the following (quoted in Appendix I, p. 185 of Morton Luce's edition of *Twelfth Night*):

there is no misery in the world sharper or
more grievous than to love and be unloved

And this misery is the object of pity. In *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, Act III, Sc. 2 (lines 234-235):

But miserable most to love unloved.
This you should pity rather than despise.

Some other references to that wound which makes the lover miserable and an object of pity in the love romances:

In *As You Like It*, Act III, Sc. 5 (lines 28-34):

Silvius: O dear Phebe
If ever - as that ever may be near -
You meet in some fresh cheek the power of fancy,
Then shall you know the wounds invisible
That love's keen arrows make.

Phebe: But till that time
Come not thou near me; and when that time comes,
Afflict me with thy mocks, pity me not;

As till that time I shall not pity thee.

And in *All's Well That Ends Well*, Act I, Sc. 3, lines 209-212 and 221-225 spoken by Helena:

I know I love in vain, strive against hope;
Yet, in this captious and intenible sieve
I still pour in the waters of my love
And lack not to lose still.....

.....O! then, give pity
To her, whose state is such that cannot choose
But lend and give where she is sure to lose
That seeks not to find that her search implies,
But, riddle-like, lives sweetly where she dies.

And in the *Two Gentlemen of Verona*, Act IV, Sc. 4, lines 83-91:

Julia: I cannot choose But pity her.

Proteus: Wherefore should'st thou pity her?

Julia: Because methinks that she lov'd you as well
As you do love your lady Silvia.
She dreams on him that has forgot her love;
You dote on her that cares not for your love.
'Tis pity love should be so contrary;
And thinking on it makes me cry, alas!

Ibid., Act IV, Sc. 4, lines 103:

Julia about Proteus: Because I love him, I must pity him.
[n his unrequited love]

Shakespeare's mercy romances are akin to his tragedies for mercy is the same or almost the same as pity and the emotions of tragedy are pity and fear while those of the mercy romances are mercy and hope. In this way the mercy plays would seem to be between tragedy and comedy for comedy moves us to mirth and hope.

If pure comedy moves us to the emotions of mirth and hope and pure tragedy to the emotions of pity and fear, the mercy romance might seem to be exactly in the middle between these two contrary forms of play. For the mercy

romance moves us to mercy and hope and mercy is the same or almost the same as pity. But what has been called above the love romance may be between the mercy romance in the middle and pure comedy one of the contrary extremes. The love romance has something of the hope and mercy or pity of the mercy romance, but with a stronger infusion of mirth which places it closer to comedy or in-between the mercy romance and the pure comedy.

The identity or connection of pity and mercy is seen in *The Merchant of Venice,* Act IV, Sc. 1, lines 3-6 where the Duke says to Antonio about Shylock:

> I am sorry for thee. Thou art come to answer
> A stony adversary, an inhuman wretch,
> Uncapable of pity, void and empty
> From any dram of mercy."

But mercy is perhaps used more where the power to inflict punishment and misery is restrained. In *Measure for Measure*, Act II, Sc. 2, lines 59-63, Isabella:

> No ceremony that to great ones 'longs,
> Not the king's crown, nor the deputed sword,
> The marshal's truncheon,nor the judge's robe,
> Become them with one half so good a grace
> As mercy does.

And the famous lines in *The Merchant of Venice*, Act IV, Sc. 1, lines 184-197, spoken by Portia:

> The quality of mercy is not strain'd,
> It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
> Upon the place beneath: it is twice blest;
> It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes:
> 'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes
> The throned monarch better than his crown;
> His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
> The attribute to awe and majesty,
> Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
> But mercy is above this sceptred sway;
> It is enthroned in the heart of kings,
> It is an attribute to God himself;
> And earthly power doth then show likest God's
> When mercy seasons justice.

King John, Act IV, Sc. 3 (lines 117-118):

the infinite and boundless reach of mercy

Mercy in the mercy plays is associated with forgiveness. *Cymbeline*, Act V, Sc. 5 (lines 418-421) Posthumus to Iachimo:

> Kneel not to me.
> The power that I have on you is to spare you:
> The malice towards you to forgive you. Live
> And deal with others better,

Mercy seasons justice or anger. In *The Tempest*, Act V, Sc. 1 (lines 25-28) Prospero:

> Though with their high wrongs I am struck to the quick
> Yet with my nobler reason 'gainst my fury
> Do I take part: the rarer action is
> In virtue than in vengeance.

Vengeance is more proper to tragedy where anger is opposed to pity. *Coriolanus*, Act I, Sc. 9, line 86:

> And wrath o'erwhelm'd my pity

It is remarkable that Shakespeare should have turned for most of his late plays to the mercy and forgiveness romance. For the passions which these arouse, mercy and hope, have a certain likeness to virtue. Thomas teaches this about mercy (*misericordia*) in *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum,* Dist. XXXIIII, Q. III, Art. IV, Sol. IV, Ad 3:

> aliquae passiones, quamvis proprie loquendo, non sint virtutes, tamen inquantum sunt laudabiles, habent aliquid de ratione virtutis; sicut misericordia et verecundia; et praecipue secundum quod est ibi electio.

And in *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sent.*, Dist. XXVI, Q. II, Art. I, Ad 1, he explains about hope:

> spes, secundum quod est passio, non est virtus, sed secundum quod est in appetitu intellectivae partis. Nec aliarum passionum nomina ita convenienter ad virtutes transumi possunt sicut nomen spei. quia spes dicitur in ordine ad bonum; et propter hoc importat

> motum appetitus in bonum tendentis, et sic habet quamdam similitudinem cum electione et intentione boni quae requiruntur in omni virtute.
>
> Timor autem dicatur in ordine ad malum. Recedere autem a malo, quamvis ad virtutem pertineat, non tamen in hoc consistit perfectio virtutis, sed in electione boni.
>
> Gaudium autem et tristitia magis dicunt impressionem boni et mali in appetitum quam motum appetitus in ea; unde non habent similitudinem cum electione virtutis.

Shakespeare also says about hope in *Richard III* (Act V, Sc. 2, Richmond):

> All for our vantage. Then, in God's name, march.
> True hope is swift, and flies with swallow's wings;
> Kings it makes gods, and meaner creatures kings.

Misericordia or pity is in tragedy and hope, in comedy. The other two emotions, fear (in tragedy) and joy or mirth (in comedy) are not like virtue. But the mercy romances of Shakespeare combine both hope and mercy. This is very interesting.

A DIVISION OF TWENTY-SEVEN PLAYS OF SHAKESPEARE

TRAGEDIES (10 plays)

NORTHERN TRAGEDIES

Hamlet
Lear
Macbeth

ITALIAN TRAGEDIES

Romeo & Juliet
Othello

CLASSICAL OR ROMAN-GREEK TRAGEDIES

Julius Caesar

Antony and Cleopatra

Coriolanus
Timon of Athens

(Titus Andronicus)

MERCY OR FORGIVENESS ROMANCES (6 plays)

Pericles
Cymbeline
Winter's Tale
Tempest

Measure for Measure
All's Well That Ends Well

LOVE ROMANCES OR ROMANTIC COMEDIES (6 plays)

Much Ado About Nothing
As You Like It
Twelfth Night

Midsummer Night's Dream
Two Gentlemen of Verona
Merchant of Venice

COMEDIES (5 plays)

GOOD NATURED COMEDIES

Comedy of Errors
Taming of the Shrew
Merry Wives of Windsor

SATIRES

WHITE SATIRE

Love's Labour's Lost

BLACK SATIRE

Troilus & Cressida

The Sub-Division of the Tragedies

There are at least three distinctions to be found among the tragedies. One is in place and time. A second is in the relative emphasis on nature (the natural and the unnatural) or on fortune and fate. A third is on the pitifulness of the character.

Three of the tragedies are set in the North (England, Scotland and Denmark) and in Medieval times. Two of the tragedies are set in Italy (around Venice or Verona) during late Medieval or Renaissance times. Five are set around Rome or Athens in Ancient times.

Although all the plays represent what is by nature and what is by fortune in human affairs, nevertheless compared to each other, some have more emphasis on nature (the natural and the unnatural) and some on fortune or fate. This is seen both in their plots and in their words. The Northern tragedies emphasize nature more than the Italian plays while the latter emphasize fortune & fate more than the former. In the Roman plays, fortune & fate are more emphasized in three of them (*Titus Andronicus, Julius Caesar, and Antony & Cleopatra*) while in *Coriolanus*, nature is again prominent. In the Athenian play, *Timon of Athens*, nature is also emphasized.

A third distinction is in the pitifulness of the character. Tragedy is defined by pity and pity is sadness over the *undeserved* misfortune or misery of another. Now King Lear is more pitiful than Macbeth in that the former's misery is less deserved. But Macbeth chooses the evil which brings about his downfall and, for that reason, deserves his misery. Yet we do pity Macbeth to some extent (and fear our own ability to choose evil).

Although each of these distinctions is important, and we have at different times divided the ten tragedies by each of these distinctions, it is perhaps best to distinguish them by the place and time in which they are set. For this distinction, besides being more able to be kept in mind, also includes to some extent the distinction by emphasis on nature or on fortune insofar as the Northern tragedies

emphasize nature and the Italian ones fortune & fate and the Roman plays, for the most part, fortune & fate. The Athenian play and one Roman play again emphasize nature. It is important for the imagination to connect the atmosphere of place and time with the more philosophical distinction made by reason between the causes nature and fortune. The distinction based on the pitifulness of the character is perhaps more limited in extent than to be the natural way of distinguishing all of the plays and is perhaps best brought in when contrasting say *Macbeth* with *King Lear* among the Northern tragedies.

The Sub-Division of the Comedies

The distinction in the comedies between the three *good-natured* comedies and the two *satires* is not into equals. It is proportional to the distinction made between *King Lear* and *Macbeth*. Just as the pity aroused by *King Lear* is more perfect than that aroused by *Macbeth*, so the mirth aroused by the good-natured comedies is fuller and more free of melancholy than that aroused by satire. And this is much more true of the black satire than of the white satire.

Among the good natured comedies, nature is more emphasized in *The Taming of the Shrew* and *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, but fortune, more in *The Comedy of Errors*.

If we compare the two satires to each other in this respect, fortune is more important in *Troilus & Cressida* and nature in *Love's Labour's Lost*. But our fallen nature is especially satirized in *Troilus & Cressida*.

The Sub-Division of the Mercy Romances

We have distinguished the four Mercy Romances which so many editors have put together under the title of *Romance* and which are the four last plays written by Shakespeare (apart from *Henry VIII* which some think is only in part by Shakespeare) and distinguished them from two other earlier plays which are not so closely related to the last four as those are to each other. For the closeness of the four, see the appendix of comments on the *Romances*.

The two earlier plays, *Measure for Measure* and *All's Well That Ends Well*, seem, from a long experience of reading them, more serious than the love romances or to have less of the comic in them. This is more clear in the case of *Measure for Measure* than in the case of *All's Well That Ends Well*. The latter resembles more the love romances because of the predominance of the theme of love in it. Yet the more one reads it, the more one is also struck by the aspect of forgiveness in it. Because of this and the seriousness or heaviness of the play as we read it, it seems to us better to place it with the mercy romances than the love romances.

In what may be the chronological order of the plays, these two plays were written after all the love romances and are followed by six tragedies and the (other) four mercy romances and *Henry VIII*.

Fortune and fate play an immense role in the mercy romances, but divine providence is also seen as extending to these chance events.

The Sub-Division of the Love Romances

We have distinguished the six love romances into the three earlier romances (*A Midsummer Night's Dream, The Two Gentlemen of Verona,* and *The Merchant of Venice)* and the three later and more mature works (*Much Ado About Nothing, As You Like It,* and *Twelfth Night)*

In the love romances, as in the love tragedies of *Romeo & Juliet* and *Othello*, fortune & fate are usually more emphasized than nature, relatively speaking. But in *As You Like It*, nature is more important.

The Place of the Ten English History Plays

Most of the ten history plays resemble the tragedies, especially the northern European tragedies. In this regard, it is significant to note the importance of nature also in them.

Richard III is like *Macbeth* in that the main character seems to choose evil. *Richard II* is like *King Lear* in some ways, but the ways in which the chief characters come to lose their kingship are quite different. *King John* is like *Richard II*, but the main character is not as bad. *Henry VIII* has less unity, but the downfall of Wolsley and the Queen's suffering have something in common with *Richard II*. The *Henry VI* plays are somewhat episodic, but the likeness of the natural and unnatural is very prominent in them.

But the two *Henry IV* plays and *Henry V* cannot be placed in the above division and must stand by themselves apart from the division. The mixture of somewhat tragic scenes in the *Henry IV* plays with some of Shakespeare's best comic scenes makes it seem forced to place these plays with either the tragedies or with the comedies. The rise of one man seems to unify these plays and *Henry V* has epic proportions or dimensions.

Thus seven of the ten history plays may be placed with the tragedies. And three of the history plays do not seem to fall naturally into our division because of their unusual mix.

The Non-Dramatic Poems of Shakespeare and the Division of the Plays

Of Shakespeare's non-dramatic works, *The Rape of Lucrece* is like the tragedies and *Venus and Adonis* like the comic satires. The Sonnets are closest in theme to the love (and friendship) romances. The *Phoenix & the Turtle* is also like the love romances.

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APPENDIX I: FORTUNE-FATE AND NATURE PLAYS

Among the tragedies, the three Northern tragedies (*Hamlet*, *Lear* and *Macbeth*) are plays in which the natural and the unnatural are emphasized in the plot and in the words.

Among the Roman- Greek plays, *Coriolanus* and *Timon of Athens* are nature plays.

But the three remaining Roman plays (*Julius Caesar*, *Antony and Cleopatra*, and *Titus Andronicus*) are fortune-fate plays in their plots and words.

And the two Italian love tragedies *(Romeo & Juliet* and *Othello)* are both fortune-fate plays.

Thus, apart from the history plays, five of the tragedies are nature plays and five are fortune-fate plays.

But the ten English history plays seem for the most part to be nature plays.

The distinction of nature and fortune plays among the five comedies is less striking than among the tragedies. But perhaps two of the good-natured comedies, *The Taming of the Shrew* and *The Merry Wives of Windsor* are more nature plays while the remaining one, *The Comedy of Errors* is a fortune-fate play. And when the two satires are compared, the white satire, *Love's Labour's Lost*, is more a nature play and the black satire, *Troilus & Cressida*, more a fortune-fate play. Yet the latter savages much, or says much about, our fallen nature.

The distinction between nature plays and fortune plays is much less marked in the romances. One might speak of *Pericles* (among the mercy romances) and to a lesser extent *The Two Gentlemen of Verona* and perhaps *Twelfth Night* (among the love romances) as fortune-fate plays. The love romance *As You Like It* would seem to be a nature play with its emphasis on the goodness of nature as seen in the forest and the reconcilation of the two pairs of brothers in the forest.

But *if* and *how* one should distinguish the remaining five mercy or forgiveness romances *(Cymbeline*, *Winter's Tale*, *Tempest*, *Measure for Measure*, and *All's Well That Ends Well)* by nature or fortune is not clear. Likewise, in the three remaining love romances (*Midsummer Night's Dream*, *Merchant of Venice*, and *Much Ado About Nothing*)

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ROMEO AND JULIET - A FORTUNE-FATE PLAY

Prologue to *Romeo and Juliet*:

Two households, both alike in dignity

In fair Verona, where we lay our scene,
From ancient grudge break to new mutiny,
Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean

From forth the fatal loins of these two foes
A pair of star-cross'd lovers take their life;
Whose misadventur'd piteous overthrows
Do with their death bury their parents' strife

Romeo and Juliet, Act I, Sc. 5:

Benvolio: Supper is done, and we shall come too late.

Romeo: I fear too early: for my mind misgives
Some consequence yet hanging in the stars
Shall bitterly begin his fearful date
With this night's revels and expire the term
Of a despised life closed in my breast
By some vile forfeit of untimely death
But He, that hath the steerage of my course,
Direct my sail! On, lusty gentlemen

Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Sc. 2:

Juliet: Hence will I to my ghostly father's cell,
His help to crave, and my dear hap to tell.

Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Sc. 3:

Romeo: O! let us hence; I stand on sudden haste

Fr. Laurence: Wisely and slow; they stumble that run fast

Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Sc. 5:

Juliet: Hie to high fortune...

Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Sc. 6:

Fr. Laurence to Juliet: These violent delights have violent ends...
Therefore, love moderately.

Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Sc. 1, lines 1-4:

Benvolio: I pray thee, good Mercutio,let's retire:
The day is hot, the Capulets abroad.
And, if we meet, we shall not escape a brawl,
For now, these hot days, is the mad blood stirring.

Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Sc. 1, lines 116-117:

Romeo: This day's black fate on more days doth depend,
This but begins the woe others must end.

Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Sc. 1, line 133:

Romeo: O. I am fortune's fool!

Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Sc. 1, lines 139-140:

Benvolio: O noble prince, I can discover all
The unlucky manage of this fatal brawl

Romeo and Juliet, Act III, Sc. 5:

Juliet: O fortune, fortune; all men call thee fickle.

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 1:

Romeo: Is it even so? then I defy you, stars!

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 2:

Fr. Laurence: Unhappy fortune! by my brotherhood,
The letter was not nice but full of charge
Of dear import, and the neglecting it
May do much danger.

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 3, line 82:

Romeo about Paris: One writ with me in sour misfortune's book!

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 3, lines 109-112:

Romeo: O, here

Will I set up my everlasting rest,
And shake the yoke of inauspicious stars
From this world-wearied flesh

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 3, lines 116-120

Romeo: Come, bitter conduct, come, unsavoury guide!
Thou desperate pilot, now at once run on
The dashing rocks they sea-sick weary bark!
Here's to my love. [drinks] O true apothecary!
Thy drugs are quick. Thus with a kiss I die

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 3, lines 135-136:

Fr. Laurence: Stay then; I'll go alone. fear comes upon me
O, much I fear some ill unlucky thing.

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 3, lines 144-146:

Fr. Laurence: Romeo. O, pale! Who else? What, Paris too?
And steep'd in blood? Ah, what an unkind hour
Is guilty of this lamentable chance!

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 3, lines 153-154:

Fr. Laurence: A greater power than we can contradict
Hath thwarted our intents.

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 3, lines 250-252:

Fr. Laurence: But he which bore my letter, Friar John,
Was stay'd by accident, and yesternight
Return'd my letter back.

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 3, lines 260-261:

Fr. Laurence: She wakes; and I entreated her come forth,
And bear this work of heaven with patience.

Romeo and Juliet, Act V, Sc. 3, lines 291-295:

Prince: Where be these enemies? Capulet! Montague!
See, what a scourge is laid upon your hate,

That heaven finds means to kill your joys with love.
And I for winking at your discords too
Have lost a brace of kinsmen: all are punish'd

OTHELLO - A FORTUNE-FATE PLAY

Othello, Act II, Sc. 1:

Othello: .....If it were now to die
'Twere now to be most happy; for I fear,
My soul hath her content so absolute
That not another comfort like to this
Succeeeds in unknown fate.

Othello, Act IV, Sc. 1:

Lodovico: Is this the noble Moor whom our full senate
Call all in all sufficient? This the nature
Whom passion could not shake? Whose solid virtue
The shot of accident nor dart of chance
Could neither graze nor pierce?

Othello, Act IV, Sc. 2:

Desdemona: It is my wretched fortune.

Othello, Act V, Sc. 2:

Othello: Who can control his fate? 'tis not so now.
Be not afraid, though you do see me weapon'd;
Here is my journey's end, here is my butt
And very sea-mark of my utmost call.

Othello about Desdemona: O ill-starr'd wench

Othello about himself: O fool! fool! fool!

Othello: When you shall these unlucky deeds relate,
Speak of me as I am, nothing extenuate,
Nor set down aught in malice: then must you speak

Of one that loved not wisely but too well.

ANTONY AND CLEOPATRA - A FORTUNE-FATE PLAY

Antony and Cleopatra, Act II, Sc. 3:

Antony: Say to me, whose fortunes shall rise higher,
Caesar's or mine?

Soothsayer: Caesar's
Therefore, O Antony, stay not by his side:
Thy demon, that's thy spirit which keeps thee, is
Noble, courageous, high, unmatchable,
Where Caesar's is not; but near him the angel
Becomes a fear, as being o'erpower'd: therefore
Make space enough between you.

Antony: Speak this no more.

Soothsayer: To none but thee; no more but when to thee.
If thou dost play with him at any game,
Thou art sure to lose; and, of that natural luck,
He beats thee 'gainst the odds: thy lustre thickens
When he shines by: I say again, thy spirit
Is all afraid to govern thee near him,
But he away, 'tis noble. [Exist soothsayer]

Antony: .....Be it art or hap,
He hath spoken true: the very dice obey him,
And in our sports my better cunning faints
Under his chance: if we draw lots, he speeds;
His cocks do win the battle still of mine
When it is all to nought, and his quails ever
Beat mine, inhoop'd, at odds.

Antony and Cleopatra, Act III, Sc. 11:

Antony about Caesar: .....He makes me angry
And at this time most easy 'tis to do't,
When my good stars, that were my former guides,
Have empty let their orbs and shot their fires
Into the abysm of hell

Antony and Cleopatra, Act IV, Sc. 14:

Second Guard: The star is fall'n

First Guard: And time is at his period

All Alas, and woe!.....

Antony: Nay, good fellows, do not please sharp fate
To grace it with your sorrows: bid that welcome
Which comes to punish us, and we punish it
Seeming to bear it lightly.

Antony and Cleopatra, Act IV, Sc. 15:

Cleopatra: No. let me speak, and let me rail so high
That the false housewife Fortune break her wheel
Provok'd by my offence.

Antony: The miserable change now at my end
Lament nor sorrow at, but please your thoughts
In feeding them with those my former fortunes
Wherein I lived, the greatest prince o'the world,
The noblest.....

Antony and Cleopatra, Act V, Sc. 1:

Dercetas: I say, O Caesar, Antony is dead

Caesar: Look you sad, friends?
The gods rebuke me, but it is tidings
To wash the eyes of kings.

Agrippa: And strange it is
That nature must compel us to lament
Our most persisted deeds

Mecaenas: His taints and honours
Wag'd equal with him

Agripa: A rarer spirit never
Did steer humanity; but you, gods, will give us
Some faults to make us men. Caesar is touch'd

Mecaenas: When such a spacious mirror's set before him.
He needs must see himself.

Caesar: But yet let me lament.....
.....That our stars
Unreconciliable should divide
Our equalness to this.

Antony and Cleopatra, Act V, Sc. 2:

Cleopatra: My desolation does begin to make
A better life. 'Tis paltry to be Caesar,
Not being Fortune, he's but Fortune's knave,
A minister of her will; and it is great
To do that thing that ends all other deeds,
Which shackles accidents, and bolts up change,
Which sleeps and never palates more the dug
The beggar's nurse and Caesar's.

OTHER FORTUNE-FATE PLAYS

Titus Andronicus, Act I, Sc. 1:

Marcus: And welcome, nephews, from successful wars:
You that survive, and you that sleep in fame.
Fair Lords, your fortunes are alike in all,
That in your country's service drew your swords:
But safer triumph is this funeral pomp,
That hath aspired to Solon's happiness,
And triumphs over chance in honour's bed.

Titus Andronicus, Act V, Sc. 3, last words of play:

Lucius: See justice done on Aaron, that damn'd Moor,
By whom our heavy haps had their beginning.
Then, afterwards, to order well the state,
That like events may ne'er it ruinate.

Julius Caesar, Act III, Sc. 2:

Antony: .....Fortune is merry
And in this mood will give us any thing

Julius Caesar, Act IV, Sc. 3:

Brutus: There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune;
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries.

Julius Caesar, Act V, Sc. 3:

Cassius: This day I breathed first; time is come around,
And where I did begin, there shall I end;
My life is run his compass.

Plutarch, *Life of Caesar*, Modern Lib. ed. of the *Lives*, pp. 892-893:

> All these things might happen by chance. but the place which was destined for the scene of this murder, in which the senate met that day, was the same in which Pompey's statue stood, and was one of the edifices which Pompey had raised and dedicated with his theatre to the use of the public, plainly showing that there was something of a supernatural influence which guided the action and ordered it to that particular place.
>
> Cassius, just before the act, is said to have looked towards Pompey's statue, and silently implored his assistance, though he had been inclined to the doctrines of Epicurus.....
>
> when he saw Brutus' sword drawn, he covered his face with his robe and submitted, letting himself fall, whether it were by chance or that he was pushed in that direction by his murderers, at the foot of the pedestal on which Pompey's statue stood, and which was thus wetted with his blood. so that Pompey himself seemed to have presided, as it were, over the revenge done upon his adversary, who lay here at his feet, and breathed out his soul through his multitude of wounds, for they say he received three and twenty.

Twelfth Night, Act I, Sc. 5:

Olivia: I do I know not what, and fear to find
Mine eye too great a flatterer for my mind.
Fate, show thy force: ourselves we do not owe;

What is decreed must be, and be this so.

Twelfth Night, Act II, Sc. 1:

Sebastian: My stars shine darkly over me; the malignancy
of my fate might perhaps distemper yours.

Twelfth Night, Act IV, Sc. 3:

Sebastian: this accident and flood of fortune

Twelfth Night, Act V, Sc. 1:

Viola: All the occurrence of my fortune

Pericles, Act I, Sc. 4:

Which welcome we'll accept; feast here awhile,
Until our stars that frown lend us a smile.

Pericles, Act II, Sc. 1:

Yet cease your ire, you angry stars of heaven.

The Comedy of Errors, Act I, Sc. 1:

Aegeon: In Syracusa was I born, and wed
Unto a woman, happy but for me.
And by me too, had not our hap been bad.

Thus have you hard me sever'd from my bliss,
That by misfortunes was my life prolong'd,
To tell sad stories of my own mishaps.

The Comedy of Errors, Act V, Sc. 1, lines 125, 362-363, 396-398:

Who put unluckily into this bay.

These are the parents to these children,
Which accidentally are met together.

Abbess: Renowned duke, vouchsafe to take the pains
To go with us into the abbey here,
And hear at large discoursed all our fortunes.

Cymbeline, Act III, Sc. 4:

And you shall find me, wretched man, a thing
The most disdain'd of fortune.

The Rape of Lucrece, line 351, words of Tarquin:

Then Love and fortune be my gods, my guides

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ON DIVIDING SHAKESPEARE'S PLAYS

When hearing and seeing or reading a play of Shakespeare, it is useful to know the kind of play it is. For Shakespeare wrote many kinds of plays. And one should not approach them in the same way or seek the same pleasure from each, but that which fits each kind.

One should not seek more precision or certitude in dividing than the matter admits. Each play of Shakespeare is to some extent unique and there is a mixture of many elements in many plays so that complete certitude or precision should not be expected in a division of his plays.

Longinus said that literary judgment is the last fruit of a long experience. One must immerse oneself in the plays before one can begin to see the different kinds of plays he wrote. What I have to say here is the fruit of a long experience of reading and re-reading the plays of Shakespeare.

Shakespeare wrote about thirty seven plays. I say *about* because in the usual complete editions of his plays, this is their number. But there is some controversy about some of them, whether they are entirely by the bard. And there are some other plays besides them in which he may have had a hand. I shall not enter into these learned controversies, but consider the division of the thirty seven plays customarily attributed to him.

In the original complete edition of Shakespeare's plays, the Folio of 1623,[1] the plays were divided into tragedies, comedies and histories. This division has been followed in many subsequent complete editions. This division is defective for a number of reasons.

The main defect is that the word *comedy* is equivocal and includes comedy in the strict sense, which is a likeness of the laughable and the contrary of tragedy, and other kinds of play which, although ending happily, are serious and not chiefly a likeness of the laughable.[2] These serious plays which end happily are in the

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[1]The Folio of 1623 contained 36 plays. *Pericles* was added in a subsequent addition.

[2]We see this same equivocation in the title of Dante's *Divine Comedy.* That work is not called a *comedy* because it is a likeness of the laughable, but

middle between tragedy and comedy in the strict sense. In recent complete editions of Shakespeare's plays, some of these middle plays are made a separate group of plays distinguished from both the tragedies and the comedies. And in that separate group, which is called the *Romances* (used in a different sense from what is popularly called a romance; more in the sense in which the Hellenistic novels are called *romances)*, is included a play, *Cymbeline,* which the Folio of 1623 had put among the tragedies. And perhaps one could also distinguish another kind of play, found under the name *comedy* in the Folio which is between this middle kind of play and the comedies in the strict sense.

The other question mark about the division of the plays into tragedies, comedies and histories in the First Folio is that the same basis for division is not used throughout. What distinguishes tragedy from comedy in the strict sense also distinguishes most of the history plays from comedies in the strict sense.

One could say that the ten history plays are distinguished from tragedies and comedies by the greater interest we take in the particular in them. Although fiction is more about the universal than about the singular, some forms of fiction approach more to the singular. Thus, our interest in the historical novel is more particular than in some other forms. But this could be said of some of the Roman plays as well as the ten English history plays, although the former are placed with tragedies. Nevertheless, as we shall see, there is a problem of where to put some of the English history plays and it may be good to set them aside temporarily while we divide the remaining twenty seven plays. We can then consider where and to what extent the English history plays can be placed in that division.

Laying aside then for the time being the ten English history plays of Shakespeare, let us consider the distinction of kinds found in the remaining twenty seven plays.

Where there are contraries and something between those contraries, it is perhaps best to begin with those contraries and then proceed later to what is between those contraries. For contraries being the forms of a thing that are the furthest apart, their distinction will be most known and most clear. And since what comes between the contraries seems to be a mixture of the contraries, one can understand better this mixture after one has seen clearly the two pure forms.

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because it goes from *Inferno*, the place of misery, to *Paradiso*, the place of happiness. But it is a likeness of serious things.

Further, one can order the intermediate forms by their likeness and distance from the contrary forms after one has considered the contrary forms.

A likeness or comparison will make more clear this way of going forward. Contraries are sometimes compared to the end points of a straight line. As those points are the points furthest apart on that line, so too, contraries are the forms furthest apart in some general kind of thing. Hence, although there can be many points on a line the same distance apart, but only *two* points the furthest apart, so too there can be only *two* contraries in any one kind of thing. And just as the end points are the points most clearly distinguished on the line, and we would say where the other points are by their distance from the end points, so also the contraries are the forms of a thing most clearly distinguished and we would arrange the forms in-between by their distance from the contraries. Thus, in colors, we could begin with the contraries black and white. These are most clear in their distinction. Hence, we say proverbially when something is very clear, that it is *black and white;* and when it is not clear that it is not black and white, but *gray*. And we would arrange the colors in-between black and white by their distance or proximity to black and white. Thus, for example, blue is closer to black than is yellow; and vice-versa, yellow is closer to white than is blue. So we would order them as white, yellow, blue, black.

Tragedy and comedy (in the strict sense) are contraries. This can be seen in their plots, characters and language. Everyone knows that the plot of a tragedy goes from some form of happiness to misery while comedy goes in the contrary direction. And this is why they move us to contrary emotions or feelings. Tragedy moves us to pity and fear and comedy to mirth and hope. And the characters of tragedy are above us in station and abilities while those of comedy tend to be below us. And the language of tragedy is more beautiful and elevated in its images while that of comedy is lowly and representing the laughable which is a form of the ugly. When Juliet is found apparently dead on her wedding day, we have the beautiful simile:

> Death lies on her like an untimely frost
> Upon the sweetest flower of all the field.[3]

But Falstaff, Shakespeare's greatest comic character, is described by Mrs. Ford, one of the merry wives of Windsor, in this image:

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[3] *Romeo and Juliet*, Act IV, Sc. 5

> What tempest, I trow, threw this whale, with so many tuns of oil in his belly, ashore at Windsor? How shall I be revenged on him? I think the best way were to entertain him with hope, till the wicked fire of lust have melted him in his own grease.[4]

And Prince Hal describes Falstaff huffing and puffing along the road in these words:

> .....Falstaff sweats to death
> And lards the lean earth as he walks along.
> Were't not for laughing, I should pity him.[5]

The last words quoted of Prince Hal, "Were't not for laughing, I should pity him", indicate again the contrariety of tragedy and comedy, the pitiful and the laughable, since one excludes the other. Hence, Gorgias gave the advice in rhetoric to kill your opponent's seriousness with jesting and his jesting with seriousness. This is a sign of the opposition or contrariety of the serious represented in tragedy and the jest or laughable represented in comedy. For opposites eliminate or exclude each other.

Let us then consider first Shakespeare's tragedies and comedies in the strict sense (that is, the plays which are a likeness of a course of action that is laughable); and then second, distinguish the kinds of plays in-between these contraries. And after that, we can consider how the ten English history plays do, or do not, fit into these divisions.

Of the twenty seven plays of Shakespeare other than his English history plays, ten can be considered tragedies and five of them, comedies. The remaining twelve can be considered to belong to two other kinds of plays in-between these contrary kinds of plays.

The ten tragedies can most easily be first distinguished by the place and time in which their plots are situated. Three of them are set in the mediaeval North: *King Lear* in England, *Macbeth* in Scotland, and *Hamlet* in Denmark. Two of them are set in Renaissance Italy or later: *Romeo and Juliet* in Verona and *Othello* in Venice and Cyprus. The remaining five tragedies are set mainly in ancient Rome or its empire and one of them in Greece. *Julius Caesar, Antony and Cleopatra,*

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[4] *The Merry Wives of Windsor*, Act II, Sc. 1
[5] *King Henry IV, Part I,* Act II, Sc. 2

Coriolanus, and *Titus Andronicus* are the Roman plays and *Timon of Athens*, the Greek play.

But there is another way of dividing the tragedies which is more profound and which yet corresponds *somewhat* to the division by the place and time of their plots. Some of the tragedies bring out more than others the role of nature in human life, the distinction between the natural and the unnatural in human action, and how nature is the measure of what is good and bad in human acts and dispositions. But other tragedies bring out more than others the role of fortune in human life. Nature and fortune are causes found in all plays, but some bring out or emphasize nature more than others, and some bring out or emphasize fortune more than others. And this distinction corresponds *somewhat* to the distinction of the tragedies by the place and time of their plots. For the three Northern tragedies, *Hamlet*, *King Lear* and *Macbeth* are wonderful in the way they bring out the role of nature in human life, the distinction between the natural and the unnatural in human action, and that nature is the measure of what is good and bad in human acts and dispositions. In *Hamlet* we see this order touched upon by Hamlet in his advice to the players:

> o'erstep not the modesty of nature; for anything so
> overdone is from the purpose of playing, whose end,
> both at the first and now, was and is,
>
> to hold, as 'twere, the mirror up to nature:
>
> to show virtue her own feature, scorn her own image,
>
> and the very age and body of the time his form and pressure.[6]

The order here is signicant for nature is the measure of what is virtue and what is vice and the age is judged by the virtues or vices predominate in it. Shakespeare stays close to the origin of the word *nature* which is from birth. Hence, plays like *Hamlet* and *Lear* revolve around the representation of what is natural and unnatural in father to son or daughter and son or daughter to father and brother to brother.

Lady Macbeth's words before the killing of the king bring out her departure from nature:

> The raven himself is hoarse

[6]*Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2

That croaks the fatal entrance of Duncan
Under my battlements. Come, you spirits
That tend on mortal thoughts, unsex me here
And fill me from the crown to the toe top-full
Of direst cruelty! Make thick my blood,
That no compunctious visitings of nature
Shake my fell purpose, nor keep peace between
Th' effect and it! Come to my woman's breasts,
And take my milk for gall, you murth'ring ministers,
Wherever in your sightless substances
You wait on nature's mischief! Come, thick Night,
And pall thee in the dunnest smoke of hell,
That my keen knife see not the wound it make,
Nor heaven peep through the blanket of the dark,
To cry "hold, hold!"[7]

And Macbeth remarks how nature seems dead when wicked images come to him:

.....Now o'er the one half world
Nature seems dead, and wicked dreams abuse
The curtain'd sleep.[8]

And after the unnatural deed, we have this conversation between Ross and an old man:

Ross: Thou seest the heavens, as troubled with man's act,
Threatens his bloody stage. By th' clock 'tis day,
And yet dark night strangles the traveling lamp.
Is't night's predominance, or the day's shame,
That darkness does the face of earth entomb,
When living light should kiss it?

Old man: 'Tis unnatural,
Even like the deed that's done. On Tuesday last,
A falcon, tow'ring in her pride of place,
Was by a mousing owl hawk'd at and kill'd.

Ross: And Duncan's horses - a thing most strange and certain -
Beauteous and swift; the minions of their race,
Turn'd wild in nature, broke their stalls, flung out
Contending 'gainst obedience, as they would
Make war with mankind.

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[7] *Macbeth*, Act I, Sc. 5
[8] *Macbeth*, Act II, Sc. 1

Old Man: 'Tis said they eat each other.

Ross: They did so, to th' amazement of mine eyes,
That look'd upon't.[9]

And later when Lady Macbeth can no longer sleep, we have these famous words about those who do the unnatural:

.....Unnatural deeds
Do breed unnatural troubles.[10]

But the Italian tragedies, *Romeo and Juliet* and *Othello, the Moor of Venice* place greater emphasis than the Northern tragedies on the role of fortune in our lives. As Romeo says:

I am fortune's fool[11]

And in Othello's last words

Who can control his fate? 'tis not so now...
When you shall these unlucky deeds relate,
Speak of me as I am, nothing extenuate,
Nor set down aught in malice: then must you speak
Of one that loved not wisely but too well.[12]

But in the Northern tragedies, we see the role of nature brought out again and again, and the distinction between the natural and the unnatural in human action, and how nature is the measure of what is good and bad in human acts and dispositions.

The Roman and Greek tragedies are mixed. *Titus Andronicus, Julius Caesar,* and *Antony and Cleopatra* emphasize fortune, but *Coriolanus* especially and also *Timon of Athens*, nature. When Coriolanus relents from the destruction of his native city, Rome, at the pleading of his mother, wife and child, we have some of

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[9]*Macbeth*, Act II, Sc. 4
[10]*Macbeth*, Act V, Sc. 1
[11]*Romeo and Juliet*, Act III, Sc. 1
[12]*Othello*, Act V, Sc. 2

the most profound lines in Shakespeare's works about nature and what it entails upon us. Coriolanus wavers between following nature or his own pride and anger against his native city:

> My wife comes foremost, then the honour'd mould
> Wherein this trunk was fram'd, and in her hand
> The grandchild to her blood. But out, affection!
> All bond and privilege of nature, break!
> What is that curtsy worth? or those doves' eyes,
> Which can make gods forsworn? I melt, and am not
> Of stronger earth than others. My mother bows,
> As if Olympus to a molehill should
> In supplication nod; and my young boy
> Hath an aspect of intercession which
> Great nature cries 'Deny not.' Let the Volsces
> Plough Rome and harrow Italy; I'll never
> Be such a gosling to obey instinct, but stand
> As if a man were author of himself
> And knew no other kin.[13]

Thus about five of the ten tragedies emphasize nature more than the other five and the latter five plays, more fortune.

In accordance with the order of learning, let us now turn to the other end of the spectrum which is the five comedies. Three of these are good-natured comedies and two are the lesser kind of comedy, the satire. Comedy should make us laugh and expel melancholy. But the good-natured comedy does this much better than the satire. The satire in fact can make us a bit melancholic if it is too savage and makes us have contempt or scorn for our fellow human beings in their defects and failings.

The three good natured comedies (which I prefer much to the satires) are *The Comedy of Errors, The Taming of the Shrew,* and *The Merry Wives of Windsor*. Perhaps it could be said that fortune is emphasized more in *The Comedy of Errors* and nature more in the *The Taming of the Shrew,* and *The Merry wives of Windsor*.

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[13] *Coriolanus*, Act V. Sc. 3

One of the two satires, I call the *white* satire and the other, the *black* satire. The white satire is *Love's Labour's Lost* and the black satire is *Troilus and Cressida*.

Perhaps both of the satires were written for more private audiences, more sophisticated and cynical, than the popular or general audience that would be found in the public theaters such as the Globe. *Love's Labour's Lost* may have had a court audience and *Troilus and Cressida*, an audience of lawyers. One distinguished critic has written about *Troilus and Cressida*:

> *Troilus and Cressida* stands in modern criticism...with the comical satires that are supposed to mark the transition from the times of Elizabeth to the more cynical and disillusioned attitude of the Jacobeans...To regard this as the very height of comedy the Jacobean critic must have recalled the occasion when it was all very much in keeping and the audience would sense in such literary heresy a kind of dexterity they could enjoy. To find such an audience in 1602 except at one or the other of the Inns of Court seems impossible, and the interpretation of Shakespeare's play, unless the observations of a well-informed contemporary are to go for nothing, should allow for the unusual occasion and the dexterity with which Shakespeare plays the physician to a group with their own peculiar kind of humour.[14]

Nevertheless, *Troilus and Cressida*, among its other excellences, contains the finest critique of fashion and its danger that I have ever seen.

Thus at the comic end of the spectrum of Shakespeare's twenty-seven plays (other than the ten English history plays), we find five plays, the three good natured comedies and the two satires. The remaining twelve plays belong in-between the ten tragedies and the five comedies.

Perhaps six of these plays could be put almost exactly in the middle between the tragedies and the comedies. I call these plays the mercy or forgiveness plays.

They are like the tragedies insofar as they are a likeness of a course of action that is serious rather than laughable. But they are like the comedies in that they end happily for the main characters (albeit after much suffering or repentance) while tragedy ends in misery and death for the main characters.

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[14]Peter Alexander, *The Easton Press Shakespeare, Tragedies,* Introduction to *Troilus and Cressida,* The Easton Press, Norwalk Connecticut, 1980, pp. 5-6

The emotional effect of this middle kind of play is also between tragedy and comedy. Tragedy and comedy divide between them the four chief passions or emotions. The four chief emotions are joy, sadness, hope and fear.[15] Shakespeare touches upon these four in *Henry VI, Part Three*, when King Henry says in his change of fortune:

> Master lieutenant, now that God and friends
> Have shaken Edward from the regal seat,
> And turn'd my captive state to liberty,
> My fear to hope, my sorrows unto joys,
> At our enlargement what are thy due fees?[16]

Tragedy moves us to pity, a form of sadness, and to fear. Hence, Shakespeare, in the Prologue to his tragedy of *Romeo and Juliet,* touches upon these two emotions in preparing us for the play:

> Two households, both alike in dignity
> In fair Verona, where we lay our scene,
> From ancient grudge break to new mutiny,
> Where civil blood makes civil hands unclean
>
> From forth the fatal loins of these two foes
> A pair of star-cross'd lovers take their life;
> Whose misadventur'd piteous overthrows
> Doth with their death bury their parents' strife
>
> The fearful passage of their death-mark'd love,
> And the continuance of their parents' rage,

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[15]Thomas explains how the other emotions are reduced in some way to these in *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sent.,* Dist XXVI, Q. I, Art. IV, Ad 5: "omnes praedictae passiones ad has principales passiones reducuntur vel sicut species ad genus, sicut admiratio ad timorem; vel sicut imperfectum ad perfectum, sicut concupiscentia ad gaudium; vel sicut effectus ad causam et participans ad participatum, sicut audacia et ira ad spem, quia spes tendit in arduum bonum quod de se est tale ut in illud debeat tendi, audacia autem et ira tendunt in arduum nocivum repellendum, quod quidem non est tale ut in ipsum tendi debeat, sed magis ut fugiatur; tendunt tamen in ipsum inquantum participat aliquid de ratione boni quod est victoria ipsius; et ideo spes participatur quodammodo in audacia et ira, sicut quod est per se, in eo quod est per accidens."

[16]*Henry VI, Part Three*, Act IV, Sc. 6

> Which, but their children's end, nought could remove,
> Is now the two hours' traffick of our stage.
>
> The which if you with patient ears attend,
> What here shall miss, our toil shall strive to mend.

But comedy moves us to mirth, a form of joy, and hope. The middle kind of play, the mercy or forgiveness play, moves us to mercy and hope. Mercy is the same as, or like, pity which is proper to tragedy while hope is one of the two key emotions in comedy.

Mercy or pity and hope are perhaps the two emotions most like a virtue.

Thomas teaches that mercy (*misericordia*) and shame have some likeness to virtue in *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum:*

> aliquae passiones, quamvis proprie loquendo, non sint virtutes, tamen inquantum sunt laudabiles, habent aliquid de ratione virtutis; sicut misericordia et verecundia; et praecipue secundum quod est ibi electio.[17]

But mercy is godlike while shame is not. Only man has something to be ashamed of, but mercy seems godlike. Thus in the famous lines in *The Merchant of Venice*, spoken by Portia:

> The quality of mercy is not strain'd,
> It droppeth as the gentle rain from heaven
> Upon the place beneath: it is twice blest;
> It blesseth him that gives, and him that takes:
> 'Tis mightiest in the mightiest: it becomes
> The throned monarch better than his crown;
> His sceptre shows the force of temporal power,
> The attribute to awe and majesty,
> Wherein doth sit the dread and fear of kings;
> But mercy is above this sceptred sway;
> It is enthroned in the heart of kings,
> It is an attribute to God himself;
> And earthly power doth then show likest God's
> When mercy seasons justice.[18]

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[17] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sententiarum,* Dist. XXXIIII, Q. III, Art. IV, Sol. IV, Ad 3

[18] *The Merchant of Venice*, Act IV, Sc. 1, lines 184-197,

And in *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sent.*, Thomas explains about hope:

> spes, secundum quod est passio, non est virtus, sed secundum quod est in appetitu intellectivae partis. Nec aliarum passionum nomina ita convenienter ad virtutes transumi possunt sicut nomen spei. quia spes dicitur in ordine ad bonum; et propter hoc importat motum appetitus in bonum tendentis, et sic habet quamdam similitudinem cum electione et intentione boni quae requiruntur in omni virtute.
>
> Timor autem dicatur in ordine ad malum. Recedere autem a malo, quamvis ad virtutem pertineat, non tamen in hoc consistit perfectio virtutis, sed in electione boni.
>
> Gaudium autem et tristitia magis dicunt impressionem boni et mali in appetitum quam motum appetitus in ea; unde non habent similitudinem cum electione virtutis.[19]

There is something profoundly Christian about this kind of play. And Shakespeare touches upon this when he used this kind of play for his farewell to the stage. Listen to the Epilogue to the *Tempest* spoken by Prospero

> Now my charms are all o'erthrown,
> And what strength I have's mine own,
> Which is most faint. Now 'tis true,
> I must be here confin'd by you,
> Or sent to Naples. Let me not,
> Since I have my dukedom got,
> And pardon'd the deceiver, dwell
> In this bare island by your spell;
> But release me from my bands
> With the help of your good hands.
> Gentle breath of yours my sails
> Must fill, or else my project fails,
> Which was to please. Now I want
> Spirits to enforce, art to enchant;
> And my ending is despair
> Unless I be reliev'd by prayer,
> Which pierces so that it assaults
> Mercy itself, and frees all faults.
> As you from crimes would pardon'd be,
> Let your indulgence set me free.

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[19] *Scriptum Super Lib. III Sent.*, Dist. XXVI, Q. II, Art. I, Ad 1

Four of these six mercy or forgiveness plays are often put together in complete editions of Shakespeare's plays today in a separate category from the tragedies and the comedies. And the name given to this category is the *Romances*. This is not romantic in the sense of romantic love, but in the sense that there is a descent of this kind of play in some ways from the Hellenistic romances or novels. These four plays are *Pericles*, *Cymbeline*, *The Winter's Tale* and the *Tempest*. In the original Folios, some of these plays (*Pericles* and *Cymbeline)* were put with the tragedies and some (*The Winter's Tale* and the *Tempest)* with the comedies. This is a sign of their mixed character. But to these four last plays of Shakespeare (I say *last,* except for *Henry VIII* for which he seemed to have come out of retirement and on which he perhaps collaborated with another playwright), I add *Measure for Measure* and *All's Well That Ends well*. These plays, although somewhat different from the last four, agree with them in their serious theme of forgiveness or mercy. The title of the latter fits well with a serious play in which, after much suffering and forgiveness, there is a happy ending.

The remaining six plays belong to a fourth kind of play which is between the romances or mercy plays and the comedies. They have some origin in the *mediaeval romance* [20] (rather than the Greek or Hellenistic romance) and could be called romances also. To avoid confusion inthe word *romance*, one could call the former six, the mercy or forgiveness romances and these could be called the love, or the love & friendship, romances. In these romances, romantic love is very important, but they also emphasize friendship.

The six love romances can be divided into the three earlier ones, *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, *The Two Gentlemen of Verona,* and *The Merchant of Venice*. The last two are connected with the same two Italian cities as the Italian tragedies. The later and perhaps more mature love romances are *As You Like It, Much Ado About Nothing, and Twelfth Night*.

The love romances are more serious than the good natured comedies, but not as serious or heavy as the mercy romances. Also, unlike the mercy romances, they have a good dose of the laughable in them.

The forest in *As You Like It* is symbolic of the goodness of nature. In the words of the Duke in exile in the forest:

And this our life exempt from public haunt

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[20]This connection can be studied in C. S. Lewis' *The Allegory of Love*

> Finds tongues in trees, books in the running brooks,
> Sermons in stones and good in every thing[21]

Hence, it is significant that the two pairs of discordant brothers in this play are reconciled in the forest.

But on the whole, in the remaining five love romances, we can say that fortune is more predominant. And this is in accord with the passion of love. For those subject to strong passion are also more the slaves of fortune. Hamlet notes this by its opposite when he says why he chose Horatio as his close friend:

> Since my dear soul was mistress of her choice
> And could of men distinguish, her election
> Hath seal'd thee for herself; for thou hast been
> As one, in suffering all, that suffers nothing,
> A man that fortune's buffets and rewards
> Hast ta'en with equal thanks; and bless'd are those
> Whose blood and judgment are so well co-mingled
> That they are not a pipe for fortune's finger
> To sound what stop she please. Give me that man
> That is not passion's slave, and I will wear him
> In my heart's core, ay, in my heart of heart,
> As I do thee.[22]

We have divided the twenty-seven plays of Shakespeare other than his ten English history plays. But before we turn to those ten history plays, we can consider the universality of Shakespeare's genius as seen in these four kinds of plays. Tragedy and comedy, as their names indicate, go back to the Greeks who are at the origin of Western fiction. The mercy romances are connected with the later Hellenistic novels and the love romances run back in their origin to the mediaeval world. Shakespeare's tree has roots in almost all the main poetic and fictional traditions of the Western world.

Turning now to the ten English history plays, they seem closest to the Northern tragedies as one would expect from their setting. However, there are some important reasons for not placing all of them with the Northern tragedies.

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[21] *As You Like It*, Act II, Sc. 1
[22] *Hamlet*, Act III, Sc. 2

Richard II foolishly loses his throne while Lear foolishly relinquishes it. And both suffer in different ways the results of their foolish actions. Hence, we could place *Richard II* next to *Lear* among the Northern tragedies, even though no one would think of *Richard II* as approaching the greatness of the tragedy of *King Lear*.

Richard III could be placed near *Macbeth* in that it represents a man who chooses to murder others so as to become a king or tyrant. (Of course, *Macbeth* is considered a much greater play.) These two plays would seem to move our pity much less than *Othello* or *Lear* because pity is sadness or sorrow over the *undeserved* misfortune or misery of another.

King John is something like *Richard III* and *Macbeth* in that he is willing to some extent to murder to keep his throne and things unravel for him because of this. But this play does not have the unity or order of *Macbeth* or even that of *Richard III*.

Henry VIII may not be entirely by Shakespeare. The scenes of Wolsley's downfall and the scenes of Catharine's suffering in the pretended annulment of their marriage by Henry VIII arouse our pity, but the play moves towards the birth of Elizabeth which is presented as a joyful event in prophetic anticipation of her reign.

The three *Henry the VI* plays are again like the Northern tragedies, but are somewhat episodic, there being so many turns of fortune in them. They emphasize nature. The playwright, in bringing out what is natural and unnatural in human affairs, must stay close to the original meaning of nature which is birth. Hence, Shakespeare will emphasize what is natural or unnatural in parent towards child and in child towards parent. Father and son are especially emphasized in the history plays of Shakespeare because the son will succeed to the father. Hence, in the *Henry VI, Part I*, we have the noble scene where the son of Talbot refuses to leave his surrounded father who urges him to flee. Finally Talbot seeing his son's determination to stay and, undoubtedly, die fighting with him against the surrounding French, says:

> Then here I take my leave of thee, fair son,
> Born to eclipse thy life this afternoon.
> Come, side by side together live and die;

And soul with soul from France to heaven fly.[23]

And in *Henry the VI. Part III,* when Henry the VI basely disinherits his son in a vain attempt to save his life and throne, he notes in reply to Warwick that his action is unnatural:

Warwick: Why should you sigh, my lord?

King Henry: Not for my self, Lord Warwick, but my son,
Whom I unnaturally shall disinherit.[24]

And the Queen more in anger denounces his unnatural act:

Who can be patient in such extremes?
Ah, wretched man! Would I had died a maid,
And never seen thee, never borne thee son,
Seeing thou hast prov'd so unnatural a father!
Hath he deserv'd to lose his birthright thus?
Hadst thou but lov'd him half so well as I,
Or felt that pain which I did for him once,
Or nourish'd him as I did with my blood,
Thou wouldst have left they dearest heart-blood there
Rather than have made that savage duke thine heir,
And disinherited thine only son.[25]

But the Queen herself is unnatural in her savage revenge on the Duke of York when she gives him the napkin dipped in the blood of York's son to wipe his eyes in the tormenting of him before his death. York upbraids her thus:

O tiger's heart wrapp'd in a woman's hide!
How couldst thou drain the life-blood of the child,
To bid the father wipe his eyes withal,
And yet be seen to bear a woman's face?
Women are soft, mild, pitiful, and flexible:
Thou stern, obdurate, flinty, rough, remorseless.[26]

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[23]*Henry VI, Part I*, Act IV, Sc. 5
[24]*Henry VI, Part III*, Act I, Sc. 1
[25]*Henry VI, Part III*, Act I, Sc. 1
[26]*Henry VI, Part III*, Act I, Sc. 4

There is a question whether the three *Henry VI* plays should be considered one work of art or three. One follows to some extent through the three plays the fortunes of the house of York in which the Duke rises, loses his life, and is revenged in the success of his three sons, one of whom becomes the King of England.

It is difficult or impossible to place the two *Henry IV* plays and their sequel *Henry V* in the division. The two *Henry IV* plays contain some of Shakespeare's most famous comic scenes revolving around Falstaff. And yet there are noble scenes in them arousing our pity and emphasizing nature - for father to son and son to father are very prominent in King Henry IV and his son Prince Hal, the future Henry V. The conversations in which the King upbraids his son for his apparent conduct and the son justifies, or states how we will justify himself, are exquisite. Here is one example in the words of Prince Hal in reply to his father's rebuke of his life in comparison to Percy or Hotspur, the young leader of the rebellion against Henry:

> Do not think so; you shall not find it so;
> And God forgive them that so much have sway'd
> Your majesty's good thoughts away from me!
> I will redeem all this on Percy's head,
> And in the closing of some glorious day
> Be bold to tell you that I am your son[27]

If one places the two *Henry IV* plays in the middle between tragedy and comedy because of their alternation of tragic and comic scenes, they should not be confused with the mercy romances. For the mercy romances are in the middle between tragedy and comedy, not by an alternation of tragic and comic scenes, but by a plot which represents the serious with a happy ending and moves us to mercy and hope. But the comic scenes in the *Henry the IV* plays move us to mirth or merriment.

One might in the abstract expect this kind of play with its alternation of comic and serious, or even tragic, scenes to be uncertain in its dramatic effect. But literary judgment is the last fruit of a long experience. These plays were very successful in Shakespeare's days and also in ours. Samuel Johnson, speaking of the two *Henry IV* plays, said that "perhaps no author has ever, in two plays, afforded

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[27] *King Henry IV, Part I*, Act III, Sc. 2

so much delight."[28] And in the introduction to *Henry IV, Part II* in the *New Hudson edition,* it is said that "The drama of *King Henry the Fourth*, taking the two parts as artistically one, is deservedly ranked among the very highest of Shakespeare's achievements."[29]

The way in which the character of Prince Hal, who becomes Henry V, ties together the two *Henry the IV* plays and *Henry V* is like the way in which David Copperfield ties together Dickens' greatest novel. We see someone rise in life to success through many vicissitudes. But it is not the kind of unity that a plot with a beginning, middle and end has. However, one can read each of the three plays somewhat by itself where there may be more a unity of beginning, middle and end.

Duane H. Berquist

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[28]Quoted in the Introduction to the *New Hudson* edition of *Henry IV, Part I*, p. liv
[29]*King Henry IV, Part I*, The New Hudson Edition, Ginn and Company, 1924, p. liii